New ATC Documentary on BBC2

[LXGB]

From the BBC2 website...

"BBC2 9:00 pm Crowded Skies
No Room For Error: New series examining lessons learnt from disastrous air collisions. This programme looks at the fatal results of simple communication errors. Contains disturbing scenes"

Sounds like fun. Full details here...

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctwo/listings/programme.shtml?day=today&service_id=4224&filename=20030803/20030803_2100_4224_60113_60


LXGB

[Point Seven]

Disturbing scenes eh?

Sounds like they've got footage of Jerricho controlling.

Or Concorde's flight deck when they find out it's GT3 on arrivals.

Sorry boys. ;)

P7

[Unwell_Raptor]

I think that I just saw a well known PPRuner being interviewed.

[AIRWAY]

The French still refusing to speak english!!!! :mad: and i thought that people learned from their mistakes...

[EGPFlyer]

UR, so it wasn't just me ;)

[radar707]

For once a program that had some valid points (or at least I thought so)

Limitations of primary radar, Level busts, Language problems, the dreaded Military outside CAS.

Still a bit of scaremongering but maybe now people will realise just how difficult our job s and that we're not the guys with the ping pong bats
:* :* :*

[MANAGP]

I missed it! Does anyone know if it will be repeated? Thanks in advance.

[Jerricho]

Ahhhh, P7.

If they had footage of you doing arrivals, they all would say "There sits the second best ATC in the world"!

But seriously, having just watched it, it was a much better effort from the BBC than the infamous "The day England stood still"......

[AIRWAY]

Not sure if it will be repeated, your best chance is maybe to ask someone who has recorded the program.

Cheers

[flower]

Why do NATS seem to avoid being involved in such programmes, they always have to ask non NATS regional airports and overseas ATC providers. Is there a conscious decision not to be involved.
Nice to see for once the issue that we need more Controlled Airspace.

[Jump Complete]

I thought the 'Crowded Skies' programe (9pm Sunday, BBC 2) did make some very valid points but was dangerously close to sensationalisim in places. In parictular the shots of the wreckage of the mid air collision over Delhi, including what appeared to be the torso of one of the passengers (or crew) Making a point about serious safety issues is one thing, but we don't need to see that (and of course the relatives most definetly do not) to get the point. I also question (although this particular programe didn't actually do this,) the need for transcripts of the CVRs to be broadcast, with the pilots very last words on this Earth shown (with subtitles) as Sunday night entertainment. It is one thing on a CRM course. Presumably all the participents are professionals who might learn something from it and save future lives, but for 'Joe Public' the "Pull up, pull up! Oh my God, this is it!" kind of transcript Channel 4 seems to be getting fons of showing, is just making cheap shock-horror entertaiment out of tragidy. I will say again, this was something this programe was not guilty of, but they were dangerouly close at times, IMHO.

[radar707]

Flower, according to the NATS intranet today, it would seem that an LL watch Manager was interviewed for the programme (which I belive is on for about 3 consecutive weeks), but that interview will not be used!!!!!

[BIK_116.80]

"The French still refusing to speak english!!!! and i thought that people learned from their mistakes..."

Yeah - you'd think the english pilots would learn french before they attempted to operate into Paris - english being one of FIVE ICAO aviation languages. :*

If you don't want to learn the lingo then stay home! :*

It would be safer for everyone.

[Pot Noodle]

Tonights programme was the first of three.

Many valid points indeed and not too over dramatised from the Beeb.

DataLink's gotta be the way to go, and eventually fully automated ATC without human intervention.:ok:

I'd love to see the Safety case get past SRG though!

PN

[Jordan D]

I taped it, and thought it was very good ... thought "The Day that Britain Stopped" was good ... and intriguing.

Jordan

[AIRWAY]

Yes, why dont we all learn Portuguese, Spanish, Greek, German, Italian and so on... Today im flying to France, i speak French, tomorrow im flying to Portugal i speak Portuguese...
Much easier huh?

[BIK_116.80]

With the present out-dated voice communications your options are :

(1) Learn the lingo = SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

or

(2) Don't learn the lingo = Fly around in IGNORANCE.

Your choice.

In the longer term the real answer is datalink. It's been in use on Pacific routes for nearly ten years now. Europe will catch up some time soon I guess.

[EGPFlyer]

If the powers that be turned round and said we all need to speak french (or any other language) then so be it. I wouldn't complain. The point is that while there are 5 allowed languages then there will always be incidents.

I was talking to a french pilot about this subject last week and he said that if you fly into an airport in an ICAO country then you can speak in any of the 5 languages and they must provide a controller that can speak it back to you. I told him he was talking rubbish but it made me think about it so I'm going to go check it out.

radar707, you had better get a subscription to linguaphone because I'm gonna be testing you soon!

[AIRWAY]

Right i better start buying some books in foreign lingo then... :hmm:
Luckly i speak a few languages so ill save some $$

Boa Noite

[spekesoftly]

and eventually fully automated ATC without human intervention.

I think it's grossly unfair, nay disrespectful, to imply that pilots are not human! ;)



On a more serious note, two questions:

i) If datalink was the sole means of ATC communication, notwithstanding the benefits, would pilots be able to maintain situational awareness?

ii) We are told that some pilots still insist on using their native language whilst at CDG etc. How do they manage when operating in Airspace where French, or whatever, is not spoken by ATC? :rolleyes:

[radar707]

EGPFlyer, if you make the effort to talk to me in one of the ICAO languages, I shall make the effort to talk to you in one of the others (probably English)

2 controllers at Glasgow:

One English, who speaks French, German, Italian, Japanese and Polish.

The Other is German who speaks God knows how many languages but you can include French and Italian on his list along with German and English

[sr562]

Jump Complete

In response to your post:

In parictular the shots of the wreckage of the mid air collision over Delhi, including what appeared to be the torso of one of the passengers (or crew) Making a point about serious safety issues is one thing, but we don't need to see that (and of course the relatives most definetly do not) to get the point. I also question (although this particular programe didn't actually do this,) the need for transcripts of the CVRs to be broadcast, with the pilots very last words on this Earth shown (with subtitles) as Sunday night entertainment. It is one thing on a CRM course. Presumably all the participents are professionals who might learn something from it and save future lives, but for 'Joe Public' the "Pull up, pull up! Oh my God, this is it!" kind of transcript Channel 4 seems to be getting fons of showing, is just making cheap shock-horror entertaiment out of tragidy

While i agree that it is not something the relatives want to hear or see, i think that for too long "joe public" has been spoon fed complete ****e from the media, and it will do the public good to be shown some reality.

Please dont take this the wrong way, as i am in no way saying that the program was totally factual, and i agree with other post suggesting it was slightly sensationalised. All i am getting at is that the public are always sheltered from the reality of what really happens not just within the aviation industry but with everything. IMHO showing images of what a disaster scene really looks like(charred and disembowelled bodies included) shows people what the realities of such a situation is like, and may help people to put things into perspective.

An example from last week in a popular Scottish red topped rag, which turned a simple RTO, into a terrifying and life threatening experience for a well known Scottish football team. The last thing that the industry needs at this time i am sure you will agree.
If only people knew the facts then maybe they wouldnt believe all this ****e, that is what i am getting at.

[EGPFlyer]

radar707, French lesson 1.

SHT6G orbite en votre position actuelle. Le trafic que vous êtes suivant est un cessna qui est Dumbarton aérien.

I'll leave it up to you to translate. ;)

[LostThePicture]

Did I watch the same programme as everybody else? Personally I thought it was utter tripe with a misleading title. It did not feature a single occurrence in which the skies were crowded. It was almost on a par with that awful "The Day Britain Stopped" programme.

The issues that could have been raised properly on the programme were not; there was no investigative flesh on the bones of the rather sensationalist incidents. Repeated images of the two tragic accidents might have increased feelings of sorrow for the victims, but did nothing to justify the title "Crowded Skies". It was more BBC bilge aimed at running down an industry that's already suffering from a lack of public confidence.

Here are some issues that could have been covered in a more factual documentary (although it still wouldn't need to rejoice in the title of "Crowded Skies"):

1) Why are civilian airliners still being allowed to fly in the bandit country that lies between airway Y70 and Newcastle / Teesside? Since the NORCA was replaced with an airway, civil traffic into NT/NV from the south and the east should be using it. Instead, airlines are taking chances with their passenger's lives by flying direct from NALAX/OTBED, into areas of high military activity. And for what? 35nm of extra flying. 50nm at the most. The airlines can cry profitability, but the airway system is there to keep them safe. If they choose not to use it, and have a major incident, then they are negligent. Simple as that.

2) There is a clear need for better comprehension of r/t between pilot and controller. Ultimately the answer to this problem, and indeed to the problem of increasing air traffic, is datalink. There should be increased funding into a cooperative solution. And it's no use people on opposite sides of the Atlantic using two different systems - the airlines would cry profitability again.

3) There is no excuse in this day and age for major radar units to be operating without SSR. That includes Delhi and anywhere else that may be thought of as "third world". Good to see that Delhi has a shiny new radar room now though. The words stable, door and horse immediately spring to mind. Although is it good practice to allow radar echoes to merge when operating primary radar only?

We can only hope that the Beeb have made a better effort for the other two programmes in the series.

LTP

[TopBunk]

BIK116.9

Are you seriously suggesting that datalinking clearance to take off and land, or to reduce speed on final approach is your preferred solution? No..... I think not. Nor does it have a place in issuing emergency avoiding action to avoid a collision.

Datalink will have a valuable place in aviation, but not in a terminal control environment, which is what was being discussed here.

Try to engage brain rather than point score!

[Boss Raptor]

An aside but for the record - the cockpit used in the Delhi collision reconstruction was a TU154M and not an IL76, they are very different - didn't detract from the presentation however

[MrBig]

I know this much. Despite the huge amount of traffic in UK and Europe it’s still the safest airspace I use. The Far East, especially India is a nightmare closely followed by Syria and the Cyprus mess. Even China has improved beyond all recognition. The French as ever are a law unto themselves, it just amazes me how they have managed to avoid a serious accident attributed directly to there complete disregard of ATC language rules. I was sat at the hold in Paris a couple of days ago surrounded by French registered aircraft and hadn’t got a clue about what was going on. There all chattering away in French. When are these guys going to grow up. It would be interesting to hear from French ATC on this forum!!! If they dare.

[Otterman]

I am always apprehensive when television makes an attempt to explain our business. The average viewer is unable to see the big picture and just zooms in on the accidents/incidents and assumes them to be the norm. Having said that I thought the program was interesting, and tried to raise some very valid points.

The use of native languages is a problem. The use of French/Spanish/Italian and Russian eats into our safety margins, and has killed people. There is only one common based communication language that all pilots (and ATC) are expected to master (can’t remember the number of words involved but it is not the complete English language). So what is the problem?? Just national pride I guess. You can dismiss this by telling pilots to learn each native language but that is being ignorant. Communication is a weak link in our safety chain. Even when English is spoken in a lot of countries it is hard to understand. You have to adjust your ears to all the different accents. Making things more interesting is the use of HF in large parts of the world and all these accents do not improve readability.

The use of ACARS will and has helped out. I have participated in experiments over the past four years in the development of Free Flight. And I thought that the BBC program sort of brushed over these advanced research projects in search of sensationalism (i.e. Sky is full; it is going to get worse). The capacity increase that these systems are capable off will deal with our growth for many years to come. Free flight has a dual advantage in that is will allow more optimum routings (doing away with our basic airway structure) and giving the aircrew much greater situational awareness. The last I heard the researchers will have the soft-hardware ready for deployment in 2007. It will mean a total revision of the way we work and interface with ATC, another topic though. It will not solve the capacity problems on the ground though and that is an even harder topic to tackle.

Regards, O.

[MrBig]

Dear BIK_116.80

I'm sure there are many other pilots who like me span the globe in a months work. Am I supposed to learn ALL the languages of the world. To date we operate to over 40 countries. The international language of aviation is ENGLISH virtually everyone recognises this FACT. Why oh why do the French have to buck the system. As I mentioned in my previous post when oh when are these guys going to grow up and act like the proffesionals they purport to be!!!!
:confused:

[Barnaby the Bear]

RADAR 707. One of those Germans should be able to speak every language. I was on his course. He is a cyborg. Say hi!

With regards to the programme. I thought it was good but I think highlighted the need for one language.

I am not sure about having to provide an an ATCO that can speak the lingo??:}

[Boss Raptor]

My own interpolation of the legalities of this are as follows (and I stand to be corrected)

The five ICAO languages, English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian are only designated by the Convention for presentation of ICAO documentation to members and this designation does not extend to operational use, RT etc.

ICAO Annex 6 'Operation of Aircraft' makes no statement that I can find, directly or indirectly, as to the language to be used for RT etc. (it only covers validity of licenses, communication equipment required etc.). I do not have ICAO PANS OPS. readily available to clarify any requirement at the Controller end.

The adoption of English as the International Language in the air has very vague roots in the now dated provisions of the International Telecommunications Union which designates English as the spoken language to be used to communicate 'with a vessel on the high seas i.e. international waters'. There is no parallel ICAO legislation/guidance.

Now what can clearly be seen is a large and potentially dangerous 'black hole' of no ICAO legislation covering the language to be used between ATC and Aircraft...there isn't any!

[Jerricho]

EGPFlyer, I can translate that.................

SHT6G, enter the hold, delay not determined due to recurrent ATC staff shortages ;)

Forgive me if this has been thrashed to death before, but is there any truth to the rumour that some operators had english translators on the flight deck?

[vancouv]

In the Saudi/Kazac mid-air did the planes not have TCAS fitted?

[Topofthestack]

Thought it started off OK but then got dogged down. If they were making a point about the Delhi crash, then it could have been followed up with lots of stuff on level busts, the size of the problem and how ATC TRUCE programs, and presentations to airlines are trying to tackle it. ATC I & I could have given them some spine chilling radar replays!

Perhaps all those who object to French being used might like to consider boycotting all major French airfields. That might make a difference to French aviation revenue! Perhaps all those who speak poor English could consider the same about UK ones as well!

As for Data Links, I can't see how this will work in a busy TMA environment. I thought that one of the points being raised was that everyone wanted feedback on what everyone else was doing? Give us Mode S today and safety will improve!

[squeaker]

An interesting programme, but as ususal spoiled by a tendency towards sensationalism. I hope it is a series, no mention thus far of TCAS, or standard levels, wouldn't do to suggest there is any hope, would it?
As for the datalink, I think it would be the way to go eventually, but the prog. did make a valid point in saying about standardisation being a problem because whichever system is adopted, there is a lot of money to be made!
Situational awareness could be addressed using a display similar to JTIDS that the military have, but there will obviously be a tendancy for some pilots to become amateur ATCOs and argue about their clearances (some do it already with TCAS!).
In the short term, with respect to language problems, the most important thing, whichever language we adopt, is to use standard phraseology. The american ATC is particularly bad for this, probably because most of their traffic speaks English (sort of) as their mother tongue, so they get away with it. As for the French, I believe this is forced upon them by government, they have a whole ministry devoted to protection of the French Language, which issues quotas to french commercial radio dictating how much french language music they must play, and they want to ban the expression "le weekend" (can't say I blame them). As English is my language, I would obviously like it to be the ICAO standard, but it is the most widely spoken, and I guess Spanish would be the next logical choice, but trying to get everyone to learn 5 languages? Not likely.
As for removing humans from ATC, I'd much rather have an ATCO to talk to than a computer. I doubt anyone would board an aeroplane without human flight crew and I wouldn't want to operate an aeroplane in an ATC environment run by a product of Bill Gates' pension fund.
MSG: You have pop-up traffic, type and destination unknown, same height, converging heading, range 0.25 mile, standby while windows calculates a new heading.....

[bookworm]

I was rather amused that the US ATC person, lamenting the poor English he encounters from his customers, gave the example of them being unable to understand the phrase "climb and maintain <level>", that delightful piece of non-ICAO phraeology. Divided by a common language... :)

[Boss Raptor]

I know for fact that Russian en-route control centres often have a translator sitting next to the controller to assist and attempt to avoid any misunderstandings.

[BIK_116.80]

TopBunk,

Are you seriously suggesting that datalinking clearance to take off and land, or to reduce speed on final approach is your preferred solution?

Yes.

With datalink an ATC computer can communicate 10 different speed constraints to 10 different aircraft in less than a second. In that same second it can communicate a landing clearance to another aircraft. With current voice methods that amount of communication takes many seconds, there is enormous scope for mis-communication and there is usually some wally checking in on frequency that will talk over the top of everyone.

The process could be further automated. An ATC computer that automatically monitors the inbound traffic spacing and closure rates and compares them to pre-programmed in-trail requirements and an aircraft performance database could generate the speed constraints automatically and very precisely and communicate them to the aircraft without any controller intervention.

Then again – why does it have to be a ground-based solution? There is no technical reason why a ground-based ATC computer cannot abdicate some of the work-load to an airborne avionics suite – eg “follow XYZ star - leave the initial approach fix at time 12:40:45 - maintain 4.00 miles behind the aircraft which is squarking 1234”. That level of precision is simply unachievable with current methods.

Datalink and automated inbound spacing would be a vast improvement over the current out-dated ground-based radar and voice communications methods which rely far too much on fallible humans eye-balling it. Safety, capacity and efficiency would all be enhanced.

Nor does it have a place in issuing emergency avoiding action to avoid a collision.

Well it could - but that’s what TCAS is for. In any case, why do you find yourself needing to issue emergency avoiding action instructions in the first place?

I suggest that an automated datalink arrangement is less likely to create situations that require the issuance of emergency avoiding action instructions.

Datalink will have a valuable place in aviation, but not in a terminal control environment....

That’s your opinion and you are certainly entitled to it.

I do not share that opinion.

Try to engage brain rather than point score!

Try to see the bigger picture, rather than endeavouring to protect the future value of a skill-set that has taken years to acquire but which will be obsolete if datalink is implemented to its greatest possible extent.

MrBig,

The French as ever are a law unto themselves....

What – like the English are a law unto themselves in their own country? Tell me, how many ICAO variations has the UK filed?

....it just amazes me how they [the French] have managed to avoid a serious accident attributed directly to there complete disregard of ATC language rules.

Which “ATC language rules” are you referring to?

There is no law that says that the air traffic controllers at Paris must use only one language. And there is no law that says that they are not allowed to speak French.

If you would prefer them to use only one language then I’m sure they would be delighted to accommodate you – but please don’t be surprised if it isn’t English.

I was sat at the hold in Paris a couple of days ago surrounded by French registered aircraft and hadn’t got a clue about what was going on. There all chattering away in French.

If you regularly go to Paris then why don’t you learn a few words of the language? Don’t you owe it to yourself and your passengers? Or would you prefer to fly around with sub-optimal situational awareness just to prove a point? Alternately, perhaps there is a French-speaking pilot in your (or another) company who should operate the route instead of you on safety grounds.

I'm sure there are many other pilots who like me span the globe in a months work. Am I supposed to learn ALL the languages of the world.

I suggest that you should consider learning a few aviation related words in as many different languages as you can. I’m sure you already have.

The international language of aviation is ENGLISH virtually everyone recognises this FACT. Why oh why do the French have to buck the system.

In what way, precisely, are you suggesting that the air traffic controllers at Paris are “buck[ing] the system”?

Current policy is that the Paris air traffic controllers should be able to speak English in order to accommodate pilots that are unable (or unwilling) to speak French. As far as I am aware the air traffic controllers at Paris are in compliance with that policy.

Topofthestack,

Perhaps all those who object to French being used might like to consider boycotting all major French airfields......perhaps all those who speak poor English could consider the same about UK ones as well!”

Very good point well made. I agree.

As for Data Links, I can't see how this will work in a busy TMA environment.

See above.

Datalink will work beautifully in the TMA environment on two conditions :

(1) Get the design right at the strategic stage - SIDs and STARs etc

(2) Forget about radar vectoring and human intervention. The separation and sequencing process should be automated so the human controller sits there and monitors the performance of the computers. The human ATC job should be one of monitoring and managing, rather formulating a plan in your head as you go along and screaming instructions down a microphone at 400 words per minute to pilots that mishear them and for whom English is not their first language.

I thought that one of the points being raised was that everyone wanted feedback on what everyone else was doing?

Listening to voice communications gives the flight crew situational awareness based on what other traffic has been instructed to do and what the other traffic has read back.

A cockpit TCAS display of traffic out to 40 miles and 9,900 feet above and 9,900 feet below gives the flight crew situational awareness based on what the other traffic is doing.

Bookworm,

I was rather amused that the US ATC person, lamenting the poor English....the phrase "climb and maintain <level>", that delightful piece of non-ICAO phraeology.

If you are from the UK then I wouldn’t start throwing stones – glass houses and all that.

Tell me again - how many ICAO differences has the UK filed?

[fourthreethree]

with respect to language problems, the most important thing, whichever language we adopt, is to use standard phraseology.

Thankyou. Finally someone has put their finger on the real reason fo the Indian midair. It was not, as the program banged on about incessantly, solely due to the pilot not understanding English, another major contributing factor was the use of a flight level when issuing traffic information. This tragedy led to a change in SP to be used when giving traffic, ie

"Traffic 12 o'clock 1000 feet above "
and NOT
"Traffic 12 o'clock at FL140"

Why did the BBC not mention this? Brits being Brits I reckon, long live the Empire, the English language will conquer all.

The language issue has been thoroughly dealt with on another thread, but for what its worth, my opinion is this. Of course there has to be a single language of the skies worldwide. Its just common sense. I'm not arguing that English is the natural choice, I am not so full of blinding national pride. But in such a far reaching international environment everyone has to be able to understand everyone else. It just means that anybody working within the industry, pilots and controllers alike, need to be able to speak the chosen language, be it English, French, Spanish, whatever.

With regards to datalink, I am very sceptical. At Maastricht we are experimenting with CPDLC, a datalink system in the early stages of development. I cannot see, apart from a few instructions (freq change, squawk change) how it could be used in any busy environment. It takes the controllers attention away from his radar screen, it does not give pilots spatial awareness (at least using another language you could hear a call sign and maybe work out a level given to it), and as far as misunderstanding is concerned, how easy would it be to simply press the wrong button and accidentally issue the wrong FL? Ok I am prepared to give it a chance, but until the system proves me wrong this will remain my opinion.

