Steve Hislop killed in helicopter accident: threads merged

[LGW Vulture]

BBC noting this in their headlines.

Nothing further yet........

[autosync]

helicopter has crashed in the Scottish Borders killing one person.
The civilian aircraft came down at the remote Caerlanrig Farm near Teviothead, off the A7 near Hawick.

Lothian and Borders Police were alerted to the accident at 1650 BST, but a spokesman said it may have happened earlier in the day.

A fire brigade spokesman confirmed there had been one fatality and said only the pilot was on board.

Firefighters and other rescuers have had to use a four wheel drive vehicle to get from the A7 road to the scene.

The helicopter is believed to have been flying north when it got into difficulties and came down on moorland.

A farmer is believed to have reported the crash.

One eyewitness said the aircraft seemed to have caught fire when it hit the ground.

Wreckage is reported to be scattered over a wide area.

A spokeswoman for the Civil Aviation Authority said the pilot would not have had to file a flight plan in advance unless he planned to use airspace open to commercial planes.

[Autorotate]

Anyone have any idea what sort of helicopters it was or who the operator was. Might have been one of PDG's as arent they up that way.

:E

[Smoketoomuch]

BBC reports it was Superbike champ Steve Hislop.

[Practice Auto 3,2,1]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3111299.stm

Latest from the BBC.

Just seen on Sky News too that it appears the man killed was British Superbike champion Steve Hislop.

RIP

[View From The Ground]

RIP Hizzy......How sad.....a great champion who will be sorely missed....what a tragic year for motorcycle racing.....RIP Daijiro 74:(

[My names Turkish]

Another of Motorcyclings Stars lost and all round nice guy, before their time very Tragic, condolences to the families involves.

[Heliport]

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/39255000/jpg/_39255732_hislop203.jpg


from the BBC Bike champ killed in helicopter crash
British Superbike champion Steve Hislop has died in a helicopter crash in the Scottish Borders.
Hislop, who was a Scot, was 41 and had won the British Superbike title in 1995 and 2002 and also won 11 races at the Isle of Man TT.

His helicopter came down at a remote farm near Teviothead, off the A7 close to Hawick.

He was understood to have been visiting friends living in the area when the accident happened.

Lothian and Borders Police were alerted to the accident at 1650 BST, but a spokesman said it may have happened earlier in the day.

It is understood the aircraft may have been travelling from the south of England.

Firefighters and other rescuers have had to use a four wheel drive vehicle to get from the A7 road to the scene.

The helicopter is believed to have come down on moorland, leaving wreckage scattered over a wide area.

Pat Douglas, 47, said her husband Walter, 51, had come across the crash scene while tending livestock.

"We didn't see or hear anything really. We heard a helicopter buzzing around earlier today but we were not aware that anything was untoward until later," said Mrs Douglas.


She said Caerlanrig farm was the nearest inhabited building to the scene of the accident.
"We are about half a mile from where the crash happened."

Farm worker John Hepburn, 18, from Teviothead, who saw the crash scene said: "The main body of the helicopter was on top of a bank and the tail was below, next to a burn.

"You would hardly know it was a helicopter unless you knew what had happened."

A Department of Transport spokesman said an air accident investigation team was on its way to the site to conduct a full inquiry. The team were expected to arrive at the crash site at first light on Thursday.

Hislop was a regular race winner but suffered two horrific accidents which would have ended a lesser rider's career.
In 2000 he broke his neck at Brands Hatch while a year later he was within touching distance of another title when he crashed into title rival John Reynolds at Rockingham.
He ploughed into the concrete retaining wall at terrifying speed and suffered a badly broken leg, ankle and collarbone, costing him the title.

Hislop, who was born in Hawick, was a popular face at racetracks around the country.
Nicknamed `Hizzy', he enjoyed wild card appearances in World Superbikes and regularly upset the international stars on home turf.

Steve Hislop factfile
1962: Born in Hawick, Scotland, on 11 January
1990: Claims British 250cc title
1994: Wins Isle of Man TT
1995: Clinches British Superbike championship
2000: Breaks neck during championship round at Brands Hatch
2002: Fights back to take second British Superbike title [/quote]

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/39344000/gif/_39344073_teviothead_203map.gif

from Ananova..... Reigning British Superbike champion Steve Hislop has been killed in a helicopter accident in his native Scotland.

Hislop was flying his helicopter alone near Hawick in the Scottish Borders when the vehicle crashed.

Hislop, 41, was a two-time British Superbike champion having first won the title in 1995.

The Scot was a regular race winner but suffered two horrific accidents.

In 2000 he broke his neck at Brands Hatch while a year later he was within touching distance of another title when he crashed into title rival John Reynolds at Rockingham.

He ploughed into the concrete retaining wall at terrifying speed and suffered a badly broken leg, ankle and collarbone, costing him the title.

Nicknamed 'Hizzy', he enjoyed wild card appearances in World Superbikes and regularly upset the international stars on home turf.

He bounced back from his Rockingham injuries to win the championship last season but was immediately released by his MonsterMob Ducati team.

This season proved difficult with Virgin Mobile Yamaha and he was released earlier this month and was preparing to join a new team in ETI Ducati.

Lothian and Borders Police said a farmer raised the alarm at 4.50pm on Wednesday - but indicated the accident could have happened earlier.

[rotorboater]

I 1st met Steve when he was learning to fly at Barton and he was always a real nice guy, I still owe him a drink, always very approachable and unassuming even as world champion.

1st Bazzer now Steve a bad year for bike racing.

RIP Steve
RB

[Heliport]

Sad loss of a great rider.

More details in the Rotorheads Forum

Click ~ http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/39344000/jpg/_39344467_stevehislop66.jpg (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?threadid=97772&referrerid=30158)

[md 600 driver]

any one know the details of the helicopter

[Rollingthunder]

"Hislop was flying his helicopter alone near Hawick in the Scottish Borders when the vehicle crashed near a remote farmhouse."

[Hilico]

Not quite sure what details Mr Thunder has added to the thread there, but several months ago I was reading a bike mag and it showed a picture of Hislop in a stationary Enstrom. It was taken late in the evening, so it was mostly dark, but I could make out that it was parked in his back garden, and perhaps, perhaps, it was a 480.

PS The Daily Mirror says it was an R44, so it was probably a Mil-26.

[Ikey Solomon]

From a conversation I had yesterday about Steve and aircraft I'm pretty sure it was a R44 out of Booker he was in.

My thoughts go out to all concerned.

RIP

Ikey

[headsethair]

From the crash site picture on BBC News Online (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3113577.stm), it is definitely an R44.

[Notar fan]

From the picture on the BBC link, it looks like a 500 skid tube.

[nitefiter]

My sincere sympathies go out to Steve,s family,friends team mates and fellow BSB riders who will all, along with his many fans miss him.
A true sportsman and great ambassador to all who have an interest in the greatest sport in the world.
Barry,Daijiro Kato,and now Steve this is truly a dark year for our sport.

[View From The Ground]

Nitefiter...you are quite right in addition to those named we have also lost David Jeffries....let us hope that this is an end to motorcycle racing tragedies for a long time to come.....RIP.....

[jumpseater]

One of the daily's has a picture from a different angle and also states it was an R44, which ties in with their picture.

[Ikey Solomon]

It was a R44 out of Booker (Wycombe Air Park)

The machine was approx a year old :(

Ikey

[nitefiter]

VFTG
Im so sorry i didnt mean to miss out David,ive been involved with the sport for nearly 25 years as a competitor,technician and sponsor and im finding this a bit difficult.

[View From The Ground]

Nitefiter

I had neglected him too in my earlier post. I really cannot believe what a tragic year we are having in this sport. I am sure however that it will come out the other side. It must be extremely hard for anyone who knows people from inside the sport.....Lets continue to enjoy the fine racing these guys provide, since I am sure that is what their departed colleagues would have wanted!

[ppheli]

I understand that the reg of the helicopter involved was G-OUEL, which is indeed a Booker based machine

[PENNINE BOY]

Having worked with Hizzy in the past, I met up with him a few weeks ago for a few beers.

He was really looking forward to getting to grips with his Commercial exams and hopefully a career in flying Helis.

I believe it was a R44, Rest in peace Steve I for one will miss you, so many people were really looking forward to see you kick arse at Oulton Park.

D.H.

[rba194]

Was it his own R44 or did it belong to one of the companies based at Booker?

[Synthetic]

Please if ayone has any further inf on this, post it.

I ask this as a 'Hissy' fan

[Heliport]

If ppheli is right that it was G-OUEL, then according to the CAA database, the R44 was first registered in Jluly 2002 and is owned by Universal Energy Ltd of High Wycombe.

There won't be any more information until the AAIB report is published.

[Flytest]

Sad loss of another great scot.


:{

Is it just me, or is there a spate of accidents / incidents involving Robinsons at the moment???

[headsethair]

"Is it just me, or is there a spate of accidents / incidents involving Robinsons at the moment???"

Depends what your definition of "spate" is.......22 Sydney, 44 Scotland. 22 Sydney well-debated here - seems to be operator-induced. 44 Scotland - unknown at time of writing.

Are you ignoring the Hughes 500 at Biggin, the Jet Ranger at Hadrian's Wall, and various other turbine incidents around the globe ?

My English master always warned against generalising from the particular. He was right.

Latest from media in Isle of Man (dated 4.08):

"Investigations into the crash are continuing. Two officers from the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch arrived at the scene on Thursday and the wreckage of the helicopter, which was strewn across the hillside, is being removed to the AAIB base in Farnborough, Hampshire, for examination.
Investigators have refused to comment on the possible cause of the accident, although it has been reported weather conditions and visibility at the time of the crash were poor.
It has also been confirmed military low-flying exercises in the area will be examined.
The area is regularly used by the RAF for training pilots and investigators said all flying activity in the area on the day of the accident will be looked at. They will also probe flight plans and weather conditions.
The Ministry of Defence said there had been no reports from pilots of near-misses, which would normally be reported instantly, but added it would cooperate fully with the crash investigation."

[Flytest]

Yeah, point taken, just felt like everytime I check the site there's a Robbie incident. I'll shut up. :sad:

[newswatcher]

Flytest, in the States, NTSB figures have 6 fatal Robinson accidents this year, all of which have occurred since the begining of May - 4x22, 2x44. There have been 23 fatal helicopter accidents so far this year. This year there have been 77 "incidents" involving helicopters, of which 19 were Robinsons.

[StevieTerrier]

Headsethair :

Flytest wasnt generalising, he was asking specifically about Robinsons.

You, on the other hand have lumped the all the turbine aircraft (H500, JetRanger and "other turbine incidents") together.

Now then, tell us again what your old English master said about generalising??

But if we do want to generalise - according to Newswatcher, one type of helicopter has been involved in over a quarter of all fatal accidents in the US so far this year. Generally, I'd say thats a pretty poor record.

[The Nr Fairy]

Steve :

Any idea what proportion of the US fleet is Robbies, by aircraft or hours flown ? Are the accident proportions in step with the other fleets ? Are R22 and R44 flown by lower time pilots and if so would the same problem occur with other fleets if the R22 hadn't been designed ?

[t'aint natural]

Three years ago an extrapolation from CAA maintenance returns showed that 48 per cent of single-engine helicopter hours in the UK were flown on Robinsons.
That's before you start taking into account the low experience level of their pilots and the uses to which they are put, as the Fairy points out.

[headsethair]

SteveT: "But if we do want to generalise - according to Newswatcher, one type of helicopter has been involved in over a quarter of all fatal accidents in the US so far this year. Generally, I'd say thats a pretty poor record."

So - you're not generalising with your take on Newswatcher's stats ?

