Committing to the missed

[Bladestrike]

In an enviroment where ARAs to mins is the norm, and about 1/3 of them result in a missed approach, I've occassionally seen "Visual, I have control" calls where visual reference is afterwards lost, hence requiring buddy on the dials to retake control and commence a missed. This is going to happen from time to time in this enviroment, but its the other way around that bothers me.

I have on occassion seen the guy looking out the window call for the missed at mins, buddy on the dials initiate a climbing turn away from the rig, then the guy looking for the rig catching a glimpse of it and calling "visual, I have control". On occassion, as a climb is already initiated, the visual reference is soon lost and the missed is reintiated.

Is this the norm or would it be prudent to continue with the missed once it is initiated, regardless if you get visual reference to the rig. I see alot of control transfers very close to a very big obstruction. Is there a standard out there?

This must happen in the runway enviroment as well.

Any input appreciated.

[ShyTorque]

BladeStrike,

I say once gone around, you're gone around and that's it till next time.

Changing one's mind like that, it's possible to get in a situation where both pilots think they have control or both think the other has control. Seen both before now, either can result in an "interesting few seconds" :uhoh:

[SASless]

Missed is Missed.

But due to my continuing argument about nothing is etched in stone but your epitaph....if one were to pop out into spiffy weather and the rig is plainly in sight....and visual flight is guaranteed.....well why not maneuver the aircraft within the visual conditions to a safe "normal" landing. Onshore....with all the procedures, ATC, and other traffic....seems to me...once you decide to go "missed" you continue with that program.

[donut king]

Do exactly what is briefed!

Briefings ahead of time can allow for wonky actions at the bottom( sometimes).

As long as both dudes stick to the same plan of action!

If that creates a confusing cockpit,..........MISS! Go around and use the fuel you've tried "to make" during the enroute. That's why we adjust power settings in cruise( " to make fuel enroute").

Sorry, sliding off topic( my '76 procedures coming out). You flying '76's Blade?

Basically, do what's simplest and safest( and not a surprise to your co-jo)!

D.K

[GLSNightPilot]

I tend to commit to the missed. As SASless said, nothing is in stone, but it's at least in brick. It would take totally breaking into the clear, and if you've initiated the missed already, it obviously isn't all that clear. If you find the rig is really clear, another approach is usually better than trying to salvage something down low & confused.

[Bladestrike]

Thanks guys, thats pretty much what I thought. It was a pretty experienced and respected high-time guy pulling this, hence the question mark. Another point I forgot, after the missed is called, instead of continuing to look for the rig, the guy looking out should have his head inside backing up the guy flying the missed.

I can think of an approach in Africa on the water where the approach half of the runway is often fogged right in, but there's a good chance of breaking into VFR weather on the missed with half the runway still below you. Different situation though.

DK, yea, I fly the 76 but now on the 61. No fuel flow metres mind you, but very little variance in the FF for small power/RRPM changes like in the 76.

[Blue Rotor Ronin]

Blade ol' boy,
not to throw a spanner in the works......BUT....... Things are never black and white enough not to have a look in the direction you should have been landing on. Meeningly(if thats a word) ARA approaches tend to be in the gloop, time to time on initiating the go-around you can see the deck... enabeling a VMC approach... and after all that's what we're there for. Safety being an obvious factor. If there's doubt there is no doubt. Leave it and go home. :ok:

[ATPMBA]

An old airline simulator trick would be to have the pilots make an approach to minimums, with no runway in sight they would start the missed approached, at that time the instructor would increase the visibility to see if the would abandon the missed and try to make a landing out of it. If they abandoned the missed they would flunk the checkride.

Now, a DC-8 and DC-10 handle a little differently from a S-76 but the principles still apply. I can see getting into trouble in a helicopter by breaking off the miss and trying to make a landing from it, it may work for a while but eventually something will happen.

