B206 Accident on Oz fires

[helmet fire]

Sadly, a Bell 206 conducting long line bucket work on the fires in SE Australia has apparently crashed about three hours ago. The aircraft went into Corrin Dam approximately 20nm southwest of Canberra where it remained upside down just below the surface for several minutes. A crewman from the SouthCare Rescue B412 helicopter (also bucketing nearby) jumped from the 412 into the water and pulled the pilot from the wreckage. With the help of a local in his boat (who had seen the helicopter crash) the B412 crewman managed to get the the pilot to the shoreline where he was loaded into another machine and flown to a Canberra hospital for emergency treatment. The B206 subsequently sunk out of view in the dam.

No word yet on the pilot's condition. All fingers crossed.

Kind regards to the pilot and his family - our thoughts are with you.
:(

[Steve76]

I have a mate on the fires down there Helmet, so please let us know when able how the pilot is doing.
Thanks....:(

[All Blacks]

Helmetfire

Was just talking to Johnny Mac and one of his 214s is on its way to pull the 206 out as we speak. Gary M is heading that way with his new toy from near Lithgow. from what I understand pilot is Ok.

AB

[John Eacott]

Duncan is in Canberra Hospital with serious head injuries, also not know how long he was underwater. ABC report is reasonably accurate (http://abc.net.au/news/2003/01/item20030113082707_1.htm) , plus ACT Chief Minister and Fire Chief jumped in to help. Aircraft was VH-AZH.

[Red Wine]

Its great to hear that "Duncan" made it to hospital.........all be it with injuries that may prevent his return to normal functions.........


On the harder side........I can't fly over water outside Autorotational distance from land without an approved float system........but I can [or can I] hover over a lake to suck/pick up water inside the HV Curve and not be able to make the bank if the engine coughs......lets get real........why do we have these double standards.....and why do pilots get so tied up in the perceived importance of what they are attempting to do, that they lose sight of the bigger picture.......that is to take care of yourself and your Air Attack Observer and your aircraft...not to mention anyone on the ground............

Lets hope this pilot makes it through his crisis and we see him in the seat again..........

[helmet fire]

I have no further word on Duncan as yet.

Steve, I attempted to give you his full name but your message box says it is too full to take any more (Mr popular or what?)

Red Wine - I think the difference is there are no third parties involved (ie pax). Though I think HUET training should be considered for water bombing pilots but I dont think it should be mandated.

The press coverage has, as usual, been disgraceful. :mad:
There is a front page photo of Duncan being dragged from the water. I am sure the family appreciate that. W@nkers.

And why didn't the photographer strip off and help too? :mad: :mad:

There are headlines about how the Minister "saved" the pilot, etc. In fact, the SouthCare crewman did 99 percent of the work. He jumped out of the 412, swam to the wreckage, dived down in freezing water and rescued the pilot, bought him to the surface and then began swimming him to the shoreline. He was assisted in the later stages of the swim by the Minister and the senior fire fighting officer. The crewman also performed ressucitation. The crewman barely cracks a mention, and is only named as an aside in one of the papers. John's ABC report above is typical.

I believe his name was Ewan MacKenzie (appologies if this is incorrect). Take a bow Ewan. Well done mate. Outstanding.

[All Blacks]

Helmetfire

Just spoke to a good friend who is RFS Super down in the Canberra area. He was saying that they operated on Duncan last night and did some sort of operation to release the pressure on his brain. This was succesful and he has been wiggling toes and fingers so the signs are good.

Redwine - the aircraft was a water bomber therefore Duncan was there by himself, no pax. Other aircraft were operating as Air Attack on that day.

With regards to Southcare, visited them not long after they started and a very professional bunch of people. They would rank as some of the more professional crews I have seen. Congrats to the crewie that jumped into the water, full credit to him for doing what comes naturally to those guys.

You will find that non aviation media dont have the same outlook on heli operations as those associated with the industry. They are out there to get the million dollar shot, and as seems to be the case, if it shows pain, suffering or blood and guts, then thats all they are interested in as it sells papers. Guarantee you that had it been an aviation reporter or photog they would have been in the water as well. In addition the headline of Minsiter saves pilots, will sell a lot more copies of the Canberra Times over Pilot saved by rescue helicopter. Proven fact that one.

Hope Duncan has a speedy recovery and those working out there fly safe and come back in one piece at the end of the day. Its a thankless job and apart from the aviation mags, no one seems to give credit where credits due.

AB

Helmetfire - Are you working out of Canberra or somewhere else.

[John Eacott]

A reasonable and full report in the Canberra Times (http://www.canberratimes.com.au/detail.asp?class=news&subclass=local&category=general%20news&story_id=202987&y=2003&m=1) names the pilot and Euan McKenzie, the SouthCare crewman.

