LATAM upset SYD-AKL Mon 11 Mar

[Chris2303]

https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/511423/50-people-treated-after-incident-on-board-latam-airlines-flight-to-auckland

[KiwiAvi8er]

A few articles are attributing the injuries to a “technical issue causing a strong movement” rather than turbulence. Will be interesting to see as some facts are released.

[Chris2303]

https://www.stuff.co.nz/nz-news/350209071/sydney-auckland-flight-drops-suddenly-50-passengers-and-crew-injured

[framer]

Jokat said there was no turbulence after the incident and once the plane landed the pilot came to the back of the plane in “shock”.

“I asked ‘what happened?’ and he said ‘my gauges just blanked out, I lost all of my ability to fly the plane’.”
Stuff News

[logansi]

Not sure of any truth, but rumor going around in a South American pilot group, is that the entire aircraft electrical system (including primary instruments, flight computers, lights, pax IFE, etc) went out for about 45 seconds and when systems came back online, there was a 'large, rapid, uncommanded' movement of the vertical stab.

[nomess]

Faulty RPDU?

The FAA had a AD out around a decade ago from memory around generator failures. Be interested to see if the RAT was deployed

Might be another one for the FAA to look at. They might need to hire some more staff soon due to workload.

[Lookleft]

Just another crap Boeing product. Very similar to a MAS 777 off the West Australian coast in 2005. That one was due to faulty software in the FT-ADIRU.

[nomess]

Just another crap Boeing product.

That really stands out when you look at the A350 program. Sure, Airbus didn’t get everything right, few issues about, but they did a damn good job and I’ve not seen such a flawless entry into service for a new type. It’s a brilliant machine also, crew and passenger favourite.

777X is the next problem child on the horizon. I don’t even need to check the crystal ball to tell me that is going to become a problem also.

[Roo]

…there was a 'large, rapid, uncommanded' movement of the vertical stab.
More likely rapid elevator movement given passengers & cc encounters with the cabin ceiling.

[Lost_in_the_regs]

Just another crap Boeing product. Very similar to a MAS 777 off the West Australian coast in 2005. That one was due to faulty software in the FT-ADIRU.
If the uncommanded rudder inputs are right, the tongue in cheek comment would be if it was an Airbus the the tail would have fallen off!

[Big Silver Spoon]

Or they didn’t recognise, confirm and breathe.

[TWT]

Just another crap Boeing product

QF72 was an A330. Fortunately, events like that are rare.

The cause of the LATAM incident remains unknown at this stage.

[DirectAnywhere]

QF72 was an A330. Fortunately, events like that are rare.

The cause of the LATAM incident remains unknown at this stage.

Different incident. Locations were similar but Malaysian had an upset too. ATSB investigation number 200503722

[TWT]

I'm very much aware of that DirectAnywhere ;). The comment stated that it was just another crap Boeing product.
I merely pointed out that Airbus products are not immune to problems.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
mmmmmmmmmmmmmm

[lucille]

Stuff News

So, no battery powered standby AHRS? Yikes! That’s what you’d call a catastrophe. But, but, but wait… everything resolved itself after a few seconds. Phew.. crisis averted, well other than the 50 pax jammed onto the ceiling enjoying their few seconds of zero G astronaut time.

All I’m saying is there’s more than meets the eye here.. not blaming hardware, not blaming crew.. let’s see what the FDR and CVR say.

[ZFT]

I am amazed that despite all the requests, pax still don't leave seat belts loosely fastened. Would avoid all these unnecessary injuries.

[Bosi72]

Not sure of any truth, but rumor going around in a South American pilot group, is that the entire aircraft electrical system (including primary instruments, flight computers, lights, pax IFE, etc) went out for about 45 seconds and when systems came back online, there was a 'large, rapid, uncommanded' movement of the vertical stab.
Sounds like full system restart..

[Mozella]

Am I the only one old enough to be thinking about the Captain turning around and yelling: CHECK ESSENTIAL!. ?

[Xray4277]

I am amazed that despite all the requests, pax still don't leave seat belts loosely fastened. Would avoid all these unnecessary injuries.

My thoughts exactly...

[Dora-9]

77X is the next problem child on the horizon.

Dunno where you get that from - the B777 also had a virtually flawless entry into service.

[magyar_flyer]

Tbh if it wasn't CAT it is certainly an interesting one
I guess CVR will be if no use ?

[Winjeel Flyer]

Tbh if it wasn't CAT it is certainly an interesting one
I guess CVR will be if no use ?
Don't be too sure; FDR will certainly be of interest though

[Sunnyjohn]

I have a feeling I've read of similar situations over this part of Australia and there was a suggestion that high magnetic fields produced by the iron mines were affecting the controls. Anyone remember?

[clark y]

“The universe is hostile to computers” is a video floating around the web explaining how random cosmic particles can affect computers. It gives examples of it occurring and mentions the Qantas A330 over Western Australian as a possible.

[Lookleft]

I have a feeling I've read of similar situations over this part of Australia and there was a suggestion that high magnetic fields produced by the iron mines were affecting the controls. Anyone remember?

The investigation of the QF A330 looked at the possible effect of the Learmonth facility and found there was no link.

​​​​​​​I merely pointed out that Airbus products are not immune to problems.

True, but the Airbus NB fleet does not have any manufacturing and quality control issues on the scale of Boeings.

[das Uber Soldat]

True, but the Airbus NB fleet does not have any manufacturing and quality control issues on the scale of Boeings.
Oeb48 might like a word.

[FlexibleResponse]

Jokat said there was no turbulence after the incident and once the plane landed the pilot came to the back of the plane in “shock”.

“I asked ‘what happened?’ and he said ‘my gauges just blanked out, I lost all of my ability to fly the plane’.”https://www.stuff.co.nz/nz-news/350209071/sydney-auckland-flight-drops-suddenly-50-passengers-and-crew-injured
Stuff News


It would appear from the pilot's comments that the aircraft had suffered an electrical failure that blanked out his gauges and which also prevented him from controlling the aircraft (ie, he was unable to use the flight controls to maintain cruise flight).

Questions that need answering are:

1. Why the essential/emergency electrical backup for maintaining pilot control of the primary flight controls of the aircraft did not occur?
2. What is programmed to occur to the pitch flight control surface positions (primarily elevator and THS) when electrical power is lost...when electrical power is restored...or briefly interrupted?
3. Is this an electric/flight control program design defect that is a one off, or will it occur every time such a similar electrical fault occurs?

It is of concern that whilst the B787 electrical power system re-configures in flight in this manner, that the flight control surfaces don't at least freeze, rather then putting the aircraft into a zero or negative g bunt which eventuated in injury to passengers hitting the roof.

The FDR will be interesting to analyse when it becomes available.

[Tom Sawyer]

There was an AD in 2020 requiring all operators to power cycle B787s to "flush stale data" in the Common Core System every 51 days. Not sure if it could be connected if it did suffer an indication or control failure?????

Details here ....https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/US-2020-06-14

[C441]

The investigation of the QF A330 looked at the possible effect of the Learmonth facility and found there was no link.

FWIW… This finding always interested me as prior to both the Malaysian and QF72 incidents, we had a momentary total electrical failure in a 767 passing Onslow (100km from Exmouth/NW Cape). The screens went blank for 4 or 5 seconds and the Status page indicated the HMGs had been commanded to operate.
There was no physical change to the flight path. We were enroute PER-DPS and upon arrival in DPS the engineers ran a series of checks that confirmed we had an electrical failure that lasted less than a second.

On the return journey, once again over Onslow, we had a double FMC failure. Again there was no serious adverse reaction on the aircraft other than what you would expect with a dual FMC failure. It took about 5 minutes to get one FMC back up and running. The other would not come back online.

These events were also considered during the QF72 investigation.

[Ushuaia]

I have a feeling I've read of similar situations over this part of Australia and there was a suggestion that high magnetic fields produced by the iron mines were affecting the controls. Anyone remember?
It happened over the Tasman Sea, for heaven's sake. About an hour before arriving in AKL. No iron ore mines there the last time I looked!

Pro pilots scan PPrune in the 24 hrs after rumours of an event, to quickly determine whether something did in fact happen.

A day or so afterwards the threads descend into nonsense and the pro pilots leave.

It's taken less than 24 hours this time!

[LivingtheDream46]

I'll bet my hat there is a lot more to this story........

[Lookleft]

Oeb48 might like a word.

That has to do with software, my statement was about manufacturing and quality control. At least Airbus gave flight crew a heads up with that OEB, Boeing gave Max pilots a single point of failure design in the flight controls.

[Global Aviator]

I see there was a Virgin Atlantic 787 return with the RAT out yesterday, LHR I think.

[MickG0105]

I see there was a Virgin Atlantic 787 return with the RAT out yesterday, LHR I think.
Possibly some sort of green energy initiative.

[Kiwithrottlejockey]

TAIC assisting Chile investigation into LATAM flight LA800 accident | TAIC (https://www.taic.org.nz/news/taic-assisting-chile-investigation-latam-flight-la800-accident)

[HUD Engineer]

So, no battery powered standby AHRS?

I don't think it was quite as you suggest, but with reported loss of primary displays and reported loss of control it is instructive to note that in the anticipated situation for which FAA-2015-0936 Interim Airworthiness Directive that at a predictable point in time the 4-off Generator Control Units could simultaneously go into Fail-safe mode and deprive the aircraft of AC electrical power, it "could result in loss of control of the airplane" and could occur regardless of flight phase That related to exceeding a 248 day powered period, so the AD instructed that power was removed at least every 120 days.

Regarding the 120 day maintenance action interval, note that in 2020, FAA-2020-0205 (not an Interim AD) was raised due to counter/timers associated with the Common Core System, that could affect data integrity after 51 days, and a power-down repeat interval of 25 days was specified in B787–81205–SB420045–00, Issue 2.

There may well be other mechanisms that have similar symptoms, so

...let’s see what the FDR and CVR say.

In this case, they should have a lot more info from the aircraft, although if the CCS was interrupted, the Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder might have some missing ARINC 664 data.

The immediate take away is that whatever did occur, the point in the flight and the actions taken recovered the situation, which 787 pilots will hopefully learn more about soon.

[airspace alpha]

Purely out of interest, the TAIC have taken (seized they say!) the CVR and FDR of the B787. Does this mean the airframe can’t fly until replacements fitted (duh! -no) but where do they come from? ANZ spares, Boeing stock, LATAM bits flown in?

[Kiwithrottlejockey]

Purely out of interest, the TAIC have taken (seized they say!) the CVR and FDR of the B787. Does this mean the airframe can’t fly until replacements fitted (duh! -no) but where do they come from? ANZ spares, Boeing stock, LATAM bits flown in?

The airliner is grounded in Auckland. I'd imagine it won't be allowed to fly out until an investigation is undertaken by Chilean civil aviation authorities.

[Ascend Charlie]

a couple of more seconds (out of control) … we would’ve been straight down to the ocean,

​​​​​​​Ummm...yeah...

[I spy]

Purely out of interest, the TAIC have taken (siezed, they say!) the CVR and FDR of the B78
Yeah, bloody bit dramatic, huh? Seized, no less!

[Lead Balloon]

I don't think it was quite as you suggest, but with reported loss of primary displays and reported loss of control it is instructive to note that in the anticipated situation for which FAA-2015-0936 Interim Airworthiness Directive that at a predictable point in time the 4-off Generator Control Units could simultaneously go into Fail-safe mode and deprive the aircraft of AC electrical power, it "could result in loss of control of the airplane" and could occur regardless of flight phase That related to exceeding a 248 day powered period, so the AD instructed that power was removed at least every 120 days.

Regarding the 120 day maintenance action interval, note that in 2020, FAA-2020-0205 (not an Interim AD) was raised due to counter/timers associated with the Common Core System, that could affect data integrity after 51 days, and a power-down repeat interval of 25 days was specified in B787–81205–SB420045–00, Issue 2.

There may well be other mechanisms that have similar symptoms, so



In this case, they should have a lot more info from the aircraft, although if the CCS was interrupted, the Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder might have some missing ARINC 664 data.

The immediate take away is that whatever did occur, the point in the flight and the actions taken recovered the situation, which 787 pilots will hopefully learn more about soon.Disconnect and reconnect power at least once every 120 days, but maybe it should be every 25 days.

Wot cood posiblie go rong?

It's as if the writing of and functioning of software in aircraft systems isn't the subject of standards. If only software engineers could anticipate the remote possibility that the software they design will be running continuously in hardware that doesn't take a coffee break.

[dragon man]

I'll bet my hat there is a lot more to this story........


From what I’ve been told there certainly is.

[Kiwithrottlejockey]

Yeah, bloody bit dramatic, huh?

