Schmidt/Umbach Guilty or Innocent?

[saudipc-9]

"Major Harry Schmidt and Major William Umbach of the Illinois National Guard are charged with involuntary manslaughter, aggravated assault and dereliction of duty" This due to them dropping a 500-pound bomb on Canadians near Kandahar on April 17, 2002.
So what do we think? Guilty of murder or just bad judgement?
For my two cents worth these two wanted a piece of the action. They decided to shoot first and ask questions later. Neither one should wear a military uniform again. All they had to do was wait a few minutes and this would never have happened. Self-defence against small arms fire??? Rubbish!!

[Deaf]

I don't have full info only what we have here but
Guilty as minor participants (fired against ROE) - the errors and guilt go a lot further up the tree.

[A Civilian]

Guilty as hell they should stick them in the vein.

[solotk]

http://www.centcom.mil/News/Reports/Tarnak_Farms_Report.htm



Did it not occur to the Wingman, that his threat warning box-o-tricks wasn't screaming it's head off?

He engaged, in spite of the fact that there was no indication of FF under attack, or messages to that end.

Twenty-eight seconds later, the AWACS Mission Crew Commander (MCC) had relayed this request to the CAOC, call sign ___. COFFEE flight could not hear these transmissions. ____ informed ____ that COFFEE flight had seen SAFIRE near Kandahar and that COFFEE 52 had requested to employ his 20mm cannon. The Chief of Combat Operations (CCO), immediately told the ____ controller to deny the request.

Unfortunately at this point , Coffee 52 heard the soundtrack in his head and went fangs out. :(

So in this case, no it doesn't go all the way up, because the people all the way up, told Coffee 52 NOT to engage

[DuckDogers]

I think the more casing point is that they were unaware that Tarnak farms WAS on the ACO and the ACM as a range area and that they were to contact Khandahar tower for info as to its use!! (No excuse for this).

In association with this, i find it very hard to believe that the AWACS did not have the latest ACO change as the very first thing done is notify ALL units of the changes on both ATO and ACO as they occu. After all it is the AWACS who update you upon check-in with them as to what change of ACO you are working to! An investigation into the AWACS crew may be in order as well.

Having been on the CAOC floor at roughly the same time as this incident transpired it came as a a bit of a shock that he was asking to engage in the first place for the reasons stated above.

Guilty as charged , i here Leavenworth is not a bad prison though

[ORAC]

Guilty, but with extenuating circumstances. They were unaware that the range was active. However, the Sqn was culpable as they did not maintain a map of the ACO. The AEW also did not possess a map of the ACO.

Below as some relevant comments from the report.

Concerning the Sqn:

"COFFEE 51 and COFFEE 52 had dissimilar and incomplete special use airspace, notably AOs, on their maps and charts. The 170 EFS did not maintain a master map depicting the ACO".

Concerning the AWACS:

"The AWACS crew reported they had little readily available information about current ACO information, to include the AO and Tarnak Farms Range. The MCC reported that he did not review the ACO prior to every flight and that this type of information was generally provided by the CAOC".

Both:

"The Tarnak Farm Range was listed in the OEF ACO on 17 April 2002 as “Not continuously active, contact Kandahar tower for status" for the period of ___. It was described as a small arms range at Kandahar. The altitude restriction was listed as surface to _____. The range was listed as having a _____radius around a center point located at 31-27.18° North, 065-49.39° East. Although listed in the ACO, the COFFEE flight pilots stated to AWACS that they were unaware of this; AWACS concurred with this statement.

[Chris Kebab]

Guilty - and I suspect upon reflection, they know it.

[maxburner]

They recognised small arms fire and called for permission to engage. They were told to wait. They should have climbed and left the area, but took it upon themselves to roll in and attack. I'm afraid the facts are clear. They should not be allowed to walk away from this.

