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Dutchie 2
18th Sep 2001, 17:27
Dear all,

Please find enclosed the text of an article that appeared in today's Financial Times.

Maybe this could be a solution and I would like to see a professional Pro's and Con's debate on the proposed operating aircraft from the ground in certain circumstances.

Please refrain from personal attacks on the writer of the article, if you have a problem with the guy start your own topic. :rolleyes:


Flying into adversity
Air travel faces difficult times. Robert Ayling has some suggestions for governments and the industry
Published: September 17 2001 20:11 | Last Updated: September 17 2001 20:16



The magic of flight last week became the nightmare of mass murder. Air travel, the safest means of transport, the indispensable conveyance of people for work or pleasure, the physical expression of our freedom to move and to trade, realised its potential for harm of an order which theorists of risk may have considered rationally but which most of us who fly have kept deep in our consciousness.

Airline managers and frontline employees, aircraft manufacturers, insurers and governments have considered and planned for the single aircraft accident, including possible deaths and damage to property on the ground. They have considered the risk of multiple collisions in busy flight paths and developed systems for their avoidance. They have faced up to previous experiences of terrorism and hijacking and installed screening systems which may have deterred and prevented bombs being taken aboard aircraft. They have faced the consequences of privatisation, deregulation, huge increases in competitive capacity and upheavals from events such as the Gulf war, Chernobyl and the Libyan raids (when North Atlantic leisure traffic dried up). Now they may be facing their greatest challenge.

The job of governments is to represent our interests as citizens. As citizens we want security and freedom. But absolute security is impossible. So we must accept less than complete security as the price of freedom. No doubt more physical security checks, the banning of everyday objects which could be weapons (though I suspect that the terrorist is always more likely to be ahead in this area) and less easy access to the flight deck, will all be on the agenda.

There is a danger here. Governments will want to be seen to be doing something. They will do things which have no real benefit but which show action. As a citizen and air traveller, I hope this does not happen or at least not more than is unavoidable.

But there are two areas where government action to reduce the threat of terrorism and to improve the effectiveness of response would be useful. Airlines have unique access to intelligence about people's movements. They may not know the significance of a person travelling from one country to another but they know it is happening. Better use of this knowledge and liaison with the security specialists within airline companies must have real value in the improvement in the human intelligence which we read is now necessary. There can be little sensible objection to this erosion in liberty.

Second, though I am not a technologist, it must be possible, as we see cruise missiles flown remotely into the windows of buildings, for civil aircraft to be flown from the ground. Would it not be possible on a given signal from an aircraft or an unauthorised deviation from a flight-path for ground pilots to take control? While the passengers of the aircraft may not be wholly out of danger, the risk of using the aircraft as a missile against a ground target may be avoided. The extraordinarily impressive development of the TCAS system, now mandatory, shows what technology can do: aircraft, fitted with transponders, are automatically diverted away from mid-air collisions. A fast, government-sponsored transfer of technology in guidance systems from the military sector could bring huge benefits in helping aircraft in trouble.

The economic challenge for airline managers and investors is accentuated by the fact that the industry is highly geared on both the capital and the operating accounts. Every fall in passenger numbers reduces revenue but has almost no effect on costs. At the time of Chernobyl, imaginative ways of reducing costs quickly were put in place with the agreement of airline employees - for example, long-term unpaid leave or absence on reduced pay but with a promise of return when demand was restored.

But the traditional methods of cutting costs quickly by cancelling all capital expenditure, returning aircraft on short-term operating leases and looking at all discretionary expenditure, however apparently sacrosanct, will this week be on the screen of every airline chief executive. Any aspiration to pay incremental dividends in an industry so volatile will also be on this list. Perhaps it should now be replaced by special dividends in good times only.

Even so, some airlines may not survive. The insolvency of Ansett, the Australian carrier, shows the risks even in normal times. An indefinite downturn in demand will push some well-known names to the brink. There will be an expectation of government support and we may well see attempts at recapitalisation by government-owned companies. But privately owned companies should not expect or, in my opinion, be given state grants. The solution here is to face the fact that there have been too many airlines - particularly in Europe - for too long and to consolidate or liquidate. And if there is to be state help, it should be in making this possible.