The New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission is merely acting on a request for assistance from Chilean civil aviation authorities who have jurisdiction over investigating this incident due to the airliner being in international airspace when it occurred and the airliner being on the Chilean civil register. However, because NZ was the nearest country and that is where the airliner landed and is now grounded, I guess it is only natural for Chilean civil aviation authorities to ask TAIC to secure all evidence until they can get their own investigators to Auckland. Under the Transport Accident Investigation Commission's charter, they are required to render assistance to foreign civil aviation and maritime authorities if requested. For those of you outside NZ, TAIC's mandate is to investigate, on a no blame basis, accidents and serious operating incidents in the aviation, maritime and railway transport modes. Their primary purpose is not to point the finger, but to get to the bottom of what actually occurred, any relevant background information, what can be learned from the findings, and how such an occurrence can be prevented from happening in the future. Any legal prosecutions in NZ come not from TAIC, but from other government agencies and regulatory bodies, such as NZ Civil Aviation Authority, NZ Maritime Authority, Waka Kotahi NZ Land Transport Agency, or NZ Police.

[das Uber Soldat]

That has to do with software, my statement was about manufacturing and quality control. At least Airbus gave flight crew a heads up with that OEB, Boeing gave Max pilots a single point of failure design in the flight controls.
Airbus gave flight crew a heads up about erroneous sensor inputs causing uncommanded nose down inputs before QF72? News to me.

I'm no fan of Boeing. The 787 is a piece of garbage. The single point of failure behind the MAX accidents is abhorent design philosphy. No argument from me there. I just dont get why Airbus seems to get a freep ass when the only reason that 330 didn't spear into the ground precisely as the Max did was luck. At least the Max pilots had a memory item specifically designed to address the trim runaway in the 737. No such procedure in the 330 back in 2008, unless I"m mistaken?

Anyway, let the Boeing bashing continue. Any manufacturer that makes me sit there and twist the heading bug whilst in managed lateral navigation for 10 hours at a time deserves all the criticism it gets.

[physicus]

System redundancy at Airbus at least means that: redundancy. Different systems. At Boeing, it's misinterpreted to mean "more of the same".

Airbus's ELACs are truly redundant Motorola and Intel systems at the hardware level, and programmed in different languages, by different teams, precisely to provide redundancy at the code/microprocessor level. You might get a hint of why that matters right about when all three GCUs fail at the same time in a 787 because of a coding error.

See here for more detail: https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/517522-why-so-many-computers-flight-controls-a320-2.html

I'm also noting that Boeing did another booboo with their integrated IRSs in the 787 that can no longer operate independently of GNSS. That's (really) bad news when you're being spoofed.

The 787 (and the MAX) are piss poor designs that should never have been approved to fly. Can't wait for one of the first few 787's that came off the line to get a lightning strike in the wing. They're an accident waiting to happen. Which is only acceptable in which world? Right. Accounting world. And that's who runs that company these days.

Shame.

[bill fly]

Concerning: 2. What is programmed to occur to the pitch flight control surface positions (primarily elevator and THS) when electrical power is lost...when electrical power is restored..?

One possible scenario could be a pilot trying to maintain attitude during the outage by control input - unsuccessfully - then power being restored while a (possibly full deflection) input is still being applied...

[Ngineer]

For those interested in the FAA’s directive regarding depowering the CDN/aircraft, the link below will explain it somewhat.

https://ioactive.com/reverse-engineers-perspective-on-the-boeing-787-51-days-airworthiness-directive/

[Reely340]

I don't think it was quite as you suggest, but with reported loss of primary displays and reported loss of control it is instructive to note that in the anticipated situation for which FAA-2015-0936 Interim Airworthiness Directive that at a predictable point in time the 4-off Generator Control Units could simultaneously go into Fail-safe mode and deprive the aircraft of AC electrical power, it "could result in loss of control of the airplane" and could occur regardless of flight phase That related to exceeding a 248 day powered period, so the AD instructed that power was removed at least every 120 days.

Regarding the 120 day maintenance action interval, note that in 2020, FAA-2020-0205 (not an Interim AD) was raised due to counter/timers associated with the Common Core System, that could affect data integrity after 51 days, and a power-down repeat interval of 25 days was specified in B787–81205–SB420045–00, Issue 2.

Sweet! :E
Sounds like they are running Windows OS. At one of my customers, the boss bought an accounting system running on windows, using SQL Server als Database. Three years ago they were forced to add a POS (PointOfSales) module issuing the cryptographically linked cash-receipts as per government anti-fraud-laws.
Since then, every 3 weeks +/- one week one of the 10 cashier systems would lock up (while cash customer is waiting).
Manufacturer "looked into it" didn't find anything to fix and installed a Sunday morning reboot of application and database server,
problem "solved the Microsoft way".

The merchandise handling system (the one I wrote) runs 24/7 on an ORACLE database on Linux (yes, open source). Current uptime is 300 days (e.g. since last hardware failure). In my 35 years of experience I cannot imagine any problem on Linux that would "require" a server reboot to clear.
One of the biggest Austrian Banks I do consulting for is running slightly north of 300 ORACLE Databases on Linux, including multi terabyte trading systems,
and not one of them "needs" periodical reboots.

Lesson to learn:
any system that needs regular reboots to keep working contains abysmal software not thorougly tested.
If after start, cruise and landing an FMC accumulates "debris" data that needs to be cleared by reboot the software is crap,
not thorougly cleaning up data traces after completing the "landing" phase.
That could be because the designing engineers were idiots, or because cost cutting mangement did not provide them with ample resources for thoroughly testing before claiming "read for business".
You may guess what my experience in that field is.

hint:
I've witnessed a european airlive got bust because clueless management went from hierarchical database system to relational database (e.g. total redesign) w/o having their own engineers lead in that process and impatiantly declaring "transition done" when it wasn't.

[Capt Fathom]

‘Hey. What does this button do?’ Oops!

[cLeArIcE]

Is this a good old case of " One can seldom encounter a problem so serious that ones rash or ill-thought-out reactions are incapable of making the problem much worse."

[krismiler]

https://www.aviationtoday.com/2015/05/05/boeing-787-power-issue-to-receive-software-fix/


Avionics Today 05-05-2015] Boeing will provide a software update later this year to address an issue that causes the 787 Dreamliner’s Generator Control Units (GCUs) to simultaneously go into failsafe mode after being powered continuously for 248 days. The FAA has issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) calling for 787 operators to address the glitch, which is caused by a software counter internal to the GCUs that will overflow after 248 days of continuous power, the AD states.

https://www.aviationtoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Boeing20787209.jpg

Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner. Photo: Boeing

According to the FAA’s directive, when a 787 has been powered continuously for 248 days, it can lose all Alternating Current (AC) electrical power due to the GCU software anomaly. The directive requires a repetitive maintenance task for electrical power deactivation on 787s.

“This condition is caused by a software counter internal to the GCUs that will overflow after 248 days of continuous power. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of all AC electrical power, which could result in loss of control of the airplane,” the FAA’s directive states.

Boeing plans on issuing a software update for the 787 by the fourth quarter of 2015 to address the issue.

Originally, Boeing observed this GCU software issue during lab testing after eight months of continuous power. After discovering the issue, Boeing recommended the AD’s mandated actions to operators on April 19, 2015.

“It is important to note this issue was observed in the lab only after eight months of continuous power, which would be highly unusual. All operators have already completed the cycle off-cycle on fix, and they know how often they need to do it in the future until the software update arrives later this year,” a spokesman for Boeing told Avionics Magazine.

Most importantly, the AD addresses an anomaly that would only occur under extremely rare conditions within normal airline fleet schedules. By performing a power-off/power-on cycle, operators eliminate the risk that all six generators aboard the aircraft would lose power at the same time.

In the directive, the FAA indicates that in the occurrence that the four main GCUs associated with the engine mounted generators were powered up at the same time, the four GCUs would all fail at the same time. This would result in a “loss of all AC electrical power regardless of flight phase,” the AD states.

Boeing 787 fleet maintenance records indicate that all in-service airplanes have already performed a power-off/power-on cycle within their ongoing maintenance schedules. Operators that have a definitive record of a power cycle within the last 120 days do not need to take any immediate action, Boeing has confirmed. A total of 28 aircraft in the U.S. registry are affected by the AD, which has also determined that the cost of the electrical power deactivation is one work hour at $85 per deactivation cycle.
Since it first entered service in 2011, Boeing has delivered 258 total 787s, and has a backlog of 847 undelivered Dreamliners.

[rcoight]

So is the system so stupid that it doesn’t even warn of the impending need to power off if it hasn’t been done by the correct interval?
Why does it let the aircraft take off if it will decide to shut everything down half way through the flight?

[Reely340]

https://www.aviationtoday.com/2015/05/05/boeing-787-power-issue-to-receive-software-fix/


Avionics Today 05-05-2015] Boeing will provide a software update later this year to address an issue that causes the 787 Dreamliner’s Generator Control Units (GCUs) to simultaneously go into failsafe mode after being powered continuously for 248 days. The FAA has issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) calling for 787 operators to address the glitch, which is caused by a software counter internal to the GCUs that will overflow after 248 days of continuous power, the AD states.

Outrageous! What monkeys are coding these things ?

HP and Dell managed to sell a lot of Enterprise class SSDs (solid state disks) made by SanDisk, where the firmware programmers managed to implement an operating hours counter that causes the thing to irrevocably brick, as soon as it reaches 32768 (2 to the power of 15) hours.
https://www.thestack.technology/ssd-death-bug-40000-hours-sandisk/
In an instant all your terabytes of data on the SSDs - while still "stored" - cannot accessed anymore.
And the unit cannot be patched, as it doesn't talk to the outside world anymore.

Now, if you installed a couple of them in a server, for redundancy for instance, the tiny variations of the internal clocks
will have them die within for example 10 hours of each other, just like the EC135 accident at night over Edinburgh when
the second engine (twin engine redundancy, we've heard it) went silent some 32 seconds after the first one,
while the POH claims the differently sizes tanks should(!) cause a 4 minute delay between fuel starvations.

[B2N2]

So is the system so stupid that it doesn’t even warn of the impending need to power off if it hasn’t been done by the correct interval?
Why does it let the aircraft take off if it will decide to shut everything down half way through the flight?

Boeing engineering? The same outsourced low cost software engineers?

https://www.industryweek.com/supply-chain/article/22027840/boeings-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers

Remember some big brains who didn’t anticipate Y2K.

[Reely340]

So is the system so stupid that it doesn’t even warn of the impending need to power off if it hasn’t been done by the correct interval?
Why does it let the aircraft take off if it will decide to shut everything down half way through the flight?
That shutdown is not a planned feature ( hence no advance warning) but result of a miscoded counter software !

[Andy_S]

So is the system so stupid that it doesn’t even warn of the impending need to power off if it hasn’t been done by the correct interval?
Why does it let the aircraft take off if it will decide to shut everything down half way through the flight?

I think you're crediting "the system" with intelligence, when it fact it's just following a set of pre-defined rules.

It doesn't look ahead. It doesn't anticipate. It doesn't know that it will have to shut down. It just reaches a particular timed point at which (if I understand correctly) the software falls over.

That's assuming of course that it is a software issue. Which given that a 'fix' was apparently made available several years ago is by no means nailed on.

[Reely340]

Boeing engineering? The same outsourced low cost software engineers?

https://www.industryweek.com/supply-chain/article/22027840/boeings-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers

Remember some big brains who didn’t anticipate Y2K.For crying out loud! Exactly this subcontractor company's "engineers" two years ago needed diskspace for a task in the huge bank I mentioned earlier. They found a directory containing a lot of files named arch<blabla>.log . Thinking these are just left over log files they deleted them w/o talking to the grown ups.
But it was the transactions logs of database which are pivotal for being able to recover the database in case of media failures.
Luckily one of us overpair european dinosaurs discovered that mess and took counter action.

One would think management immediately cancelled that subcontract and employed a couple more local pros, being thankfor "lesson learned w/o damage".
But we all can guess who still is allowed and payed to mess with central, business critical banking databases.

Too cheap to get rid of, seems to be management's motto.

[lucille]

Is it ever likely that an aircraft would remain electrically powered up continuously for 248 days? Possible, certainly but likely?
And when was the last time that LATAM 787 was totally dark?

[Karearea]

AO-2024-002
Boeing 787-9, in-flight disturbance over Tasman Sea, 11 March 2024
Status
Current
Occurrence Date
11 Mar 2024
Jurisdiction
Overseas
TAIC is providing support for an investigation by Chilean investigation authority, the Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil into an incident involving a Boeing 787 aircraft in international air space on its way to New Zealand.

