KAL whoops!

[amhart]

Well it seems that KAL have had another flapless take-off on the B747-400.
Also a crew which ignored the take-off config warning and couldn't raise the gear after rotation. Instead of returning to Dallas they diverted to.......LAX running short of fuel as they couldn't calculate what amount of fuel they would use with the gear down.
How about the B747-400 which held over New York and wouldn't divert because they couldn 't understand that JFK was closed. They eventually deemed to ask a travellling U.S. crewman to the cockpit to liase with ATC in English, prompting an immediate diversion, landing with 9000lbs of fuel (yes pounds!). They would have continued to hold until it all went quiet....really.
How about the almost weekly incidents such as crossing active runways when not authorised and they're active. Because they guess what their clearance might be.
Or how about the compulsary Berlitz English courses which the KAL crews are made to complete, but it's just materialised that a large percentage were caught cheating.
Not to mention the houhah over the misunderstanding in Alaska on 9/11/01.
Or the A330 which flew through a thunderstorm severely damaging the airframe, smashing the forward windscreens causing an engine fire warning. The aircraft was so badly damaged that they couldn't pressurise. Yet they still flew 250nms over water from their Chinese departure airport back to Seoul.
Or the constant CFIT warnings due to misunderstanding of altimeter settings. For example ending up at 800ft agl at 11nms from the airport...Tashkent.
I mention these because a catastrophe is just around the corner. It will happen, it's just when, and it will be bad. :eek:

[Shawny1]

Does anyone know if KAL takes on ex-pats or what the job situation is like over in Seoul. Just a very preliminary enquiry at the moment but any info would be greatly appreciated.
Have the Shed, Dornier 328, F27 and Airbus A320 on the licience.
Thanks.

[411A]

They have expats now of course, but the latest news from SEL is that the foreign crews are to be wound down over the next two years or so.
Perhaps not good news.:rolleyes:

[shake rattle n roll]

Well if they wind down the expats, then it will only be a matter of time. Wonder if they will be allowed to fly into the states? Remember Guam.

[Cyclic Hotline]

High Alert
For 30 tense minutes on morning of East Coast attacks, officials feared KAL jet was hijacked, bound for Anchorage


By Zaz Hollander
Anchorage Daily News

(Published: September 8, 2002)
For about 30 minutes, Alaska's top military commander believed Korean Air Flight 85 might actually be hijacked and closing in on a target in Anchorage.

En route to a refueling stop in the state's largest city, the Seoul-New York flight with more than 200 people on board had already sent out one hijack message.

Then about a half-hour later, the pilot punched in a second.

7500. 7500. 7500.

The four-digit international hijack code flashed on radar scopes before the eyes of baffled and worried military and civilian air-traffic controllers.

Two planes had already destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center. The Pentagon burned around the wreckage of a third hijacked jet. The debris of a fourth smoldered in a western Pennsylvania field.

Along with the rest of the world, Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz woke up that morning to a terrorist plot to use commercial airliners as weapons. Anything could happen. And suddenly, a fifth possible hijacking cruised into his territory.

"Given what had happened on the East Coast, it was entirely plausible to me this was an analog on the West Coast," said Schwartz, head of the Alaskan Command. "So naturally, we took this seriously."

At the time of this Sept. 11 incident, little was publicly disclosed about the wayward signals from the Korean pilot. The airline and flight crew have kept mum about what happened that day, when brief evacuations cleared hundreds from downtown Anchorage and Valdez, and F-15s streaked southwest to intercept the jet.

But recent interviews with Schwartz and Tim Crowley, an air-traffic controller, shed new light on the scramble that occurred from Washington, D.C., to Whitehorse, Yukon, as civilian and military forces reacted to the alarm that a hijacked jet might be aimed at Alaska.

SCRAMBLE

The first inkling of a possible problem came about 8 a.m.

A technician with ARINC, an airline contractor in Maryland, who was scanning air-to-ground teletypes from jets for anything suspicious, spotted three chilling letters in a message from Flight 85, a Boeing 747 in the air near the Aleutian Islands.

Embedded in the text was the code for a hijacking: "HJK."

The company urgently dialed up the Federal Aviation Administration in Washington, D.C.

Within minutes, a rare mix of military and civilian controllers huddled in a windowless command center at Elmendorf Air Force Base, the strategic heart of Alaska's North American Aerospace Defense Command.

Normally, the FAA controls the airspace over Alaska. But on the morning of Sept. 11, the Department of Defense owned the skies.

Schwartz ordered Elmendorf Air Force Base to launch two F-15s armed with missiles.

Tail the aircraft, he told the fighter pilots. Follow Flight 85 at a position out of sight of passengers. Follow so the four-man flight crew -- and anyone in the cockpit with them -- couldn't see them either.

BIZARRE QUIET

Flight 85 cruised toward Anchorage. Passengers on the long flight might have been looking forward to stretching their legs during the refueling stopover in Anchorage.

As soon as the Korean airliner flew into radio contact over land just west of Dillingham, a controller asked the pilot to confirm that first hijack signal.

The pilot punched in the "7500" hijack code.

Civilian air-traffic controllers saw the numbers start to flash on their scopes at the FAA's Air Route Traffic Control Center, a glossy box of a building a stone's throw from Elmendorf's Boniface Parkway entrance.

Controller Tim Crowley, a shop steward for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, had arrived at work around 8 a.m. The Korean incident was under way.

The center was heavy with that bizarre quiet that only comes when there's trouble.

He surveyed the room.

About a dozen controllers peered into four rows of radar scopes, busy clearing the skies, finding places to land dozens of inbound jets flying toward Anchorage after the military ordered all civilian aircraft grounded.

Crowley, serving in his union capacity rather than as a controller this day, mingled with them as a liaison, making sure controllers got clear instructions from supervisors and managers. He visited with union members in the break room. Some wanted to go home and be with their families. But nobody cursed, and nobody prayed.

A dozen managers and supervisors fielded frenzied phone calls at the center's watch desk, a Star Trek-type corner console stacked with computers that overlooks the controllers. Normally, three or four people supervise center activities from the desk.

The desk's eight phones rang with calls from FAA headquarters in D.C., from military brass, from airline companies tracking their jets.

FAA brass in Washington, D.C., first told controllers to let the plane land at Anchorage as planned. They were following an agency policy not to turn hijacked aircraft to keep hijackers from killing the crew and crashing the plane.

But after Flight 85 beamed that second hijack signal, another message came from the military.

Turn the plane.

A controller told Flight 85 to bear north of Anchorage by about 100 miles, fly east, then turn southeast for Yakutat, a fairly remote airport with a runway long enough to land the Boeing 747.

A controller gave the pilot his new heading. The pilot repeated the heading, confirming his plans to make the sweeping turn south.

COMPLICATIONS

Schwartz started to relax only when the plane turned. The pilot showed he was in control of the jet. Thirty minutes and about 300 air miles after the second hijack signal, the immediate threat had passed. The fighter jets would continue their escort.

But the ordeal wasn't over. No one had checked weather conditions in Yakutat. The weather there was deteriorating. It wasn't clear whether the airport's navigational aids or on-board maps were good enough to guide the Korean pilot over risky mountainous terrain.

Another complication arose. Civilian controllers discovered Flight 85 had less than an hour of gas. The pilot couldn't head back to Anchorage or make it to Fairbanks. The group at NORAD brainstormed other options. They settled on Whitehorse.

Schwartz contacted skeptical Canadian authorities about 9:45 a.m. He reminded them of the circumstances, and the jet's low fuel. They talked about how the plane, now over Alaska for an hour, wasn't acting like a hijacked aircraft.

Everybody agreed on Whitehorse.

Canadian police suggested downtown businesses and residents evacuate. Most did not. Locals who heard about the plane from police scanners eyed the skies as Flight 85 roared overhead with an escort of U.S. and Canadian fighters and landed without incident.

The evacuations were called off around 10 a.m.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police entered the cockpit and -- at gunpoint -- escorted the first officer off the plane. Later, the crew and passengers filed into the terminal. The plane later flew on to New York.

Korean Air administrator Michael Lim said last September that the pilot typed in the 7500 signal following instructions from air-traffic controllers. The first HJK signal? Possibly a question rather than a warning. ARINC staff say pilots can't type in question marks on the teletypes.

The confusion of the day made everything hard, Crowley said. Language problems with foreign pilots made things even harder.

The Korean Air incident wasn't the only one Elmendorf fighter pilots scrambled for that day. They also followed an Asiana cargo jet bound for Anchorage when the pilot refused to turn the plane as directed because he didn't understand controllers' instructions, he said.

All involved said the Korean Air pilot cooperated with controllers every step of the way.

"If it had been an American pilot, he probably would have said, 'Center, why are you doing this? Everything's fine here,' " Crowley said.

But he didn't -- or couldn't.

And the military treated the situation as the real thing.

"Were we prepared to act? Yes," Schwartz said. "Was such action imminent? I would say as the morning wore on, no."

[stud_lee]

That's a bit scary. I flew Korean Air a few weeks ago from JFK to and ICN and back. I thought the service was excellent and the crew was very friendly and most of them spoke very good English. One thing I noticed, especially when we took off from JFK, was that the pilot used absolute full thrust right at the begining of take-off, and that normally isn't the case, especially on a 744. The flight was jammed packed and -- because of it was -- full of fuel, but the take-off roll wasn't as long as I expected. I don't know reving up your engines right away a good thing or a bad thing, but I have heard that this is common practice by KE pilots.

[AEROVISION]

AMHART

Why don't you go to, www.jetjock.net , Korean Air's flight crew website, and express your concerns to Capt. R.K. who's coordinates are mentioned there. He will take the matter up and bring it to the chief pilots attention and will get back to you accordingly.

With best regards
A.V.

[Justforkix]

I must say I have never seen anything as devastating as this report: KAL safety audit report (http://www.pprune.org/go.php?go=/pub/tech/korean.html)

[BlueEagle]

Justforkix - The report is dated December 1998 and the final paragraph says:

"All Korean Aircrew have the company's best interest at heart and wish to see Korean Air as quality, International player.

Korean Air has decided to adapt to the change. This is a courageous decision, and it is unquestionably the correct one. We hope this document will be of assistance in achieving these goals."

That is over 3 years ago, a long time in politics and even longer in aviation. Maybe you shouldn't feel quite so devastated after all?

[amhart]

Blue eagle, that was three years ago the report? So why have things now got worse?! What do you know that we don't?:(

[747400CA]

With all due respect to contributors to this thread, most of this is old news.

I should say at the outset that I do NOT fly for KAL, nor is it likely that I ever will.

With many friends flying there, however, I have on occasion become familiar with much of what happens at that very unique airline.

Granted, the English language skills of many of the senior captains are lacking.

Granted too that the Korean culture makes it difficult for a subordinate F/O to challenge or corrrect his captain.

And yes, this 'mission oriented' ex-military culture admittedly gives rise to some rather unusual decisions now and then.

To their credit, both the airline managers and the FSB trainers acknowledge these deficiencies and are working hard to correct them. I think all who might comment with knowledge will say that the trend is both upward and improving.

Those familiar with the airline business in this part of the world know that change comes slowly here.

Am I saying that all is well at KAL? I think not - but they are working hard there to change for the better, and let us hope that the changes are both timely and sufficient to prevent the accident that Mr Amhart seems to be predicting with such confidence.

With respect to Captain R.K. - while he is both friendly and professional (and maintains the 'www.jetjock.com' site on his own time and out of his own pocket) I would not suggest that PPRuNers deluge him with operational complaints or questions re: his airline.

Rather, there are plenty of official channels for your concerns - starting with Managing Vice President (Safety and Security) George Snyder or Executive Vice President (Operations) and COO Dave Greenberg - whose contact details are similarly available on said website.

Having said all of this - if someone has some 'new news' to offer re: KAL's operational and safety performance, it would be nice to have a discussion sans hysterics on the topic.

[PETERJ]

WWW.JETJOCK.COM EH ?!!!!.. You couldn't make it up could you ?.......talking as someone who read the the Audit report with a great deal of non- aviation interest. CRM, Small Group Dynamics, Corporate Ethos. If KAL keeps this up they're gonna make the Harvard Business School case study databank hopefully before anyone actually dies as one of their passengers.

[Airbubba]

>>I must say I have never seen anything as devastating as this report: KAL safety audit report<<

This copy of "747 Classic Delta Audit findings" has been debunked here before. Delta did not write it, it is the opinion of a disgruntled Australian check captain whose contract was not renewed.

Some of the "findings" are probably valid but many others appear to be personal technique and would laughed out of the cockpit at Delta.

Use of armrests and being told to loosen your tie and collar are not normally debrief items on U.S. linechecks but they may be issues in Oz...

[chimbu warrior]

I understand that they almost rearranged the surrounding terrain when taking off in Nadi recently. Apparently took off on RW02 (which requires an immediate turn at strip end), but continued straight ahead. As they gave their departure report to ATC the GPWS could be heard in the background. then to compound the error, they apparently turned right (toward higher terrain) before detecting a sense of urgency in the ATC instructions to turn left. A very near thing apparently.

[Ignition Override]

Does Lloyd's (Insurance) of London, or any other organization, have any secret ratings and ranking for many airlines around the world, based on risk factors, whether international carriers or domestic only?

The US State Department allegedly uses foreign political factors in its evaluations as to which airlines can fly to US airports-i referred to this on a different thread, as it was uncovered in an article by "Conde Nast Traveler" magazine years ago. In the US, even the military keeps an eye on airlines which augment airlift during a war, although airlines are required to maintain higher levels of safety than organizations which are strictly "mission-oriented" during a conflict, if you all will pardon this attempt to contrast the different operating environments.

Typos again.

[amhart]

747 400 You need to be there to understand. Your comment about FSB, yes they are trying but they still pass local pilots on their sim checks who would be kicked out of any other company. The standards range from average to abysmal. Anything to do with visual procedures (ie looking out of the window) is equivalent to rocket science. Crosswind landings are just plain scary, especially on the aircraft. A good example was in New Zealand where the F'o scraped a pod in a 7kt crosswind due to incorrect control inputs. This happened so quick that the highly experienced ex-pat Capt. had no chance. As was mentioned the Nadi incident in a 747-400 was criminal negligence, and the capt. should be dismissed. The so called 'audit' that is mentioned is basically accurate and should not be dismissed as this is what happens.

[Justforkix]

I don't know if I misunderstood the report. It does apear to be a : 747 Classic Delta Audit. Especially when "backed" by PPRune and put permenantly in the Tech/Safety corner as such! I'm sure that PPRuNe would not display it as a Delta audit, if it was a disgruntled Australian check captain that wrote the report.

BlueEagle I don't feel devastated at all, it's the report that is devastating. I will aknowledge that the report is from 1998, hopefully things are changing.

[Airbubba]

>>I'm sure that PPRuNe would not display it as a Delta audit, if it was a disgruntled Australian check captain that wrote the report.<<

So, you believe Delta wrote: "33. Foreign crews who live on the Korean Air network would like to operate as often as possible to their home base. This is currently not permissible." in a safety report? This is classic expat verbiage, not safety audit findings from Delta Air Lines.

Or "28. Shoulder harnesses must be worn till top of climb and from top of descent, as well as when required." In the U.S., shoulder harnesses are required to be worn for takeoff and landing, not TOC to TOD, doesn't sound like a Deltoid wrote this. As I said, much of this stuff seems to be opinion and personal technique.

At the moment, there are a couple of retired Delta pilots flying for KAL but this report came out before they arrived as far as I know.

According to an article in the Asian Wall Street Journal on April 8, 1999: "The report of more than 14,000 words was written by "one or two" pilots who took part in an internal audit the airline ordered after the Guam disaster, according to the airline. It said it didn't ask them to write the report after the audit."

http://www.vision.net.au/~apaterson/aviation/kal_articles.htm#THE%20ASIAN%20WALL%20STREET%20JOURNAL%208

This so-called "747 Classic Delta Audit findings" has become an urban legend on the net. It may have been written and sent to Delta by "one or two" expats during the audit. But, it certainly is not Delta's report of KAL audit findings as some have suggested.

[Lu Zuckerman]

Many years ago I managed a training program for the US Army teaching Maintenance officers and Mechanics the fine points of helicopter maintenance. Many of our Officer classes were integrated with US and foreign military personnel. In several of these classes we had Korean Military Pilots as students. We were told not to fail the Korean officers because if they were to fail it would bring dishonor to the country. In cases of failure the students would be executed upon their return to Korea. With that knowledge the students would get up in the middle of their Friday exam and head for Washington DC to attend some type of affair at the Korean Ambassadors home.

Perhaps these same pilots eventually left the military and started to fly for Korean Air.

There was a case where a Korean pilot took off from Mehrebad airport in Tehran, Iran and instead of following the procedure he turned in the opposite direction and rammed his aircraft into the Alborz Mountains.

[AA717driver]

Just about any South American airline or China Air or... In any organization, there are exceptional, good, average and lousy pilots. There are some cultures that simply don't develop the personal and mental skills it requires to fly airplanes. Naturally, there are those who inherently possess the skills it takes to do this job.

It seems that the industrialized nations produce a higher number of people who excel at flying airplanes. This would make a good thesis for someone getting their Ph.d.

In summary, I wouldn't put my enemy's dog on a third world airline.TC

[Airbubba]

>>It seems that the industrialized nations produce a higher number of people who excel at flying airplanes. <<

Gee, all this time I thought South Korea was pretty industrialized...

[innuendo]

The Delta safety audit on KAL.

"9. Crew must use a torch for preflight at night, this is sometimes not done."

Crew must use a TORCH? C'mon, I can't imagine a Delta Airlines pilot using the word torch in place of flashlight.

[Airbubba]

Like I said, obviously not a product of an audit team from Delta Air Lines. This dubious document has been touted as the gospel from ATL by some gullible folks here and elsewhere for quite a while now.

You can BS the fans, but you can't BS the players...

Over here in the U.S. we don't worry too much about loosening neckties and armrests. Or turning off our nav lights during the day (maybe it's a Cessna thing).

We set our clocks to local time since we never fly to Green-witch.

Why, we're just a bunch of country boys tryin' to earn a livin'.

[AA717driver]

Ok, Bubba, how about "Western Culture" instead of "industrialized nations".

Don't make me come down to the Waffle House and whup yer ass...:D TC

[Norman Stanley Fletcher]

I note that Guus Hiddink, the Dutch manager of South Korea's World Cup soccer team was held in such high esteem by the Koreans after their success in the Summer that it was felt necessary to reward him greatly for his assistance to the country. Among other rewards bestowed upon him as a hero of the Korean nation, Mr Hiddink was given free first-class travel for 4 years with Korean Airlines (KAL) - whenever and wherever he wanted. Presumably had they been knocked out at the group stage instead of the semis then Mr Hiddink would have been given 8 years free travel instead!

(Edited for bad spelling of Mr Hiddink's name - apologies to my Cloggie cousins!)

[flapsforty]

He's called Guus Hiddink, NSF. Not Gus Heykonk.
:eek: ;)

[Capt.KAOS]

"He's called Guus Hiddink, NSF. Not Gus Heykonk. "

Correct Flaps, gus heykonk is a local Korean delicacy; frogs ear, sliced in very thin pieces, fried in Ginseng oil.

Cheers

KAOS

[VR-HFX]

Last I heard from someone there is that KAL now has between 500-600 foreign captains, just under 50%.

It lowers the odds but I am afraid they still don't pass my acid test.

Would I put my wife and kids on KAL? The answer is still NO I am afraid.

[lomapaseo]

>Does Lloyd's (Insurance) of London, or any other organization, have any secret ratings and ranking for many airlines around the world, based on risk factors, whether international carriers or domestic only?
<

Yes, that's only a portion of how they decide on what rates you will get. Of course if one airline has three crashes in a year most all airlines are sure to sustain higher (but not the highest) rates as well. Much more complicatesd then this, but I was interpreting what you might have been hinting at.

If one were to muse some more along these lines, would your inference be to punish the arline somehow by placing him in a "bad driver" category like with auto insurrance..

Don't forget the airline is mostly a user of equipment and the real owners are the folks like leassors and Boeing/Airbus who haven't been paid off as yet. Thus their liens against the equipment need carry insurrance as well.

Probably best to encourage flight safety in other ways

[Lu Zuckerman]

If one were to muse some more along these lines, would your inference be to punish the arline somehow by placing him in a "bad driver" category like with auto insurrance..

This is exactly what the airframe manufacturers do. When they sell a plane(s) to a large airline they take the following into consideration: the operational record of the airline, the qualifications and experience of the pilots and the maintenance operations, the quality of the airfields serviced by the airline, the climatic conditions under which the aircraft are to be operated and many other things related to the airlines operations. All of these elements are factored in when the service warrantees are calculated, the level of spares that must accompany the first aircraft are determined and other logistical elements. British Airways would get a much better deal from the airframe manufacturer than Bumdung Airlines that operates in Africa or Asia. No two airlines would get the same deal.

[Eboy]

On the basis of a preiminary review of the accident rate charts below, I tentatively conclude the following:

1) KAL has a higher accident rate than most other airlines

2) As a group, European and Australian airlines have a significantly higher accident rate than U.S. airlines. Thus, by the same logic of those opposed to KAL travel (mostly Europeans and Australians, it seems from this and past discussions), the traveling public should avoid European and Australian airlines, as well as KAL.

3) Air is the safest mode of transportation, regardless of airline.

I also have suspicions about the authenticity of that Delta KAL document, as it contains language that would not be used by a native American English speaker.

Let us proceed based on reason and objectivity, not faith and superstition.

http://planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm

http://www.airdisaster.com/statistics/

[Norman Stanley Fletcher]

Eboy - are you reading the same websites as me? I have just checked out British Airways (they employ more than 50% of all British airline pilots in one form or other). They had one crash in 1976 over Zagreb resulting from a mid-air collision for which an Air Traffic Controller was jailed. That is it for them! To suggest that somehow European main airline safety is worse than the good ole' USA is ridiculous. And then to speak of the Europeans in the same breath as KAL is frankly laughable. As recent events have proved, no airline is exempt from the spectre of crashes, and none of us should ever crow about how good we are.

What I do believe is that in each of Australia, Europe and the USA, an enormous effort is put into flight safety compared to the rest of the world. There are many areas that 'the West' must hang it's head in shame on in comparison to the rest of the world. Aviation, however, is one where we can say we are leading the field in terms of a relentless search for excellence in flight safety. I for one am proud of being part of an airline where safety has such a high place - and most if not all of my colleagues would feel the same. We in Europe (I cannot speak for Australia/NZ but I feel sure it is the same there), have a safety culture that transcends all aspects of aviation and anyone believing that somehow it is better in the States is simply wrong. I would gladly fly any US, Australian or European Union major (not including Eastern Europe) airline and have no fears whatsoever for my safety. I could not say the same about KAL or some of the Chinese/Taiwanese outfits. That is just hard fact and until someone starts addressing themselves to the cultural issues that mitigate against safe flying, there will be continue to be a constant stream of crashes/incidents emanating from the rest of the world.

[Eboy]

"To suggest that somehow European main airline safety is worse than the good ole' USA is ridiculous."

When I average the European accident rate on the first site, I get 0.537. When I average the North American rate I get -2.68 (the rates on this site are weighted for deaths).

When I average the European accident rate on the second site above, I get 1.495. When I average the US and Canada rate I get 1.27.

I agree BA has an excellent record by these metrics. KAL does not.

Now, I just picked the first two accident sites that popped up on Google as a first check. All statistics should be viewed with suspicion. There may be junk science or a hidden agenda. Results depend on assumptions. If you have other sites with data contrary to these I would like to see them. I really don't care what the truth is, and I am not saying I found it with my quick check. I think, however, that when reaching for conclusions we should keep at least one foot on solid ground.

I agree with most of your points. I guess my point is that, to me, the difference in my chances of being struck by lightning, and those chances increasing five times, does not seem significant. All things equal, I'd probably choose another carrier over KAL unless I see KAL's accident record has improved. If I can save $2000 on business class, however, I would choose KAL.

[lomapaseo]

>If I can save $2000 on business class, however, I would choose KAL.
<

Hell, based on relative risk among other of life's risk I choose their "J" class if only a $200 savings:p

I intend to live what's left of my life to the fullest and what's a tiny increase in risk overall if I get better service.

Service sells ... safety doesn't

[Won2Go]

At last count there were 272 foreign captains out of a total in excess of 1800. 50% of captains on 777 are foreign and about 25% on 744.

[Techman]

Eboy, 'Europe' is a very variable factor and not a single country. Not so with the U.S..

[innuendo]

Norman Stanley Fletcher, did BA not lose a B-707 in an accident in Japan in the Mt Fuji area?

[Final 3 Greens]

Innuendo

BA did not lose a 707 over Japan.

BOAC did, but that was a long time before BA was formed.

[Eboy]

Techman, you are right. I think each of the two sites defines Europe loosely. As I said above, looking at the assumptions is important for a serious analysis.

Also, there is an oversiimplification in that my analysis applies equal weight to rates of all airlines. It would be more meaningful to weight airline rates by distance flown. By my analysis, Turkish Airlines impacts the Europe result as much as BA, when BA should receive greater weight due to greater miles flown.

[innuendo]

Final 3 greens, so if we change Korean Air to say, Kimchee Air then their previous losses do not count?
I would suggest that the essentials of BOAC were not much changed when they became BA.

[Airbubba]

>>Final 3 greens, so if we change Korean Air to say, Kimchee Air then their previous losses do not count? <<

Kinda like USAir became US Airways after five fatal crashes in five years. Or Valuejet morphed into AirTran after the fiery plunge at MIA.

[Final 3 Greens]

Innuendo

I simply stated a fact in answer to a question that you asked. Your argument may or may not be valid, don't know enough to agree/contest, but the fact is that BA did not lose a 707 over Mt Fuji, as it was formed about 8 years later, so Norman Stanley Fletcher's assertion was true and he should not do porridge for it.

Air bubba

I am not familiar with the transformations you mention, but can state as a fact that BA was formed by the British Government by amalgamating BOAC, BEA and a few other small airlines due to the implementation of a recommendation from the Edwards Committee report of 1969. This recommendation was based on creating a more efficient organisation with economies of scale.

[amhart]

We forgot to mention the Milan incident last month. Where a B744 freighter on the VOR approach into MXP, used the wrong mode inbound and headed for the ground setting off the GPWS but the crew ignored it and carried on. It was an expat skipper on the upper deck who was dead heading who ran into the flight deck and initiated a go around. The crew then tried to do the same again on the next approach!
The statistics game is running out of time.:(

[PAXboy]

lomapaseo: "Service sells ... safety doesn't"

I agree that, overall, it does not. All carriers are reluctant to use it for the fear of the next prang providing the media with even more horrible headlines.

However, Saftey does sell - for me. Service I can adjust to by eating before the flight and making sure that I have a bottle of water in my hand case. Saftey - I cannot touch and I willingly pay more money for a seat on a carrier that I trust. Or, trust more than the competition! :rolleyes:

[AEROVISION]

Amhart,
How are you today,

Maybe I lost you, so, can you elaborate?

a. Was it a KAL 744?
b. Which "mode" where they on?
c. What did the "expat skipper" do once at the F/D?
d. What was the consencus at the F/D when they pulled it of a second time? Expat skipper did what then?
e. Who is "we"?
f. And how do you know?

Thanks and with best regards
A.V.

[hdaae]

To be honest I havent followed the KAL accident history, but Ive flown with lots of the cadets in their training facility in California.

What I saw were people with extreme disipline and will to excel.
The group pressure to succed were nothing like Ive expirienced before at other flight schools Ive worked at.
They have very good knowledge of general math&physics etc

What I didnt like with the program were the short time they had to complete zero to 255 hours (PVT thru COM INST ME).
They had only 9 months to do it all, and as you know, their english is usually quite weak when they arrive, so I can see how this seriously hampers performance later on in their careers.
Also, I noticed that they often use memorization to get good exam results but their knowledge are still quite high and well within what are the norm in USA.

Ive flown with Europeans and Americans for every level of certificate, and when it comes to work ethics noone ever came close to the KAL cadets.

What happens trainingwise when they come to Korea I do not know, but quite a few of the cadets in our group were born to be pilots.

Maybe something about the commandstructure?

The cadets that spoke of their future in KAL mentioned "years of doin nothing more than watching the captain flying the plane"
but they said that depended on the Captain.
Supposedly some of the ex military Captains had a dislike to the civilian trained pilots and will give them little practical expirience.

As I say, some of this info came from the KAL cadets, so how valid it is I dont know.

But, poor english and a tendecy to act from rote memory might be the main problem added with the command structure.

[2BR]

Does anyone know if KAL recruit ex-korean's for F/O positions.If not,why?????

THANKS for any replies:)

[ZFT]

<We forgot to mention the Milan incident last month. Where a B744 freighter on the VOR approach into MXP, used the wrong mode inbound and headed for the ground setting off the GPWS but the crew ignored it and carried on. It was an expat skipper on the upper deck who was dead heading who ran into the flight deck and initiated a go around. The crew then tried to do the same again on the next approach!
The statistics game is running out of time>

Good job it wasn't a pax a/c with locked doors

[411A]

...or, a rather lack thereof.:rolleyes:

[Avius]

Iomapaseo:
Service sells......safety doesn't ??? Unfortunately you are right...sadly.

Unlikely to change.......

The Audit report has some valid points, but also includes quite a lot of nonsens. Definitely not work of a DL guy.

Probably a result of pressure to produce a lot of paper, or perhaps other pressure....in which case the author could have done all of us a favor by visiting the bathroom first.

Cheers

[747400CA]

A.V. wrote:

Amhart
How are you today,

Maybe I lost you, so, can you elaborate?

a. Was it a KAL 744?
b. Which "mode" where they on?
c. What did the "expat skipper" do once at the F/D?
d. What was the consencus at the F/D when they pulled it of a second time? Expat skipper did what then?
e. Who is "we"?
f. And how do you know?

Thanks and with best regards
A.V.

Still waiting...

[Covenant]

The statistics you linked to are flawed and tend to exaggerate the values for airlines with a greater volume of flights. It may be that this was done unintentionally, or it may be that it was done so as to give some spread in those airlines who have had no recorded fatalities. Either way, it is not an appropriate measurement for comparison. In actual fact, there is no appropriate measure for comparison of individual airlines because the probability of a "fatal" flight is so small compared to the number of flights that most carriers perform.

The figures used are simply the difference between the expected number of fatal flights and the actual adjusted fatal flights. A brief dimensional analysis shows that this figure has "dimension" of "adjusted fatal flights" (for want of a better description) which is not independent of total flights for the airline and therefore does not give a fair comparison.

A better way of comparing would have been to simply divide the adjusted number of fatal flights by the number of flights. This yields a number which is equivalent to the probability of a fatality for a single passenger per million flights.

If you use this method, although it still shows all US carriers together have a net fatal accident rate (0.33) lower than European (0.37), the difference is not statistically significant, and can easily be attributed to random factors.

Interestingly, if you assume a normal distribution for fatal flights among airlines, there are only two airlines that fall outside the 95% probability for the figures being just as a result of random factors: China Airlines (marginal at 2.32 standard deviations from mean) and Cubana (weighing in at a massive 8.23 standard deviations from mean).

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Covenant

Statistics can be bent in any direction depending on the point being made. What you have to do is compare the number of flight hours on a specific aircraft series and measure the MTBC (Mean time Between Crashes) or MTBF (Mean Time Between Fatalities) as guaranteed by the manufacturer in order to gain certification.

