NAS on the skids?
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Hello BIK
Time you were NOTAMed off as U/S, buddy, because your signals are really confusing everyone now that you're scalloping so badly.
Of course, controllers (I'm not one) are entitled, and most welcome by the majority of us, to use this site for the following reasons:
1. there's a good chance that the controllers who participate in Pprune are also recreational, or semi-professional, pilots who, I'm sure, would have a vested interest in ensuring that any system they participate in as flyers offers an acceptable level of personal safety; and
2. like other safety-critical occupations (eg pilots, medical profession, emergency services etc), for a controller to lose a life on their sector or shift (particularly when the distress event is protracted and very personal) would have to be one of the most shockingly traumatic events they could experience, even when the causal circumstances or subsequent events are beyond their direct control. Now imagine what the post-disaster trauma would be like for a controller if the catastrophe (eg a mid-air) was due to a failure of the system to provide the controller with adequate decision tools and safety-net processes for them to provide their function safely? Even though the controller would probably escape litigation, if it could be proved the mid-air disaster was caused by systemic failure, this would only offer a small comfort to the controller who, on waking every day, would first ask the questions "if only I had done..." or "what if I did...."! Do you think the controllers on duty, when the mid-air collision occurred at Bankstown last year, just went home, got a beer from the fridge and put their feet up in front of the TV? Even though that particular accident was not of their doing, I'm sure they went home, probably cried and asked themselves the same questions as above, while thinking about the horrific final moments of that family, particularly the children.
No, to be fair BIK, I think the controllers are entitled to have a say in how the NAS is designed and implemented, if for no other reason than to ensure that any system they work with provides them with the requisite safety-nets so that they never have to face a situation like the one above, and its associated post-event trauma.
Time you were NOTAMed off as U/S, buddy, because your signals are really confusing everyone now that you're scalloping so badly.
Of course, controllers (I'm not one) are entitled, and most welcome by the majority of us, to use this site for the following reasons:
1. there's a good chance that the controllers who participate in Pprune are also recreational, or semi-professional, pilots who, I'm sure, would have a vested interest in ensuring that any system they participate in as flyers offers an acceptable level of personal safety; and
2. like other safety-critical occupations (eg pilots, medical profession, emergency services etc), for a controller to lose a life on their sector or shift (particularly when the distress event is protracted and very personal) would have to be one of the most shockingly traumatic events they could experience, even when the causal circumstances or subsequent events are beyond their direct control. Now imagine what the post-disaster trauma would be like for a controller if the catastrophe (eg a mid-air) was due to a failure of the system to provide the controller with adequate decision tools and safety-net processes for them to provide their function safely? Even though the controller would probably escape litigation, if it could be proved the mid-air disaster was caused by systemic failure, this would only offer a small comfort to the controller who, on waking every day, would first ask the questions "if only I had done..." or "what if I did...."! Do you think the controllers on duty, when the mid-air collision occurred at Bankstown last year, just went home, got a beer from the fridge and put their feet up in front of the TV? Even though that particular accident was not of their doing, I'm sure they went home, probably cried and asked themselves the same questions as above, while thinking about the horrific final moments of that family, particularly the children.
No, to be fair BIK, I think the controllers are entitled to have a say in how the NAS is designed and implemented, if for no other reason than to ensure that any system they work with provides them with the requisite safety-nets so that they never have to face a situation like the one above, and its associated post-event trauma.
I don’t know who BIK is, I don’t know what he does, and I don’t agree with him on some NAS-related points. I do know that his posts are among the most objective and intellectually rigorous on this forum, though not so in this thread. However, the posters who’ve responded in kind strike me as pots calling the kettle black.
But as an acne-stippled, wheelchair-bound geek from Hicksville USA, my opinions are of course presumptively to be ignored.
Carry on ‘professionals’ …
But as an acne-stippled, wheelchair-bound geek from Hicksville USA, my opinions are of course presumptively to be ignored.
Carry on ‘professionals’ …
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Nasty nasty
This is getting nasty. Poor old BIK.
