CDM at LHR
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: London
Age: 69
Posts: 148
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I found it interesting how A-CDM worked during the NATS computer failure incident in December, as reported in the Enquiry Report :
3.4.12 The recent introduction of the Eurocontrol Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM)
system at Heathrow and Gatwick should have helped in creating shared understanding across
stakeholders – airports, airlines, ATC and the NMOC – of movement priorities, aircraft
readiness for departure and Network slot times. Ideally, informed in real time by progress
with the London airspace system’s recovery, the situation on the ground at the airports and
FCMs, the NMOC would then have been able to allocate new Calculated Take Off Times
(CTOT) intelligently for departing aircraft from the London TMA airports and contribute
more effectively to managing congestion hot spots and Network performance more widely.
3.4.13 However, the initial suspension of all affected Flight Plans by the NMOC in response to the
4-hour ZRR prompted mass cancellations of CTOTs in the A-CDM system and, to some
airports and operators at least, gave the appearance of A-CDM not being able to ‘keep up’
with the crisis. Added to this was the apparent difficulty in re-establishing CTOTs, as not all
those affected understood the reason for them having lapsed. In some frustration, both
Heathrow and Gatwick Airport Ops Cells dispensed unilaterally with the A-CDM system and
resorted to managing departures locally within the MDI rates set by Swanwick and
extensions to slot times agreed by the NMOC. This was less efficient than it may have been
and had the effect of removing key data and communication pathways to and from the
NMOC and the consequential need for increased telephone coordination. Moreover, such a
fallback scenario had not been practised and, on the day, 2-way communications between
HOEC and the NMOC proved to be severely limited and ineffectual.
3.4.14 As a direct result of the contingency regulations invoked by NATS in response to the failure,
and in addition to those flights diverted or cancelled, some 353 flights were delayed29. It is
estimated that the number of passengers impacted by these initial delays, diversions and
cancellations is around 65,000. However, further delays continued during the recovery and
into the evening. In total, it is estimated that in the order of 1900 flights were affected by the
failure during the afternoon and evening of 12 December, impacting some 230,000
passengers. Additionally, several airlines reported cancellations and flight disruption the
following day, with approximately 60 aircraft and 6000 passengers affected.
system at Heathrow and Gatwick should have helped in creating shared understanding across
stakeholders – airports, airlines, ATC and the NMOC – of movement priorities, aircraft
readiness for departure and Network slot times. Ideally, informed in real time by progress
with the London airspace system’s recovery, the situation on the ground at the airports and
FCMs, the NMOC would then have been able to allocate new Calculated Take Off Times
(CTOT) intelligently for departing aircraft from the London TMA airports and contribute
more effectively to managing congestion hot spots and Network performance more widely.
3.4.13 However, the initial suspension of all affected Flight Plans by the NMOC in response to the
4-hour ZRR prompted mass cancellations of CTOTs in the A-CDM system and, to some
airports and operators at least, gave the appearance of A-CDM not being able to ‘keep up’
with the crisis. Added to this was the apparent difficulty in re-establishing CTOTs, as not all
those affected understood the reason for them having lapsed. In some frustration, both
Heathrow and Gatwick Airport Ops Cells dispensed unilaterally with the A-CDM system and
resorted to managing departures locally within the MDI rates set by Swanwick and
extensions to slot times agreed by the NMOC. This was less efficient than it may have been
and had the effect of removing key data and communication pathways to and from the
NMOC and the consequential need for increased telephone coordination. Moreover, such a
fallback scenario had not been practised and, on the day, 2-way communications between
HOEC and the NMOC proved to be severely limited and ineffectual.
3.4.14 As a direct result of the contingency regulations invoked by NATS in response to the failure,
and in addition to those flights diverted or cancelled, some 353 flights were delayed29. It is
estimated that the number of passengers impacted by these initial delays, diversions and
cancellations is around 65,000. However, further delays continued during the recovery and
into the evening. In total, it is estimated that in the order of 1900 flights were affected by the
failure during the afternoon and evening of 12 December, impacting some 230,000
passengers. Additionally, several airlines reported cancellations and flight disruption the
following day, with approximately 60 aircraft and 6000 passengers affected.
Biggest waste of money I've witnessed 
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: London
Age: 69
Posts: 148
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I see that the 28day notice for changes in AIP says Heathrow de-icing may be operated by A-CDM
Will this improve matters ?
(5) Aircraft De-icing Requirements.
(aa) Annually, Heathrow publishes an Aircraft De-icing Plan (HADIP). All airline operators should ensure that
they have read and understood this document. A copy of the plan can be downloaded from Heathrow: Welcome to Heathrow Airport
airside.
(bb) During periods of high demand for de-icing, Heathrow activates the A-CDM ‘Winter Module’ which includes
aircraft de-icing rig allocation capability.
(cc) In order to request de-icing, pilots should follow their company’s standard procedure. In accordance with
Heathrow’s de-icing plan, operators will enter the requirement for de-icing into A-CDM, which will ensure that deicing
resources are allocated appropriately. If the aircraft is to be de-iced remotely, operating companies will pass
this information to pilots prior to push. Remote de-icing facility locations are shown on chart AD 2-EGLL-2-8.
(dd) When doors are closed and ready to commence de-icing on gate, pilots must call Heathrow Delivery stating
“Ready for de-icing”. This call must be made at +/- 5 minutes from TOBT.
(ee) Once de-icing on the gate is complete, pilots should call Heathrow Delivery again, stating 'De-icing
complete, ready to push and start'.
(ff) Pilots who have been allocated a remote de-icing area should contact Heathrow Delivery, stating 'Ready to
push and start for remote de-icing'.
(aa) Annually, Heathrow publishes an Aircraft De-icing Plan (HADIP). All airline operators should ensure that
they have read and understood this document. A copy of the plan can be downloaded from Heathrow: Welcome to Heathrow Airport
airside.
(bb) During periods of high demand for de-icing, Heathrow activates the A-CDM ‘Winter Module’ which includes
aircraft de-icing rig allocation capability.
(cc) In order to request de-icing, pilots should follow their company’s standard procedure. In accordance with
Heathrow’s de-icing plan, operators will enter the requirement for de-icing into A-CDM, which will ensure that deicing
resources are allocated appropriately. If the aircraft is to be de-iced remotely, operating companies will pass
this information to pilots prior to push. Remote de-icing facility locations are shown on chart AD 2-EGLL-2-8.
(dd) When doors are closed and ready to commence de-icing on gate, pilots must call Heathrow Delivery stating
“Ready for de-icing”. This call must be made at +/- 5 minutes from TOBT.
(ee) Once de-icing on the gate is complete, pilots should call Heathrow Delivery again, stating 'De-icing
complete, ready to push and start'.
(ff) Pilots who have been allocated a remote de-icing area should contact Heathrow Delivery, stating 'Ready to
push and start for remote de-icing'.
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Wor Yerm
Age: 68
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CDM is yet another system created by people whose necks you can't get your hands around. Designed by W*****s for W*****s and certainly not for airport operations. The only thing it gives you is enough time to tell your passengers the reason why they are delayed. Fighting fire with fire will be our best option. Airports HATE social media. They can't control what people post. So suggest that to your passengers that they make a nasty post on Face***k etc.
PM
PM