The FAA has a safety requirement that states that a system failure that is catastrophic and results in death of one or more passengers or crew can occur no more frequently that 1 10 9 or one time in a billion hours. The safety engineers at the airframe manufacturers can by the use of Boolean algebra show that a system failure that results in a single death will occur no more frequently than 1 10 12 all the way up to 1 10 17. This is a total sham and no system in the world can actually meet those figures. In fact there is no system that can meet the 1 10 9. The figures quoted are for the total flight hours for a fleet of the same type of aircraft. Some aircraft can’t even reach a total of a million hours before a fatal accident caused by system failure. Case in point is the 737, which had at least six or seven major rudder incidents and three fatal crashes for the same reason.

The airlines also perpetrate a sham on the flying public by tying their safety record to passenger seat miles. An airline can show that they have generated multi millions of passenger seat miles since their last accident and don’t tell the public that they may have only flown 20-25,000 total hours to generate the number of passenger seat miles quoted in their advertisements. The FAA requirement of catastrophic system failure rate of 1 10 9 is yet to be met on any aircraft presently flying any other types no longer in service.

When it comes to hours just think of this to put it in perspective. Jesus Christ was born about 17,537,520 hours ago.

Liars’ figure and figures lie.

[fire wall]

so that's why he stinks!

[lomapaseo]

>The FAA requirement of catastrophic system failure rate of 1 10 9 is yet to be met on any aircraft presently flying any other types no longer in service. <

Methinks that you are mixing apples and oranges. The cited accidents for the most part have nothing to do with violations of system safety which is meeting E-9 under 25.1309. Also I believe that the protection is against catastrophic consequences which is multiple fatalities, not just a single fatality.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: lomapaseo

Technically, you are correct. AC-25-1309 states the following: Between 10 7 to 10 9 fleet flight hours you can incur serious injury to or death of a relatively small proportion of the occupants as well as reduction of the aircraft capability or of the crew ability to cope with adverse operating conditions.

From 10 9 and beyond it states; Prevention of continued safe flight of the aircraft to include loss of the aircraft and / or fatalities meaning, more than a relatively small proportion of the occupants.

However there is one problem. 1309 addresses the aircraft and it alludes to 10 9 applying to the aircraft. In actuality 10 9th applies to a system problem that can escalate upwards and cause loss of the aircraft. In my previous post I mentioned the use of Boolean algebra to determine the safety of a system going all the way up to 10 17th which is proved through the manipulation of reliability numbers that were derived from non representational data bases and massaged with K factors. In other words GIGO (Garbage in garbage out). If you applied the same logic to determining the safety of a large aircraft that may have as many as 30-35 systems that if they were to suffer a catastrophic failure it can be shown that at the aircraft level the safety is somewhere between 10 7 to 10 8 so now the aircraft potential for catastrophic failure is well below what 1309 requires yet the FAA does nothing about it.

:cool:

[lomapaseo]

>it can be shown that at the aircraft level the safety is somewhere between 10 7 to 10 8 so now the aircraft potential for catastrophic failure is well below what 1309 requires yet the FAA does nothing about it. <

Of course! Actually air travel is no better than about E-6 for all causes including the pilots, so why dump on the aircraft design that only makes up 10%

The FAA is just being practical in regulating what can be regulated (system safety under 1309). It wouldn't be very practical to require boolean calculations on fuel tank explosions where one doesn't forsee an ignition probability or on a rudder tearing off under overstress.

On the other hand this thread drift kind of supports the lack of statistical evidence that KAL is a lousy airline, but the piloting stories persist in spite.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: lomapaseo

The FAA is just being practical in regulating what can be regulated (system safety under 1309). It wouldn't be very practical to require boolean calculations on fuel tank explosions where one doesn't forsee an ignition probability or on a rudder tearing off under overstress.

If a proper FMECA (Failure Mode Effects Criticality Analysis) is performed many of the failures that do occur could be prevented. Case(s) in point: The thrust reverser on the Lauda Air 767, The rudder problem on the 737, the engine explosion on the 737 at Manchester, England as well as many others. TWA 800 could have been prevented if a complete safety hazard analysis were performed.

Another contributor to many crashes is the FAA’s requirement that the safety of a given component or system can be proven by test or analysis. In the case of the Lauda air crash Boeing had the opportunity to demonstrate a thrust reverser deployment during flight test. It was felt that it would be both expensive and it would place the aircraft in jeopardy so they ran a complete computer flow pattern analysis, which proved that the aerodynamic disruption would be survivable and could be controlled safely. In the case of the Sioux City DC-10 crash GE performed an analysis of the fan disc and it proved that it would never fail but their quality assurance program overlooked a flaw in the disc. P&W performed an analysis on the combustor can of one of their engines and that analysis proved the can would never fail. Since the engine would never have an explosive event, which is what was indicated in the P&W FMECA Boeing did not protect the underside of the wing of the 737. The result was in the Manchester catastrophe.

The system is extremely flawed and should be changed and the public should be made aware that commercial aircraft are not as safe as they could be.

One final point regarding the loss of the rudder on the AA A-300. Structures are not placed under FMECA or, Safety Hazards Analyses as it is felt that the static and dynamic tests of the structure prove that it has a reliability of 1. In other words, it will never fail under normal flight profiles.

[lomapaseo]

> Another contributor to many crashes is the FAA?s requirement that the safety of a given component or system can be proven by test or analysis. In the case of the Lauda air crash Boeing had the opportunity to demonstrate a thrust reverser deployment during flight test. It was felt that it would be both expensive and it would place the aircraft in jeopardy so they ran a complete computer flow pattern analysis, which proved that the aerodynamic disruption would be survivable and could be controlled safely. In the case of the Sioux City DC-10 crash GE performed an analysis of the fan disc and it proved that it would never fail but their quality assurance program overlooked a flaw in the disc. P&W performed an analysis on the combustor can of one of their engines and that analysis proved the can would never fail. Since the engine would never have an explosive event, which is what was indicated in the P&W FMECA Boeing did not protect the underside of the wing of the 737. The result was in the Manchester catastrophe. <

This stuff above is just plain wrong!

You are mixing a few facts with your faulted idea of what was wrong to support your idea that critical fault analysis could of/should have prevented these accidents. You must have eyes in your backside to see things so clearly post accident. If things were really thought to never fail than there would have been no need for the manufacturers to have issued Service Bulletins against the possible malfunction before these accidents.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: lomapaseo


You are mixing a few facts with your faulted idea of what was wrong to support your idea that critical fault analysis could of/should have prevented these accidents. You must have eyes in your backside to see things so clearly post accident. If things were really thought to never fail than there would have been no need for the manufacturers to have issued Service Bulletins against the possible malfunction before these accidents.

The point is that equipment’s, appliances, subsystems and systems fail at a rate far lower than what is predicted in the reliability analyses. The figures derived in the reliability analyses feed into the preparation of the FMECAs and are factored into the safety hazard analysis, which is the basis for certification. If the figures used in the Reliability analyses are not accurate an /or are very optimistic then any element of the analytical process is contaminated and therefore is not a realistic representation of the ultimate safety and /or reliability of the system under analysis. When these contaminated optimistic figures are entered into the hazard analysis and then massaged using Boolean algebra the manufacturer can show that his systems safety far exceeds the safety requirements established by the certification authorities.

The basic rule of reliability, from an FAA perspective, is that if a part fails at a rate higher than predicted a service bulletin it issued and the manufacturer of the component goes back to square 1 and the failure is not chargeable even if it resulted in a crash.

The fact that the manufacturer promulgates service bulletins goes to prove that the component was not properly analyzed for potential defects and that problems arise that were either not predicted or there is another defect in the manufacturing and quality assurance in the manufacturer of that component. All of these things can be predicted and many of them most likely were but the manufacturer declined to incorporate the necessary changes in the part or the manufacturing process or the quality program. In most instances it is to save money and time.

As far as having eyes in my backside I have often been accused of having my head up my butt. However, the real reason I make the charges that I do is because I have been a Reliability, Maintainability and Systems Safety Engineer since 1968 and for thirteen years prior to that I worked in various engineering positions in the aerospace industry. I have seen it all. I have complained loudly and I have experienced the rebuff of engineering when I made a valid suggestion relative to the design. My fellow RMS engineers have often told me to be quiet as not to shake the boat. Their reasoning was that it puts bread and butter on the table. I personally don’t subscribe to that position. That is why I shoot my mouth off on technical forums such as PPRune.

[lomapaseo]

Well by now I suspect that most readers have just learned to skip over this thread as it is probably a trifle boring to the normal PPrune.

Eyes in your backside refers to "excellent hindsight" rather than convincing forsight..

If you mean by experiencing a "far lower" failure rate, that the manufacturers were overly optomistic in their non-credible design assumptions used in the FMEA's I can agree with you in the reverser case. The problem was partly to do with lack of oversight of the many vendors' QA programs.

Regarding your comments on Service Buletins (SB) they are issued for a variety of reasons and in the case of the burner cans it was more for the rectification of shortfalls in presumed maintenance than it was to correct design defficiencies.

And as the person responsible for developing the rules by which system safety progresses forward by incorporating "lessons learned" I can tell you that time and money do not enter into the equations once the rule is promulgated.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: lomapaseo

And as the person responsible for developing the rules by which system safety progresses forward by incorporating "lessons learned" I can tell you that time and money do not enter into the equations once the rule is promulgated.

Once the lesson is learned the educational process tends to deviate. The NTSB learns the lesson from a standpoint of safety and they try to minimize or totally eliminate the possibility of the accident or incident from ever happening again by recommending to the FAA what must be done. This can take the form of a fleet grounding or a very expensive retrofit program. The FAA on the other hand learns the lesson from the point of view of the operators and as such very seldom follows the recommendations of the NTSB.

Here is how the FAA determines if an operator or operators must incorporate a necessary design change as a means of preventing a reoccurrence of the problem. The FAA will perform a cost benefit analysis to determine if it is cheaper to incorporate a fix as opposed to not incorporating that same fix. They determine the cost in human lives if that same accident were to happen again. A branch of the department of transportation the parent of the FAA makes an annual determination of what a human life is worth. This figure along with the cost to the operators related to downing their fleet, the cost of the new equipment or new system design times the number of aircraft in the fleet and the financial loss to the airline caused by the loss of their aircraft due to the grounding. If the cost of making the change is more expensive than not making the change the FAA will vote against the NTSB recommendation to make the change.

And, these are the guardians of our safety.

[lomapaseo]

I see that we have made excellent progress in understanding.

We finally have a government of the people, by the people ... that we can blame this on. :)