"Robinsons" are not one type of heli :-)

And if you follow his lead and look at the NTSB figures, you'll see that most of the accidents were non-mech failure, low-time pilots mainly flying R22 - but also R44.

The most popular helicopters in the world being flown by the most inexperienced pilots..........

This could run as long as The Mousetrap.

Now - where are the current UK stats?

[StevieTerrier]

t'aint natural / nr fairy

I agree that is the big problem with Robbies - a helicopter with not a lot of margin for error been flown by low time pilots / private owners. Dont know if anybody has ever bothered to do the stats on pilots / hours / type accidents, but I guess that by sheer number then, yes the Robbie would not fair too well.

headsethair. Yes I was generalising, but then again my old English teacher was a drunk, and very rarely turned up for class. Besides, we all know that the R44 is just a beefed-up R22, so I think it's fair to lump them all together as "Robinson", just in the same way as the LongRanger (different engine, transmission, body, tail boom, blades etc etc) is still a Bell 206.

Just a couple of points about Tim Tucker and his Robinson stats. Firstly, he works for Robinson, so he is going to be looking for the best way of "analysing" those stats from a Robinson-based viewpoint

Secondly, his view of the stats was critisised in the "professional" press as being much too simplistic - e.g. the R44 was the safest helicopter because it had been involved in the least reported incidents / accidents, not taking into account the number of aircraft in each fleet, hours flown by type etc etc.

I have no personal axe to grind about Robinsons or Tim Tucker's opinions. I have over 500 hours R22 time and enjoyed (nearly) all of it, and I did my FAA commercial GFT with Tim, who I found a very genial bloke.

However, what you do find is that Robbie pilots are fiercely loyal to their machines, sometimes beyond the point of reason. It's quite sweet, really! However, put them in a proper helicopter....

:ok:

[CaptainEagle]

Sup ya'll. Aight lets nail the facts here, the only reason there are any Robinson accidents (IN GENERAL) is because they are such good value that many pilots who fly them aren't trained so well. This is not a fault of the machine. Pilot error causes almost all Robinson accidents, if you look at the statistics for the 44, it hasn't had a mechanical induced engine failure for years, any failures were due to carb icing, which is pilot error.

It is perfectly fair to generalise the rest of the helicopters into the 'turbine' bracket because when we talk about helicopter safety we are primarily talking about heli engine safety, it is a rare enough occurance for helicopters to just crumble in mid air for any other reason than a massive control input. The Robinson helis are safe when operated by well trained pilots, the same as most helicopters. When you put someone into the cockpit of any aircraft who is not well trained you are asking for trouble. I am not making any reference to Hizzy here, I don't know the extent of his training nor have I seen him fly. For all we know any number of things could have happened.

Remember, helis are only as safe as the humans who fly them- No matter which manufacturer or country they come from.

[Dantruck]

Well said Captain E

My thoughts exactly

[Heliport]

This appears in the Glasgow Herald but apparently lifted from an interview given to Motorcycle News Hislop’s instructor warned him not to fly helicopter days before fatal crash

STEVE Hislop, the champion motorcyclist killed in a helicopter crash last week, was apparently warned not to fly the aircraft by his instructor days before the fatal accident.

News of the warning emerged as final preparations were being made for his funeral today.

Norman Bailey, the 41-year-old's flying instructor, told Motorcycle News that he had indicated to Hislop that he should wait until he had more experience before flying the Robinson R44 which he had hired from an air park in High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire.

Mr Bailey, who runs (edited) said: "Steve was a relative novice as a pilot and the Robinson can be a handling challenge. It is a very responsive, zippy, and fast helicopter, but for a low-time pilot it is not very forgiving."

Some people believe bad weather may have also contributed to the fatal crash.Mr Bailey dismissed the possibility that his former student would have flown if there had been any low-lying cloud and mist present that day. "Steve just wasn't a risk taker when it came to flying. I've heard about the poor weather but I just can't believe that Steve would have flown knowing conditions were bad. He told me that in racing he had to take risks, but he was not one to do the same in the air," he said

Mr Bailey revealed Hislop, who gained his pilot's licence in March this year, had not completed any of his flight training in the cockpit of a Robinson R44. Instead he did so in an Enstrom helicopter which, according to flight instructors, is an easier aircraft to fly.
Mr Bailey added: "He wasn't vastly experienced, but he was incredibly competent."

Any views on revealing 'warnings' of this sort to the Press in advance of the AAIB report?

[Flytest]

Gents before we descend into another "I heard what happened was.." may I suggest that I apologise for my "always Robbies" post, bid our condolences to the family and leave it at that.

My angle is one of safety, my job is to help Helo's fly as smoothly and reliably as possible, and where possible, spot defects before they become failures, catastrophic or otherwise. My thread was perhaps ill timed and ill concieved in light of the popularity of Robs and the experience levels of the drivers, for that I apologise.

Never let it be said I do not recognise when I am wrong.:ok:

[CaptainEagle]

Fair play flypast. I agree with your post, leave it at condolence. Hindsight is a very useful commodity that's best left unused in my opinion.

[The Nr Fairy]

Nervy:

Preliminary reports only appear to be issued where there is a major risk to large-scale public transport (e.g. 747 from Stansted some years ago).

No disrepsect to the deceased, but one R44 and one casualty - the report won't be seen until it's ready, and then in a normal monthly bulletin.

[STANDTO]

Whilst stood with my thumb up my ar$e at Parliament Square today, waiting for the Parade Lap after the Senior TT, there was about half an hour on Hizzy on Manx Radio.

Why don't we just wait for the AAIB report, and let what was a good man on a bike have a bit of peace? As has been said, Robbos are a bit prone to bumps,(for whatever reason) and I doubt we will learn anything new from this one.

[Helisell]

Glad I'ts anonymous and happy to let you know what happened but I can't reveal how I know at this stage.

(Please believe I DO KNOW what will be in the official report)

The official report will say WX.

Entry into IMC followed by loss of control and the result speaks for itself.

I don't know why the results have not been published yet.

R.I.P Steve

[The Nr Fairy]

zxcvbn:

It's probably taking some time because what was left of the aircraft was unrecognisable as an R44 from the tailboom / fuselage join forwards - having seen the wreckage in the AAIB hangar November 2003.

Generally, it seems to take a year / 18 months or more for a fatal accident report to be published, probably because all the loose ends need tying up.

[Jarvy]

I understand the delay is because the AAIB report is being contested by the family.

[jumpseater]

'AAIB report is being contested by the family'

Is this possible? Do the next of kin get to see accident reports before publication? I can understand a family wanting to do this, but was not aware they were consulted, apart from pertinant background information relating to the cause or possible cause.
Can anyone comment?

[Flying Lawyer]

Yes, it's possible.

The AAIB provides copies of draft reports to all interested parties (including the next of kin) to allow them an opportunity to make any comments/suggestions on the draft findings and recommendations before the final report is published. ('Interested' in this context means people or bodies directly concerned in or with the findings/recommendations, not just curious.)

The AAIB takes submissions into account, but doesn't necessarily accept them.

Tudor Owen

[Synthetic]

Anyone any news on this one?

I ask only as a Steve Hislop fan.

[The Nr Fairy]

Synthetic:

Check http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins.cfm between the 5th and 10th of each month, when the monthly bulletins get published.

[Synthetic]

Many thanks for that.

[The Nr Fairy]

This report is now available on the AAIB web site - click here for the link (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2005/robinson_r44_raven_i__g_ouel.cfm).

[Gaseous]

As a pilot rated on both Enstrom and R44 I find this report very interesting.

I think the crucial fact is made in the report that the R44 is unstable, but the relative stability of the Enstrom that Steve trained on, and did his instrument appreciation on is not mentioned. Steve would have been more used to the stable,centrally trimmed position of the Enstrom.

I have been in IMC in both types of machine and of the two, the R44 is much more challenging because the cyclic has no centrally biased position. One is truly immediately on instruments. An Enstrom is totally different. The thing will fly hands off and it is a conscious effort to move from the straight and level and is easier to control in IMC. This gives one time to gather ones thoughts. I was lucky and escaped both times.

While I obviously can't say whether this handling difference contributed to the accident I believe it is a point that any pilot converting from Enstrom to Robinson should consider.

The full AAIB report has lots of information on blade stall that I have not seen anywhere else. I think it is recommended reading for Robinson pilots.

I do not wish to upset Steves family, but why are they dissatisfied with the report?

Steve, my thoughts are with you.

[Jarvy]

I agree that the report should be read by Robbo pilots all 26 pages of it. The fact that it hints that as Steve was a biker (throttle management) this could have been a problem and that he flew into cloud may have been why the family objected.
Having done all my initial training on the 22 the 44 seems quite stable to me!

[bladewashout]

As a biker myself, I can absolutely agree with the report on throttle direction.

During PPL training, I have turned it the wrong way for an auto (on instead of off), and on startup I have turned it off instead of on, more times than I considered reasonable for a simple error. The instinct on a bike is to roll it towards you for on, away from you for off. The more chopper hours you do, the less of an issue is because you think 'helicopter' not just 'hand on throttle', but after a history of doing it wrong several times, I now think positively about it every time I turn it. The bike instinct for this pilot was massive, mine was maybe 6 years?

I was concerned that I was getting it wrong during training, and just thought it was stress. It wasn't until I read the report above that I realised what the reason might have been.

In my opinion, the report is right to say what it does: there are a bunch of explanations for what happened, and some are compelling. But nobody will ever know. The family, who knew him best, will clearly feel that he was unlikely to make a one of the more serious errors laid out. Some pilots will feel that in stressful situations, that was exactly what happened. What is clear to me is that whatever happened he didn't intend it and it is unlikely that he did anything which he believed at the time to be significantly risky.

The best we can hope to do is take on board the possible scenarios and learn from them so that irrespective of whether they were or were not the cause of his accident, they don't become the cause of one of ours.

BW

[Gaseous]

Jarvy,

Yes, I see what you mean about the throttle management bit.

Steve was primarily an Enstrom pilot so probably had a better appreciation of throttle control than most Robbie pilots.

As for the human factors bit implied by being a biker, The throttle is in the opposite hand so the automatic response bit doesn't really follow. Take an example of an automatically programmed activity such as playing a musical instrument like a guitar. Turn it round and try to play left hand and it just doesnt happen. I am a biker too but have never found any cross over between bike and helicopter. When I was a student I got it wrong but I also got the pedals wrong and I cant see a precident for that. Students who are non bikers get the throttle wrong.
According to the report it takes 1.1 seconds after the throttle chop to get to 80%. That should be long enough to realise you have gone the wrong way and open it again. Steve's reactions were pretty good. I saw him race.

I was surprised there was less emphasis on the possibility of carb icing, particularly as the carb heat assist would have pulled the heat off during the climb and there was visible moisture and low Nr blowback.

Maybe thats why the family aren't satisfied.


The message is clear yet again. Avoid IMC.

Edit :

BW :
You posted while I was writing and it is interesting we take the opposite point of view.


What is the experience of non bikers turning the throttle the wrong way?

[Thomas coupling]

A very thorough and most proficient report. All thanks to the AAIB for their professionalism - so that others may learn.

However, I would suggest this is as close as they are permitted to come (formally and publicly) to condemn the handling characteristics of the R22/44 class of helicopter, I would suggest.

These helicopters have been the subject of considerable adverse debate for a long time, now. When will someone somewhere take charge of the issue and do something about it?

If I was a prospective buyer, reports like this would be enough to put me off a particular product for ever!

Trouble is the education process is hit and miss. Some see the cheaper helicopter as the way to go, others do their research properly and wisen up!

RIP: big guy.