The reported circumstances were that on 11 March 2024, a Boeing 787-9 passenger aircraft, registration CC-BGG, was traveling from Sydney, Australia, to Auckland, New Zealand. The aircraft was operated by LATAM Airlines. About 250 nautical miles from Auckland, it encountered a ‘technical problem’ and a resulting ‘strong movement’ in which around 50 passengers, including cabin crew, were injured. The aircraft landed in Auckland safely. No fatalities were reported.

Chile, as the State of Registry, is investigating this incident and has requested New Zealand’s assistance. TAIC is gathering evidence on behalf of Chile. TAIC will not produce a report for this inquiry. This is a responsibility of Chile authorities.

(NZ) Transport Accident Investigation Commission: Inquiry AO-2024-002 Boeing 787-9, in-flight disturbance over Tasman Sea, 11 March 2024 (https://www.taic.org.nz/inquiry/ao-2024-002)

[Ngineer]

‘Hey. What does this button do?’ Oops!

hopefully not the CCR reset switches 😀

[Needle Knocker]

Airbus gave flight crew a heads up about erroneous sensor inputs causing uncommanded nose down inputs before QF72? News to me.

It's been a few years since I studied the QF72 official report in depth, but off memory, switching off any 2 of the 3 ADIRUs would have degraded the active flight law from Normal to Alternate - at which point flight envelope protections reverted to advisory only. If the QF72 crew had done this it would have prevented subsequent pitch-downs, but as the procedure wasn't prumulgated at the time it was deemed that the flight crew acted appropriately. It's my understanding that this procedure was subsequently prumulgated and boldfaced - primarily as a result of this incident.

FYI the issue wasn't caused by "erronious sensor inputs" - it was caused by one of the ADIRUs sending invalid outputs to valid sensor inputs, and it being accepted due to some incredibly unfortunate timing. Off memory there was a reasonably good case to argue that it was playing "mix and match" with data labling; specifically, labeling altitude data as AoA data, which the flight envelope protections subsequently acted on. Again, from memory, Airbus changed the AoA algorithm, made improvements to the BITE (Built In Test Equipment) and introduced the procedure to degrade the active flight law. May have been one more thing but I can't remember.

the only reason that 330 didn't spear into the ground precisely as the Max did was luck. At least the Max pilots had a memory item specifically designed to address the trim runaway in the 737. No such procedure in the 330 back in 2008, unless I"m mistaken?

The A330 has additional protections whenever the radar altimeters detect that it's within 500 feet of the ground, but I'm uncertain if these would have made any difference. The pitch down events were of incredibly short duration - but abrupt.

If anyone is interested, the official report gives a facinating insight into Airbus design philosophy and system detail - especially on the A330 (also applies to A340 I believe). The official report can be found here: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-070

I remember at the time counting about 7 "holes" in safety nets that just happened to line up; it was incredibly "unlucky" but - none-the-less - shouldn't have happened, but did. In a comparison study of the official report of a similar Boeing event that resulted in an uncommanded pitch-up I was left with the impression that whereas Airbus engineer in a gobsmacking amount of fault-tolerance, safety, and redundancy to the flight control systems, Boeing lagged somewhat behind; they too had redundancy & fault-tolerance, but by my observation, just not as much; and after their design decisions regarding MCAS on the MAX came to light it reinforced to me that they still have a long way to go to catch up.

[Orange future]

Dunno where you get that from - the B777 also had a virtually flawless entry into service.Thats great, but the 777X definitely has not.

At least half a decade late and many many green X’s sitting around in the rain at Paine Field.

And some rather dodgy inflight issues during test flying that the Seattle Times are trying to get to the bottom of.

The FAA are deeply embarrassed by the fraudulent Max certification and will not be pencil whipping this one.

The 767 tanker, full of problems with some being returned.

The Max, nothing needs to be added.

The Dreamburner, ongoing inflight and significant manufacturing issues.

The question remains, what exactly does Boeing do well these days?

Oh thats right, running a zombie business in a finacialised economy propped up by tax payer money.

[Ollie Onion]

I hear there was a Flight Attendant on the flight deck at the time so this will be interesting.

[Roo]

System redundancy at Airbus at least means that: redundancy. Different systems. At Boeing, it's misinterpreted to mean "more of the same".

.... You might get a hint of why that matters right about when all three GCUs fail at the same time in a 787 because of a coding error.
The 787 has six Generators not three, but hey, you know what you are talking about !


I'm also noting that Boeing did another booboo with their integrated IRSs in the 787 that can no longer operate independently of GNSS. That's (really) bad news when you're being spoofed.
I am noting that you have NFI. 787 GPS NAV can be & is set to off in areas of known spoofing. It then operates independently of GNSS (IRS with radio updates), but whatever you reckon.

When I flew Airbii, I recall the 330 had a wonderful feature that disabled its flaps once retracted inflight, if a monthly inspection had been overlooked. Requiring a flapless landing. Was that because it was programmed for redundancy in different languages by different teams? ;)

Back on topic, it will be interesting to see what caused this event.

[dragon man]

FROM THE AUSTRALIAN

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1320x2000/img_7445_858fff84aae610e81e9952e4b60e844da34740ac.jpeg

[Lead Balloon]

Maybe the seat adjustment and the presence of the FA in the cockpit are related...

[EDLB]

Are the stopover hotels now so lousy that the usual activities have moved to the flight deck? At least they can make a memorable TOC entry into their logbook...

[mahogany bob]

Was this jet powered up for more than 248 hours?
Are all 787 s grounded until this incident is checked out
at LL it would have crashed ?
computers - are there any more ‘computer glitches ‘ out there hidden under the carpet waiting to pounce?

bring back fly by wire - thick wire!

I think I’ll travel by boat! or at least keep my seat belt firmly fastened.

[clearedtocross]

Dont look for signed or unsigned integer overflow any further. The flat-earthers predicted it: If you fly past the edge of the world, the nose will drop sharply. And New Zealand is probably near the end of the world.

[compressor stall]

Re the seat theory.

IIRC the RAF did similar with a 330 tanker. PIC had a camera between the armrest and the stick. Pushed the seat forward and pushed it into a nosedive.

[Noeyedear]

Wouldn't it be crazy if the "trouble with the seat ..mechanism" was because the alleged F/A had leant against the fore/aft switch on top of the seat back, perhaps with an elbow, and pushed the Captain (possibly sitting in a relaxed position) forward so legs came into contact with the the control column resulting in A/P disconnect?

[KAPAC]

Happened in chieftain also . Autopilot disconnected and climb power on one engine .

[Capt Fathom]

Happened in chieftain also . Autopilot disconnected and climb power on one engine .

So tell us exactly what happened in the Chieftain?

[MickG0105]

Re the seat theory.

IIRC the RAF did similar with a 330 tanker. PIC had a camera between the armrest and the stick. Pushed the seat forward and pushed it into a nosedive.
RAF Voyager ZZ333 - 9 February 2014. The PIC was court martialed for it. A very good account of it here here.

​​​​​​

[Eutychus]

If it was a, um, seat malfunction, the pilot's account that all the instrument panels blacked out before mysteriously reappearing was devised very quickly and will not hold water very long?

[Sailvi767]

That really stands out when you look at the A350 program. Sure, Airbus didn’t get everything right, few issues about, but they did a damn good job and I’ve not seen such a flawless entry into service for a new type. It’s a brilliant machine also, crew and passenger favourite.

777X is the next problem child on the horizon. I don’t even need to check the crystal ball to tell me that is going to become a problem also.

If only Airbus had done as well with the A330-900.

[Sailvi767]

The 787 has six Generators not three, but hey, you know what you are talking about !

I am noting that you have NFI. 787 GPS NAV can be & is set to off in areas of known spoofing. It then operates independently of GNSS (IRS with radio updates), but whatever you reckon.

When I flew Airbii, I recall the 330 had a wonderful feature that disabled its flaps once retracted inflight, if a monthly inspection had been overlooked. Requiring a flapless landing. Was that because it was programmed for redundancy in different languages by different teams? ;)

Back on topic, it will be interesting to see what caused this event.


The A330 has also had repeated incidents of losing all GPS nav for the remainder of the flight after the GPS gets jammed. Happened to me departing out of TLV. No GPS for next 12 hours.

[Sailvi767]

If it was a, um, seat malfunction, the pilot's account that all the instrument panels blacked out before mysteriously reappearing was devised very quickly and will not hold water very long?

I suspect based on the lack of any short term recommendations or even concerns about the 787 from this incident they already know exactly what happened.

[lucille]

I suspect based on the lack of any short term recommendations or even concerns about the 787 from this incident they already know exactly what happened.

But on the other hand, if it was clearly not an aircraft issue, Boeing would have quickly leaked the cause. Every minute this drags on is costing Boeing a lot in lost reputation, trust and brand value.

All manufacturers are always quick to pin the blame on crews as a matter of commercial and marketing imperative.

[EDLB]

Lets wait for the first reports if the cause was an integer or gymnastics overflow...

[AerocatS2A]

Is there any actual evidence for the "seat theory"? Or is it just some random's idea? I can't access the full article on The Australian and haven't seen any mention of it elsewhere. It also doesn't correspond with previous statements from passengers about what they were told by the crew.

[Window heat]

The CVR will confirm or disprove the seat theory. There will be electric seat motor noise followed by expletives if it’s true.

[C441]

If it was a, um, seat malfunction, the pilot's account that all the instrument panels blacked out before mysteriously reappearing was devised very quickly and will not hold water very long?
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the only mention of the panels going blank is from a passenger who claims the Captain told him that.
Maybe he did, but passengers often say some 'interesting' things after they've been involved in a newsworthy event and a camera/microphone is thrust in front of them.

[Mach2point7]

Very true C441. Both the passengers and the media get a bit carried away in these events. "The jolt lasted about “40 milliseconds” according to passenger ......" according to The Australian, March 12.

[Chris2303]

Is there any actual evidence for the "seat theory"? Or is it just some random's idea? I can't access the full article on The Australian and haven't seen any mention of it elsewhere. It also doesn't correspond with previous statements from passengers about what they were told by the crew.
"A new theory has emerged for the terrifying drop in altitude on a LATAM airlines flight from Sydney to Auckland which injured up to 50 passengers and crew.It is understood an issue with the electric seat mechanism in the cockpit may have pushed the pilot into the flight controls at such an angle the Boeing 787-9 was briefly sent into a deep dive.

The flight crew was able to recover the aircraft quickly, but the suddenness of the altitude loss meant any passengers and crew who were unrestrained were launched into the ceiling.

The explanation for the incident came as questions were asked about the safety of Boeing 787-9s, which are operated by numerous airlines, including Qantas, Air New Zealand and Singapore Airlines.

An airline industry insider said the carriers were not reacting because of the information which had been shared with them after the LATAM incident (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/aviation/50-people-injured-by-strong-movement-on-latam-flight-from-sydney-to-auckland/news-story/56971d0bf4264f71a4d220fadb8a1f2b).

“As soon as something like this occurs, information is shared with other operators of the aircraft type, to help them decide what action they may need to take,” said the source.

“In this case, it was none because the cause wasn’t related to a problem with the aircraft, it was something that happened in the cockpit.”

A pilot with knowledge of 787-9s said what was described could happen quite easily if the pilot’s seat was electrically driven forward.

“The control column if pushed forward enough, will override the autopilot causing it to disconnect,” said the pilot.

“The aircraft would then suddenly pitch down causing a negative G scenario where people would be up in the air if no seatbelt was worn.”


50 passengers injured on LATAM flight from SydneyLATAM airlines has so far only said a technical issue caused the “strong movement” which saw 13 passengers and crew taken to hospital in Auckland, including four Australians.

Dozens more were assessed and treated at the airport following Monday’s flight.

It was revealed the pilot told a passenger on board his flight control gauges momentarily went blank, resulting in the frightening drop.

Pilots familiar with Boeing aircraft expressed surprise such a thing could happen with the 787-9, but a Federal Aviation Administration directive (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/aviation/latam-incident-linked-to-risk-of-flight-systems-simultaneously-resetting/news-story/495eeac17b8f22a7311847bf2e292456)issued in 2016 and 2020 warned all three flight control modules could simultaneously reset in certain circumstances.

Such a reset would only happen if the aircraft’s systems were not powered down for 22-days, which was considered highly unlikely to occur.

Chile’s Director General de Aeronautica Civil was investigating the incident with assistance from New Zealand’s Transport Accident Investigation Commission.

TAIC was responsible for gathering evidence, and had seized the cockpit voice and flight data recorders.

A Boeing spokesman said the manufacturer stood ready to support investigation-related activities as requested.

LATAM Airlines was formed in 2012 as the result of a merger by Chile’s Lan Airlines and Brazil’s Tam airlines.

It is considered the safest airline in the region and had a six out of seven-star rating on airlineratings.com."

[Pearly White]

Yeah, bloody bit dramatic, huh? Siezed!
Am I being a spelling pedant if I say they SEIZED it?