The employees of airline companies are particularly exposed. We speak of them as frontline employees, and this is literally true. The pilots and cabin attendants of American Airlines and United Airlines lost their lives last Tuesday doing their job. Airline employees trust their managers every day to have taken all reasonable steps to ensure their safety. The bonds within an airline are especially human and need even more careful nurturing by good management when absolute assurances for the future are so difficult to give and yet when the feelings of the frontline are on such public view. I was particularly struck and, if I may say so, proud of the friendly professionalism of the British Airways crew who brought my family and many American families to London at the weekend after delays in Europe caused by enhanced security checks and lost slots. The same will be true throughout the industry.

So finally there is us, the passengers. We will face and must accept some inconvenience. We will face and we should expect higher fares. We will want but cannot have absolute security. We can only do what should always be done in the face of illegitimate force: carry on with our lives as normally as possible and carry on flying.

The writer is a former chief executive of British Airways

Dagger Dirk
18th Sep 2001, 20:58
This detailed answer to your question about inflight ground take-over and automated recovery of a hijacked flight was mounted on 12 Sep 01 and includes some assessments by automated flight-control experts whose resumes are also on the site (same page).

See here (http://www.iasa-intl.com/RoboLander.htm) and

here (http://www.iasa.com.au/RoboLander.htm)


The concept was discussed briefly on these Pprune threads:
http://www.pprune.org/cgibin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=015428&p=5 Skymarshall Now.......

and
http://www.pprune.org/cgibin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=3&t=002473&p=2 cockpit security - doors

and
http://www.pprune.org/cgibin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=015460&p=3 [cockpit doors/access]

Narada
20th Sep 2001, 07:47
Note TCAS does not "automatically" fly the airplane away from a potentil mid-air collision - it provides guidance to the pilot to do so.

It is an interesting topic for discussion, but at the current state of technology, my (Principal Avionics System Engineer - Commercial Aircraft) opinion is against giving automation the over-ride authority to the human pilot. The problem is not one looking for an avionics solution for several and complex reasons. An airplane is somewhat a fragile piece of complex equipment from this perspective. Even considering that acceptable level of safety (once a hijack situation is known) is less than otherwise, there are too many failure modes in the automation to worrry about, and one can only indicate it (rather than write a detailed report) in a post like this.

An automation to override the pilot meas all controls (for control surfaces and propulsion/electrical systems) have to be overridden. This means all these systems have to be routed through one (or two or three) central point(s). There has to be one or more override switches located conveniently.

How robust should the override be? To prevent the Sept 11, 2001 type scenario, it should be very robust meaning no reversion to the cockpit should be possible. What happens in case of inadvertant activation or switch failure? (This is more than conceivable and will happen more often than hijacks.) If a ground controlled reversion back to the pilot is designed in, what about the communication system failures? Even today, over the ocean, the communication is 'not very good.' Even trying to come up with an operational concept for such a system gives very unsatisfactory results.

Military technology is best suited for military where pilots/crew are trained for it and - in the extreme, can bail out of the airplane in the case of fighter aircraft.

To implement such a safe automation override (even if we choose to) will result in enormous costs to the existing fleet and take years to implement. Much better solutions for operational security are available (see pointers in the previous message(s)) including skymarshals, armed pilots (non-lethal arms, perhaps) and better doors and procedures and implementing certain no tolerance policies.

Apologies for any remaining typos.

[ 20 September 2001: Message edited by: Narada ]

MasterBates
23rd Sep 2001, 03:59
Brilliant. So the lunatics (read terrorists) won't have to get to the air. They'll just take over these ground stations and tackle the joysticks while the poor pilots look at it, totally helpless.
Just brilliant

Wino
23rd Sep 2001, 15:42
It also leads to the possibility of a hijack of the aircraft by the engineers on the ground. So Mr Hamas terrorist becomes a mechanic of the the airline, switches a few boxes in the E&E compartment when no one is looking, and presto, Instant manned V1 aircraft bomb.

VERY bad idea.

Cheers
Wino

Dagger Dirk
27th Sep 2001, 02:46
Concept refined and updated with FAQ's and added links at:
http://www.iasa-intl.com/RoboLander.htm