With datalink an ATC computer can communicate 10 different speed constraints to 10 different aircraft in less than a second.

Right. And who can input those restrictions at that speed?
And what if the datalink software, perish the thought, failed? The controller is left with a very dangerous case of overcrowding to sort out. The whole point of datalink, from a safety perspective, is that it should not take over the job of a controller, the atco must at all times be able to use r/t to carry out the same job as the datalink.

Well it could - but that’s what TCAS is for. In any case, why do you find yourself needing to issue emergency avoiding action instructions in the first place?

Don't get me started on TCAS. To answer your ill thought out point, the last two times I have needed to give emergency avoiding action was solely due to :mad: TCAS. False RA's which the pilot is obliged to act upon are the scurge of my life, especially when the a/c concerned climbs outside atc restrictions int opposite traffic which is seen by TCAS as less of a threat than the the traffic atc is keeping it clear of.

Enough said, I will watch the program again next week:cool:

[MrBig]

Dear BIK_116.80

Learn the language. Mmmmm. Just come back from a 2 week trip overflying countries using the following English, Flemish, French, German, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Turkish, Greek, Arabic, Farsi, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Thai, Burmese, Campucian, Vietnamese, Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonees) That was just the first trip. Through in Filipino, Indonesian and Malay for the second week. Now which language do you suggest.

The simple truth is that English is the language of aviation, period. As you say situational awarness is of great importance.

(Please excuse any spelling erors)

[feet dry]

I have a question regarding Datalink....

Does the system provide each cockpit of all movements within a certain range?

Any reponses greatly appreciated

[BIK_116.80]

Fourthreethree,

With regards to datalink, I am very sceptical. At Maastricht we are experimenting with CPDLC, a datalink system in the early stages of development.

Datalink has been in use over the Pacific for years. Why do the Europeans have to re-invent the wheel all the time? Is this just a contest to see who can urinate the furthest up the wall?

Right. And who can input those restrictions at that speed?

No one. Which is precisely why it is not a job that should be done by a human. The process needs to be automated. There are enormous volumes of data processing involved - something that computers do exceedingly well but which even the most highly trained humans do rather poorly.

To answer your ill thought out point, the last two times I have needed to give emergency avoiding action was solely due to TCAS. False RA's which the pilot is obliged to act upon are the scurge of my life....

You continue issuing instructions to aircraft that are flying an RA????

:eek: :eek: :eek: :eek:

Prepare for another Lake Constance disaster!

[bookworm]

Finally someone has put their finger on the real reason fo the Indian midair. It was not, as the program banged on about incessantly, solely due to the pilot not understanding English, another major contributing factor was the use of a flight level when issuing traffic information. This tragedy led to a change in SP to be used when giving traffic, ie

"Traffic 12 o'clock 1000 feet above "
and NOT
"Traffic 12 o'clock at FL140"

Was it? I haven't seen the accident report on the Delhi midair, so I noticed that possibility as the drama unfolded in the reconstruction. But the subsequent dialogue didn't seem to support such a misunderstanding -- the radio operator queried and corrected the pilots about the descent below FL150, so he at least was in no doubt. Is the report available online?

If you are from the UK then I wouldn’t start throwing stones – glass houses and all that.

Tell me again - how many ICAO differences has the UK filed?

No stones BIK_116.80, just an acknowledgement that there's more to designing safe communication than the language in which the words are spoken.

You may now descend with the thread... :-)

[fourthreethree]

Oh dear oh dear.

You continue issuing instructions to aircraft that are flying an RA????

No. Read my words before opening your mouth next time. I do give advisory traffic information and suggest avoiding action. Did I mention the word "instruction"? No. The avoiding action I gave on both occasions was a turn to the traffic not involved in the TCAS debacle.
Apology accepted.

Notice you skipped over my point re: safety and datalink. You argue against yourself quite well there. Yes datalink could work faster than a human. As far as I'm aware thats not under discussion. The point is that if it fails, and it will then the controller needs to be able to take over, which would not be possible with your scenario.

Finally, CPDLC had a predecessor, PETAL, which was used also for years, and much was learned from it. Europe are not "reinventing the wheel" as you put it, but Eurocontrol along with many other organisations, are putting a great deal of time, effort and money into a huge project which is seen as the future of ATC.

[BIK_116.80]

Apology accepted.

Are you seeing things?

Perhaps if you kept the planes a bit further apart they wouldn't be getting RAs?

[garp]

Dry Feet,

http://www.eurocontrol.int/dgs/publications/leaflets/maas_uac/machine_interface/machine_interface.pdf

http://www.ainonline.com/issues/07_03/07_03_European2005p83.html

BIK,

Re-inventing the wheel? Don't think so. Operational trials over Europe since 95. For once that Europe is leading the way it should be told or if you want to hear it from the FAA itself :
According to one FAA official, “In the past, we used to be able to show the Europeans that we usually had the better arguments for change, and the technology to back us up. But over the last few years they have developed powerful and well prepared positions and technical capabilities that we are finding increasingly hard to counter.” Some Washington insiders believe that the September ICAO Conference may turn into a watershed event, where the traditional U.S. leadership in ATC affairs could find itself seriously challenged

[feet dry]

garp

merci monsieur

[Point Seven]

Bik

Chill out man!! I think that your inflammatory posts are getting people's backs up. On the one hand you say "that's your opinion" then you jump on anyone proffering an opinion that differs from yours. Calm down dear, it's just a forum.

On the subject of datalink, I don't think that anyone can be in any doubt that it IS the future. Whether we like it or not, eventually all controllers will no longer fill the role that we have now, but we will act as system monitors and only intervene when things get out of hand. I'm not talking about next Wednesday, but in the future it will happen, it has to. How else are we going to reduce controllers workloads sufficiently to accomodate the massive predicted increases in traffic?

Datalink will remove a lot of "chores" that do not have massive safety bearings (initial flight plan clearances, changes in routings etc.) and allow controllers to concentrate on keeping planes apart. WHEN the technology allows then maybe we can start to let it take over a bit more but there remains a lot of work to be done.

So BIK, enter into the swing of things. Casting aspersions on someone's ability to keep planes apart ain't professional (unless it is Jerricho, widely known to be useless;) ). If you re-read the chaps' post it was a FALSE RA anyhow.

P7

[Lon More]

BIK 116/8 for info on what is being done in Europe on CPLDC go to www.eurocontrol.int and search for DALI
After you've read that lot come back and tell us we're reinventing the wheel.

EGPF Ffyer the French pilot was talking merde. The National Authority lays down which languages can be used where. Normally to be found in the AIP.
At one time Belgium still insisted that Maastricht UAC used French as well as English in the Brussels sectors. This despite no requirement for the controller to have French as a language.

Many states (inc. Germany still?) have frequencies allocated to their own language, normally only for VFR.

Five official languages (plua American) It doesn't require fluency, but just understanding the words, climb, descend and turn, may be enough to save your life.

For many reasons,with 4-3-3 on TCAS. Unfortunately it does not provide situational awareness but seems to be encouraging the opposite.
Take as an example a reporting point where 3 inbound routes converge for Amsterdam, EEL. Take an inbound flight descending to fl260 to cross EEL at level. After the usual, do we have to start down now, do we have to be level at EEL (Really, it's on the tape)
descent commences 4.500 to 5000 fpm. Passing FL265 the aircraft levels off then starts to climb and turn !!! Reason TCAS alert on traffic maintaining FL250. Pilot starts to bad mouth ATC.
Unfortunately this is happening more and more, together with questioning of instruction to turn,: traffic info then given response is ,"We see him on TCAS"

Lon More. more than just an Atco

Garp and Point 7 hadn't seen your post when I started

[fourthreethree]

Or maybe if certain pilots learned to use their TCAS it would also help. As heard a few days ago......

Maas "XYZ123 descend FL300"
XYZ123 "Er Maastricht confirm we have traffic on TCAS 1000 feet below?"
Maas "Negative sir traffic is 1000 feet above "
XYZ123 "Ok, roger descending FL300"

:confused:


Point seven

Cheers, glad to hear people in here can read, I was starting to wonder....:ok:

[Slippers]

On the subject of Datalink, although I have no experience of it, I can't see that it can be quicker than verbal commication.
I imagine that from the time that I decide I want to give an instuction in my head, I would have to:-
click on an a/c, select the type of instruction, click on climb or descend, click the desired level, select any level by restriction, confirm the instruction and then send. The pilot would then have to see the instruction and then send an acknowledged reply which I would then also have to see.
How would that be quicker than saying " C/S descend FL250 level by LOGAN" , "Roger descending FL250 Level by LOGAN, c/s"

Please correct me if that is not how it works.

On the subject of fully automated ATC, when will we learn that humans are NOT good system monitors. Our concentration levels always lapse when we are asked to do boring and monotonous tasks like checking that a computer is doing it's job properly.

History is littered with disasters caused by this very fact.

Humans are far better when they have to think about what they are doing, formulating plans and activley problem solving. Sure we make mistakes, but we are also in a far better position to spot and correct those mistakes if it is us that have made them!

[garp]

Slippers,
You are writing what thousands of colleagues are thinking. How will Datalink help me in my day to day work and will it make my life easier?
It is vital to understand that the present use of Datalink is purely strategic and not tactical. The difference being that strategic use includes non-time critical, routine communications and that tactical use covers basically all the rest where the speed of transmission and receipt are critical for the safety of the a/c.
The idea is to share tasks on a sector suit. This implies that two controllers are on the sector. One executive and one assistant. The tasks that can be done by the assistant are route clearances, squawk changes, frequency changes, confirmations of requested levels etc. Quite some extra frequency time can be offered to the executive in this way. One superb extra feature is the "check mike" instruction in case of a stuck mike on the freq.
As you can see there are benefits to the system and it's needless to say that things will improve in the coming years. Still I'm convinced that voice will remain essential with the present ATC systems for the coming decades.

[ModernDinosaur]

OK, two observations from a low-time PPL...

First, I don't understand this datalink idea - how does a text message on a screen allow a commercial pilot to gain situational awareness of what other aircraft are doing? If messages for other aircraft are also displayed, surely there is a much greater risk of "mis-reading" an instruction intended for someone else, especially if the messages are scrolling upwards as new ones are received. I'm also rather nervous about the pilot using his eyes to receive clearances - his eyes should be looking for other traffic and/or monitoring the instruments. In most flying the ears aren't heavily used, so are ideal for getting instructions into the brain. Perhaps I'm missing something????

Second, on the subject of controlled airspace, I'm going to make myself very unpopular with a lot of GA pilots. I personally have no objection to their being controlled airspace over the whole of the UK from surface to orbit PROVIDED that all aircraft (including GA) have an equal right to fly through the vast majority of it with nothing more than a radio and a Mode-C transponder. OK, so some vintage types with no electrical system may have problems complying with the "radio+Mode-C" bit, but it's not unsurmountable even for them. I'd expect something like 95% of airspace below FL100 to be class-E or class-D with comprehensive secondary radar cover and staffed to provide RIS/LARS to all, with class-C (or even class-B) airspace around the busier airports. Hmmm - sounds a bit like the US.... Who knows - it might even improve the standard of R/T from GA pilots!

MD

[Jerricho]

Hey BIK, what's your malfunction. Suggesting "if you kept your planes further apart.....etc" is way out of line. I invite you (and I'm sure other ATCO's would agree here) to come and watch a radar of a very busy Terminal environment, where there are so many pressures of using minimum separation standards.

I'm sure you would get mighty p*ssed off if somebody told you how to do your job.

(Of course, we don't bother telling P7 how to do his, cause you can't improve on perfection, can you? Oh, and stop reminding people how much I suck............they know!)

I do have a question reference datalink. Let's look at an final approach situation where the a lander suddenly burst a tyre and spills it on the runway. What will happen to the 6 jets following. How will missed approach/breaking off instructions be issued? I'm intested in hearing BIK's thoughts on this one!

Just as an aside as well about technology supposedly making our lives easier, look at thetrial of FAST (Final Approach Spacing Tool) by LHR approach. Playing that things rules was dangerous, and many people showed better landing rates than the machine (apart from me, eh P7?).

[radar707]

BIK,

Avoiding Action is rarely used because we've let separation erode.
It is mainly used outside controlled airspace because of pop up traffic or fast moving military traffic whose intentions we do not know and starts to do a dirty dive right towards your aeroplane, if you like I can refuse to provide you with a Radar Advisory Service and just give you a Radar Information Service (or if I'm really busy giving avoiding action to IFR traffic under a Radar Control Service in Class E airspace against pop up traffic 12 o clock 1 mile no height information) I could give you a Flight Information service and let you try and sort things out yourself against primary radar returns or that fast moving military traffic you've no chance of seeing.

We do a bloody good job stopping aeroplanes banging into each other, a darn sight better than any computer could do via datalink.

Flyer it'll be you lucky day if I ever tell 6G to orbit and follow you from dumbarton, when I do, I'll expect the biggest bottle of single malt you can get your hands on ;) ;) ;)

[Pie Man]

MD

I'd expect something like 95% of airspace below FL100 to be class-E or class-D with comprehensive secondary radar cover and staffed to provide RIS/LARS to all

Bit of a problem there the number of LARS units in ever decreasing, controller shortages and cash may not be available to upgrade the present system - would the GA comunity like to pay more for the service?

Regards

Pie

[whowhenwhy]

You know, I'm not sure that we all watched the same programme! I got the distinct impression from watching 'that programme' that I didn't exist for a start. ATC seems to be split between 'civil' area ATC and NV, NT, SH and PD approach. Ummmm, so what about all those so beautifully red-shaded bits on your map BBC where ATSOCAS are provided (generally) by military units, be they terminal or area????
33 nms to get round to P18? Can't increase the cost overheads that much. The problem occurs not so much when you get pilots who obviously don't have that great a grasp of English, but pilots who don't have a clue what TOS they're being provided, or even that they're off-route. If civil airlines are going to 'persuade' their pilots to fly IFR in class G airspace, they should at least ensure that the pilots are briefed effectively as to THEIR and my responsibilities to their transit. Should some of these guys really be allowed to fly in class G? Do their passengers know that they're doing it??

[Down Ampney]

Considering the journalist was making a point about language he should be proud of the best malapropism I've heard for years when he said the young indian chap was "ambiguous" about getting on the Saudia flight!

[digidave]

Refering to whowhenwhys post, I'd always assumed (as SLF) that if I was on a civil airliner, flying a scheduled flight, that I would be safely protected within controlled airspace with an ATCO watching over me.

It was quite a shock to see that there are civil airports that don't (or didn't) have protected routes.

As someone who once wanted to be an ATCO this has been an illuminating thread, possibly more illuminating than last nights program. Thank you to all.

dd

[Thames virtual]

As another SLF, thanks guys for your comments - it has broadened my point of view seeing the professionals' response to the programme.

Most of you will probably have missed the subtitle for the deaf which converted "situational awareness" into "situation unawareness" :bored:

TV

[ModernDinosaur]

Pie Man replied to me:
Bit of a problem there the number of LARS units is ever decreasing, controller shortages and cash may not be available to upgrade the present system - would the GA comunity like to pay more for the service?
Perhaps we should treat the airspace above the UK as a national resource for the use of all, much like the roads are. Or at least as they used to be until the government introduced tolls, congestion charges etc.

My problem at the moment is that I see myself paying a large and increasing amount in taxation, both direct and indirect, yet I really don't see a large and increasing improvement in the quality of the country - schools, hospitals, roads, ATC staffing levels, you name it, I bet there have been cuts in the last ten years (and in the ten years prior to that, and...). Something, somewhere is going badly wrong. My personal feeling is that the root cause is that there are too many people looking out for their own little empire and too few looking out for the good of the country as a whole. I'm not trying to point the finger at any individual or group here - my comment is a general one aimed at almost everyone, including myself. The end result is that there are too many people making too much money at the expense of society rather than for the benefit of society.

What I feel is needed is a strong lead towards a more selfless way of thinking about things: taking aviation for an example (this IS PPRuNe after all!) why should the air traffic service around Heathrow be paid for by the users of Heathrow? BAA don't own the airspace. NATS don't own the airspace. The people of the country own the airspace, and they all get some benefit from it, whether through holiday flights or freight imported by air and sold in the shops at low prices. Therefore everyone should pay for the technical facilities and controllers who make the use of the airspace possible, through national taxes.

Too radical? Probably :( I guess there's nothing for it - I'll just HAVE to get a Green Card and go live in the States! ;)

Cheers,

MD.

[jack-oh]

In one part of the programme a civil pilot who had had an Airprox with a military aircraft stated "as I was flying through the Vale of York", he might well of started off by saying "as I was swimming off the Great Barrier Reef with a pork chop tied round my neck". When will these people realise that if you fly around an area that has a large concentration of fast jets in it you may well meet one sooner or latter. The fact that its not controlled airspace is irrelevant. If the UK military adopted the same rules as the US or Australians and introduced controlled airspace that was regulated by the individual military airfields or area units, the same aircraft could have been doing the same thing provided, in the pilots view, he was still VMC. We have all been stung by an ac popping out of low level but that is exactly why ATCROCAS were written to provide advice and information and not to guarantee separation. If you don’t want this type of service don’t fly in that airspace, it may mean a slightly longer trip but it would also mean that you wont see any sharks. :E

[Jordan D]

I have to say having watched as an SLF, and hopefully a future Miltary Pilot (I'm in the Cadets atm), that I was surprised at the amount of empahsis putting the blame on the Fast Jets, when aircraft are transiting through airspace that is 'off the beaten track' and regularly used by those aircraft especially in areas of high usage by them (e.g Kinloss/Lossie & Wash Area).

there's blame for incidents, but the way it was shown seemed a tad harsh.

Jordan

[PH-UKU]

Well what about all the passenger aircraft on Advisory routes that our pointy headed friends with their arses on fire seem to ignore ? THAT is an accident waiting to happen. Tornados out of Lossie and Leuchars, other NATO fastjets, controlled? by AWACS who have no concept that these are civil aircraft and that the civil ATCO is trying to avoid them. It's bad airmanship from the military.

What if someone were to fly an aircraft outside the ATZ of an RAF base but inside the MATZ without bothering to speak to the RAF ATC ? Same idea !! So why can't mil jets do the smart thing and recognize Advisory Routes, and get a radar service before crossing.

That would be a good topic for a program, but of the course the BBC never bother to venture (too far) north of Hadrian's Wall.

[ferris]

CPDLC.
Have to agree with BIK116.8 on this, so far as it's use in the Pacific is a great improvement. OVER HF. However, the oz experience showed that where VHF is available, it is far more preferable to use that. It is much faster. But I can certainly see the day where CPDLC will be used in preference to VHF. You know when that day will be, BIK116.8? The day they take human pilots out of the loop. So be careful what you wish for. You may be a rabid controller-hater, but guess what? All that vitriol you spit at us (computers will be able to do it better than you etc) applies equally to pilots. So when we are both out of a job, with the ATC computer directly feeding sequencing instructions into the onboard FMS, you'll be able smile smugly and say "I told you so!". Be careful what you wish for.

ps. What language would you like the CPDLC instructions to arrive in? English, French, Basic, Java.............

[16 blades]

PH-UKU,

We are well aware of the advisory routes and get our traffic info from London Mil. (AWACS???) You say it's 'an accident waiting to happen'. Well, it hasn't happened because we know where the traffic is and avoid it.

One doesn't get to become a pilot in the military without knowing one's @rse from one's elbow. A mil pilot who displays any tendencies of 'bad airmanship' would not remain in the military for long. The only 'bad airmanship' here comes from civvie halfwits taking shortcuts across well known (and well publicised) mil AIAAs, then complaining about an airprox. And on the subject of GA idiots in MATZs with no R/T call, it happens on a daily basis.

[TopBunk]

BIK_116.whatever

I'm sure that Datalink works very well over the Pacific where there is probably 1 aircraft per zillion square miles, nice little toy for the boys to experiment with without having to use nasty HF.

That system will not translate to Europe or the coastal USA without MUCH work, there are more aircraft airborne there at any time than exist in Oz in total, and in about 25% of the area, all going in different directions, climbing and descending to different destinations. Don't get me wrong, I'm sure the work and experience will prove useful in defining the final solution, and I am in no doubt that Datalink will form a very large part of our lives at some point ahead in en-route environments, but as to translating it to terminal ops, then that is a step further. Let's cross one bridge at a time.

Ah, I get it now, you are from Oz and possibly an ATC person - you ALREADY think you fly the aircraft, ne c'est pas [French, for your benefit].

[Kalium Chloride]

ICAO Annex 6 'Operation of Aircraft' makes no statement that I can find, directly or indirectly, as to the language to be used for RT etc.


Language requirements for R/T are in Annex 1 and Annex 10.

The requirements have just been updated and now encompass pilots as well as air traffic controllers.

[1261]

ferris makes a good point which I fully endorse.

Maybe we should all just get our brains embalmed in a comfortable pot of goo with a drip feed of Stella Artois and let the computers do everything.

[EGPFlyer]

16 blades, you are wrong. Might I suggest you take a visit to ScOACC and ask them what happens on the advisory routes.

(edited to say, radar707, I trust that an 18yo Dalwhinnie will suffice ;) )

[Gonzo]

ModernDinosaur,

You mean an Air Traffic service provided by, and funded by the UK Government? A Civil Service, so to speak? That rings a bell......I'm sure I've herd of that before somewhere! :rolleyes:

[eastern wiseguy]

Ah, I get it now, you are from Oz and possibly an ATC person - you ALREADY think you fly the aircraft, ne c'est pas [French, for your benefit].

If I am correct ......and I reckon I am ...he DOES fly the aeroplane...he IS Australian ....and he must have had a kicking from a bunch of ATC's when he was young because he LOATHES the idea of ATC and fails to see why he can't go where he wants when he wants at the level he wants(duffy 3 BIK!!) ......We have crossed swords before over various topics.He is entitled to his opinions and I know some ex UK atc staff who ARE trying to sort out a workable data link system...but in all honesty I think it is an enroute tool across oceans/deserts/africa as imho I think it will take pilots OUT of the situational awareness loop.s it not easier to listen to instructions rather than read them all the time?