Re AB's post about "thankless job", we've received nothing but positive and complimentary coverage this season. In country NSW it can be difficult to pay for little things, when the shopkeepers recognise the smokey flight suit. My crewie has even had KFC refuse his money, and hardware stores will go out of their way to help find bits to keep buckets operating.

[helmet fire]

They have extracted the wreckage from the dam now, but I still have very little word on Duncan's condition.

AB: I agree with all your comments on the media aspects, sadly! I have been on the fires to the north of Syd, but am enjoying a couple of days off. You back from the PNG wilds yet?

[All Blacks]

Helmetfire

Got back from Kuri and Kikori a few days ago. Did some flying down in the Great Mercury Islands today with a B2 and EC-130 and tomorrow heading off to the fires so keep your eyes open. Heard Johnny Macs 214Bs are working well. Might make it as far as Canberra.

AB

[gulliBell]

The subject accident aircraft (as reported) has had, what would seem, a jinxed life. It is the same aircraft that crash landed at Channel 10 in Perth a few years back (the young pilot ran it out of fuel), requiring a complete rebuild in New Zealand, as well as accidents elsewhere throughout its life. It's sister ship (VH-FUX) crashed in the Victorian Alps also due to engine failure (icing of engine intake), fatally injuring the experiened pilot and passengers. Let's hope this is its last accident and the pilot makes a full and complete recovery.

[Time Out]

I just found the original thread.....

JetRanger III and a Bell 412 water-bombing in fire fighting operations near Bendora Dam, sw of Canberra.
Bell 412 pilot noted absence of JetRanger during a racetrack pattern, tried to contact him and then saw it upturned in the water. He broadcast a PAN call, released his water bucket, and hovered close to the upturned helicopter. Crewman entered the water and freed the unconscious pilot from the wreckage. There were no known witnesses to the accident.

The JetRanger was substantially damaged. Examination indicated impact with the water in a slightly right side down, nose-low attitude, that both rotors had been under power on impact, and the engine was probably producing above flight idle power at that time. No evidence of any pre-impact engine or other aircraft abnormality.

Impact damage to the pilot's helmet was consistent with it being struck either by the door frame structure or a main rotor blade.

An estimated 135 L (107 kg) of fuel on board, sufficient for planned flight, free from contamination and of correct type.

Bucket attached to JetRanger's cargo hook by 24 m steel cable. Both release mechanisms operated normally during subsequent testing.

An internal `cinching strap' controlled the volume of an `as-manufactured' `Bambi Bucket' via a series of metal `D' rings positioned along the length of the strap. That allowed selection of 70%, 80% or 90% of bucket capacity. Nylon webbing loops stitched to the inside of the collapsible synthetic bucket positioned the strap inside the bucket. The bucket strap fitted to the occurrence bucket was non-standard and did not include any `D' rings. Instead, the strap had been tied off with a knot. That was contrary to the bucket manufacturer's Repair Assessment Manual1 that stated that it was not an acceptable practice to tie knots on the strap. The manufacturer cautioned that such actions may result in a false indication of the actual maximum volume of water in the bucket. It was determined that the bucket was of a non-standard construction.
Post accident testing of the bucket's electric water release mechanism revealed that the bucket's mechanism operated normally.

The JetRanger pilot held a CPL(H), 6,713 hours total with in excess of 2,917 hours on type, appropriately endorsed for, and very experienced in, fire fighting and long-line operations.
The pilot sustained traumatic head injuries and was submerged for an undetermined period. During subsequent interviews he was unable to recall any details of the accident.

The AUW for the helicopter, including 420 L of water, estimated to be about 3,309 lbs. The MTAUW was estimated to be about 3,320 lbs. The helicopter's centre of gravity was estimated to have been within limits.

Met forecast indicated east-northeasterly wind at 15 kts. Other pilots reported winds varied in direction and strength. Visibility was 'good', with some smoke in the area. The investigation was unable to determine the actual wind direction and speed at the time of the accident.

FAA Advisory Circular AC90-95 described the conditions under which a loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) can occur. Included among those conditions were: high all up weight; out of ground effect hover; low forward airspeed; high power settings; and a wind direction from the left or rear of the helicopter. LTE can result in a loss of control.

Other pilots reported that the JetRanger pilot had been lowering the bucket vertically into the water to fill from an out of ground effect (OGE) hover, and then lifting it clear vertically before transitioning to forward flight. Underwater photographs of the helicopter showed that the bucket cable was not positioned over the rear of the skid assembly. Examination of the helicopter's landing gear skids did not reveal any damage from the bucket cable.