Well, I support NAS!!
(Didn't used to until I read some of the anti-GA stuff eminating from some 'professional' pilots on here, which made me decide their opinions were worth merde).
A letter with 6000 members hey???
Well I am penning one that effectively negates that, on AOPA letterhead.
More GA pilots than RPT = more votes. A more reasoned argument from you guys might be more persuasive, but I ain't seen it yet.
Start shooting guys
AK
Well, I support NAS!!
(Didn't used to until I read some of the anti-GA stuff eminating from some 'professional' pilots on here, which made me decide their opinions were worth merde).A letter with 6000 members hey???
Well I am penning one that effectively negates that, on AOPA letterhead.
More GA pilots than RPT = more votes. A more reasoned argument from you guys might be more persuasive, but I ain't seen it yet.
Start shooting guys
AK
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Reply to Snarek
Snarek, you are right - it is getting a bit nasty but that is due to a large extent (in my opinion anyway) toBIK's penchant for "playing the man rather than the ball". I, like you, would like to see us focussing on the real issues at hand here, not the personalities.
Personally, I am supportive of the introduction of the majority of the elements of NAS, particularly those relating to improved access to airspace and procedures for VFR flights, subject to adequat safety assessment.
However, what I do not support is the concept pushed by some members of the ARG that every single aspect of the US airspace model can be (and will be) faithfully replicated here in Australia without proper, and formal, consideration of the safety or cost impacts on the Australian industry. I also believe that over the years, Australia (along with other nations) has developed some very innovative and useful procedures for enhancing aviation safety, based on years of hard learnt experience under Australian conditions. Do we really want to throw the baby out with the bath-water?
My vision for Australia is that we implement an airspace system that can responsively evaluate and accommodate the best that the world has to offer in terms of safety management and optimum cost; be it from NZ, the UK, South Africa, Germany or Canada; all systems that I have working experience with. A slavish replication of the US airspace model implies that that particular system has all the answers and effectively shuts the door on any other procedural innovation that may emerge in other countries.
Personally, I am supportive of the introduction of the majority of the elements of NAS, particularly those relating to improved access to airspace and procedures for VFR flights, subject to adequat safety assessment.
However, what I do not support is the concept pushed by some members of the ARG that every single aspect of the US airspace model can be (and will be) faithfully replicated here in Australia without proper, and formal, consideration of the safety or cost impacts on the Australian industry. I also believe that over the years, Australia (along with other nations) has developed some very innovative and useful procedures for enhancing aviation safety, based on years of hard learnt experience under Australian conditions. Do we really want to throw the baby out with the bath-water?
My vision for Australia is that we implement an airspace system that can responsively evaluate and accommodate the best that the world has to offer in terms of safety management and optimum cost; be it from NZ, the UK, South Africa, Germany or Canada; all systems that I have working experience with. A slavish replication of the US airspace model implies that that particular system has all the answers and effectively shuts the door on any other procedural innovation that may emerge in other countries.
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BIK,
You advocate the creation of an ATC forum here on the PPRuNe site. For your information, there already is one, hosted on the Civil Air Forum. Perhaps it might interest you to have a read. Given your previous posts, unlikely.
As an aside, the many (supposed) ATCs who participate in this forum do so as professionals in the industry, who have an interest in knowing what is going on in the piloting fraternity. Most don't participate to push the ATC barrow, despite your beliefs.
Oh, and regarding NAS and "professional" pilots - I would rate local RPT operators as "professionals", particularly in the way they conduct themselves on a daily basis. And when their cheif pilot(s) notify their crews NOT to be involved in NAS procedures (i.e. VFR procedures in Class E airspace), you will find it is not just ATCs who have an opinion on NAS. You can't tell me these operators aren't professionals or pilots.
You advocate the creation of an ATC forum here on the PPRuNe site. For your information, there already is one, hosted on the Civil Air Forum. Perhaps it might interest you to have a read. Given your previous posts, unlikely.
As an aside, the many (supposed) ATCs who participate in this forum do so as professionals in the industry, who have an interest in knowing what is going on in the piloting fraternity. Most don't participate to push the ATC barrow, despite your beliefs.