[LXGB]

Next episode details...

"Crowded Skies
Sun 10 Aug, 9:00 pm - 10:00 pm 60mins

In 1977 the world's worst ever air accident claimed the lives of some 583 people when two aircraft collided in thick fog on a runway on the island of Tenerife. Unable to see through the fog, the air traffic controller responsible for guiding the jets didn't even know they'd collided. In 2001 a remarkably similar accident occurred at Milan, when again, two aircraft at the airport collided in heavy fog. This programme asks how, 24 years after the catastrophe that was Tenerife, history was able to repeat itself with the tragic loss of over a hundred lives?"

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctwo/listings/programme.shtml?day=sunday&service_id=4224&filename=20030810/20030810_2100_4224_62800_60


LXGB

[ModernDinosaur]

Gonzo asked:
You mean an Air Traffic service provided by, and funded by the UK Government? A Civil Service, so to speak? That rings a bell......I'm sure I've herd of that before somewhere!
At least then we knew our tax money was going to provide a useful service. Now we have less idea where the money goes and a less useful service (not through any fault on the part of those at "the sharp end" I hasten to add).

Is this what they call progress?! :ugh:

MD

[HugMonster]

I'm very ambivalent about DataLinking's usefulness and value.

For one thing, as the programme pointed out, there are many systems under trial, none of which are compatible with any others.

Furthermore, its usefulness will be circumscribed by how many aircraft in a sector are fitted with the necessary equipment.

Next, it will actually reduce situational awareness since you will "hear" no instructions to other aircraft.

Finally, since situational awareness will be degraded quite considerably, there is no ability to question an instruction that appears erroneous.

[jack-oh]

PH-UKU makes the point of advisory routes in scotland and mil fast jets. As the responsibility for the vast majority of these advisory routes have been turned over to Millitary ATC ie Lossiemouth I cant understand what he is talking about. civil ac quite merrily ply there trade up and down them in the safe knowledge that controllers used to dealing with unidentified conflicting traffic are looking after them. The amount of times I have seen civil sector controllers wait until the last miniute to find out what is going on is the real scary issue.

[TheRev]

The program had both ligitimate and sensationalised points -lets face it, though, if it didnt it wouldnt have made on tv.

I thought the problem of aircraft flying through the Vale of York being at risk from unpredictable military traffic was wrongly attributed to ATC, surely if the airlines chose to fly outside of the airways system they are the ones putting passengers at risk. They could rectify this by sticking to the airways. The capt they interviewed should be thanking the controller for giving him avoiding action and reviewing his decisions while making a flight plan

[radar707]

Jack-Oh, civil controllers don't wait until the last minute, we provide a service as do the military controllers, and i don't want this to turn into a civil v military slagging match because we all do the same job, albeit slightly differently.

the fact is that outside CAS, form Scottish, you will only get a RIS, from Glasgow, you will generally get a RAS (again subject to terrain safe level restrictions), my understanding (and it is very limited) from Scottish Mil, you wil get a RAS subject to level and then a RIS.

Outside CAS, anybody can fly with/out a radio or transponder and can do whatever the hell they like.

We controllers have to do our best to stop the aircraft we do and do not KNOW about bumping into each other.

Maybe if more pilots chose to actually call an ATC unit for a service then the less work the Airprox board will have to do.

I will never understand why pilots choose to fly in known areas of high intensity military traffic (Vale of york for example) and not contact a relevant ATC unit. (Is Linton still open???)


Our job is all about safety, inside CAS (A-D) it's fairly easy, E is a class unto it's own and always will be, outside controlled airspace we can only do our best to advise traffic we are working and pass the relevant traffic information or avoiding action depending on the service being provided.

But just how many pilots know the difference between RIS and RAS and their responsibilities.

or for those flying in the Scottish TMA (Class E) are aware that it is technically an unknown environment?????

[Jordan D]

Radar, Linton is very much open, and still used for the RAF training purposes.

Jordan

[HugMonster]

TheRev:-

You miss one major point the programme was trying to make, which is that there are a significant number of regional airports in the UK that have very limited or non-existent access to the airways, and that we have to go off-airways to get to and from those airports.

Were all airlines to keep to controlled airspace at all times, the operating costs of many routes would immediately make them totally unviable as a commercial prospect.

As the person interviewed, who skippered that flight through the Vale of York, yes, I could have told the company that I didn't intend to fly that route, and intended to route down the NORCA to GASKO and then head off to STN. They would probably have decided they could function quite nicely without my assistance. In my (fairly long) career I have had a few airmisses. The instance discussed in the programme was one of the hairiest, and was caused by a foreign mil. pilot who didn't understand the rules of operation of UK airspace.

My backside was saved by a Pennine controller who was very much on the ball (as they always were) who gave me a very good service. I thanked him at the time for his very professional service, and sent another message of thanks through our ops later.

I suggest that you save your criticism of airlines and pilots for a time when you have accumulated a little knowledge of how the system works.

[LostThePicture]

there are a significant number of regional airports in the UK that have very limited or non-existent access to the airways, and that we have to go off-airways to get to and from those airports.

My own personal opinion, which has been well documented on other threads about this programme, is that Newcastle and Teesside are no longer part of this "significant number". For a small increase in track miles, airliners can be safely surrounded by class A/D the whole way from take-off to touchdown.

I realise that as a commercial pilot, you may be directed to follow a certain route in and out of certain airfields. This is fine, if you're happy with trundling through the VoY at military playtime. I wonder if the passengers would be happy, knowing their lives may be at risk. The airline bosses will continue to direct you to fly outside CAS until the day that an airprox becomes a mid-air collision. That will be the day when profitability will no longer be an issue. And the route will either disappear from the schedule, or the airline will charge more to cover the mileage. Which is what they could be doing now.

With respect, I don't think you were the first person to have a scare in the VoY / North Sea airspace, and I don't think you'll be the last. The military are really struggling with the volume of traffic into and out of NT/NV that wants to take a shortcut to and from the North Sea.

There's a theory about air safety, and indeed a book, called "The Tombstone Imperative". The basis of it is that the airlines will not make a radical change to procedures in order to make things safer, unless people die because of the unsafe procedures. The airspace south of Newcastle might just become a classic.

LTP

[flower]

I can think of many regional airports who have little or no CAS around them, one regional airport carrying almost 4 million passengers a year has only a very small control zone and all aircraft in and out fly outside regulated airspace.
There is absolutely no way without more CAS to protect these commercial operations to the fullest extent. We offer and provide a comprehensive RAS however with a large number of fast military aircraft also flying in the vicinity it isn't always easy.
I have to say I have had very few problems with military aircraft the vast majority call us up and tell us what they are doing( we have the advantage of a UHF frequency) but when i did have problems with one and advised him we would be filing he even refused to give his registration, and when ringing his unit to say that we were appalled at his airmanship we were promptly told he was outside CAS he could do what he wanted.
It is as always the odd few who give a bad name to many, but to protect our regional airports with Class D airspace linked to the airways system , stepped to allow aircraft who do no wish or require a service would be a sensible approach IMHO

[LostThePicture]

one regional airport carrying almost 4 million passengers a year has only a very small control zone and all aircraft in and out fly outside regulated airspace.

Where's that then? I can't think of any regional airport fitting that description. :8

[1261]

EGPK/PIK has to rely on a class G ATZ; I've sat in the tower there, not all military pilots bother to call up as they transit through a five mile final at 1000' AGL.

[contact_tower]

Speaking from experience with your RAF, they are not the masters of "Rules of the Air". Frequent airspace and level busts when they operate on our side of the north sea.

41Sqn got a temporary grounding during a visit last winter, and my SATCO had to do a new "in-brief". The triggering violation was flight trough a class D TMA at FL100 and several Jaguars with U/S transponders. One flight allso veered out of a danger area with allmost 10 miles, straight into 2 airways. (Without talking to anyone, not even reachable on UHF/VHF guard.)

If anyone fancy a try at Norwegian, the AAIB report on the TMA bust: http://www.aaib-n.org/Rapporter%202003/rapport%2038-03.htm

[flower]

Lost the picture
Try a busy regional airport in the South West of England, non NATS whose passenger transport movements have gone through the roof in the last 2 years.

[PH-UKU]

Jack-oh, 16Blades. (edited due to product of 2 night shifts !!)

AFAIK (willing to be corrected) there are very few Advisory Routes (Class F airspace) south of 55 Deg N, the bulk are around Scotland (GOW-BEN, GOW-STN, GOW-INS-WIK-SUM, ADN-WIK, ADN-SUM), with enough civil airliners to make it interesting - and no alternative routes to fly.

Having worked both mil+civil I can categorically say we have an excellent mil/civil liaison at ScACC controller to controller. Can't speak for the scopies though ;) - the problem is unknown traffic, speaking to no-one, or worse still wearing 'NATO autonomous@ squawks.

Jack-oh - Lossie are delegated a very small part of the ADR structure (and then only Mon-Fri), but there is quite a large world outside the 50 mile range ring and above FL115

16B - the point I am making is that frequently mil jets are maneouvring around in Class F advisory routes, and frequently civil airliners are wheeched about the sky trying to anticipate and to avoid them. And I am sure there are drawers full of airmiss reports on the subsequent melee - (and many other filled drawers...) I take your point about the Vale of York, busy place, (I worked the LARS there a few years ago). Wiltshire based crews ;-) I suspect are more aware of 'other traffic' due to the even more busy nature of Southern airspace. Some of the jets flying around Scotland may be under the impression that they are the only people in the sky .... not so. Scottish just posted it's busiest ever day/week at the end of July.

Now I am sure you would agree that while Class F airspace is not recognised by the mil, it is tempting fate to fart around in it with gay abandon. Put the boot on the other foot. MATZ around mil airfields are not legally enforcable (2nm ATZ is, but MATZ isn't). So what would be the likely reaction if Joe Bloggs drove his little Cessna right up to the ATZ edge and flew (perfectly legally) up and down the final approach with equal gay abandon ? Think he'd be criticised for unsportsmanlike conduct?

To the ATP, SF34 and E145 pilots who daily run the gauntlet. There is talk of a jet syndicate getting together at a West of Scotladn airfield. Perhaps your own interceptor to accompany you on the ADRs might be not too far away :ok:

[TheRev]

Hugmonster

You criticism of my levels of experience suggest you take my comments personally, and they weren't directed at you but at the appearance the program gave that air traffic controllers were bordering on the cowboy and our airspace resembled wild country where passengers were at risk. I was particularly refering to the VoY area as this is not an area which MUST be crossed - which regional airport within it would you be trying to reach ? There is a great deal of military traffic both low level and transitting to the danger areas off the coast to practice refuelling etc and I had thought for the most part it they didnt cause to many problems, until I heard your story. Now I am inclined to believe that perhaps, as others have said, it is an intense milatry playground during the day and best kept clear of, particularly with a nice warm cosy airway so close. That is the lesson I have learned from your story.

Whether you reach the same conclusion is nothing to do with me, whether your airline puts pressure on you to fly a more risky route to save a few bucks is nothing to do with me. I totally agree there are some areas which require more CAS. All I said was aircraft putting passengers at risk flying through the VoY
was a subject more suited to a program on how airlines are taking unnecessary risks with passengers rather than one about ATC.

[savechip55]

How has this thread so quickly turned into a mil vs civ punch up!!
We as Mil ATC are as professional as anybody else, we are all in the game of safety, and are all on the same side!
I for one have been saved a couple of times by the civil planners, and i am sure the feeling is mutual.
I agree that some mil pilots may have busted levels etc, as was stated earlier, have their civil brethren not also fallen foul of this?
Most, even all, mil pilots who are under an ATC service, even if RIS, will stop off or reroute to help out other aircraft, you only have to ask. Calling their airmanship into question is in my opinion a little harsh, they did'nt get their wings out of a christmas cracker.

As far as the NT/NV situation goes, (a/c routing direct from UMBEL) this is a very sensitive subject at present. The civil pilots would probably tell you the same, it is extremely hard work for both pilot and controller, the pilot is sometimes being asked to perform manoeuvres that the Red Arrows would be proud of!! It isnt an ideal situation, but until it is resolved i am afraid (as much as it pains me to say) we will all just have to cope. (as usual)

If i have totally misunderstood any of the above, i apologise, its just the way it read to me.

;)

[Captain Stable]

TheRev, I think you misunderstand the point of the programme in one respect, (which HM pointed out to you) which is that, where lack of CAS exists for the service required, aircraft HAVE to go off-airways. It is not a matter of airlines "saving a few bucks". Without the use of advisory routes, of Class G airspace or whatever, there simply would not be a service. Lots of controllers and pilots would then be out of jobs, lots of the travelling public would be unable to fly from the regional airport of their choice.

This is simple economics.

It is not acceptable for the military to indulge themselves in "it's legal, so we can do it" behaviour, and it's not acceptable for the 172 driver to hang around on the extended centreline of a military runway.

It has to be accepted that we need to share airspace responsibly. We also need airspace that works for all of its users. What we have at present does not meet that criterion.

[contact_tower]

As far as the NT/NV situation goes, (a/c routing direct from UMBEL) this is a very sensitive subject at present. The civil pilots would probably tell you the same, it is extremely hard work for both pilot and controller, the pilot is sometimes being asked to perform manoeuvres that the Red Arrows would be proud of!! It isnt an ideal situation, but until it is resolved i am afraid (as much as it pains me to say) we will all just have to cope. (as usual)


How can your CAA sit and let this situation continue? It sounds like you operate with a safetylevel common to some developing countries. Well, perhaps this is what you get when you have allmost water-tight bulkheads between the MIL/CIV control and airspace structure....... :rolleyes:

Have anyone looked at having one service for BOTH "customers", it seems a bit odd when the airspace available is so limited, and traffic levels are as high as you say?

Captain Stable in onto something......
Better duck again.....:E

[LostThePicture]

Have anyone looked at having one service for BOTH "customers", it seems a bit odd when the airspace available is so limited, and traffic levels are as high as you say?

Well, this is effectively what our military controllers are being asked to do, and what they are finding so difficult. Generally, a military controller will have only 3 or 4 aircraft on his frequency, but they might all be fast jets operating in completely different areas. If the controller is providing a RAS to all these a/c, he has to have eyes everywhere to prevent a loss of separation and a potential airprox.

So, as if his life isn't interesting enough, you add a couple of F50's doing 250kts, cutting a swathe through his airspace, wanting continuous descent into Newcastle. Of course, this civil traffic demands a RAS, so now he's watching a slow aircraft outside controlled airspace. There could be anything out there, and indeed there frequently is. Trying to maintain 5m/5000' against all that must be no mean feat.

The controllers at MASOR shouldn't be being asked to handle all this traffic (in the summer months, it's an awful LOT of traffic), but for one reason or another, it happens. Suffice to say it's all political.

It is not a matter of airlines "saving a few bucks". Without the use of advisory routes, of Class G airspace or whatever, there simply would not be a service. Lots of controllers and pilots would then be out of jobs, lots of the travelling public would be unable to fly from the regional airport of their choice.

An interesting statement, but generally a work of fiction. My previous post (6th Aug, 11:42) explains where I stand on this subject, but just to re-iterate:

If these routes are as popular as their frequency indicates, then the airlines can afford to fly along the airways and charge their passengers a bit more. If the passengers really value having an airport on their doorstep, they'll pay a bit more for the privilege of using it, instead of having to go to Manchester. Even if, horror of horrors, the route had to be suspended, I don't think any of us "would be out of jobs". The controllers would be positively delighted, especially the military ones, who would be able to get back to controlling military traffic.

It has to be accepted that we need to share airspace responsibly. We also need airspace that works for all of its users. What we have at present does not meet that criterion.

I'm sure the people in power who decided on the current airspace arrangement around Newcastle, which was the result of radical changes in March of this year, would be delighted to hear you say that. The airspace as it stands is fine. It just needs certain civilian carriers to use it properly. The military need places to fly their aircraft with quite a lot of freedom, just as the airlines (should) need airways on which to fly theirs. Another airway into Newcastle would be nice for a small proportion of civilian flights, but far too restrictive for the military.

savechip55, keep up the good work. I hope the airlines appreciate it. :ok:

LTP

[HugMonster]

LostThePicture - well named! ;) :rolleyes:

You're wrong in almost every important respect.

Just about nobody (CAA, NATS, MoD, civil operators) think the airspace we have is fine. And it needs rather a lot more than just "certain civilian carriers to use it properly", although it does need that.

It also needs certain (minority) military elements to show a sense of professionalism rather than yeeeeha gungho-ism.

Basically, I get the impression that you've never seen the world from the flight deck of a regional airliner, nor have any idea of what goes on in civilian aviation except for what you see on your screen. Please confirm this is wrong? :uhoh:

[LostThePicture]

The new North Sea airspace (have you flown on it yet Hugmonster?) came into being in March this year. The airspace was radically restructured because:
1) The old North Sea airspace was generating huge delays due to flow restrictions.
2) The military wanted a bigger danger area in which to fly their Typhoons, when they arrive.

Another change which occurred at about the same time was the introduction of a new class A airway, which was roughly along the lines of the old NORCA (POL-NEW) which allowed civil airliners to safely transit the Vale of York.

The airspace, as it stands now, is basically one big compromise between the CAA and the MoD. Nobody got exactly what they wanted (there wasn't enough space for that), but in the end the airspace was agreed in theory.

As far as I can see, the only people who are disgruntled with the current layout are the MoD, or more specifically, MASOR East. Why? Because they are being inundated with civilian traffic which they really should not have to be controlling. The idea was that all traffic routeing to Newcastle and Teesside from the East would go around via RIMTO and GASKO. But, for one political reason or another, the MoD agreed to give a service to NT/NV in/outbounds wanting to take the shorter route, outside CAS. Unfortunately, due to "profitability", this was EVERYONE. So, the MASOR are currently working their asses off doing our job.

I stand to be corrected, but I think more-or-less everyone in the civil world is quite pleased with the airspace. The capacity has been increased markedly and the sectors no longer cause delays. Happy airlines too, not waiting for a slot because of one inefficient sector. There have been a few teething problems on the ATC side, but that is only to be expected for such a huge change (the biggest ever to UK airspace).


In one part of the programme a civil pilot who had had an Airprox with a military aircraft stated "as I was flying through the Vale of York", he might well of started off by saying "as I was swimming off the Great Barrier Reef with a pork chop tied round my neck".
This statement from a post earlier in the thread more or less says it all really. Although I chuckled, the fact is that if you are flying out there over the Vale of York or the North Sea, below FL245, you can be receiving a service from ANYONE (MASOR East, Pennine Radar, the Lord Almighty) and you're still not necessarily safe. It's class G airspace, open FIR. The pilots in there don't have to be talking to anybody, they don't even have to have a transponder. And that includes military fast jets. "Gungho-ism" doesn't come into it - they aren't breaking any rules. Flying out there in a turboprop is a very, very risky business.

To answer your final question, I take my fam. flights (when I can get them) and consider myself reasonably well informed on the subject of civil aviation. (Do you have any idea what goes on in the world of ATC?) But no, I've never been on the flight deck of a regional airliner. And if the opportunity arose tomorrow to sit in the cockpit for a flight AMS-NCL, I'd stay at home. :uhoh: :eek:

LTP

[whowhenwhy]

Hugmonster, I am afraid that Lost the Picture actually seems to be able to see the bigger picture and I'm not being biased. A lot of these civ airliners flying through the VoY (including big airbuses for cripes sake) should not be there. Many pilots seem to think that they are still on-route, even more haven't got a clue what we are talking about when we ask them what type of radar service they require. We impose RAS because it's the best that we can do, but they DON'T UNDERSTAND what their responsibilities are under RAS. How safe is that??? On a weekend recently I actually explained RAS to a KLM pilot over the RT because he was the only guy on freq. After a couple of minutes he said 'ohhhhh, is that how it works!' Strangely enough when I then called traffic to him he said that he was 'good VMC and happy to continue' as well he might be. There was no cloud at all, 80k's vis nil wx. Learning had taken place!:ok:

[savechip55]

Lost the Picture :ok:
Good to see that somebody out there sees the bigger picture!
I for one thank you :ok:

[contact_tower]

It's class G airspace.............Flying out there in a turboprop is a very, very risky business.

Could there be a stronger reason for increasing the amount of CAS? :hmm:

[HugMonster]

c_t, you got it in one. Which is more than can be said for LTP."Gungho-ism" doesn't come into it - they aren't breaking any rules.

And if the opportunity arose tomorrow to sit in the cockpit for a flight AMS-NCL, I'd stay at home."I'm not breaking any rules - I can do what I like here" is not an attitude that will aid flight safety. Nor will the attitude shown by the second sentence of yours that I quoted.

Is it fair to assume that you are a mil controller?

[KPax]

It would have been nice if the programme had at least asked for the views of a military controller. One sided comments don't give the full picture.

[Kalium Chloride]

Datalink has been in use over the Pacific for years. Why do the Europeans have to re-invent the wheel all the time?


Because the datalink in the Pacific is FANS-based and it only works in low-density airspace.

If we could stick FANS datalink into Europe, we would have done. But core airspace here is a touch busier than it is over the ocean blue.

Think of it as inventing a round wheel instead of the square one that you're currently stuck with. ;)

[LostThePicture]

Of course, we could just blanket the country in controlled airspace and prohibit the military from flying anywhere. Would that satisfy contact_tower and Hugmonster? I think that the UK military already feel terribly restricted by the amount of controlled airspace that is starting to surround them - and you want another airway - a 3rd airway - to two fairly minor regional airports? Entirely unreasonable, given the relatively tiny volume of civilian air traffic that would use it.

Hugmonster, if I may answer your final question first - No, I am not a military controller. I am a civilian who can realise that the military are getting a very raw deal as far as this little patch of airspace is concerned.

As for my first comment that you have highlighted for criticism, I can only say the following (although that I can see, given your opinion, we may have to agree to disagree): Class G airspace is not designed for you and your regional turboprops to fly through; it is free airspace. Saying "I am not breaking any rules by not talking to ATC" does not display a lack of airmanship or professionalism, it's merely an exercise of rights. The only person jeopardising air safety is you, by expecting an advisory service in airspace which should be "see and avoid". Have you any idea how difficult it would be to avoid an unknown primary return by 5nm if it popped in front of your aircraft? That is the separation minimum, and that's what you're expecting a military controller to do for you as you trundle through his airspace at 250kts.