[goeasy]

I see aircraft positions back to Santiago today… so no major structural or system issues one would assume.?

[Max Tow]

Reports from LATAM connections coincide with #85 above but line given is apparently aircraft fault. I guess we'll see and I'm sure Boeing will clarify asap...would be interested to know numbers/location of those in cockpit.

Also:https://theaircurrent.com/feed/dispatches/pilot-seat-movement-at-center-of-latam-787-9-dive-investigation/

[lucille]

Next thing you know, there’ll be an AD limiting the girth of pilots on the 787.

[AerocatS2A]

Plane dropped from F390 to a090..
No it didn’t.

[Chronic Snoozer]

Plane dropped from F390 to a090. Not sure why it’s taking LATAM so long to release this info.30,000’. Holy soiled trousers, Batman!

[C441]

Plane dropped from F390 to a090..
Not according to Flightradar unless of course you are referring to its normal descent.:rolleyes:
There are a couple of 25ft altitude deviations but that is common on FR, especially with the 787 for some reason.

[Chronic Snoozer]

Not according to Flightradar unless of course you are referring to its normal descent.:rolleyes:
There are a couple of 25ft altitude deviations but that is common on FR, especially with the 787 for some reason.

The data isn’t complete. There are gaps on FR24. I think the flight was at F410 too.

[Buswinker]

If the seat theory proves to be accurate, there’s a haiku in it somewhere

https://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-613863.html

[mahogany bob]

Was it a seat malfunction
a total flying control failure following software reset
or something else
(magnetic field !!)

surely Boeing should have issued a statement by now to end speculation - why haven’t they?

[RickNRoll]

Am I being a spelling pedant if I say they SEIZED it?
I before E except after C.

Oh, and before Z.

[Max Tow]

surely Boeing should have issued a statement by now to end speculation - why haven’t they?

Because that's not how accident investigation works. Boeing as manufacturer is only one of the parties potentially involved and will send out a notice to operators if any immediate safety actions, modifications or checks are required. You may however regard the lack of such to date as indicative.

[Capn Bloggs]

Am I being a spelling pedant if I say they SEIZED it?
Definitely not. Somebody's gotta keep the show upright and on the rails. :E

[Jonty]

Reuters are running a story based on this report.

Pilot Seat Report (https://theaircurrent.com/feed/dispatches/pilot-seat-movement-at-center-of-latam-787-9-dive-investigation/)

[fox niner]

The 787 pilot seat can be moved electrically by 2 distinct switches. One is located on the usual place, down near your hip. It is located on the side of the seat adjacent to the pedestal. (Boeing terminology: aisle stand)

The other switch, is located on TOP of the seat back, in the middle. Just behind the head rest. This switch is meant to make it easier to move the seat back, so you can get in more easily.

This second switch is new to me. I have been flying boeings for 29 years now, and this was the first time that I saw this second switch. 777, 747, 767 and obviously also the 737 all do not have this feature.

It is now possible for “others” who are not in the seat, to easily operate the seat electrically.

[bill fly]

Well, that showed us... There we all were having a nice time knocking cheap programmers and all the time it was the seat... There was an inverse incident on another airline where the pilot flying had his (improperly locked) seat run rearwards on Take off, causing a pitch up and feet away from the brakes etc. Not sure what happened there but the assisting pilot had his hands and feet full for a while.

Let's hope the electrical story doesn't hang the crew.

[Needle Knocker]

It is now possible for “others” who are not in the seat, to easily operate the seat electrically.

My understanding is that the switch on the back of the seat is covered. As such, would it be accurate to say that although anyone could operate the seat, it wouldn't normally be possible for someone to operate it accidentally? (eg as in "leaning on the back of the seat whilst having a chat").

I'm also curious - given the wording "it is understood the seat movement at cruise altitude on the flight was “pilot induced, not intentionally.”" - could this be a "seat runaway" where, for example, one of the pilots returns to their seat after a restroom break (I believe this was just prior to ToD, so perhaps a good time?) - commands the seat to move forward again ("pilot induced") side switch sticks and keeps going and going and going? (thus "not intentionally").

Is there an easy way to stop a seat "runaway"? Is there a mechanical way to reposition it should a runaway occur? Is it inevitable that an average size pilot would be forced into the yoke in the event of a seat runaway?

[Sailvi767]

The seats have mechanical stops. This has happened in the past and it’s usually only an issue if the pilot has his legs in an odd position like he was twisting around to speak to someone. If obese I guess it could also be a issue before the seat hit the stops.

[Window heat]

I flew the 737 and 744 with electric seats. I can’t see it happening as the seats move so slowly. You’d have to be fat, have your legs crossed behind the yoke or a bit dim to make push it over.

[clark y]

This issue can occur when a pilot moves a seat momentarily and the seat continues on its own almost like a sticky activation switch. Any direction.
The seats also have an electrical master switch on them.

Will turning the seat off within a certain time frame be the next memory item or split switches like stab trim?

Needle Knocker, my GUESS is that if you use the mechanical levers to adjust the seat is it will disconnect a clutch while you hold the lever and stop moving(or freely slide along the rails, or down rapidly). I can only guess the motor would stop when it hits a limit switch.
The seats can be used with manual adjustments only.

[MechEngr]

What if, and this is spit balling at its finest, the guy who came out was reporting correctly, that the displays did go dark. And the reason for all this is ...

He fell asleep and he could no longer see the displays while his finger was jammed into the seat switch and he woke up when the plane went nuts from him being pushed into the wheel. And ... the other pilot was also rudely awakened from their own nap.

(Now let's see how long this entirely unfounded speculation takes to make it to a news service.)

[Noeyedear]

have your legs crossed behind the yoke.............to make push it over.

I believe we have a winner. Let's see what comes.

[Ascend Charlie]

An obese airline pilot? Obviously not an Oz pilot, with all the medical conditions required to satisfy the Oz Chief DAME. All pilots are fine examples of the human physique.

[bluesideoops]

What if someone was sat on the lap of the pilot between himself and the control column? :ooh:

[das Uber Soldat]

I dont buy the 'CC accidently leaning against the swith' theory floating around. The switch has a cover, and takes a decent amount of finger force to get the seat to move. It would be absolutelu obvious to anyone who pushed it that they were the cause of the movement, and they'd let go. No way they just hold it whlist the captain likely shouts about wtf is happening.

My moneys on CM1 being occupied by more than 1 person ;)

[J.L.Seagull]

I dont buy the 'CC accidently leaning against the swith' theory floating around. The switch has a cover, and takes a decent amount of finger force to get the seat to move. It would be absolutelu obvious to anyone who pushed it that they were the cause of the movement, and they'd let go. No way they just hold it whlist the captain likely shouts about wtf is happening.

My moneys on CM1 being occupied by more than 1 person ;)


I guess you haven't seen the video then..

[tdracer]

Just spitballing here, but perhaps the switch cover was broken or damaged such that it didn't provide the intended function.
No idea about the LATAM incident aircraft, but we tend to forget that the 787 has been in commercial service for over12 years - there are some pretty high time aircraft out there that are getting rather worn...

[Ollie Onion]

Well crew at my airline have had a notice issued warning Cabin Crew about inadvertent activation of the pilot seat when leaning on it.

[dejapoo]

Well crew at my airline have had a notice issued warning Cabin Crew about inadvertent activation of the pilot seat when leaning on it.

"Leaning on it" cough. Couldn't imagine why a cabin crew would be leaning on the seat... mind boggles.

[compressor stall]

That’s is very unlikely (but not impossible) to be a thing a safety department makes up on speculation.

I’ll wager that it is in reaction to an operator safety alert (equivalent) from Boeing.

[Reely340]

I'm also curious - given the wording "it is understood the seat movement at cruise altitude on the flight was “pilot induced, not intentionally.”" - could this be a "seat runaway" where, for example, one of the pilots returns to their seat after a restroom break (I believe this was just prior to ToD, so perhaps a good time?) - commands the seat to move forward again ("pilot induced") side switch sticks and keeps going and going and going? (thus "not intentionally").Or - as the a/c was a Boeing - the CoPilot wanted to adjuist his seat, activated his switch and the other seatr started moving. :E

Boeing has a long history of messed up cabling, swapping right with left :

Back in the days of me attending university in the 90ies there was a joke about a priest at his final visit to a death row imate carring good and bad news: bad was that the convict's appeal was denied, good was that Boeing did the cabeling on the electric chair.
(background given was a then recent incident, where extinguishing an actual fire in one engnie actually soaked the remaining good engine due to mis-cabling)
I was truly amazed at reading this from 2013 : https://www.flyingmag.com/aircraft-jets-fire-suppression-system-wiring-flaw-latest-boeing-787-woe/

Somehow they don't learn and do not fix their quality checks.

[gearlever]

LATAM Flt 800 UPDATE!

[Sailvi767]

I suspect the seat had actually been moved a time or two before this incident. Doubtful cabling was reversed. I did have an Airbus seat that went up when you pushed down. The seat had however just been replaced. The issue was apparent 5 seconds after sitting down.

[jugofpropwash]

What if the pilot had his lunch tray in his lap? FA leans over, perhaps to give him a cup of coffee, and leans on the possibly broken cover of the seat switch? Could the tray get pinched between the pilot and the controls? It might take a bit to extricate the tray if it got jammed in there.

A couple further questions. Could spilled liquid short out either of the seat switches and cause a malfunction? And if a dinner tray was shoved into the controls, is there anything it could possibly hit which would cause the panel to go dark?

[AerialPerspective]

Just another crap Boeing product. Very similar to a MAS 777 off the West Australian coast in 2005. That one was due to faulty software in the FT-ADIRU.

And the MH A330 and QF A330 off Western Australia? Was that due to good 'Airbus' design flaws as opposed to 'crap Boeing product'.

Don't get me wrong, I'm glad QF is buying more Airbus', especially the A350 because it's a beginning of life design, not a 30 year old re-hash with a few token bits of composite nailed on, but why do I hear so much about the woeful reliability of the A380 then?

[AerialPerspective]

Or - as the a/c was a Boeing - the CoPilot wanted to adjuist his seat, activated his switch and the other seatr started moving. :E

Boeing has a long history of messed up cabling, swapping right with left :

Back in the days of me attending university in the 90ies there was a joke about a priest at his final visit to a death row imate carring good and bad news: bad was that the convict's appeal was denied, good was that Boeing did the cabeling on the electric chair.
(background given was a then recent incident, where extinguishing an actual fire in one engnie actually soaked the remaining good engine due to mis-cabling)
I was truly amazed at reading this from 2013 : https://www.flyingmag.com/aircraft-jets-fire-suppression-system-wiring-flaw-latest-boeing-787-woe/

Somehow they don't learn and do not fix their quality checks.

The 'merger' (actually a reverse-takeover) with McD didn't help. Boeing was once an Engineer driven company, now it's a marketing weasel-word driven company who allegedly mistreats engineers who speak up. Joe Sutter must be spinning in his grave, not to mention William E Boeing.

There's a line for you "Boeing. A company founded by a William E Boeing, now run by a Wile E Coyote".

[exBng Pilot]

Just read a news article (not the most reliable source I know!) that a flight attendant hit a switch on the pilot's seat while serving meals.
Maybe the meal tray or pilot's leg was pushing against the control column while the seat was moving forward - eventually the autopilot disconnects and down you go!

[MickG0105]

And the MH A330 and QF A330 off Western Australia?
Are you sure you don't mean the MH B777 off Western Australia, as in the 9M-MRG inflight upset back in 2005?

[AirScotia]

According to Juan Browne / blancolirio, it's looking like a faulty rocker switch on the seat: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRF1YTVJ1Q4&ab_channel=blancolirio

[Mariner]

I can see a redesign of that switch coming up, to allow aft seat motion only..

[ST Dog]

According to Juan Browne / blancolirio, it's looking like a faulty rocker switch on the seat: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRF1YTVJ1Q4&ab_channel=blancolirio

Hmm, odd that it's not working...
Maybe the extra at the end of the link?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRF1YTVJ1Q4

[lucille]

If it’s something as simple as a dodgy seat switch why don’t they come out with an interim finding? Surely a quick chat with all the crew in the cockpit and a 5 minute poke around the switch would confirm this.

That the aircraft was deemed fit to ferry back to Santiago a couple of days later indicates that there were no serious underlying design or technical issues of concern.

Starting to look like this issue is now in the hands of the respective company’s PR departments.

[ST Dog]

From Juan's full video, a short showing a malfunctioning switch.
www.youtube.com/shorts/7DLNKU2wEjM

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/7DLNKU2wEjM

[Lookleft]

And the MH A330 and QF A330 off Western Australia? Was that due to good 'Airbus' design flaws as opposed to 'crap Boeing product'.