Oh, and regarding NAS and "professional" pilots - I would rate local RPT operators as "professionals", particularly in the way they conduct themselves on a daily basis. And when their cheif pilot(s) notify their crews NOT to be involved in NAS procedures (i.e. VFR procedures in Class E airspace), you will find it is not just ATCs who have an opinion on NAS. You can't tell me these operators aren't professionals or pilots.
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Interesting that Mike Smiff seeks to rely on the infamous Willoughby Report in response to the questioning of any perceived or real benefits to be attained under NAS.
At the recently held RAAA conference Mike, in a response to a question specifically questioning the benefits of NAS and indeed the Willoughby Report, said (words to the affect) that he doesn't think anybody should really take any notice of that report.
I understand the forums are recorded so it would be interesting to see if he has expressed the same sentiment to the Minister!
At the recently held RAAA conference Mike, in a response to a question specifically questioning the benefits of NAS and indeed the Willoughby Report, said (words to the affect) that he doesn't think anybody should really take any notice of that report.
I understand the forums are recorded so it would be interesting to see if he has expressed the same sentiment to the Minister!
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This is what Bernie Smith, the CEO of Airservices Australia, had to say regarding the "anticipated savings" forecast by the Willoughby Report:
(Extract from Australian Hansard June 2003)
If the CEO of AsA doesn't agree with the potential "financial benefit", then how can it be touted to the industry??? 
(Extract from Australian Hansard June 2003)
Senator O’BRIEN—The report says that the Australian national airspace model has a potential financial
benefit of over $70.2 million. Do you understand how Mr Willoughby calculated this figure?
Mr B. Smith—No.
Senator O’BRIEN—Do you agree with the rationale and assumptions used in the costing?
Mr B. Smith—No, we do not.
Senator O’BRIEN—Was Airservices involved in any way in calculating the figure?
Mr B. Smith—We provided a certain amount of financial information to Mr Willoughby, but it was clearly
not utilised, or it certainly was not apparently utilised, in the final figures that came out.
benefit of over $70.2 million. Do you understand how Mr Willoughby calculated this figure?
Mr B. Smith—No.
Senator O’BRIEN—Do you agree with the rationale and assumptions used in the costing?
Mr B. Smith—No, we do not.
Senator O’BRIEN—Was Airservices involved in any way in calculating the figure?
Mr B. Smith—We provided a certain amount of financial information to Mr Willoughby, but it was clearly
not utilised, or it certainly was not apparently utilised, in the final figures that came out.
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Coral, thanks for highlighting the existence of the NASIG letter to Civil Air. Let's address some of the issues highlighted in Mike Smith's response:
1. The Wes Willoughby cost-benefit analysis: the Minister approved the implementation of NAS on the condition that
(a) a system-wide cost benefit analysis be undertaken proving that the implementation of NAS would offer benefits to the industry and
(b) safety analyses be undertaken by CASA before any proposed changes were implemented.
The industry scuttlebutt is that the Wes Willoughby financial report is both substandard in content and extremely flawed in its assumptions and recommendations and, therefore, has not yet received endorsement from the Minister. Yet, NAS implementation activities continue unabated. How can this be allowed to happen?
2. The statement by Mike Smith that "See and avoid is a PRIMARY (my emphasis) means of maintaining separation in VMC, and contributes significantly to the US safety record…." is blatantly incorrect and requires the strongest possible challenge by all of us.