The traffic in class G is not necessarily exclusively military; there could be other small turboprops out there, capable of speeds and altitudes similar to civil airliners, who are not talking to anyone. The military controllers at MASOR East operate from a limited number of consoles, with a limited number of staff, and can therefore handle a limited number of aircraft. There is also a limit as to how many tracks each console will accept; I don't know the exact numbers because, as I said, I am not a military controller. But suffice to say it is not a huge number, and the sectors, at this time of year, are frequently overloaded. Every time they get lumbered with a civilian track wanting a RAS into Newcastle, their capacity to handle other traffic decreases. So in a way, you are the object of your own demise.

And so to my second comment. This was merely my personal view of the route which an aircraft flying AMS-NCL would take. It was not about flight safety, it was about PERSONAL safety. I would feel deeply anxious, knowing the airspace I'd be flying through. My job is all about flight safety, so there is little need to preach to me about it. All I'm saying is, when you take that right turn direct to Newcastle, you're out of my hands. And that's not to say that military hands are any less safe. They are excellent controllers who at times are asked to do unenviable tasks, hence my praise of savechip55 and his colleagues at West Drayton. In class G airspace anything can happen, and happen very quickly. Your safety is not a foregone conclusion, no matter whose hands you're in.

LTP

[EGPFlyer]

If the sun comes out tomorrow then I think I'm going to go play 'fly up and down in a MATZ'....I hope the RAF controllers can speak french! :O ;)

[contact_tower]

we could just blanket the country in controlled airspace and prohibit the military from flying anywhere.

It seems a bit odd to me that the RAF is allmost the only airforce in the world unable to fly in CAS...... You can do everything you do in G in class C/D, just just need clearence first. :E It's works here, and the fighter jocks seem quite content with the situation.

We often have F-16 on live and practice air to ground missions over Setermoen Bombing Rng, all of which are inside the class D-TMA. They talk to FAC or whoever on UHF, and with us on VHF. Works quite well actually. (Imagine, a fighter talking to a civ controller, oh wait we don't have any MIL controllers! :} )

[LostThePicture]

c_t, with the best will in the world, you cannot compare the procedures in Norway with how we do it here in the UK. We have some of the busiest controlled airspace in Europe and it pays to keep civilian and military air traffic apart. Although my knowledge of Norwegian geography is not complete, if Setermoen is anywhere near Bardufoss, I doubt that the military have many civilian flights to interfere with their jaunts in controlled airspace! It would be a little different here.

And anyway, we're not talking about class D here, we're talking about a class A airway. No VFR.

I'm delighted that your air force pilots are quite content to maintain listening watches on two frequencies, while on live-firing missions in Class D airspace! For a start we have areas for doing things like that. They're called DANGER areas, for obvious reasons. Secondly, the RAF pilots would be utterly distraught at having to maintain a listening watch on a civil frequency, AND talk to each other, AND conduct an exercise. And so they should be. It would be unnecessary.

It makes a whole lot more sense to let our fast jets operate in their own airspace, completely autonomously, so that they can concentrate solely on what they're supposed to be doing (training for conflict). And when they're finished they can call up a military frequency to get vectors home through class G airspace, keeping them outside busy CAS, and off the often even busier civilian frequencies. It's the best way of doing it.

LTP

[055166k]

Experience shows that even when there is a CAS option available it is not used. Cardiff traffic will join/leave at AMMAN rather than route via BCN; and join at ALVIN/leave to go through the FIR from near Lyneham and overhead Bristol...again to avoid routeing via BCN and remaining within the Airway system. This is compounded by the actual publication of arrival/departure routes that do not make use of CAS protection even when that option IS available. If an aircraft has an incident outside CAS when following a published procedure of this type does the relevant ATC Authority bear responsibilty and liability or is this another "washing of hands"......?

[HugMonster]

LTP, no your suggested "solution" would not make me happy. To suggest such an idiocy makes you sound very petulant. It is not a solution because it does not provide an improvement on what we have now.

No, Class G airspace is not "see and avoid". Those are the rules for VFR flight. There is a difference. You may like to look them up. While you're about it, check up the rules for flying IFR as well.

If a military jet is flying VFR in Class G airspace, the onus is on the pilot to ensure he is as well-informed as possible of other traffic using the airspace, and to see and avoid them. Failing to talk to ATC to inform himself of that, failing to use all means at his disposal to prevent accidents that may be caused by his playing with his mates is lack of professionalism.

Military controllers who refuse perfectly valid requests for information from the civilian colleagues about the likely intentions of military aircraft under their control also display similar lack of professionalism.

Civil airliners are as entitled to use Class G airspace as the driver of an FJ. At present there appears to be a singular lack of professional courtsey and responsibility about its use on the part of the military.

By your own admission airspace does not meet the needs of either the military or civilian operations.

It's time for a rethink.

[flower]

All aircraft have the option of remaining inside CAS if they wish to whilst being vectored at Cardiff to do so they can route via BCN. However the requests to do so are almost unheard of. Being both vectored inbound & outbound however that requires some quite extraordinary heading changes.
Note are routes may be published but they are not SIDs and STARs which of course we cannot have because of the lack of CAS
There is a note in the published procedures it says

Part of this route lies outside Controlled airspace. Radar service may be provided by Bristol approach Control or Cardiff Approach Control as appropriate. Pilots requiring to remain within Controlled Airspace should request routing via BCN with " London Control"

Outbound the only difference is that you request the routing with Cardiff

Aircraft flying in and out of Bristol and Exeter do not have that luxury they all have to fly in unregulated airspace.

I do dislike the way this thread seems to be military against Civil. Airspace is there for all to be used and there are many units such as mine who give RAS. I have encountered maybe 2 unhelpful military pilots in my time here, maybe because we have a UHF frequency the vast majority call us up for a service . Our LARS service to is comprehensive because of our necessity to vector aircraft outside of CAS. We have very little direct communication with "D" School Yeovilton but they keep there aircraft clear of all of our civil traffic .

I am unfamiliar with the VoY scenario however surely our military aircraft have sophisticated equipment to keep them clear of transponding aircraft, or am i simply being a fool here and I'm prepared to be corrected.

[PH-UKU]

All this talk about Class G is well and good, but what aboot the Class F airspace Advisory Routes ? That was the original grumble after all.

EGPFlyer - zuts alors !!:} Why not do 2.5nm DME arcs on the LUK TACAN ? :E

[LostThePicture]

My suggested "solution" was not a "solution" at all. At no point did I say it was a potential solution. It was hardly petulance on my part - forgive me but it seems that this is merely the ludicrous extreme to which your argument is heading.

No, Class G airspace is not "see and avoid". Those are the rules for VFR flight. There is a difference. You may like to look them up. While you're about it, check up the rules for flying IFR as well.
An interesting paragraph. Almost entirely fictional, but interesting all the same. My Manual of Air Traffic Services has the following to say about "see and avoid":

"In Class E, F and G airspace, conflicting traffic may not be known to ATC and so it is necessary for all flights to make use of the see and avoid principle."

ALL flights. Irrespective of flight rules. Aw, shucks Hugmonster, you haven't been flying through class G all these years with your eyes glued to the instruments have you? My manual also has the following to say about classifications of airspace:

Class: G
Flight Rules: IFR and VFR
Aircraft requirements: None
Minimum services by ATC Unit: None.

Which more or less backs up what I have been saying all along. There CAN be anyone in class G, and they don't have to be talking to anyone. In fact, if the military are too busy to handle your flight, they can deny you a service altogether. You could be out there all alone squawking 7000, with your eyes in the cockpit, because you're IFR. Hope you're feeling lucky.

You do have one thing correct: Yes, you do have as much right to be in class G airspace as a fast-jet, or any other aircraft for that matter. It is just extremely ill-advised to expect the same level of protection and separation in class G airspace as you would get from a civilian ATCO in class A airspace.

Even if we were to stamp out the alleged lack of professionalism which you insist is rife in military air traffic circles (it is not), you still have to avoid all the non-military traffic that may be there. Or are you immune to airmisses and collisions with GA traffic? Not with your head in the cockpit, you aren't.

By your own admission airspace does not meet the needs of either the military or civilian operations.
I didn't actually say this either. I said that the airspace was one big compromise. Neither the MoD or the CAA got exactly what they wanted out of the deal, but they thrashed out an agreement. The airspace DOES meet the needs of a majority of users; it would meet the needs of everyone if a few penny-pinching airlines swallowed the bitter pill that is a 40-50nm increase in track mileage to their destination.

PH-UKU (interesting name), the "original grumble" stems from an incident in the documentary which is the title of this thread, which occurred in class G airspace.

[contact_tower]

Delighted to hear that you have danger areas as well :cool: , As have we in this case, just is not lage enough! (desinged in the "bombing at low level" days) The current missions at medium level require a bit more space, and they cannot stay inside END-404.

Secondly, the RAF pilots would be utterly distraught at having to maintain a listening watch on a civil frequency

No loud screams last december during a deployment, but I guess they had to put up with it. :{

I have one sincere question: The military cannot need to occupy "all" your class G at all times, and you seem to have a lot of it. (Sitting with a Lower AS IFR map of the UK. Looks a bit tricky to get from say Newcastle to Birmingham. )

Make it CAS, and delegate it to the military WHEN they need it, and let everyone else play when they don't.

Edit: Removed childish remark :hmm: (I know UK airspace is congested, kinda mentioned that earlier):)

[HugMonster]

LTP, so long as you insist on arguing with things I have not said, there is little point in continuing this discussion.

You have no idea about how military aircraft behave in the "open" FIR, you have no idea about the economics of operating a route commercially, you have no interest in finding out the problems both military and civil aircraft encounter.

Carry on in your own little world. You have no interest in finding out the point of view of others. You are therefore part of the problem, and are incapable of being part of the solution.

[LostThePicture]

LTP, so long as you insist on arguing with things I have not said, there is little point in continuing this discussion.
Well, that's rich. I spent a good proportion of my last post defending myself against the somewhat inaccurate quotations that littered yours. If you can find an instance where I have misquoted you or taken your words out of context, I apologise.

You've now said on more than one occasion that I have no idea of regional airliner operations in class G airspace, and yet you refuse to enlighten me - isn't that what the forum is here for? I know what my ideas on the subject are, and contrary to your belief I have every interest in hearing your opinions (and anybody else's for that matter).

But it appears that I am not the only one here that needs to be educated. It is a fact that every time you venture into class G airspace you are at least partially responsible for your own separation, even if you are under a RAS. The see and avoid principle DOES apply.

You have said elsewhere in other posts that your airprox occurred in 2001 and was one of the "hairiest" you'd ever had. Did you know that arguably the most dangerous airprox in 2002 also happened just south of Newcastle, when an RJ85 and a Jaguar nearly collided? Just coincidence, or a pattern as a consequence of the whole operation being a bit questionable in the safety department? The operator of the RJ85 concerned ordered its pilots to fly the airways for a period of time after that incident. I refer you to the "Tombstone Imperative". If either of these two quite serious incidents had developed into a situation where fatalities had occurred, all civilian traffic would be flying the airways today and you know it. So why is it acceptable to take shortcuts across class G when people only nearly got killed?

One conceivable solution to the now much-loved problem would be for the area of class G airspace south of Newcastle to be available to commercial traffic during "off-route" hours. Every day, the MASOR phones the civilian sectors to inform us of the start and finish of military operations. Outside of these hours you are much less likely to come into conflict with a fast-jet, and demand on the military controller is greatly reduced. During weekday daylight hours (generally speaking when the military are most active) the civilian operators would agree to stay on route and fly the airways. Slightly less draconian than flying the airways at all times, despite the fact that in my opinion civil operators would be well advised to do so.

Hugmonster, if YOU seriously wanted to be part of the solution, you would save the petty insults and get a grip. By being so resistant to change when it is clearly inevitable, you are more a part of the problem than I will ever be.

LTP

[Slippers]

I would like to ask the pilots and operators of comercial airliners who choose to fly outside controlled airspace when a perfectly good airways route is available (all be it with extra track miles), whether they believe they get the same level of protection outside CAS as they do inside?

If the answer to the above question is no, then it's clear that they are putting their passengers at increased risk for solely comercial reasons.

If that is the case I would also like to ask whether their passengers are informed of this increased risk prior to purchasing a ticket?

Apart from the moral implications of this, it is also a question that I'm sure their families lawyers will be asking should anything happen to them!

[mainecoon]

ltp

whilst i agree with most of what you have said on this thread there are a few points i would like to raise as a pennine controller

first minor point masor never inform us or
the other sectors at manch of the off route status
secondly the re-route after the very close shave you mentioned still involved being off route between pole hill and newcastle as the airway was not established at that time

i agree that some (most not from our shores) don't understand the service that they are getting which is not great but the vast majority that i have dealt with over the years have a healthy respect for the airsapce and are very switched on

i would never miss-call the mill controllers but they are under a different kind of pressure than we on the civil side in that the pilots seem to try too force the issue more

example mil pilot on ris when you phone for co-ordination when giving a ras and the reply is ok i will call you in not a lot of help

that was a worst case but still happened lot

must admit though the current (political) situation is not ideal by any means which london mil and ourselves both agree

just trying to help don't like too see you and hug at loggerheads
regrds maine:ok:

[HugMonster]

OK. First, as has been pointed out many times, the way CAS is laid out at present leaves several airports with little or no access to airways. In many cases, therefore, traffic using these airports has no choice but to fly outside. In many other cases, the airways do not provide coverage on many of the routes people want to fly. Ditto.

Stop looking at this as exclusively a NCL problem. Various sneering comments have been made at pilots and airlines about not wishing to accept the extra track miles.

We have a schedule to keep. If we don't keep to it, people ask questions. Even something as small as, say, a F50 takes somewhere in the region of £1500 per hour to keep in the air. An extra 33 track miles therefore puts £250 on the cost of a one-way trip. Di that eight times per day and you've lost a couple of thousand quid - or put it another way, your break-even load factor has just gone up by two pax per trip - not insignificant in a small aircraft.

Compare this with the efforts we make to tanker fuel when we can - uploading at AAA instead of BBB can save £15 per rotation. That's all. So £500 per rotation is a LOT of dosh. Compare the reported saving BA made by reducing the number of olives in a business-class salad from three to two.

Running off-airways is a risk, yes. Of course it is. Nobody doubts it. Sometimes (going into NWI or HUY for example) there is no choice in the matter.

In general, pilots on both sides of the civvie/mil divide are extremely professional. There are exceptions on both sides, however. Where these exceptions occur, people tend to tar all with the same brush. I have had conversations with mil pilots who refer to airways as "your bit of airspace" and Class G as "our bit of airspace". He quite seriously argued that civil traffic should not be permitted in Class G. I have heard military traffic refuse to move and refuse to give ATC an estimate of when they would relinquish their "box" to allow traffic to descend into NWI.

I keep myself as up-to-date on ATC matters as I can. I regularly visit my local ATC unit wherever I'm based. I try to understand from talking to them what the specific problems in the area are. I've attended ATC training days, I've played in ATC simulators. I've watched the Pennine guys and gals going throught heir paces trying to keep stuff apart. I'm trained as a Flight Safety Officer, and still have very good contacts in the military world. So you can believe me when I say I know what goes on on the other side of the mike.

Part of the perceived problem between civil and military FJ mates is that airline pilots are generally paid to be ultra-conservative and restrained. By the time they get a command, on average they are well into the second half of their working lives. In contrast, FJ drivers are much younger, and while trained to the nuts in safety, are selected for a rather more aggressive, "can-do" attitude to their work. This can result in their being perceived as gung-ho. In a very few cases, the gung-ho attitude is real. My colleagues, on the other hand, are seen often as stick-in-the-mud, get in the way, refuse to do anything they've never done before, and are slow.

What's the solution? Tolerance, professionalism, attention to other airspace users and their needs.

[1261]

HM,

Your points throughout this thread have all been valid, and I (as one who [I'm pretty sure] works your company's aircraft routinely) respect your opinion.

However, reading your last post leads me to one conclusion: that if such routings are necessary in order to render such a route viable, then surely it ISN'T viable.

[HugMonster]

I disagree.

How many mid-airs have we had in the UK in any given period you could name? (As I said in the programme, sooner or later one will happen. But there is more than one way of ensuring that day is as far away as possible.)

I can't think of any. I can think of a great many near misses. Sadly, the military are responsible for far more than their fair share, but that's life.

Next, compare, say the number of CFITs in the UK, or any other accident cause.

My thesis is that our airspace can be made safe for all, that we can have a system of airspace that serves all those who have the right to be there - transit traffic, heavy jets, light regional stuff, business users, military, training traffic, microlights, gliders, ag sprayers, skydivers - the lot.

At the moment all we have is a "system" that has grown up piecemeal, developed by tinkering with it each time it became too unwieldy and useless.

[mainecoon]

thanks hug

we seem to be getting to the point of this board finally

keep talking and we can share views:cool:

i take on board you point about the ncl thing

i am from near inverness and follow the threads on these probs but

haven't been up the road to scottish on a visit for some time

thanks for the input and keep it coming
regards maine:E

[LostThePicture]

Yeah, cheers HugMonster, I also appreciate the insight, and it seems we may agree on more than we think! There IS absolutely no excuse for anyone in the military to think that class G is exclusively for their use. I have yet to come across anybody on the ATC side who subscribes to this view, but as you say, some pilots may think differently. At the same time though, the ATCOs are probably starting to feel a little bit like undervalued civvies in that they handle a great deal of civilian traffic during the daytime when they should really be concentrating on looking after their own.

I also agree that there is no reason why routes to the regional airports should not be viable, whether it be NCL, HUY, NWI, MME or wherever. Eastern Airways seem to be doing quite well, and a great number of their operations need to fly outside CAS. The loss of smaller regional routes would be detrimental to us all. Pilots suffer from uncertainty over job security, passengers suffer the inconvenience of having to travel overland to get to their nearest major airport, and ATCOs suffer as more and more traffic wants to be going to the same place at the same time, making sectors more vulnerable to sudden overloads.

While you say this is not solely a NCL/MME problem, it is where most of the problems lay. Traffic into NWI and HUY tends to have fewer conflictions (military or otherwise), and as you say there is no choice other than to fly outside CAS.

An extra 33 track miles therefore puts £250 on the cost of a one-way trip. Di that eight times per day and you've lost a couple of thousand quid - or put it another way, your break-even load factor has just gone up by two pax per trip - not insignificant in a small aircraft.
As an alternative, could you not just charge (on an F50) each passenger £5 more for each sector? I know that fare pitching is a fine balancing act between having aircraft full, and operating with them half-full. I also know that ultimately the passengers will have to bear the cost of any increase in flight time. Would there be a massive loss of goodwill for £5? At the moment most of the AMS-NCL aircraft are F100's anyway. Correct me if I'm wrong, but the potential "increased cost per passenger" would be reduced on a larger, faster aircraft? And you would only have to charge this fare when the direct routeing wasn't available.

I respect the view that the airspace should be available to all users at all times. It should. But sadly history has shown than this isn't always as safe as it should be.

[BIK_116.80]

fourthreethree,

....the last two times I have needed to give emergency avoiding action was solely due to....TCAS. False RA's which the pilot is obliged to act upon are the scurge of my life, especially when the a/c concerned climbs outside atc restrictions int opposite traffic which is seen by TCAS as less of a threat than the the traffic atc is keeping it clear of.

I’m interested to learn precisely what you mean by “False RA”.

Do you mean :

(1) The TCAS system was malfunctioning – ie operating outside its technical specifications – and issued an RA that should not have been issued if the TCAS was performing correctly; or

(2) The TCAS system was performing as advertised and correctly issued an RA in accordance with its technical specifications?

Mr Big,

....situational awareness is of great importance.

I agree.

But listening to the radio is not the ONLY way to obtain situational awareness information.

Fourthreethree,

Yes datalink could work faster than a human. As far as I'm aware thats not under discussion. The point is that if it fails, and it will then the controller needs to be able to take over, which would not be possible with your scenario.

It’s not possible now – at least not with the same airspace capacity.

When the UK ATC computers fail (as they have done) the whole airspace comes to a grinding halt. No one is allowed to take-off and those that are already airborne suffer lengthy holding. When things come back online the target sector flow rates are a mere fraction of what they usually are. The current airspace capacity is only possible because of the computers. Datalink will be no different.

garp,

Europe is leading the way it should be told or if you want to hear it from the FAA itself :

According to one FAA official....[etc]

I would not dispute that the FAA do have some of the most out-dated ATC computer systems on the planet. It’s a legacy from being first into the technology – there are now an enormous number of old, 1960s and 1970s computers that regularly break down, are difficult to maintain (both hardware and software) and which are long past their use-by date.

Thankfully, the private-sector development work that Boeing are doing in the area of air traffic management eclipses anything that is even on the drawing boards of the governments of Europe or the USA.

Point Seven,

On the subject of datalink, I don't think that anyone can be in any doubt that it IS the future. Whether we like it or not, eventually all controllers will no longer fill the role that we have now, but we will act as system monitors and only intervene when things get out of hand.

I very much agree. :ok: :ok:

I'm not talking about next Wednesday, but in the future it will happen, it has to.

I wasn’t talking about next Wednesday either. :) I agree that it has to happen.

How else are we going to reduce controllers workloads sufficiently to accommodate the massive predicted increases in traffic?

You aren’t. The only other option is to acquiesce to the NIMBYs demands to tax the hell out of aviation (as if it isn’t already :rolleyes: ) so that no one can afford to fly. I guess that’s one way to solve the airspace capacity problem! (Not my preferred way, mind you.)

Datalink will remove a lot of "chores" that do not have massive safety bearings (initial flight plan clearances, changes in routings etc.) and allow controllers to concentrate on keeping planes apart. WHEN the technology allows then maybe we can start to let it take over a bit more but there remains a lot of work to be done.

Agreed.

....it was a FALSE RA anyhow

See above.

Lon More,

After you've read that lot come back and tell us we're reinventing the wheel.

