FMAs...to callout or not

[FlareArmed]

Some companies require Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) changes to be called out and others don't.

Some require the callout to be acknowledged with 'checked' and others don't.

Some companies require the speed limit to be called before making a flap or gear selection, for example, PF:"Speed below, 250, Flap 1". PNF:"Speed checked; selected".

I am interested in your opinion and experience. Which do you believe is safer: crew chatter and multiple 'checked' calls for cockpit situational awareness or silent monitoring with maximum 'ears out of the cockpit'?

Does your company require crew callouts when things are going right or just when it's not?

Is anyone aware of any studies?

[m&v]

Airbus SOP's (3.03.90p2) stipulate FMA :all changes will be normallycalled by the PF...
Although some outfits were'nt as emphatic with the FMA changes ,some Boeing people think it's a good practice.:O

[411A]

Operated TriStars for a very long time, nearly all equipped with FMS.
All companies did not require these callouts as the pilots assigned to this equipment were expected to know the aircraft limitations...and besides, autopilot/FD/FMS selections are clearly visable to all.

IMO, speak up when it is called for (abnormal/unusual ops) rather than all the chit-chat that permeates all too many flight decks today.

[Plastic Penguin]

Calling FMA modes and checking speeds isnt about the individual pilot knowing the limitations or how to use the AFDS... It is about both pilots being in the loop when it comes to what the aircraft is doing. Particularily important when you work for a huge company and fly with different people all the time. Because I have never met him before, I dont know if the other pilot is a muppet or not. I would like to know he is checking up on me as I do him for mistakes in speeds or FMA changes
:D

[downwind]

Guys,

I do know that Virgin Atlantic employ these principals for their flight ops, IMHO it is good pratice for both pilots to know what the AFDS is doing in the critical phases's of flight. I do recall from someone when doing a Boeing type rating that there was a book written by a rusian pilot who was a B777 flight instructor, that went quite into depth about FMA annunciations.

Cheers

DW.

[Bumblebee]

In our outfit (on the 737 classic), current SOP is to call and cross check FMA changes when the HP makes a new MCP selection. Both HP and NHP should be monitoring anyway during critical phases anyhow - so it shouldnt be necessary (for example) to call out everytime you get ALT ACQ and ALT HOLD each time you capture and level off, since that's what you expect it to do - (and the HP is flying the aeroplane aren't they?! Some colleagues call all FMA changes, which i don't have any objection to, but it can be a bit too much sometimes...especially as in the example above, when 9 times out of 10 ATC call you with a reclearance to climb just as the AFDS goes into ALT ACQ, and you have two people talking to you at once! More important, i reckon in this case, is actually cross checking that as the new level is selected and the FMA reverts to V/S, that an MCP selection for N1/VNAV/LVL CHG, engages correctly and is annunciated...

BB

[Crossunder]

All companies did not require these callouts as the pilots assigned to this equipment were expected to know the aircraft limitations...and besides, autopilot/FD/FMS selections are clearly visable to all.

...and that's the stuff accidents are made of. This cowboy attitude belongs in another era, where CRM was a strange three-letter combination and aircraft were raining down from the sky. We all know how easy it is to misread an instrument - or see things as we expect them to be. Mode annunciations and speed call will ensure that both pilots are in the loop, and will give them the opportunity to cross-check. Far too often in my company (especially when flying with the soon-to-be-golfing-full-time captains) I find that the FMS has been re-programmed while I was finding my plates or filling out the flight plan.

...rather than all the chit-chat that permeates all too many flight decks today.

Ah, you mean the professional attitude a real pilot is expected to have?

[E120]

The SOP's of my company require me to call out all FMA changes, except below 500 ft. during approach and 1000 ft. during takeoff. This excludes off course all abnormalities. This works very well. For those of you who are interested; the PF calls for a configuration change and monitors the change, while the PNF selects the change and monitors the change silently.

Safe flights :D

[BEagle]

We had a very simple method:

PF called for configuration change, e.g. "Flap take-off"
PNF did it, e.g. "Speed checked, selected"
FE confirmed it was happening, e.g "Running"
PNF stated when configuration had been achieved, e.g "Take-off and out"
FE confirmed, e.g. "Confirmed".

But I'm not sure whether an additional "Speed below 229 knots, flap and slat take-off and out, Mr Copiglet, if you please" is actually needed.

[wingtip777]

in our company, the airbus requires callouts, but boeing doesn`t. but recentlly , the boeing drivers find out that is a good idea to callout changes. so some of them do it even the sop doesn`t require. IMO the callouts do help sometimes. they remind us any changes of the areplane`s status.

[Intruder]

We've done it both ways (744). When we first got the airplanes, we had to call out all FMA changes. Recently (after 3+ years) the FHB was changed, and we call out virtually nothing.

There was some initial hue & cry about making unnecessary calls, but after doing it for so long it became second nature. I sometimes find it hard to NOT make the callout, and do it under my breath all the time.

I think calling out the changes is useful for new pilots on the airplane, because it gets you to start thinking about "Why is it doing that?" When you get to the "Looks like it's doing that again..." stage, it may be less useful, but only because the habit and experience has been built.

[safety_worker]

Hi All,

In my previous company, the 'B' guys didn't call it out. :confused: The fleet has been flying 'comfortably' since late 1980's. We were trained by MR. B himself. While they DO NOT have it as a mandatory STANDARD CALLOUT, they do have it as a VERIFY. One of their guys was down checking our operations out and reported that we SHOULD call out FMA's. This went back to MR. B himself, and the reply was '...upto the operator....'! :O

Meanwhile, the 'A' guys, DO call it out. :confused: Having sat in on many trips in the cockpit, I've noticed a parrot like fashion with the callout.

Now, in my new airline, both the 'A' and the 'B' guys do the callout.
I am glad that it is 'STANDARDISED'!:ok:

Discussion -
Do we behave like parrots by calling out what we see?
vs.
Should we callout ONLY what we don't see after making a selection (PF callout's what mode changes he makes - PNF callout's the 'missing / wrong' FMA if any, otherwise says CHECK)

I have found myself becoming a parrot in the callout whilst forgeting to 'realise' whether the FMA readout is CORRECT. I AM NEW on all-sevens, but I do realise sometimes , AFTER I have made the callout that it is correct (logically).
So how do I ensure I haven't made the wrong 'readout' in a stressfull situation, and with the other argument, how can I make sure I will recognize the wrong FMA, and then call it out.

Bottom line, bring in the Psycho / CRM experts on this (I obviously am not 1) :sad: (striving)

Safe Wishes,
:D

sounds like i had a few b's :D ?????????

[LEM]

Callouts enhance awareness, calling out while ATC is calling enhances confusion.

So always make callouts, but use good common sense since aviation is not an exact science!

[411A]

Actually Crossunder, if the guys that need the 'callouts' to remind them of the limitations that they should have learned in specific equipment ground systems/procedures training, they should be taken off line flying immediately and sent back to relearn what they should have learned in the first place.

Can't bother to learn = not interested = no professional ability = goodby from the company.

And, oddly enough, the Chief Pilot and DirOps both agree.

My kinda guys...:E

In addition, on takeoff/landing (for example) the absolute minimum callouts should be incorporated in the FOM to insure that the flight crew actually listens to ATC communication. Have found all too often during line checks that this is not done, resulting in rather too much uncertainty/missed calls, and in one case, actually turning the wrong way, to avoid conflicting traffic.

Not good.:mad:

[Crossunder]

Then how are you going to make sure that both pilots are in the loop if there are no callouts? I'm not talking about speed callouts - I totally agree with you on that one, but FMS mode and AP/FD changes must be called out. How's the PNF going to monitor the PF if he doesn't know what the PF is doing? Just look at AA's B757 flight into Cali. One is changing AP/FD modes, while the other one is punching on the FMS. I bet you they didn't even write down the clearances. Didn't go too well did it?

[LEM]

I also think that calling "Speed below, 250, Flap 1" is ridicolous!
Just call "Flaps 1" and PNF respods "Speed checked, Flaps 1".

Totally agree with Crossunder.

[411A]

Good point Crossunder, but then you have to remember Cali was an AA problem. Wonder if they even thought to actually tune the ADF properly? Last minute changes (when the pilots had a perfect chance to say 'no thanks') together with no other traffic, made for a bad day (night) for all concerned.

[Iceman49]

At our company we have Boeing and Airbus...we do not call out any FMA changes. Our callouts concern only gear and flap configuation changes, additionally we call out all altitude changes, plus 2 and 1 to go. I our company philosphy is to call out deviations from the norm that are recognized on the FMA, eg when it goes to vertical speed vs open climb or descent. Since I have never worked for a company that calls out all FMA changes...its difficult for me to support one side or the other. However, IMHO I would think that after a while the callouts would become like background chatter...thus being ignored.

[Phoenix_X]

I've flown FMA callouts on the Boeing, then no FMA callouts on Boeing, then FMA callouts on the 'Bus.

I prefer no FMA callouts unless non-normal or non-expected. The FMA calls cause alot of distraction. Then again, I'll probably get used to it after awhile.

[lizard drinking]

So many think that it is OK to use a tongue to fly an airplane. Yack yack, constant chatter repeating the bleeding obvious. What makes you think that the chatterer is actually doing what he/she says he is doing? Much of it is as meaningless as the calls, and such calls as “check speed” are just that; words. I would rather fly with a pilot who does the job quietly and conscientiously than who yacks.

Boeing procedures require the pilots to monitor the performance of the airplane, which means ADI, ND and Eicas. The FMA does the same thing, and displays what it is doing. What is the point of monitoring a monitor? If there was a need for a verbalisation, it would be easy to fit a voice mode, but there is no such need.

The constant chatter degrades the callout effectiveness. If the PNF only called abnormal indications, it would have a greater effect. The PF would actually listen to what was said, instead of tuning it out as a distraction. As it is now, if there was a need to call a malfunction, there is a good chance this would be missed in the general noise.

Newbies to the airplane take a while to learn how to make these callouts, especially during takeoff, and there is no way most of them can see anything other than what they are trained to see, which is normal indications. If there was something going wrong they would not see it since they are flat out getting all the calls in on time. When they have more experience, they still will not see anything outside the FMA since they are trained to have tunnel vision.

If the FMA was taped over, it would be easy to monitor the performance of the airplane using normal flight instruments and much safer, since it would be independent of the FMA and it would actually relate to what the airplane should be doing, not what the FMA thinks is correct. Consider situations that cause errors;

1. Takeoff with LNAV/VNAV not armed (error in setting up or change of runway etc). If the LNAV and VNAV do not capture, the FMA will not change, and many support pilots will not respond since the FMA does not have a reason to react.

2. The airplane levels off during a climb because the intermediate altitude is still in the vertical profile. The FMA shows “ALT”, and the PNF calls it out, not noticing that the level off is not what is wanted. And many times, that is all that will happen until someone notices that the level off is not correct.

3. While in ALT HOLD, ATC instructs further climb/descent. The PNF changes the alt reading to the new value and pushes in the select button. Nothing happens because the airplane is not in VNAV, but he does not see this since the FMA does not change, and he has no reason to make a callout. Again a delay until someone notices that something is wrong.

Pilots nowadays are almost automatons, incapable of thinking. The imposition of Airbus procedures on the Boeing operations does not help, and makes things less safe. Cut out the chatter and use the brain.

[411A]

lizard drinking--

Three cheers to you, sir. Very well put!:ok:
The 'dark cockpit' is in vogue (no lights unless something abnormal), suggest the pilots be silent likewise.

[javelin]

If the request needs a response, give it i.e. flap, gear, selection whilst flying manually. If it is a PF selected event, PF should announce it, the PNF should check it and only verbally challenge if they think it is not correct. That satisfies a challenge/response check and keeps the inane check chatter down.

Previous post suggests you can fly with the FMA covered - on the Bus, this is not a good idea as there are things that can be selected on the FCU that will not happen unless they are confirmed on the FMA - i.e. constraints in climb, managed descent (VNAV) in heading etc. It is not a problem, it is how the system communicates a confirmation that a selection has been either activated or conditionally activated.

[LEM]

So many think that it is OK to use a tongue to fly an airplane. Yack yack, constant chatter repeating the bleeding obvious
No, Sir!
Callouts have been developed through the years because in a team communication is essential.
Of course when everything goes well you could say they are superfluous. Even boring, maybe. But that's what keeps awareness up when things go to worms and are not obvious at all. If I'm busy with something else, I want my colleague to tell me of every change he's made in the cockpit. The callouts method is the guarantee that will happen in bad times. Or when I'm tired. Or bored or distracted. I'm human, after all...
It doesn't mean I'm not using my brain or flying with my tongue.
It means I'm realistic and know and accept my limits.
Callouts help me, yes.
Repeating the obvious? Until you keep it obvious you keep it safe.

[FlareArmed]

Thanks to everyone for well thought out and articulated replies.

My previous company required all FMA changes to be verbalised including those generated automatically by the FMS, with no response from the PNF. On several occasions, I have seen pilots callout what they expected to see instead of the actual indications.

An example: after a pilot thought he pressed the APP button, he called, "Heading mode, loc and glide slope armed'. In actual fact, we were in LNAV and ALT HOLD.

My current company has a new type of aircraft and is not quite settled on the fine detail of its procedures yet. Currently, all FMA changes are called and the PNF responds with 'checked'. We also call the applicable speed limit prior to making a configuration change. This can also be error prone; a number of examples exist of pilots calling for configuration changes above the limit speed in spite of the verbalisation of the limit.

The intention of the callouts is clear; it keeps both pilots in the FMA loop and prevents over speeds. The paradox is that it can also degrade safety by creating a large amount of chatter during the busiest periods of ATC, particularly when pilots raise their voice so they can be heard over the radio! I don't particularly appreciate that, on a dark and stormy night, in a foreign country when I can barely understand the controller at the best of times.

In my previous job, a couple of pilots were exchanged with the parent company airline with a view to establishing interoperability of crews. The parent company procedures were basically silence unless something was wrong, whereas our procedures were to talk when everything was right. The pilots on exchange developed the view that the silent cockpit was a better system as it allowed maximum situational awareness outside the cockpit and they felt they had more mental 'reserve'.

We never really got to try it because my own company made a determined shift towards manufacturer procedures (including Airbus), which required maximum talking.

I would like to see a reduction in our flight deck chatter because I find it distracting and it does not necessarily fulfill the intention. The views expressed have certainly given me some perspective.

[Rananim]

Agree with 411A on all points.Call-outs should be kept to a minimum and speak up only when things are ABNORMAL.Confirming a normal or expected FMA might be a good idea on the Airbus as there are more of them and each annunciation has a more complex implication to the pilot.On the Boeing it's completely unnecessary except perhaps during initial training.
Crossunder's point that excess verbosity automatically equates to good CRM(thirty years on,we still dont have a definitive answer to what is good CRM)is absolute b.s.
The best flight-decks are pretty quiet ones.
Have watched guys in the sim make a dozen call-outs during start-up and still miss an exceedance.Point is that stating the obvious doesnt make it a safer operation.
The flap-speed call is not a bad thing at all,but "speed checked,flaps ..." is all you're ever going to need.
There's a low-cost Irish airline that requires pilots to do a x-check of nav aids and instruments during the most critical phase of flight,namely approach and landing.This represents up to 2 minutes of heads down verbosity when all they should be doing is monitoring the flightpath and ATC.PFD and ND annunciations will alert the crew to any discrepancy in the pilots altitude,speed and heading.And the nav aids?Well,that should have been taken good care of in the briefing prior to descent.
The Cali crash is totally unrelated to this topic and whoever said it was(probably crossunder again) has totally missed the plot.The pilots accepted a runway change at the last minute and workload resulted in loss of situational awareness.They could have cross-checked with each other till they were blue in the face and it wouldnt have mattered.The error was not procedural...they didnt fly the plane...and why?Because they were about five minutes behind it due to a poor judgement call.Next time your colleague types the wrong waypoint in the scratch pad,let him and see what happens.The world wont stop turning,I can assure you.Reach over and select HEADING.Just fly the plane.

[Capt Pit Bull]

This is a topic that reoccurs every 18 months or so.

Just to paraphrase my usual response...

What is 'obvious' to one pilot may not be 'obvious' to the other.

A pilot can obviously have an incorrect view of the situation ((i.e. wrong mental model)). It doesn't mean we are substandard and need immediate suspension, it just means we are human.

One of the best ways to see if your mental model is wrong is to compare it to the other pilot.

We can only do that by communication.