If you are going to defend Boeing at least get the aircraft type correct. The MAS 777 incident was because of a FT-ADIRU problem which Boeing designed to take the pilot out of the loop in case of faulty IR units. The QF A330 incident was due to a rare combination of events. If this incident was because of faulty seat switches then I say again that it is an indication of another crap Boeing product. Alongside the 737 Max and the 767 tanker.

[Fursty Ferret]

Never had a switch stick, but equally they don’t feel like the highest quality. A meal tray or even an iPad on your lap would get wedged pretty quickly, and given the force needed to disconnect the autopilot would easily result in a violent pitch down.

For what it’s worth, momentary screen blanking is not unusual on the 787 and is usually just a result of a GPM restarting in the CCS.

[Troo believer]

This crap about the 737 Max seems to have taken on a narrative that’s not founded on facts. The Lion Air crash investigation alone points to some glaring failures and negligence.
https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/10/28/lion-air-737-max-final-accident-report-cites-aoa-sensor-mcas-as-contributing-factors/

[Lookleft]

This crap about the 737 Max seems to have taken on a narrative that’s not founded on facts

The Max reputation is completely unfounded and the FAA, EASA grounded it because of bias. Drink the Boeing Kool Aid if you want to but the facts about MCAS and single point of failure are well and truly in the public domain. Of all the crap Boeing products that one is the worst...so far.

[MaybeItIs]

Interesting discussion.

I'm just an observer, not an expert, but the debate about Airbus vs Boeing really needs it's own dedicated blog or topic, imho.

That said, for my 2 cents, it's hard to beat the AF447 crash of an A330. A simple, temporary icing up of (I think) a pitot tube, led to that situation, The unforgivable flaw with that is that the junior pilot was secretly countermanding the inputs of the more senior, then pilot-attempting-to-fly. There was, it seems, no obvious way that the PIC could tell that his inputs were being countered. Nothing like a horn and warning saying "Pilot Input Conflict" or some such. This would also warn about inadvertent inputs, such as laptops, dinner trays, hostess's feet, legs, head etc jamming a stick, or a faulty stick.

I suppose that situation is still the same?

A bit like having your seat driven forward without your input.

This stupid seat switch design, equally seems to have had no one with any sense overseeing it and its possible risks - such as the most obvious - hijackers and terrorists. Now, they all know about it.

Ordinary, everyday car manufacturers do far better. My car warns when the driver and passenger seat belts are not fastened. The passenger seat has a weight switch built in to stop erroneous warnings - though something heavy enough on the passenger seat will set it off anyway. Reminds you to strap the package in too...

The point is, weight switches on the pilot's seats to disable the seat-back switches would have prevented this entirely, faulty or missing cover, loose switch or whatever. To me, this "accident" is inexcusable for an aircraft manufacturer to design in.

As for the "kinky" seat track - WTF? Isn't there ample space on the outboard side to get in? Is this just a marketing gimmick? "Look, we have a side-shifting pilot's seat!" WOW! Or WaW.

Flying is just getting scarier and scarier. This accident wouldn't even happen on an ordinary commuter bus. And some of those drivers are Eeenormous.

[Troo believer]

The Max reputation is completely unfounded and the FAA, EASA grounded it because of bias. Drink the Boeing Kool Aid if you want to but the facts about MCAS and single point of failure are well and truly in the public domain. Of all the crap Boeing products that one is the worst...so far.

Another self appointed expert.
Did you read the report or just launch at the key pad?

[visibility3miles]

The flight attendant serving a meal who allegedly hit the seat switch causing the plane to nose dive wouldn’t have been strapped in by a seat belt, so would also have hit the ceiling along with all others who weren’t strapped in.

Were there reports of someone in the cockpit smashing against the ceiling?

Just asking…

[Lookleft]

Another Boeing apologist. If it was just the quality of the pilots and their lack of understanding of the runway trim recall then why the worldwide grounding, Senate hearings and the FAA taking up their office space back in the Boeing factories all suggest that the Max is a crap product. BTW I have several thousand hours on the 737 so not self-appointed.

[ANCIENT]

MaybeItIs all Airbus FBW aircraft have a "DUAL INPUT" alert both visual and audio if both side sticks are operated at the same time.

[MaybeItIs]

MaybeItIs all Airbus FBW aircraft have a "DUAL INPUT" alert both visual and audio if both side sticks are operated at the same time.

Hi ANCIENT, Thanks. Good to know.

[Icarus2001]

MaybeItIs, You are not a pilot are you? Have a look at the video above.

Most jet aircraft have some sideways movement of the seat, otherwise, no there is no room to get in.

There was, it seems, no obvious way that the PIC could tell that his inputs were being countered.

Wrong.

[Sailvi767]

MaybeItIs all Airbus FBW aircraft have a "DUAL INPUT" alert both visual and audio if both side sticks are operated at the same time.

In the case of AF447 the dual input alert went unnoticed. This was primarily because the Airbus design philosophy is very aural alert heavy. When things go bad the alerts simply cancel each other. This has been a problem on other Airbus events.

[Icarus2001]

When things go bad the alerts simply cancel each other. I think you mean there is a hierarchy of alerts, in which a DUAL INPUT alert is well below the priority of the STALL waring.

[Gear in transit]

I think there is a bit more to it with the Airbus callout and what’s prioritised. AF447 stall warning went off over 70 times, that will take priority over the dual input from memory. They did get a dual input but that was much later toward the end.

[MaybeItIs]

MaybeItIs, You are not a pilot are you? Have a look at the video above.

Most jet aircraft have some sideways movement of the seat, otherwise, no there is no room to get in.



Wrong.

Nice, Icarus2001. Nothing like a blunt answer. You mean, of course, passenger jets. Bet there's no sideways movement in a Stealth Fighter seat.

Yeah, I looked at (maybe) "that" video before I commented - Hence my comments about the "kinky" seat track.

Which (video), of course, substantiates exactly what I said. The seat moves sideways. Well, it couldn't move sideways if there was no space for it to move into. Which is exactly the point I was making. There is room on the outboard side on the seat, just as much as on the inboard side once the seat has moved over. So I suggest the sideways trick is redundant and unnecessary - unless of course, the problem is a lack of headroom outboard. Which may well be the case. I'm sure you'll inform me on that. Despite the fact that a tipping or pivoting seat back would probably be just as effective and a lot simpler and safer. That whole pilot seat looks weak and flimsy to me. Just like the switch and its cover. Can't see what attaches it to those rails, but I bet the passenger seats are much stronger - probably because, by regulation, they have to be. But which seats are the most important in the entire plane? Not the toilet seats, I guess.

And, thanks to Sailvi767, it would appear that there were / would have been alerts on AF447, but they were drowned out by all the multitudes of other alerts, which again goes to show that Airbuses may not really be any better than Boeings. Obviously, the alerts are not prioritised, just all rammed at the bewildered pilots at random. And that A330 crashed into the sea in a recoverable stall. At least the 787 recovered its own temporary control problem and landed safely, though it's apples and oranges. But what do I know, right Ic?

[ivorget]

CNN actually interviewed the passenger who said the pilot had told him the instruments went blank (bit about the pilot is at 2:22 in the video):
edition.cnn.com/2024/03/12/australia/latam-airlines-flight-injuries-new-zealand-tuesday-intl-hnk/index.html

So it seems someone must have lied, either:

the passenger
the pilot
the anonymous officials who allegedly briefed The Air Current journalist
or the The Air Current Journalist

Boeing has issued a new advisory about 787 pilot seats but the advisory does not mention the LATAM flight.

🧐

[aeromech3]

Does my memory serve me:- that on the B747 crew seats there was a black button switch which needed pressing to pass power to the multi directional switch (up, down, fore and aft) for seat adjustment, this could be achieved by thumb on the button switch and finger movement of the multi.
Safety engineered?

Smiley, B747, we were not allowed to use the electrical seat adjustments during flight!
The noise of the seat actuator disturbed the passengers in the nose section, whom were either 1st class or the VIP bedroom occupants.

[MickG0105]

In the case of AF447 the dual input alert went unnoticed. ...
Were there dual inputs on AF447? I thought that the co-pilot in the RH seat was PF, and essentially all inputs came from his side-stick.

[Chronic Snoozer]

Were there dual inputs on AF447? I thought that the co-pilot in the RH seat was PF, and essentially all inputs came from his side-stick.

Yes. But no mention of the dual input alert.​​​​​​At 2 h 11 min 37, the PNF said “controls to the left”, took over priority without any callout and continued to handle the aeroplane. The PF almost immediately took back priority without any callout and continued piloting.At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said, “[we’re going to arrive] at level one hundred”. About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the side-sticks were recorded and the PF said, “go ahead you have the controls”.
https://bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf

[MickG0105]

Yes. But no mention of the dual input alert.
https://bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf
Thanks for that.

[Icarus2001]

You mean, of course, passenger jets. Bet there's no sideways movement in a Stealth Fighter seat.

Yep, like I said MOST jet aircraft.

​​​​​​​ Obviously, the alerts are not prioritised, just all rammed at the bewildered pilots at random.

Obviously, nothing could be further from the truth. The alerts are prioritised and not random.

Sorry for the thread drift.

Screens going "blank' and seat moving? Mmmmm someone is telling porkies.

[BuzzBox]

There is room on the outboard side on the seat, just as much as on the inboard side once the seat has moved over. So I suggest the sideways trick is redundant and unnecessary...

There isn't room on either side of the seat for a pilot to get in or out once the seat is positioned forward (ie the normal flying position). When the seat moves rearward, it moves aft and then outboard by a few inches to create enough room on the inboard side for the pilot to get in or out of the seat. The outboard side would normally be occupied by the pilot's nav bag.


https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1500x1101/stock_photo_paris_jun_cockpit_of_boeing_dreamliner_shown_at_ th_paris_air_show_on_june_144165613_aa9f4941d603f43b695427e6 05b1716f5f4b87ff.jpg
Photo with the seat fully aft and outboard. The space on the outboard side of the seat would normally be occupied by the pilot's nav bag.



https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/540x360/360_f_430942326_chusda8nhhdzkeogh6aqfnvy23kv7fla_f3d18b5609c badd5a55676b7f703c08a874f07c1.jpg
Photo with the seat fully forward.

[AerocatS2A]

But what do I know, right Ic?

Very little apparently.

[slfool]

https://www.wsj.com/business/airlines/cockpit-mishap-might-have-caused-plunge-on-latam-boeing-787-ee3dd7b4?mod=hp_lead_pos1
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-68580950
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/mar/15/boeing-cockpit-seat-switch-latam-flight

[lucille]

Looking at the photo of the seat fully forward… and assuming stick position is also fully forward. I suppose it would be possible for a porky pilot’s gut to push the stick forward as the seat rolls forward, uncommanded.

However if said pilot was not porky that does bring into play a number of salacious possibilities.

[MaybeItIs]

Very little apparently.

Maybe so. Exactly why I came here. To learn. Mission accomplished. Thanks to all who have assisted.

[Gne]

Does my memory serve me:- that on the B747 crew seats there was a black button switch which needed pressing to pass power to the multi directional switch (up, down, fore and aft) for seat adjustment, this could be achieved by thumb on the button switch and finger movement of the multi.
Safety engineered?
But that was back in the days when the company was focused on safety and engineering excellence not shareholder dividends.

When I think back to the days of getting systems agreed with Boeing for FANS1 and then look at today's issues I realise it's not just a different company it's a totally different safety and quality ethic.

Gne

[EXDAC]

As for the "kinky" seat track - WTF? Isn't there ample space on the outboard side to get in? Is this just a marketing gimmick? "Look, we have a side-shifting pilot's seat!" WOW! Or WaW.

Many aircraft have seats that move outboard at the aft end of their travel. The earliest one I'm familair with is the DC-10. However, the DC-10 seat had no controls on the back. They were all on the inboard side.

If you had been on the flight deck you would know that, without sideways travel, it would be unreasonably difficult to get into the seat.

[das Uber Soldat]

. But what do I know, right Ic?
Absolutely nothing, by the looks of things.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

So I suggest the sideways trick is redundant and unnecessary - unless of course, the problem is a lack of headroom outboard. Which may well be the case. I'm sure you'll inform me on that.

OK. Quite simply, when you look at an airliner from the front, it’s round, not square. When you look at it from on top, it’s narrower at the front. The manufacturers haven’t just arranged for inboard access for sh1ts and giggles.

[MickG0105]

... Quite simply, when you look at an airliner from the front, it’s round, not square. When you look at it from on top, it’s narrower at the front. ...
So, in other words, it's pointy at that end.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

So, in other words, it's pointy at that end.

Not since Concorde retired. :ok:

[EDLB]

Question: When the seat is commanded moving forward with a stuck switch on its backrest, can the movement be stopped using the other switch at the center console?