[Blue Rotor Ronin]

ATP MBA,
universally honoured that you've revealed this trick, however helichoppers are astoundingly different to planks simply by manoevreability. I'm sure your're aware of this. If IMC becomes VMC do you not land? If there's doubt there is no doubt, go around.:ok:

[212man]

I think the phrase 'suckers gap' could be inserted in here somewhere. It's a mistake to consider the ARA as any different to other IF approaches and therefor the same protocols should apply; you wouldn't expect to abandon a missed approach from a VOR/DME approach would you?

As a cautionary tale, a very experienced crew, trying hard to get into a fog bound rig in the N. Sea about 9 years ago carried out a third and final missed approach from an ARA. The Captain who was PNF caught a glimpse of the rig in the 4 o'clock through a gap in the fog, and took control. He racked the a/c round (332) and gave control back to the co-pilot (high hours ex-mil) for the visual approach. Unfortunately, they had a slight tale wind and had lost most of the airspeed. I think the torque pulled in order to avoid hitting the sea was 127%.

Wasn't good for their subsequent careers.

[Bladestrike]

The two times I've seen it done, neither was pretty and the potential FU factor was extremely high.

The first time, the visual pilot got a very clear look at the rig after the missed was initiated, the fog being very patchy, but as a climb had been initiated, he was unable to arrest the climb in enough time to avoid reentering the goo and control was passed back to the instrument pilot, who reinitiated the missed, now somewhat inside of the MAP, with curious passengers wondering why it appeared the pilots were fighting over the controls.

The second time (I'm not a quick learner) we made it on to the deck, but again passengers were questioning what in blazes was going on. The visual pilot admitted to initially having good visual but "almost" losing it again and "almost" recalled for the missed. This pilot has tons more time than I do, and most of that in exactly this enviroment, so I have alot of respect for his opinions, but after this second episode, he now agrees that missed is missed and thats the end of it.

If you're changing your mind at 1/2 mile (Canadian limits) its not that great to start with, and if you got a good visual on the rig after the missed is called, it would surely fall into the "sucker hole" category. Twice is enough for me, I won't fall into that trap again.

[CTD]

There is a very wet and salty Super Puma named C-GSLK that would agree with you.

[Capn Notarious]

Ditching.
I understand that most helicopters would invert and some parts may get bent.
So : Salvage Restoration and bin it.
Would a turbine have to be stripped to its most disseminated state.
Are there parts that would never be used again, regardless of economical viability.
Do electronics dry out to re-use?

[Blue Rotor Ronin]

Ever seen ridge and furrow fog on the North sea, I have and landed a 332 after going around from an ARA, safely. Suckers gap is a very real ruin of careers and lives but never rule out the fact that in order to land you need to go from IMC to VMC and if you can see where you need to land, you land. If there's doubt there is no doubt. :ok:

[Another KOS]

Isn't it correct that the missed approach point is the last point at which a 'safe' go-around can be guaranteed?

Isn't it also true that the ARA is a unique instrument approach - taking the pilot to the largest obstacle in the area?

Having commenced a go-around, the part of the structure seen during the manoeuvre may not be the part that is struck.

The moving of the MAP from 1/4 mile (in the the early days) to 3/4 mile was to address such issues.

MAP should be seen as a go/no-go - no option is included.

Wasn't the Dutch S-76 accident partially caused by such a dilemma?

I'm with SASless - don't even consider it.

[S76Heavy]

Another KOS,

The KLM-ERA S76 accident was not caused by trying to land from a missed approach. Having had acces to (a version of) the accident report, I am pretty sure of that.
Relevant factors here were : dark night with low cloud, long FDP, no AVAD fitted, trying to deman a NUI, lack of confidence of P2 and P1 pushing P2 instead of taking control of the A/C.
The P2 went around the first time after losing sight of the deck, then, following verbal instructions from the P1 commenced a low level circuit for another try. Still unhappy with the picture but urged on by the P1, the A/C was too fast on finals with a high rate of descent, both pilots unaware of RoD until too late.

Similar situation occurred in 1985 with a Dauphin that hit the water when turning final to a ship at night. Fortunately, there were no fatalities that time, I got the story from one of the pilots of that A/C.

Just as dangerous, but nothing to do with turning towards the rig after initiating a Missed..

I