Will H225 return offshore?

[parnaiocas]

Does anyone have any news if the H225 is actually returning to flying offshore? Has any company already returned?

[212man]

Does anyone have any news if the H225 is actually returning to flying offshore? Has any company already returned?
It never stoppped in some parts of the world, and it has certainly resumed in others too. I’d bet my bottom dollar it won’t return to the North Sea.

[helihub]

A timely item - Union polls members on North Sea helicopter safety (https://www.energyvoice.com/health-safety-environment/550069/union-polls-members-on-north-sea-helicopter-safety/)

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1170x1644/418477521_739146525073852_3719986886975695909_n_dd60530dc90e 8db0835fc45359b5bdf3c39556ed.jpg

[detgnome]

I can't see the 225 returning in any form. The S92 is expensive to operate and the requirement for 19 pax is not what it used to be; Sikorsky seem to have little interest in supporting it beyond the bare minimum. The H175 and (eventually) AW189 will come to dominate the N Sea, probably from both sides.

[nowherespecial]

Anyone know what was actually being polled by Unite?

[helihub]

Anyone know what was actually being polled by Unite?

The poll is here > https://surveys.unitetheunion.org/ScotlandOrganising/unite-offshore---back-home-safe-202

[nowherespecial]

Thanks Helihub. Apologies, I made the incorrect assumption that you would have to be a union member to do a union survey!

[Cyclic Hotline]

If I recall correctly, quite sometime after this accident Airbus determined the root cause of the gear failure, but elected not ro publish the information. Was that correct, or did I miss something in the intervening time?

[212man]

If I recall correctly, quite sometime after this accident Airbus determined the root cause of the gear failure, but elected not ro publish the information. Was that correct, or did I miss something in the intervening time?
https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/airbus-helicopters-finds-root-cause-of-turoy-h225-crash/134282.article


But the airframer has continued its own analysis of the event, says H225 programme director Michel Macia, leading to identification of the root cause and a successful replication of the failure in testing. That work has been externally validated, he says.

Findings from that effort were subsequently shared with Norway's SHT accident investigation body, regulators including the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and other manufacturers, says Macia.

"Everyone now knows that the root cause is understood and has been reproduced," says Macia.

Although he declines to detail the failure, he says the safety barriers put in place to enable the H225 to return to service deal with the underlying issue.

[SASless]

Well....were I to be confronted with a decision to climb into a 225 based upon that explanation I know exactly what my decision would be......HELL NO!

Laid out the full explanation, show exactly how the analysis was done, the "root cause" replicated.....several times not just once.... and that multiple testing of the aforementioned methods to prove they work......and I would consider it.

I was around when the 76 A slung a couple of rotor blades and know how heartbroken some folks were that they failed to get it right despite their every no holds bar effort.

The 225 might one day return to the North Sea but I very much doubt. this effort shall succeed due directly to the way the Maker is going about proving they have fixed a very fatal design failure.

The onus is on them to prove beyond a doubt they have it right this time and just saying in so many words "trust us".....just ain't gonna fly.

Does anyone have access to this "proof" and if not....why is it. not in the public domain?

I would think that would be the very best first step in regaining lost trust.

[212man]

Why on earth should it be in the public domain? Apart from commercial confidentiality and IP issues, the travelling public are (in the most part) not metallurgists or aeronautical engineers, so the information would largely be meaningless. The people that need to know, do now know - the regulators and other OEMs.

I was around when the 76 A slung a couple of rotor blades and know how heartbroken some folks were that they failed to get it right despite their every no holds bar effort.

I was told, on my 76 conversion, that the speed with which Sikorsky introduced the fix indicated that they already knew about the issue, and had been working on it. Without telling the operators. This was why Alan Bristow cancelled (most of) his 35 aircraft order. That might be apocryphal, but the source was around at the time.

[Asturias56]

I really doubt the oil companies will allow the 225 back in the N Sea - they have a very low tolerance for bad news these days and it would be seen as an unacceptable risk - they know what sort of headlines the journos will write

[RVDT]

Why on earth should it be in the public domain? Apart from commercial confidentiality and IP issues, the travelling public are (in the most part) not metallurgists or aeronautical engineers, so the information would largely be meaningless. The people that need to know, do now know - the regulators and other OEMs.



I was told, on my 76 conversion, that the speed with which Sikorsky introduced the fix indicated that they already knew about the issue, and had been working on it. Without telling the operators. This was why Alan Bristow cancelled (most of) his 35 aircraft order. That might be apocryphal, but the source was around at the time.

Folk still climb aboard an S92 which is still basically the same as the Cougar machine? They may have fixed a few things but it still won't do 30 minutes with loss of lubrication or maybe I haven't kept up with things?

[That lights normal!]

Folk still climb aboard an S92 which is still basically the same as the Cougar machine? They may have fixed a few things but it still won't do 30 minutes with loss of lubrication or maybe I haven't kept up with things?

I don’t fly the S92, but my understanding is: It never did fly, or promise to fly for 30 min with a total loss of MRGB oil. The problem was some crews being clear about this. Lose oil. Land or ditch immediately.

As an EC225 pilot, I followed the “rectifications” carefully. Airbus put out a “film” that said things like: “It might have been due the gearbox being in a traffic accident, so we put shock sensors in the packing now”. “It might have been an undetected deterioration, so we shortened the inspection period”. “It might have been…”

Not really good enough. It might have been something else. I don’t want to be the one that finds out.

[HeliComparator]

Well....were I to be confronted with a decision to climb into a 225 based upon that explanation I know exactly what my decision would be......HELL NO!

Laid out the full explanation, show exactly how the analysis was done, the "root cause" replicated.....several times not just once.... and that multiple testing of the aforementioned methods to prove they work......and I would consider it.

I was around when the 76 A slung a couple of rotor blades and know how heartbroken some folks were that they failed to get it right despite their every no holds bar effort.

The 225 might one day return to the North Sea but I very much doubt. this effort shall succeed due directly to the way the Maker is going about proving they have fixed a very fatal design failure.

The onus is on them to prove beyond a doubt they have it right this time and just saying in so many words "trust us".....just ain't gonna fly.

Does anyone have access to this "proof" and if not....why is it. not in the public domain?

I would think that would be the very best first step in regaining lost trust.

I’ll bite! I’ll never have to put my money where my mouth is, but I’d say “hell yes”
There has only been one accident caused by mechanical failure - nasty and catastrophic. But actually most helicopters crash due to pilot error, and the 225 has very good flight envelope protection making it very safe overall. By the way, I’m discounting the L2 accident because that was a maintenance error.

The passengers always disliked the 225 because it seemed very cramped, even though the 92 was only slightly bigger in terms of floor space. It had a lot more space above one’s head though, so it appeared to be much more spacious. For that reason I’m sure the voters will vote against the 225 even though it is safer than most.

[SASless]

HC has a long well known antipathy to the 92 and placed all of his chips on the 225....as we who have attended this forum for a long time can recall.

The Cougar tragedy identified the problem with the 92 Oil Filter that led to the loss of oil....but also uncovered some pilot issues that resulted in an uncontrolled crash into the sea rather than a controlled ditching had the proper procedures been followed.

Granted such a ditching was something that wast fraught with its own serious risks.

The fix for the oil filter was easy, clearly defined, and well publicized.

I defy anyone to say the same about the 225 loss of the rotor head being such a straight forward exercise or handled in such a transparent manner.

The issue is not why the 225 is no longer in use on the North Sea but rather shall it be allowed to return as a result of the strong feelings many of the future passengers might hold.

Look back to the Chinook crash that resulted in that type aircraft being returned to the United States where they still labor on in the forestry, construction, and utility market.

Public opinion plays a very large role in the types of aircraft that will be found acceptable no matter the desires of the operator, oil company, or the civil authorities.

Look to Boeing's problems with the 737 Series Airliner of late......passengers get the Hebbie Jeebies and quit flying on a particular airplane and airlines stop buying them....same in the oil patch.

[HeliComparator]

HC has a long well known antipathy to the 92 and placed all of his chips on the 225....as we who have attended this forum for a long time can recall.

The Cougar tragedy identified the problem with the 92 Oil Filter that led to the loss of oil....but also uncovered some pilot issues that resulted in an uncontrolled crash into the sea rather than a controlled ditching had the proper procedures been followed.