[DBChopper]

I am convinced that there is an inherent difficulty for an experienced motorcyclist who is an inexperienced helicopter pilot as regards throttle control.

I had amassed probably well in excess of 100 000 miles of emergency services motorcycling when I came to do my PPL(H). Despite it being the "wrong hand", so to speak - which was my instructor's argument against it - I found the instinct to roll the throttle the opposite way was overpowering. Now, riding motorcycles far less frequently than I fly, I feel I have mostly overcome the problem, but in an emergency? I'm not so sure.

DBChopper

[bladewashout]

Thomas: As a buyer (!) I think many of us are only too aware of the handling issues.

It partly comes down to affordability: I think most buyers would fly the best they can afford, sadly some of us can't afford much, so we wisen up but still buy the cheaper option. I have a 22, would prefer a (safer IMHO) 44 but would be happiest in an EC120 or 206. It's a 22 or nothing.

Anyone who buys an R22/44 and hasn't perused some or all of the UK, US and possibly australian and canadian accident report databases, is nuts. Every possible accident you could have is already there to be learned from.

Ignoring the truly unforeseeable, my way out as a low hours private pilot is to fly only when the weather is well within the envelope, try to be very conservative even then. Low cloud, high density altitude, near MAUW, anything tricky, just walk away, and until you have say 250-300 hours in a Robbie, only fly with rated pilots (like the Robinson factory does) - don't take distracting passengers when you have limited skills.

BW.

[212man]

I've read the report and although obviously highly distressing for the family to read, I fail to see why they would be unhappy with what the AAIB have found; a very thorough investigation I'd have said.

I do think it is a little easy to jump on the Robinson, though. If EC-120s and B-407s were the same price as a Robinson, you'd still get 75 hr PPLs crashing after going IMC. Just look at the FW PPL statistics; between 1985 and 2004 the biggest cause of accidents was CFIT (according to LASORS 2005). Bear in mind small FW are much more stable a/c than small helicopters, and normally have a reasonable instrument fit too. If anything, bigger aircraft may cause more of a problem because they are faster and get you into trouble quicker.

It's not just low hour PPLs either; look at the crash a few years ago with the 355 and the Chelsea Manager. Spatial disorientation can kill anyone.

[Thomas coupling]

I should have been more specific about the reasons for them crashing.
It's more to do with the head design/Nr decay/recovery times that concern me with the 'R' family. Certainly nothing to connect to CFIT - that is trully global problem!

Read the AAIB's final paragraph about reaction times - there's the rub:hmm:

[slowrotor]

The comments about throttle operation compared with motorbikes is interesting, however the R44 is of course standard in this respect.
On the other hand, the Robinson R22(and R44 I think) has a non-standard control yoke.
I lost control of a R22 for several seconds in normal cruise once. The instructor took control and brought us back to level. Here is what happened in my opinion.

Consider how the yoke can be rotated as well as moved from side to side on the Robinson. In normal operation of automobile control wheels, a small movement of the hand, UP and Down, occurs as the wheel is rotated.
When I lost control it was because I had reverted to instinctive reaction from years of operation of control wheels. (Cessna control yoke is similar as well). We normally turn with an up and down rotation but the R22 is side to side. It is a strange mix of control wheel and control stick.

As an experienced pilot, it is slightly embarrassing to admit that I lost control of the R22 yoke in early training, but I think the issue should be revealed for instructors to take note.
I think the R44 yoke is similar to the R22 but I cant remember for sure.
Pilots often react by instinct when scared. And the operation of our cars is much more ingrained in our brains.

[UwantME2landWHERE!]

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------According to the report it takes 1.1 seconds after the throttle chop to get to 80%. That should be long enough to realise you have gone the wrong way and open it again.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gaseous, by this statement, you have obviously never experience all the bells and whistles going off under 'normal circumstances', it takes 1.1 seconds to recognise the horn...! not to mention while encountering such a stressful situation as I-IMC, and at less than 100hrs TT.

I've had the horns go off, and I've been I-IMC, but thankfully not at the same time.
Put them both together..........
If I did pull it off, I'd be ten years older in the climbout!

The world is definitely a less exciting place without him.:(

RIP

[Gaseous]

Landwhere,

You may be right that it was not enough time under the circumstances. I do not know and I did say 'should'.

It has been enough time for others, but maybe the conditions were different.

Bear in mind that the first sign of a throttle chop is not the horn, it is the violent yaw which often comes as shock to Robbie pilots as they do not practice chops.

you said:
you have obviously never experience all the bells and whistles.

I have had an engine stop in flight in an aircraft without a horn. You dont need one to know its stopped!

[UwantME2landWHERE!]

Gaseous,


I too had the an A250 on a jetbox just quit, no horn.
I distinctly remember the feeling that the slowly decaying Nr and the deafening silence must have something in common, but it took me a few seconds to make the connection.....Thank god for big blades.

However, I also had a fuel contamination problem in a R44, when the engine just slowly wound down then quit. No cough, no splutter, just slowly stopped. My initial reaction was to progressively use more and more pedal to keep the nose straight. Only when the horn sounded and I became conscious of the differing engine note did it finally register. Under different circumstances, those may have been very valuable seconds.

I was merely questioning the fact that under most circumstances 1.1 seconds is not very long and a few seconds could easily go by unnoticed if the results of ones actions are not as expected.!

[TTSN]

I have read the whole report and would like to throw the following open for discussion.

Robinson tail strike / low G situations - over the years if you read all the detailed reports they often state that other aircraft radar traces were in the area....strange - a number of these have happened on perfect clear vis days...could it be that a pilot who flies a R22/44 competently under normal conditions gets spooked by seeing an aircraft he wasn't expecting and makes abrupt / violent control inputs causing mast bumping / low g posssibly resulting in a tail strike. Not the case here but an intresting observation I have picked out reading many previous reports.

There is probably a simple answer to this next question / thought - why do Robinson not increase the RPM at which the Low RPM warning horn comes on ie make it come on at 100% or 101%. I know this may cause it to come on in some turbulence etc but surely it would give slightly more warning in the event of a Low RPM situation ? any views

I don't agree with this talk of motorbikes and people turning throttles the wrong way -the 26 pages of this report just seems to conclude that the aircraft went IMC then the pilot possibly suffered spatial disorientation resulting in abrupt / severe control inputs that caused a low g situation that resulted in a tail strike. The coincedence of having a problem with the aircraft / rolling the throttle off etc at exactly the same time as going IMC is unlikely even taking into consideration increased pilot stress. Having said all the above flying into cloud / poor weather does increse the likelyhood of carb icing which could quickly cause Low RPM.

Did this seem like a long flight for someone of limited experience in the aircraft type and low total time?. I would'nt call Wycombe to Scotland solo a very straightforward flight.

Is extreme caution to exercised when going from very stable trainers like the Enstrom or Hughes 300 to the Robinson 22's / 44's? (ie when all initial training has been done on the "easier" to fly aircraft). I'm not knocking the Robinson product but being realistic they are trickier if someone has got used to a more stable aircraft.

[Gaseous]

TTSN
An interesting post for your first.

Is extreme caution to exercised when going from very stable trainers like the Enstrom or Hughes 300 to the Robinson 22's / 44's?

Yes. Absolutely. And the school told Steve that.

I did my Enstrom conversion at Steve's Enstrom only school and I generally turned up there for my lessons in an R44. I had discussions with the CFI who was not Robbie rated, on the handling differences and it seems that he passed on this information to Steve and in fact warned him of the handling differences. (see Normans interview on page 3 of this thread). Steve did not take this on board.

Wycombe to Scotland? Again he was advised not to do it in a 44.
On the other hand he was licenced, conscientious and very able as a pilot, just not experienced.

Would the outcome have been different if he had been in an Enstrom?

Who knows, but they don't have carb icing and are more stable and don't do mast bumping and he was more familiar with them. They will go into IMC and lose Nr if you shut the throttle though.

Draw your own conclusions.

[[email protected]]

The twistgrip stuff and the continued debate about Robinson NR decay is really extraneous to the real cause of the accident - inadvertant IMC! How many pilots will continue to push on with deteriorating weather, sitting as high as they can to keep away from the ground and, as a result, scudding along at the cloudbase where they have few options when the windscreen suddenly goes grey. Don't do it, it's a killer.

[muffin]

I have often wondered about the activation threshold for the low RRPM horn. The governor controls at 104% but it presumably has to see a small error before it responds to it, hence the actual RPM must vary within a dead band. In a previous life I was a control systems engineer, and I don't think the governor on an R22 is particularly sophisticated. I assume that if the horn warning level was set much higher, the risk of spurious warnings under normal operation would be higher. If the thing went off too often, then the user would get accustomed to it and maybe ignore it on the one time it really did matter.

During R22 PPL training, you do range autos at 90% rrpm if I remember correctly. Hence 97% has quite a large safety factor as a warning setting. I guess it depends on the rrpm decay rate which itself depends on the power demand and pitch setting.

Presumably like most things it has been chosen as an acceptable compromise.

[rotorspeed]

Having just read this very thorough report, have to agree with Crab here.

Firstly it is reasonable to assume the pilot did get disorientated in cloud. It also seems probable that for a number of reasons the R44's design made it more likely that either during, or when trying to recover from, such disorientation the catastophic blade-hits-tail failure occurred. But even if it hadn't, the chances of a fatal conclusion were high.

The real issue, as so often, was why the acft got in cloud at all, and why the pilot climbed. It is obviously not clear how this occurred, though from the presented information, I would have thought it a moderate, but not high, risk. The R44 had been flying at around 1500 ft, the cloudbase probably around 1600 ft, but the ground elevation was perhaps 600 ft in the narrow valley where he was initially flying, and 1000 - 1200 ft over the ridge to the west, beyond which was another, lower valley.

If this is all correct, he would not have needed to climb at all, even if he deliberately turned right (west) to either do a 180 or reach the other valley. Even the power lines on the side of the valley would have had an elevation of say 750 ft, so should have been well below. In fact, the pilot could have descended a couple of hundred feet and still maintained 100 - 200ft clearance over the ridge, which for someone used to measured risk and speed close to surroundings, should not have been an issue.

It maybe that a sense of needing 500 - 1000ft terrain clearance at all times pushed him into climbing into the cloud, but I find it hard to believe that.

Once in the cloud, his climb was alarmingly rapid - 1800 ft/min. Was this a deliberate, if panicky, effort to establish a sensible altitude before trying a 180 and descending? Possibly, though I'm not sure he would have climbed that high and certainly would not have allowed A/S to drop to 50 kts if he really knew what he was doing. Nor of course should he have turned at the same time, but then no-one could ever expect a pilot with such little experience to have much chance of putting into practice any theory he'd leant about IMC recovery. So it was probably all getting horribly messy quite soon.

But let's come back to this question of why did he climb in the first place. Of course, we don't know precisely what the weather was like, exactly where he was. It is quite possible the weather was locally much poorer, with very poor vis and considerably lower cloud. What does strike me as being interesting though is the fact that the turn appears to start just after G-OUEL had crossed the pylon line. Could the pilot have suddenly seen the pylons/wires in the murk and pulled up abruptly to avoid them, which caused him to enter the cloud, with the consequent partially/uncontrolled climb?

Whatever the sequence of precise events, this does emphasis yet again that inadvertent entry into IMC is a massive challenge to handle for a VFR pilot (and machine) and that it MUST be avoided at all costs. I've banged on about this before, and not to everyones agreement, but in this kind of typical situation, it can be avoided by simply going lower and slower until you either turn back, or just land.

NEVER loose sight of the ground.

[Thomas coupling]

Rotorspeed/Crab: the trouble with inadvertent entry into IMC for an inexperienced pilot, is that they don't know what they are about to experience - they haven't done enough IMC flying, so they assume it'll be different but OK:ooh:
When it happens - some make it - some don't.

The enigma is that they are flying the most versatile aircraft in the world, certainly the most manouevrable. Why they choose NOT to land, has always confused me:confused:

Is it a MAN thing to press on, and a sissies way out to land for the day/night?

There'll be lots more.......................

[Gaseous]

TC.
Heres a theory.
Initially the 500 ft rule keeps the novice uncomfortably near the cloudbase and then when the whiteout comes it is fear of CFIT and obstacles that stops them descending. The 500 ft rule was drilled into me as a student. Dire threats were made about what the CAA would do for low flying. And the low flying to avoid IMC would be deliberate.

My first excursion into the whitestuff (at 81 hours in a R44) was with a cloudbase of at least 600ft AGL! I didnt descend. I did a 180 and flew out of it as trained. Is the training an issue? Is this still what is taught? Its a few years since I trained.

Now, with a few more hours I'd descend and turn round or land.

Incidently, The CAA have made clear in a GASIL that they would never prosecute for landing to avoid IMC or any safety related issue.

[Thomas coupling]

Gaseous: I noticed the stark difference with your latest recoveries, in that you wouldn't now do a 180 IN CLOUD. And it is this that disorientates pilots, because it is a difficult manouvre at a time when you haven't settled on instruments.

Don't forgetalso the advice is to fly AT A SPEED COMMENSURATE WITH THE VISIBILITY. Low viz - low speed. If you still go inadvertent - DO NOT turn 180, but descend and clear cloud before manouvering or LAND LAND LAND :ok:

[212man]

I'm not sure I'd advocate a 180 degree turn at 500 ft ish agl , having gone IMC, in an area such as this accident! A perfectly flown rate one turn at 100 kts will take up about 1 mile laterally, and it's unlikely to be that well flown so probably will use up a lot more space which the map would indicate isn't there to be used.

The notion that the 500 ft rule should influence your decision making (as quoted by a recent post) is something that should be more accurately taught during the PPL, by the sounds of it. The aircraft and its occupants' safety is paramount at all times, and the last thing a low hour PPL (or indeed anyone) need concern himself with facing a letter box in a valley, is Rule 5.

If you get yourself into such a situation, just thank your lucky stars that you are not in a Cessna 152 or similar, and find a spot to land.

Maybe a sensible addition to the PPL syllabus would be some form of bad weather flying awareness exercise, done somewhere like the Lake district or Wales. It may emphasise to the student how unforgiving an environment it would be to get stuck in IMC. It would be at least as relavent as the instrument awareness training, maybe more so. By definition, you are not likely to inadvertently go IMC at a sensible cruising altitude; it is most likely to be below MSA in high ground.

CFIT is still the world's largest cause of accidents across the board, the more aware you can be of that and the causes, the better.

[Vfrpilotpb]

My comment here may leave me open to ridicule from some, but I obtained my license before the advent of the intrument awarness for any inadvertant IMC,.... hence if I see such grey or white stuff anywhere on my planned route I give it a very respectable wide berth, indeed I have in the past done a one eighty and retreated several miles to rethink my route, on two occasion I flew back to EGNH and ended my flying for the day.

I am not Mary Poppins, but the clouds are for far better pilots than I!


Peter R-B

Vfr:ooh:

[helicopter-redeye]

"Old pilots and bold pilots, etc" as the old rhyme goes.

Long live life.

[muffin]

I have held a plank IMC rating for many years, and although I have not renewed it in recent times, the odd temporary excursion into the white stuff in a fixed wing did not particularly bother me.

Then a few weeks ago for the first time ever, I experienced inadvertent IMC entry in an R22. What a different world! I immediately exited downwards, but after only a few seconds I decided that this was not a place to be longer than absolutely necessary.

[PENNINE BOY]

As a personal friend of Steves, I am not looking forward to reading the report. I have just printed it off to read later whilst on standby at work.

Having read alot of the previous postings about this fatal accident re: training issues the usual bashing on about Robbos.

IMC and IR training is no good unless you fly regulary on instruments. But most helis have the basic fit, would you want to fly IMC on any small heli that hasnt got a heated pitot? Heated screen? I fly 5days a week using my IR and believe me if you go and have a 2 week break and come back it is amazing how your scan has deteriated.

I took up heli flying a few weeks after Steves death and like Steve I am hooked, but as a Airline Captain please please keep out of cloud, put it on the deck and phone a cab!!!!!!

Rest in peace my friend you are sorely missed..............

D.H.

[Fg Off Max Stout]

Muffin and Thomas Coupling,

in your last posts you have both advocated descending following inadvertant entry into IMC. To me this sounds like a recipe for CFIT. RAF policy is to immediately begin a climb to safety alt, turn away from high ground and get a radar service. Can I assume from your posts that PPL(H) pilots are NOT drilled into doing this instinctively? Descending in inadvertant IMC, possibly in the vicinity of high ground to try and regain VMC sound terrifying and potentially lethal to me.

I'd be very interested to know just how PPLs are taught to respond.

[helicopter-redeye]

Can I assume from your posts that PPL(H) pilots are NOT drilled into doing this instinctively?

Correct Sir. Not meant or allowed to enter IMC therefore not taught to respond to situation that would not occur (sic).

However how many PPL(H) pilots if entering IMC would last long enough to

(i). climb through IMC to VMC on top in anything other than very thin layer cloud or CU;

(ii). thus have time to request a service upgrade even if one were available in UK mountain terrain at low altitude, and be able to establish effectively on instruments in a low stability machine while fiddling with the transponder and ident button?

Avoid IMC at all costs.

h-r


:\ :8

[Thomas coupling]

Max stout, how often do you do IF?

How often does a PPL do IF???

QED.

[muffin]

My IMC training was all on planks, and yes, this is exactly what I was taught. Climb on instruments to above cloud then sort yourself out as necessary.

However, my PPL(H) training never came even close to cloud. Under the CAA PPL(H) there was no instrument training at all. You never went into IMC, hence no need to train for it. Actually I did a couple of hours just for the experience, but there was no official need for it. The JAA (H) syllabus does require 5 hours IF though.

In the case I mentioned above, I knew exactly where I was, the terrain was flat, and I had only just flown into it. I also knew it was a very shallow layer so opted to drop down out of it rather than attempting a 180 in a very unstable IF platform. I still think that was the correct decision in the circumstances.

[[email protected]]

The problem is that it would require the PPLH pilot to do some proper pre-flight planning and know the safety altitude, know the frequency for a radar service (possible have it dialled up as a standby freq), know where the zero degree isotherm was, have thought about his actions in the event of IIMC, know where his nearest diversion was etc etc etc.

[bladewashout]

Just coming towards the end of my PPL(H), and what we were taught is how to fly straight and level on instruments, and how to make level turns, to a compass point. We did some raise/lower altitude, but not climbing or descending turns.

The aim (I have been led to understand) is to perform a 180 turn on instruments to get back where we came from.

However the underlying advice (in no uncertain terms) is stay away from clouds and if it doesn't look nice, don't go, or land. For me, that means if you can't maintain 1500 ft due to cloud, that's the decision point for go home/land, and it's been made.

BW

[Head Bolt]

The discussions regarding inadvertent IMC have raised some very good responses and it is in the interests of all VFR pilots to heed these words of wisdom.

I have noticed that many people state that if going IMC, they would make a 180 and get out of it, as they were taught to do. This raises an important issue, because the IF element of the PPL(H) syllabus is not designed to teach people to do a 180 if they get in trouble. It is IF awareness, designed to show people how difficult it is, and to give them some sort of chance of holding it together long enough to DESCEND to get out of trouble.

A 180 turn is neither the quickest nor safest option to recover from IMC - a DESCENT is the answer, as this will restore the forward viz you had before going IMC.

As a flight examiner, I am required to ensure that a student can perform a 180 turn on instruments as part of his License Skills Test. This is there to assess whether the student has sufficient ability to control the machine by sole reference to instruments, and is considered by JAA to be a manouevre that will demonstrate this or otherwise.

I believe that this test requirement has been adopted by some instructors as the IMC recovery method, and it is drilled into the student - make sure you can do a 180 for the examiner.

I always ask a candidate what he/she would do if they went IMC, and invariably the answer is - 'do a 180, because it was clear where you just came from'. Wrong answer.

Fly at a speed commensuare with the viz, if necessary go lower and slower, and then make the decision early and land, or turn back.

Get this idea of a 180 out of your heads, please.

[Vfrpilotpb]

In my opinion, it seems that any sort of "Instrument Awarness" given to any new PPL(H) posibly gives them more confidence to go nearer or even flirt with the soft wispy veiled stuff that is always on the edges of most cloud systems.

So why does this new system cover any of the instruments required for blind flying, if the PPL(H) student isn't going onward into the full CPL course why give that possibility of allowing one or two New Pilots the ability to feel they can handle cloud, when quite clearly it is for experts only!!

PeterR-B
Vfr

[UwantME2landWHERE!]

VFR,

I was under the impression that the 'instrument awareness' training was never designed to offer reduced personal minima or encourage 'confidence to go nearer or even flirt with the soft wispy veiled stuff'.

My understanding is that it hopes to give a low hour PPL(H) a fighting chance if they encounter I-IMC and prevent the very incident discussed in this thread.

If one or two pilots become overly confident due to this training then we can review their actions in the next AAIB report, however the overall benefit of this additional training on a new PPL(H) must outweigh this.

Head Bolt,

It's good to hear a voice of reason is still in a position of authority and influence. Too many low hour FI's regurgitating text book training having had almost no more 'instrument awareness' than their students!.......And certainly no practical experience of attempting a rate-one under stress.!

[Vfrpilotpb]

Uwantme,

Thank you, I understand what you are saying, but what percentage of entry into cloud incidents happened before and then after the introduction of this very basic Instrument awarness was introduced,

By the nature of human beings and their natural ability to learn and advance, this sort of "Instrument Awarness" will give that sort of additional confidence to some new pilots, I am not saying its a bad thing, but are the intructors giving enough dire examples to student pilots about the problems they will be in if the inadvertantly enter cloud, lets face it clouds are pretty easy to see, they dont lurk round any corners, so inadvertant entry is a little bit of a strange way to explain the fact that if you are a PPL(H)without any instrument rating you really should be well away from anything that remotely looks like a cloud.

How many new pilots could at a sconds notice tell you where they were, some are hopeless at knowing what is underneath them, I personally will never go near any clouds, I would hate to have to try and execute a 180 to get out, in most of the training helis and small SFH types you would more likly come unstuck just by doing any 180 in cloud!

Peter R-B
Vfr

[Head Bolt]

VFR,

I can see the point you make about basic IF perhaps instilling unwarranted confidence, but in practise I don't think this is the case.

It is my experience when teaching basic IF that the student actually develops a very healthy respect for the difficulties involved, and comes away with a stronger than ever conviction to stay away from cloud.

I always include some hood time when conducting LPCs, not to assess the candidates IF ability but to reinforce the point that they can't do it well enough to save their life.

I find that almost without exception they can't, and they come away with their conviction renewed - my parting words are usually along the lines of 'if you're in doubt, then there is no doubt - you shouldn't be there'.

Seems to work for me.

[Vfrpilotpb]

Well said H-B, I agree with how you are looking at it,

Sadly I dont think any one thing points towards why PPL(H) pilots get into Cloud problems I am sure they dont purposely set out to get involved with clouds but as one other poster to the thread wrote, possibly it would help with better route planning and taking more notice of the Wx and how fast it was moving comparative to the route they were planning to fly.