To demonstrate my point let me put up some examples for members' review:
(a) Scenario 1 (the USA): I'm an IFR private flight (Seneca V) departing a non-towered airport in VMC, and on departure will be climbing to my flight planned level of FL150 on a non-published IFR route. After departure, I enter E airspace at 1200 ft agl and contact Centre who advise me (because they have radar) of VFR traffic cruising at 9,500 in my 12 o'clock. I try to call the VFR aircraft to arrange separation with no success (possible comm failure). Because I can't contact the aircraft, Centre offers radar headings to ensure that I avoid the aircraft, which I accept gladly. Once I pass, 10,500 I rejoin my flight planned track, again with the assistance of ATC radar headings. Drama impact rating: 0
(b) Scenarion 2 (NAS Australia): I'm an IFR private flight (Seneca V) departing a non-controlled airport in the middle of Australia under VMC, and on departure, will be climbing to my flight planned level of FL150 on a non-published IFR route. I give Centre my departure call and enter E airspace shortly after. Unfortunately, unknown to both Centre and myself there is VFR traffic on my track cruising at 9,500 feet. As we all know, E airspace in Australia doesn't enjoy full radar coverage and VFR aircraft don't require a clearance or have to communicate with ATC, so Centre had no way of knowing the VFR aircraft was in conflict with me. Passing 9000ft, I saw what looked like dirt smudge on my windscreen. At the last moment, I realised to my horror it was an aircraft on my direct track and I immediately took avoiding action. Unfortunately, I was not successful and I fatally clipped the wing of the other aircraft whilst also suffering structural damage and injuries to my aircraft and passengers. I declared an emergency and finally managed to land successfully, however the other aircraft was totally destroyed in mid-air with the loss of all life. Drame impact rating: 10+
So what is the major difference between these 2 scenarios?
First and foremost is that the US airspace structure under Scenario 1 offers a level of safety redundancy because of the superior aircraft surveillance capabilities available to Centre. These enhanced surveillance capabilities allowed Centre to be able to detect and resolve the potential conflict despite the fact that the VFR aircraft had neither flight planned or was communicating with the ATC system. Secondly, because both the controller and pilot had access to radar suveillance capabilities, allowing the presentation and utilisation of a range of alternative tracking and separation options, the need for "see and avoid" was no longer the PRIMARY means of traffic separation and was therefore, relegated to SUPPLEMENTAL status, as soon as the controller offered, and the pilot accepted, alternative radar headings. The real fact is that, in the US, "see and avoid" is INVARIABLY NEVER relied on as the PRIMARY means of separation in enroute airspace for IFR aircraft because of the wide coverage and integrity of the national radar surveillance system.
On the other hand, the proposed airspace structure for Australia simply cannot be classed as offering the same level of inherent safety as its US counterpart, unless the surveillance capabilities over the whole of Australia are significantly enhanced (maybe through ADS-B). With the present level of surveillance infrastructure, the proposed system for Australia offers no redudancy in terms of conflict detection and resolution options, particularly for aircraft not participating in the ATC system. The proposed Australian system also TOTALLY relyies on "see and avoid" as the PRIMARY and ONLY means of traffic separation in all cases; despite the fact that both BASI and CASA have cast doubts on its suitability as a primary tool in the past following extensive study.
So, where does this leave us? In 1972, the FAA adopted a policy position that recognised that reducting the number of unknown aircraft within the airspace system was one of the most productive steps in collision avoidance. It is also important to appreciate that "surveillance" does not necessarily imply the use of radar or ADS technologies. Many pilots will recall that in the past, large areas of Australia got by very well with procedural position reporting as the (only) method of surveillance, which allowed ATS to first alert pilots to potential conflicts (PRIMARY separation tool) and, second, gave pilots the option of segregating themselves from the conflict area through pilot communications or relying on "see and avoid" for resolution (SECONDARY separation tools).
So long as the NASIG continues to peddle "half-truth" propaganda regarding the "similarity" between the current US system and the proposed Australian NAS, or blatant untruths regarding potential safety and cost benefits, I will always consider the NAS to stand for the "NO AIRSPACE SAFETY" system and I will continue to resist its implementation until the system is properly, and independently, evaluated in terms of safety and cost by reputable organisations. On a positive note, the NAS does offer some improvements and benefits and I would hate to see the whole system canned just because NASIG persisted with its current deceptive tactics, and was eventually "found out" by the industry. That, in my view, would also be a retrograde step.
1. The Wes Willoughby cost-benefit analysis: the Minister approved the implementation of NAS on the condition that
(a) a system-wide cost benefit analysis be undertaken proving that the implementation of NAS would offer benefits to the industry and
(b) safety analyses be undertaken by CASA before any proposed changes were implemented.
The industry scuttlebutt is that the Wes Willoughby financial report is both substandard in content and extremely flawed in its assumptions and recommendations and, therefore, has not yet received endorsement from the Minister. Yet, NAS implementation activities continue unabated. How can this be allowed to happen?
2. The statement by Mike Smith that "See and avoid is a PRIMARY (my emphasis) means of maintaining separation in VMC, and contributes significantly to the US safety record…." is blatantly incorrect and requires the strongest possible challenge by all of us.
To demonstrate my point let me put up some examples for members' review:
(a) Scenario 1 (the USA): I'm an IFR private flight (Seneca V) departing a non-towered airport in VMC, and on departure will be climbing to my flight planned level of FL150 on a non-published IFR route. After departure, I enter E airspace at 1200 ft agl and contact Centre who advise me (because they have radar) of VFR traffic cruising at 9,500 in my 12 o'clock. I try to call the VFR aircraft to arrange separation with no success (possible comm failure). Because I can't contact the aircraft, Centre offers radar headings to ensure that I avoid the aircraft, which I accept gladly. Once I pass, 10,500 I rejoin my flight planned track, again with the assistance of ATC radar headings. Drama impact rating: 0
(b) Scenarion 2 (NAS Australia): I'm an IFR private flight (Seneca V) departing a non-controlled airport in the middle of Australia under VMC, and on departure, will be climbing to my flight planned level of FL150 on a non-published IFR route. I give Centre my departure call and enter E airspace shortly after. Unfortunately, unknown to both Centre and myself there is VFR traffic on my track cruising at 9,500 feet. As we all know, E airspace in Australia doesn't enjoy full radar coverage and VFR aircraft don't require a clearance or have to communicate with ATC, so Centre had no way of knowing the VFR aircraft was in conflict with me. Passing 9000ft, I saw what looked like dirt smudge on my windscreen. At the last moment, I realised to my horror it was an aircraft on my direct track and I immediately took avoiding action. Unfortunately, I was not successful and I fatally clipped the wing of the other aircraft whilst also suffering structural damage and injuries to my aircraft and passengers. I declared an emergency and finally managed to land successfully, however the other aircraft was totally destroyed in mid-air with the loss of all life. Drame impact rating: 10+
So what is the major difference between these 2 scenarios?
First and foremost is that the US airspace structure under Scenario 1 offers a level of safety redundancy because of the superior aircraft surveillance capabilities available to Centre. These enhanced surveillance capabilities allowed Centre to be able to detect and resolve the potential conflict despite the fact that the VFR aircraft had neither flight planned or was communicating with the ATC system. Secondly, because both the controller and pilot had access to radar suveillance capabilities, allowing the presentation and utilisation of a range of alternative tracking and separation options, the need for "see and avoid" was no longer the PRIMARY means of traffic separation and was therefore, relegated to SUPPLEMENTAL status, as soon as the controller offered, and the pilot accepted, alternative radar headings. The real fact is that, in the US, "see and avoid" is INVARIABLY NEVER relied on as the PRIMARY means of separation in enroute airspace for IFR aircraft because of the wide coverage and integrity of the national radar surveillance system.
On the other hand, the proposed airspace structure for Australia simply cannot be classed as offering the same level of inherent safety as its US counterpart, unless the surveillance capabilities over the whole of Australia are significantly enhanced (maybe through ADS-B). With the present level of surveillance infrastructure, the proposed system for Australia offers no redudancy in terms of conflict detection and resolution options, particularly for aircraft not participating in the ATC system. The proposed Australian system also TOTALLY relyies on "see and avoid" as the PRIMARY and ONLY means of traffic separation in all cases; despite the fact that both BASI and CASA have cast doubts on its suitability as a primary tool in the past following extensive study.