Granted such a ditching was something that wast fraught with its own serious risks.

The fix for the oil filter was easy, clearly defined, and well publicized.

I defy anyone to say the same about the 225 loss of the rotor head being such a straight forward exercise or handled in such a transparent manner.

The issue is not why the 225 is no longer in use on the North Sea but rather shall it be allowed to return as a result of the strong feelings many of the future passengers might hold.

Look back to the Chinook crash that resulted in that type aircraft being returned to the United States where they still labor on in the forestry, construction, and utility market.

Public opinion plays a very large role in the types of aircraft that will be found acceptable no matter the desires of the operator, oil company, or the civil authorities.

Look to Boeing's problems with the 737 Series Airliner of late......passengers get the Hebbie Jeebies and quit flying on a particular airplane and airlines stop buying them....same in the oil patch.

Sorry to disappoint but I agree with all that! But public opinion is not a good guide to which helicopter is safer than another in the grand scheme of things. There have been a number of very close calls in the S92 due to the interaction between the pilots and the very poorly designed (by modern standards) AFCS. There has been a recent S92 fatality which, although speculation, was probably caused by a combination of the unfriendly AFCS and in a particular, a crazy design aspect of the float switches.

So I would be fairly confident that the EC225 won’t be coming back to the N Sea any time soon, but it won’t be down to a rational decision.

[megan]

I don’t fly the S92, but my understanding is: It never did fly, or promise to fly for 30 min with a total loss of MRGB oilThey did promise in their advertising in the early days, got a beating about the head from HC for buying into the statement, due in part to having had flown a Huey for a period with no oil.


https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/748x701/92_33dbc26055eb9d6c763b7f2d018df2e45db776cb.jpg

[Mee3]

just like sas has always been known to hate ec for whatever reason.

all modern helicopters have their safety design in, is just a matter of which aspect being emphasize more or frankly speaking, where they put their bet on for the limited budget.

[Aser]

As a recap...
https://pilotswhoaskwhy.com/2024/03/25/what-happened-to-the-super-puma-helicopter-family/

Regards.

[Pittsextra]

public opinion is not a good guide to which helicopter is safer than another in the grand scheme of things...
So I would be fairly confident that the EC225 won’t be coming back to the N Sea any time soon, but it won’t be down to a rational decision.

Really? If rational is to mean based upon reason or logic then fears that have and had been expressed are entirely rational aren't they? The view you express today was similar back in 2012 and then the 2016 accident occurred. The new discoveries since 2016 seemed to come through simply looking harder. Remember a companies reputation is a combination of the technology, the people and the culture. Its a bit beyond just the tech or the other words at the time of putting big boy pants on....

[212man]

As a recap...
https://pilotswhoaskwhy.com/2024/03/25/what-happened-to-the-super-puma-helicopter-family/

Regards.
interesting article but it only looks at the mechanical related accidents. In addition there was the CFIW/T of G-REDU in 2009 and G-WNSB in 2013 (4 fatalities). The pax are aware of those too and will lump all the accidents into the same basket.

[jimf671]

H225 was always my favourite ride offshore. Smooth ride, long MGB run-dry time, good (and proven!) flotation performance. huge escape windows, good view of the instruments from the right aisle seat in the second row! (Nerd alert!)

I have been involved with helicopters for SAR, defence, underslug utility tasks, as well as offshore crew change, and have followed and documented helicopter accidents for a couple of decades. So here's what I think.

1. Helicopters are more dangerous than an A320 from GLA to TFS and always will be.
2. Hundreds of people died in CAT accidents in S-61, 332, and other of those eras.
3. The H225 and S-92, both commencing service in 2004 ushered in a new era of large rotorcraft safety. That remains the case.
4. The S-92 was on the back foot from the start due to MGB run-dry time cheating and flotation limitations and ...
5. ... Cougar 91 revealed other weaknesses.
6. Higher fatality count for the H225 is because it is a successful military helicopter and gets shot at.
7. Looking at fatal accidents only in CAT ops, they are near equal but one number pushes the H225 ahead:
8. 12 years of intensive CAT operations before the first H225 fatal accident.
9. A huge proportion of NS crew change flights carry between 9 and 16 PAX: enter the Super-Mediums.
10. We don't know what we don't know yet. Will 2014 super-medium rotorcraft ultimately be safer then 2004 large rotorcraft?