I feel only careful flying to build up hours and experience are the main thing we can hope for, and the PPL(H)'s remember that experience by flying as safely as possible at all times, after all PPL(H)'s are only doing it for the freedom and fun, unlike the CPL's and the Mil pilots who do it for their living!

Vfr

[Arkroyal]

Poor Steve. Such a ballsy racer, who held the fastest lap of the TT course for so long.

Once again the combination of the world's most demanding machine in the hands of the inexperienced has bitten.

The AAIB's words sum up my view of this horrid helicopter:

Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 27.143 concerning pilot reaction times states that:

'No corrective action time delay for any condition following power failure may be less
than - For the cruise condition, one second, or normal pilot reaction time (whichever is
greater); and for any other condition normal pilot reaction time.

It is therefore questionable that pilots, particularly of relatively low experience, should be expected
to consistently and reliably react within, what appears to be, an unrealistic timescale.

[Pat Malone]

Arkroyal:
I'm concerned about the AAIB's addition of their seemingly irrelevant remarks on intervention time, which I believe distract from the lessons of this accident.
The report says that it is possible in an R44, under certain regimes of flight, for Nr to fall from the level at which the horn is activated to an unrecoverable value in as little as two seconds.
Now hold on there... how many light helicopters would, without intervention, take any more than two seconds to reduce from 97 percent to an unrecoverable value at max pitch in a climb? If the certification criteria for helicopters were changed to reflect the AAIB's concern, I suspect it would take out every helicopter up to and including the 206.
Steve Hislop must have had the lever in his armpit to sustain a virtually level turn at 120 knots in a 44 and may well have overpitched it, but the gyrations of his helicopter from the moment it apparently went IMC would indicate that the jig was up long before the main rotor hit the tailboom.
To my mind, the mandate to fly five hours on instruments for a PPL (H) is the most disastrous piece of nonsense the JAAs have come up with. A lot of helicopter students are immensely capable, self-confident people. We show them how to fly on instruments, we give them five hours experience of instrument flying – more than virtually any other exercise – then we tell them not to do it. What we've done is change the little voice in the backs of their minds that used to say: "I'm dead if I go in there" to say "there is another option..."
If the five-hour instrument requirement was wise, then this accident would not have happened. Time to get rid of it.

[Johe02]

To my mind, the mandate to fly five hours on instruments for a PPL (H) is the most disastrous piece of nonsense the JAAs have come up with.

I couldn't agree more. . .:ok:

[Arkroyal]

Fair point Pat.

I agree that the instrument flying appreciation probably does more harm than good in most cases.

My point is that the robbie is most demanding to fly, and also the most unforgivimg of the mistakes typical of the inexperienced.

That's why I don't like it.

I reckon a 206 would have fared better.

I'm still a bit worried about anything that has such a habit of having a mid-air collision with itself.

[The Nr Fairy]

Ark:

Helicopters are prone to "midairs with themselves" - rotating things at high speed close to a tailboom is an occupational hazard, if you will, and the teetering head doesn't help, for sure.

R22/R44s aren't the only ones who do this - a B206 lost its main rotor in flight about 8 years ago, and although the cause wasn't fully determined, mast bumping was the prime suspect see (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_500156.pdf for the report in full).

I think the issue here is not that the helicopter did something wrong, but that the pilot got into a position where he found it necessary to make inputs which lead to the final result. The precursor to that? Flying into cloud. Not much about the helicopter design implicated in that stage of the flight, I'm afraid.

[Arkroyal]

All helicopters prone, Nr Fairy?

I've managed 5000 hours plus on helos without encountering it so far.

The mast bump in the 206 is extreme and rare.

Farnborough has a skip full of robbie tail booms cut off by their own rotor blades.

As for this particular accident, I can only agree with you. But, the last thing a pilot needs when it all goes pear shaped, is a machine whose requirents for safe extrication exceed his experience and abilities.

It went pear shaped, possibly due to the cosy feeling engendered by the instrument awareness course. It became fatal, possibly because the robbie is a bitch in low-houred hands.

[helicopter-redeye]

It went pear shaped, possibly due to the cosy feeling engendered by the instrument awareness course.

Speculation, suggest reword or withdraw.

[Head Bolt]

Pat,

I am surprised that you can make the bold statement that this accident 'would not have happened' without the instrument awareness training.

That may be your opinion, but that does not make it a fact.

Do you have the accident stats to show that inadvertent IMC accidents have increased since the introduction of the 5 hours IF, because pilots now think they can handle it?

I have posted previously that it has been my experience that students actually become acutely aware of how difficult it is to fly on instruments, even in simulated IMC, and this tends to make them more cautious.

Obviously this will not always be the case, and there may be those who may think they are better equipped to press on when they shouldn't.

Thoughts from other instructors on this?

[[email protected]]

I presume the mandated 5 hours IF is all simulated and therefore only useful for teaching basic scan techniques - maybe mandating one hour (or even less) of actual IF would be more benficial. Simulated IF can build false confidence and nothing removes any over-confidence quicker than entry into real cloud.

[Arkroyal]

No, redeye I won't.

The word 'possibly' was put in deliberately, as I am not making any kind of judgement on this accident.

[Cron]

I'm probably totally out of my depth posting here (as a PPL with 55 hours R22) but as the discussion relates to the value of the 5 hours Instrument time I may have something to offer.

I got the feeling from all the instructors at my school that 5 hours thing was really a joke but they are/were a very professional bunch and never forced opinions.

I had been shown and had successfully (well not too badly) carried out 180's in patchy cloud but I was always able to sneak a peek at outside reference - mayble this was for confidence building.

One day one of them very calmly and carefully and with extensive 'precautions' directed me to fly into cloud at about 4000'. He was hawk like hovering over the controls as we entered very 'thick' cumulus.

Now, I have been near too and in thin cloud on a Hang Glider several times (not on purpose of course) and really thought this would be no big deal - the initial roughness at cloud base was expected but I was suprised that the helicopter moved around as much as my glider - I could not keep steady needles.

As we entered the cloud the whole world changed, the helicopter seemed to be vibrating 10 times more than usual, outside there was just blinding white, there was no view, no reference, my senses were saying we were pointing at the ground and going 200mph. The AH was tipping left slightly. Yes, I began to correct the wrong way, yet on my (fairly good PC simulator) I can fly around in cloud all day no problem.

Even when the Instructor assisted in levelling the a/c I gently pushed back at him the wrong way, we were still slowing - about 50kts now, the instructor started predicting the outcome - I remember him saying 'upside down', I'm hunched forward right over the cyclic for no good reason, my veins are sticking out of my arm just through the force I'm gripping the lever with.. no matter how much I told myself the right way to move the cyclic my senses overcame and moved it the wrong way - even just gentle small movements.

The instructor levelled us and with lots of c/heat descended into the clear. I'm all back to normal now and we are in the clear and can fly as usual (inexpertly but I hope safely).

I was totally and utterly shaken by this experience, not the physical aspects but by my inablility to even remotely cope with the situation. All the books, all the PC simulators all the advise were as nothing. I decided at that point that hundreds, possibly thousands of hours are required to adapt out the senses and apply the instruments. It worked for me as shock therapy - another 10, 50, 100 hours I feel would not be enough.

[bladewashout]

Is that even legal? R22 certified for VFR flight only, clear of cloud & in sight of ground, irrespective of the instructor's rating (IR or otherwise).

I completely understand the rationale for doing it but it seems an unjustifiably risky addition to the training programme.

BW

[tommacklin]

Some very interesting points being made here.

I believe that there is a definite advantage to be gained by teaching a student pilot how to fly the aircraft without external reference. Unfortunately, in most helicopters, and aeroplanes for that matter, you simply cannot get rid of all external references. No matter how well you restrict the student's field of view, there is always an external reference that will make the exercise unrealistic and inadequate.

The only way to improve the reality of the exercise is to get into the cloud and do it for real under IFR, or, do it in a quality simulator.

Both of these options create their own difficulties and would be quite difficult to achieve given that most PPL(H) training is now done on the R22/Schw 300. I am guessing, therefore, that the aviation authorities around the world are aware of this and have decided to accept a few hours of simulated IF as a compromise.

Personally, I prefer the "educate and supervise" approach. The student must be well aware that simulated IF is a poor compromise and is not a ticket to explore the sky nor to ignore reducing visibility/cloudbase. If all else fails they MUST land and phone their mum.

You woudn't catch me in cloud in a 22.

[DeltaFree]

Having worked for a VFR operator that did some training for inadvertent IMC. I realise any training affects different people different ways. Some gain in confidence, if they can do it in a simulated environment then it is no big deal. Others realise the difficulties and vow never to get into real IMC. Lets face it if you fly rotary one of the biggest assets is the ability to go down and slow down to the point where, you might just as well land and live to fly another day.

[helicopter-redeye]

I sat next to a high hours IR pilot on a return from the US once.

His view (only a view mind) was that if he had not practiced IR flying THAT WEEK, he was not current for flying in instrument only conditions.

:\

[Pat Malone]

Head Bolt:

Quote:

"Pat,

I am surprised that you can make the bold statement that this accident 'would not have happened' without the instrument awareness training."

So am I. I didn't.

Pat

[[email protected]]

Cron - your experience validates my point - there is no substitute for real IMC training. But do we now have the tail wagging the dog? there is no real IMC training for PPLs, not because there is no need (quite the opposite) but because the machines used for training are not suitable for IMC work. The R22 may be cheap to run (300 similarly) but we are short changing our PPL pilots for the sake of 1 hour in an IFR aicraft in cloud (surely 5 hours in an R22 would pay for one hour in something IFR rated).
I am afraid that in my experience, no simulator can come close to the real experience of being in bumpy cloud (the fear factor is impossible to replicate) and there just ain't no substitute for doing it for real.

[rotorspeed]

Interesting, frank and unsurprising view from Cron, saying how alarming it was to actually enter true IMC with no previous experience. And that was when he knew he was at 4000ft with lots of clear sky just below - and an instructor right alongside! Now add the stress being totally on your own, with a very cloud base that makes the exit options tricky, and you can probably double the level of angst!

Going IMC to prove the point in an R22/44? Am not an instructor, but don't like that, (a) because it's illegal and more importantly (b), because there's got be to pretty high risk in that accidents will result. So is the instructor instrument rated? Recent experience? Machine's suitability? Hmm. We know from the Hislop accident that it doesn't take much disorientation in an R22/44 to end up cutting tails off. Sure many instructors can do this well. But can all, all of the time?

So as Crab says, use an IFR machine and IR instructor. But then jumping out of a 22/44 into say an IFR 355 for an hour is likely to be so alien and overwhelming that the purpose may well be swamped by the totality of the new experience.

Back to the 5 hours instrument awareness to get a PPL. I'm right with those who think it's a bad thing, tempting those who can be over-confident. But the initial requirement is only part of it - what "instrument awareness" is subsequently taught/tested? Does the annual LPC include it? And even after getting your full IR, you'd be pretty poor after 3 months of no instrument flying, let alone a year after 5 hours instrument awareness as a low time PPL.

So as far as I'm concerned we're right back to either being VFR or IFR, with nothing in between. Frankly it is not difficult to keep out of IMC, if you are motivated to do so.

[Hilico]

BBC report dated 25th July 07.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/south_of_scotland/6915489.stm

[rotorspin]

for such an open and shut case this is madness?

there are many, many more incidents that have bigger doubts over them that never end up at an enquiry????

Suppose we had all better get celeb status so we can have an enquiry in the event of poor piloting? :ugh:

[Whirlygig]

Unless new evidence has come to light, I cannot see that a public enquiry can possibly come to any different conclusion from that produced by the AAIB.

