Air Traffic Control out in Sweden
I was ready to go at KUO (Finland) at 15:15z when we were told that Sweden Radar was down and a CTOT 1:35hr later was given. Suddenly 25 mins later we were cleared to start. Normal radar service through Sweden.
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eglnyt
No information I have encountered mentions Primary or Secondary Radar. What is known is that military radar continued to work.
Luftfartsverket are adamant about the solar flares:
LFV utreder onsdagens radarstörning - www.lfv.se
My translation:
The first analysis by LFV shows clearly a link between the time for solar storm and the disturbances in radar systems. A number of radar stations was overloaded and needed to reboot.
- We will now investigate the consequences of yesterday's incident, Olle Sundin continues.
No information I have encountered mentions Primary or Secondary Radar. What is known is that military radar continued to work.
Luftfartsverket are adamant about the solar flares:
LFV utreder onsdagens radarstörning - www.lfv.se
LFVs initiala analys visar en tydlig korrelation mellan tiden för solstormen och störningarna i radarsystemen. Ett antal radarstationer blev överbelastade och behövde startas om.
– Vi kommer nu att utreda konsekvenserna av gårdagens händelse, fortsätter Olle Sundin.
– Vi kommer nu att utreda konsekvenserna av gårdagens händelse, fortsätter Olle Sundin.
The first analysis by LFV shows clearly a link between the time for solar storm and the disturbances in radar systems. A number of radar stations was overloaded and needed to reboot.
- We will now investigate the consequences of yesterday's incident, Olle Sundin continues.
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Interesting debate drawing similarities between flight deck and ATC system issues in terms of reliance on technology and the atrophy of 'manual skills'.
One important difference though. If a modern aircraft suffered a control system failure, then the flight crew would aim to put it on the deck ASAP.
The ATC system as a whole, where technology is integral to the service, such as in most of Europe, aims to do the same in the case of a major failure. Get everything safely on the ground, or to other airspace.
And yet we seem to be expecting the ATC system to carry on manually, with no radar, or with handwritten, paper strips. Isn't that the same as expecting the flight crew to get into their broken jet and fly another load of passengers on another flight using backup and or manual systems?
Do we feel comfortable with that?
One important difference though. If a modern aircraft suffered a control system failure, then the flight crew would aim to put it on the deck ASAP.
The ATC system as a whole, where technology is integral to the service, such as in most of Europe, aims to do the same in the case of a major failure. Get everything safely on the ground, or to other airspace.
And yet we seem to be expecting the ATC system to carry on manually, with no radar, or with handwritten, paper strips. Isn't that the same as expecting the flight crew to get into their broken jet and fly another load of passengers on another flight using backup and or manual systems?
Do we feel comfortable with that?
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Yes, that was my point.
I think.
Many electronic strip-equipped towers started off with reverting to paper strips as the contingency. The further we go, the greater the proportion of ATCOs have no experience of paper strips (or procedural ATC, or any other 'old school' way of controlling). Is it fair to expect that we should continue planning to use such methods for contingency?
Or do we accept that modern ATM systems are required, and if we lose them then we either shut the whole thing down, or we run at a very, very reduced capacity.
Don't forget that the support staff required to run a 'manual' operation are in many cases no longer there.
Terrain Safe, you're not expected to keep the operation going at the same level without electronic strips though. Are you?
I think.
Many electronic strip-equipped towers started off with reverting to paper strips as the contingency. The further we go, the greater the proportion of ATCOs have no experience of paper strips (or procedural ATC, or any other 'old school' way of controlling). Is it fair to expect that we should continue planning to use such methods for contingency?
Or do we accept that modern ATM systems are required, and if we lose them then we either shut the whole thing down, or we run at a very, very reduced capacity.
Don't forget that the support staff required to run a 'manual' operation are in many cases no longer there.
Terrain Safe, you're not expected to keep the operation going at the same level without electronic strips though. Are you?
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Turns out the events coincided with a massive cyber attack against Sweden.
https://www.aldrimer.no/sweden-issue...raffic-reeled/
https://www.aldrimer.no/sweden-issue...raffic-reeled/
Turns out the events coincided with a massive cyber attack against Sweden.
https://www.aldrimer.no/sweden-issue...raffic-reeled/
https://www.aldrimer.no/sweden-issue...raffic-reeled/
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First official report
The first official "report" of the event was published today at LFV's (the ATC operator) website:
LFV levererade full kapacitet 90 minuter efter radarbortfall
TL;DR: Cause: Solar flares combined with (un)favourable sun angle w.r.t. the radar stations (near sunset). Radar screens were back to normal after 45 minutes, full airspace capacity restored after 45 more minutes.
Google translate of webpage:
LFV levererade full kapacitet 90 minuter efter radarbortfall
TL;DR: Cause: Solar flares combined with (un)favourable sun angle w.r.t. the radar stations (near sunset). Radar screens were back to normal after 45 minutes, full airspace capacity restored after 45 more minutes.
Google translate of webpage:
The investigation that LFV has done for radar interference in November 2015 shows that the reason was the radio radiation associated with solar flares. Radar shortfall came to affect parts of the air traffic in Sweden.
It was on Wednesday, November 4, 2015 at 16 o'clock that one of the control centers in Stockholm and Malmö were the first indications that LFV's radar did not deliver correct data to the flight line. The cause was quickly identified and action taken.
- When the disturbance occurred was the air traffic controllers could not use the information on the radar screens of the alternative ways to lead aircraft, says LFV's technical director Ulf Thibblin.
For LFV air safety a top priority. If the aircraft for various reasons, unfavorable weather or technical problems, can not be guaranteed reduced airspace capacity.
It has been discussed in recent days that the radar interference were not related to space weather, but that it instead was due to a cyber attack against Sweden.
- In our investigation we had early on with it as a hypothesis. There was nothing in our radardata- or Internet traffic logs to support or confirm a possible cyber attack. Also, we had the relationship in time with space weather, plus there were a few more technical reasons which excluded a cyber attack, says Ulf Thibblin.
After the radars had rebooted had LFV air traffic controllers correct radar presentation 45 minutes after the disturbance, and after another 45 minutes it was at full capacity in the airspace.
LFV radars have been affected in a similar way two times in the last 17 years - 1999 and 2003. The disturbance then and now occurred at sunrise or decline when the sun's angle is straight into, or virtually straight into the radar facility.
According to experts in the field it is possible to predict a solar flare but not its consequences, such as radio frequency radiation. As the shock travels at the speed of light from the sun to the earth, there is no opportunity to receive a notice in confirmed cases.
CAA radar facilities around Sweden continuously upgraded and will gradually be supplemented by a new type of monitoring, wide area multilateration, which means that LFV increases its robustness significantly.
It was on Wednesday, November 4, 2015 at 16 o'clock that one of the control centers in Stockholm and Malmö were the first indications that LFV's radar did not deliver correct data to the flight line. The cause was quickly identified and action taken.
- When the disturbance occurred was the air traffic controllers could not use the information on the radar screens of the alternative ways to lead aircraft, says LFV's technical director Ulf Thibblin.
For LFV air safety a top priority. If the aircraft for various reasons, unfavorable weather or technical problems, can not be guaranteed reduced airspace capacity.
It has been discussed in recent days that the radar interference were not related to space weather, but that it instead was due to a cyber attack against Sweden.
- In our investigation we had early on with it as a hypothesis. There was nothing in our radardata- or Internet traffic logs to support or confirm a possible cyber attack. Also, we had the relationship in time with space weather, plus there were a few more technical reasons which excluded a cyber attack, says Ulf Thibblin.
After the radars had rebooted had LFV air traffic controllers correct radar presentation 45 minutes after the disturbance, and after another 45 minutes it was at full capacity in the airspace.
LFV radars have been affected in a similar way two times in the last 17 years - 1999 and 2003. The disturbance then and now occurred at sunrise or decline when the sun's angle is straight into, or virtually straight into the radar facility.
According to experts in the field it is possible to predict a solar flare but not its consequences, such as radio frequency radiation. As the shock travels at the speed of light from the sun to the earth, there is no opportunity to receive a notice in confirmed cases.
CAA radar facilities around Sweden continuously upgraded and will gradually be supplemented by a new type of monitoring, wide area multilateration, which means that LFV increases its robustness significantly.