[HeliComparator]

Really? If rational is to mean based upon reason or logic then fears that have and had been expressed are entirely rational aren't they? The view you express today was similar back in 2012 and then the 2016 accident occurred. The new discoveries since 2016 seemed to come through simply looking harder. Remember a companies reputation is a combination of the technology, the people and the culture. Its a bit beyond just the tech or the other words at the time of putting big boy pants on....

Rational is to mean based on reason or logic. Fear tends not to be reasonable or logical. Your average pax can’t possibly be expected to evaluate all the many factors that would allow us to say that helicopter x is safer than helicopter y. The experts on here can’t agree, so clearly it would be ludicrous to imply that an amorphous group of people called “the pax” could come up with the right answer. The pax will instead look at which helicopter crashed most recently on their patch, what the Daily Mail and social media had to say about it, and whether they find riding in the back of it pleasing to the posterior. All of which is fair enough and human nature, but it doesn’t mean they will come up with an accurate evaluation of the relative safety of various different types of helicopter.

[Pittsextra]

Rational is to mean based on reason or logic. Fear tends not to be reasonable or logical. Your average pax can’t possibly be expected to evaluate all the many factors that would allow us to say that helicopter x is safer than helicopter y. The experts on here can’t agree, so clearly it would be ludicrous to imply that an amorphous group of people called “the pax” could come up with the right answer. The pax will instead look at which helicopter crashed most recently on their patch, what the Daily Mail and social media had to say about it, and whether they find riding in the back of it pleasing to the posterior. All of which is fair enough and human nature, but it doesn’t mean they will come up with an accurate evaluation of the relative safety of various different types of helicopter.

Perhaps although slightly overlooking the fundamentals. They don’t need to evaluate the detail of helicopters merely likely assume that the model of helicopter without its rotor isn’t ideal.

Ok perhaps you might say fool me once… then they reflect upon how 2012 was dealt with and then 2016 happened…

Everything you have just posted is / would be absolutely fair except they are the same comments made prior to 2016 and so now what you’re saying is - it really is fixed now. How that process occurred now but not ahead of 2016 is likely more than half of the problem.

[HeliComparator]

Perhaps although slightly overlooking the fundamentals. They don’t need to evaluate the detail of helicopters merely likely assume that the model of helicopter without its rotor isn’t ideal.

Ok perhaps you might say fool me once… then they reflect upon how 2012 was dealt with and then 2016 happened…

Everything you have just posted is / would be absolutely fair except they are the same comments made prior to 2016 and so now what you’re saying is - it really is fixed now. How that process occurred now but not ahead of 2016 is likely more than half of the problem.

I think what I am really saying is that humans are extremely bad at quantifying risk, and have a wide range of risk tolerance according to what the activity is. For quantifying risk they will say “Oooh look, that looks really dangerous” without having any concept of what the actual accident statistics are.
I do a lot of gliding in the highlands of Scotland, lots of people think it is highly dangerous. I mean, flying around without an engine? Must be crazy! People refuse to go up because they are too scared.

Recently the wives of two of our gliding club members have had bad accidents, one a broken leg, the other multiple fractures and is wheelchair bound for several months pending recovery. Did they crash in a glider? Of course not, one was a mountain biking accident, the other a skiing accident. Meanwhile no-one at the club has suffered any sort of injury from gliding. So mountainbiking is wonderful. Skiing is lovely, But GLIDING??? NO WAY! Not rational!

Getting back more on topic, I think the 225 head detachment thing was pretty horrific. The pilots were just flying along minding their own business, then BANG - curtains. Not the slightest hint of pilot error. Very nasty.

Meanwhile various other pilots have come to grief due to crashing due to - in our eyes - incompetence and stupidity. Happens relatively often. We would never possibly do that kind of stupid thing, obviously. We are great, wonderful pilots!

