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Chuck K
30th Nov 2002, 23:05
Canadian Press Reports

According to a previously unreleased report prepared for investigators, the U.S. pilot who accidentally bombed Canadian troops in Afghanistan was wearing NVGs that would have severely distorted his view.
The report says "Attempting to estimate distances to light sources or distances between light sources in the NVG image is impossible to do with any accuracy."
The goggles limit a pilot's field of vision to 40 degrees, the same as looking through a pair of toilet paper rolls.

The American fighter pilot who dropped a bomb on Canadian troops in Afghanistan was wearing a pair of night vision goggles that made it "impossible to accurately estimate" the height of gunfire coming from the ground, according to the confidential report prepared for investigators.

The two-page synopsis, written by a U.S. flight surgeon and former Navy fighter pilot, outlines numerous deficiencies with NVGs -- deficiencies that may help explain why Major Harry Schmidt believed he and his flight lead, Major William Umbach, were under attack.

"Attempting to estimate distances to light sources or distances between light sources in the NVG image is impossible to do with any accuracy. Being close to the source or viewing a very bright source at a distance may [cause] blooming of the image, which can degrade the image enough to make it impossible to assess distances."

On the night of April 17, Maj. Schmidt was on his way back from a support mission when he flew his F-16 over a brigade of Canadian soldiers, who were conducting a live-fire training exercise at an abandoned al-Qaeda base near Kandahar. The paratroopers, who were firing at ground targets, later testified their ammunition reached no higher than 1,200 feet.

But Maj. Schmidt, a former instructor, told investigators he saw what appeared to be bright projectiles being launched at least 10,000 feet into the air. Convinced that the soldiers were aiming at Maj. Umbach, the decorated pilot invoked the right of self-defence, unleashing a 225-kg laser-guided bomb that killed four members of Light Infantry.

The Coalition Investigation Board that probed the friendly fire blast noted the pilots' NVGs "would have made light-producing events on the ground, such as weapons firing, more noticeable," but it concluded the goggles were not even partially to blame for the accident. A separate Canadian investigation reached a similar conclusion.

However, the report prepared by the unnamed Navy flight surgeon -- and submitted to coalition investigators -- provides a detailed breakdown of how night vision goggles can distort perception.

"Other things that may adversely affect distance estimation to light sources include fatigue, high-task loading, poor training, complacency and overconfidence," reads the report, which does not specify exactly what type of NVGs the pilots were wearing. "These could contribute to any mishap, but there is less room for error when using NVGs."

When flying in an area of low illumination, the report continues, it is extremely difficult to assess the distance of various light sources because there is nothing to compare them with. Even during the day, "when vision is at its peak of effectiveness," it is hard to assess the angle or height that light sources travel.

Lawyers for the pilots, who are both charged with four counts each of involuntary manslaughter, plan to focus their defence around the fact the airmen were never briefed about the Canadian training drill.
But they also plan to discuss the goggles at an upcoming hearing, which will determine whether enough evidence exists to send the case to a military court martial.

"He clearly saw something shooting," said Charles W. Gittins, Maj. Schmidt's lawyer. "The problem is that the NVGs distorted it so that he believed it was coming at his lead and he couldn't tell the distance."

Both men had extensive training using NVGs -- Maj. Schmidt logged 400 flying hours with the device while Maj. Umbach had 41 hours of practice in an F-16.


Any thoughts from anyone who's flown with NVGs?

jungly
1st Dec 2002, 00:06
For the most part the comments above are correct....but whether they contributed to the blue-on-blue, Im remain sceptical.

I once avoided gunfire at night (quite violenty and very low level) only to find out it was a cigarette butt thrown from the lead helicopter.

That said looking down on gunfire through goggles has always been quite different (in my experience)...as the gunfire illuminates the ground and your altimeter tells you how high your are. Combined, these two sources of information give you a perception of depth.
Depth perception on NVGs is a learned skill, as there is limited 'interpupillary distance', not something goggles naturally lend themselves to.
Vertical gunfire is also easy to differentiate from horizontal gunfire through goggles....and quite simply, if its coming past the cockpit...they're aiming at you! If its not, they may just be probing or you maybe in the wrong place.

Why were the jets there? Did the gunfire just erupt beneath them or did they go to investigate? These guys are travelling at high speed over a life fire exercise (small area) 20 seconds in any direction...and they're out of range! To pickle a 500lb bomb they would have had to either approach from a distance or turn back, sure? And what about the AWACS, what did they have to say?

'Blooming' as mentioned in the article is a significant degradation of NVG capability but I have only seen that due to really close gunfire (less than 200m). Explosions, flares, yes....but not gunfire. (I do not know what the Cannuks were firing that night)

My last comment, .....the pilots should have been told about the live fire exercise. The Sqn or Ships Intelligence Officer should have known/been informed. Similarly the AWACS should have known. This was a fatal omission in a relatively high threat environment.
Im glad to see that this is their primary defence strategy and I believe the NVG story is a red herring; a lawyers attempt, perhaps, to confuse the situation with ideas and concepts a jury will find hard to comprehend - reasonable doubt etc.

This has been a tragedy but rather than hanging the pilots out to dry I hope they thoroughly investigate their system too. Poor communication is a common thread in blue-on-blues sadly.

SASless
1st Dec 2002, 15:22
Lets go back a few years....hotshot LTC , F-15 pilot....northern Iraq.....splashes a US Army helicopter.....kills over a dozen US Army and Air Force troops. His wingman remained unsure if the helicopter was a Hind or a Blackhawk.....

The way to reduce the Blue on Blue events is to find a way to restrain the boys in blue from feeling free to drop bombs on every bit of gunfire around. I firmly believe in the Self Defense theory....but at some point the concept of merely being shot "at" being an excuse to lose some bombs on an unidentified target being a valid reason should be challenged. It is one thing to be shot "at" and being properly hosed another...been there and done that.

Usually, when one gets shot "at"....you somewhat casually note the presence of tracers or muzzle flashes or both.....one time I even noted airbursts. When I knew it was serious was when the tracers passed immediately by or through the airframe....I took hits....or the airbursts were damn close and obiviously meant for me personally. I have even seen the chappy with the RPG over his shoulder step from behind a tree prior to shooting his whizbang at us.

I suggest that without knowing where the friendly troops are or are not....is the key criteria for making the decision about whether to drop bombs or strafe. If you are putzing around over vast miles of turf.....you will certainly pass over both friendly and non-friendly troops thus you cannot possibly know where all the good guys are.

The Air Force certainly considers themselves to be the dominant power in combat.....they have been reading their own propaganda ever since it was said Airpower alone wins wars. They conveniently ignore the facts that it is really the guys on the ground that take, hold, and deprive the enemy of their property.

I strongly suggest the Junior Birdmen suck it up....ignore the distant gunfire......and when the AAA gets close and personal....call and confirm the locations of friendly troops in the suspect area....then bomb hell out of any properly identified hostile target. Otherwise, they will continue to kill innocent friendlys.

Far better a hostile escape than we kill one of our own. Maybe we should post these two pilots to an ALO billet for a couple of years.....let them see how it is to live in the desert and having to look over their shoulders every time a jet flys over head. Our guys on the ground have a miserable enough life without having to put up with some halfwit hotshot fighter jock looking to drop another message to Osama in the wrong place. Hell, they miss the target enough when they are aiming at something as it is. Why add to the thrill of ground combat.....our guys deserve better than this.

griffinblack
9th Dec 2002, 22:24
It appears from the statement below that the range template only extended to 1200 ft. This would indicate that the Canadians were only using small arms on the night fire exercise. Furthermore, the range of tracer burnout for small arms is about 800m (about 3000 ft). Given the fact that it would be the ricochet that would be of interest to the F16 pilots, I would be surprise if they extended much above 1000 ft.

NVG bloomout? I have done a bit of urban NVG stuff and the bloomout issue is quite easy to cope with, with practice and a robust scanning technique.

On the operations I have been involved with, we have always thoroughly briefed ROE and OFOF (orders for opening fire). If in doubt get the hell out of Dodge and send a contact report.

The fighter pilots were flying at 10 000ft? I find it pretty hard, on the evidence presented, that they felt sufficiently threatened to require weapons release. But there again what do you expect from Sepo’s?