So, where does this leave us? In 1972, the FAA adopted a policy position that recognised that reducting the number of unknown aircraft within the airspace system was one of the most productive steps in collision avoidance. It is also important to appreciate that "surveillance" does not necessarily imply the use of radar or ADS technologies. Many pilots will recall that in the past, large areas of Australia got by very well with procedural position reporting as the (only) method of surveillance, which allowed ATS to first alert pilots to potential conflicts (PRIMARY separation tool) and, second, gave pilots the option of segregating themselves from the conflict area through pilot communications or relying on "see and avoid" for resolution (SECONDARY separation tools).
So long as the NASIG continues to peddle "half-truth" propaganda regarding the "similarity" between the current US system and the proposed Australian NAS, or blatant untruths regarding potential safety and cost benefits, I will always consider the NAS to stand for the "NO AIRSPACE SAFETY" system and I will continue to resist its implementation until the system is properly, and independently, evaluated in terms of safety and cost by reputable organisations. On a positive note, the NAS does offer some improvements and benefits and I would hate to see the whole system canned just because NASIG persisted with its current deceptive tactics, and was eventually "found out" by the industry. That, in my view, would also be a retrograde step.
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Similar but not the same
It should be pointed out that this letter from Mr Smiff; is not in response to the joint letter at the start of this thread. Things don't move that quickly when the government is involved.
This letter is a response to a similar letter sent to the minister by Civil Air in mid August.
To my knowledge there has been no response to the joint letter; not even a we got your letter response.
Bottle of Rum
This letter is a response to a similar letter sent to the minister by Civil Air in mid August.
To my knowledge there has been no response to the joint letter; not even a we got your letter response.
Bottle of Rum
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if NAS is on the skids i would love to know how much money has been wasted on it so far.
Instead of spending it on dicks pet project it just could have been shared with everyone and we all would have been happy with no degradation in service.
Instead of spending it on dicks pet project it just could have been shared with everyone and we all would have been happy with no degradation in service.
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QSK
I understand that the Minister was advised NOT to table the Wiloughby report for the reasons outlined, but obviously other political reasons prevailed.......
In regard to
You do of course realise that the example you give here is possible in the existing Class G (OCTA) airspace ?
Even with DTI you would not get traffic on the other VFR aircraft and would have to rely on a visual sighting to avoid... so having class E is no change in that example whatsoever.
All the Class E is going to do is provide a separation service instead of a traffic info service. The existence of VFR in a non radar environment is not going to change one bit.
"No known traffic"
I understand that the Minister was advised NOT to table the Wiloughby report for the reasons outlined, but obviously other political reasons prevailed.......
In regard to
(b) Scenarion 2 (NAS Australia): I'm an IFR private flight (Seneca V) departing a non-controlled airport in the middle of Australia under VMC, and on departure, will be climbing to my flight planned level of FL150 on a non-published IFR route. I give Centre my departure call and enter E airspace shortly after. Unfortunately, unknown to both Centre and myself there is VFR traffic on my track cruising at 9,500 feet. As we all know, E airspace in Australia doesn't enjoy full radar coverage and VFR aircraft don't require a clearance or have to communicate with ATC, so Centre had no way of knowing the VFR aircraft was in conflict with me. Passing 9000ft, I saw what looked like dirt smudge on my windscreen. At the last moment, I realised to my horror it was an aircraft on my direct track and I immediately took avoiding action. Unfortunately, I was not successful and I fatally clipped the wing of the other aircraft whilst also suffering structural damage and injuries to my aircraft and passengers. I declared an emergency and finally managed to land successfully, however the other aircraft was totally destroyed in mid-air with the loss of all life. Drama impact rating: 10+
Even with DTI you would not get traffic on the other VFR aircraft and would have to rely on a visual sighting to avoid... so having class E is no change in that example whatsoever.
All the Class E is going to do is provide a separation service instead of a traffic info service. The existence of VFR in a non radar environment is not going to change one bit.
"No known traffic"
Last edited by triadic; 24th Sep 2003 at 21:19.
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tobzalp
No.. the point I believe he is trying to make is that Class E in those circumstances is less safe in Oz vs USA. The example is not the same as radar is the mitigator in the USA example.