[Tigs2]

Maxburner
Spot on. Sure there are some mitigating circumstances in terms of procedure, going right up the management chain, but ultimately all these boys had to do was wait until given authority to engage(or not as it turned out). It is not as if the vehicle was going to outrun them. This is typical of the gung-ho cowboy attitude that must be eradicated from military flying. When your the captain of a $30 million dollar killing machine you should display an exceptional amount of responsibility, professionalism and self discipline.
I am not into blame cultures in aviation, however this was a decision made by the formation leader to engage when he had been told to wait for authority.

Guilty!

[rivetjoint]

I'll put my "know nothing about this" hat on but what would the consequences have been to allied forces on the ground had they not engaged the small arms fire?

[Jackonicko]

The tapes are astonishing. The short gap between being told to wait, and not to engage, and the formation leader 'rolling in in self defence' was very brief. How much danger were they in, at their height, from the small arms fire encountered?

[ORAC]

Rivetjoint, they'd still be alive. No hostile forces were present in the area.

Jacko, they were in no danger whatsoever. At the outset they were at medium to high level in transit to a tanker to refuel prior to recovery. They actually broke the rules by descending below the altitude floor and into AAA range. The following is an extract from the CENTCOM report:

ROE Analysis and Self-Defense

The OEF ROE do not differ significantly from the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) on the issue of self-defense. When invoking self-defense, in OEF as in other theaters, the requirements of necessity and proportionality are applicable. The decision to employ force, including lethal force, in response to a hostile act or hostile intent resides with the on-scene commander. On 17 April 2002, both COFFEE pilots were commanders for ROE purposes. COFFEE 51 was the commander of the two-ship flight and COFFEE 52 was the commander of his individual aircraft. Therefore, the right to invoke self-defense was an inherent right of each of the pilots. However, in assessing whether COFFEE 52's resort to lethal force against a perceived AAA threat was appropriate in these circumstances, several factors must be considered.

i. First, the use of lethal force must have been necessary for COFFEE flight to defend themselves, their aircraft, or nearby friendly forces. That is, were they or other friendly forces in their immediate vicinity in imminent danger of being harmed or destroyed and did any options short of the use of lethal force exist?

ii. Second, any response had to be proportionate to the threat. Was COFFEE flight's chosen course of action, in this case use of lethal force, proportionate to the threat to themselves and their aircraft?

iii. Third, any decision had to take into account all relevant information that was reasonably available to them at the time. Did COFFEE flight assess all information available during flight planning or in their possession in flight? Did they make reasonable requests for readily available information from others?

iv. Fourth, the right to employ weapons in self-defense existed only as long as there was an imminent threat. Assuming that the ground fire observed by COFFEE flight was from hostile forces, would the ground fire have reasonably presented an imminent risk?

v. Fifth, the decision to employ weapons in self-defense must never be retaliatory in nature. What were COFFEE flight’s motives in turning, slowing, and descending toward what they perceived to be a AAA threat? Why did they choose to employ weapons rather than safely withdraw?

vi. Finally, the OEF ROE established a high standard for determining that a AAA system was a threat to OEF aircraft and pilots were directed not to deliberately descend into a AAA system’s Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) in order to attack if the AAA was firing well below their altitude. Was the perceived threat to COFFEE 52 or his lead COFFEE 51 so imminent and severe that it necessitated COFFEE 52's violation of a specific ROE restriction?

Analysis of COFFEE Flight's Self-Defense Call

The issue of COFFEE flight's compliance or noncompliance with the Standing and OEF ROE is of great significance to this investigation. Whether or not the actions of COFFEE 51 flight constituted a proper exercise of their right to self-defense is of substantial importance in determining the cause or causes of this incident. Therefore, a careful analysis of facts and circumstances leading to COFFEE flight's use of force follows.