But the thing is, those “stupid” pilots all thought they were wonderful too. And maybe they were, most of the time. This is the thing with pilot-induced accidents, it is something that only happens to other people. It could never happen to us. Meanwhile we certainly don’t want to fly a helicopter with a quickly detachable rotor head because we have no control over that, whereas we do have control over not crashing due to being incompetent - because we are wonderful pilots!

However if you look at it from the pax perspective, they don’t particularly care whether they die from a QD rotor head, or from pilot incompetence. Either way, they are dodo-like. Same applies to the cold hard statistics. One needs to look at why bad accidents happen and what can be done to prevent or reduce them. Any pilot is horrified at the thought of the QD rotor head activating its QD function unexpectedly, but we gloss over the possibility that we might be the next cause of an accident. It is all rather illogical,

A helicopter that is better at guiding the pilots away from doing something stupid, is therefore probably the safer aircraft even if it did once suffer from a catastrophic mechanical failure, because the mechanical failure is not the primary source of crashery.

[SASless]

I pretty much agree with HC.

The short version I think goes along the line of "Perception is reality.".....even if the perception is flawed for very valid technical reasons.

My point earlier was to point that out....and that until EC finds a way to change the perception they shall have to live with reality.

Most of us can look at the remodeled oil filter containment of the 92 and understand how the mod solves that particular problem.

Few of us can analyze the causes and fixes of the Rotor Head problem that led to the 225 becoming persona non grata on the North Sea.

It may very well be fixed and what they are saying might be the God's honest truth....but thus far their efforts to put the perception to bed has not succeeded.

These modern aircraft are less of a danger to the passengers than the humans flying them as is borne out by the statistics and results of accident investigations.

Many....many years ago the Chinook decided to shed some blades due to Incidence Bolts shearing which allowed the blades to rotate in the cuff....with predictable results.

The cause was quickly found and a fix quickly instituted and every single Chinook Blade in the US Army inventory had to be modified.

The fix was simple....it required the Incidence Bolt be installed 90 degrees opposite the original direction (if the original was oriented vertically....the new one was horizontal or vice versa)...and we were told all was good.

It was.....but the attitude most of us shared was not very trusting. We were wrong and the Engineers were right.

We do have to remember that we have many single point failures in every helicopter that can cause us to end our flying career as passengers.....yet we climb into the aircraft and go about our trade trusting in the odds being in our favor.

All of the 225's that are still flying are proving to be safe so far.....so how does EC cure the perception problem.

[wrench1]

.....so how does EC cure the perception problem.
I think Airbus needs to formally address what the AIBN final stated, that the “Puma” transmission is at its design limits. Instead, Airbus continues to point to a maintenance issue for G-REDL and a crate falling off the truck for LN-OJF.

What they fail to address is that the majority of 2nd planetary gears/bearings didn’t meet their operational time limits since the L2s started flying. So short of a new main transmission design/installation for the 225, I don’t think the masses will touch it. But then that would also require Airbus to admit they had a problem to begin with.

[megan]

From the accident report REDL. My take away is the reticence to use the aircraft may very well be the inability to show what was the initiator of the failure.An extensive and complex investigation revealed that the failure of the MGB initiated in one of the eight second stage planet gears in the epicyclic module. The planet gear had fractured as a result of a fatigue crack, the precise origin of which could not be determined. However, analysis indicated that this is likely to have occurred in the loaded area of the planet gear bearing outer race.

A metallic particle had been discovered on the epicyclic chip detector during maintenance on 25 March 2009, some 36 flying hours prior to the accident. This was the only indication of the impending failure of the second stage planet gear. The lack of damage on the recovered areas of the bearing outer race indicated that the initiation was not entirely consistent with the understood characteristics of spalling. The possibility of a material defect in the planet gear or damage due to the presence of foreign object debris could not be discounted.

Because the root cause of this accident has not yet been identified, it has not been possible to identify a terminating airworthiness action with respect of the failure mode experienced by G-REDL.The use of "could not be determined", "likely", "possibility" do not engender confidence.

[HeliComparator]

From the accident report REDL. My take away is the reticence to use the aircraft may very well be the inability to show what was the initiator of the failure.The use of "could not be determined", "likely", "possibility" do not engender confidence.
True. Except that REDL was not an EC225. Quite similar? - yes. Identical ? No. Cockpit epicyclic chip detector light being one difference.

