KDCA Incident - 4/18/2024

[BFSGrad]

Assuming the LiveATC audio is complete, appears this incident is an ATC error. Another ASDE-X save? Unusual for DCA to be using RW 4 for departures.

KDCA Runway Incursion

https://youtu.be/yooJmu30DxY?si=939GFuZOYTBKOFoq

[ATC Watcher]

Looks like a bad coordination between the 2 controllers ,to be confirmed of course. But it happens . Well spotted , well corrected . Very professional handled afterwards. No finger pointing . Well done .

[mike current]

Looks like a bad coordination between the 2 controllers ,to be confirmed of course. But it happens . Well spotted , well corrected . Very professional handled afterwards. No finger pointing . Well done .

A high speed rejected takeoff is not my idea of "well spotted, well corrected".

Disaster was avoided by the alertness of some of the people involved, but that's just about the only positive to take away from it.

[Propellerhead]

No RWSL?

[BFSGrad]

No RWSL?
According to the FAA, KDCA does not have runway status lights (RSL). The other two DC-area airports (KIAD, KBWI) have limited RSL.

Regarding post #3, AvHerald reports that the JetBlue ERJ conducted a low-speed RTO, stopping about 790 feet down runway 4. While SWA departed almost immediately after the incident, the JetBlue ERJ sat on J for about 15 minutes before returning to the gate.

[360BakTrak]

Why not simply have the crossing aircaft switch to the controller working the relevant runway?! Far less chance of these sorts of incidents.

[BFSGrad]

Why not simply have the crossing aircaft switch to the controller working the relevant runway?! Far less chance of these sorts of incidents.
Simple answer: that’s not the way the FAA trains U.S. ATC.

Per 7110.65, 3-1-3, the local (tower) controller has primary responsibility for the active runway(s).

Ground control must obtain approval from the local controller to before authorizing any aircraft to cross an active runway.

The ground controller must then advise the local controller when the active runway cross is complete.

In the KDCA runway incursion (assuming the various video recreations are accurate), the SWA crossing clearance was issued prior to the JBU takeoff clearance. Thus, either the ground controller did not follow procedure by obtaining local controller authorization for the cross or the local controller did authorize the cross but then forgot he had done so and issued the JBU takeoff clearance. Note that in this incident, the local controller was handling 3 active runways (1, 4, 33).

Not convinced that saddling a single controller with issuing takeoff, landing, and crossing clearances would result in fewer runway incursions.

[DIBO]

Not convinced that saddling a single controller with issuing takeoff, landing, and crossing clearances would result in fewer runway incursions.
No sane person would interlace at the same moment, a T/O clearance with 4 runway crossing clearances on the same runway (referring to the new KJFK thread (https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/658742-yet-another-runway-incursion-incident-kjfk-20-4-2024-a.html)).
And everybody on/near the same runway on the same frequency might improve the SA of the pilots involved.

Both arguments less valid in the context of multiple a/c on finals, having been cleared to land minutes earlier and subsequent rwy crossings.

And indeed, the one rwy/one ATCO/one freq. principle might become unworkable when handling 3 active runways with a substantial number of runway crossings.

[ATC Watcher]

Note that in this incident, the local controller was handling 3 active runways (1, 4, 33).

Not convinced that saddling a single controller with issuing takeoff, landing, and crossing clearances would result in fewer runway incursions.
and
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And indeed, the one rwy/one ATCO/one freq. principle might become unworkable when handling 3 active runways with a substantial number of runway crossings.

This not how the system works , in a high density airport it should be 3 active runways, 3 controllers. But the FAA does not have the staff to do this, so they bend the rules. Again it works in low traffic but not in DCA or JFK . hence the incidents.
The sad thing about those 2 incidents is that very likely the individual controllers will be given the blame, but nor those that devised and allowed such procedures.

[DIBO]

in a high density airport it should be 3 active runways, 3 controllersbut then again, having a look at KDCA's airport diagram, it might prove to be the exception that proves the rule. With 3 active runways, each crossing the 2 other active runways and dense traffic, one TWR controller/one Freq/three Runways + GND handling all the crossings, might prove to be the least bad solution....

It's a WW II design that was MAX-ed :E out a few decades too many...

[WillowRun 6-3]

This not how the system works , in a high density airport it should be 3 active runways, 3 controllers. But the FAA does not have the staff to do this, so they bend the rules. Again it works in low traffic but not in DCA or JFK . hence the incidents.
The sad thing about those 2 incidents is that very likely the individual controllers will be given the blame, but nor those that devised and allowed such procedures. (emphasis added)

I don't represent Mr Whitaker (don't I wish) but I'd wager more good hard-earned cabdriver money that this Administrator, in this information- intensive environment (which sometimes isn't only intensive but saturated), will be responsive promptly and effectively to both tasks. That is, isolating and defining the procedural deficiencies, and then demanding and - to extent not delegated - implementing the necessary changes.

Yes sure, the "interagency process" lives and thrives inside the Beltway. Nevertheless, in this environment it is very likely that this Administrator will seek resolution. This may not be exactly the same as blaming those who devised dysfunctional procedures - but it will have greater positive effect.

[ATC Watcher]

WR 6-3 :
. That is, isolating and defining the procedural deficiencies, and then demanding and - to extent not delegated - implementing the necessary changes.

i do not know him but fairly well some of his predecessors in this post.
some, at the beginning of their appointments tried to change what they saw , all failed .

Mr Whitaker ability to “move the mammoth” out of its comfort zone might well need another accident to happen . Incidents rarely do the trick looking in the past.
but whatever solutions are found they will restrict capacity . And that has been until now a no go for the Airline lobby and was never supported politically by both parties .
is this about to change ?
looking at CNN yesterday the US Congress circus on Ukraine and the interview of Mrs Taylor-Greene that followed , i am not optimistic as to the abilities of anyone to reform anything in the current political climate in the US .

[Gne]

A good start would be to separate the ANSP from the regulator in accordance with ICAO guidance and the recommendations of several studies over the years. If you can source a copy, the Air Traffic Control Commercialization Policy: Has It Been Effective? Report Prepared by MBS Ottawa Inc makes interesting reading and addresses most of the root causes behind the deficiencies identified in this and similar threads. The MBS report was undertaken in 2004/05. NOTHING HAS CHANGED.

Gne