i. Necessity. Numerous F-16 pilots interviewed by the Board stated that if they had found themselves in similar circumstances to those confronted by COFFEE flight on the evening of 17 April 2002, their immediate course of action would have been to accelerate to greater airspeed, climb in altitude, and leave the immediate area to evade and avoid the threat. COFFEE flight took none of these actions. Neither COFFEE 51 nor COFFEE 52, both of whom stated they believed they were being targeted at some point by the ground fire, aggressively maneuvered their aircraft in the face of what they presumably believed was a surface-to-air threat. Throughout the entire engagement, COFFEE 51 maintained a slow rate, level right-hand turn approximately five miles from the source of the ground fire, almost completely circling the Tarnak Farms range. COFFEE 52 turned back toward the SAFIRE and descended below recommended altitude to take a mark. Later, he turned back toward the SAFIRE again and slowed to well below tactical airspeed. He never appeared to maneuver defensively. Finally, both COFFEE 51 and 52 stated they believed the ground fire was burning out around 10,000 feet AGL, well below their initial transit altitude, they later stated their belief that projectiles continued to climb after burn out. COFFEE 52 descended close to what he perceived to be the burn-out altitude and remained there during the entire sequence.

ii. Proportionality. Although COFFEE 52 ultimately released a 500 lb. bomb, he had requested use of a lesser amount of force when he requested clearance to use his 20mm cannon prior to declaring self-defense. However, COFFEE 52 did not engage in any non-lethal means of self-defense (i.e., maneuvering away from the threat) before making the decision to use lethal force.

iii. Reasonably available information. There are several examples of reasonably available information apparently not considered or actively pursued by COFFEE flight in making their decision to employ weapons against what they perceived to be a AAA site. For example, COFFEE 51 stated to COFFEE 52 early in the sequence of events that they should be sure there were no friendly forces in the area, but neither COFFEE 51 nor 52 actively queried their controlling AWACS, for information on possible locations of friendly forces in the vicinity of Kandahar. COFFEE 51 and COFFEE 52 had dissimilar and incomplete special use airspace, notably AOs, on their maps and charts. The 170 EFS did not maintain a master map depicting the ACO.

iv. Imminent. Objective reasons for COFFEE flight to believe they were in imminent danger must be assessed from all information reasonably available to them at the time. Some guidance is available to aid in making this determination. The OEF SPINS state, "[A]ircraft should not deliberately descend into the effective range of AAA to engage and destroy AAA units which fire well below their altitude." AFTTP 3-1.5, Tactical Employment F-16 C/D states,

[T]he pilot always retains the right of self-defense and the defense of other friendly assets unable to protect themselves. This right, however, should not be used as a planned work-around for solving poor tactics and decision trees. The F-16 pilot must make a conscious decision that the immediate threat outweighs the risk of fratricide. In situations where there is not an immediate threat, i.e., outside of abort range or nobody is spiked, or when SA on friendly positions is unknown, maintain a conservative, defensive approach to the situation until certain of compliance with the ROE.

v. Retaliation/lawful purpose. There was no evidence that weapons employment was motivated by retaliation or any other purpose prohibited by the laws of war.

vi. ROE restrictions. COFFEE 52 descended and slowed his aircraft in the vicinity of the SAFIRE site and requested permission to fire on the site with his 20mm cannon, a request denied by AWACS in the form of a reply, “Stand by” and subsequently, “Hold fire.” The employment of the 20mm cannon would have placed COFFEE 52 in greater jeopardy due to the descent to lower altitude and closer approach to the suspected SAFIRE site this move would require. In addition, this action would have required COFFEE 52 to descend well below the altitude floor imposed by the ROE. In addition, OEF SPINS directed that aircraft should not descend into the lethal range of a AAA system firing well below them in order to attack in self-defense.

CENTCOM Report (http://www.centcom.mil/News/Reports/Tarnak_Farms_Report.htm)

[A Civilian]

Having read through the entire report earlier on there was numerous point when evidence has been altered either through neglect or intent

1) The flight recorders were wiped clean which were against the rules when any aircraft had been in an accident.

2) The pilots commander debriefed then on there return to base yet conducted the interview with numerous breaks in the tape recording and without keeping the pilots seperate.

3) Numerous written evidence was either non-existent or could of been falsified after the event (including 'possibly' the poppers subscription). (well who really likes paperwork I dont)

Everyone looks out for their buddies so theres no point continuing discussing what other people 'could' of done in this situation but it certainly does not not help them achieve a non-guilty verdict.