And since we all know the flight path is the most crucial thing, it therefore follows that anytime anything about it changes we need to make sure our mental model is correct. So we need to announce what we think is happening, so that our colleagues can set us right / be set right.

CPB

[lizard drinking]

Everyone has his own view on the subject and will not change it from what he reads here...
The FMA in the Boeing airplane is meant to show each pilot what the status of the A/P and F/D is, in real time. It is located in front of each pilot and prominently displays this information, highlighting changes for ten seconds. It has been designed to do this effectively and without ambiguity. So why the need to make a callout? How can the system possibly be improved this way? If a pilot is not aware of what is happening right in front of his eyes, and if he does not know that he can check the status of the system at any time merely by looking at the display, how does a callout help? If he needs such a callout he should not be in the seat in the first place.
Of course callouts are important when a switch is moved or mode changed by one pilot, but the callout should relate to what is being done, not how the FMA responds.
Safer flight will be achieved when the pilots actually monitor what the airplane is doing (basic flight and engine instruments) and not the FMA, which only shows what the airplane is programmed to do (should be doing).
If the airplane is programmed by the pilot to fly into a mountain for example, monitoring the FMA will not save you, in fact it will faithfully show that the program is correct and give a feeling of false confidence. Less fancifully, if the airplane is making a LOC capture, the FMA will show that capture has occurred, but only raw data monitoring will tell you if the capture has been made incorrectly, or if the airplane has flown through the LOC without capture, etc. A failure of the airplane to achieve a parameter programmed (does not level off when it should, does not capture LNAV etc) will not be displayed by the FMA and many pilots, accustomed to allowing the FMA to make all their decisions for them, will not see this because nothing will happen in front of them.
Many pilots are swamped with information and overwhelmed by the amount of work required to safely fly the airplane in busy environments, and forcing them to concentrate on the FMA, which is only a switch position indicator after all, prevents proper monitoring of actual airplane behaviour. I have seen many IPs berate the FO for missing a callout, equating it to the worst sin possible, such that new FOs will put every effort into these calls, ignoring all else. And one of the funniest sights is a FO who is PF, still making the calls! If this does not show how absolutely ignorant this policy is, nothing does.
I can only assume that those who need/require FMA callouts are simply ignorant of the purpose of this system, or are ex-Airbus pilots (who are by definition ignorant of the system).

[411A]

Spot on, lizard drinking.
Have personally watched a few F/O's call 'altitude capture" when in fact the aeroplane was still climbing/descending.
No capture at all.
When I point this out, their response is....'well, it was supposed to capture.'

These guys really have absolutely no idea what the aeroplane is doing, simply because they fail to observe.
And it's not their fault, 'tis the fault of the respective airline training department and the nonsense that prevails therefrom.:yuk:

[LEM]

or are ex-Airbus pilots (who are by definition ignorant of the system).
Please be nice with my Airbus friends!!
:D :p :p :D :eek:

[safety_worker]

Does anyone know why :confused: AIRBUZZ insist on FMA callout's? :hmm:
BOWING don't!??!
Safe Callouts :D

[ManaAdaSystem]

Too much talk, and not enough attention.

Do you prefer to talk your way through a Cat III, or just hear "Go Around" if something is not right?

[Willit Run]

Been on Lockheed, Airbus and now Classic 747. Calling out FMA status is very important. It just keeps both pilots in the loop. I can't say how many times on each type of plane, that the pilots had different info depicted because one side captured and one side didn't. It just saves a LOT of cunfusion in critical phases of flight.

[LEM]

Good point, WR.
One more reason to make callouts.

To those who say that despite the callouts some people still miss some elements: have you considered the possibility that without callouts they would have missed even more?

[Iceman49]

I must have been lucky, after 13+ years on the "bus," I've only had different indications on the FMA once...and that was when the FMGC was in independent ops...than we knew it from the scratch pad message.

[safety_worker]

Looks like there is good arguments on both sides. I personally prefer 'standardization' across all aircraft types (preferably prefer the preferance of NOT calling out FMA ;)

Main question......
Why do AIRBUS 'CALLOUT' and BOEING 'VERIFY' ?? :confused:

Wonder which side will pull ahead by 2 in the tie-breaker:zzz: