Reasons not to fly a VFR only, Single-engined helicopter offshore at night

[SASless]

Am I alone here in my heartfelt belief.....that single-engine, VFR only, single piloted helicopters have no place offshore at night? Am I alone in thinking this is a very risky endeavour?

Would you ever consider routinely flying a single-engine helicopter offshore at night? What would be the minimum equipment you would have if you did?

A collateral issue.....what responsibility does company management bear in dispatching single engine, VFR only, single piloted aircraft on overwater flights? Should they be subject to punitive damages if found negligent in their dispatch responsibilty and authority under the pertinent airlaw?

[donut king]

I'm with you SASLESS!

As someone else on this board said in another discussion..."it's just going backwards"!

The helicopter industry has progressed to where we have twin engine, glass cockpit, efis/defis, two pilot op's, .......and so on.....

Why put an aircraft with basic equipment into an environment that demands more? I appreciate technology and what it has to offer us, but I respect what my predecessors have accomplished with basic a/c.

Having said that, I fully realise what had to be done in the past to get the job done. I hope the majority of us are beyond that!

My humble thoughts!

D.K

[BlenderPilot]

it sounds like something I wouldn't feel comfortable doing under any circumstances. Maybe under really nice weather and a little moon, not to far offshore it could even be nice, but since I am dreaming I would also like to have a pony.

[clearleft]

In Australia their are a number of operators who fly Single Engine helicopters off shore (single pilot) conducting Marine Pilot Transfers (on and off ships)

The rules allow ops up to 10nm off the coast, belond this an auto pilot is required, or a twin.

Types in use include B206, H500, MD520 and AS350

Hard to get Night command time, so it is a good way to probably get soe hours.

As I understand a lot of the flight is done in reference to the instruments, especially the take off (into the Black)

Sounds like fun.

[GLSNightPilot]

The takeoff from a ship, or platform, or drilling rig, or whatever else, at night, is difficult at best. You're going from a very brightly lit pad into solid blackness. It's an instrument takeoff, completely, every time. We do it dual pilot, & I consider it an ITO. The PNF calls out positive rate of climb, airspeed increasing, & rate of climb in 100' increments, altitude in 100' increments, & airspeed in 10 kt increments, plus Vtoss, Vmin, and Vy. I wouldn't want to try it alone, nor the approach. The PF has to be on instruments until at least 500', & I just fly them full time.

Some nights, with clear skies and a full moon, are relatively easy & fun. Others aren't so bright, and you can be dead before you know what happened.

[JimL]

What is difficult to understand is how the requrement of FAR 135.207 is met "..at night, visual surface light reference sufficient to safely control the helicopter".

Isn't it true that most loss of control accidents are in part caused by a reduced visual cue environment. Some of the above commenters discuss flight on instruments...at some stage of the flight.

There is a duty of care involved here whether it be by the operator or by the oil company - or is that asking too much.

What part has the regulator to play in the enforcement of existing rules - or the generation of some specifications that have to be agreed and met.

[ShyTorque]

In UK there is technically no night VFR and so that type of operation isn't allowed for civilian Public Transport.

I used to fly unstabilised aircraft in the police role (no stick trim), OGE night hover was bread and butter stuff and this is still being done. It requires training, experience and currency to be safe. It is classed as "visual contact" flight and has additional weather and visual parameters laid down. However, this was using a twin engined machine.

When I first began my RAF career, our boys were carrying out night offshore SAR using the Whirlwind. Single engine, unstabilised, no stick trim. Good on 'em, I grew to respect them an awful lot; in my SAR time we had fully IFR aircraft with DDAFCS, auto transition, auto hover, mark on target, climb, remote hover trim etc. Still bloody risky in poor conditions. Insurance companies realised that; the Australian ones I tried refused to sell me any life cover at all.

[moosp]

Good point Shy. I wonder how long we would have a viable operation if we printed on the emergency procedures card, "The pilot of this helicopter has been refused life insurance for this flight."?

[Mr Toad]

I totally agree that single pilot night offshore in a single engine helicopter is bloody dangerous.

BUT pilots who need to make a living can be forced into it by Regulatory Authorities who care more about the commercial aspects of an operation than they do about it's safety. Curious that the two countries that are the worst offenders in this way apply totally different standards to Fixed Wing and Helicopter Public Transport Operations; and this is reflected in the relative pay and conditions of the two industries there.

You can't blame the operator; it's the duty and responsibility of the Regulator to ensure a Safe and Efficient industry, not to pander to powerful commercial and political interests. IT'S ALL DOWN TO THE REGULATOR.

Governments don't normally care unless somebody embarrasses them in public with a campaign; and this is a cultural thing in the country in which you live, people may or may not approve. You'll be accused of trying to create more jobs for pilots and trying to destroy the economics of the industry. We went through all this in the North Sea a long time ago, and frequently again since; but safety is a high-profile item in Europe. Many countries where commercial interests rule don't share that view when it comes to helicopter operations and Regulation is correspondingly slack.

[Blue Rotor Ronin]

Well Night Pilot, I'm impressed. My PNF's usually too busy moaning about the fact he/she got a salad.
Seriously though, I'm with NP on this one. After being 'Blinded by the Light' lifting from a rig I would'nt give much chance to smooth ditching on a dark and gloomy night, especially after losing your one and only donk. Two's surely better than one, unless it's sore ears after the verbal bashing I got this morning after a late and drunken appearance last night...:ok:

[Another KOS]

Shy Torque

Although there is no 'night VFR' in the UK - it, in concert with other States, permits such practices by allowing flight in accordance with pseudo VFR by helicopters when operated below 3000' (of course there are additional provisions for instruments and training) - no singles of course.

Mr Toad

I am all for regulator bashing (my favourite sport) but in this case it is a little harsh to say that 'pilots are forced into it by Regulatory Authorities'. In fact the Operator is to blame - they are ultimately responsible for running a safe operation.

You are correct in stating that the culture of the country is the ultimate arbiter of what is an acceptable accident record. Such an accident in Europe would have been (close to) headline news.

There is also the non-compliance with FAR 135.207 as pointed out by JimL above.

Blue Rotor Ronin

Would you have got away with losing one on rotation?

[Av8r]

“Am I alone here in my heartfelt belief.....that single-engine, VFR only, single piloted helicopters have no place offshore at night? Am I alone in thinking this is a very risky endeavour?”

I’m of the belief that the ‘single engine’ part is not the major problem, for close offshore ops at least, but the problem lies in non IFR equipped helicopters flown but non IFR equipped pilots flying supposedly NVFR ops in IMC.
As Clearleft rightly points out, here in Oz, these operations occur right around the country every night, moon or no. How do you keep ‘visual reference to land or water’ on such nights? You can’t. It’s IMC.
I think that for a VFR aircraft to be conducting such op’s IAW the regulations, a min of 1/3 moon and a visible horizon should be a requirement.

If you can’t afford the equipment required to do the job safely, get out.

Here’s an interesting read along those lines:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/occurs/occurs_detail.cfm?ID=473

Mack

[Bladestrike]

Do the oil companies not have their own safety standards or do they simple adapt the regs of the country they are operating in?

I've seen some large discrepencies by major oil companies depending on where they are operating. It would be nice if they took the highest standard and applied it to all their ops, but no doubt that would hurt their bottom line.

[ShyTorque]

Another KOS,

I concur, the title does say single engine; that's what I referred to. Sorry for any confusion. :ok:

(My last job included writing a UK PAOM part 2).

[Blue Rotor Ronin]

Blade ol' boy, beer chits be the devide between safety and accountibility as far as I've encountered.
KOS, how dare you suggest I could have evaded an ear-bashing by a bit of rotation. She refuses, I've tried........:E

[ATPMBA]

Several regulations that apply:

135.207 - night, visual surface light reference sufficient to safely control the helicopter.

135.159 – helicopters with a gross weight of 6,000 lbs. or less that carry passengers under VFR at night need to have a slip skid indicator, artificial horizon and a directional gryo.

Under 135.159 you can carry cargo only and would not need any of that equipment.

Operating at night in the GOM would surely be a fertile environment for spatial disorientation.

Hopefully pilots that fly at night in the GOM or elsewhere have an instrument rating but it’s not required by the regulations. Even having an instrument rating is no guarantee if one does not keep his/her currency.

[clearleft]

Do any of the pilots in OZ who regularly conduct this type of operation (with only NVFR) have any comments to make on the difficulty or ease of this type of operation and maybe on the training they have received.

Thanks

[John Bicker]

Night flight in Australia is a little different to other places. There is no requirement to have any visual contact with anything. The aircraft shall be equipped with gyro instruments and radio navaids. I have always wondered, if flight is conducted using these instruments, is it still VFR? No, because in Australia it is Night VMC not Night VFR. There is no Night VFR as the rest of the planet interprets it, in Australia. A helicopter placarded as Night VFR capable by the FAA cannot be flown by night in Australia.

FI, if you are flying along in your Bell 206B with a bunch of gyro's and navigating by ADF/VOR or whatever, if you can't see anything outside the window which is entirely legal if it's not IMC, are you still VFR?

What difference would it make if you were IMC? How would you know?

I know in the US there are flight visibility and celestial and terrestrial lighting requirements.

The "marine pilot" thing in Aus has evolved like Topsy, wasn't born, I just growed.

There are loopholes that are fully exploited. In a lot of cases the "passengers" actually own and operate the aircraft - we won't go there!

[Av8r]

"John, this might be a refresher for you:

AIP ENR States:
1.1 The Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
1.1.1 VFR flight may only be conducted:
a. in VMC;
b. provided that, when operating at or below 2,000FT above the
ground or water, the pilot is able to navigate by visual reference
to the ground or water;
c. at sub-sonic speeds; and
d. in accordance with the speed restrictions identified at ENR 1.1,
Section 76.
(John, this applies to both VFR by day and VFR by night)

1.1.2 Unless the pilot in command holds a Command Instrument Rating
or night VFR (NGT VFR) rating and the aircraft is appropriately
equipped for flight at night, a VFR flight must not depart from an
aerodrome:
a. before first light or after last light; and
b. unless the ETA for the destination (or alternate) is at least 10
minutes before last light after allowing for any required holding.

“A helicopter placarded as Night VFR capable by the FAA cannot be flown by night in Australia”
Why and where’s that written?
I believe that so long as it complies with CAO 20.18 Appendix 8 and certified under the NVFR in the RFM is all that’s required.

Mack

[John Bicker]

Mack,

Thanks for the "refresher". The point is that above 2000' there is no requirement to be able to navigate by visual reference as you clearly state.

As for VMC - well it may be VMC and if anything was to be seen that was lit you probably could.

A helicopter certified by the FAA as Day/Night VFR would have nothing additional in it. No gyro's no navaids. Night VFR in the U.S. in addition to Day VFR only requires:
(c) Visual flight rules (night). For VFR flight at night, the following instruments and equipment are required:

(1) Instruments and equipment specified in paragraph (b) of this section. (Day VFR)

(2) Approved position lights.

(3) An approved aviation red or aviation white anticollision light system on all U.S.-registered civil aircraft. Anticollision light systems initially installed after August 11, 1971, on aircraft for which a type certificate was issued or applied for before August 11, 1971, must at least meet the anticollision light standards of part 23, 25, 27, or 29 of this chapter, as applicable, that were in effect on August 10, 1971, except that the color may be either aviation red or aviation white. In the event of failure of any light of the anticollision light system, operations with the aircraft may be continued to a stop where repairs or replacement can be made.

(4) If the aircraft is operated for hire, one electric landing light.

(5) An adequate source of electrical energy for all installed electrical and radio equipment.

(6) One spare set of fuses, or three spare fuses of each kind required, that are accessible to the pilot in flight.

This is of course operation under Part 91 and is all you need and is definitely not in compliance with CAO 20.18 Appx 8.

Even your neighbours only require:

Night VFR instruments and equipment
(a) Each powered aircraft with an airworthiness certificate operated
under VFR by night shall be equipped in accordance with 91.509 and
haveÑ
(1) except as provided in paragraph (b), a means of indicating rate
of turn and slip; and
(2) position lights; and
(3) an anticollision light system; and
(4) illumination for each required instrument or indicator.
(b) An aircraft equipped with a third attitude instrument indicator that is
usable through 360¡ of pitch and roll does not need to be equipped with a
means of indicating rate of turn.

Where the difference is would be in the Flight Manual as part of certification. For instance in the Bell 206B.

Section 1
Operating limitations
Night Flight Limitations

Night flight operation is limited to visual contact flight conditions. Orientation shall be maintained through visual reference to ground objects solely as a result of lights on the ground or adequate celestial illumination.

I would guess that there are plenty of times where this could not be achieved in parts of Australia.

This is a flight manual requirement under FAR Part 27.1525 Kinds of operations and shall be demonstrated.

To go further the 206B Supplement for the Night Flying Kit clearly states:
This helicopter has not been demonstrated to comply with the standards for instrument flight.

Being equipped to CAO 20.18 Appx 8 would not remove this requirement.


To quote the ATSB via your posted link the B407 which found a reef in the dark:
Night VFR operations

There were no aviation regulatory requirements for pilots to consider the amount of external visual reference that was likely to be available for a flight conducted at night under VFR, with the exception of considering forecast cloud below the lowest safe altitude. The pilot was not required by the regulations to consider the amount of celestial illumination, amount of terrain lighting, and/or the presence of a visual horizon. Aviation weather forecasts did not provide information on the amount of celestial illumination nor were they required to do so.

I would guess that statement would be incorrect inasmuch as the aircraft may not have been operated in accordance with the Flight Manual which is in the regulations.

My point has always been that the aircraft can be operated NVFR without meeting all the requirements of CAO 20.18. These requirements may be beneficial but if you are operating solely by reference to instruments or put another way, cannot operate without them then you are IFR in a non IFR aircraft.

Evidently the following applies as well:

for other than night VFR flights except that in the case of such flight which will
involve more than 30 minutes flight over water or over land areas where
aircraft altitude (attitude?) cannot be maintained by reference to ground lighting, an approved autostabilisation system or a two pilot crew shall be carried.

So now we are VFR with an autopilot or 2 pilots or put another way we must be IFR but only for a maximum of 30 minutes. So that means you can fly between adequately lit places not further than 30 minutes apart, technically IFR which you must be as it isn't really VFR or is it? If 2 pilots are mandated then one will need an ATPL at least and they both will have to have done a CRM course no doubt or will in the near future. Also nobody need have an instrument rating. Gets wierder by the minute.

But definitely not in a Bell 206 even if it has an autopilot or 2 pilots unless it is IFR equipped and certified, crewed, and operating IFR.

Sounds a bit half-arsed to me and is written to satisfy someones interest. The Aussie regulations are a minefield written by lawyers for lawyers who probably own the helicopter company anyway.

Had a classic one stated to me the other day. UKCAA ANO's first sentence:

Thou shall not fly, unless.....................

Kinda somes up the first priority doesn't it.

[Mr Toad]

Another KOS

I still maintain it's up to the Authority of the State to decide, set out and police the legal parameters within which an Operator may do business; and it's the duty of the Operator to his shareholder(s) to get the legal maximum out of those regulations in his attempt to be a profitable enterprise. Nothing wrong with that, it's our capitalist free market philosophy.

[Another KOS]

Mr Toad:

That is a more rational argument - however it still has a built in assumption that the operator has no responsibility for his/her own actions provided it is undertaken within the letter of the law (in fact the within the regulation - a subtle difference).

The best result will be a safe operation that makes a decent return for the shareholder.

On the need to set out and police the legal parameters within which an operator may do business:

An illustration of the problems that we are faced with is shown in the difference of approach between the two sides of the Atlantic:

In the US everthing is permitted until it is shown (presumably by the accident record) that something needs to be addressed - the tombstone philosophy. (Any revision of FARs has to be subject to a cost benefit analysis which relies upon financial justification for any change - in Europe this might be achieved by taking a probabilistic approach, in the US operational experience and accident records have to be considered. It is not sufficient to say an engine failure will lead to a ditching which might lead to casualties - evidence has to be examined to show that this has occurred an an unacceptable number of occasions.)

In Europe (and in the Antipodes - where it is enshrined in legislation) there is an attempt to Risk Assess and prohibit operations that are seen to be below the threshold of acceptable risk. What is the threshold of acceptable risk - depends on the local culture and hence problematical when seen in a global perspective.

Neither approach is wrong but the former - the solution in the large - is permissive and does rely on the operator to act responsibly. On the other hand the latter - the solution in the small - does lead to more prescriptive regulation and the freezing out of acceptable practices (this is why European regulations are replete with exemptions - particularly the UK).

Both systems have a notion of Corporate Responsibility - the so-called duty of care. Recent accidents, in industries other than aviation, have brought closer the introduction of the crime of corporate killing. The intent of this surely, is to convince the corporate body that they need to be 'involved' in the Risk Assessment. (It is a commonly held understanding that, providing risk has been considered and addressed, it can be used as a defense against the charge of negligence.)

What is the point of this posting: to show that it is not quite a simple as it appears to change cultures. Yes there should be an introduction of additional measures to restrict the more risky practices but this might have to be done in a more subtle way than a change of FARs - although the consideration of applying FAR 135.207 to these cases should be considered.

An introduction of Risk Assessment by all parties: Regulators, Operators and Pilots might lead to a more considered approach to dodgy practices - we all have our part to play.

Finally our part of the aviation industry is miniscule when compared to the Airlines - it could be that the FAA has to put resources where it will get best bang for the buck. That is not an excuse - just a statement of reality.

I apologise for the length of the posting.

[helmet fire]

Good points J Bicker.

I have very little B206 time, but doesn't the FM contain some passage about ground/celestial lighting requirement for NVFR? I dont know about the H500, but I dont remember the passage in the AS350 FM.

In Oz, the regulator has effectively allowed these operations through a loop hole - the company who owns the passengers, buys the helicopter and becomes the operator and "hey presto" it is a private operation and they can't touch it!

I personally reckon that if you do not have a visual horizon, then you are generally IFR, and on dark nights away from urban areas, that would make you IFR IMHO.

At least give these guys a fighting chance by keeping them Instrument rated.

[gulliBell]

Here are my thoughts on why single pilot single engine overwater night ops are not a good idea:
1. It's wet down below
2. It's dark out there
3. Humans make mistakes
4. Machines break down
and the biggest reason of all
5. there is a safer way to do it, 2 pilots (one monitoring the other and the aircraft's systems) and 2 engines (double the chance of an engine failure but an infinitely greater chance of keeping yourself dry if one stops turning).

"No job is so important that a safer way to do it can't be found" and a safer way for night offshore is 2 qualified pilots and a spare engine just in case one or the other decides to make life interesting for you.

[Shawn Coyle]

At the risk of diverting the discussion - as I believe that night VFR is only possible over built-up areas with good lighting coming from below - the single engine vs. multi-engine issue needs to be addressed with more thought.
If we could produce an engine that never failed, then one engine would be enough. That isn't going to happen. But if we produce an engine that has a failure rate that is acceptably low, and can be kept low by good maintenance, etc., then that single engine might be preferrable to a twin that had a poor engine reliability and sufficiently poor performance such that one engine could barely keep you airborne even at minimum power.
This is the logic being used in the FW world to permit PC-12 and Caravans to be used for night and IFR passenger flying, and it appears to be working. They are, of course, IFR approved...

[Another KOS]

Shawn,

I agree with the thrust of your argument - and flying twins in Performance Class 3 makes no sense (twice the probability of an engine failure with the same consequence).

What would you regard as acceptable engine failure rate?

[GLSNightPilot]

I tend to agree with Shawn on this. I certainly prefer 2 engines to 1, but the thing that is likely to kill you is flying into the water with the engine(s) running fine. For night over-water, instrument capability is mandatory, IMO. Four or six or any number of engines won't help if you hit the water upside down. The two biggest killers in helicopters are midairs and flying into terrain or water in poor weather. Everything else is far, far behind. Even if the one engine fails, you at least have a chance to survive the autorotation if your instrument skills are up to par; you probably will bend some metal, but who cares, as long as you live to tell about it. But if you can't control the aircraft, you're going to die, engines running or not, end of story.

[Another KOS]

GLS:

Why is it then that FAR 135.207 can be ignored in the GOM - with impunity?

Surely any filing of a VFR Flight Plan must be called into question.

[SASless]

Good question for the FAA....Part 91 does not require the surface light reference that Part 135 and the operator's OpSpecs do. Thus when in areas of darkness, with no visible horizion, overcast sky.....where is the surface light reference as required for Part 135? Bet you dog droppings to doughnuts....and you can hold the stakes in yer gob.....the FAA will not take a public position on the matter!

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

Another KOS: Why is it then that FAR 135.207 can be ignored in the GOM - with impunity?SASless: Thus when in areas of darkness, with no visible horizion, overcast sky.....where is the surface light reference as required for Part 135?Section 135.207: VFR: Helicopter surface reference requirements.
No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter.To those of you unfamiliar with the "shallow-water" Gulf Of Mexico, it might seem impossible to safely fly offshore at night. In reality there are thousands of platforms. Most manned platforms are lit up like Christmas trees. Many of them have flares burning. Even an abandoned or unmanned platform will still have a navigation light.

On a clear night it would be a piece o' cake and well within all applicable FAR's to go offshore. Even an overcast would not pose too much of a problem, as long as there was good visibility underneath. (In fact, having an overcast might help minimize the confusion between stars and platforms.) Night flight might even be easier than on a calm, flat, hazy day where there is little surface texture to the water. The in-flight visibility might be five or ten miles, but if the nearest platform is eleven miles away, you're virtually IMC, baby and in violation of 135.207 to boot.

No rational, sane pilot is going to take a helicopter and venture offshore at night without being able to see enough platforms to continue. To do otherwise is sheer lunacy and would obviously also be a violation of 135.207.

In the western Gulf, where GLSNightPilot and the R-44 pilot are/were flying, there are big areas where the platforms are not as closely grouped together as in the waters off Louisiana. However, the one (MI A-133) the R-44 pilot was headed for was "only" about 45 miles from the shore and there are many platforms in that area. A straight line flight from Houston Hobby Airport would have allowed him to "hopscotch" his way down, always keeping various fields/platforms in sight. The weather was reported clear with light winds. I'm sure the R-44 pilot felt that the flight was do-able.

But what was so bloody important that it had to come out at that hour of the morning? And what can an R-44 carry? What was he delivering, breakfast biscuits from Hardees? The morning newspaper? I think he just simply fell asleep. Most guys his age I know are in bed by 9:00 p.m. What was he doing up at 0-dark-thirty?

[GLSNightPilot]

As I've said before, some night flights are easier than others. For some, there are lots of lights. Simply filing a flight plan is not prima-facie evidence of a violation of any FAR. And few FAA flight plans are filed anyway, since it's generally impossible to close them because FAA communications are so scarce out there. Mostly we rely on our own company radios, & file company flight plans. I've never filed an FAA VFR plan, other than DVFR for coming back across the ADIZ, and these require no communications, since they're automatically closed as soon as we cross the ADIZ. For IFR, we either get our clearance through company dispatchers, or climb up to > 3000' & try to contact Houston Center if the weather allows it. Generally, we only get radar contact within 50 miles or so of the coast, sometimes not then. The DEA/USAF are watching us all the way, but they offer no assistance.

As for what was so important, I don't know about this flight specifically, but in general what we carry at night are parts for broken drillling rigs. Rigs can be down for all kinds of parts, some of them small and light, and some of the big rigs can cost upwards of $1million US/day, everything considered. With that kind of money at stake, they try to get it back in service as soon as possible. Depending on the contract, either the oil company or the drilling contractor may be responsible, & either may charter a flight. I have no idea what the situation was in this case, but I've launched in an S76 for a 4-hour round-trip flight in the middle of the night carrying less than a pound of cargo. If the rig needs it badly enough, it goes.

[SASless]

One million dollars per day.....cost of twin, IFR crew.....cost of one Jetranger/Astar/Robbie...and a pilot.....Duh! Tell that to the next of kin....

[GLSNightPilot]

In all these discussions, I haven't said any of it is right. Just that it is. Corporations and their management caring more about short-term profits than safety or the welfare of their employees, or pilots doing this stuff for low money, and other pilots not admonishing them - none of it may be right, but it all exists. As for how to change it, I don't have a clue.

[SASless]

What you say is true GLS.....As long as pilots will let the company put their neck on the chopping block.....it will continue. I personally feel the Union movement needs to focus as much of their effort on Safety issues and Regulatory changes as they do on pay and benefits. It doesn't help to have great benefits, good pay, and a solid retirement if you are staring up at Daisy roots.

The situation described for the GOM today....sounds very much like the early days on the North Sea......I still recall the North Scottish guys flying a BO-105 back and forth betweent the Ninian Field to Sumburgh in the Shetlands at night and in IMC weather....single pilot....unstabilized aircraft.....old style Decca....no radar flight following.....company flight plans....ah yes...those were the days! 125nm of nothing but cold...cold water.

It took a Union and lots of effort to get the safety programs moving there.......it is time for the same in the GOM. There is no reason the FAA cannot provide repeaters for radio communication....they do the remote business on NDB's and Vor's/Vortac's.....they could put radar out in the Gulf......there are old Early Warning platforms there....or they could use leased facilities and crew change the radar operators just like the oil companies do. AWOS and ASOS systems could be installed in more locations. FAA Inspectors could start riding along on flights.....just like they do on airlines. Then ATC functions and flight plans and the usual Flight Service Station services could be provided to this part of the commercial aviation industry just like the airlines.

TCAS ought to be mandatory for all aircraft.....lots of things could be happening if the management of the companies would just push the issue.

[Another KOS]

SASless, GLS Night Pilot:

Don't underestimate the contribution of the oil companies in the improvement of safety standards in the North Sea and elsewhere.

You might find that the push for improvement in the GOM comes from a joint effort from interested parties - recent fatal accidents have provided the climate for change and the FAA cannot continue to sit back and ignore the signs.

TCAS has its problems - using it to provide separation for aircraft flying in IMC will have to await the algorithmic changes for helicopters.

[SASless]

Kos.....I would suggest you not sit back and hold your breath. The FAA, despite what they tell themselves and anyone else who will listen, don't care to put their noses into something like the GOM. At three FSDO's....I have had inspectors tell me that they (as Inspectors) had almost no ability to influence safety initiatives. They opined that I as a pilot had far more chance of making a change than they did while working inside the very agency empowered to set the safety standards by means of regulation and law.

The oil companies could snap their fingers and devote money and talent to ensuring the improvements existed. It is a simple risk-cost analysis for them. Dollars and cents count....not lives.

[GLSNightPilot]

Actually, the FAA has thought about improving service in the GOM, mainly for the airlines overflying to Cancun et al, but there is service for helicopters also. The holdup appears to be money, which could be found easily in this administration if the oil companies would do a little lobbying for it. See FAA Gulf of Mexico Working Group (http://gomwg.faa.gov) for an overview. We aren't holding our collective breath.

[Shawn Coyle]

Someone asked me what I would like to see as an engine failure rate. Obviously never would be ideal, but that is clearly not achievable.
Something akin to the requirements laid out for ETOPS in the FW world would be a big help. I know that P&W inspects all the PT-6s used in the single engine FW IFR world twice, and has some pretty detailed maintenance procedures to ensure safety. Why don't we insist on the same?
Back to the question though - how about one failure every 500,000 hours? Every million hours? What effect would that have on the cost of operation? Do engines fail more frequently towards the end of their lives? Do they fail more frequently after maintenance?
One of the problems is that in North America, for a single engine helicopter in most operations, if you have an engine failure and land safely, there is no requirement to report the engine failure.
Surprised?? So was I.
This means our database of engine failures is horribly skewed - we simply don't know what the failure rate is. And if we don't know what it is, we can't do anything about it.