One thing that sticks in my mind was the AWACS operaters response to the request to use '20 mike'. It was like they couldnt belive anyone would ever ask such a thing.

[kbf1]

Having heard bits of the tape where they were told to wait and then after engaging the target one asked the other if they really ought to have engaged suggests to me that the decision to attack was ill-considered. Had they been rookies there may be an argument in defence, but these guys were Majors and significantly more experienced.

[Jackonicko]

Were the drugs an issue?

[A Civilian]

They got up at 10:15 am and the incident occured at 12:?? am (next day) local time. The report said that the first thing they did during the day was get a subscription for some popers. They also mentioned that the bomb dropping pilot had exceeded his maxinium allocated 'work' hours during the flight.

Other than that they are not mentioned.

[Woff1965]

These guys are claiming they are not responsible as they were on apmphetamines at the time of the "accident". In fact from other articles on this matter it appears that amphetamines are issued on a regular basis to USAF pilots. It is not clear whether it is official policy or if it is known to go on and is tacitly approved.


The fact these guys are flying combat aircraft under the influence of speed is frankly appalling. Amphetamine Sulphate has a severe effect on the human body causing impulsive behaviour, loss of pateince and impairment of judgement and other mental processes.

However, it should be noted the defence lawyers are already spreading the blame around on this. One of the lawyers has stated the Canadians were virtually asking to be bombed by conducting live fire training in a war zone. The more cynical amongst us would also note that they are trying to imply that as those responsible for the attack on the Afghan wedding party were not charged then the F16 pilots are being victimised.

I have also seen articles on the net that imply the unit in question has previously been accused of "questionable" practices vis-a-vis promotion and cronyism by the command staff in the in the past (unfortunately the paper concerned deletes articles off its archives after 7 days - however to the best of my recollection the link below is a full copy of the article).

http://ragingbull.lycos.com/mboard/boards.cgi?board=YOUC&read=504

These guys are going to skate through this without getting touched. I have no doubt they will eventually sue the Canadian Army for the psychological stress they have been subjected to.

See the Guardian article -

http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,874815,00.html

[BlueWolf]

Guilty as hell.

They knew it at the time, they know it now, and so does everybody else.

The chain of command upwards from them is equally culpable, for permitting such inexcusable lack of proffessionalism.

Excuses, drugs, dodgy interviewing practises, tapes being wiped or not continuous, blame shifting and legal opinions all achieve nothing other than to reinforce that culpability. Jesus sufferring Christ, how can someone have the gall to call themselves a man - let alone an officer and a gentleman - when they know they've screwed up, and they know the reason they screwed up was because they were being stupid and unproffessional, and yet they don't have the balls to own up to that and take the punishment they know they deserve? This hiding behind lies is pathetic, it's contemptible. It makes me sick to the stomach.

Cowboys, plain and simple. "Hey, small arms fire. It must be the bad guys. Let's get 'em. Hell, we're reservists, we might not ever get another chance to fire some real live weapons at some real live people. Let's just do it. What's the worst thing that could happen? Ha Ha Ha....oops, they were our guys. Oh s h i t.....(panic panic sweat sweat) better start lying fast, buddy, and cover our a s s e s...."

So, amphetamines probably helped turn clouded judgement into bad decisions. But who or what sanctions their use, and why? If we can't fight a war without drugs, are we going about it the right way? Someone, somewhere, has to have the leadership and clarity of thought to stand up and say "enough, an end to this practice", rather than parading all sorts of expert opinions as to how it can be justified when it's patently bloody obvious that it can't.

This happens with monotonous regularity. It is perpetuated by a culture which seems to regard it as acceptable, even inevitable, and which is now making excuses for it. What's going to be done to stop it happening again?
Friendly fire my ar$e. There's nothing friendly about being bombed. How would the mob in question respond if someone did it to them, as opposed to them doing it to everyone else? That does, after all, seem to be the way it usually happens. Would it then become a problem in need of fixing?

