Duplicate ICAO 24-bit aircraft addresses and SSR
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Duplicate ICAO 24-bit aircraft addresses and SSR
I have a silly radar question.
According to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) when two (or more) aircraft with the same (duplicate) ICAO 24-bit aircraft address are operating within range of a specific Mode S interrogator, then potentially hazardous situations can arise:
* One (or more) of the aircraft involved may be assessed by the Mode S interrogator to be a false or reflected echo, and subsequently ignored. These aircraft will not then be displayed to air traffic controllers.
* In the case of aircraft whose flight paths cross, the identification labels of those aircraft may inadvertently ‘swap’ (i.e. replace one another) on air traffic controllers displays, thereby presenting controllers with incorrect information and creating the possibility of misidentification.
The text above is taken from EASA Safety Information Bulletin July 4, 2011:
http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/SIB_20.../SIB_2011-14_1
There is a significant number of planes flying with bad aircraft addresses:
AIRFRAMES.ORG - Aircraft Database - incorrect ICAO 24-bit addresses
My questions are:
* Did anybody ever seen the duplication effects or knows why they occur?
* Can the two duplication effects combine to create one displayed path consisting of data points of one plane until the crossing point and of the other plane afterwards? At the crossing point the displayed path may have a turn or a corner.
My guesses for the explanations are respectively:
* the SSR software automatically deletes points it considers erroneous
* the label assignment algorithm gets confused by the path crossing
According to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) when two (or more) aircraft with the same (duplicate) ICAO 24-bit aircraft address are operating within range of a specific Mode S interrogator, then potentially hazardous situations can arise:
* One (or more) of the aircraft involved may be assessed by the Mode S interrogator to be a false or reflected echo, and subsequently ignored. These aircraft will not then be displayed to air traffic controllers.
* In the case of aircraft whose flight paths cross, the identification labels of those aircraft may inadvertently ‘swap’ (i.e. replace one another) on air traffic controllers displays, thereby presenting controllers with incorrect information and creating the possibility of misidentification.
The text above is taken from EASA Safety Information Bulletin July 4, 2011:
http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/SIB_20.../SIB_2011-14_1
There is a significant number of planes flying with bad aircraft addresses:
AIRFRAMES.ORG - Aircraft Database - incorrect ICAO 24-bit addresses
My questions are:
* Did anybody ever seen the duplication effects or knows why they occur?
* Can the two duplication effects combine to create one displayed path consisting of data points of one plane until the crossing point and of the other plane afterwards? At the crossing point the displayed path may have a turn or a corner.
My guesses for the explanations are respectively:
* the SSR software automatically deletes points it considers erroneous
* the label assignment algorithm gets confused by the path crossing
There is a significant number of planes flying with bad aircraft addresses
But there are certainly documented cases of aircraft airborne simultaneously in the same airspace (including the London TMA) and sending the same address. While that would affect the Mode S information that the controller sees, both aircraft would still be responding independently to Mode A and C, so radars that use code-to-callsign conversion should still be able to identify both.
Incidentally, one other possible effect of Mode S duplication is to confuse TCAS, which uses the 24-bit address under certain circumstances to determine what type of RA is issued (for example two aircraft at the same altitude).
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DaveReidUK thanks a lot!
There are indeed, although a "bad address" won't necessarily duplicate one belonging to another aircraft (there are 16 million possible combinations).
The EASA document explains it this way:
"Any incorrect aircraft address is, potentially, a duplicate address, because it has not been legitimately assigned to that airframe. The potential for duplication rises dramatically in cases of incorrect addresses where values such as all 0’s or all 1’s have been set."
Regarding TCAS it says:
"The performance of ACAS II systems could be seriously degraded or even disabled."
You can still differentiate between the planes using the assigned squawk code?
Can all equipment do code-to-callsign conversion?
Would the controller need to recognize there is a problem and switch modes?
There is a significant number of planes flying with bad aircraft addresses
"Any incorrect aircraft address is, potentially, a duplicate address, because it has not been legitimately assigned to that airframe. The potential for duplication rises dramatically in cases of incorrect addresses where values such as all 0’s or all 1’s have been set."
Regarding TCAS it says:
"The performance of ACAS II systems could be seriously degraded or even disabled."
But there are certainly documented cases of aircraft airborne simultaneously in the same airspace (including the London TMA) and sending the same address. While that would affect the Mode S information that the controller sees, both aircraft would still be responding independently to Mode A and C, so radars that use code-to-callsign conversion should still be able to identify both.
Can all equipment do code-to-callsign conversion?
Would the controller need to recognize there is a problem and switch modes?
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<<Can all equipment do code-to-callsign conversion?>>
I believe that this is (still?) carried out on the ground and simply converts the SSR code issued by ATC to read a callsign on the radar. I do not believe that aircraft addresses referred to have a part to play. QRX for an expert!
I believe that this is (still?) carried out on the ground and simply converts the SSR code issued by ATC to read a callsign on the radar. I do not believe that aircraft addresses referred to have a part to play. QRX for an expert!
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HEATHROW DIRECTOR thanks a lot!
I'm having more questions regarding ADS-C in this situation:
Is ADS-C data displayed with the same equipment as SSR?
Is ADS-C surveillance aware of squawk codes?
I'm having more questions regarding ADS-C in this situation:
Is ADS-C data displayed with the same equipment as SSR?
Is ADS-C surveillance aware of squawk codes?
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I believe that this is (still?) carried out on the ground and simply converts the SSR code issued by ATC to read a callsign on the radar.
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Originally Posted by Ron Black
Did anybody ever seen the duplication effects or knows why they occur?
Internally, a Mode S radar maintains a database of all tracks in the coverage area of the radar. This allows the system to schedule interrogations for the moment the radar beam will cross a track. The track database is then updated with information acquired from the transponder replies. The radar then reports to downstream ATC systems with data from the track database.
When two aircraft with the same address are in the same azimuth of the radar it is difficult to determine which aircraft replied to the interrogations. This results in data from one aircraft being associated with the track data of the other.
A lot of data is not updated every radar rotation. In order to reduce the amount of transmissions, most data that doesn't change frequently is only downloaded from the aircraft when it has recently changed. To facilitate this, the transponder announces data changes by setting a specific flag in all replies, which triggers the radar to interrogate for the updated data.
Now imagine two tracks with the same Mode S address crossing the same radar azimuth. One aircraft announce a new flight ID, the radar interrogates for it, and the other aircraft replies. This causes the two tracks to have the same flight ID until the radar interrogates for flight ID again, which may be a long time.
The same applies to interrogations for squawk code, although that is not as persistent.
Originally Posted by Ron Black
Can all equipment do code-to-callsign conversion?
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
While that would affect the Mode S information that the controller sees, both aircraft would still be responding independently to Mode A and C
For TCAS II, the problem is even bigger. Since the TCAS algorithm does not track the direction of the replies, a duplicate address may cause a single target to be formed, with fluctuating distance. The distance measurement will be so noisy that TCAS will not be able to work correctly.
For ADS-B receivers, duplicate addresses will cause problems because the 24 bit address is used to correlate ADS-B messages to an aircraft.
I don't know about the effects on ADS-C.
To put the risk of duplication into perspective, ICAO has so far allocated around 10 million of the 16 million possible 24-bit addresses to individual states, for them to use on both civil and military aircraft.
That doesn't mean anything like 10 million Mode-S-equipped aircraft actually flying, of course - I doubt whether it's even 10 percent of that number in practice. For example the USA uses less than half of the one million or so addresses in its allocation at any given point in time.
One of the most common causes of duplicated 24-bit addresses is an undetected single-bit error (a 0 instead of a 1, or vice versa) which, if it occurs in the LSBs and in a country that allocates addresses sequentially (like the UK), is likely to match an address used on another aircraft.
The other main cause, in countries that reissue tail numbers (like the USA), is where an operator changes a tail number but fails to reconfigure the transponder to use the 24-bit address that matches the new registration. If the original tail number is then re-used on a different aircraft, both would end up using the same address.
Notwithstanding ICAO and EASA's exhortations, there doesn't seem to be any organised international effort to deal with the problem effectively. Unless anyone knows differently.
That doesn't mean anything like 10 million Mode-S-equipped aircraft actually flying, of course - I doubt whether it's even 10 percent of that number in practice. For example the USA uses less than half of the one million or so addresses in its allocation at any given point in time.
One of the most common causes of duplicated 24-bit addresses is an undetected single-bit error (a 0 instead of a 1, or vice versa) which, if it occurs in the LSBs and in a country that allocates addresses sequentially (like the UK), is likely to match an address used on another aircraft.
The other main cause, in countries that reissue tail numbers (like the USA), is where an operator changes a tail number but fails to reconfigure the transponder to use the 24-bit address that matches the new registration. If the original tail number is then re-used on a different aircraft, both would end up using the same address.
Notwithstanding ICAO and EASA's exhortations, there doesn't seem to be any organised international effort to deal with the problem effectively. Unless anyone knows differently.
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In addition to the causes mentioned by DaveReidUK, transponder swaps between aircraft cause duplications as well. When a transponder is installed from the maintenance workshop and it was installed on a different airframe before, then the 24 bit address needs to be adjusted the new airframe. If forgotten, this typically causes a duplicate address within one airline's fleet, with a high change of both aircraft being in the same airspace at the same time. To prevent these errors, most new transponders now have an external memory module that is fixed to the aircraft so that reprogramming is not needed after a transponder swap; the address remains with the aircraft.
Eurocontrol addresses Mode-S anomalies in Europe, including duplicate 24 bit addresses. If their Mode-S monitoring cell is aware of a duplicate address they will try and find the operator and ask for correction of the address.
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
Notwithstanding ICAO and EASA's exhortations, there doesn't seem to be any organised international effort to deal with the problem effectively. Unless anyone knows differently.
In principle a Mode S radar has no more problem with Mode S aircraft operating duplicated addresses that the old Mode A/Mode C technologies would have with aircraft operating duplicate Mode A codes. Indeed the options for degarbling Mode S are considerably better. The address "uniqueness" can be used to help with reflection processing, but only a very foolish radar designer would not include the potential for a genuine duplicate aircraft into the algorithm.
Problems will only really occur when targets with duplicate addresses are at similar range and azimuth from the radar, where there is the possibility of mis-association of returns.
Multilateration systems, like radar, are able to use their own timing mechanisms to separate out returns from all but the closest targets. The effects of mis-association are usually minor and transient unless the targets are in extended close proximity - for example holding in a stack.
ADS-B has a greater problem with duplicated addresses. This is because it has no directional or timing information on which to avoid mis-association of transmissions. But even here a ground station is able (indeed is required) to be able to handle multiple aircraft with the same 24-bit address provided these are separated by more than 6 nautical miles. However the system must do this based upon inference rather than any genuinely independent measurement.
The biggest problem however is for TCAS. TCAS cannot operate between two aircraft with the same address. Indeed the conflicting aircraft will be invisible to TCAS!
Fortunately, allocation of addresses is fairly well managed and monitored. They are out there, but the occurrences of duplicate addresses in the same airspace at the same time are pretty rare.
Problems will only really occur when targets with duplicate addresses are at similar range and azimuth from the radar, where there is the possibility of mis-association of returns.
Multilateration systems, like radar, are able to use their own timing mechanisms to separate out returns from all but the closest targets. The effects of mis-association are usually minor and transient unless the targets are in extended close proximity - for example holding in a stack.
ADS-B has a greater problem with duplicated addresses. This is because it has no directional or timing information on which to avoid mis-association of transmissions. But even here a ground station is able (indeed is required) to be able to handle multiple aircraft with the same 24-bit address provided these are separated by more than 6 nautical miles. However the system must do this based upon inference rather than any genuinely independent measurement.
The biggest problem however is for TCAS. TCAS cannot operate between two aircraft with the same address. Indeed the conflicting aircraft will be invisible to TCAS!
Fortunately, allocation of addresses is fairly well managed and monitored. They are out there, but the occurrences of duplicate addresses in the same airspace at the same time are pretty rare.
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I'm very grateful for the extraordinary comments to my questions! They provide excellent background on this subject and make it possible to guess how the system works and the ID duplication effects are created. I'll think on what you said and will come up with more questions.
the ID duplication effects
The 24-bit address is allocated to an airframe and "should" be unique across the entire aircraft population. Occasionally errors occur but in principle it is unchanging and unique.
Mode S also supports Aircraft ID (sometimes called ACID). This is an eight-character alphanumeric that is set on the flight deck for every flight. Normally for a commercial flight this will be the flight number. Simplistically this should match directly with the number on the flight plan, thus removing the need for the old code/callsign correlation process on the ground. I say "simplistically" because it has been a technical and bureaucratic labour of many years turning that apparently simple mechanism into reality. Now when an aircraft is seen to be "squawking 1000" it is because the new direct matching of ACID to Flight Plan is in force, and the Mode A has been relegated to conspicuity only.
Needless to say, when a radar has found a duplicate 24-bit address it would be well advised to check that the Aircraft ID and the altitude are also identical before even beginning to consider this may be a "reflection".
Last edited by Dont Hang Up; 11th Nov 2014 at 08:17.
As DHU says Mode S Interrogators allow for the fact that two (or more) aircraft may have the same 24 bit ICAO address, it was quite common in the early days, not so now. Problems only arise when close in both azimuth and range. There is an indication in the radar message that gets sent off to the ATC center that an aircraft has a Duplicated Address, not sure what happens at the other end though. Is there any indication?
Reflection processing uses a number of factors before flagging a response as false (e.g. height, range, Aircraft Id etc.) and older Mode A/C systems survived without surpressing half the code 7000's buzzing around.
RR
Reflection processing uses a number of factors before flagging a response as false (e.g. height, range, Aircraft Id etc.) and older Mode A/C systems survived without surpressing half the code 7000's buzzing around.
RR
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There are certainly configuration issues to be resolved with Mode S.
Here "Down Under" we see issues such as aircraft imported from the USA retaining their old American Mode S Address (not updated to the Australian allocation), interpreting the binary address as the Hexidecimal code - I have seen numerous Mode S hex addresses as 0111111 - Aus allocations are with 7Cxxxx (not sure what the LAME did with the other 18 characters!) or setting the rego as the hex address (typically for ultralights).
Education is the key!
Here "Down Under" we see issues such as aircraft imported from the USA retaining their old American Mode S Address (not updated to the Australian allocation), interpreting the binary address as the Hexidecimal code - I have seen numerous Mode S hex addresses as 0111111 - Aus allocations are with 7Cxxxx (not sure what the LAME did with the other 18 characters!) or setting the rego as the hex address (typically for ultralights).
Education is the key!
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ID duplication is a real ATC problem?
It seems ICAO 24-bit Aircraft Addresses duplication may be a practical ATC problem in Europe. Major Donald L. McCallie (USAF) says in:
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada545599
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545599.pdf
An interesting document on NATO practice of continually changing the ICAO 24-bit Aircraft Address says:
https://www.eurocontrol.int/articles...eld-tabs-tab-1
Note an interesting sentence that adds to the EASA document:
Unfortunately it seems that this subject was exploited by conspiracy theorists and these types discredit everything they touch.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada545599
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545599.pdf
6.2.4 Impact of duplicate 24 bit ICAO addresses
To increase security, DoD and government aircraft transponders are not required to have fixed 24 bit ICAO addresses. This exception to policy has introduced human error into the ADS-B technology. It has been noted in European airspace, where ADS-B is already being used that U.S. military aircraft are routinely flying with duplicate 24 bit ICAO codes.
As the FAA brings ADS-B and NextGen upgrades online in the U.S. it is likely that we will see these same conflicts occur here. Research in this area should explore how FAA controllers and the NextGen system will handle duplicate codes and if this exception could be used by an attacker to further exploit the system.
To increase security, DoD and government aircraft transponders are not required to have fixed 24 bit ICAO addresses. This exception to policy has introduced human error into the ADS-B technology. It has been noted in European airspace, where ADS-B is already being used that U.S. military aircraft are routinely flying with duplicate 24 bit ICAO codes.
As the FAA brings ADS-B and NextGen upgrades online in the U.S. it is likely that we will see these same conflicts occur here. Research in this area should explore how FAA controllers and the NextGen system will handle duplicate codes and if this exception could be used by an attacker to further exploit the system.
https://www.eurocontrol.int/articles...eld-tabs-tab-1
Military Use of 24-bit aircraft addresses
In NATO member States, authorities have apportioned part of their overall available 24-bit aircraft addresses for military use. The relatively large number of aircraft addresses for military use allows rotating the assignments of 24-bit addresses on military aircraft on a frequent basis. The purpose of this random changing of addresses is to conceal information on military airframes allowing building up an Air Order of Battle. A controlled rotation of 24-bit addresses is therefore not considered to be in contradiction with the above principles. This rotation of 24-bit addresses however must not be done during flight.
When using the Mode S transponder in flight, unique and correctly assigned aircraft addresses must be used. The occurrence of duplicate 24-bit addresses can jeopardise the safety of aircraft and the operational efficiency of ATM functions and therefore must be avoided at all times.
SSR Mode S Interrogators & Radar trackers: The uniqueness of the 24-bit aircraft address is important for the unambiguous identification of the aircraft. Effects of duplicate addresses are unpredictable. This can cause synchronous garbling, radar track swapping or dropping.
In NATO member States, authorities have apportioned part of their overall available 24-bit aircraft addresses for military use. The relatively large number of aircraft addresses for military use allows rotating the assignments of 24-bit addresses on military aircraft on a frequent basis. The purpose of this random changing of addresses is to conceal information on military airframes allowing building up an Air Order of Battle. A controlled rotation of 24-bit addresses is therefore not considered to be in contradiction with the above principles. This rotation of 24-bit addresses however must not be done during flight.
When using the Mode S transponder in flight, unique and correctly assigned aircraft addresses must be used. The occurrence of duplicate 24-bit addresses can jeopardise the safety of aircraft and the operational efficiency of ATM functions and therefore must be avoided at all times.
SSR Mode S Interrogators & Radar trackers: The uniqueness of the 24-bit aircraft address is important for the unambiguous identification of the aircraft. Effects of duplicate addresses are unpredictable. This can cause synchronous garbling, radar track swapping or dropping.
- ACAS II: ACAS II systems use Mode S protocols and transponders to maintain safe separation between aircraft. Duplicate 24-bit addresses can have serious safety implications, i.e. one or more of the ‘threat’ aircraft can remain partially or totally undetected.
This can cause synchronous garbling, radar track swapping or dropping
Last edited by Ron Black; 17th Jan 2015 at 05:28. Reason: Found and added another link for document.
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Are there mode-S radars immune to ID duplication effects?
It seems there are mode-S radars immune to ID duplication effects. In the technical specifications of a national Thai tender for six sites (2012) the following requirements were stated:
1.1.1.26. The SSR Mode S System shall track all the aircraft, including aircraft with duplicated addresses and maintain the roll-call list.
1.1.1.12. The non-unique address Mode S targets shall be flagged in the ASTERIX data item I048/030 Warning Error/Conditions code 16 “Duplicated or Illegal Mode S Aircraft Address”.
http://www.aerothai.co.th/thai/anou_...3771850077.pdf
http://www.aerothai.co.th/thai/anou_...3714470079.pdf
I guess it's a very sensitive issue which radar models are immune and which are not.
1.1.1.26. The SSR Mode S System shall track all the aircraft, including aircraft with duplicated addresses and maintain the roll-call list.
1.1.1.12. The non-unique address Mode S targets shall be flagged in the ASTERIX data item I048/030 Warning Error/Conditions code 16 “Duplicated or Illegal Mode S Aircraft Address”.
http://www.aerothai.co.th/thai/anou_...3771850077.pdf
http://www.aerothai.co.th/thai/anou_...3714470079.pdf
I guess it's a very sensitive issue which radar models are immune and which are not.
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As always, it depends ... A fully equipped and completely enabled radar station with Mode-S will detect any inconsistency and there are. I remember a time where a workshop did Mode-S upgrades and only put in the aircraft ID and not the Mode-S, which resulted in a number of planes with the same 24-bit signature. They figured it out quite fast and resolved the issue, but I guess there are still a lot duplicate numbers around. If call sign, or flight number is put in the device it should be no problem as long as there are not too many signals around and pilots start selecting specific signals only.
RB
The same requirement has been present in the Eurocontrol Mode S Functional Specification since the first issue (1996)
https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/de...n-20050509.pdf
(If I've failed to post the link correctly just Google "Eurocontrol Mode S specification")
" The Plot Assignor Function shall track all the aircraft, including aircraft with duplicated addresses and shall maintain the Roll Call list"
"The multiple target processing shall discriminate between false and real, nonunique addressed Mode S targets. The latter shall be flagged in the ASTERIX data item I048/030 Warning Error/Conditions bit 16 "Duplicated or Illegal Mode S Aircraft Address”
So any Mode S radar that claims complience to this spec will have these features and I'd be surprised if there are any around that don't.
RR
The same requirement has been present in the Eurocontrol Mode S Functional Specification since the first issue (1996)
https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/de...n-20050509.pdf
(If I've failed to post the link correctly just Google "Eurocontrol Mode S specification")
" The Plot Assignor Function shall track all the aircraft, including aircraft with duplicated addresses and shall maintain the Roll Call list"
"The multiple target processing shall discriminate between false and real, nonunique addressed Mode S targets. The latter shall be flagged in the ASTERIX data item I048/030 Warning Error/Conditions bit 16 "Duplicated or Illegal Mode S Aircraft Address”
So any Mode S radar that claims complience to this spec will have these features and I'd be surprised if there are any around that don't.
RR
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RaRadar thanks,
The European Mode S Station Functional Specification is a very interesting document. Since it preceded the AeroThai document by about 7 years the Thais were probably aware of it.
Like you say most or all European radars probably comply with the specification. The interesting question is whether countries with a tight budget and looking for a cheap deal may buy non-compliant radars. In other words whether there are companies that produce cheap non-compliant models.
The EASA document being published about 6 years after the specification seems to suggest that even compliant radars may suffer from ID duplication effects.
The European Mode S Station Functional Specification is a very interesting document. Since it preceded the AeroThai document by about 7 years the Thais were probably aware of it.
Like you say most or all European radars probably comply with the specification. The interesting question is whether countries with a tight budget and looking for a cheap deal may buy non-compliant radars. In other words whether there are companies that produce cheap non-compliant models.
The EASA document being published about 6 years after the specification seems to suggest that even compliant radars may suffer from ID duplication effects.
Last edited by Ron Black; 21st Jan 2015 at 02:07. Reason: Correcting a bad argument etc
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Have a look at 38:50 in the video below.
And also 47:30 is interesting, about how to send out fake TCAS signals.
"What happens when a hacker gets bored and starts looking at an aircraft tracking systems?
This talk will look at ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast), a common technology installed or being installed on a vast majority of commercial airliners that involves an unencrypted and unauthenticated radio broadcast.
This technology has some interesting features and weaknesses that are a useful lesson in failures when security is not built in from the beginning. This talk constitutes a work in progress and hopes to spur more research and investigation into this field."
And also 47:30 is interesting, about how to send out fake TCAS signals.
"What happens when a hacker gets bored and starts looking at an aircraft tracking systems?
This talk will look at ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast), a common technology installed or being installed on a vast majority of commercial airliners that involves an unencrypted and unauthenticated radio broadcast.
This technology has some interesting features and weaknesses that are a useful lesson in failures when security is not built in from the beginning. This talk constitutes a work in progress and hopes to spur more research and investigation into this field."
Last edited by m99; 21st Jan 2015 at 14:48.