Civil Aviation Order (CAO), 20.11, 5.1.1(a), stated that:
Aircraft shall be equipped with one life jacket for each occupant when the aircraft is over water at a distance from land:
(a) in the case of a single engine aircraft - greater that that which would allow the aircraft to reach land with the engine inoperative...'
Para 5.1.7 of the CAO stated, in part:
`Where life jackets are required to be carried in accordance with subparagraph 5.1.1(a) each occupant shall wear a life jacket during flight over water...'

The pilot was reported to have been conducting his water pick-ups from close to the shoreline of the dam. The pilot was not wearing a personal flotation device (PFD).

A Flight Safety Foundation report - External Loads, Powerplant Problems And Obstacles Challenge Pilots During Aerial Fire Fighting Operations, based on USA accident reports from 1974 to 1998, stated in part:
`Research has shown that the average person, when immersed in cold water, can hold [their] breath for 17.2 seconds, plus or minus 3.7 seconds. Studies of water accidents involving military helicopters and civilian helicopters, however, show that successful underwater escape requires 40 seconds to 60 seconds'.
The pilot had not undertaken HUET.

ANALYSIS
The pilot was qualified and authorised and had recent experience for the operation.

Sufficient fuel of the correct type on board for the flight. Rotational damage to the main rotor system and engine was consistent with engine operation at the time of impact.

The helicopter was at high all up weight and operating close to maximum predicted performance in an area with reported variable winds. While those conditions would have increased the risk of encountering LTE, the pilot was highly experienced in long-line and water-bombing operations and had been operating in the area of Bendora Dam for most of the day. That experience should have mitigated the risk that LTE was a factor in this occurrence.

Although of a non-standard construction, the occurrence bucket was assessed as being capable of normal operation, and was able to be carried by the helicopter at its post-accident assessed capacity. There was no evidence that it contributed to the accident.

While the manufacturer of the 'Bambi Bucket' warns of the possibility of dynamic rollover when conducting water-bombing operations, the use of a 24m long-line by the pilot, and vertical water pick-up would have diminished the likelihood for that to have occurred in this occurrence.

The investigation could not confirm the position of the cargo hook release circuit breaker prior to the accident. Had the circuit breaker been in the open-circuit position the rapid release of the bucket by the pilot, such as in an emergency situation requiring jettison of the load, would not have been possible.

The nature of the helicopter's impact with the water, and the resulting damage sustained by the pilot's helmet, reinforced the protective benefits of the use of flightcrew helmets.

It is possible that, during the water pick-up, the pilot may have been at a distance from the shoreline from which, had an engine failure occurred, the helicopter would not have been able to reach land. In that case, the provisions of CAO 20.11 would have applied, requiring the pilot to wear a PFD. That would have greatly eased the difficulty experienced by the helicopter crewman and others performing the rescue and, potentially, lessened the severity of the pilot's injuries.

Given the absence of pilot recollection and witness reports of the accident, and the lack of detailed indications of operation of the helicopter at impact, the reason(s) for the accident could not be established.

While recognising that, in this accident, the pilot was rendered unconscious and therefore unable to exit the helicopter without assistance, the ATSB draws attention to the benefits of HUET. Studies have shown that escape from helicopters involved in water accidents can take longer than the average time that a person can hold their breath. HUET has been shown to decrease exit times from an immersed helicopter, and increase the likelihood of a successful exit by an uninjured occupant. The provision of HUET to pilots, aircrew and passengers regularly operating over significant expanses of water would maximise the possibility for the successful exit of occupants from an immersed helicopter.

SAFETY ACTION

Local safety action
The operator has amended the company's operations manual to correctly reflect the types of fire buckets used on the company's individual helicopter types.

The operator has standardised the position of the external load jettison switch on the different helicopter types used by the company in fire fighting operations.

The company's operations manual now details the type of safety clothing to be worn by pilots when engaged in water-bombing operations in company helicopters. The clothing specified includes the wearing of cotton or better, flying suits, approved helmets and comfortable fitting life jackets. Inflatable life jackets have been positioned in each helicopter for that purpose.

The operator has introduced a system for tracking the fitment and maintenance history of cargo hooks fitted to company helicopters.

ATSB safety action
In a briefing to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the ATSB drew attention to the fact that the occurrence bucket was not of standard manufacture, and highlighted the possible effects of the use of non-standard buckets by helicopters during fire fighting operations.

As a result of this occurrence, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau issues the following safety recommendations:

Recommendation R20030219

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, in conjunction with the relevant industry associations, highlight the safety benefits to helicopter pilots and crew of the wearing of personal protective equipment, such as helmets and personal flotation devices when carrying out water-bombing in support of fire fighting operations, through safety promotion initiatives.

Recommendation R20030220

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, in conjunction with the relevant industry associations, assess the desirability of a requirement for Helicopter Underwater Escape Training for specialist aerial work operations, such as water-bombing in support of fire fighting operations.

Recommendation R20030221

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, in conjunction with the relevant industry associations, consider advising Australian helicopter operators involved in water-bombing in support of fire fighting operations, of the need to review the type of fire-buckets used to ensure that they comply with the bucket manufacturer's guidance for use on helicopter types and to ensure that the fire-buckets are appropriately maintained.


(Sorry for any confusion. I started a new thread before I found this original thread, deleted it and reposted here.
ATSB report. (http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/occurs/occurs_detail.cfm?ID=557))

Interesting issues.
Thanks, Time Out

Heliport

[belly tank]

Being an airwork mission, I think it would be hard to get pilots to wear life jackets when in the bush, considering "most" dams and water sources anre not much bigger than your rotor disk.

fair enough if your pulling out of a lake all day but i still think it will be a fair challenge to get pilots to wear life jackets.

read the report and yes it is interesting. buket size and lift capacity are critical, on a typical mission on a 206 with 1 hour fuel aboard, pilot and 410 litre bucket your only about 10 kg below external max weight.

anyway interesting article from the atsb!!

cheers

[Shawn Coyle]

Skimming over this post, I didn't see any mention of whether the pilot was wearing a helmet.
Anybody know?

[Flying Lawyer]

http://www.stopstart.freeserve.co.uk/smilie/deal.gifImpact damage to the pilot's helmet was consistent with it being struck either by the door frame structure or a main rotor blade.

[Heliport]

Canberra Times Helicopter pilot cleared of crash error
17 December 2003

Despite pushing as hard as he could on the left rudder pedal of his Bell 206 JetRanger helicopter, pilot Duncan Patrick could not have averted the crash at Bendora Dam which nearly claimed his life on January 13.

An exhaustive 11-month inquiry by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau has absolved Mr Patrick of blame in the accident, which occurred as he was conducting aerial water-bombing over the Namadji National Park, southwest of Canberra.

The bureau's findings were issued yesterday, and while investigators could not provide a definite cause for the crash, a series of factors was seen as possibly contributing to it.

It was found that the straps holding the 455-litre fire-fighting bucket were not standard, and the strap had been tied with a knot, which is not recommended.

Webbing loops which control the volume of water scooped up by the device had been torn loose from the wall of the bucket. This may have let more water into the bucket and increased its weight.

Investigators were also puzzled to find that the automatic circuit breaker, which trips in an emergency to release the cargo hook, was in the "open" position.

This means that either as a result of pilot selection or the accident, the 420kg load could not be automatically released when the emergency occurred.

Tests revealed later that the circuit breaker was operating normally.

Although the helicopter was seen as operating within its safety limits on the day of the crash, there was little margin for error.

The "maximum take-off all-up weight" for a JetRanger under those ambient conditions was 1505kg. The safety bureau has estimated that when the helicopter crashed, its all-up weight, including 420kg of water in its bucket, was 1500kg.

Visibility was reported as "good" with some smoke in the area, and a Department of Meteorology report indicated a wind speed of 15 knots.

Mr Patrick, a pilot highly experienced in aerial fire-fighting and long-line operations, suffered traumatic head injuries in the crash. He has no memory of what happened but investigators are certain his life was saved by his safety helmet, and the timely arrival of a trained air-sea rescue crewman who hauled him from the submerged wreckage.

His helmet was badly damaged either as a result of hitting the helicopter door frame, or from being bashed by the main rotor blade.

The bureau believes the JetRanger, operating in high temperatures which rob the engines of optimum power and the main rotor blades of maximum lift, experienced what is known as a loss of tail-rotor effectiveness.

"All of the conditions of the day may have conspired against the operation," bureau deputy director Alan Stray said. "With 420 litres of water in the bucket, the high power needed for the lift, and the low forward speed, increasing amounts of left tail rotor input are required."

The loss of control occurred so quickly that Mr Stray believes the experienced pilot would have had seconds to comprehend the seriousness of the situation before the helicopter slewed sideways and plunged into the dam.

By fortunate coincidence, the Snowy Hydro SouthCare helicopter swooped on the crash site, crewman Euan McKenzie leapt from the open cabin door and dived into the dam. The officer swam down, dragged Mr Patrick's unconscious body from the submerged wreckage.

Mr Patrick was resuscitated and after a three-week recovery in Canberra Hospital returned to Queensland for further rest and rehabilitation. He has not flown since the accident.