It isn't good enough. It just simply isn't good enough.:mad:

[saudipc-9]

This whole affair reminds me of the EA-6B which killed all those Italians. What happened to them? A discharge from the USMC and that's about it. :(

[Scud-U-Like]

If killing whilst under the influence of drugs were a defence, then everyone who had ever killed whilst drink-driving would have been acquitted. There are very narrow circumstances in which acting under the influence of drugs may amount to a defence, but these do not appear to have been satisfied in this case.

The drugs issue may provide some mitigation, but the prosecution would doubtless argue that, far from mitigating the offence, its commission, by two experienced aircrew, under the influence of drugs, simply compounds its gravity. Drugs, legal and illegal, are available to us all. Whether we take them or not is ultimately a matter of personal choice.

[FJJP]

I have read the Board's report line by line from start to finish. I may have missed something here, but where does it say that the pilots had taken speed?

[ORAC]

It's not the full report, just a "Summary of Facts". It doesn't name the individuals or give any details not considered relevant to the incident, which is why it doesn't go into any details of the earlier part of the sortie. The drugs were/are in routine use and not considered relevant.

The pilots have since raised the issue as part of their defence.

[Woff1965]

The pilots have a site to fundraise for their defence - there are a couple of interesting sites linked to it though -

Harry Schmidt defence site

http://www.harryschmidt.org/

and ABC news report -

http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/DailyNews/2020_pilotpills021220.html

I also understand the article 32 is on line somewhere butI can't seem to find it at the moment.

[Jackonicko]

I skimmed Harry's site and the ABC report and could see no mention of the fact that they'd been explicitely told not to engage by the AWACS, nor that SOPs would have dictated a rather different course of action.

Funny that.

[solotk]

Harry dropped a bomb in self-defense which stopped the machine from firing but killed four Canadian soldiers and wounded eight others.

I'm speechless. is the point being made, that Harry got the bomb on target?

The Controller said cleared in self-defence, after he let the bloody thing go...

Most weird

It'll be swept under the carpet. Just like 2 A-10 pilots some time ago :mad:

[zalt]

Read a WSJ item on this a few months back. Story was crews didn't have to take speed, but they'd be decalred unfit to fly the long distance missions otherwise. A modern Catch 22 and as paranoia can be a side effect.....

In the Blackhawk shootdown didn't they initially go after one of the AWACS controllers?

[saudipc-9]

A flight surgeon has testified that the pills have no more effect than a cup of coffee. This is just another attempt to deflect the course of justice. Seems to me these two officers need a reminder that integrity is a pillar of the commission that they both enjoy. I suspect that one is trying to keep his UAL job and the other his new house by the golf course

[QDMQDMQDM]

amphetamines probably helped turn clouded judgement into bad decisions

Indeed. I'd be interested to see the evidence on which the US armed forces uses stimulants. There is no evidence at all, as far as I know, that amphetamine-based stimulants actually enhance performance. Rather, the evidence is that they downgrade it and considerably so. Further, idiosyncratic reactions (paranoia, halluciantions etc.) are not uncommon side effects.

I'm gobsmacked that this stuff is still used. My mum was fed benzedrine-laced tea as a WAAF during the war to help keep her awake until the bombers got back, but I thought it had gone out with the ark.

QDM

[tu chan go]

This was an incident waiting to happen. When military aircrew walk around wearing badges on their flying suits saying "Patience, my ass, I want to kill something", their lords and masters should be taking a very close look at the implications of this behaviour.

Unfortunately, this gung ho attitude is not a rare occurence and the USAF (and ANG) are the worst examples. I have experienced this on numerous occassions in the past few years in my job and I cannot believe the crass stupidity of some of the so called professionals.

[zalt]

I'm glad I always stuck to a flask of coffee.

[Woff1965]

Their commander has been on the stand -

http://calgary.cbc.ca/template/servlet/View?filename=ca_ppcli20030117

[Flash2001]

I understand that benzedrine was made available to RAF single engine fighter pilots during the second world war. I don't know if they were compelled to take it or not. Its use here is not to keep the subject awake or extend duty time but rather to enhance performance in the normal course of duty. There is some evidence that it does just that.

After an excellent landing you can use the airplane again!

[SPIT]

I am not being morbid but does anyone know if the AC Tapes are available on the web ??? if so where ???:confused: :confused:

[ORAC]

Pilots Didn't Follow Orders, General Says.
From Associated Press

BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, La. -- The two U.S. pilots who mistakenly killed four Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan last year showed a "reckless disregard" for standing orders by attacking instead of continuing on their way, an Air Force general testified Tuesday.

Brig. Gen. Stephen Sargeant, who headed the investigation into the bombing, said the pilots failed to follow procedure by not communicating about gunfire they had spotted on the ground.

"At that point it would have been possible to continue on," Sargeant said at a military hearing to determine whether the pilots will face a court-martial for the deadly bombing in April.

Defense lawyers asked the hearing officer, Col. Patrick Rosenow, to throw Sargeant's testimony out. They said the law bars the opinion of investigators on the cause of the accident from being considered as evidence in civil military proceedings.

Rosenow heard arguments on the issue, but he did not rule.....

[tug3]

Whatever the outcome one can only hope, (perhaps in vain), that lessons will be learned and the chances of this happening again be significantly reduced. However, I can't help but think that the coming months will again show us just how easy it can be to make such a "mistake".

The following may be of some interest - if nothing else it'll make the hair on the back of your neck stand up.

(Good luck to all destined to get sand between their toes)

Rgds
T3

http://www.afa.org/magazine/perspectives/desert_storm/1291fire.html

[BlueWolf]

You know, I drink an awful lot of coffee, and have done so for some considerable number of years now. I have never felt compelled to drop bombs on Canadians whilst under the influence of coffee.

Also, if the pills have no greater effect than a cup of coffee, why don't they just drink coffee?

Either way, I can't see how it constitutes a defence - unless of course the establishment comes out and admits that feeding warriors on mind-altering substances banned in general society, before sending them out in the field in charge of incredibly powerful killing machines, is not, in fact, a good idea.

Good call, saudipc-9.

[PETERJ]

Tug 3 Did you catch the caption to one of the photos in the Airforce article...." The Royal Scats Dragoon...." Flourescent Identification panels...................oigh vay !!!!!!!!!!!

One interesting point from this ( if you all will forgive an intrusion from a non military person)......... FATIGUE MANAGEMENT...Am I right in remembering a thread in this forum not so long ago about an exercise East of Suez in an area where boots burn and tank filters clog up when a flying person complained that the tented accomodation where he was expected to manage his fatigue was a couple of hundred metres from an active runaway ????? Just one of the Arduum that you have to get through to reach the Astra ?.....or wpould it have ever ben allowed to included in any Court Martial evidence ?

Good luck and thanks to you all

[Saxon]

Guilty as sin; but there is no way thay should be facing this music alone. There are serious issus that go both around and above just these two individuals. Unfortunately, as has already been stated, this isn't the first time either.

[saudipc-9]

This makes interesting reading
Cutting through the 'fog of war'

Jonathan Kay
National Post


Wednesday, January 29, 2003

On April 17, 2002, Illinois Air National Guard pilot Harry Schmidt dropped a 500-pound laser-guided bomb on a coalition firing range in Afghanistan. Four Canadian soldiers were killed, eight wounded. And yet, some Canadian journalists have openly taken Maj. Schmidt's side. He was just an ordinary American grunt trying to do the best he could in the fog of war, the argument goes. Give the man a break.

I have all the respect in the world for America's grunts, and I like to think I'm one of the last columnists in this country who can be accused of America-bashing -- but I refuse to accept this sort of apologism. As the evidence presented at this month's military hearing in Louisiana shows, this isn't about a good man taking the fall for the mistakes of highers-up. It's about a pilot who made a series of terrible, possibly reckless, decisions.