[Pittsextra]

I think what I am really saying is that humans are extremely bad at quantifying risk, and have a wide range of risk tolerance according to what the activity is. For quantifying risk they will say “Oooh look, that looks really dangerous” without having any concept of what the actual accident statistics are.
I do a lot of gliding in the highlands of Scotland, lots of people think it is highly dangerous. I mean, flying around without an engine? Must be crazy! People refuse to go up because they are too scared.

Recently the wives of two of our gliding club members have had bad accidents, one a broken leg, the other multiple fractures and is wheelchair bound for several months pending recovery. Did they crash in a glider? Of course not, one was a mountain biking accident, the other a skiing accident. Meanwhile no-one at the club has suffered any sort of injury from gliding. So mountainbiking is wonderful. Skiing is lovely, But GLIDING??? NO WAY! Not rational!

Getting back more on topic, I think the 225 head detachment thing was pretty horrific. The pilots were just flying along minding their own business, then BANG - curtains. Not the slightest hint of pilot error. Very nasty.

Meanwhile various other pilots have come to grief due to crashing due to - in our eyes - incompetence and stupidity. Happens relatively often. We would never possibly do that kind of stupid thing, obviously. We are great, wonderful pilots!

But the thing is, those “stupid” pilots all thought they were wonderful too. And maybe they were, most of the time. This is the thing with pilot-induced accidents, it is something that only happens to other people. It could never happen to us. Meanwhile we certainly don’t want to fly a helicopter with a quickly detachable rotor head because we have no control over that, whereas we do have control over not crashing due to being incompetent - because we are wonderful pilots!

However if you look at it from the pax perspective, they don’t particularly care whether they die from a QD rotor head, or from pilot incompetence. Either way, they are dodo-like. Same applies to the cold hard statistics. One needs to look at why bad accidents happen and what can be done to prevent or reduce them. Any pilot is horrified at the thought of the QD rotor head activating its QD function unexpectedly, but we gloss over the possibility that we might be the next cause of an accident. It is all rather illogical,

A helicopter that is better at guiding the pilots away from doing something stupid, is therefore probably the safer aircraft even if it did once suffer from a catastrophic mechanical failure, because the mechanical failure is not the primary source of crashery.

Yes I hear you and broken out statistically in that way pilot error v mechanical failure winner. But it isn’t winning so either the data is being presented badly or the idiots aren’t listening.

Overlying the entire mood will be why it took the 2016 accident to get the manufacturer to find it’s solution which it suggested there was nothing to see before - hence how 2016 could have happened.

That majors upon trust and now the feedback loop to data and how the systems are so much better, etc and…it’s no surprise it isn’t winning. The only way it could is to throw the prior management of EC/Airbus heli under the bus and present the facts / process. Oh and remember the false EMLUB failure alarms in 2 ditching still requires mindfulness that even the best systems errr.

[212man]

long MGB run-dry time

Not sure where you get that from Jim? You mean it has a back-up lube system?

[SASless]

True. Except that REDL was not an EC225. Quite similar? - yes. Identical ? No. Cockpit epicyclic chip detector light being one difference.

HC, not trying to be rude but having a caution light that might illuminate as a major remedial improvement does not exactly fill me with the warm and fuzzies.

I recall in Cockpit BIMs for rotor blades that got disconnected as they were very unreliable and dozens of false indications on various magnetic chip detectors in all sorts of helicopters.

Today we have HUMS....something pioneered by Bristow as I recall that still takes five hours for analysis that usually takes place while the aircraft in question might be out on another flight.

HUMS, in my view, is the very best warning tool if the data can be processed in a most timely fashion and can detect those very minimal changes that might....operative word....MIGHT be detectable and by discovery prevent an inflight disaster.

A Chip Detector in addition to HUMS is fine....but please do not hang your hat on a chip detector as an effective, accurate, reliable fix to a gear box problem.

We still have to recall what the issue is currently and that is the opinion of those being asked to ride in the 225 as their ride to and from work.

What would you have EC/Air Bus/ Oil Companies/ North Sea Operators do to alter those opinions? Or....is it too late to be able to do that?

[HeliComparator]

HC, not trying to be rude but having a caution light that might illuminate as a major remedial improvement does not exactly fill me with the warm and fuzzies.

I recall in Cockpit BIMs for rotor blades that got disconnected as they were very unreliable and dozens of false indications on various magnetic chip detectors in all sorts of helicopters.

Today we have HUMS....something pioneered by Bristow as I recall that still takes five hours for analysis that usually takes place while the aircraft in question might be out on another flight.

HUMS, in my view, is the very best warning tool if the data can be processed in a most timely fashion and can detect those very minimal changes that might....operative word....MIGHT be detectable and by discovery prevent an inflight disaster.

A Chip Detector in addition to HUMS is fine....but please do not hang your hat on a chip detector as an effective, accurate, reliable fix to a gear box problem.

We still have to recall what the issue is currently and that is the opinion of those being asked to ride in the 225 as their ride to and from work.

What would you have EC/Air Bus/ Oil Companies/ North Sea Operators do to alter those opinions? Or....is it too late to be able to do that?
HUMS and chip detectors are complementary. HUMS for non-debris releasing faults, chip for debris releasing faults. It is very hard to do HUMS on planet gears because they don’t stay in one place! So the protection against planet gear problems is only chip detection.

Probably the 225 is a lost cause from a hearts and minds point of view. I’m retired, so I don’t have to fly a flying tractor thing (aka S92). The 175 is nice to fly though.

[megan]

REDL was not an EC225. Quite similar? - yes. Identical ? NoNever having anything to do with French helos I'm not au fait with the various models of Puma, and likely the off shore neither, hence I fear a blanket would be placed over them all. Rather similar to Huey covering 204, 205, 212, 412 and Cobra.

Out of 20,000 hrs 6,000 were flying Turbomeca engines in the 76 in which I had my only hand grenade engine failures, two off, one of them caused a severe bout of PTSD, ask me what I think of Turbomeca engines. ;).

An individuals perception is their reality, is the glass half full or half empty?

[HeliComparator]

Today we have HUMS....something pioneered by Bristow as I recall that still takes five hours for analysis that usually takes place while the aircraft in question might be out on another flight.


Oh and I meant to say, not sure where you get 5 hours from? A few minutes with a modern HUMS (computers are fast these days!). In Bristow we had a policy of requiring a clean post flight HUMS report before a subsequent departure from base. Even if it was a rotors running turn-round in Aberdeen (which takes about 40 mins). When I retired in 2013 I don’t think all other operators did this and it was not required by the legislation or oil company rules. Which was a bit silly!

[jimf671]

Not sure where you get that from Jim? You mean it has a back-up lube system?

Well that might be connected with the H225 number with the back-up lube system being 52 minutes and the S-92 number before alleviations being 11 minutes. And yes, there is a like-for-like issue contained within that sentence but whichever way it's spun, Airbus owned the issue and created a system that exceeded the requirement whereas Sikorsky's approach remains controversial.

[Apate]

H225 number with the back-up lube system being 52 minutes

H225 RFM AFAIK is 30 mins at Vy then Land Immediately.

[Cinderella12]

I think one thing that may be forgotten is this;

On Tues/ Weds 26/27th April 2016 I was chatting to the 225 accident captain about technical things at the CAE Sim Centre in Oslo. On the Friday 29th April, we got the shocking news of the accident followed by learning the names of the crew [who we knew]. There was much discussion of what could cause the main rotor to detach and 'fly' to the ground. We all agreed that it would take a while to ascertain what had happened [ 225s were soon grounded by the Norwegian and Brit CAAs]
.
However, on the following Monday morning Airbus released a statement effectively stating that the there was no fault with the 225 and hinting that there may have been a maintenance problem involved in the cause. On that basis they were happy for continued operations with no requirement to consider a temporary grounding [ this had echoes of their responses to the 2 EM lube ditchings years earlier........no one was injured because of luck in those incidents]. I was astonished [but not entirely surprised] as there was no way they could have known at this point what caused the accident.

I printed off the Airbus statement and showed it to some CHC crews at CAE Oslo as I thought Airbus were being very irresponsible and I wanted their opinions. They all agreed with me.

So......one of the underlying reasons for the 225 not being in the North Sea since, was that element of distrust of not just the aircraft, but also the Airbus organisation..

[jimf671]

... ... ... The passengers always disliked the 225 because it seemed very cramped, ... ...

The 225 is only cramped when things are going well. When things are going very badly, there are two enormous doors and lots of very big escape windows.

The 92 is not so cramped when things are going well. When things are going very badly, there are smaller escape windows and a perhaps confusing arrangement of more adequate escape orifices.

[albatross]

I found Airbus’s actions after this tragedy to be reprehensible. Throwing blame and accusations in every direction.
I had been told in no uncertain terms when, on course, I called one a PUMA that the 225LP was not a Puma but a new aircraft…..after the accident Airbus started to refer to the “Safety Record of the PUMA family”.

On another note they kept talking about the wonderful emergency lube system, which when actually activated, indicated a system failure of the system that led to 2 ditchings. Has it ever been used successfully?

Don’t get me going on the fuel system. If you were PNF you spent 25% of your time checking fuel xfer. especially if using the external aux tanks.

I freely admit it was far from my favourite aircraft.


I think one thing that may be forgotten is this;

On Tues/ Weds 26/27th April 2016 I was chatting to the 225 accident captain about technical things at the CAE Sim Centre in Oslo. On the Friday 29th April, we got the shocking news of the accident followed by learning the names of the crew [who we knew]. There was much discussion of what could cause the main rotor to detach and 'fly' to the ground. We all agreed that it would take a while to ascertain what had happened [ 225s were soon grounded by the Norwegian and Brit CAAs]
.
However, on the following Monday morning Airbus released a statement effectively stating that the there was no fault with the 225 and hinting that there may have been a maintenance problem involved in the cause. On that basis they were happy for continued operations with no requirement to consider a temporary grounding [ this had echoes of their responses to the 2 EM lube ditchings years earlier........no one was injured because of luck in those incidents]. I was astonished [but not entirely surprised] as there was no way they could have known at this point what caused the accident.

I printed off the Airbus statement and showed it to some CHC crews at CAE Oslo as I thought Airbus were being very irresponsible and I wanted their opinions. They all agreed with me.

So......one of the underlying reasons for the 225 not being in the North Sea since, was that element of distrust of not just the aircraft, but also the Airbus organisation..

[HeliComparator]

H225 RFM AFAIK is 30 mins at Vy then Land Immediately.

The certification requirement is for 30 mins, hence that is what it says in the EOPs (and what you should do) but the system was tested for 52 mins. So there is some reserve, although one must still obey the EOP 30 minutes.

[albatross]

The certification requirement is for 30 mins, hence that is what it says in the EOPs (and what you should do) but the system was tested for 52 mins. So there is some reserve, although one must still obey the EOP 30 minutes.

A good system to have as back up.
So with a Vy of 80 kts and providing the emergency lube system works. It is best to have a place to land within 35-40 Nm given zero winds. If not near a rig or the shore at least you have lots of time to look for a passing ship, flat iceberg, etc., brief the pax and get SAR enroute to your probable splash down area. ( we used to joke in the Persian Gulf that the biggest danger in a ditching was to be hit by or hitting a huge tanker. )

The meaning and intention of term “Land or Ditch Immediately” can’t be stressed enough.
It is not meant to save the aircraft but to save as many lives as possible in a very bad situation regardless of what is underneath the helicopter be it jungle, mountain, stormy seas or 5* resort where the Swedish Bikini Team is in training.
A horrible decision for a Capt. to have to make but it must be made.

My only experience with this kind of thing was engine failures in single engine machines where no decision making upon my part was required. I was very lucky in all events. Thank the aviation Gawds for excellent training.
As one great instructor once told me : “When something goes wrong you should be disappointed but not surprised.”

[minigundiplomat]

I trust Vladimir Putin more than I trust the AH leadership team.

AH care about selling helicopters; their safety and through life support, supply chain etc seem to be after thoughts. The H175 should be excluded from the NMH competition until AH can satisfy operators (military and civil) that the culture leading up to, and following, the Turoy accident have been addressed.

[SASless]

Addressed or terminated for cause?