In Oz under NAS there would be NO repeat NO difference to the existing class G with the proposed class E in an area that did not have a radar service.
I would be interested to know where you are getting "more" airspace from?? There would in fact be more class E than at present, but to the VFR operator that does not count.
These "unknown" aircraft are out there today and making more class E is not going to change that one bit...they will still be there and unknown to the system (as they are now).
Class E is used more than any other class of airspace worldwide both in and out of radar coverage. It is not less safe than the existing Oz class G, otherwise why would so many countries use it (and successfully whats more)??
If you think class E is the problem with NAS then I don't think you understand either the existing system or the proposed one.
That brings me to the big E word.... EDUCATION .
So far we have not seen any significant education of pilots or controllers... when we do, then we might start to collectively get a handle on it. So far it is a joke (and it aint funny!).
"no known traffic"
No.. the point I believe he is trying to make is that Class E in those circumstances is less safe in Oz vs USA. The example is not the same as radar is the mitigator in the USA example.
In Oz under NAS there would be NO repeat NO difference to the existing class G with the proposed class E in an area that did not have a radar service.
I would be interested to know where you are getting "more" airspace from?? There would in fact be more class E than at present, but to the VFR operator that does not count.
These "unknown" aircraft are out there today and making more class E is not going to change that one bit...they will still be there and unknown to the system (as they are now).
Class E is used more than any other class of airspace worldwide both in and out of radar coverage. It is not less safe than the existing Oz class G, otherwise why would so many countries use it (and successfully whats more)??
If you think class E is the problem with NAS then I don't think you understand either the existing system or the proposed one.
That brings me to the big E word.... EDUCATION .
So far we have not seen any significant education of pilots or controllers... when we do, then we might start to collectively get a handle on it. So far it is a joke (and it aint funny!).
"no known traffic"
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Class E airspace will replace not only Class G (for a higher level of service to IFR - and also less flexibility off radar), but also Class C. Currently RPT jets and turbo props benefit from a full separation service on arrival/departure from places like Coffs Harbour, Rocky, Mackay. With NAS (and its overlying Class E airspace) they will now be reliant on radar traffic advisories and TCAS to avoid overflying VFR traffic as they climb/descend. Lets just hope the VFR remembers to turn the transponder on!! OOps - I forgot, the RPT pilots have to be looking out the window for traffic closing on them at 300+ knots!
The NAS propoganda is placing plenty of emphasis on the 'natural separation' achieved by having VFR and IFR cruising at different levels - but nothing is said about actually getting to your cruising level.
Maybe?? there are some longer term benefits in all of this, but it seems to be a lot of effort to reduce our levels of service so Dick and his mates can fly wherever they want without talking to ATC.
The NAS propoganda is placing plenty of emphasis on the 'natural separation' achieved by having VFR and IFR cruising at different levels - but nothing is said about actually getting to your cruising level.
Maybe?? there are some longer term benefits in all of this, but it seems to be a lot of effort to reduce our levels of service so Dick and his mates can fly wherever they want without talking to ATC.
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triadic
You do of course realise that the example you give here is possible in the existing Class G (OCTA) airspace ?
).Not only that, but they won't even be required to be monitoring the area frequency for traffic. They could be listening out on multicom, area VHF, local tower, the cricket or golden oldies.
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Bloomin' hell. The last couple of responses seem to indicte to me that the professional IFR pilots think that they have the absolute responsibility for the "see-and-avoid". No. This is a shared responsibility Now and with NAS. You IFR types can rest assured that I am also looking out which decreases any risk significantly. I pride myself on the fact that when I hear an IFR RPT inbound call; I can manouvre my aircraft away from yours, sight and pass you. Of course today I have to tell you all about that, but with NAS I can SAFELY manouver out of your way, sight and pass without having to make a call or even bother you with my whereabouts. This will leave you with less (not more) to do in the landing phase and also be able to concentrate on aircraft which you do need to concern yourselves with. Comment? s welcomed.