[mahogany bob]

Passengers aboard the LATAM flight said the Boeing 787 Dreamliner plunged earthward while flying from Sydney to Auckland on Monday evening, slinging unrestrained travellers out of their seats and smashing them into the roof of the cabin.

The Chilean airline said Tuesday it was working with authorities to unravel the unspecified "technical event", the latest in a string of safety incidents to plague US airplane manufacturer Boeing.

for goodness sake HOW LONG does it take to say that the seat moved ?
thereby dispelling worrying rumours of total gen failure ,screens going black etc!

it was said earlier that ‘it isn’t done that way’ and obviously a thorough investigation is vital but common sense says that a short interim statement would be in everyone’s interest!

PS looking at the seat fully forward position would it not be possible for the pilot to ‘spread his knees wide ‘ so that he would not hit the CC ? Would he have time ? How fast does the seat move ? Or was he getting in or out?

[BuzzBox]

Question: When the seat is commanded moving forward with a stuck switch on its backrest, can the movement be stopped using the other switch at the center console?

Boeing sent a message to operators on 15 March. The message states:

Boeing and Flight Deck seat supplier, Ipeco, advise the 787 fleet of a known condition related to a loose/detached rocker switch cap on the fore/aft auxiliary rocker switch. This rocker switch is located on the seat back of both Captain and First Officer seats. Closing the spring-loaded seat back switch guard onto a loose/detached rocker switch cap can potentially jam the rocker switch, resulting in unintended seat movement.

Unintended fore/aft seat movement (due to a jammed seat back rocker switch) can be stopped with the emergency power cutoff switch, or by holding depressed the fore/aft rocker switch located on the inboard side of the seat pan in the direction opposite to the seat movement, or by holding depressed the manual fore/aft control lever on the inboard side of the seat pan to declutch the horizontal actuator. Please note that inputting an opposing fore/aft switch command will stop powered movement only for the duration that the seat software sees opposing commands. As soon as one of the fore/aft switches is released, the seat will resume movement following the remaining command. The preferred option is to shut off power using the power cut-off switch, but if the occupant is not able to reach that switch, the other options will halt the seat powered movement until power can be shut off. Boeing is evaluating potential updates to the appropriate Flight Crew Manual.

https://avherald.com/h?article=51601631&opt=0​​​​​​​

[EDLB]

O.k. So it is possible to at least stop the motion. However since the seat movement control seem to go over software, why did they not put in some safety mechanism for a stuck switch. Stuck switch is a typical scenario for any functional safety analysis. Continuous forward movement until the forward mechanical stop of the seat should be looked as a dangerous situation. Now with 20/20 hindsight.

[nyt]

Loose/detached ?! Mind-boggling.

[HUD Engineer]

Disconnect and reconnect power at least once every 120 days, but maybe it should be every 25 days.

It's as if the writing of and functioning of software in aircraft systems isn't the subject of standards. If only software engineers could anticipate the remote possibility that the software they design will be running continuously in hardware that doesn't take a coffee break.

Actually, sometimes it turns out the hardware does need more than a coffee break. I've come across types of RAM on Avionic Systems that can be upset by radiation, and while you can detect it via a fragmented Periodically - scheduled full RAM test, it cannot be cleared through any reset except by a Vcc power down. I've seen products where the customer-sourced hardware contains a register that can count to a finite limit before rolling over, that means either you have a maintenance action to cycle power or accept that at some point soft "Invalid Data" is flagged at counter roll-over and ideally the data consumer switches to a different data source, or no data is available, depending on the system design and integrity.

There is another aspect that rarely seems to get fairly assessed: In my experience, Power-up Cold Start BIT is often when the most rigorous on-aircraft LRU (Line Replaceable Unit) testing can be done (often while outputs are isolated). It strikes me as sensible that this should be run at intervals, at a convenient time (with the aircraft parked), in order to establish the integrity of the LRUs, rather than just relying on the continued apparent good performance of the bits of a system that remain running indefinitely, although if designed well, that should also offer high degrees of assurance about the LRU system integrity, but that cannot cover all cases. For example, during Cold Start BIT, one may check the internal 28V Power Supply hold up capacitance, something which may not be possible at other times, but may be important to confirm that the LRU can still meet the power-interrupt play-through period. Besides, a lot of work goes into developing Power-up Cold Start BIT, so it is heartening for the software engineers, etc., etc., to know that it is being exercised more often than once in a blue moon.

From a crew perspective, any time there is a maximum system reset interval, I hope that either the system makes it clear that that event horizon is approaching, in a suitable timely manner, or that the crew are able to independently conform that the maintenance action has been carried out in the recent past. I hate being asked to trust that something on which lives may depend has been done, but in some circumstances, that is what we have to do.

Just food for thought...

[golfyankeesierra]

Loose/detached ?! Mind-boggling.
No, it’s just something as irrelevant as a seat.
I would be really mind boggling if such inferior quality would be found in a fire switch. Oh… wait..

[MechEngr]

O.k. So it is possible to at least stop the motion. However since the seat movement control seem to go over software, why did they not put in some safety mechanism for a stuck switch. Stuck switch is a typical scenario for any functional safety analysis. Continuous forward movement until the forward mechanical stop of the seat should be looked as a dangerous situation. Now with 20/20 hindsight.

And what if someone wanted to move the seat to the forward stop?

The clear problem isn't the simply the switch, but that there apparently was an added obstruction, the meal tray, that was trapped. Can't tilt down - pilots thighs are in the way. Can't go right or left because of surrounding structure. And can't go up if it's under the wheel and maybe a bit of belly fat or seat-belt buckle (no photos, but perhaps a pilot might clarify) . The seats don't move lightening fast, and it may be the pilot even started out having to suck in a bit while tucking under the wheel, which would have been fine but doesn't leave an exit strategy if a flight attendant then directly or indirectly pushes the go forward button.

Look at the typical analysis - the switch jams and the seat moves. If it moves forward it cannot reach the control column. The pilots legs are supposed to be on either side of the control column, so they cannot be forced against it. The edge of the seat should be ahead of the pilot's abdomen, unless the pilot is morbidly obese; I haven't see all pilots but I think I would have noticed, but that is covered in the human factors books for 5th and 95th percentile design guidance, so any body outside those limits would be unlikely to be considered. Sure, it's uncomfortable getting pushed up with the knees folded, but without cockpit dimensions and the human factors limits, I can't be sure it would be "unsafe."

One could suppose a second switch in series with the first that applies power and the rocker switch controls direction. Seems good, but then there are two mechanical places for the seat to fail to operate. Likewise is one switch can override the other and one fails then the seat is also unable to move.

Frankly, I'm not a fan of power seats, but then I've read on a number of cases where a mechanical lever gets stuck and when the pilot get to Vr, pulls back, nose comes up, and the seat comes loose and takes the pilot away from the controls,.

If it's the meal tray - the fix is really simple. Get new trays so that this cannot happen.

I also really, really, really want to see a photo of the switch that is being blamed. I worked with military equipment for 30 years and the rule was, if they could break it they would break it. We put equipment into HMMWVs, Bradleys, M113s, and Striker vehicles - people with big feet, big boots, swinging guns around. Did not have a problem with broken switches. Mostly because they had switch guards, similar to ones I see in cockpit photos. Does this rocker not have a switch guard?

[nyt]

On Mar 15th 2024 Boeing released a message to operators of all Boeing 787 variants referencing another message sent out in 2017 advising operators to apply adhesives to the rocker (pilot seat movement) switch caps to prevent them from coming loose.
That gem was missing from the previous article quote. Almost an AD, to match almost a switch.

[AerocatS2A]

I also really, really, really want to see a photo of the switch that is being blamed. I worked with military equipment for 30 years and the rule was, if they could break it they would break it. We put equipment into HMMWVs, Bradleys, M113s, and Striker vehicles - people with big feet, big boots, swinging guns around. Did not have a problem with broken switches. Mostly because they had switch guards, similar to ones I see in cockpit photos. Does this rocker not have a switch guard?

There's detail floating around the internet. Juan Browne has some good stuff on his YouTube channel including a video of a seat moving on its own.

https://youtu.be/cRF1YTVJ1Q4?si=cIKOXpab3a_os1aS

Too Long Didn't Watch version is that there is a cover to protect the rocker switch on the seat back but if the rocker switch and cover are in poor condition the seat can move just from leaning or pressing on the cover.

[BuzzBox]

A question for the B787 drivers, or anyone else with relevant knowledge: Does the rocker switch on the seat back drive the seat at the same speed as the switch on the seat pan, or is the speed a bit faster given that it's intended to be used when the seat is unoccupied?

[Lookleft]

It must have been like the garbage disposal scene in Star Wars!

[dmwalker]

The primary problem is the switch. How necessary is the switch, since I believe no other aircraft type has it? If it's necessary for the 787, replace it with a more robust switch. That would be the seat supplier's responsibility, wouldn't it?

The secondary problem would seem to be what looks like an awkward location of the power cutoff switch, as if nobody anticipated any emergency use. Maybe it would have been easier for the steward behind the seat to operate the switch.

Redesigning the tray should be lhe last consideration, shouldn't it?

The seat seems to take a total of about ten seconds to go from fully backward and outward position to fully forward positon; five seconds to move inward then five seconds to move forward.

It looks to me that, when the seat is in the forward position, there is no room for the tray to go under the control wheel so that is what it would come in contact with.

[amc890]

No, it’s just something as irrelevant as a seat.
I would be really mind boggling if such inferior quality would be found in a fire switch. Oh… wait..
hehe, just remember the answer to all 787 tech questions is : it’s lighter or it’s cheaper. Could be both I guess

[MechEngr]

The tray can be addressed in days or eliminated entirely. Software or an electrical fix is months or more. The tray takes no regulator approvals, except airline management.

[drpixie]

Now you don't think it was something simple and silly, like ... someone leans on seat motion switch, seat moves, pilot (instinctively) grabs control wheel, autopilot lets go, shake-and-wobble (screams from pax).

It will all come out in the wash.

[Lookleft]

What is ironic ,if the seat scenario is correct, is that when Boeing designed the 777 and the 787 they were insistent on the control yoke being of traditional design even though the aircraft was FBW. So now there is a possible situation where that very same control column which was supposed to make pilots feel like real pilots, has metaphorically kicked the Captain in the goolies. If they had been fitted with side-sticks ( a US response to the benefits of FBW) and a fold out table then all those passengers would have arrived safely in Chile. Instead a dodgy seat and a refusal to move with the technology has possibly led to this incident. And before the mob with their pitchforks start shouting "What about the Voyager, what about the Voyager?" that was a pilot's lack of camera SA that caused that, not some cheap and nasty seat switches.

[Ollie Onion]

What is ironic ,if the seat scenario is correct, is that when Boeing designed the 777 and the 787 they were insistent on the control yoke being of traditional design even though the aircraft was FBW. So now there is a possible situation where that very same control column which was supposed to make pilots feel like real pilots, has metaphorically kicked the Captain in the goolies. If they had been fitted with side-sticks ( a US response to the benefits of FBW) and a fold out table then all those passengers would have arrived safely in Chile. Instead a dodgy seat and a refusal to move with the technology has possibly led to this incident. And before the mob with their pitchforks start shouting "What about the Voyager, what about the Voyager?" that was a pilot's lack of camera SA that caused that, not some cheap and nasty seat switches.

Kind of what Boeing is known for, persisting with old tech to keep things common, I mean look at the 737.

[EDLB]

That switch in the seat backrest will be used at least every cycle, so in the 5 digit range. There must be a safety analysis for a stuck switch or damaged cable yielding seat forward motion.
There was a reason in the 747 to have 2 switches in series, so with what rationale now a single switch does the same job?

[RampDog]

I believe that the investigation will show that this is exactly what happened....... Ted was smart though, he had his seatbelt on:ok:
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/695x900/wings_fall_off_e90b60a80c963e5ba0371455e275810ab3524586.jpg

[MikeHatter732]

There was a reason in the 747 to have 2 switches in series, so with what rationale now a single switch does the same job?

Probably the same rationale that had the MCAS system rely on a single AOA sensor :}

[MechEngr]

The problem with 2 buttons is that if the seat has to move -now- and one button fails then the pilot could be very restricted in making a rapid exit or prevented from getting into the seat and getting the seat arranged. Or maybe one switch fails in the "On" position and no one notices and then this same event happens when the second switch also fails.

Some days those big knife switches as appear in Frankenstein movies are very appealing. Up for forward, Down for back, and sit in the middle for don't move. But then you don't have enough room to replace all the switches with those. Someone spills coffee and it all goes abby normal.
---
The SMYDs each rely on a single AoA sensor and don't have bounds checking and don't have self-verification of calibration**. MCAS relied on the SMYD. The SMYD issued the false stall warning that prevented the continued operation with the autopilot and autothrottle and pushed the plane into manual control. Whether MCAS existed or not the false stall warning remains a fundamental problem that some claim causes some pilots to be unable to function, being all startled.