The tragic sequence began on April 17 as Maj. Schmidt and his flight commander, Maj. William Umbach, were returning from a patrol in northeastern Afghanistan, each in a single-seat F-16. While passing Kandahar at 20,000 feet, Maj. Schmidt saw fiery streaks that he mistook for vertical fire from anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). In fact, the shots were coming from Canadian machine guns and anti-tank weapons, both aimed horizontally at a tank hull they were using as a practice target.

Following instructions from controllers, Maj. Schmidt set out to mark the exact co-ordinates of the fire source. One way to accomplish this would have been to fly over the target at cruising altitude. But instead, he chose a more dangerous method -- going into a dive and aiming his plane directly at the Canadian troops. He also requested permission to spray the area with his 20 mm canon. Controllers wisely instructed him to "stand by" and then, a minute later, "hold fire."

But by now, Maj. Schmidt was low enough that he could make out shapes. "I've got some men on a road and it looks like a piece of artillery firing at us," he said. "I am rolling in in self-defence."

Maj. Schmidt then called "bombs away" and released his payload. Ten seconds later, the tragically useless message came in from controllers: "Be advised Kandahar has friendlies. You are to get ... out of there as soon as possible."

At the hearing last week, Maj. Schmidt explained: "I was called upon to make a perfect decision in a rapidly unfolding combat environment ... I had to make that decision with, what I now know, with the acuity of 20-20 hindsight, was imperfect information." But this argument doesn't fly: There was no urgency in his situation, no reason Maj. Schmidt couldn't sit tight at 20,000 feet -- where the threat from anti-aircraft artillery would be negligible -- and wait for more information.

In fact, air control personnel operating in the Afghanistan theatre testified to the coalition team investigating the April 17 bombing that reports of surface-to-air fire were routine, and that pilots operating at normal cruising attitude didn't perceive it as a threat to safe flight.

"Historically in response to [surface-to-air fire], the practice was to take a report and to process that report through the Coalition Air Operations Center," according to investigators. "This process typically required at least five minutes and was done in a non-urgent reporting environment ... [But] the timeframe in this situation was significantly compressed due to [Maj. Schmidt's] inappropriate response to the perceived [surface-to-air fire]. From the time of the transmission ... to 'lay down some 20 [mm fire]' until he released his [bomb], only 1:57 had elapsed."

So much, in other words, for the "fog of war."

Every single experienced F-16 pilot interviewed by investigators stated that, confronted with a similar perceived threat, their response would be to accelerate, climb and leave the area. According to the rules of engagement implemented during the Afghanistan campaign: "Aircraft always have the right of self-defence against [AAA, but] should NOT deliberately descend into the AAA range to engage and destroy AAA units which fire well below their altitude."

Yet that is precisely what Maj. Schmidt did: Notwithstanding his claim of "self-defence," he circled the fire source at speeds as low as 440 km/h (less than the velocity of a commercial aircraft), and descended to about 10,000 feet, an altitude within the range of most anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-mounted missiles. He never took evasive manoeuvres or otherwise signalled that he was in imminent danger. It is impossible to escape the suspicion that this was merely an aggressive pilot looking for a notch on his wing.

Maj. Schmidt's contention that he was never specifically informed that Canadian solders were active in the area seems credible: There is plenty of contradictory evidence about how well he and Maj. Umbach were briefed on coalition ground activities. But this is mostly beside the point. From the start of the Afghanistan campaign, pilots knew the ground situation was fluid, and that allies and special forces could be just about anywhere. Maj. Umbach certainly seemed aware of this. Even before controllers gave the word to "hold fire," he asked Maj. Schmidt to make sure "it's not friendlies."

This month's proceeding was not a trial. Rather, it was the military equivalent of a civilian grand jury hearing. When he rules in coming weeks, the presiding judge will merely recommend whether the charges against the two pilots -- involuntary manslaughter, aggravated assault and dereliction of duty -- can potentially be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a general court-martial. From the evidence presented, it is impossible to know whether the pair are guilty. But at the very least, the evidence suggests that a full trial is warranted.

Jonathan Kay is editorials editor. [email protected]

© Copyright 2003 National Post