DETAILS OF BOMB SCARE/THREAT BA6214 (DUR – JNB) 21/05/2003
During the climb out of DUR passing +/- 8000’ we were advised by ATC that a “Code Charlie” had been declared at Durban and that we had to turn onto a heading of 240.
We did not understand the “Code Charlie” but turned onto the heading instructed. (At the time I was the PNF and as such was doing the radio work). I changed to OPS frequency and spoke Comair Traffic in Durban. The operator advised me that a bomb threat had been made to DUR and that we had to land in Durban immediately. At this time we were not advised about the detail of the threat. We were the only flight given the “Code Charlie” message, and as such saw it as a threat directed at our specific flight/aircraft.
I called the “Cabin Controller to the flight deck” and carried out the NITS briefing with very limited information at my disposal. Nature = BOMB THREAT; Intention = RETURNING TO DUR; Time = LESS THAN 10 MIN; Special Instructions = PREPARE CABIN – NO EVACUATION PLANNED. At this time I made a PA announcement , but only indicated that we were requested to land back in DUR without delay (to prevent possible panic). I requested that the passengers follow all instructions given by the cabin crew.
We were advised by ATC to descend to 7000’ and had to advise them “field visual” for the left hand visual approach for RWY 06 at DUR. On the left base I assumed the position of PF, and executed the visual approach and landing. The tower controller advised us to vacate to the compass swing bay after the landing, and we shut down in that position (on the North Eastern side of the airport, and across the RWY from the terminal buildings).
We called DUR Traffic to send steps/stairs to the aircraft to disembark. After the shut down, I went back into the Cabin and advised the passengers on the PA of the bomb threat that had been issued. I asked them to remain calm and seated. Our passengers remained relatively calm and co-operated very well. When the stairs arrived, they disembarkd the aircraft in an orderly manner. (Passengers included elderly couples, PAU and A pregnant lady!) If we had evacuated the risk of injury was relatively high – so we disembarked.
The police arrived with the stairs, and a K9 unit with “sniffer dog”. Our passengers were transported to the BA-Lounge. The SAPS senior officer (a Brig. General) requested that the cockpit crew stay at the aircraft, to assist them and supervise the search of the aircraft and baggage. The Cabin crew went to the Rennies lounge. The sniffer dog was used to search the aircraft, and then all hand luggage and baggage after it had all been placed outside. After we were given the “all clear” by the police the aircraft was towed back to bay A2. All the luggage had been X rayed at International Departures and all passengers had to identify his/her luggage and check the contents after the search. After we had re-fuelled and the passengers again boarded for the return flight, we were running +/- 2 hour 30 min late of schedule.
Lessons learnt, and points to ponder:
The use of “Code Charlie” by ATC was very confusing, as this was NOT the company system as would be expected in this situation. After the flight we found that “Code Charlie” was a International ATC code used to indicate – Bomb warning/threat. Keep the (new)“Codes” in your flight bag!
Some passengers took out cell phones, to make telephone calls after landing (before we disembarked) – We instructed them to put away the phones, as we had no way of knowing if an explosive device was onboard, or if it could be triggered by cell phone.
The time it took for the stairs to arrive at the aircraft was very frustrating – maybe because we wanted to disembark the passengers without delay. We were later advised that the stairs had to be escorted by a radio equipped vehicle, to cross the runway. The crew was faced with a difficult decision – If you pop the slides and evacuate you risk injury to passengers (We had elderly people; pregnant lady and a PAU). If you sit and wait for the stairs you might end up like the Captain on Saudia Air and leave every one to perish! We decided to wait.
The value of a supportive F/O can not be emphasised enough. My F/O did an excellent job of this during the flight, and provided great inputs and arranged numerous things ( Refuelers / flight plan / tug and parking bay etc.) afterwards.
The cabin crew did a wonderful job, and afterwards were complimented by most of our pax. Of the 66 original pax only 4 did not travel back to JNB with us (Businessmen who had missed their meetings). During my recent SEPT refresher the instructor pointed out the importance of a “visible captain” to control/calm a situation. This is especially true with the” locked door policy”. I must say that this worked very well, but obviously depends on your situation.
Crew could feel traumatised by a situation after they prepared the cabin, coped with crying passengers and had to assist them throughout. Crew / duty time could also become an issue and also needs consideration. Flying with an unwilling crewmember could also jeopardise safety.
As a crew we received compliments from just about all of the passengers as we finally disembarked in JNB. We have even been thanked by e mail and letters so, I believe that this negative incident was well handled by the crew as a team.
Please send me your comments, remarks, or crit .
For a copy of the ATC code list e-mail me on:
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Flyboy737