[SASless]

Other stats that might be of value....percentage of successful open water autorotative landings.....percentage of successful night open water autorotations.....percentage of successful autorotations over hostile terrain......percentage of successful autorotations while flying IMC......and by successful....I will accept no damage to occupants......almost successful as being repairable damage to the aircraft. Unsuccessful means any injury to the occupants and/or the loss of the aircraft. Care to guess how those numbers will stack up?

[GLSNightPilot]

Well, it would be a guess in any case. As Shawn said, the engine failure, and thus the autorotation, isn't required to be reported, so there is no way to know the number of autorotations, much less the number of successful ones. The unsuccessful ones will be reported as accidents, but the successful ones, with no damage to the aircraft, may or may not be, and there is no way to find out how many aren't reported. Same thing for flying hours - it just isn't reported, and all the FAA has is an estimate, which may or may not be in the ballpark, so there is no way to get an accurate rate of failure, even if every failure were reported.
So everyone can make up their own numbers, and they can't be proved or disproved.

The larger companies operating in the GOM do publish their accident rates, if they're low enough to be used for marketing, but do they reflect the overall rates? I don't know.

[PPRUNE FAN#1]

Chaps, when it comes to engine failures and part-135 aircraft, check out 135.415. At least we keep track of stuff for aircraft operated under this part.

[Another KOS]

PPRUNE:

Thanks for that - I had missed FAR 135.415. Wonder what happens to the data that is collected, is it published on the FAA Incident Database?

As a matter of interest how many FSDOs look after the GOM? (As all reports have to go to the the FSDO, do they collate regionally?)

Shawn:

From memory the acceptable engine-failure rate for ETOPS is 1x10 -8 (1:100,000,000) and for the second engine 0.3x10 -8 (0.3:100,000,000) per flight hour.

You mentioned earlier that you would accept the SEIMC rate; this is proposed by the ICAO WG for 'very reliable engines' to be 1x10 -5 (1:100,000) per flight hour.

PPRUNE indicates that engine failures are required by FARs to be reported for CAT operations. In Europe, in most States, this is also the case (in the UK turbine failures have to be reported under the Mandatory Occurance Report system).

As for the causes of failure; examination of the evidence (from Europe at least) appears to indicate that the core engine (I won't qualify that as the clever engineers will have a field day) has a failure rate of about 0.2 to 0.5x10 -5 (0.2 - 0.5:100,000) per flight hour.

Yes, as expected, maintenance failures add to that rate as do operational conditions. What do I mean by operational conditions: well in once again in Europe, air pollution appears to cause pitting of the lining or compressor blades which eventually leads to compressor failures (this can be offset by coating the blades and by periodic - splitting the engine - inspections); hot end failures caused mainly by abuse - be it hot starts or exceeding the limits during take-of manouevres (which can be offset by fitting Usage Monitoring System - not HUMS, which is mainly concerned with vibration monitoring - but plain usage in the sense of event parameters).

The combined effect of core engine-failures, maintentance events and operational events take the engine failure rate close to 1x10 -4 (1:10,000). With mitigation - coating the blades, inspection and fitting the UMS (which by the way eliminates hot starts), the rate settles at or slightly above 1x10 -5 (1:100,000) - probably as good as we can achieve given human factors.

The question of surviving the engine-failure is really down to the place where it occurs and includes: the autorotation - which comprises the two factors of environmental conditions and skill; and surviving the time to rescue - which is down to the clothing, and survival equipment (lifejackets, liferafts, survival packs etc).

Finally

Are we still happy with single-engine single pilot operations at night (and when the conditions do not support a safe outcome) with a failure rate of 1:10,000 flight hours?

Not me!

Mind you if you are flying a twin in Class 3 the probability of an engine failure leading to a ditching becomes 1:5,000 at worst and 1:50,000 at best.

Why not check out FTW03FA118 and see if you think those conditions were acceptable.

[Shawn Coyle]

Another KOS:
Thanks for the numbers - so why are we happy to accept a failure rate that is so significantly below that used by the airlines? Beats me. Body count is lower, so it gets less attention from the authorities, to be completely frank.
But it shows that extremely high reliability is achievable -- so why aren't we fighting for it?

Sorry, but I don't know what FTW03FA118 is - can someone help?

[GLSNightPilot]

FTW03FA118 (http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20030502X00613&key=1) is here.

[Another KOS]

Shawn:

I do apologise I gave you the wrong accident reference - it should have been:

http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20030221X00247&key=1

Somewhat disingenuously, you were given exactly what you asked for - the engine failure rates!

However, the engine failure rates give only 'likelyhood' of an event; what is also required is 'the consequence' - when we have both elements we are in a position where we can conduct a Risk Analysis - AS/NZS 4360:1999 "a systematic use of available information to determine how often specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences".

This brings us back to the heart of the question contained in this thread "reasons not to fly a VFR only, single-engine helicopter offshore at night".

In my view there are two inferences we can draw from the question: (1) an engine failure will lead to a night ditching; and (2) a flight conducted with reference to (questionable) 'surface light references'.

Lets examine both of these:

(1) If we accept the data contained in my earlier posting (using European engine-failure rates) there is a 1:10,000 chance that the engine will fail in a flight hour and the consequence - an autorotation at night. Likely outcome, unknown really but likely to be a less than perfect ditching and, provided all occupants get out OK, a search and rescue conducted in the dark.

(2) No data offered for this but even with the mitigation offered by PPrune#1Fan: "To those of you unfamiliar with the 'shallow-water" Gulf Of Mexico, it might seem impossible to safely fly offshore at night. In reality there are thousands of platforms. Most manned platforms are lit up like Christmas trees. Many of them have flares burning. Even an abandoned or unmanned platform will still have a navigation light.experience from analysis of the UK accident data indicates that flying into a reduced Usable Cue Environment (UCE) is in the top echelon of accident causes.

We have now conducted a Risk Analysis and answered the questions set by SASless but we still have to go through one more stage - Risk Evaluation "the process used to determine risk management priorities by comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other critieria".

We are now entering the area of cultural differences - these type of operations are permitted in some areas of the world but not in others. From this we deduce that while such operations are Risk Assessed in the GOM and found to be acceptable - they are not deemed acceptable in Europe or by ICAO (not really surprising as Europe placed a heavy footprint on the Annex 6 Part III development).

The reason for the reference to the accident report earlier in the post; that type of operations is also not permitted in Europe - it being considered as a flight over a hostile environment.

Not to labour a point but flying a twin in the same circumstances but in Performance Class 3 - doubles the probability of an engine failure with the same consequence. The only mitigation that can be offered is that twins appear to be better maintained than singles.

Once again apologies for a too lengthy post.

[Shawn Coyle]

For the most operators, it's not just that twins are better maintained, they are often flown by a completely different class of operator and pilot (not to put down the guys who fly single engine stuff in a very professional manner).
That makes a big difference in the whole philosophy of what risks they will and won't accept, which further contributes to the safety aspect.
It is obvious that some operators and regulatory authorities have done a lot of thinking about this, and others appear (on the basis of what they are doing) have turned a more or less blind eye to the situation.
If the certifying authorities and the operators and the customers all turn a blink eye, then who is left to make some changes? Insurance companies? Do they listen?
Hmmm.

[JimL]

Shawn - it is not certain that operators or regulators have turned a blind eye to these type of operations. It may well be that they have been assessed under the system alluded to by KOS and deemed them to be acceptable to the target set by the authority (or the operator).

Even if assessed by the regulator, the operator still has a duty of care to satisfy himself, by a risk assessment, that operations can be conducted safely.

Let me take an example (if I have this wrong please let me know): extended overwater operations for helicopters is defined as an operation over water at a horizontal distance of more than 50 nautical miles from the nearest shoreline and more than 50 miles from an off-shore heliport structure. Following a risk assessment, what operator would permit a helicopter to be launched for a flight to an offshore installation of 95 miles, without carrying a liferaft; even though not required by FAR 135.167.

We must also assume that the launching of a twin without single-engine performance must have been risk assessed and considered to be safe (notwithstanding that KOS's engine-failure rates appear to give the possibility of an engine failure every 5,000 hours - KOS's worst case scenario).

If Shawn's contention that insurance rates reflect the assessment of risk is true - how can such an operation wipe its face?

[Lu Zuckerman]

Please understand that the predicted rate of failure is based not on the flying hours of one aircraft but on a fleet of aircraft of a given type. If KOS's worst case scenario of 5000 hours is correct a fleet of helicopters can reach 5000 hours in a short period of time and as such would be dropping from the sky at an alarming rate.

:uhoh:

[Hingeless Rotor]

I feel that the point made earlier regarding the use of two pilots as apposed to single pilot operations is probably the more relevant when discussing the safety aspects of overwater night flights.

Without a doubt the majority of accidents revolve around the fact that the pilot has lost visual cues and has ditched, usually on approach. I can recall at least half a dozen over the past 5 years where this has been the case. I believe the engine failure rates should be an ongoing concern but really the use of single pilot operations, whether VFR or IFR, should have the greater focus. My opinion on this goes as far as to include all EMS operations as well.

If the use of two pilots were incorporated (assuming most know the advantages of two pilots), you may not completely stop these accidents, but you will severely reduce them.

I don’t think this point can be argued by anyone, most of all the regulators.

Cheers

[Bladestrike]

Lu, reminds me of an old Saturday Night Live sketch;

Newsreporter: "In New York City, a man is mugged every two minutes..........tonight, we meet that man."

[Another KOS]

Hingeless:

We know that the wish for two pilots is well intentioned but, in the context of this thread what would it achieve?

In the first of the two cases considered - the engine failure case - it would merely add one more to the potential casualties.

In the second - the reduced visual cue environment - the problem would be ameliorated but only in the case where the workload lends itself to task sharing (and, for offshore operations a dual panel fitted). This is true for onshore operations such as HEMS where the pure flying and the HEMS task related items can be separated - without the provision of the dual panel. (In fact this is the case in Europe where HEMS does require a crew of two - either two pilots, or more usual, a pilot and a HEMS crew member. Police operations are similarly crewed).

Surely you are missing the obvious choices with your solution - twin engine helicopters, when flown other than in Performance Class 3, would ameliorate the first case; the use of an IFR certificated helicopter could avoid the second - provided the pilot is well trained and current. (IFR aircraft are, during their certification process, assessed for handling qualities and workload and qualified as two pilot IFR or single pilot IFR (and in the latter case equipped with an autopilot).)

I would also add another item - the fitting of a radalt - which could give a safety net for the unintentional descent into the water and adds a further and invaluable cue for autorative landings on the water (obviously GPWS would provide much more functionality but will have to remain a dream, or Sikorsky only fit - at least for the immediate future).

Lu:

Your point is well made, perhaps we should concentrate on the more probable engine-failure range of 1 to 5:100,000. What is not in dispute is that, if a twin engine helicopter is flown in Performance Class 3, the probability of a failure (for the helicopter) is increased to the range of 2 to 10:100,000. Moving into a different Performance Class would not change the rate but would reduce the consequence (it was tempting to put eliminate but for Performance Class 2, exposure on the take-off and landing still has to be considered).

What are we doing in these series of posts?

Well obviously we are engaged in the very Risk Assessment that was discussed in an earlier post.

What was missed in the earlier post was the method of setting the safety target which could be one of: Zero Risk: not an option for us unfortunately De Minimis: minimised to an acceptable safety target (the JAR-OPS approach to performance) Comparative Risk: comparison to conducting the operations by other methods (e.g. by boat) As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP): where additional controls are not commercially or reasonably practicalThis discussion is extremely timely in the context of proposed changes to the industry due to the extant ICAO process.

[Shawn Coyle]

Unfortunately, people use the Risk Assessment words, but not the real methodology.
When pressed for the Risk assessment report, they will not be able to produce it "but it was done..." they say.
There is a formal process for Risk Assessment and risk reduction, and it would be nice to see someone (like an insurance company???) demand it be done in a formal method.

[Another KOS]

Shawn:

Demand who do it in a formal way?

[Shawn Coyle]

Another KOS:
Anyone who says that they have done a 'Risk Assessment' ought to be asked to produce the report showing the methods they used.
Like flight testing - no report = no test done. No Risk assessment report = no Risk Assessment done.
There are formal methods to completing a Risk assessment, and when followed, they are good things. But people use the term too loosely and without discipline.

[Another KOS]

Shawn:

Yes, with you 100%.

So under the US Freedom of Information Act - if the FAA states they have Risk Assessed their current Regulations and OpSpecs, you think that assessment should be made available for us to see?

Is it possible that others have a view on this issue, or have Shawn and I killed the thread stone dead?

Do you consider that it has been established that VFR only, single-engined helicopters can be flown offshore at night - to an acceptable (safety) target?

[S76Heavy]

Depends on your target. I'm sure that a DC2 can still be a viable airliner today, but when there is so much better equipment for the job available, it all boils down to the standards you set..

[B Sousa]

Would you ever consider routinely flying a single-engine helicopter offshore at night? What would be the minimum equipment you would have if you did?


Sasless, are you getting old on us?? You have been around the horn plenty and dont tell me you dont remember those dark nights in SEA with that ONE engine behind you.....:ugh:

Anyway as mentioned on another thread, I have done plenty of nights in the Virgin Islands into some seriously black holes. And yes in a B206 (series) Hated every minute of it, and just tried to take things a bit
s l o w e r .
One place in particular we used to go into at night was www.peterisland.com (http://www.peterisland.com) or www.neckerisland.com (http://www.neckerisland.com) Dark night, maybe an unseen squall and an unlit Helipad was just a way of life.
Radar Altimeter would have been my choice beyond the usual items.:D

Dam good Rum down there though.........:rolleyes:

[Shawn Coyle]

B Sousa:
You have an impressively long memory. 2003 was a very long time ago! But the topic is still a very warm one.

[INVESTOR]

Some very good discussion and research , but some of it wanders from the point . Is it safe ? If it isn't safe in some circumstances can it be made safe in others .

First my background . I was trained in the military . Flew four engined turbine aircraft internationally . I am a very good instrument pilot on FW and helicopters . I have 12,000 hrs helicopter . On Marine Pilot Transfer operations in Australia my job is to fly single engine helicopters at night over water . We operate under NVFR .

Is single engine helicopter NVFR over water dangerous ? Any helicopter operation can be dangerous unless the pilot is correctly trained and the aircraft correctly equipped . If a pilot has a basic NVFR rating with its 2 hours of instrument training , has low natural instrument flying ability , and minimal dark night experience , and his aircraft has the minimum of NVFR equipment , he can be legal and the possibility of his surviving over water at night is about zero . And that is without complicated operations or emergencies . I will cover twin engines from the equipment point below .

Can it be safe? The MPT operation I am involved with has achieved 35 years accident free and more than a third of our flights are at night [ governed by when high tides occur ]. Why is it safe ? Our aircraft instrumentation , aids , and comms are effectively to IFR standards . We have autopilots , rad alts , Schermully flares , pop out floats , life vests , GPS/406 beacons ,crash location beacons , marine EPIRBs , marine radios , ship AIS , landing light plus swivelling search light , underwater breathing equipment , jettison doors , pop out windows , life raft , medical kit and survival kit . Our maintenance is to a high standard .Our pilots are very good instrument pilots and we fly good instrument procedures . Our pilots are also very good at night visual flight . Our weather conditions are generally benign , the seas warm and the sharks well fed . Why don't we have two engines ? If we operated over less friendly waters and more than 21nm from land , we would . In our operation we start with the EXXON premise that twin engined helicopters are 2% safer than single engined helicopters . We would happily go to the expense of twins to gain that extra 2% safety but there are three problems . Some of our ships are small and the landing is a confined area , and it's an unforgiving confined area . If we clip an obstruction we don't just get a gentle rain of greenery . Our rotor clearance standard , derived from the International Marine Organization rules , is rotor diameter plus 10 mtrs , so we have 5 mtrs clearance each side . Our B206 and EC120 aircraft have good visibility and are light and precise on the controls and these factors aid our confined area ops. Due to size constaints the only twins that fit are the BK105 , EC135 and the Explorer . The BK105 has poor vis and is not light and precise on the controls . The Explorer may have support problems . The EC135 sounds better but I suspect that when I am training a new pilot and crabbing in , he will get to see the ship and I won't . Using a wing down tecnique I would get to see the ship but not how much he is clearing the obstructions by . Apart from visibilty and precise controls there is the down time of the more complex twins . Each time the aircraft is grounded , the marine pilot must travel by pilot boat . This is comparatively dangerous and must be considered in the overall operation . So starting with a 2% advantage , the visibility , controls and availability of twins could erode safety into negative figures .

We fly single pilot which I know is contentious . We know that the problems of an instrument take off and of a night visual approach that has led to impact with the water with other operators has often occurred with two pilots on board . The accident is precipitated by the PIC and it is hoped that the second pilot will save the situation . Trouble is that the second pilot often doesn't achieve the result required .Our attitude is that the pilot must have superior instrument and night abilities so that the problem isn't precipitated in the first place . We insist on very high standards to achieve that result as indicated by our scrub rate . Also , with our singles , it helps to keep the aircraft light .

I would rather auto at night into water than auto at day into trees .

We don't winch because 87% of our ships are suitable for landing on . Winching has its own accident rate . What we don't land on is serviced by a pilot boat .

Please don't think that we are dogmatic about our attitudes . We are aware that other organizations and authorities have different requirements and different ideas and we always try to appreciate their point of view and benefit from it . We half expect that we will eventually be directed to fly twin engined IFR and we will accept the umpires decision . But in the meantime when it comes to our operation we have the results on the board and we look forward to another 35 years accident free .

I am aware that I have left much unsaid and at the same time I have been long winded so I beg your indulgence .

[blade root]

I did it a few years, had quite a few frights along the way.

The company I worked for was very thorough in their training and no expense was spared in the maintenence of their aircraft.

One concern was the B206 flight manual definition of night flight limitations.

Now a little wiser, I would have to question the legalities of those flights conducted on those moonless/starless nights.

Don't care what anyone says, but it is IFR and if anyone wishes to tell me otherwise I will take them for a fly on a "black" night.

A few years ago CASA was reviewing the MPT regulations, as usual it was to hard for them and it was put to bed.

[McGowan]

Investor, well said, but I also agree with blade root, on a black night, it's IFR. The regualtions point out the simple fact that if you fly "by sole reference to the instruments" it's IFR not NVFR.

[helicfii]

VFR Off-shore at night is an IFR operation- it is a weird hybrid of IFR and VFR that is like no other kind of flying that I have experienced.

The potential for disorientation on take-off and while setting up for an approach is very real. Not to mention all the false horizons that you encounter out there due to platform lights and weather.

I did it for about a year, and would never, ever consider doing it in anything other than a medium with an IFR certified crew of 2. :ok:

Off-shore weather at night- very hard to see the scud most nights, or decreasing visibility (until after you are in it)...the chances of going inadvertant IMC out there are too great to ignore.

[INVESTOR]

The potential for disorientation is actually a certainty given a number of take offs . It is to greatly reduce the frequency of disorientations that our NVFR pilots are directed to do instrument take offs. Even then we can occasionally expect the leans to be induced from peripheral vision inputs. As part of our training our applicants have to demonstrate instrument flight to normal parameters while having the leans . CASA and BASI in Australia agree with flying on the instuments for all take offs towards dark ground at night to avoid somatogravic illusion [ even with a good horizon ] .So the concept of a NVFR pilot doing instrument take offs has official approval as a procedure .

We seem to agree that NVFR flight over water requires instrument flying and instrument equipment . From all the concerns expressed on the flight and legislative sides I think we have indicated where the greatest hazards are and there may be a drift towards the concept that the biggest problem is not that the one engine is going to fail . In fact unless you get the basics right , you are going to impact with the water long before your engine gets a chance to quit .

I agree that NVFR regulations are weird . But then again , instrument ratings and IFR are not magical panaceas that will prevent water impacts . Need I remind you that a Puma crewed by a captain and a check captain doing a night marine pilot transfer flew into the water , and IFR multi crewed flights terminating in the water continues to be a problem around the world .Reading the accident reports there seems to be a perception by some operators that an instrument rating automatically bestows an ability to handle the night visual portion of the flight and that more crew and eqipment somehow decreases the need for flying ability and airmanship .



I probably need to restate that we operate in very benign weather conditions here and that I support twin engine IFR for less fortunate operators .

[800]

The fact still remains;

Can you fix your position visually as required for VFR flight?
Can you maintain the minimum required horizontal visibility distance (for the whole flight) as required for VFR?
Can you maintain visual contact with the ground or water, at your cruise height, as required for VFR flight?
Can you maintain the minimum horizontal and vertical distance from cloud (can you see the cloud) as required for VFR flight?
Can you fly without assistance from the artificial horizon (remember its a VFR flight)?
Remember that NVFR has the same MINUMIM requirements for navigation and the conduct of the flight as for DVFR with some extra lights and insturments thrown in. The Instruments are for a back up, not intended as a means of completeing the flight if the weahter conditions are not suitable for NVFR.
[LIST]
Do you have sufficient moon to assist you in any of the above when there is insufficient ground lighting?
[LIST]
If you do conduct a flight with a moon and no other ground illumination, say at 45 degrees above the horizon, what happens when you conduct a 180 deg turn - now no moon, no horizon, no VFR!


If there is insufficient ground or moon illumination, how can you see a horizon. If you cannot see a horizon, how can it be NVFR?

Lets face it, those who have not had the opportunity to fly at night under the IFR with an appropriately configured aircraft will always think NVFR is OK:ugh:

This argument/debate will continue :mad: forever

[INVESTOR]

I think I have this right

Yes , yes , yes , yes , yes , yes , and no .

When we take off from the base helipad we climb to cruise height and look 10 miles ahead to a bunch of ships , we procede to the ships and land , or if chasing a departing ship we look ahead another 10 miles to the lights of the departing ship and go and land on it .

Can we do the whole flight without relying on the AH . Blowed if I know . I have never tried to . I always assumed the AH was there as a necessary tool to be used .

[helmet fire]

Can we do the whole flight without relying on the AH . Blowed if I know . I have never tried to

Great answer - I am with you! Why would you????

Australia has long had an issue with the NVFR rating and rules, they almost unique in the world. We have no requirement for a visual horizon, but employ a LSALT instead to ensure ground separation. This means you HAVE to be proficient with instrument skills to take advantage of the rating - despite the fact that it is called a "VFR" situation and that that label seems to make people believe that they should be looking out the front for orientation.

The CAO controlling the NVFR training and rating standards clearly details the requirements for instrument proficiency in terms of limitations on heading, altitude and airspeed control - all of which are to be demonstrated to the examiner "with sole reference to the flight instruments". What has been lacking in Australia are those standards being applied to the applicants undergoing the test, and the fact that a perpetual rating is issued absolving the applicant of ever having to demonstrate instrument competency right up until he/she eventually demonstrates that he doesn't have any by producing a smoking hole and another pprune thread slinging crap at him/her!

We need to harden up on the cost issue and change NVFR in Australia to that of the rest of the world - a visual horizon and ground MUST be present, otherwise go and invest in the instrument rating that has been proven again and again to help. And what about NVG....just kidding!

Why don't MPT and GOM VFR ops at least install something like the max viz uncooled IR system? Weights about 2kg, costs US$60K and would be perfect for showing up the rig/boat overwater at night and therefore provide a good spatial tool during the descent phase?

And BTW, I am a solid supporter of the twin theory. I can just imagine going down over water at night believing in the comfort of "only 2%" worse off, or 2 in 100,000 or what ever. Can those who like to perpetuate such points of view please jump on board at that time so that I might get off?

[McGowan]

As 800 says, this discussion can go on for ever, and most opinions will be correct or close to it.
I don't think it is a single/twin engine issue as it is an IFR/NVFR issue.
I also recon it's a Pilot issue, is he/she trained, current and capable to conduct the flight.
The issue of how much training, what kind of training, who does it, how often do you do it and of course, minimum equipment to do the job has to be taken into account. Again, here in Aussie it is only a matter of time before the insurance companies step in and say "we won't insure you off shore in an aircraft that doesn't meet the following minums".:= Then they will dictate what we will be flying.
With unlimited money and time we have no accidents or incidents, in the real world where money isn't plentiful, we do it in a single with one a/h, one Pilot and only when the sun is shinning. I suppose it's just what you can afford and good luck..........................

[eagle 86]

In the days of Yore, when HF was only dreaming of Hueys, the term was "Class 4 Instrument Rating" and that's what over-water night ops is about.
GAGS E86

[800]

From the B206 RFM limitations section;

NIGHT FLIGHT LIMITATIONS

Night flight operation is limited to visual contact flight conditions. Orientation shall be maintained through visual reference to ground objects solely as a result of lights on the ground or adequate celestial illumination.

So, if your flying a B206 then this limiation applies to you. If your flying some other type of aircraft, then maybe this should be used in your risk management decision making guide.

:ok:

800

[Capt SFB]

800,

Not having a B206 Flight Manual handy, what does it say if your machine is equipped and certified IFR ??

Capt SFB

[800]

All I can say is that it was a VFR RFM, so that would mean it applies to VFR operations.

When you find the RFM with the IF supplement in it then all would be explaned and you can tell us all.

Normally when flying IFR you would not have to look outside except in the takeoff and landing phases of flight, so the VFR limitation would probably not apply (my opinion) but YOU better check.

[Shawn Coyle]

To the best of my knowledge, there has only been one 206B that was certified for IFR and that wasn't even a full IFR certification (it's the Bristow's one in the UK).
Problem with certifying the 206 is only one generator, no force trim and doesn't meet some of the handling requirements without a stabilization system.
It will, for all intents, forever remain a VFR machine - and people who try to fly the thing IFR or in very poor vis will continue to suffer the consequences.

[Capt SFB]

Shawn,

I've flown a full IFR 206B here in Australia, a 2nd battery installation met the requirements there and an auto pilot was also fitted. There have been a few others also on the VH reg over the years, together with some 206L's.

Our MPT NVFR 206's and 120 feature autopilots, the 120 with full flight director, alt capture, etc.

Cheers,

Capt SFB

[800]

Thats Great Capt SFB.

Improved safety and reduced fatigue during those missions.

BUT, Do you still fly fulfulling the requirements of NVFR on those missions?

[spinwing]

Mmmmmm .......

Well I still think that flying ANY single engined Heilcopter over water at night VFR or IFR is a task that will eventually "end in tears".

Yes I have done .... No I didn't like it ..... No I'm not gunna do it again!

Thankfully I'm way too old for that **** .... I guess I'm now one of those "Old but NOT bold" types ....

Cheers :E

[Gomer Pylot]

The US Army goes IFR regularly in 206s, no autopilot, just stock, with new instrument students. Of course, they aren't bound by the FARs, but they've had no accidents in that regime over the years. It's not as dangerous as some would claim, but that doesn't mean I want to do it.

[heliski22]

On the other hand, Spinwing, old men do like to give good advice when no longer able to give bad example!!

Just teasing!!!

[spinwing]

Oooh .... Oooh .....

Yes thats me ........ now!

:E