**If the AoA sensor had two changes the SMYD could be changed to determine whether the sensor was clearly invalid. The first is a stop that the vane contacts at some extreme AoA, such as 60 degrees nose high. If the vane is removed the counterweight will move to an out-of-range position which is normally impossible, indicating a missing vane. Alternately or additionally, use a low current to check continuity to the vane heater (there is already a high-current check) and if there isn't continuity assume the vane is compromised. This warning was given on ET-302. Using both would confirm vane departure. The second is to add a small torque coil that would drive the vane to the stop. Since that stop is a known value the reading from the resolver can be checked as part of aircraft startup. Perhaps one has seen the clever gauge needles in cars do what looks like a range test, probably to confirm they are actually moving as commanded so drivers know the speed and RPM and fuel readings, et al, are correct and the needles aren't stuck. If the drive doesn't turn off, the AoA reading will be constant at that stop, also signalling an invalid AoA sensor. Drive in the other direction would meet the internal AoA sensor stop.

In the event that either test fails, the SMYD reports "invalid" or stops reporting data. MCAS is already programmed to shift to the other SMYD in the event such a report happens. In both accident aircraft the SMYD reported the unrealistic AoA sensor reading as valid.

Note that if the torque coil is used then the AoA sensor can also be given a small, perhaps 60Hz, continuous sinusoidal torque that is capable of making slight sinusoidal nudges to the AoA sensor which can be used to detect from the resulting sinusoidal output if the AoA vane is locked into place by ice or not. If the dithering is reasonably fast a simple averaging routine would smooth that out before sending it to the autopilot or to MCAS. Also, it would alert pilots that the AoA sensor had become unreliable if the vane doesn't move with a known torque. Airbus had an event happen with 2 of 3 vanes frozen and their system voted the only working one off the island before starting a nose-down trim event the pilot input could not overcome because, as speed increased the AoA needed to decrease, but the vanes were frozen in place and could not move. More nose-down trim kept getting added to correct the too-high AoA reading.

[Lookleft]

For the benefit of the uneducated among us, I shall now translate. ME is trying to demonstrate with all that gumph that the 737 Max is a much maligned product from an outstanding company whose main motivation is people before profit and that it was the useless pilots that are to blame. Bollocks is my reply.

[MikeHatter732]

For the benefit of the uneducated among us, I shall now translate. ME is trying to demonstrate with all that gumph that the 737 Max is a much maligned product from an outstanding company whose main motivation is people before profit and that it was the useless pilots that are to blame. Bollocks is my reply.
Absolutely. You can tell they aren't too worried about shareholders because the ratio of share buybacks vs capital actually spent on aircraft development...... oh wait... nevermind.

[Clinton McKenzie]

For the benefit of the uneducated among us, I shall now translate. ME is trying to demonstrate with all that gumph that the 737 Max is a much maligned product from an outstanding company whose main motivation is people before profit and that it was the useless pilots that are to blame. Bollocks is my reply.Ah, the exquisite irony.

So you mean to say that the simple, albeit distressing, explanation for the 737 Max tragedies – useless pilots – turned out not to be a valid explanation? You mean to say that, sometimes, errors in design, errors in manufacture, errors in regulatory supervision or errors in maintenance can result in bad outcomes that are easily but invalidly blamed on pilots?

Please hold that thought and pop over to the thread about the recent 172 tragedy at Camden and reflect upon what you’ve posted there.

/thread drift off.

[MechEngr]

Oh I don't hold the pilots solely to blame. No one in their organization did more then forward the Emergency AD. No one checked to see if the pilots actually read it, actually understood it, actually memorized it. Might as well be on toilet paper. Does that not make anyone angry? They even owned MAX simulators and did not try the procedure.

I do find a great fault in the way the AoA sensors are managed on both Boeing and Airbus aircraft as not individually verifiable in spite of cases where 3X voting fails. This could be addressed at the lower module rather than a full system overhaul like synthetic AoA requires.

But, sure, compare the procedure for stall warning to the FDR. See any sign that the existing stall warning procedure, with decades of training in the type, was followed in the slightest? Is that an airplane problem or a pilot training problem?

[Lookleft]

Interesting that now when you reply to me you use your real name but when you liked my post you used your nom de plume.

I have always been consistent with my discussion on the Max. Sometimes the pilots through deliberate action or non adherence to SOPs i.e.VMC into IMC are responsible for a crash. In this case Boeing introduced a digital response to an analogue problem and did not tell the pilots or the airlines what was going on. Its not rocket science. You compare your profession of lawyer with that of pilots and come to the conclusion that pilots don't come up to the same standard of conduct. Thats because you are on the outside looking in and simply don't understand the environment and mindset of the professional pilot. Pilots are always assessing the actions of other pilots and being critical of their conduct if necessary, that's how two crew operations work. I have explained my reasons for why I consider the Camden accident to be a deliberate action. For the same reason I consider MH370 a deliberate action by the PIC. Its not blaming the pilot simply because thats the simplest option in the way ME is trying to. Its looking at the flight profile and coming to a conclusion that a pilot trying maintain control and get an unsafe aeroplane on the ground would have flown a very different profile. If you want to see the difference look at the Silk Air 737 profile and then look at the Ethiopian 737 Max. Most professional pilots could spot the difference.

[megan]

There was a reason in the 747 to have 2 switches in series, so with what rationale now a single switch does the same job?Share holder value, switches cost money, see MAX AoA. ;)

[Capn Bloggs]

The problem with 2 buttons is that if the seat has to move -now- and one button fails then the pilot could be very restricted in making a rapid exit or prevented from getting into the seat and getting the seat arranged. Or maybe one switch fails in the "On" position and no one notices and then this same event happens when the second switch also fails.
This is going from the sublime to the ridiculous. If you need to get in and out and the seat won't move, just get on it do it. If in the AF447 case, are you really going to stand there slowly motoring it out of the way so you can get into your seat? Not that you have to since you can reach the column...

If you need to get out in a hurry, just jump up, stand on it and GTFOOT.

One failed on and the other switch fails? Really?

[MechEngr]

Yes - unless there is a way to detect the switch has failed in the closed/conducting position then the situation ends up no different than if it was replaced by a piece of wire when it fails. It is far better to have a single, more robust switch than try to build a fail-safe logic out of components that do not fail in a safe manner.

When the Alaska jackscrew failed there were two nuts, one for "backup," but the backup had already failed by being unable to take the load when the primary failed; there wasn't any clear method of detecting the wear of the "backup" separately. Were it not for the false logic that there was a backup the development would likely have taken a different direction.

In this case, why didn't the pilot just jump up? Was he not quick enough?

[artee]

Yes - unless there is a way to detect the switch has failed in the closed/conducting position then the situation ends up no different than if it was replaced by a piece of wire when it fails. It is far better to have a single, more robust switch than try to build a fail-safe logic out of components that do not fail in a safe manner.

When the Alaska jackscrew failed there were two nuts, one for "backup," but the backup had already failed by being unable to take the load when the primary failed; there wasn't any clear method of detecting the wear of the "backup" separately. Were it not for the false logic that there was a backup the development would likely have taken a different direction.

In this case, why didn't the pilot just jump up? Was he not quick enough?
Maybe he had someone on his lap... :E

[Chronic Snoozer]

When the Alaska jackscrew failed there were two nuts, one for "backup," but the backup had already failed by being unable to take the load when the primary failed; There should always be two nuts in the cockpit.
In this case, why didn't the pilot just jump up? Was he not quick enough?He was strapped in?

[MechEngr]

Maybe he had someone on his lap... :E
Oh, my!

[Lookleft]

In this case, why didn't the pilot just jump up? Was he not quick enough?

Thats why they didn't give parachutes to pilots in WW1 because a pilot's first reaction is to get out of the seat when the rotating fan is spreading smelly stuff. There is a regular contributor(s), {neither of which are professional pilots BTW} to these pages who laments how professional pilots are openly critical of others in the profession. If the professional pilots were the only people who posted then possibly there would be sensible discussion. Unfortunately that horse bolted decades ago.

[mahogany bob]

Has Boeing actually SAID that this incident WAS caused by a seat malfunction yet - or are all the posts above pure SPECULATION ?

[Fonz121]

I can’t say I really understand any of this. If you bring the 787 seat all the way forward, you still don’t touch the control column assuming you’re sat normally.

If you did have something on your lap, or your legs crossed or similar, the seat moves so slowly that there would be ample time to move any obstacle out of the way.

[KAPAC]

Has it been established who was in the cockpit ? Obviously 1 pilot , it’s been said 1 cabin crew , was there another pilot in cockpit or was it just the 2 ?

[Mr Albert Ross]

Nearly 200 Posts on this Thread and 30 on the other Thread (same topic) and I have been struggling to find \a sensible Post! Ah well, that's PPRuNe!

A few days ago I had a thoroughly enjoyable flight on a B787. During the cruise we had a friendly hat with one of the cabin crew. Amongst many other topics, this LATAM incident was brought up and the seat issue had only just got into the news (we read it in the departure lounge). They had been briefed on the matter before the flight ad being aware of the info that they were given, sensible precautions were being taken. That real world does not fit in with the 230-odd pages of nonsense that there have been here.

We have another flight booked in a B787 next month and we are looking forward to it.

[artee]

Nearly 200 Posts on this Thread and 30 on the other Thread (same topic) and I have been struggling to find \a sensible Post! Ah well, that's PPRuNe!

A few days ago I had a thoroughly enjoyable flight on a B787. During the cruise we had a friendly hat with one of the cabin crew. Amongst many other topics, this LATAM incident was brought up and the seat issue had only just got into the news (we read it in the departure lounge). They had been briefed on the matter before the flight ad being aware of the info that they were given, sensible precautions were being taken. That real world does not fit in with the 230-odd pages of nonsense that there have been here.

We have another flight booked in a B787 next month and we are looking forward to it.
Bon voyage!
This is a rumour network. It's our job...

[dejapoo]

Ffs, were they boning or not ????

[EXDAC]

When the Alaska jackscrew failed there were two nuts, one for "backup,"

No, the DC-9, MD-80, MD-90, and B-717 all have a single nut but that single nut has two threads. ( A two start thread.). Jack screws with two independent nuts are typically arranged so the backup carries no load until the primary fails. In the two thread single nut design both nut threads wear together and they wear quickly if they are not lubricated.

[aeromech3]

Whilst we are going along the education route: mechanical seats have levers, bowden cables and pins into holes, all subject to wear and failure; electric motored seats, as far as I recall, all had a mechanical back up, not a B787 Engr, but from earlier posts of the mechanical selection cutting out the actuators suspect the same back-up.
2 switches? the button switch had a very positive feel, also pilots might select the directional switch and then blip the button switch, hence failure would be apparent; blip-ping the directional switch is much more subject of incorrect direction.
When I first worked on an American aircraft of BAE manufacture, I questioned the foot rests on the instrument panel; I was told used in cruise, I note not visible on the B787 panel, but I would still suspect Pilots sit at the rear most seat position during cruise, than hunched over the control column, perhaps some actual Pilots might comment?

[EXDAC]

When I first worked on an American aircraft of BAE manufacture, I questioned the foot rests on the instrument panel;

They are fitted on some MD aircraft too. The logic seemed to be that pilots are going to put their feet there anyway so best to protect the displays. I don't think I ever saw a flight test pilot use them.

[IGh]

I hate when "investigators" resort to "Human Factors" (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HBXGkjKyYAIT8_HJXrOLtz2rODfBxvUz/view?pli=1)
to explain a "complex failure interaction".
But maybe sometimes there are such HF's.

We all recall the AA901 / 26June94 MD11 upset ntsb's id MIA94FA169 (https://www.accidents.app/summaries/accident/20001206X01590)
(co-pilot NOT seated in a "normal position",
with seat-aft, & legs-crossed heel-to-knee). Electric seat, visitor entered cockpit ... .
That's ONE red-flag for students of inflight upsets.

The other red-flag mentioned : Visitor-in-Cockpit (F/A).

Several pilots have mentioned PAX ethics (keep their seat-belt fastened)
Pilot-lessons : Cockpit Housekeeping
-- AA311 / 8Oct1947, DC-4, NC90432 (https://doi.org/10.21949/1500420), Chuck Sisto upset,
taught us that cockpit occupants can unexpectedly interact with switches on the overhead panel (feathered engines).

Housekeeping, Pilot Ethics, "airmanship" (https://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/394431-pilot-ethics-pro-standards-housekeeping.html?highlight=Housekeeping#post5291331) from 2009

[MechEngr]

No, the DC-9, MD-80, MD-90, and B-717 all have a single nut but that single nut has two threads. ( A two start thread.). Jack screws with two independent nuts are typically arranged so the backup carries no load until the primary fails. In the two thread single nut design both nut threads wear together and they wear quickly if they are not lubricated.

Gotcha - I recalled that the claim was a dual load path that turned out to be not truly dual allowing for them both to wear at the same time. It baffles me that a single nut with two starts counts as redundant. How far back does FAA blindness go?

[Mr Albert Ross]

...
This is a rumour network. It's our job...And that is being adequately proven with the posts on here...

But they are far more in keeping with an APRuNe (Amateur Pilots Rumour Network)!!!

I am happy when I look at an airline booking and find that it is on a B787...

[Lookleft]

Or it could stand for Paxing Pedant Rumour Network, you know, for the people who post about the other posts without making any reasonable contribution with their post.

[framer]

When I first worked on an American aircraft of BAE manufacture, I questioned the foot rests on the instrument panel; I was told used in cruise, I note not visible on the B787 panel, but I would still suspect Pilots sit at the rear most seat position during cruise, than hunched over the control column, perhaps some actual Pilots might comment?
I can only speak for myself but I would feel negligent if I sat with the seat in the most aft position during cruise. I can also say that I can’t remember seeing my First Officers sitting with their seat right back either. I fly short haul though ( max five hour sector) so it may well be different with long haul pilots. My opinion is that the PF should be in a normal seating position at the least.

[AerocatS2A]

I can only speak for myself but I would feel negligent if I sat with the seat in the most aft position during cruise. I can also say that I can’t remember seeing my First Officers sitting with their seat right back either. I fly short haul though ( max five hour sector) so it may well be different with long haul pilots. My opinion is that the PF should be in a normal seating position at the least.

Your FOs probably take their cues from you. I certainly don't have my seat right back but it's easy enough to be in a comfortable position where you still have access to the flight controls and can put your feet up.

[MechEngr]

I had to design a cover because the equipment operator would relax by using an under the crew station connector shell as a foot rest. They were resting an ankle on the crossed leg and bracing their foot against the connector under the counter. The user kept complaining the cursor would just randomly move, but could not reproduce. We had engineers on fly-alongs so the operator would be on best behavior and posture. I don't know who finally understood what was happening.

The connector was on a force (rather than displacement) joystick. My company designed the electronics; the installation was managed by a subcontractor with "experience" in such installations and should not have left the cable or connector exposed to such footloose behavior.

I won't name the aircraft, but it was to make deliveries in close proximity regardless of the weather conditions.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

I can only speak for myself but I would feel negligent if I sat with the seat in the most aft position during cruise.

How do you eat your scrumptious crew meal?

[framer]

How do you eat your scrumptious crew meal?
Ha ha yes good point! I do indeed slide my seat right back to eat my meal. I think the mechanic/engineer who stated ​​​​​​​I would still suspect Pilots sit at the rear most seat position during cruise, than hunched over the control column, perhaps some actual Pilots might comment? was imagining prolonged periods that weren’t restricted to formal handovers for meals. I could be wrong though, it happened once before …..1997 I think.🤔

[Window heat]

Our 737 classics had a little tab on the top outer edge of the FMC to stop that from occurring. It was a known problem, the 744’s did not.

[Lookleft]

Hmmm -- during flight test of the very first B747 FMS, aboard RA1, the test-engineers had the cockpit video operating.

After that B747 suddenly turned away from the planned arrival course, all the test crew were mystified.
Later into the night, after that failed test, the test engineer re-watched the video :
Dale's right forefoot was resting on that foot-rest,
the edge of his shoe-sole tapped the INSERT button on the #1 Delco INS --> sudden sharp turn .

This is a good example of why cockpit video cameras should be mandatory. Voice recorders and data recorders can pick up a lot of things but a video recorder would have this incident resolved very quickly.

[EXDAC]

This is a good example of why cockpit video cameras should be mandatory. Voice recorders and data recorders can pick up a lot of things but a video recorder would have this incident resolved very quickly.

I had access to, and used, cockpit video and one second frame rate stills as a flight test engineer. These recordings can be a critical component of a flight test data set.

You just have to convince revenue crews, and their unions, they should be fitted. Good luck with that.

[Lookleft]

The ironic part of the reluctance to accept cockpit video recorders is that the objections are being undermined by all the airline pilot u toobers and social media junkies who are recording their day at work. They are assuming that all those Go-Pros and selfies will not be made available to investigators if their approach to whatever holiday island goes pear shaped. I remember seeing a video from an engineer's phone who was sitting in the jump seat of an Air New Guinea 737 that landed short of the runway in a heavy shower. The video showed the Captains ND with the magenta line going to the runway but the wx radar overlay showing a big mass of red on the final stages of the approach. In the absence of any call outs by the PNF the CVR and FDR would not tell the investigators the full story of that approach. The video showed the investigators what the pilots saw. So there is already de-facto cockpit video recorder so the industry should just mandate it and put similar protocols around it similar to the CVR and FDR.

[golfyankeesierra]

The problem with 2 buttons is that if the seat has to move -now- and one button fails then the pilot could be very restricted in making a rapid exit or prevented from getting into the seat and getting the seat arranged. Or maybe one switch fails in the "On" position and no one notices and then this same event happens when the second switch also fails.

Sorry, but the 747 seat (and for that matter the 787 and probably any other aircraft as wel) also has manual adjustment. And to get in and out (especially when you are in a hurry) most pilots won’t bother with the electrical but use the manual levers instead. It’s much faster and convenient.
Electrical is used mostly for fine tuning and while you’re actually flying.

I believe the 2 buttons was an excellent idea, like everything else used to be at Boeing:) (but more expensive then a single button).

[Mr Albert Ross]

The ironic part of the reluctance to accept cockpit video recorders is that the objections are being undermined by all the airline pilot u toobers and social media junkies who are recording their day at work. They are assuming that all those Go-Pros and selfies will not be made available to investigators if their approach to whatever holiday island goes pear shaped. I remember seeing a video from an engineer's phone who was sitting in the jump seat of an Air New Guinea 737 that landed short of the runway in a heavy shower. The video showed the Captains ND with the magenta line going to the runway but the wx radar overlay showing a big mass of red on the final stages of the approach. In the absence of any call outs by the PNF the CVR and FDR would not tell the investigators the full story of that approach. The video showed the investigators what the pilots saw. So there is already de-facto cockpit video recorder so the industry should just mandate it and put similar protocols around it similar to the CVR and FDR.
Yes, there are a lot of those 'junkies', but only a small percentage of the real world. (I don't even own a phone that can take videos and have very often been very wary of those wanting to video everything in sight in my flight-deck/cockpit.)

But the real problem with any cockpit video recorders would be who would have access to them. You hear far, far too many recordings/transcripts from CVRs being broadcast far too widely after an incident where those who don't have a clue (many on here, sadly!) focus on the irrelevant because it is 'sensational' rather then relevant. I know of one crew who cringed when they listened to the CVR together with the UK AAIB of the comments that they had been passing immediately before an incident (the AAIB brushed it aside saying "don't worry, we hear worse"!) but those (irrelevant) comments were NOT made available to the public simply because they were not relevant. But in far too many 'regimes', those comments are made available. I understand that many years ago the New Zealand government decided that the police and prosecuting authorities could have first access to CVRs after any incident. As a result New Zealand pilots went through a significant period of not talking on the flight deck and communicating with hand gestures. This very, very rapidly cause a reversal of that decision as the response was not safe, so the accident investigators now have first access to the CVRs and only release them if there is obvious criminal intent. Cockpit video recorders would be a step far, far too far unless there were absolutely cast iron guarantees over restrictions on their use and their availability to the the idiot public and the idiot media.

[Lookleft]

Well incidents like this one will only strengthen the hand of investigators who do want them. You don't think that CVRs and FDRs were once considered a step far, far too far?

[Icarus2001]

The cockpit camera idea is a solution in search of a problem.

[Mr Albert Ross]

Well incidents like this one will only strengthen the hand of investigators who do want them.Maybe. Maybe not. I suspect from what I have heard that there is already enough information from this incident.
You don't think that CVRs and FDRs were once considered a step far, far too far?Without proper control, yes. However, I have always been happy that any of the FDR and CVR information on aeroplanes that I have flown would always be properly handled. The Accident Investigators that would have dealt with it would never have made any actual CVR recordings available to the public and only transcripts of the very relevant parts of the recordings pertinent to an actual incident would ever be made public in the incident report. (The Union involved in the very early days ensured that this would be the case and the Accident Investigators are honouring that.) I don't see how that can be met with video recordings. (How do you get a 'transcript' of a video recording, etc.?) I'm not saying it's impossible, but I am saying that it will be a lot more difficult to gain acceptance. Especially keeping irrelevant bits away from the idiot public and idiot media. And having seen some of the comments that are on here reinforces my opinions in my previous sentence.

[Lookleft]

You hear far, far too many recordings/transcripts from CVRs being broadcast far too widely after an incident where those who don't have a clue (many on here, sadly!) focus on the irrelevant because it is 'sensational' rather then relevant.

​​​​​​​However, I have always been happy that any of the FDR and CVR information on aeroplanes that I have flown would always be properly handled.


I'm not sure you can be certain of the second statement in light of your first one! If you happen to have an accident somewhere that doesn't have the same protocols around protection of the CVR and FDR then you might very well find the recording of your flight being broadcast far too widely.

How do you cope with LOSA? How do you cope with a QAR. It also has strict protocols around it yet crew can agree to have a person sitting in the jumps seat recording everything pertinent to the flight. A video camera is just a digital LOSA auditor. Cockpit video cameras would have to have the same protocols around them as CVR and FDR. CCTV is a lot more prevalent than most people realise and are used to help solve crimes as a silent witness. Cockpit Video Cameras can be set up so they don't record faces but can record actions and the instrument panel. They can be an additional tool for safety investigators to give a better picture (a metaphor and a fact) of what led to an accident or incident.

[Mr Albert Ross]

I'm not sure you can be certain of the second statement in light of your first one! If you happen to have an accident somewhere that doesn't have the same protocols around protection of the CVR and FDR then you might very well find the recording of your flight being broadcast far too widely.

I never flew to such places.

... yet crew can agree to have a person sitting in the jumps seat recording everything pertinent to the flight. And a crew can say "No, don't."

[Capn Bloggs]

How do you cope with LOSA? How do you cope with a QAR. It also has strict protocols around it yet crew can agree to have a person sitting in the jumps seat recording everything pertinent to the flight.
LOSA reports are strictly controlled, de-identified reports that, if the pilot details were leaked, would land the leaker and the SMS as a whole in very hot water. So unless cockpit video were afforded the same protections as the CVR, it's a no go from me. Until of course they put OVRs and videos in the bosses office...

Interestingly, in the 737 Freighter ditching, the NTSB published everything that was said by each pilot from before start until the crash. And I mean Everything.

[Lookleft]

So unless cockpit video were afforded the same protections as the CVR, it's a no go from me.

Why do pilots think that a Cockpit Video recorder would not be given the same protections as all other recording devices including LOSA? Yet as I mentioned there are plenty of pilots who are more than happy to post their latest landing onto social media. I am sure there are also tens of thousands of video images recorded on Ipads that are not posted to social media. Look at the video image taken by the pax onboard the Sea World collision. Because there are no rules around personal footage taken onboard an aircraft then its immediately available for the media. Any protocols and rules for properly installed cameras could be extended to other recording devices taken inside an aircraft, possibly through changes to annex 13. The 737 rudder hardover crashes have never been properly solved, cameras onboard may have shed a bit more light on it. The Max accidents would definitely have benefited from cameras, at least to have protected the crews from accusations of not following proper procedures. Cockpit cameras are just the logical evolution from CVR and 4 channel FDR, to longer recording FDR to QAR and LOSA. The case against cockpit cameras dissipates every time a new video of a landing is posted. Overtime, just like the presence of the QAR, pilots will just forget they are there.

[RubberDogPoop]

The Max accidents would definitely have benefited from cameras, at least to have protected the crews from accusations of not following proper procedures.
??? They didn’t follow proper procedures🤷🏻‍♂️

[lucille]

Not all countries have laws which protect freedom of speech and privacy. What protections do pilots in these countries have that CVR recordings are not downloaded unofficially? The presumption of altruism on the part of airline management is misplaced.

What next, video cameras in the toilets to monitor possible nefarious activities which may have an impact on safety?

[Lookleft]

They didn’t follow proper procedures

And what were the MCAS specific procedures that they had been instructed in and trained for that you are referring to? Or are you referring to the procedures that Boeing carried over from the previous series of 737 ( all the way back to the 1960's) that were not fitted with MCAS?