His family, friends and fans want a different answer but sadly, they are unlikely to get it and all we get from is an increased tax bill.

Cheers

Whirls

[zalt]

If the Air Accident Investigation Branch report did go as far as saying 'that an aircraft malfunction "could not be eliminated" '(BBC), then this no doubt has left the family with an open question they hope to resolve.

[Chukkablade]

Zalt, thats because the AAIB had s little to go on. How do you prove a negative?

It's another case of a low hour PPL getting into IMC in a helicopter thats not designed for it, and things going very, very quickly to rat****. Even his instructor warned him he was getting outside his experience envelope before his fatefull day.

The guy may have been god on a 'bike (and he was, IMHO) but that isn't related to the facts.

Rotorspin and Whirlygig are, as usual, spot on, if a little blunt with it.

If he was Joe Bloggs, fresh PPL, would this enquiry be getting held? My moneys on a no.

[Whirlygig]

It's another case of a low hour PPL getting into IMC

I believe Steve Hislop had a CPL.


and Whirlygig are, ... spot on, if a little blunt with it.

Excuse me! I'm not blunt! I'm cute and cuddly and caring!

Cheers

Whirls

[rapman]

R.I.P. Steve

[Chukkablade]

Sorry Whirls, your mistaken here, Steve never had a CPL, he only had 96 hours total time when he died. Mostly on Enstroms I believe, not on R44's.

IIRC, when he had that fatefull day, the weather was grim enough for the RAF to bin a 2 ship low flying sortie in the area, and a Chinook also did a dog leg West to avoid it. When he entered the IMC, the data recovered from the GPS stated it went from good to dead in about 60 seconds. They think he entered IMC, and tried to do a 180 turn away from it (as taught on the PPL course) and thats where he got bitten.

Bloody sad.

[Three Blades]

Original thread on this subject:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=97772&page=1

AAIB report:
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2005/robinson_r44_raven_i__g_ouel.cfm

____________________________________________________________ ___

Threads now merged

Senior Pilot

[verticalhold]

I remember this one horribly well. I didn't post on the original thread as there was a lot of arguing going on. That evening I was in the area with a VFR only twin Squirrel working my c**k off due to the conditions. I binned the rest of the job, chucked it in a field and spent the night in a nearby pub.

God help anyone flying as things were that evening, especially a low time PPL.
The viz was patchy and down to zero in places with very wet cloud hanging off the hills. A climb to MSA was utterly out of the question as the weather obviously went up a long way and I didn't want to spend the rest of my life in IMC with the usual VFR standard of instruments that the 355 provides as a basic VFR fit.

That night frightened me at times. Sadly for Steve Hislop he probably didn't know enough to know how much trouble was awaiting him.

VH

[r44raven]

Having read the AAIB report and new stories, I wonder, with respect to all parties concerned, if the family's pressure for a public enquiry was prompted not so much by the suspicion of a critical in -flight failure than the presence of fast jet traffic in the LFA around the time of the incident?

steve

[Martin Barclay]

As I am sure you are all aware from the innaccurate media coverage there is an ongoing case being heard regarding the sad loss of Steve Hislop. For any readers of that esteemed rag 'The Metro' this morning they will have been interested to read that the pilot had 5 hours of flight experience!
This level of journalism beggars belief and implies that we are all charging around the skies having received our licences free from Keloggs with a couple of cereal box lids.

Morning rant over, but seriously this kind of thing should be stopped. Any ideas?

[Whirlygig]

You could try writing to the publication concerned (either the Editor or the particular journalist) and point out their error to them, requesting that they print an erratum in the next edition.

The five hours probably came from the 5 hours "instrument time" gained at PPL and, after all, the accident did occur in IMC.

Cheers

Whirls

[scottishterrier]

Gentle People,

As has been said in the past,

LET US AWAIT THE OUTCOME .

:rolleyes:

[TiPwEiGhT]

Scottish, the AAIB issued a report somoe time ago. A search for G-OUEL on the AAIB website will bring it up for you.

TiP

[Martin Barclay]

Let us await the outcome of what!

The AAIB has already spoken. This is about ludicrous sensationalist reporting years after the event for the sake of some column inches.

Yes I did contact the newspaper concerned and they did retract the story from their web site and print a much more accirate report on the following day's court evidence which did a lot to confirm the AAIB report.

[Martin Barclay]

Sorry Tipweight. Posts crossed.

[scottishterrier]

Martin,

Let us await the outcome of what!

I can only think that this was an error of yours, cosidering the previous posts and the fact that The Metro was refering to information given at the Fatal Accident Inquiry in the Scottish courts.:ugh:

This is about ludicrous sensationalist reporting years after the event for the sake of some column inches.


I think not. I do believe the Metro was reporting the statements that had been made to the court. This would be written by an ill educated Journo or worse a sub - editor who was rushing to fill a space.
Whats more they are entitled to write about this issue considering the ongoing hearing.

Additionally this is the Metro what do you expect of a freebie, Quality journalism. If you really wish to take issue with this why not try the Editor, who's direct email address is on the website.

tipweight,

Thank you, I am well aware of the report from the AAIB.


ST

[Martin Barclay]

No it was not an error of mine. I am equally well aware of the fatal accident enquiry, conducted by people who are exremely learned but hardly as qualified to establish the cause of an aviation accident as the AAIB or would you have judges etc sifting through wreckage at accident sites

[scottishterrier]

Would you concede that it is possible the rag took information given ,and then used it out of context ? ( by the way, I am not seeking to defend the media)

Are you also suggesting that there should be no inquiry given that it is something unique to the Scottish Legal System ?

:D
Or are you willing to accept a report from a governmental agency who in their report puts suggestion that attempts to lead the reader to agree with their conclusion?

Evidence given to the inquiry challenges some statements of the AAIB report.

ST

[TiPwEiGhT]

Sorry Scottish, I did not realise the FAI was happening just now. What items are being challenged in the AAIB report? TiP

[scottishterrier]

Tip,

One item which is worthy of note is the statement regarding the Chinook. It was stated that the crew were experienced and in fact were under training, with the mission commander not in the front. He did show face at the inquiry and was unable to show the court the route they had taken on the day, on a OS map. in the AAIB report the route taken is stated quite definately.

Further evidence by witnesses on the ground stated that the weather was fine. This was given to AAIB who chose not to use it in the report. It was also stated that there were no "Fast Jets" in the vicinity of the accident which was countered by witnesses.

There is more

ST

[TiPwEiGhT]

Ah... this is not good. Thanks for the update, ST. TiP

[AllyPally]

ST

read post 119 - if this is a real witness post then the weather from an aviation point was not good. Ground witnesses are very unreliable sometimes. Fast jets in the area is also a red herring.

What is a Chinook mission commander? The captain of the a/c will always be in the front. Never heard of a mission commander unless he was an army officer in charge of the troops in the back:ooh:

It is not unusual to be unable to recall a SH route after so much time. They don't fly along defined airways. There is a pick up point and a drop off point how you get between depends on a myriad of factors.

To a dispassionate reader of the events surrounding this tragic accident points to a low time PPL (5hrs on type) getting disorientated in poor viz and being unable to recover before hitting terra firma. It is a tragic way to loose a life but it happens too often. The influence of military traffic can be ruled out after all they would be at least 250ft below his legal transit height iaw rule 5.

AP

[scottishterrier]

Ally,

Thank you for your input.

This was as stated at the inquiry. Mission Commander or not, the bloke who gave the evidence in court was not in the drivers seat and it was he who gave evidence not the Pilot Flying. Considering how the report stated quite clearly
low cloud beyond this point
caused the experienced RAF helicopter pilot, with his navigator, to decide not to continue south
this is taken directly from the report

The Pilot Flying and the Non flying pilot were not experienced but were under training.

If the Chinook was going from A-B by a non defined route, why is it that for the report the route is very defined as coming from the horses mouth so to speak. And why after giving a clear report to the AAIB would this individual, given that he is military trained and the crew would keep some sort of flight plan, be unable to state what his route was or is it that when one gives evidence to the AAIB regarding an aviation incident you would have a complete brain fade when comes to an inquiry.

With respect, who are you to discredit any witnesses on the ground or suggest the military traffic is a red herring.

As for your rule 5 suggestion, that is bogus.

Why then did the military aircraft in Cumbria wipe out a Bell 206 on a survey whilst operating a see and avoid procedure.

I have had my own personal close calls with military traffic in the scottish borders. I fortunately could see him and i hope he could see me as he flew directly underneath.

An objective report would not need to suggest that someones occupation in some way influenced the accident.

ST

[scottishterrier]

Real witness report my eye.

Considering the accident occured at 10.00 am, a lot can happen between what can be called morning and evening in regard to weather developments in the Scotish Borders.

That evening I was in the area with a VFR only twin Squirrel working my c**k off due to the conditions.

someone needs to get there facts right.

The previous evening was a dreadfull night, which I remember very clearly.

[AllyPally]

ST

Where did you get the information that the Chinook crew were inexperienced? And what do you class as inexperienced? Inexperienced on type? By the time a military pilot gets to fly a Chinook with a navigator in the LHS he is well able to make sensible interpretations of the weather.

SH crews do not "keep flightplans" and the way I read the report the Chinook pilot gives what I would expect - a general synopsis of where he would have flown.

The B206 you mention, was I believe, operating under a CAA exemption from rule 5 to allow him to operate below 500ft.

Your comment that a fast jet flew under you reinforces my point that if a FJ was in the area (not shown on radar) then there should be no confliction.

This was a tragic accident my he RIP.

AP

[scottishterrier]

This is from testimony given to the FAI.

The crew were under training.

Are you suggesting that if there were fast traffic in the area they would definately be maintaining under 500' AGL.

You are correct regarding the 206. It is also the case that the crew claim to have been unaware of the contact with the helicopter, despite causing it to crash.


The absence of radar returns was
consistent with local terrain masking the helicopter at its relatively low level.
Therefor FJ traffic could well have been in the area without nay record. Additionally and in particular the Tornado has in some models I believe the GR1 has a terrain following radar. As it is the normal practice of military aircraft to avoid radar they would not be recorded in the area.

ST

[cats_five]

It was stated that the (Chinnok) crew were experienced and in fact were under training

I see no contradiction between them being experienced pilots and doing a training mission in a Chinook. We don't know what kind of training was going on, and AFAIK the miliary do a great deal of training beyond 'how to drive a tank' and 'how to fly a Chinook'.

[scottishterrier]

It is strange then that the crew however experienced did not appear at the inquiry and the MoD thought it neccessary to be represented by a barrister.

The victim's family sadly was not able to have legal representation.

ST

[AllyPally]

ST

I see you chose your name carefully;)

Why should the Chinook crew attend an enquiry into an accident in which they played no part? They are probably in Iraq or Afganistan so unable to attend anyway!

"Are you suggesting that if there were fast traffic in the area they would definately be maintaining under 500' AGL."

Yes that is what they train for and do very well.

"Therefor FJ traffic could well have been in the area without nay record"

No they couldn't - they have to book into and out of Low flying areas and none were booked into that area at that time - see AIB report

Your comments about the Tornado GR4 are correct is has TFR but if any jet was using this they would definitely be at 250ft or below.

You seem to be unable to accept that this has all the hallmarks of inadvertant entry into cloud followed by disorientation and a tragic loss of life. The GPS info though not perfect seems to prove this the theory of UFIT.

AP

[scottishterrier]

Ally,

What I meant was that there would be no Radar record of those aircraft in the area. There were infact aircraft booked to or through the area of the AAIA during the period of the incident.

I have considered the fact that historically Robinsons have a history of mishap due to poor weather. The most recent I recall was the two aircraft who inadvertantly flew into IMC near Pole Hill.

It is the testimony of the witnesses on the ground whos information should be accepted and who have been experiencing FJ's in the LFA which has been a contentious issue over the years.

The AAIB went to great length in their report to explain the downside of a teetering rotor system in a low G situation and the why the rotor would strike the tailboom. They were very good at likening the damage to that found on other incidents that were more likely due to inadvertant IMC.
There is also the possibility that over control due to a rapid avoiding manoeuvre or even mis handling.

See AAIB Report

Two fast-jets were booked into the Low Flying Area (LFA) encompassing the accident site.


No apology necessary !:O
ST

[jumpseater]

ST
Considering the accident occured at 10.00 am,

AAIB
Of the jets
Their approved time of entry into the LFA was 1030 hrs and, although the
exact time at which they passed the accident site could not be determined, the aircraft had to negotiate bad weather and were delayed on their intended flight plan. They did not enter the low flying area until after 1030 hrs.

Several people however, heard the helicopter. Witnesses, at a farm 1,200 metres north-east of the accident site, clearly heard the engine sound from G-OUEL as it passed low overhead. One of these witnesses heard the continuous sound of the engine suddenly stop with a bang, which she likened to a rifle shot.
So she heard a single helicopter, If the Chinook was in the vicinity I would have expected any witnesses to be describing the very characteristic sound of the 'wokka'. Even to a lay person its a very distinctive sound.

When the Chinook approached Teviothead some 10 minutes after G-OUEL, low cloud beyond this point caused the experienced RAF helicopter pilot, with his navigator, to decide not to continue south


The radar recorded only one primary radar return in the vicinity of the accident site, at 1004 hrs.

So no other primary returns, and no secondary returns showing 7001 the mil low level conspicuity squawk either.

[scottishterrier]

Once again thank you !

I am well aware of the content of the report.

My initial post on this subject was reference the Accident Inquiry which has just ended in Edinburgh and the evidence and testimony given. Final summation of the court may take a while to be made public.

As far as the report goes, Just because it says so in the AAIB report does not mean it actually occured. Conjecture and second guessing. Sadly there is only one individual who knows exactly what happens or one that would give the truth. He is no longer available, so why does the AAIB seek to condemn him ? It is not dissimilar to the Kintyre incident where the crews parents and family have fought tooth and nail to clear their name. I also believe the AAIB investigator is ex MOD !

The report Stinks !

As for the competency for the investigators, did they not drive off from the scene dropping tagged evidence behind? And did they not leave the scene having not found a part of the blade?, which of course was found later by a group of locals who intentionally went to look for it. Also why did the report take so long to be made public if it was so cut and dry ?

ST

[212man]

historically Robinsons have a history of mishap due to poor weather

No, inexperienced non-Instrumented rated pilots have a history of mishap due to poor weather, some in Robinsons, some in other rotary types and some in fixed wing types. In fact, the mishaps are not due to the bad weather - they are due to poor decision making with regard to the poor weather.

Conjecture and second guessing

Last time I checked, GPS memories tended to be pretty objective and accurate sources of information.

AAIB seek to condemn him

They do not 'condemn' him - that is your subjective view of the AAIB's inevitable conclusion.

I also believe the AAIB investigator is ex MOD !

Strangely enough, there are many pilots out there who have had both a military career and a civilian one, and who are therefore endowed with a breadth and depth of experience considered highly valuable. So, you object to the AAIB employing the most experienced pilots they can recruit, and, incidentally, who will continue to operate every few weeks with a civil operator to maintain currency?

You are exhibiting the tendencies not of a terrier, but of Al Fayed :mad:

The report Stinks !

Rather than running around saying he avoided a fast jet/Chinook/UFO* (*delete or add other objects as desired), it wasn't his fault and it's all a big cover up, why not spend some of your energy campaigning for better education amongst private pilots for subjects such as practical weather assessment, cockpit management (I mean practical while on a navex etc, not CRM) and decision making. All commercial pilots are regularly checked and trained, private pilots are not. Or lobby for better IF training in the PPL(H) syllabus, or something constructive and helpful that may prevent a future occurence.

[scooter boy]

Inexperience and poor decision making are the issues here.

The friends and family of the bereaved will find this difficult to accept (like Al Fayed) but we are all capable of accidents based on poor judgement. Those of us who are lucky enough to survive them learn from it and avoid making the same mistake twice.

When I did my R44 type rating my instructor insisted we "cloud flew" for about 3 of the 5 hours. This gave me the stupid overconfidence to go IMC once or twice in my 44 to get above/under cloud layers. I have a current fixed wing IR but the R44 is nothing like a fixed wing aircraft when you are in the soup. There is no autopilot and the whole machine is inherently far more unstable. IMC in a Robbo is a pretty quick way to end your days.
If you can't stay visual then put it down on the ground and wait, or turn around but out of ground contact with no visible horizon is not a good place to be in a simple helicopter.

RIP

SB

[Helinut]

scooter boy,

In the light of your description, I suspect I can guess the family name of the instructor........


Helinut

[scottishterrier]

212,

You are correct. I have considered the fact that historically Robinsons have a history of mishap due to poor weather.
Historically it is the less experienced who have pushed the limits of themselves and the capabilities in an un stabilised machine. Unfortunately these have happened to be mostly in Robinsons.

The GPS information merely tells where the occurence was in the previous period with limited altitude information due to a number of factors.
It does not tell what exactly happened nor does it record the visibility conditions.

Let me ask you all, and this is directed to pilots who operate Enstrom B47 HU296 and also 212/412 's with the governor failed or off.

In the report the AAIB goes some way to explain the operation of the manual throttle.
The operating sense of the throttle twistgrip requires the left hand to be rotated away from the pilot (ie clockwise, viewed from the front) in order to manually open the throttle. This is the conventional sense for a helicopter throttle as it enables the wrist to naturally rotate the throttle open as the left arm is raised to increase the collective setting, when operating the throttle manually.
WHY
He goes further
However, the operating sense is opposite to that of a motorcycle throttle. [/LEFT]

He adds
Several instructor pilots reported that
pilots, and in particular motorcyclists, operating this type of helicopter throttle control commonly did
not find the direction of manual twistgrip rotation required in response to a rotor RPM excursion to be instinctive.


Now we all or at least most of us know how the throttle operates. The reporter states that the trottle operates a natural motion in the left hand but claims would be unnatural or not intuitive to a motorcyclist. Do the flyers of the previously mentioned types operate the throttle intuitively or even instinctively? I have flown all of them and believe operation is indeed instinctive.

Why the connection with motorcyclists ? Well as it happened this unfortunate man was a former British Super Bike Champion, 11 times Isle of Man TT winner whos throttle control by his right hand was without challenge. Yet give him a throttle to operate by his left hand however natural the operation and he will have difficulty ??! I think NOT.
The man also happened to be a CORRIE-FISTER or for those south of the border LEFT HANDED .


Scooter,
Low hours PPL(H) + dreadful weather = CFIT/UFIT

The problem here is that witnesses on the ground disagree with the fact that, as you choose to put it, DREADFUL WEATHER.

The facts are In this case the pilot delayed his flight due to the weather on the previous afternoon/evening. His judgement was indeed correct at this time.

[Hummingfrog]

ST

Interesting comment about the throttle and the sense in which it operates. I learned to fly on the Whirlwind 10 which had a manual throttle for use when the computer failed. The RAF was always keen for us to fly without aids:{ so manual throttle was used a fair bit and I found it non-intuitive and was always closing the throttle as I raised the collective. My only previous usage of a twist grip throttle was on a motorbike which uses the opposite movement to open the throttle so under stress I can easily see why a motorcyclist would unconsciously revert to a movement he was very familiar with.

I can see that you are trying to provide an alternate reason for this tragic accident but it does have all the hallmarks of an UFIT accident. The most compelling witness being the one who only heard the helicopter go over followed by the sound of the crash - no fast jet noise and no wokka blade slap.

RIP Steve

HF

[212man]

The GPS information merely tells where the occurence was in the previous period with limited altitude information due to a number of factors.
It does not tell what exactly happened nor does it record the visibility conditions.

I think it DOES tell you, with sufficient accuracy, that the flight path prior to the accident was not one commensurate with taking avoiding action. So, the tailboom severance was NOT a result of an abrupt pull up (following late sighting of a fast jet etc.)

The wording in the report about the GPS accuracy is deliberately conservative - don't forget that instrument approaches are predicated on this system.

As for the throttle, well now you are talking sense. FOLLOWING his loss of control and subsequent descent, he MAY well have operated the throttle in the incorrect sense as a result of instinct and conditioned learning.

Interestingly, Russian helicopters use the the throttle in the opposite sense.

[kevin_mayes]

Hi, Chaps.

I have a Bell-47 and spent lots of time riding a trials bike on the moors, so I can say that the throttle direction has caused me to hesitate and think on more than one occaision, once gettting it completely wrong (near to the ground, so we just did a run on landing - which probably looked quite good from outside) I know its the left hand that you use in the heli, and the right hand on the motorbike, but I still have problems....

Kevin.

[eagle 86]

Over many years I had many basic students that rode motorbikes - we always asked them prior to the first flight. Never experienced major problems with rolling the throttle the wrong way. If you think about it - revs low - RRPM gauge unwinds anti-clockwise - natural tendency is to "push" the revs higher with the throttle and vice versa with high revs.
GAGS
E86

[scottishterrier]

Thanks guys for the input regarding throttle control.

Frog,

My point was that on a helicopter the throttle is controlled by the left hand. I simply dont see the connection. I have been riding sports bikes for years and before I even started flying. I did not have any difficulty with the operation of either. I was using my bike every day during my basic flight training, although it stood in the garage for some time once I had qualified which looking back was an unbeatable thrill.

Bear in mind the witness to whom you refer was quoted in the report, there was however further witnesses at the FAI who did hear noise of other traffic and saw the Chinook.

You are spot on regarding my looking for an altenate reason, I do not have time for sheep who will follow the flock and not think for themselves. It is without doubt that I have a personal interest in this case.

212,

I do not doubt or challenge the accuracy of GPS information if it interpreted correctly, Differential GPS is some way different to the capability of a skyforce moving map .
Instinct and conditioned learning, Im sorry,my whole point is he was conditioned to operate a throttle with his right hand on a motorcyle and he was trained on an Enstrom using a left handed throttle and his dominant hand was his left.

Do you think when Jonathan Palmer was doing his helicopter training he was predisposed to applying right pedal when he wished to accelarate and left to slow up? , or that the late Colin Mcrae had a tendancy to heel and toe in the turn ? did Barry Sheene have trouble ?

I have resisted the temptation to add to this thread in the past. I was however motivated to repond to Mr Barclay, and now the FAI has completed Im happy the debate is reopened

ST

[212man]

I do not doubt or challenge the accuracy of GPS information if it interpreted correctly

What, like deriving the position, groundspeed, track and altitude? What else would you like to interpret? It works well enough to put Mach 3 bombs through windows, I'm sure it can give a reasonable estimation of a 120 kt helicopter's last minute or two.:confused:

Ok, so we all agree then, he was not reacting to a late sighting of a fast jet/Chinook/UFO, he was not plagued by unhelpful instinctive throttle responses as a result of his motorcycle experience, and the weather was crap (which is a bad thing for low hour PPLs,) and maybe the reference to the ex-MOD AAIB investigator was a red herring.

Remind me - what exactly was the discussion/disagreement about, other than "low hour PPL inadvertently enters IMC and loses control and may or may not have chopped the tail boom of in his attempted recovery." Oh, yes he did, oh no he didn't....ad infinitum.:ugh:

[scottishterrier]

212,

NO, I'm sure you wont be surprised to be told, I do not agree.

The technology required to put munitions through windows is I'm sure far more advanced than skyforce, which I guess is indicated by price.

Your assumption of what actually happened in the final minutes of this flight is only what you read from the report.

What I've said previously is that the information given to the FAI and that not included in the AAIB report counters what was claimed in the report.

The discussion that I entered into was one that evidence give at the FAI was inconsistent in some areas to the AAIB report.

ST

[212man]

Your assumption of what actually happened in the final minutes of this flight is only what you read from the report.

No, it's based on experience and is supported by the views of the report - also based on experience.

In my 23 years and 11,000 hours of experience, I have lost 3 close friends and several colleagues. Others, with more years and time than me, will recount similar figures, and will consider my experience limited by comparison with their's. That notwithstanding, I think I have a pretty good handle on what a 96 hour pilot will or will not do when he goes IMC by mistake, without an IR. Why do you think the IR was invented ?

[scottishterrier]

212,

Yes,

You are correct, we all are aware what our early flying experiences were like and the history of losses of low time colleagues and those who had plenty.

Despite all your experience will you agree with what a report states just because it is commited to print and is then challenged by evidence given in Court.

Do also believe there is WMD's in Iraq, Just cause Blair and his Mates put in a report.

11,000 Hrs is indeed a credible period in the industry. Pray tell, which of the 250 Hrs per year, gives you the unique qualifiaction as an expert in this accident.

ST

[Bravo73]

11,000 Hrs is indeed a credible period in the industry. Pray tell, which of the 250 Hrs per year, gives you the unique qualifiaction as an expert in this accident.


Huh? 11K / 23 = 478 :confused:

[Say again s l o w l y]

Is this still going on? Whilst I've always been a Hizzie fan, the simple fact is that it's another Robbo flying into cloud and chopping the tail off.

I thought this had all been dealt with months ago, or is it a case of the family not believing that Hislop could make a mistake?

[jumpseater]

Bear in mind the witness to whom you refer was quoted in the report, there was however further witnesses at the FAI who did hear noise of other traffic and saw the Chinook.

Indeed the Chinook in the vicinity was in an adjacent valley ten minutes later. The 'ear witness' who heard the 'tail boom snap', didn't comment on the Chinook being there. Odd that, that if a Chinook were in the same valley simultaneously, she didn't notice it.

Also from the FAI according to the Scotsman
STEVEN Hislop sent a text message complaining about the weather just hours before the crash, a fatal accident inquiry heard yesterday.

He began his flight despite the poor weather conditions, the court heard.

The court was told how, on the morning of the crash, Wendy Stevenson, a friend, received a text message from him. It read: "F****** rain, it will no be until after lunchtime until I get away."

And the accident occurred at 10:00am.

[Scissorlink]

Private pilot+too much money+helicopter+ego+bad weather = DEAD !! End of Story. Until these guys learn they're not invincible and when in rough weather they're way out of there depth we will keep reading about this happening. I can think of two accidents here in NZ in the last 3 years resulting in the death of two completely innocent passengers from the same kind of scenario


SL

[212man]

Pray tell, which of the 250 Hrs per year, gives you the unique qualifiaction as an expert in this accident.


As you can see by the consensus opinion, it's a far from unique qualification.

I started my IF training (in FW) at about the 75 hour mark, and it included real limited panel - no ADI or DI, including QGH let downs. I well remember a session doing unusual attitude recovery, where the instructor would kindly trim the a/c for about 40 kts, roll it over into a dive then ask me to recover. Obviously the stick forces would build rapidly and it was imperative that you set 1 g on the g-meter before attempting to roll level using the turn needle. On one occasion I allowed a bit of back stick to develop whilst trying to move the needle off the stop and simply continued in a rolling dive, with the situation getting progressively worse until I was told to look out and was able to recover immediately (just before we hit Vne!) Had I been in that situation on my own and in real IMC I would have either hit the ground or massively overstressed the aircraft.

It's also important to realise that even experienced pilots in large multi engined machines with autopilots can also lose control in the right/wrong cicumstances. If you allow the speed to drop below Vmini it is very easy to rapidly 'lose it'. I've seen it many times in the simulator, and occasionally had to hang on tight while trying to reach for the stop button. Sadly, in real life there is no stop button:(

[rapman]

This was a tragic and sad accident, which i feel has been invistigated fully and the outcome was that hizzy was too inexperienced to cope with the conditions. Most professionals on here would not disagree with the findings.

I miss watching hizzy racing as he was one of the best in the UK... Thats how i would like to remember him and have many good memories of him on the track... maybe we should put this thread to bed!

RIP

[Whirlygig]

The accident occurred at 10:00 UTC; this was 11:00 local time. Just puts a slightly different complexion on the timings.

Cheers

Whirls

[mark sicknote]

Possibly a silly question from a fixed wing PPL...

Don't modern helicopters come equipped with some rudimentary form of position hold? Unlike fixed wing, this would prove a lifesaver for anyone caught out by weather. A helicopter's ability to actually "stop" in flight is negated if it enters instrument conditions.

Best,

Sicknote

[helimutt]

Not a silly question if you don't know the answer. Too expensive for the cheaper end helicopters. Even some good twin eng heli's don't have IFR fit. As for things like doppler hover etc? I think not, if thats what you mean.

Some autopilots will bring you to 50' above runway height at 70kts, although, playing around a bit, saw that 50kts and 20' above the runway is possible from a fully coupled ILS. (courtesy of The Governor) but this isnt going to work out in open countryside, on a hillside, in ****e weather.

As for modern, the R22 /R44 is still being produced to day so in effect, is a modern helicopter. Inside you couldn't ask for more basic, unless of course you climb into a schweizer?

[Art of flight]

Sicknote

Even the more expensive modern helicopters (£4million/EC135T2) with autopilot lack the ability to remain hands off below around 60kts. Most GA heli's are much further down the chain of sophistication and 'most' owner/operators are flying around in R22/R44 and perhaps B206's with no stability whatsoever.

In my experience these accidents often come down to the matter of decision making, based on the forecast weather (should I even attempt the sortie), experience (have I been in a similar situation before and how did I survive it), aircraft capability (and my proven ability to use those capabilities to the full if required).

I have lost a few good friends over the years due to aircraft failure, but far more due to them making the wrong decision in poor weather (ie to continue at low level and look for a gap in the weather or the terrain).

[scooter boy]

"A helicopter's ability to actually "stop" in flight is negated if it enters instrument conditions"

The corollary of this is that the helicopter's ability to stop and land (just about anywhere) is a wonderful way of avoiding entering instrument conditions in the first place. Just put it down on a flattish surface, shut down and sit it out, or walk to the nearest dwelling.

I'm not too proud to say that I've done this more than once, usually restarting and continuing to my destination a few minutes later, sometimes restarting and only getting a little further on and sometimes continuing by car and rescuing the chopper the next day.

SB

[ChrisGr31]

I am not a pilot of any type, just an interested observer of aircraft.

It does seem that many of the high profile helicopter accidents involve poor conditions, which would seem to indicate that SBs approaching of setting down and waiting for the weather to clear, or continuing by car and fetching the helicopter later is the wisest course of action. However I can also understand why many would not want to do that and would prefer to continue flying on the "it will get better soon" or "it won't happen to me" optimitic thoughts.

[jumpseater]

The accident occurred at 10:00 UTC; this was 11:00 local time. Just puts a slightly different complexion on the timings.

Perhaps, but the Metar's/TAFs, makling the assumption the trip was planned using them, are in Zulu too. In my experience ATC/OPS, there are many private pilots who seem to forget or not realise this potentially vital time difference. Booking out is a typical and frequent example.

My first thoughts on hearing of the accident were wondering if it were a poor weather/low hours/CFT/UFIT accident. I was not surprised to see the 'conclusion' reached due to weather, location, relatively low hours, and Type (light, non IFR).

[Martin Barclay]

I can only apologise to those who knew Steve Hislop and for whom this continued debate must be most unpleasant. My post (30/4), which I had intended to be a seperate thread, was aimed squarely at the the very poor reporting standards exhibited by the media when writing about the Fatal Accident Enquiry. Unfortunately my post was seen to be relevant to this thread and moved, a decision I did not agree with. I would endorse the opinion that the thread should cease now as it is merely going over old ground.

[anjouan]

Martin,

I can only endorse what you have said. I don't know whether the usual poor standard of reporting by the media, or this thread would cause more distress to his family and friends (if they read it), but surely it's time for the moderators to lock it up and leave it at that.

[scottishterrier]

212,
Apologies for the error in accounting for your experience.

Im sorry to say that concensus still proves nothing. Opinions are like assholes, everyone's got one.
We all are well aware that the weather and cumulo-granite is the heli pilots greatest challenge.



School auxiliary Maureen Briggs, 63, told the hearing she was in her garden when she heard a helicopter noise overhead, followed "seconds" later by the sound of jets and then a bang.
"Suddenly there was a terrific noise of two jets," she said.
"They were on their sides going up each side of the valley, very low. "It was immediately after the helicopter."

Here is something to support an earler part of a post.

Squadron leader John Rigby said he had told his crew to move away from the A7 valley during an exercise from RAF Lossiemouth, to avoid cloud which can cause pilots to become disorientated.

perhaps they weren't so experienced as was claimed.

Scissor, this is something I hope you regret, You did not know anything of this man.
Private pilot+too much money+helicopter+ego+bad weather = DEAD !! End of Story.

The real tragedy and loss of this accident is lost to most of you, I can assure you that the family of the victim are hardened to this sort of debate considering the years passed and the Inquiry just completed.

Moderator,

I believe that there is an interest to the greater good and learning from this post and believe it should continue. If you need further approval pm me.

[Mama Mangrove]

scottish terrier,

I believe that there is an interest to the greater good and learning from this post and believe it should continue.

You seem to be one of the very few who thinks so. It's time it was put to rest.

[Scissorlink]

If you have to fly in it and don't want to stay home and drink coffee

-Use RainX so the water beads off
-Slow Down
-Always make sure you can see a ridge in front before you leave the one beside you
-Always have an Out, don't get stuck up a valley and can't turn around
-Land take the door off and throw it in the back, that way when it gets REALLY bad you can stick your head out and also you get incredible visibility slightly forward and out to the side. Water on bubble gives some nasty illusions
-Picking up wet pax get them to take off there raincoats so bubble doesn't fog up quick
-Get the demister/airflow going hard, rather be frozen then not see
-Remember its easier to go up to a pass then get back down, come back down go slow,get the hillside nearest to you and make sure you dont fly away and lose reference
-be careful going over a ridge that the wind doesn't push you up into the cloud, crossing at a 45 at least helps... can see something on the otherside before you cross/commit
-Watch the cloud isn't slowly getting lower and pushing you down into a wire filled enviorment. Also flying a valley you don't know and hitting a wire
-Land
-Stay at home

These worked for me in the past found most of it out my yakking to guys who have forgotten more then I will ever know, must be lots other ideas out there :D

[rapman]

RIP Steve

I think its time to put this to bed! I think we all know the weather was the contributing factor in this accident.. autopliots, ec135's etc etc. were not:ugh:

[scottishterrier]

For all out there who's sensibilities have been troubled by the continuation of the tread and discussion. A Scottish Court has just completed a Fatal Accident inquiry whos findings have not been released.

This discussion is going on elswhere so there is no need to end this thread.

Scissor,
I dont think your advice is really the kind of info that well benefit someone of low time. Best advice for low time folks is dont go or sit it out .

Rapman.

Best guessing does not answer the other related issues. It is arrogant of you to state what other people may think or believe. I can assure you your opinion is not shared by all.

ST