I’ve read it.

You’ve re-invented the wheel.

There is much new development work yet to be done on the technology and procedures that surround datalink in order to allow it to work well in a terminal environment – the pilot and controller interfaces for example, the interfaces with yet to be developed automated ATC computer systems and with the more automated and more integrated airborne avionics of the future.

But before Europe starting work on all the sexy stuff they invested heavily in developing a new and incompatible basic communications protocol at a time when suitable technology already existed and was already in use.

Many states (inc. Germany still?) have frequencies allocated to their own language, normally only for VFR.

Last time I flew IFR into Nuremburg the controllers were speaking Deutsch to aircraft that wanted to speak Deutsch and were speaking English to aircraft that wanted to speak English. It worked just fine.

Five official languages (plus American) It doesn't require fluency, but just understanding the words, climb, descend and turn, may be enough to save your life.

Precisely! :ok:

I can only understand a few words of German - the numbers and a few other aviation related terms - but that was enough for me to have a fair idea of what was going on.

For many reasons, with 4-3-3 on TCAS. Unfortunately it does not provide situational awareness but seems to be encouraging the opposite.

Like any technology – the massive amount of situational awareness information available from TCAS is only ever as good as the operator using it.

And there are many different types of TCAS displays – some allowing much greater situational awareness than others.

Some of the cheap and nasty retro-fitted TCAS units (the type that replace the round-dial electro-mechanical VSI with a combined LCD VSI/TCAS display) have a maximum traffic display range of just 12 nautical miles, with a reduced range of 6 nm being pilot-selectable. Other combined VSI/TCAS displays have a maximum range of just 15 nm. It’s fine when flying at relatively low speed in a terminal environment - but these displays are of only limited value when enroute.

The better TCAS displays overlay traffic information on a moving-map navigation display and have a TCAS traffic display range of at least 40 nm.

As a bare minimum, most TCAS systems will display traffic within a window of +2,700 feet to -2,700 feet. But the better units also allow the flight crew to select +/-9,900 feet. On some units +/-8,400 feet is pilot selectable.

If a particular TCAS display has maximum display parameters of +/-2,700 feet, or if the flight crew has neglected to select -9,900 feet when such a selection is available then the TCAS display will not show traffic that is (for example) 3,000 feet below – at least not until that traffic becomes a TA or RA.

It’s also possible (but highly unusual) to fly around with no TCAS traffic displayed – with just the TA/RA aurals.

So there are a few variables. If you want the best possible TCAS derived situational awareness then get a TCAS display that goes to 40 (or more) miles and +/-9,900 feet and always ensure that you use the most appropriate display settings. You wouldn’t, for example, want +9,900 feet selected if you were in a 3,000 feet per minute descent. Displaying traffic that is more than 2,700 feet above will only serve to clutter the display and might mean that you don’t notice other more relevant traffic that is below you.

Take as an example a reporting point where 3 inbound routes converge for Amsterdam, EEL. Take an inbound flight descending to fl260 to cross EEL at level. After the usual, do we have to start down now, do we have to be level at EEL (Really, it's on the tape) descent commences 4.500 to 5000 fpm. Passing FL265 the aircraft levels off then starts to climb and turn !!! Reason TCAS alert on traffic maintaining FL250.

Hardly surprising.

If you issue a descent clearance with a crossing constraint without specifying “descend now....” or “when ready....” then why is it unreasonable for the flight crew to seek clarification?

Anecdotal evidence suggests that more often than not a flight crew that make the query will be told “descend when ready”.

If controllers always specified “when ready” or “descend now” when issuing a descent clearance with a crossing constraint then there would be no uncertainty, and the flight crew query would be redundant.

In any case, why was it imperative to leave the descent instruction so perilously late that just the very briefest of delays from two simple flight crew queries (which could just as easily have been two other stations transmitting simultaneously, or whatever) would necessitate a 4,500 – 5,000 feet per minute rate of descent in order to meet the crossing constraint? Isn’t it the case that the dangerously late descent instruction was the point at which the wheels fell off the separation wagon in the Lake Constance disaster?

The resulting RA that you describe is clearly the result of a high closure rate - both vertically and laterally. TCAS works in terms of the time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach. TCAS is not interested in the concept of “cleared level” because there is never any absolute guarantee that an aircraft will actually stop at its ATC-assigned level. As long as the crews don’t fly against an RA then TCAS will keep the planes apart without any regard for who is cleared to what level.

A slightly more un-nerving variation on the theme is the TCAS “crossing RA” where the descender is issued with a TCAS RA to increase descent THROUGH its cleared level and the conflicting traffic below is issued with a TCAS RA to climb or to increase climb ABOVE or THROUGH its cleared level. The two aircraft pass not only through their own cleared levels but the aircraft also vertically pass each other. A crossing RA can be most disconcerting for everyone involved - but it will still result in a miss as long as the crews don’t fly against the RA.

A crossing RA is almost always the result of an irresponsibly high rate of climb or descent when close to a cleared level. The adequacy of flight crew training in this area is open to question. The UK has mandated the fitment of TCAS in certain aircraft. Although there is mandatory flight crew training, many operators treat it as no more than a box-ticking exercise. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that flight crew knowledge about TCAS is woefully inadequate - self-induced RAs due to excessive vertical rates when close to a cleared level (and even the occasional crossing RA) prove it. Will the problem go away? No.

One might also question the timing of descent clearances with crossing constraints that are issued so impossibly late that the flight crew can only come back with “we’ll do our best”.

....questioning of instruction to turn,: traffic info then given response is, “We see him on TCAS”

It’s entirely possible that at the precise moment when the flight crew asked for confirmation of the turn instruction the conflicting traffic was not clearly displayed on their TCAS display. This could happen for any number of reasons (see above).

But would you prefer that the flight-crew NOT question an instruction that doesn’t sound right – for whatever reason?

How about the flight crew that was inbound to Amsterdam on a heading of approximately east and expecting runway 18C that misunderstood a verbal heading instruction as 255 degrees. Should the flight crew question that? Well one flight crew didn’t – they just flew the right turn (as they believed they had been instructed and as they had read back), putting them head to head with following traffic!

The three people that all pressed their push to talk at the same time prevented the controller hearing the incorrect read-back. As far as the flight crew were concerned they had read back the heading instruction and had not been corrected by the controller. Had the flight crew queried it they would have realised that it was for another aircraft.

Flight crew must be encouraged to clarify any instructions that don’t seem right – for whatever reason.

Fourthreethree,

Or maybe if certain pilots learned to use their TCAS it would also help.

Agreed - please see above.

As heard a few days ago......

Maas “XYZ123 descend FL300”
XYZ123 “Er Maastricht confirm we have traffic on TCAS 1000 feet below?”
Maas “Negative sir traffic is 1000 feet above”
XYZ123 “Ok, roger descending FL300”

Again, would you prefer the flight crew to NOT query your descent instruction if they believed (for whatever reason) that there was traffic below?

Isn’t it better for the flight crew to double check and look like a bit of a goose than not ask the question at all?

Aren’t we all playing the same game here?

Slippers,

On the subject of Datalink, although I have no experience of it, I can't see that it can be quicker than verbal communication.

I imagine that from the time that I decide I want to give an instruction in my head, I would have to:-

click on an a/c, select the type of instruction, click on climb or descend, click the desired level, select any level by restriction, confirm the instruction and then send. The pilot would then have to see the instruction and then send an acknowledged reply which I would then also have to see.

How would that be quicker than saying “C/S descend FL250 level by LOGAN”, “Roger descending FL250 Level by LOGAN, c/s”

Please correct me if that is not how it works.

Doing it that way wouldn’t be any quicker. Your rate of data entry is clearly the weak link in the chain.

And you’re right - that’s basically how datalink has been used on Pacific routes for nearly ten years.

But that type of controller interface is now old hat and we need to look to the future.

The great advantage of datalink is that it can transmit vast quantities of explicitly addressed data very quickly and very reliably with automatic confirmation that the correct recipients have received the correct data.

Datalink is not the be all and end all in its own right – datalink is an enabling technology that will allow an ATC computer to communicate directly with an airborne avionics suite – or a thousand airborne avionics suites. And the ability to do that has enormous potential to increase safety, efficiency and capacity.

But please don’t imagine for a minute that there will be a human sitting at a keyboard or manipulating a mouse trying to input detailed instructions for hundreds or thousands of aircraft. There wont.

The human air traffic controller’s job will change from one of micro-managing a handful of aircraft, “controlling”, to one of overseeing the automated handling of vast numbers of aircraft – “managing”.

On the subject of fully automated ATC, when will we learn that humans are NOT good system monitors. Our concentration levels always lapse when we are asked to do boring and monotonous tasks like checking that a computer is doing it's job properly.

Agreed. And the main reason for that is that for the overwhelming majority of the time the computers do a fabulous job and don’t need human intervention.

History is littered with disasters caused by this very fact.

It is.

But the question we should be asking ourselves is not whether there will be disasters due to lack of human ability to reliably monitor ATC computers - the question we should be asking is whether the rate of those disasters will be more or less than what the rate would be if we continue with the current labor-intensive ATC methods that rely on fallible humans processing enormous volumes of data to formulate a plan and then correctly communicate instructions to other fallible humans via an unreliable asynchronous VHF voice link.

I think that on that measure the scales are tipped in favour of a more automated ATC process – particularly so when you consider the vastly greater traffic densities that will be required in the future.

Humans are far better when they have to think about what they are doing, formulating plans and actively problem solving. Sure we make mistakes, but we are also in a far better position to spot and correct those mistakes if it is us that have made them!

Again, the question is not what type of work humans are best at – the question is what is the best overall solution for the management of air traffic.

Is it preferable to have the detailed tasks performed by humans simply because it allows human ATCers to be working to their greatest potential, or would it be better to use a more automated system if it could achieve better ATM performance in terms of safety, efficiency and capacity?

Garp,

As you can see there are benefits to the system [datalink] and it's needless to say that things will improve in the coming years. Still I'm convinced that voice will remain essential with the present ATC systems for the coming decades.

Agreed. Unfortunately technological progress is never as fast as it needs to be. As Point Seven said – we’re “...not talking about next Wednesday”.

ModernDinosaur

If messages for other aircraft are also displayed, surely there is a much greater risk of “mis-reading” an instruction intended for someone else....

Although different datalink systems do many things differently one of the things they have in common is the ability to address messages to a specific aircraft.

Executive instructions from ATC are explicitly addressed and are delivered only to the particular aircraft that is directly affected.

You wont have to wade through pages and pages of data to find a message that was directed to you.

....controlled airspace over the whole of the UK from surface to orbit PROVIDED that all aircraft (including GA) have an equal right to fly......I'd expect something like 95% of airspace below FL100 to be class-E or class-D with comprehensive secondary radar cover and staffed to provide RIS/LARS to all, with class-C (or even class-B) airspace around the busier airports. Hmmm - sounds a bit like the US....

I’d expect that too.

Unfortunately there are two problems.

Firstly, the status quo in the UK is that the vast majority of “airways” are class A – no VFR allowed. I can’t see any sensible justification for this. Why couldn’t this airspace be class B, for example? In class B VFR is allowed but everything is still separated from everything else. Then again, what’s wrong with class C? Class C is still a known traffic environment and everyone needs a clearance. Why couldn’t the airways be class C?

The controlled airspace issue is further complicated because in the UK many people incorrectly assume that “controlled airspace” necessarily means class A. I’ve lost count of the number of people who’ve sternly told me that one is not allowed to fly in “controlled airspace” unless one has an instrument rating. They don’t seem to realise that the class D control zone surrounding their local airport is controlled airspace! (Not to mention class B and class C.)

The other problem is that there has been chronic under investment in the UK’s aviation infrastructure for decades – same as the railways.

Someone’s got to pay for it and no one is putting their hand up.

A group of airlines tried but most of them have now written off their investment in NATS as a bad joke that resulted from a flawed decision that seemed like a good idea at the time.

Controlled airspace (whether class A, B, C, D or E) exists to reduce the risk that fare paying passengers will be involved in a mid-air collision. But I agree that it’s a bit useless if it doesn’t go where the planes go! The airway system exists to service the needs of air traffic - not the other way ‘round.

Jerricho,

I invite you (and I'm sure other ATCO's would agree here) to come and watch a radar of a very busy Terminal environment, where there are so many pressures of using minimum separation standards.

Yep - been there done that, thanks. And I do agree that the pressures are enormous.

Even though the vast majority of air traffic controllers are highly intelligent, highly skilled and highly motivated people they find themselves needing to utilise a dangerously large proportion of their available brain power whilst performing a safety critical function under enormous pressure.

It’s hardly the sort of task that we should be entrusting to mere humans!

I'm sure you would get mighty p*ssed off if somebody told you how to do your job.

These sound like the words of someone who is so engrossed in micro-managing the detail that they cant see the forest for the trees.

I’m always open to new suggestions because I know that there’s more than one way to skin a cat.

When it’s all said and done most airline flight crew are obliged to follow their company’s standard operating procedures. Flight crew are told how to do their job.

Just the same as air traffic controllers are told how to do their job. I’m referring to MATS Part 1 and the multitude of different inter-unit interface agreements, amongst other criteria.

In regard to datalink and more automated ATC processes it’s quite obvious that the rulebook will require significant revision. I’m talking in terms of re-writing the rule book – not how to comply with the current one that has been constrained by technology and which has remained largely unchanged for decades.

I do have a question reference datalink. Let's look at a final approach situation where the a lander suddenly burst a tyre and spills it on the runway. What will happen to the 6 jets following. How will missed approach/breaking off instructions be issued? I'm interested in hearing BIK's thoughts on this one!

Would an icon that said “RUNWAY CLOSED – DELAY NOT DETERMINED” suit you?

A human air traffic controller detects that an aircraft is stuck on the runway and clicks an icon. The automated ATC computer has been continuously calculating a go-around plan for all the inbounds every few seconds. The ATC computer issues aircraft specific explicitly addressed go-around instructions via datalink. All the inbounds are automatically assigned a holding fix and level.

Flight crews can continue to hold or they can nominate a diversion airport via datalink. If they request to divert the automated ATC computer will generate a clearance to the alternate including enroute, STAR, time to leave the alternate’s inbound holding fix and the landing runway.

When the disabled aircraft has been removed from the runway the human air traffic controller can click on a “RUNWAY OPEN” icon and the automated ATC computer will issue each of the inbounds with an aircraft specific explicitly addressed time to leave the holding fix and instrument approach clearance.

Just as an aside as well about technology supposedly making our lives easier, look at the trial of FAST (Final Approach Spacing Tool) by LHR approach. Playing that things rules was dangerous, and many people showed better landing rates than the machine....

Dare I suggest it – garbage in garbage out. Any computer system can only ever be as good as its software.

We must ensure that any future automated ATC system is developed by a team of the very best and brightest computer specialists, ATCers and flight crew.

Please rest assured that at Boeing that is precisely what is happening.

radar707

Avoiding Action is rarely used because we've let separation erode.

It is mainly used outside controlled airspace because of pop up traffic or fast moving military traffic whose intentions we do not know and starts to do a dirty dive right towards your aeroplane....

Why are you attempting to provide a separation service involving unknown traffic outside controlled airspace?

Or perhaps more to the point, why does your employer require you to attempt to provide a separation service involving unknown traffic outside controlled airspace? What a silly state of affairs!

If the traffic density and/or traffic type in a particular area does genuinely need a separation service then the area should be designated as controlled airspace.

I know that UK ATC units can provide RAS / RIS / FIS to participating traffic in an unknown traffic environment outside controlled airspace – but what other country attempts to do this? Is this just another quaint ICAO difference?

RAS does nothing more than provide the appearance of a separation service – it’s a feel good measure that is big on vibe and small on substance. And as your post amply demonstrates, attempting to provide RAS in an unknown traffic environment is not only hugely labor-intensive, but it relies entirely on the great skill, careful judgement, and faultless performance of a fallible human air traffic controller. At best, all of that sounds rather optimistic. At worst, it’s nothing more than a perilous ruse.

And is it really all that sensible to have military aircraft conducting combat manoeuvres amongst the tax-payer carrying civilian aircraft in class G airspace?

OK, let’s think about this. Civilian aircraft (the big ’uns and the little ’uns) need a convenient place to fly but they don’t want to get run-down by a combat aircraft in a mid-air collision.

The military would ideally like an area all to themselves for their exclusive use, free from the hazard and distraction of civilian aircraft, where all traffic is known and the chaps can “roger” and “tally-ho” to their heart’s content.

And what’s the current situation? An enormous compromise that suits no one.

The military fly their combat manoeuvres in class G, but the area is designated an “Area of Intense Air Activity”, warning civilian pilots not to fly there – unless they want to. AIAA or not – it’s still class G.

The defence forces exist to protect the taxpayers, not imperil them – which is precisely what they do when they fly combat manoeuvres in class G airspace.

The civilian pilots (big ’uns and little ’uns) fly through these AIAAs and either cross their fingers and hope for the best, relying on the big-sky theory (which works extremely well for 99.99% of the time), or they talk to someone on the radio and obtain a half-baked separation service (RAS) in an unknown traffic environment outside controlled airspace.

No one is doing anything illegal – but it’s a very big compromise from both perspectives.

I’m sure that those who conceived this compromise perceived it as being the best of both worlds.

But I suggest that in reality what we actually have is they very worst of both worlds.

The military will, at times, need to reserve an area of airspace for their exclusive use. Why not allocate suitable restricted areas? They don’t have to be permanent – they could be only at certain published times of the day on certain days of the week (like the AIAAs are now), or they could be activated by NOTAM. The restricted areas don’t even have to be in the UK. Many civilian and military pilots already spend a significant proportion of their training time outside their home country. Does it really make sense for military pilots to conduct combat training manoeuvres in the densely populated airspace over a densely populated small island? I think not.

Alternately, why not designate all of the airspace that is currently an AIAA as class C airspace. When the airspace is required for military operations it can be allocated, either wholly or in blocks, to military users. In effect – nothing more than obtaining a clearance. When the airspace is not required for military operations civilian traffic can obtain a clearance to transit or operate with a more realistic expectation that they are not going to be run down by fast moving military traffic.

The question is simple – is it safe for civilian light aircraft and small airliners to fly in class G AIAAs whilst military aircraft are conducting combat training manoeuvres?

If the answer to that question is YES then why are we having this discussion?

By classifying the AIAAs as class G the UK government is tacitly suggesting that it’s perfectly safe - anyone is allowed to fly there at anytime. If it wasn’t safe to fly there then the government would not have classified it as class G.

But if, as many viewers seem to be suggesting, the answer is NO then we need some way of POSITIVELY ensuring that separation is maintained. The only real way is to have a known traffic environment – either a restricted area or some class of controlled airspace.

....if you like I can refuse to provide you with a Radar Advisory Service and just give you a Radar Information Service....

If the traffic is outside controlled airspace then why are you required to attempt to provide it with any service? It’s not a known traffic environment – leave ’em alone.

....or if I'm really busy giving avoiding action to IFR traffic under a Radar Control Service in Class E airspace against pop up traffic 12 o clock 1 mile no height information....

Now we are getting to the heart of the problem.

Why has this traffic only just popped up? And why is there no pressure altitude information?

The UK authorities have mandated the carriage of TCAS in certain aircraft.

But they have not mandated that all other aircraft must carry and use a transponder with altitude reporting.

It’s a half-hearted solution that in reality is just window dressing.

I’m told by various UK-based air traffic controllers (civil and military) that 85+% of the non-squawking (or squawking but with no altitude information) traffic that are asked to “squawk mode C” come back with a verifiable altitude that is within vertical navigation tolerances within just a few seconds. It would seem that the vast majority of (mainly light, but sometimes military) aircraft that are flying around without squawking have this stuff fitted but switched off!!!!

I’m told by various aero-club and flying school instructors and students that they make a regular practice of flying around with their transponder’s altitude output switched off so that they “don’t get caught being somewhere we are not supposed to be”. This is an entirely ridiculous state of affairs. If they are not where they are supposed to be then that is PRECISELY the time when it is imperative that surrounding traffic know EXACTLY where they are!

There needs to be a law that mandates that if an aircraft is fitted with an altitude reporting transponder that it must be switched on with altitude reporting enabled. Such a requirement would have no cost impact on airspace users.

Which leaves those aircraft without an automatic altitude reporting function. Various flying magazine advertisements show altitude encoding blind altimeters available in the UK, tax paid, for under £150. Is this too much to ask? I think not.

....or that fast moving military traffic you've no chance of seeing

See above about military aircraft in class G.

But the main reason I wouldn’t see it is I will be head inside looking at the TCAS display – particularly if I am in cloud at the time. But even that’s a bit of a waste of time if other aircraft refuse to switch on their altitude reporting transponder.

We do a bloody good job stopping aeroplanes banging into each other, a darn sight better than any computer could do via datalink.

Any existing computer system? Yes.

Any future computer system? We’ll see.

ferris,

CPDLC....it's use in the Pacific is a great improvement. OVER HF. However, the oz experience showed that where VHF is available, it is far more preferable to use that.

The preferred European datalink protocol is VDL-2 which uses VHF.

I can certainly see the day where CPDLC will be used in preference to VHF. You know when that day will be, BIK116.8? The day they take human pilots out of the loop. So be careful what you wish for.

You seem to imply that I should fear the advance of automation because of some unspecified desire to perform continuous and repetitive detailed tasks associated with operating an aircraft.

I don’t.

Or perhaps it’s that you believe that I should for some reason be motivated to resist safety, capacity and efficiency enhancing technological advances for the sole purpose of conspiring to keep as many pilots employed as is possible.

I’m not.

I don’t believe that the primary reason for the existence of the aviation industry is to provide employment for pilots or for air traffic controllers (or anyone else).

You may be a rabid controller-hater....

Air traffic controllers are often highly intelligent, highly skilled and highly motivated people. Some of my best mates are air traffic controllers (or former controllers).

What I do hate is inefficiency.

....but guess what? All that vitriol you spit at us (computers will be able to do it better than you etc) applies equally to pilots.

I agree. :ok: The less we rely the variable performance of humans and the more we automate both processes the better. Safety, capacity and efficiency will all improve.

So when we are both out of a job, with the ATC computer directly feeding sequencing instructions into the onboard FMS, you'll be able smile smugly and say “I told you so!”. Be careful what you wish for.

Sounds great – I can’t wait! I look forward to the time off! :) :ok:

But as we both know the reality will be nothing like that.

It is certainly true that there has been a significant reduction in the number of flight deck crew required to operate a large airliner.

In the bad old days airliners required a captain, a co-pilot, a flight engineer, a navigator, and a radio operator. And if you flew very long flights you had to carry two of each!

Thankfully, aircraft technology and airborne automation have improved to the point that now even the very largest airliners are operated by a flight deck crew of just two.

Over the last few decades airliners have gone from requiring five crew - to four - to three - to two. You really don’t have to be Einstein to predict what the next step will be! :) :ok:

The military are already making great progress with the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles. Technology that is initially developed for military purposes has a habit of eventually finding its way onto civilian aircraft. Perhaps there might be two more steps to go!

Bring it on I say! :ok:

The aviation industry does not exist simply to provide employment for pilots or air traffic controllers.

All that being as it may.....even if one were to take a rather left-wing socialist “make work” attitude towards the aviation industry in the belief that it exists primarily to provide employment for the greatest possible number of people, the anti-automation argument still seems to fall flat.

A more automated ATC, with a network of ATC computers automatically generating clearances and issuing them to an automated airborne avionics suite via datalink with the aircraft being left alone to fly itself in LNAV and VNAV will be a great thing for the workers.

Air traffic “controllers” will become air traffic “managers”. They wont have to get bogged down with the detailed micro-management of a small number of aircraft. Air traffic managers will oversee the automated control of a much larger number of aircraft at a much greater traffic density. There will be very little to do but put your feet up and drink coffee (I say – that sounds frightfully familiar.... ;) ).

And don’t believe for a moment that there will be a smaller total number of controllers required. The compound growth in air transport movements will cause an enormous increase in traffic density (isn’t that what the whole TV show was about?) and there will be just as many (if not more) of your comrades employed – but each one of them will be one or two orders of magnitude more productive.

ps. What language would you like the CPDLC instructions to arrive in? English, French, Basic, Java.............

All of the above – pilot selectable – by the (one and only, for now at least) pilot. :)

[Scott Voigt]

BIK 116.8;

Hate to say it mate, but you are looking at some OLD data. The FAA doesn't have old computers anymore. We have gotten rid of most of the old stuff. We do indeed have some older software around in the host processing in the new hardware, but our computers don't fail very much anymore. We are also working with new displays and some of the enroute facilities are working with new data systems also. More are to come on line in the next 8 to 12 months.

We are also working on the new HOST replacement hardware and software. The design is being ironed out and the requirements are set in firm jello as of now. Hopefully we will see some good direction on this new program by next year (ERAM)....

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman

116.8;

While I am at it <G>... The Boeing plan does look sexy doesn't it. The problem with it though is when you get into it, it lacks substance and the HOW they are going to do it. We have talked with them about the PLAN... They can never answer the questions of just how they are going to be able to do it, nor can they answer how much is it going to cost and who is going to pay for it...

While working on projects ( I enjoy working out of the box ) we have asked the engineers to come up with some really neat stuff that we controllers would like to have to make our jobs eaiser so that we can move more aircraft. It is something that we like to do here if you aren't to familiar with the US ATC... The answer from the experts who are writing all this wonderful code ( Don't work for the FAA or any other part of the govt. they are private enterprise. ) is that we can't do that yet. Even the more or less minor things that we would like to do we are told that we can't afford it even if we can make it work. So, if it is unaffordable, then it is for now unobtainable.

There are indeed things that we can do better, and hopefully we can come up with an integrated solution for it that is not cost prohibitive. But many of the things that are going to be needed to improve the through put of aircraft is going to require equipment not just on the ground and in space, but in the cockpit, and as we have found out with datalink. The airlines are not in a position to desire to upgrade their fleets and spend the money. Nor are they in a position to upgrade the nav in the 70's and 80's era glass cockpit aircraft that use DME/DME for navigation. This is leaving them out of some of the leading edge nav stuff that we are trying to do to improve efficiencies of getting about in both the terminal and enroute airspace. So it isn't just the problem of the ATC provider.

While we are speaking of equippage. For us to do our jobs as controllers, we have to have everyone doing things about the same. When we start mixing navigation equipage which in the future may determine separation criteria it makes our jobs a LOT harder. If we want to increase our output, then we have to make the job easier and not harder...

Would like to go on, but my brain is mush right now after a nice evening shift with thunderstorms about...

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman

[garp]

Impressive post BiK. I can share your views on the datalink future. We will probably be heading into that general direction. Like it or not.

[FFP]

Good Lord BIK !!!!

How long did it take you to do all that !!!

My finger is hurting just from scrolling down :p

[chrisN]

I found Bik's post so impressive that as an amateur I am wary of dissenting, but two points seemed to be a generalisation a little too far:
---------------------
"By classifying the AIAAs as class G the UK government is tacitly suggesting that it’s perfectly safe - anyone is allowed to fly there at anytime. If it wasn’t safe to fly there then the government would not have classified it as class G."
-------------------

Perfect safety is unattainable - if the Government/CAA/NATS or whoever has a tacit position, it is that there is an acceptable level of risk, which is around 10 to the -8 or so per flight. If you look at what actually kills people in UK airliners, collisions with military (or anything else) in class G is historically less than dropping Tridents onto Staines, fires at Manchester, hitting motorway embankments after shutting down the wrong engine, and taking your chances with various foreign places. Including risks to third parties, there is also the issue of getting lumps of blue ice, inter alia, or even whole Korean airliners, fall out of the sky.

------------------------
"Which leaves those aircraft without an automatic altitude reporting function. Various flying magazine advertisements show altitude encoding blind altimeters available in the UK, tax paid, for under £150. Is this too much to ask? I think not. "
------------------------------------------------
There is more to it than that. I fly a non-transponder glider and weigh 205 pounds including parachute, with a max cockpit weight allowed of 208. I use up the last three with water, food, and a logger (a black box recording my flight).

There is no £150 solution for me. What would be the price, even if I could accommodate the weight including another battery, the size in my already crowded cockpit, and whatever on my already full panel, for a transponder, + alt encoder, + fitting, + certification, for a non-standard installation?

I would guess that gliders comprise more of the UK traffic on good summer days than all the rest put together (an educated guess, based on extrapolation from the last published survey of UK airspace utilisation). Hardly any have, or could at present have, transponders. Ditto for many permit PFA-type aircraft.

I have no more wish to have a collison than anyone else, but what kills UK glider pilots historically is mostly self-inflicted - other forms of bad airmanship; then collision with other gliders; then collisions with GA traffic; and not yet with heavy stuff. Of course, the first time the latter happens it may swing the figures if the airliner is also mortally afflicted, and of course we don't want any of these things to happen, but the solutions have to practicable and affordable.

On a more general note, I am on the side of those who see airliners leaving controlled airspace by choice and mixing it with the military, me, and everyone else, to save fuel and/or keep routes "viable", as compromising their attitude to safety. It is an arguable position where there is no linking airspace, but questionable, showing profit triumphing over safety, where there is a protected but longer route available.

Where I found the BBC programs disturbing was the apparent continuing lack of willingness by the big professional outfits to invest in safety until forced to do so. E.g. Milan and ground radar. Or even Leeds. It just confirmed what I have seen over three decades - the big boys want safety when somebody else pays for it, e.g. by more controlled airspace which takes from me at no expense to them, but not in equally urgent and probably more life-saving potential but costly measures such as rear-facing seats, ways of getting passengers out of burning aircraft (a la Manchester), this new data link, video cameras to show which engine is really on fire (Kegworth), etc.

Chris N.

[fourthreethree]

Well well, aint it amazing the responses you get when you turn to reasoned discussion rather than your previous method of debate. Having read your post I have reassessed my opinion of you. I may not agree with what you say a great deal, but thats the point of a discussion thread. At least now I can respect your viewpont as one coming from an intelligent human being.

To answer your question, a False RA, or at least my definition of it with regard to my post, is an RA given byTCAS when there was never any danger of an infringement of separation. In my case the action taken by the pilot, which was correct in accordance to airline policy, was to divert from my safe clearance, and climb into opposite traffic, which I had to turn away to avoid a loss of separation.

As you say, TCAS if left to its own devices will keep a/c apart, but we have separation minima to respect, TCAS will not adhere to that. If you are happy with that scenario then you're a braver man than me.

There are many quotes I could use from your post which show quite clearly to me that you do not understand fully the job of an ATCO in a busy radar environment. I do not pretend to be aware of the intricacies of piloting an aircraft even though I have many freinds, and indeed family who are pilots.

For example, you seem to think that TCAS gives enough situational awareness to know the controllers plan. Enough to question the plan. It doesn't matter how much traffic you can see on TCAS, until you know the flight plan data of every target you see you CANNOT have situational awareness. Doesn't matter how good the user is.

I could go on but my break is at an end, gotta go keep the skies safe again!!
Cheers Bik for a well reasoned post. Sure we will meet again.:ok:

[LXGB]

Last Episode...


"Crowded Skies
Sun 17 Aug, 9:00 pm - 10:00 pm 60mins

Made by the company behind the 2001 Emmy-nominated 'Challenger: Go For Launch', this major documentary series looks at the most terrifying air collisions and near misses of the past - and explores how we can avoid these catastrophes in the future.

In the wake of the tragic mid-air collision over Switzerland last year, the series takes a detailed look at the world's air traffic control system, looking at the people and technology responsible for handling some 5 million air passengers every day.

Through detailed examination of disastrous air collisions, the series asks whether the lessons of the past have been learnt and how, with a system already running at full capacity, the industry will cope with the expected doubling of air traffic by 2020.

The Blame Game

Last summer the unthinkable happened when two modern airliners collided 35 thousand feet above Switzerland. This accident sent shock waves throughout the industry, not least because of the resulting 71 deaths - including a party of Russian schoolchildren making their first trip abroad having won an essay writing competition to win a holiday in Spain.

With moving testimony from the families who lost their children in the crash, along with accident investigators and colleagues of the Zurich air traffic controller who was blamed by many for the accident, this programme forensically examines exactly what happened that night. Mid air collisions are very rare, but near misses are not uncommon over British skies and the programme goes on to ask if a Lake Constance collision could happen over here.

Stereo Widescreen"

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctwo/listings/programme.shtml?day=sunday&service_id=4224&filename=20030817/20030817_2100_4224_1228_60


LXGB

[ferris]

Well, what a marathon. I'm sure you'll get more respect shown to you after that civil and well-thought out post.

As I said, I agree totally that we, like just about everyone, is facing automation. It won't necessarily do it better, but if the bosses could shift the traffic at a cheaper price, they will. When my son is asked "what do you want to do when you grow up?", his answer is "not ATC". "Why?". "Because my dad says there wont be any in the future". Like everything else that is automated, it will be less flexible, more specialised and be a painful transition. Hopefully I'll be old enough to accept my redundancy with good grace.

A couple of points. You misunderstood my position about CPDLC and HF. I was making the point that (in the oz experience), CPDLC was better than HF voice communication. You know, over the ocean and in the boonies where pilots have to use HF. CPDLC is a marked improvement. But where VHF voice comms are available, they are far superior (if both pilots and ATC speak the same language). I estimate I could do 10 times the amount of ATC with VHF voice, than with CPDLC. You certainly couldn't attempt to use CPDLC in high traffic environments. Until you take the pilots out of the loop. I'm pretty sure it's developers were fully aware of this, but had the 'big picture' in mind. All the elements are already there. The TAAATS platform, the 'maestro' flow control program, CPDLC. It's not a huge step to have it all talking together to the avionics controls on a/c. Of course, all the individual elements would need to work significantly better:hmm: but you get the idea.
Secondly, your faith in TCAS is a worry. You mention the idea that pilots can have sit. awareness if they use it correctly. Absolute crap. Whether it's the tech aspects, or the human side, it isn't happening. TCAS has limited ability to process targets, and if it gets too many (more than 25??), it just drops them off. Even engineers can't explain to me how or which targets it drops. Frequently, the threat a/c is merging/same direction, and TCAS seems particularly poor at identifying said threats (something to do with rate of change of threat). Planning in ATC frequently requires more than 9000' forward. eg. last week I had an arrival stopped at FL200 vs a departure on a different freq (at that time) climbing to FL180 (note to pilot- 2000' sep to stop false RAs - efficient?). The descender thru FL240 queried where his traffic was (it was climbing thru FL110 and crossing) as he couldn't see it on TCAS. That wastes my time when I could be doing something else. It never used to happen. It is becoming more and more common (see other thread this forum), and I could go on and on, but I won't.

At the end of the day, capacity enhancements are governed more by available airports and runways than anything to do with ATC.

Happy holding.

[Whipping Boy's SATCO]

Wow. And there was silly old me thinking that ATC was just about stopping aircraft from bumping into each other.:ooh:

[NigelOnDraft]

433...

I am intrigued by your definition of a "False RA". I would define a "False RA" as one that was given, when if no further action was taken by the one/both aricraft, no risk of collision would occur.

You seem to say that if you clear, say a climber to FL150, and an opposing descender to FL160, or even FL170, then if an RA is generated it is "false" because your clearance would separate the aircraft. True, your clearance would, but only if BOTH pilots follow your clearance. If one fails, a collision may result...

What to do about this? It comes down to the airmanship of the pilots - we need to avoid high rates of climb / descent, particularly close to the assigned FL / Altitude. In the USA they brought in a rule something like >1000'/m until ~1000' to go, then 500'/m. This would avoid most of these RAs. In addition, most RAs are preceded by a TA, and if that is not a clue to reduce the RoC/D, then I do not know what is.

Please remember (both pilots and controllers) what TCAS is for - it is the backup system for when the ATC system fails - which may be for all sorts of reasons (aircraft or ground induced). There seem a few posts here a bit "anti TCAS" - having flown with it for some years now, I had an aircraft the other day without it, and felt very vulnerable.

However, as has been stated, it is not an alternative to ATC. Quite often it does not "display" proximate aircraft we are visual with. Anyone who decides they can propose an alternative course of action based on TCAS is being unfair to the ATCO. On the other hand, ATC should not mind an instruction being queried if TCAS shows the instruction may be hazardous - that's the value of a backup system...

All IMHO of course!

NoD

[fourthreethree]

NigelonDraft

You seem to say that if you clear, say a climber to FL150, and an opposing descender to FL160, or even FL170, then if an RA is generated it is "false" because your clearance would separate the aircraft. True, your clearance would, but only if BOTH pilots follow your clearance. If one fails, a collision may result...

True, but there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions. I would not consider it to be a "false RA" if separation were infringed when the RA was issued. My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation, and it is suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation, forcing me to turn traffic away which was previously not traffic. Its a frightening feeling sitting behind the radar and not being in control of the picture, watching aircraft getting closer and not being allowed to do anything about it because a pilot is following company policy and reacting to an RA.

For the record I am NOT anti TCAS, I can see the benefits of such a system, but I do believe the criteria for an RA should be changed, and controllers able to override an RA. Not the generally held view I know, but there ya go!

[savechip55]

There has been a lot of talk about types of service in this thread, a couple questioning why we give avoiding action against unknown traffic in class G airspace, instead of trying to explain, the follwing are the rules for RAS wich we are BOUND by, so if you ask for RAS these are the rules which will guide you to your destination.

A RAS.
RAS is an air traffic radar service in which the controller will provide advice necessary to maintain prescribed separation between ac participating in the advisory service, and in which he will pass to the pilot the bearing, distance and if known, level of non-participating traffic, together with advice on the action necessary to resolve the confliction. Where time does not permit this procedure to be adopted, the controller will pass advice on avoiding action followed by information on the conflicting traffic.


"RAS will only be provided under IFR irrespective of met conditions.

The controller will expect pilots to accept radar vectors or level allocations which may require flight in IMC. Pilots not qualified to fly in IMC should accept RAS only where compliance with ATC advice permits the flight to be continued in VMC.

There is no legal requirement for a pilot flying outside CAS to comply with instructions because of the advisory nature of the service. However, a pilot who chooses not to comply with advisory avoiding action must inform the controller. the pilot will then become reponsible for initiating any avoiding action that may subsequently prove necessary.

the pilot must inform the controller before changing heading or level.

The avoiding action instructions which a controller may pass to resolve a confliction with non-participating traffic will, where possible, be aimed at achieving separation which is not less than 5nm or 3000ft, except where specified otherwise by the regulating authority. However, it is recognised that in the event of the sudden appearance of unknown traffic, abd when unknown a/c make unpredictable changes in flight path, it is not always possible to achieve these minima.

Information on conflicting traffic will be passed until the situation is resolved.

The pilot remains responsible for terrain clearance, although ATSU,s providing a RAS will set a level or levels below which RAS will be refused or terminated. "

So, if you want RAS outside CAS, in s busy class G area, this is why you are given a turn or three! :ok:

[Lon More]

Bik re "When ready, descend..., cross xxx at FL nnn" For more than 30 years that.s been my normal way of doing things. I've always tried to do it in such a way as to allow plenty of leeway for the pilot i.e. in such time that the average rate need not be more than 2000fpm, Unfortunately, as i stated, many pilots are now automaticallly questioning the clearance.
I agree entirely with the American method of reducing vertical rate within the last 1000ft - much more comfortable for the pax. We;re having some success in educating our military into doing ir when in proximity to civil traffic.
Perhaps classing them as False RAs is wrong, Nuisance RA is maybe better, but when a pilot follows a False/Nuisance RA it will, one day, lead to the mid air the system is supposed to help avoid.
Nothing,either on ths ground or in the air, is a substitute for good airmanship and "controllership"

edited for spelling

[PPRuNe Radar]

Agree entirely with Lon More.

The RAs are not 'false' since the TCAS is doing what it is designed to do ... predict the closest point of passage and issue a resolution to make sure that the pilot does something about it to prevent a collision.

They can of course be considered 'nuisance' RAs since they do not take account of the whole story (cleared levels) and may affect ATCs plan, however we have to understand that the pilot needs to heed the warnings which may save his and others lives.

And of course the PR which came with TCAS when introduced many years ago said that pilots will generally only deviate by about 400' before returning to their cleared level (hahahahaha :) )

[NigelOnDraft]

433

<< but there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions>>
There is in fact - TCAS!

<<My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation>>
The solution here lies with the pilots, and them not using stupid RoD/C close to assigned Level off Altitudes. And if necessary, prescriptive maximum RoC/D need to be introduced as law i.e. as in the USA.

<<suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation>>
I can see it must be frightning for a controller - if both pilots follow their RA, it is actually "controlled", but by TCAS. And his separation criteria is tight - I have had an RA and with 500' of separation it was "Maintain Vertical Speed" throughout...

<<because a pilot is following company policy and reacting to an RA>>
It is not, or at least should not be "company policy". It MUST be National / ICAO policy. TCAS will only work if we ALL ALWAYS follow its commands, or bin the whole thing...

<<and controllers able to override an RA>>
Disagree - this was what in effect led to the German / Swiss midair. TCAS is a very "close in" tool, and in "reversal" type scenarios it is quite hard work to react to it in its timescales in the FD - there is no time to check, or get overriddden from the ground. All we can do is follow it, as quickly and accurately as possible, and only then inform ATC.

I do come back to the original point. As an ATCO, and providing legal separation minima, aircraft under your control should hardly see a TA, and never an RA. If they do, it is either an error on your part, which is what TCAS is for, or (far more likely) one or both aircrew using inappropriate RoD/C. And as an aside, ATC clearances requiring high RoD/C e.g. outside the 3x table, are in turn more likely to generate TAs/RAs....

Good debate as ever!

NoD

[fourthreethree]

Nigel

Couple of points, first, the Swiss tragedy was, in the beginning, a controller error, in that two aircraft were converging at the same level. In this case TCAS gave instructions which were tragically overridden by ATC, amongst much confusion. The scenario I am talking about is somewhat different, where there is no chance of loss of separation, I would like the chance to inform pilots of this fact so that when they recieve a nuisance RA (agreed, better terminology) they can choose to disregard it. I can give traffic info to pilots in such a case, indeed I often do, but it seems it is just a waste of time and breath. If I have screwed up and TCAS can save my butt (not to mention the lives of those on board) then naturally I will be glad to let that happen.

Now I don't know that much about the technical side of TCAS, but would I be correct in saying that different operators can calibrate theis TCAS differently? I only ask because there is one particular operator who, in my limited experience, have more RA's than others. A few weeks ago, I had two of their aircraft, one climbing, one descending, cleared levels separated by 1000 feet, opposite direction. Neither were high roc/d, both had traffic info. At 1800' separation, both had simultaneous RA's and both reacted. I have similar situations nearly every day, but never before with the same outcome. In this case it was not busy, and there was no other tfc to effect, but next time?

As I said, it is against the instinct of any controller to sit back and let a machine which is not aware of the traffic picture carry out your separation for you, but it is what we are legally obliged to do. Let me put it this way, if you were on the operating table for major heart surgery, what would you prefer, an experienced surgeon trained to deal with all scenarios, or a robot who knows only the programmed operation? Not a perfect analogy I know but you get the picture.

[Scott Voigt]

DoD;

Slowing climb or descent 1000 prior to level is not rule in the US. It is merely a suggested operating practice...

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman

[jack-oh]

I have been reading with avid interest as these threads sway from one topic to the next some with heated exchanges. I am also fascinated by the space age technology purported to be just around the corner; changing all of our jobs to one of management rather than control (promotion at last). One question vexes me however, in the utopia that will obviously be all our futures, will aircraft transponders be able to select 8s and 9s and will ATC systems be able to read them? As this octal system has prevailed since the 1960s forgive me for being slightly cynical if I do not immediately sign up to, the dream of a worldwide-integrated ATC system watched over by big brother just yet.

[Scott Voigt]

Jack-oh;

Actually with the advent of ADS-B or whatever comes after that <G>, there won't be a need for the old transponder as we know it in the future. The ADS-B will have it's own unique identifier which will tell you the aircraft identification as well as the type of aircraft...

regards

Scott

PS. It is just going to take a long while to mandate equippage so that everyone can use the newer systems. Costs money and that is hard to get mandated.

[brockenspectre]

I am watching the latest in this series and am appalled that it would appear, at least from what I believe I just heard, that the Danish ATC who was working two screens, who had no working telephone service, whose screen was faulty therefore not showing a collision alert, is being blamed for what happened over Lake Constance??!! Surely this can't be true .. OK so maybe he could have called a colleague back from break to work the second station but neither of them would still have been able to telephone the airport control tower.

My heart goes out to him ...

It also appears that the Tupolev's pilots were (1) 8yrs experience (in command) and (2) airline chief pilot (second in command) and the second in command overruled TCAS and overruled the captain...


:(

[Wedge]

Agree Brocken -

This was a very good reconstruction, and there were all kinds of difficult and unusual circumstances that he was being asked to deal with. Including having to talk with telephone engineers asking him to take the primary phone system offline while dealing with two workstations - en route and approach control. He agreed and was left without a phone. Which would have averted the accident if it was online.

If he is being blamed for what happened, I'm appalled.

I wouldn't want to be a Controller if this is the environment they have to work in.


If anybody is going to stand trial for Manslaughter it should be his managers. To make a scapegoat of this controller for the gaping flaws in the system would be shameful.

[Oggy]

Did anybody carch the programme mentioned at the end of tonight's episode?

Thought I heard someting about the lo-cost sector of the market.

Sounded like channel 4 in ten minutes, but kids flipped the remote before i heard the rest.

Any clues?

[digidave]

Does anyone know what the current situation is with regards to the Controller?

I've just watched the program and am as appalled as BS and Wedge that the Controller, under crazy conditions, is being blamed. What were the Management thinking????

Oggy. program referred to is on BBC4 - I only get 1 and 2 so who knows!

dd

[Oggy]

Thanks dd,

I don't have access at the moment either.

If anyone knows if it'll be repeated or if it was worth watching I'd be grateful.

[Random Electron]

Brockenspectre

The program suggested that the Captain was being checked by his boss, who was in in the right hand seat, ie, a more senior pilot acting as examiner AND first officer (possible nightmare scenario there).

The captain, it seems, wanted to obey the TCAS, which is what we are all trained to do, but he was overuled by the examiner.

Like your other writer, I feel for the poor ATCO, there can be no way he carries any of the blame. He was just the last link in a very flawed chain.

[Wedge]

I didn't see the BBC4 prog but it was about the revolution in the budget airline market.

[chrisbl]

I saw the programme about the low cost airlines. Not too bad and the moral of the programme, the passengers now have a choice for their money.

[Lon More]

Can't remember where I saw it, either on another thread here, or in a report at work, but there was a statement that many of the old Eastern Block states required the pilot to follow ATC instructions, even when conflicting with the RA.

[HugMonster]

As I interpreted it, they weren't blaming only the Danish ATCO on duty at the time, but also the confusion caused on the flight deck of the Tu154, SkyGuide management, the Tu154 Chief Pilot and one or two other aspects.

It did make the point, though, that there was a whole chain of error factors and that the chain could have been broken at any one point.

Like the Reason Model - watching that programme with a sense of mounting horror, watching all the holes in the swiss cheese line up...

The thing that really got to me (as a pilot) was the report that the Russian crew were alive for a further two minutes after impact, all the way down to the ground, and that the 757 carried on from the impact for quite some distance/time (5 minutes?) knowing that, minus a tail, there was only one way they were going to go...:ooh:

Horrible thought. I know many pilots whose two most fervent prayers are that, if aviation kills them, it is quick and clean, and that people don't think they died being a ********.

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

Interesting comment Lon, although I'd better not comment further given that the press are watching....

Fairly early in my ATC career I was talking to a passenger a/c which crashed... it too was being flown by a captain being "checked out" from the RH seat. It was quite different circumstances to the one portrayed last night but it makes you wonder. Peter X will never forget - I know for sure.

Huggy.... remember the Vanguard which crashed in Belgium? The guy talked all the way down from cruising level. What effect that must have had on the ATCO I dread to think.

[LostThePicture]

Yes, by far the best programme out of the three in the series, and a comprehensive account of the terrible sequence of events that led to the tragedy.

If it highlighted one thing to me more than any other, it was that pilots must always, always follow the TCAS when they are in an RA situation. There is a school of thought that says that controllers should only give avoiding action in the horizontal plane in such a situation, and let the TCAS take care of the vertical element. Controllers have no way of knowing how the TCAS systems on each aircraft will "agree" to resolve the conflict, and the result can often be differing instructions from the voice in the cockpit and the voice on the ground. Pilots should always follow the TCAS, but there is bound to be a split-second of doubt when ATC is telling you the opposite.

However, this is in no way criticism of Peter X, who was entirely a victim of bad management and circumstance - the incident could have happened to any ATCO. I only hope that he is not charged.

[Gaza]

A very disturbing, but in my opinion, excellent programme. The makers seemed to have based it on facts and there seemed to be little uniformed comment.

It was interesting to see the news reports from just after the event where many (including a DHL spokesman) were quick to blame the Russian's saying they had repeatedly ignored ATC instructions. If the programme was accurate then the first they knew about a problem (apart from the TCAS warning) was 43 seconds before impact. If any blame can be laid on the Russian crew it is that they chose to follow the ATC command rather than TCAS. The disagreement between the RH and LH seats is a classic example of CRM failing.

[bookworm]

I agree that the programme was a good representation, but did I imagine that at one point during the reconstruction the DHL aircraft was cleared to the "Tango Golf October" beacon? :)

[Check your speed with....]

At the risk of upsetting a lot of people, could those who are blaming the management please explain why they think the management bear more responsibility than the controller and the Russian training captain involved.

[HugMonster]

One could argue all day long about reconstructions. I didn't catch the "TGO" beacon comment. But the "DHL flightdeck" certainly wasn't a 757.

[1261]

LTP's point is a good one; best practice must surely be that controllers only give avoiding action TURNS rather than level changes. Whether or not the controller in question felt that this was an avoiding action scenario is arguable.

As for the chain of events [and although I'm a controller myself] I have to say that I disagree that the controller was entirely free from blame. He was one of the last links in "the chain", and could have told the engineers to get lost. I fully accept that he should never have been placed in that position to start with, but he must shoulder at least a modicum of responsibility as he chose to continue providing two different services singlehandedly even knowing that the system was seriously degraded.

I have been through the "then you'll be unplugged!" scenario, it leaves a very bad taste in your mouth - bottom line is, however, it's my licence and my responsibility and I'll call it as I see it.

[Wedge]

Fair points 1261.

I suppose the question is did he act reasonably at all times and to the best of his ability. The answer has to be no, but at the same time he was not negligent in my view.

He did make mistakes, but understandable mistakes, and he is only human after all.

Re: the telephones - he could, and should, have told them to get lost, but he was trying to cooperate and would have felt he was being unhelpful not to.

The real error was his failure to call his colleague back when things got busy. But again, he was I suppose only trying to be cooperative with those around him. He was not being negligent in my opinion. It's easy with the benefit of hindsight to point out where he went wrong, and when he took those decisions he could have had no idea of their ramifications. Stating the obvious I know, but it's worth bearing in mind that this was just another quiet evening and he would not have been anticipating any of the circumstances that contrived to cause this terrible accident.

I do feel the utmost sympathy for him, I suspect many good controllers would have acted as he did and if just one chink in the armour had remained disaster would have been averted. Like almost all aviation accidents. He will have to live with this for the rest of his life, and with the knowledge that he was just unlucky for this to occur while he was on duty, and incredibly unlucky in that if things had been just a little different (ie the Boeing had been 20ft higher) it would have gone down as just a very dangerous airprox.

One lesson that I think should not be forgotten from this accident is that the Captain should always call the shots whoever is on the flight deck. The apparent argument between him and the more senior check Captain was crucial to the accident, the Captain of the TU knew he was being checked and could not have felt good about contradicting a direct command from a senior pilot. But his reaction to follow the TCAS RA was the correct one. The Captain's decision should never be compromised. Even if all around him think it's the wrong decision - and even if it is the wrong decision.

[GroundBound]

It was my understanding (not from the BBC program) that the Russian check pilot insisted on following ATC instructions, because that is the rule in Russia. :eek:

The underlying problem is that TCAS has been brought into the avaiation system without a clear understanding of how it works to those on the ground and in the air. Nor has it been properly integrated into ATC procedures. Furthermore, the ICAO rules on TCAS are open to different interpretations - perhaps why the Russian wanted to follow ATC instructions instead of TCAS?

I thought I understood TCAS, until I attended a 2 day briefing, and my eyes were opened - wide. :O TCAS works, and works well - however, it is imperative that once a pilot commences an RA, that s/he inform ATC immediately, and that ATC DO NOT ATTEMPT to resolve the problem once an RA has been declared. It is this last bit which is very difficult for a controller to accept, and to follow. After all, controllers spend their whole time actively trying to prevent flights banging into each other, and never to just sit and watch it happen. However, once a TCAS RA is commenced, both pilots must follow it and ATC must keep quiet - then it will work.

There is still a huge lack in training controllers to do this, and in making clear operational instructions that they must do so. I doubt Peter X had received such instruction, otherwise I am sure he would have told the Russian pilot "follow your TCAS" and not tried to intervene.

It is also very worrying to hear controllers speaking of telling pilots about potential traffic which may cause a TCAS RA, and suggesting/implying the pilot should then avoid following it, if forewarned. A pilot must follow an RA. If he doesn't TCAS will detect the lack of change of profile and instruct the other pilot to a greater deviation. Most nuisance RAs (as they are called) can be resolved by asking a pilot to reduce his rate of climb/descent, so that TCAS does not generate the RA in the first place.

When I attended the TCAS briefing, I was disappointed that many of the controllers feel affronted by TCAS, and that it is a suggestion that they have failed in their job. Well sadly, sometimes it is, but that can't be a bad thing if it stops people being killed, can it? It should be appreciated, though, that TCAS works with information which a controller does not have, and which is more up-to-the-second than the information displayed on the ATC screen. Nuisance RAs which are a problem, can be resolved by a more active profile management by the flight crews, and improvements to the FMS software to reduce rates of climb/descent when close to the target level.

Better TCAS information and training for controllers and pilots is essential, especially in an increasingly crowded sky, to avoid a repitition of what happened at Ueberlingen.

[Scott Voigt]

Well, TCAS works well most of the time. We have too many documented reports of when TCAS didn't work. Everything was done correctly by the flight crew, but the machine was doing things that were not healthy... It is NOT a perfect piece of equipment...

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Regioin
Safety and Technology Chairman

[HugMonster]

Name me a piece of equipment that does work perfectly. And how many reports constitutes "too many"?

Put simply, having TCAS is more useful than not having it. ICAO needs to ensure that all pilots know to follow TCAS when its instructions are contradicted by ATC, and all ATCOs need to provide turns rather than climb/descent for avoiding action.

TCAS did not cause the Lake Constance accident. One factor was the Russian crew failing to follow it.

Incidentally, and given 20/20 hindsight, if the controller wanted to spend some time on the other screen, why would he not give the Tu154 1000' descent immediately he got on his screen - then he knew there could be no conflict. Instead, he had only two aircraft to play with, and had them at the same level... :confused:

[eastern wiseguy]

Hug...agree totally.You have answered your own question earlier when you said the holes where lining up and the chain could have been broken at any stage.As to giving descent..I agree...he could also have called his mate back into the ops room(we are encouraged to do so).Management could also have had some sort of "quality assurance" in place whereby it could be shown that to remove a principal piece of equipment e.g. direct dial telephones the standby equipment would be serviceable and routing the calls correctly. As to TCAS ...I may be dim ..but is there a stage in the process where(as it appears on the documentary)the second aircraft is not responding in the manner agreed by the two transponders that one says (electronically) ****** this lets look for another solution and changes its' mind...for example BOTH aircraft now descending.TCAS thinks lets try CLIMBING one?

Bring back fam flights!!

[LostThePicture]

ICAO needs to ensure that all pilots know to follow TCAS when its instructions are contradicted by ATC, and all ATCOs need to provide turns rather than climb/descent for avoiding action.
In an ideal world this would be how things are done, as I alluded to in my previous post. But there are two problems before we achieve this utopia:
1) With some pilots there will always be a shred of doubt when ATC instructions contradict TCAS. And more importantly:
2) There is NOTHING (yet) set down in ATC training to suggest that avoiding action TURNS are best practice when an Airprox is occurring, and pilots are probably reacting to RAs.

In fact, at Swanwick, there must be any number of instructors, even local competency examiners, who suggest that vertical avoiding action is the best way to go. Purely on the basis that 1000ft is easier to achieve than 5 miles, and the good book says that in a loss of separation situation we must "use every means at [our] disposal to obtain the required minimum with the least possible delay". Sounds good, but it's hardly helpful when half the instructors AND the air traffic manual are working AGAINST what is clearly common sense.

TCAS is a brilliant piece of kit. I have seen radar replays of an incident where it managed to keep FOUR aircraft apart, when a Gatwick outbound off 26L was cleared to climb to FL130 towards DET when there were two in the hold at BIG and another coming in from the south to hold at FL110. Left to its own devices, TCAS will keep things apart.

Unfortunately the pace of change in the ATC procedures world is slow, and the pace of common sense is often slower....

LTP

[BIK_116.80]

Scott H. Voigt,

Hate to say it mate, but you are looking at some OLD data. The FAA doesn't have old computers anymore. We have gotten rid of most of the old stuff. We do indeed have some older software around in the host processing in the new hardware, but our computers don't fail very much anymore. We are also working with new displays and some of the enroute facilities are working with new data systems also. More are to come on line in the next 8 to 12 months.

Some of the FAA ATC computers are ancient, even now. The ratio of old computers to new computers is improving rapidly, but there are still a large number of very old computers in daily use.

The Boeing plan does look sexy doesn't it. The problem with it though is when you get into it, it lacks substance and the HOW they are going to do it. We have talked with them about the PLAN... They can never answer the questions of just how they are going to be able to do it, nor can they answer how much is it going to cost and who is going to pay for it...

How can I put this gently....

Boeing are not interested in supplying ad-hoc bits of hardware to the FAA.

Boeing want to design, install and operate a national (indeed, world-wide) air traffic management solution that will require a paradigm shift away from the current labor-intensive, inefficient, capacity constrained ATC methods.

As a card-carrying, office bearing member of a trade union that is very publicly campaigning against ATC privatisation, are you really all that surprised that Boeing is a bit reluctant to give away its secrets?

Boeing don’t want to replace the FAA computers – they want to replace the FAA.

....so that we can move more aircraft. It is something that we like to do here if you aren't too familiar with the US ATC...

I am somewhat familiar with US ATC – and you folks do a fine job and provide an exemplary service. :) In my opinion 99.9% of US air traffic controllers would go the extra mile trying to move traffic in situations where the air traffic controllers in most other countries would just say “too hard” and give up, resulting in airborne holding or slot delays on the ground. It’s that great American can-do attitude at its very best. :ok:

Even the more or less minor things that we would like to do we are told that we can't afford it even if we can make it work. So, if it is unaffordable, then it is for now unobtainable.

As I am sure you are all too aware, the subject of FAA funding is at the very heart of the privatisation issue.

The current federal budgetary process that allocates funds to the FAA year by year makes planning for medium and longer-term infrastructure investment almost impossible.

Boeing have a big chunk of money and are ready to invest – but they want to own the game, not buy into someone else’s problems.

....many of the things that are going to be needed to improve the through put of aircraft is going to require equipment not just on the ground and in space, but in the cockpit, and as we have found out with datalink. The airlines are not in a position to desire to upgrade their fleets and spend the money. Nor are they in a position to upgrade the nav in the 70’s and 80’s era glass cockpit aircraft that use DME/DME for navigation. This is leaving them out of some of the leading edge nav stuff that we are trying to do to improve efficiencies of getting about in both the terminal and enroute airspace. So it isn’t just the problem of the ATC provider.

I couldn’t agree more. :ok:

Airlines wont spend a buck unless it’s mandated or they can make their money back within the current financial reporting period.

If it wasn’t mandatory equipment the airliners of today would never have been fitted with EGPWS, TCAS, RVSM, 8.33 kHz radios, fire-resistant furnishings, Mode C transponders etc.

So what’s new? Nothing. Make datalink mandatory – the same as having a transponder is mandatory. No datalink – no fly.

In any case, although the world fleet of 70s and 80s era airliners is enormous, it is diminishing rapidly as these old clunkers are one by one withdrawn from service. They’ve already started parting out 1970s A300s and 1980’s B737-300/400s, for example.

While we are speaking of equippage. For us to do our jobs as controllers, we have to have everyone doing things about the same. When we start mixing navigation equipage which in the future may determine separation criteria it makes our jobs a LOT harder. If we want to increase our output, then we have to make the job easier and not harder...

Agreed. :ok:

A common solution is what is required. Unfortunately, the current situation is that there are several very expensive development projects running in parallel – and none of them are compatible. To use a 1980s video cassette analogy, one of them will end up being the VHS and one will end up being the Beta.

ChrisN,

....two points seemed to be a generalisation a little too far:

---------------------
"By classifying the AIAAs as class G the UK government is tacitly suggesting that it’s perfectly safe....
---------------------

Perfect safety is unattainable - if the Government/CAA/NATS or whoever has a tacit position, it is that there is an acceptable level of risk, which is around 10 to the -8 or so per flight.

I couldn’t agree more. :ok:

Actually – you are preaching to the converted.

There is no such thing as absolute safety. The best we can ever hope for (as you quite rightly point out) is an acceptable level of safety.

And as you go on to say later :

“....the solutions have to practicable and affordable.”

I’ve been a big advocate of affordable safety for some time now because I know that there is no other kind.

You are quite right - to be technically correct I should have used the words “deemed to be an acceptable level of risk”, but I went with “perfectly safe” because it has greater impact, is a simpler concept, and because it reads better.

------------------------------------------------
"Which leaves those aircraft without an automatic altitude reporting function. Various flying magazine advertisements show altitude encoding blind altimeters available in the UK, tax paid, for under £150. Is this too much to ask? I think not. "
------------------------------------------------

There is more to it than that. I fly a non-transponder glider....

I was referring to the great number of UK based light aircraft (and some UK military aircraft) that are fitted with a transponder but which don’t have an altitude encoder. I wasn’t referring to aircraft that don’t have any kind of transponder.

A you rightly point out – the chance of a non-transponder equipped glider or very light aircraft colliding with an aircraft that is of a class required to carry TCAS is sufficiently remote as to be statistically acceptable. It would seem that the big sky theory, along with a judicious lookout, works very well. :ok:

fourthreethree,

Well well, aint it amazing the responses you get when you turn to reasoned discussion rather than your previous vitriolic garbage. Having read your post I have reassessed my opinion of you. I may not agree with what you say a great deal, but thats the point of a discussion thread. At least now I can respect your view point as one coming from an intelligent human being.

I am under no delusion that this is a back-slapping mutual admiration society. I don’t need or seek your approval or respect.

Your words are touching, but unnecessary.

To answer your question, a False RA, or at least my definition of it with regard to my post, is an RA given by TCAS when there was never any danger of an infringement of separation. In my case the action taken by the pilot, which was correct in accordance to airline policy, was to divert from my safe clearance, and climb into opposite traffic, which I had to turn away to avoid a loss of separation.

Your clearance might have been “safe”, but the flight path of the aircraft was not safe – and that’s why they got a TCAS RA.

And how can you be so sure that “there was never any danger of an infringement of separation”?

Perhaps you listened carefully for a correct read-back from the flight crew? Great! But how can you know for sure what altitude the flight crew dialled into the autopilot / altitude alerter? How do you know that the autopilot is functioning properly and will correctly and accurately capture the assigned altitude? How can you know that the autopilot is even engaged? There are just too many variables – there is simply no way for you to know for sure that “there was never any danger of an infringement of separation”.

TCAS has no interest in the clearance you have issued. TCAS looks at what the planes are actually doing – not what they have been authorised to do.

There is never any guarantee that a climber or descender will actually level off at its ATC assigned level. If there were a guarantee then there would be no such thing as a level bust.

There was nothing “false” about the RA. The TCAS equipment was in all likelihood functioning correctly and in accordance with its manufacturers specifications and within FAA/CAA approved parameters.

Having said all that, there remains a question as to why these aircraft had such a high closure rate that it generated an RA.

Flight crew of TCAS equipped aircraft should moderate their rate of climb or descent when approaching a cleared level. They are only making work for themselves if they don’t.

Unfortunately, not all crews do. I did hear a brilliant bit of proactive controlling recently :

“[callsign 1] traffic you may see on your TCAS screen is a [aircraft type] in your 12 o’clock, seven miles, cleared to 1,000 feet below your level – he’s got quite a high rate of climb on – about 4,500 feet per minute.”

and then :

“[callsign 2] maintain [level] on reaching - traffic is a [aircraft type] in your 12 o’clock, five miles, maintaining 1,000 feet above your cleared level.”

The controller might as well be saying to the climber : “Hey – reduce your rate of climb, Bozo!” And fair enough too! :ok:

I’m not for a moment suggesting that this level of ATC service should be mandatory. Flight crews should already know that they must moderate their rate of climb or descent when approaching a cleared level.

But I did think that this controller exhibited remarkable situational awareness and a proactive but friendly style that quite probably avoided an RA – and that’s got to be a good thing.

Again – the clearance was safe – but the aircraft’s flight path was not.

As you say, TCAS if left to its own devices will keep a/c apart, but we have separation minima to respect, TCAS will not adhere to that. If you are happy with that scenario then you're a braver man than me.

You (as an air traffic controller working to a man-made set of specifications) have ATC separation minima to respect.

But in the real world (and as some ATCers on these pages have been known to quip) “a miss is as good as five miles”. And indeed it is – it doesn’t matter whether two aircraft miss by 100 feet or by five nautical miles, the outcome is the same – no collision and no calamity.

TCAS certainly will keep the planes apart – but it does it using a different methodology.

Whist ATC minimum separation criteria is specified in terms of 1,000 feet vertically or five nautical miles laterally (sometimes three miles), TCAS TAs and RAs work in terms of the time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach.

For information about TCAS TA and RA criteria refer to this :
Honeywell TCAS Users Manual (http://www.honeywelltcas.com/products_pages/cas81_6mcu/cas81_pilotguide.pdf).

(NB : This document has been around for a while and some of the TCAS traffic display hardware is a bit old fashioned. The current displays are much better.)

From the Honeywell manual :

“TCAS II predicts the time to, and the separation at, the intruders closest point of approach (CPA). Should TCAS II predict that certain safe boundaries may be violated, it will issue a Traffic Advisory (TA)....

If the intruder continues to close, TCAS II will issue a Resolution Advisory (RA) to obtain or maintain safe vertical separation between your aircraft and the intruder....”

And further :

“TRAFFIC ADVISORY (TA) – A symbol change to a filled yellow circle indicates that the intruding aircraft is considered to be potentially hazardous. Depending on your altitude TCAS II will display a TA when the time to CPA [closest point of approach] is between 20 and 48 seconds......Under normal conditions a TA will precede an RA by 10 to 15 seconds.”

and :

“RESOLUTION ADVISORY (RA) – A solid red square indicates that the intruding aircraft is projected to be a collision threat. TCAS II calculates that the intruder has reached the point where a Resolution Advisory is necessary. The time to closest [point of] approach with the intruder is now between 15 and 35 seconds depending on your altitude.”

and :

“TCAS II can track as many as 45 aircraft, display up to 30 of them and can coordinate a resolution advisory for up to three intruders at once. The advisories are always based on the least amount of deviation from the flight path while providing safe vertical separation.”

I’m very happy with the protection TCAS offers.

The net result of two aircraft coming within 100 feet of each other (but missing) is the same as if they were fifty miles apart – there is no collision and no calamity.

I’m not sure how timid you are, but the various TCAS systems that I’ve worked with have more than earned my faith in them. :ok:

....you seem to think that TCAS gives enough situational awareness to know the controllers plan. Enough to question the plan. It doesn't matter how much traffic you can see on TCAS, until you know the flight plan data of every target you see you CANNOT have situational awareness. Doesn't matter how good the user is.

I disagree.

Flight crews do have a very high level of situational awareness, even without TCAS.

If you instruct me to descend and I see traffic 1,000 feet below me (either on TCAS or out the window, or because I heard it on the radio) then I will question the descent clearance.

If you give me a turn towards nearby traffic at the same level (that I have seen on TCAS or by looking out the window) then I will question the turn.

Sorry – but that’s the way it’s got to be. My self-preservation mechanism won’t allow me to do otherwise.

My comments about the usefulness of a TCAS traffic display as a situational awareness tool (the comments that I addressed to Mr Big, Lon More and others) were mainly in relation to the loss of certain situational awareness cues when datalink is fully implemented and voice instructions are no longer broadcast.

Flight crews don’t currently have flight plan data about other aircraft, and I’m not aware of any proposal for the distribution of this kind of data at any time in the future.

ferris,

I'm sure you'll get more respect shown to you after that civil and well-thought out post.

Again, really touching but entirely unnecessary. :rolleyes:

You misunderstood my position about CPDLC and HF.

Nah – I didn’t. I just love winding you up. ;) :ok:

I estimate I could do 10 times the amount of ATC with VHF voice, than with CPDLC. You certainly couldn't attempt to use CPDLC in high traffic environments.

You wont have to. The process will be automated.

Until you take the pilots out of the loop....It's not a huge step to have it all talking together to the avionics controls on a/c.

I agree with you about what is technically feasible, and I do agree that it’s a great idea.

But in terms of airspace capacity the rate at which a flight crew can manipulate the autopilot or program the FMC is not yet a limiting factor. It’s not likely to be a limiting factor at any time in the foreseeable future.

In many parts of the world the limiting factor is already the rate at which a human air traffic controller can shout instructions down an unreliable asynchronous VHF voice link. See, for example, the Flight International extract below.

....your faith in TCAS is a worry. You mention the idea that pilots can have sit[uational] awareness if they use it correctly. Absolute crap.

Are you for real or are you just spanking the monkey?

If you are in any way serious then you have a much greater lack of understanding than I’d previously imagined.

TCAS has limited ability to process targets, and if it gets too many (more than 25??), it just drops them off. Even engineers can't explain to me how or which targets it drops.

This stuff is all in the public domain.

Even older versions of TCAS software will track up to 45 targets and display up to 30 of them. The 30 that are displayed are the ones that are most relevant – ie the ones that have the least time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach. There’s no point in TCAS displaying a target that is four minutes from CPA if there is another target that is 45 seconds from CPA. Unless you manage to miss the 45 seconds target you wont have to worry about the target that is four minutes away. This stuff isn’t rocket science.

Frequently, the threat a/c is merging/same direction, and TCAS seems particularly poor at identifying said threats (something to do with rate of change of threat).

Targets that are close but approaching at an acute angle have a much greater time to closest point of approach than targets that are further away but approaching at an obtuse angle. TCAS works in terms of the time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach. It’s simple geometry. There’s no black magic to it.

....last week I had an arrival stopped at FL200 vs a departure on a different freq (at that time) climbing to FL180 (note to pilot- 2000' sep to stop false RAs - efficient?).

As earlier, I suggest that there is nothing “false” about these RAs. These RAs result from an unsafe flight path that is brought about by an irresponsibly high rate of climb or descent when approaching a cleared level. Flight crews should know this.

So why are you issuing clearances that you know to be less than optimal?

The 2,000 feet between cleared levels is largely irrelevant to TCAS. TCAS works in terms of the time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach. If your descender gets a 6,000 feet per minute descent going he could still get a TCAS RA – even with 2,000 feet between cleared levels.

The descender thru FL240 queried where his traffic was (it was climbing thru FL110 and crossing) as he couldn't see it on TCAS. That wastes my time when I could be doing something else.

I spose we could all be doing something else – like going sailing or playing golf or whatever.

If you’d given the flight crew a simple heads up, like “Descend flight level two-zero-zero, further descent in two-zero miles” or “Descend flight level two-zero-zero, opposite direction traffic climbing to one-thousand feet below” then perhaps they wouldn’t have been in a great rush to get down to FL200 and they wouldn’t have felt the need to give you a nudge. You can either save work for yourself or you can make work for yourself. You choose.

At the end of the day, capacity enhancements are governed more by available airports and runways than anything to do with ATC.

They might be where you are, but that’s simply not the case in many capacity constrained parts of the world which have an abundance of concrete but a shortage of VHF air time. See the Flight International extract below

fourthreethree

....there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions.

You bet your life there is. That’s precisely what TCAS is for. :ok:

I would not consider it to be a “false RA” if separation were infringed when the RA was issued....

TCAS has no knowledge of or interest in ATC separation criteria. TCAS will keep the planes apart based on their actual trajectories.

My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation....

TCAS is largely uninterested in your 2000 feet of separation. TCAS works in terms of the time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach. In short – the closure rate.

....it is suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation

It is a controlled situation – it’s just that you are not the one controlling it.

TCAS will simultaneously co-ordinate RAs with up to three intruders (ie four aircraft in total).

....forcing me to turn traffic away which was previously not traffic.

TCAS will issue an initial RA that requires the minimum acceptable deviation from the current trajectory.

If your other traffic gets too close then all three aircraft will be issued with a co-ordinated RA.

....I do believe the criteria for an RA should be changed, and controllers able to override an RA.

Oh dear! I can see that this isn’t going to work. :eek:

Lon More,

“When ready, descend..., cross xxx at FL nnn” For more than 30 years that’s been my normal way of doing things. I've always tried to do it in such a way as to allow plenty of leeway for the pilot i.e. in such time that the average rate need not be more than 2000fpm, Unfortunately, as I stated, many pilots are now automatically questioning the clearance.

You have two options. Specify with the initial descent clearance weather they should “Descend now....” or “When ready....”, or else wait for them to call you back and query it. Your choice.

I agree entirely with the American method of reducing vertical rate within the last 1000ft....

I’m not so sure that it’s ever been an exclusively “American method”. The very sensible practice should by now be universal.

fourthreethree,

The scenario I am talking about is somewhat different, where there is no chance of loss of separation, I would like the chance to inform pilots of this fact so that when they receive a nuisance RA (agreed, better terminology) they can choose to disregard it.

Nope – that still isn’t going to work. Your clearance might be “safe” but you have no way of knowing for sure that there is “no chance of a loss of separation” because you don’t know for certain that both aircraft will stop at their assigned levels. And because RAs between airliners are nearly always co-ordinated, what happens if one crew decides to disregard a nuisance RA (based on your traffic information) but the conflicting crew doesn’t? It’s going to be a scenario very similar to Lake Constance.

I can give traffic info to pilots in such a case, indeed I often do, but it seems it is just a waste of time and breath.

It’s definitely not a waste of time, as I tried to suggest by including the earlier example of proactive controlling. Flight crews should be aware of the need to moderate their rate of climb or descent when approaching a cleared level. But some flight crews are simply lazy. Reducing the rate of climb on a Boeing airplane requires a pilot to press the “VS” button and rotate a pitch wheel. Some crews are VERY lazy! A timely heads-up from ATC can often convince a lazy flight crew that if they don’t press a button and turn a wheel they are sure to get an RA – and that means that they’ll have to push many buttons and hand fly the airplane. Give them the heads up. I don’t know of too many crews (not even the very laziest of them) who would put themselves in a situation that is sure to generate an RA.

....would I be correct in saying that different operators can calibrate their TCAS differently? I only ask because there is one particular operator who, in my limited experience, have more RA's than others. A few weeks ago, I had two of their aircraft, one climbing, one descending, cleared levels separated by 1000 feet, opposite direction. Neither were high roc/d, both had traffic info. At 1800' separation, both had simultaneous RA's and both reacted.

Of course they “reacted”. If they didn’t “react” then they’d deserve to be sacked! Flying an RA isn’t optional.

Whilst it’s technically very easy to modify the RA parameters at the factory, TCAS units are certified in accordance with an approved set of performance criteria. I’m not aware of any TCAS unit that has a user-adjustable RA.

On Honeywell units the time between a TA and CPA varies between 20 and 48 seconds, depending on altitude. The time between an RA and CPA is between 15 to 35 seconds, depending on altitude.

Even if you could adjust the RA parameters – just how close to CPA would you like to leave it?

If there was going to be a nuisance RA due to an irresponsibly high rate of climb or descent then I would expect it to happen when one (or both) aircraft are between 800 feet and 1,500 feet from their cleared levels. Anything greater than about 1,500 feet and you would need an extremely high vertical closure rate (Saturn V ascent profile) to set off an RA. Anything less than about 800 feet and the autopilot has already gone into altitude capture mode, reducing the vertical closure rate.

I note that you say that neither aircraft had a high rate of climb or descent, but I’m almost certain that’s precisely what’s caused the nuisance RA(s). The fact that they were opposite direction (ie high lateral closure rate) would tend to reduce the vertical closure rate RA threshold.

....it is against the instinct of any controller to sit back and let a machine which is not aware of the traffic picture carry out your separation for you....

TCAS is aware of the surrounding traffic. TCAS will co-ordinate a four-way RA with surrounding traffic if required.

Although TCAS will make no attempt to achieve or maintain MATS Part 1 minimum separation criteria, it will keep the planes from banging together so long as the crews don’t fly against an RA.

Wedge,

One lesson that I think should not be forgotten from this accident is that the Captain should always call the shots whoever is on the flight deck. The apparent argument between him and the more senior check Captain was crucial to the accident, the Captain of the TU knew he was being checked and could not have felt good about contradicting a direct command from a senior pilot. But his reaction to follow the TCAS RA was the correct one. The Captain's decision should never be compromised. Even if all around him think it's the wrong decision – and even if it is the wrong decision.

You’re very close – but I think you may be just slightly wide of the mark.

It’s the pilot in command who is in charge of the aeroplane – not the captain.

This is a subtle but important distinction.

Although the captain and the pilot in command are often the same person, there are literally hundreds of flights every day where this is not the case.

Although I am not familiar with the Tu-154 operator’s SOPs, western operators I am familiar with would all designate a check captain performing a check flight and occupying a control seat as pilot in command. The guy in the left seat who is under check is still the captain – but in this situation he’s not the pilot in command.

Although good CRM dictates that all crew members must feel free to speak up when they are not completely happy with a situation or a proposed course of action, and although a good pilot in command should always welcome these contributions and take time to carefully consider them, there are certain time critical situations (like an RA) when the pilot in command has to make a very quick decision and then live with the consequences come what may. And that’s precisely what happened in the TU-154 in Lake Constance.

Check your speed with....

At the risk of upsetting a lot of people, could those who are blaming the management please explain why they think the management bear more responsibility than the controller and the Russian training captain involved.

And excellent question for which I think there is no satisfactory answer. The disaster was a team effort.

GroundBound

Thanks for a really excellent post – one that I wholeheartedly agree with. :ok:

HugMonster ,

Incidentally, and given 20/20 hindsight, if the controller wanted to spend some time on the other screen, why would he not give the Tu154 1000' descent immediately he got on his screen - then he knew there could be no conflict.

Instead, he had only two aircraft to play with, and had them at the same level...

My thoughts exactly.

My understanding is that Peter X was handing (in total) five aircraft.

It is my understanding that the TU-154 and the B757 had both made radio contact with Peter X more than five minutes prior to the collision, but that the TU-154 descent instruction was issued approximately one minute prior to the collision. It’s the prioritisation during the time in between that I can’t figure out.

Was Peter X solely responsible for this disaster? Definitely not.

Was Peter X partly responsible for this disaster? Definitely yes.

eastern wiseguy,

As to TCAS....is there a stage in the process where (as it appears on the documentary) the second aircraft is not responding in the manner agreed by the two transponders that one says (electronically) ****** this lets look for another solution and changes its' mind...for example BOTH aircraft now descending TCAS thinks lets try CLIMBING one?

Short answer : YES.

Refer : Honeywell TCAS Users Manual (http://www.honeywelltcas.com/products_pages/cas81_6mcu/cas81_pilotguide.pdf).
(particularly see Adobe pages 34-34 of 83 which are the same as original document pages 31-32)

Slightly longer answer :

(I’ll use the TCAS v7 aurals as examples here. Earlier TCAS software versions are essentially similar.)

The TCAS in the Lake Constance disaster issued a “DESCEND DESCEND” initial RA to the B757 and a “CLIMB CLIMB” initial RA to the TU-154. These RAs were co-ordinated, meaning that before either RA was issued there was an automatic electronic exchange between the two TCAS units and an electronic agreement was reached about which TCAS unit would issue a climb RA and which would issue a descend RA.

After issuing the initial RAs the B757 commenced a descent (in accordance with its RA) and the TU-154 commenced a descent (going against its RA).

Both TCAS units continued to evaluate the traffic situation in real time, looking at the time to (and separation at) the closest point of approach. As you suggest, at this point the TCAS units jointly (because it’s a coordinated manoeuvre) make a decision about whether the initial RAs are working or not.

If they are working then that’s great. If they are not working then a secondary RA will be issued.

TCAS can decide to increase the intensity of the RA in the same direction (eg “INCREASE DESCENT”), or can decide to reverse the direction of the RA (eg change from a “DESCEND DESCEND” to a “CLIMB, CLIMB NOW, CLIMB, CLIMB NOW”).

It is quite likely that in the Lake Constance disaster both aircraft got secondary RAs of increased intensity - the B757 getting an “INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT” RA and the TU-154 getting an “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB” RA.

If the two TCAS units had decided that it would have been better to swap things around and issue a reversal then the B757 would have got a “CLIMB, CLIMB NOW, CLIMB, CLIMB NOW” RA and the TU-154 would have got a “DESCEND, DESCEND NOW, DESCEND, DESCEND NOW” RA.

Bring back fam flights!!

Actually – unless you know where to find some very dodgy controllers the best way to see TCAS in action is to rent some simulator time so you can safely explore (and fly) a whole range of TCAS scenarios.

LostThePicture,

TCAS is a brilliant piece of kit. I have seen radar replays of an incident where it managed to keep FOUR aircraft apart, when a Gatwick outbound off 26L was cleared to climb to FL130 towards DET when there were two in the hold at BIG and another coming in from the south to hold at FL110. Left to its own devices, TCAS will keep things apart.

Agreed. I’ve never been involved in a 4-way split - that one sounds interesting! Current TCAS systems can co-ordinate RAs with up to three intruders (ie four aircraft in total) – so that 4-way would have been testing the system to its maximum potential! Good job it worked, eh? :ok:

Post Script :
In an earlier post on this thread I said that getting the SIDs and STARS right was a pre-requisite for automated terminal ATC via datalink.

One of the great problems with many UK STARs is that they end at a holding fix with no published procedure to get from the holding fix to the ILS. In many other countries the STAR ends at an off airport holding fix that is also one of the initial approach fixes for the ILS. Aircraft don’t have to be subjected to protracted, labor-intensive radar vectoring to get from the holding fix to the ILS - rather, aircraft in or approaching the hold are simply told “cleared ILS”.

Although the following Flight International extract deals with P-RNAV approaches the reason I have included it here is, firstly, because it shows that it is possible to design an ILS approach procedure that starts at an off airport holding fix (such an approach procedure in and of itself does not necessarily require P-RNAV, or even B-RNAV – it could just as easily be designed using existing terrestrial radio navigation aids), and secondly, because a NATS spokesperson has said that in relation to London Heathrow : “In traffic capacity terms, you can be constrained as much by the amount of instruction time on the radio as by the airspace itself.”

It’s worth noting that Boeing FMSs have been capable of P-RNAV approaches for a number of years, but it’s only now that the UK CAA and NATS are finally pulling their finger out to put their stamp of approval on the procedures. Oh well – I guess that change at a glacial pace is better than no change at all! ;) :ok:

Flight International 12-18 August 2003 page 12

“BA tests precision area navigation at Heathrow”

British Airways has begun trials of high-accuracy, continuous descent approach techniques at London Heathrow airport. Working with the Civil Aviation Authority’s Directorate of Airspace Policy and National Air Traffic Services (NATS), it’s aim is to make approaches quieter, more accurate, simpler in air traffic management terms, and more fuel-efficient.

BA Boeing 747s and 777s....will fly precision area navigation (P-RNAV) flightpaths....

P-RNAV requires lateral accuracy of 1nm compared with existing basic RNAV (B-RNAV) allowance of 5nm.

[etc]

NATS, which is helping to manage the trial, says : “It will reduce the fuel and noise penalty – but also the radio communication workload. In traffic capacity terms, you can be constrained as much by the amount of instruction time on the radio as by the airspace itself.”

The trial will involved BA flights arriving via the Lambourne holding point to the north-east of Heathrow. .... BA says its 747s and 777s are already equipped with flight management systems (FMS) that can carry out the procedure....

BA’s air traffic management project manager for area navigation, Kevin O’Sullivan, says procedures for the P-RNAV approach have been drawn up by the CAA. “These are coded into the normal navigation database as a procedure – like the standard arrivals and standard departures – using the FMS.” [etc]

[eastern wiseguy]

Actually – unless you know where to find some very dodgy controllers the best way to see TCAS in action is to rent some simulator time so you can safely explore (and fly) a whole range of TCAS scenarios

Thanks for the reasoned response.Actually the reason for bring back fam flights is to introduce a dialogue between all of us,not to see two aircraft use the kit for real!!;) .There will soon be a generation of ATC's who will have seen a total of ZERO aircraft up close and personal,their whole experience being derived from a few hours of PPL training and a course at Cranebank(I believe!).The aerodrome side of training for all is being removed and I believe this is to the detriment of OUR(i.e. you AND me) business as a whole.As to renting simulator time...do the bean counters see a cost benefit? If they don't it won't happen...not holding MY breath.I saw the TCAS in operation in a sim at Cranebank....how many more experienced Atco's will?

[Point Seven]

Bik

Another cogent post as we're coming to expect, but let's put all this into perspective.

TCAS is great - no question, I think that all pilots have come to find it to be one of the most important pieces of kit at their disposal. However, from the view of a safety regulatory point of view (and I'm only playing Devil's Advocate here), a 4 way RA does not, at the outset of conflict resolution in the planning phase, have any degree of inherent, built in separation. I'm not saying that it is not safe, as I think we have established TCAS IS safe, but it cannot form the basis of a separation mechanism on it's own because you cannot show, AT THE MOMENT, any pro active, pre planned separation, only a tactical phase resolution. The TCAS separation is purely reactive. I'm sure this bothers safety regualtors and operators alike.

But there are projects in place to investigate the use of Mode S information to couple with TCAS that could eventually mean that it WILL be integrated into actual input in separation. Mode S can provide information on the data block on the radar to show selected level, selected rate of climb/descent and, perhaps, TCAS RA and it's order of direction.

Now, remeber when we were talking about ATCOs becoming system managers Bik, a couple of weeks ago? Well, let's extrapolate that idea.

On the flight deck, pilots get the ATC cleared level, select the relevant level and relative rate of climb descent. The controller/monitor bod is watching all this info via Mod S, can see an incorrect level selection and correct it, can spot a potentially excessive RoD/C and rectify (not necessarly instruct to change but point out that it may be excessive, fter all you fly the planes!)and in the event of TCAS RA, and I believe that this one should be implemented ASAP to stop a rerun of Lake Constance, a controller will be able to observe the RAs given to each aircraft and leave well alone unitl the Mode S shows the event to be over. Most imnportantly, there will never be the need for a controller to give contradictory avoiding action in the event of TCAS RAs ever again because the whole scenario will be displayed on their screen.

These are huge leaps forward in technology led safety and form an interesting future. And for all those out there who say "What if the cleaner knocks the plug out?", then we revert to the system we have now, same as if someone pulls the plug now we go
procedural etc. Today's best practice is tomorrow's back up plan.

P7

Post Script

The P-RNAV arrival at Heathrow is being developed so that British airlines can prove the system works in practise, then devise their own procedured into airfields with poor ATC service and/or poor or unserviceable nav aids. It will also provide quieter CDAs so that night quotas can rise but the public can be shown that they're not getting a raw deal. Maybe.:ok: