Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade

[kgbbristol]

Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade, suffers serious damage
https://tangosix.rs/2024/18/02/embraer-195-maraton-erlajnza-bezbedno-sleteo-nakon-vanrednog-dogadjaja-po-poletanju-sa-aerodroma-nikola-tesla/

[Pilot DAR]

A video of the damage has been posted on Facebook showing that the left side of the plane was gashed from the cockpit to the leading edge of the wing, and foamed by the fire department.

[AreOut]

they got incredibly lucky

it's crazy how both pilot&ATC made such a huge mistake

[JanetFlight]

Wow....that is nasty...how they did that!!???
https://twitter.com/Pedjijatar/status/1759334893836702105

Twitter @ Pedjijatar/status/1759334893836702105

It seems they entered the runway from the wrong intersection and started take off roll with insufficient runway length hitting a pole as it rotated.

Operated by greek Marathon Airlines but maintaining ex Danish registration from DAT.

https://avherald.com/h?article=5151ede4

[AreOut]

The captain entered the wrong intersection and the ATC let him take off with 1300m of runway left. It's a wonder they took off at all with the airliner full of PAX.

[JanetFlight]

Entering the RWY at D5 instead of D6 for a dep on rwy 30 its less that half of it...Jesus, pax should buy the Euromillions this week...:uhoh:

On a note aside,,,Someone at EMBRAER must be very proud, having in mind the rough scars on the airframe and flying well till landing again...such a flying armoured Tank indeed!

Some similarities here perhaps »»»
https://avherald.com/h?article=4bded52d&opt=0
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1548x771/lybe_39b38850e0264e0e43d4540ff09dc1dac432dd36.jpeg

[Chronic Snoozer]

Wow....that is nasty...how they did that!!???
https://twitter.com/Pedjijatar/status/1759334893836702105

Twitter @ Pedjijatar/status/1759334893836702105

It seems they entered the runway from the wrong intersection and started take off roll with insufficient runway length hitting a pole as it rotated.

Operated by greek Marathon Airlines but maintaining ex Danish registration from DAT.

https://avherald.com/h?article=5151ede4

I’m no engineer but I suspect that won’t buff out.

[TOGA Tap]

https://www.airportia.com/news/marathon-e195-at-belgrade-on-feb-18th-2024-overran-runway-on-takeoff/


https://x.com/AmmarMesic/status/1759327891794309471?s=20

[ATC Watcher]

@ Areout : t's crazy how both pilot&ATC made such a huge mistake
and
t (https://www.pprune.org/members/432135-areout)The captain entered the wrong intersection and the ATC let him take off with 1300m of runway left.
Can you explain which " huge mistake" ATC made ?
And where did you get this info about " wrong intersection " ?

[DaveReidUK]

And where did you get this info about " wrong intersection " ?

That much is clear from the ADS-B track.

[AreOut]

@ Areout :
and
t (https://www.pprune.org/members/432135-areout)
Can you explain which " huge mistake" ATC made ?
And where did you get this info about " wrong intersection " ?

see the picture above

[NG1]

First I was wondering why they were burning fuel, I'd imagine even if they were tankering in BEG and carrying more fuel than necessary for the flight to DUS the E195 would be able to reland immediatelyß But they might have been worried about the state of the landing gear and not be aware of the substantial damage the aircraft suffered? Don't wan to armchair pilot that (in particular as I am not a pilot).

But as per video (and an article in the usually quite well informed ex-yu-aviation) they taxied (or towed the plane) to a etbridge and was foamed there? I've never seen this before and would have expected the aircraft to be evacuated on the runway or at least taxied to the nearest remote stand instead of parking it right in front of the terminal and connecting a jet bridge?

[netstruggler]

A video of the damage has been posted on Facebook showing that the left side of the plane was gashed from the cockpit to the leading edge of the wing....

...and again on the horizontal stabiliser. Did the landing light remain standing or did it do the damage as it fell?

[DaveReidUK]

First I was wondering why they were burning fuel, I'd imagine even if they were tankering in BEG and carrying more fuel than necessary for the flight to DUS the E195 would be able to reland immediatelyß But they might have been worried about the state of the landing gear and not be aware of the substantial damage the aircraft suffered? Don't wan to armchair pilot that (in particular as I am not a pilot).

But as per video (and an article in the usually quite well informed ex-yu-aviation) they taxied (or towed the plane) to a etbridge and was foamed there? I've never seen this before and would have expected the aircraft to be evacuated on the runway or at least taxied to the nearest remote stand instead of parking it right in front of the terminal and connecting a jet bridge?

The E195 appears to have been back on the departure gate within a few minutes of landing, so it looks unlikely that it was towed on.

Incidentally, the aircraft performed a GA/flyby before landing, at around 400-500 ft AAL.

[Xhi]

The E195 appears to have been back on the departure gate within a few minutes of landing, so it looks unlikely that it was towed on.

Incidentally, the aircraft performed a GA/flyby before landing, at around 400-500 ft AAL.

It was in the air for a full hour as they had to determine visually that the gear was down & undamaged. Crew suspected damage to landing gear. Also they wanted to burn off excess fuel as they had indication of a fuel leak so probably wanted to minimise risk of fire.

Except that then they taxied all the way to pax terminal, with an obvious massive leak.

Two different controllers asked if they were sure they could take off from D5, one even quoting them TORA from that point to whic crew confidently confirmed they were happy to take from D5. D6 that they were assigned by ATC would have given them an additional 1000 m of TORA.

As they reportedly took off (or, rather, separated from ground obstacles) some 800 m after rwy threshhold - it appears quite clear what happened.

Some questions will be asked.

[Joe_K]

it's crazy how both pilot&ATC made such a huge mistake

Unconfirmed reports floating around online, saying "Air traffic control noticed in time that the plane was at D5, asked the crew if they were sure they could take off from that position, to which the crew replied in the affirmative." If true (big if), then this would make it rather difficult to blame ATC for this incident.

Curious if someone remembered to pull the breaker on the cockpit voice recorder...

[AreOut]

the problem is they asked him at all, there is nothing to ask at that point, no airliner ever took off from that position on BEG, not even an empty ATR

[FUMR]

The captain entered the wrong intersection and the ATC let him take off with 1300m of runway left. It's a wonder they took off at all with the airliner full of PAX.

ATC twice asked them to confirm that they wanted to depart from D5 and even gave them distance available. ATC cannot do more than that. They are not flying the aircraft. That's the captain's responsibility. He has the numbers not ATC.

[AreOut]

ah, so they can get permission from ATC to take off even if there is a 100m of runway left? Interesting.

[FUMR]

ah, so they can get permission from ATC to take off even if there is a 100m of runway left? Interesting.

Completely ridiculous statement! It certainly wasn't 100m was it. As I said, the pilots have the numbers not ATC. ATC have no idea of the aircraft's load or total weight. They can only ask if it is the pilot's intention to depart from D5, giving him the available distance left. That should be more than sufficient. It is NOT ATC's responsibility to fly the aeroplane.

[Herod]

Not only are ATC blameless, they get a "good show" for asking the captain. His decision.

[AreOut]

It is ATC's responsibility to deny the take off if no plane ever before took off from such a short distance(especially because he obviously didn't follow instructions to enter D6). You have thousands of airliners taking off from >2 km distance and then all of a sudden there is one trying to take off with only 1.3km left, you don't have to be a rocket scientist to conclude that something is way off.

[FUMR]

It is ATC's responsibility to deny the take off if no plane ever before took off from such a short distance(especially because he obviously didn't follow instructions to enter D6). You have thousands of airliners taking off from >2 km distance and then all of a sudden there is one trying to take off with only 1.3km left, you don't have to be a rocket scientist to conclude that something is way off.

You obviously have an agenda. You also clearly indicate that you have absolutely no understanding of what you are talking about.

[AreOut]

I don't have any agenda. I think pilots are absolutely and ultimately responsible (it seems FO was the PIC) and they should have also landed immediately without burning fuel (pure luck the wings/hydraulics were still operational after almost one hour airborne after hitting ground stuff) but the ATC should have reacted differently and send them back to where they originally were nstructed to be.

[FUMR]

Can you not read? Ultimately it is NOT ATC's responsibility. Confirmed above by Herod who we regulars on here know is a retired commercial pilot. The crew should be aware of where they are. They were given more than adequate warning. End of.

[AreOut]

OK we are waiting ATC's here to say if they would or would not deny the takeoff if the pilot wants to perform it from the half of standard take off length.

[ATC Watcher]

It is ATC's responsibility to deny the take off if no plane ever before took off from such a short distance.
No it is not. Stop digging a bigger hole you are already in . You obviously do not know what you are talking about., and if you don't, then ask questions ,we'll be happy to answer you.

@DaveReidUK
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher And where did you get this info about " wrong intersection " ?
That much is clear from the ADS-B track.
FR24 shows a take off from D5 not what was requested by the Crew.. I was told they are the ones that requested D5,. and the TWR Controller asked them to confirm and gave them the TORA. But I have not heard the R/T recording yet.

[Hollywood1]

I don't have any agenda. I think pilots are absolutely and ultimately responsible (it seems FO was the PIC) and they should have also landed immediately without burning fuel (pure luck the wings/hydraulics were still operational after almost one hour airborne after hitting ground stuff) but the ATC should have reacted differently and send them back to where they originally were nstructed to be.

It's obvious by this statement you're not a pilot. ATC are not responsible for checking an aircraft's take off performance calculations. ATC wouldn't even have the data to be able to do it.

[AreOut]

ATC is responsible to see that something is way off, maybe the plane is hijacked, maybe the pilot is drugged or what not.

[PENKO]

Did the crew specifically request D5 or did they make the wrong turn into D5?

[FiveGirlKit]

I would like to see pictures of the track of the aircraft on the ground. They finally had a positive rate of climb when they crossed the Autobahn at 50', and that is ~1500m past the end of the threshold. Very lucky to have got airborne :uhoh:​​​​​​
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/900x2000/screenshot_2024_02_19_13_38_57_17_8a6ce7ef6b1c5341b022b20d7f bb4b6e_6f7bc05d1d6f772561464566aecf8d64e1500c70.jpg

[Sailvi767]

I don't have any agenda. I think pilots are absolutely and ultimately responsible (it seems FO was the PIC) and they should have also landed immediately without burning fuel (pure luck the wings/hydraulics were still operational after almost one hour airborne after hitting ground stuff) but the ATC should have reacted differently and send them back to where they originally were nstructed to be.

The E195 can operate from 4000 feet if lightly loaded. It’s advertised takeoff requirement is 4700 with a full load of passengers and a 1+15 flight time. This one was somewhat heavy but ATC has no way of knowing an aircraft’s weight. The FO is never the PIC, not sure where you got that from.
As far as earlier comments about the aircraft built like a tank the runway lights are designed to be frangible to minimize damage if hit.

[AreOut]

"The FO is never the PIC,"

that's right, I mixed this with another report

[DaveReidUK]

I would like to see pictures of the track of the aircraft on the ground. They finally had a positive rate of climb when they crossed the Autobahn at 50', and that is ~1500m past the end of the threshold. Very lucky to have got airborne :uhoh:​​​​​​

Sorry, but that "50 feet" figure is not borne out by the data.

[BoeingDriver99]

I understood it to be Air Traffic Control not Air Traffic Conditional? ATC are within their rights to tell pilots to go around if they have the equipment to alert them. And to stop take-offs if the situation so requires. So why pick and choose when you can and cannot intervene?

Ultimately pilots pay the price with their lives and ATC with their paperwork. This boils down to a pretty basic pilot error that could have been prevented by A) better pilots B) more assertive ATC.

[Sailvi767]

I understood it to be Air Traffic Control not Air Traffic Conditional? ATC are within their rights to tell pilots to go around if they have the equipment to alert them. And to stop take-offs if the situation so requires. So why pick and choose when you can and cannot intervene?

Ultimately pilots pay the price with their lives and ATC with their paperwork. This boils down to a pretty basic pilot error that could have been prevented by A) better pilots B) more assertive ATC.

So are you suggesting that ATC be made aware of the weight of each aircraft and run performance data to approve and tell the pilots how much runway they need?

[ATC Watcher]

I understood it to be Air Traffic Control not Air Traffic Conditional? ATC are within their rights to tell pilots to go around if they have the equipment to alert them. And to stop take-offs if the situation so requires. So why pick and choose when you can and cannot intervene?

Ultimately pilots pay the price with their lives and ATC with their paperwork. This boils down to a pretty basic pilot error that could have been prevented by A) better pilots B) more assertive ATC.
Gee, are you really a Boeing ATPL as your pseudo suggests ? We controllers do not " pick and choose" when to intervene, we follow the procedures we are trained on , just like you. Refusing or Canceling a take off clearance when a vehicle enters the runway is part of the procedures, but definitively not questioning the PIC TOW and TORA calculations. If the Embraer had been empty and carrying minimum fuel it would have made it ,, and controllers have no way or knowing these factors and make the calculations , this is the PIC area. , It is not about being "more assertive" it is about following established safety procedures. The PIC was, ( as I heard) asked by the controller to confirm his decision to use D5 and was given the TORA left in case he miscalculated. Apparently again , he confirmed.. His decision period. .( again waiting to hear the R/T to make sure what I was told is 100% correct)

[JumpJumpJump]

If they did request D5... woukd be interested to know what heading they had dialed... which runway they were expecting... any chance they've accidently prepared for the reciprocal and this is a gross error?

[DaveReidUK]

If they did request D5... would be interested to know what heading they had dialed... which runway they were expecting... any chance they've accidently prepared for the reciprocal and this is a gross error?

A 12R takeoff from D5 would give a 2266m TORA/TODA/ASDA, in fact not much different from a 30L takeoff from D6 (2349m)

[JumpJumpJump]

So this might not be a bad rabbit hole to go down.

[FiveGirlKit]

Sorry, but that "50 feet" figure is not borne out by the data.
The data shows the first indication of altitude (50') at this position. The reading before this shows 0' well past the threshold.
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/900x2000/screenshot_2024_02_19_15_47_39_60_3d9111e2d3171bf4882369f490 c087b4_6050cc7385427d5a93469f59fca39ca94d5437ba.jpg

[DIBO]

The data shows the first indication of altitude (50') at this position. The reading before this shows 0' well past the threshold.
Needs to be corrected for local QNH before anything sensible can come out of it.

[DaveReidUK]

Needs to be corrected for local QNH before anything sensible can come out of it.

Yes, with the added complication that a 0 alt on FR24 is anybody's guess.

I see that Avherald is also quoting "50 feet" - but then it has form for not understanding ADS-B data. :O

At that point, height AAL would have been approx 175-200 feet - still low enough to scare the motorists ...

[1southernman]

If somebody tries it again I would think this controller (and His/Her peers) would be more assertive...Just sayin...And yes I tick most of the pilot boxes...:)

[FUMR]

If somebody tries it again I would think this controller (and His/Her peers) would be more assertive...Just sayin...And yes I tick most of the pilot boxes...:)

why? As has already been said by several posters (who also tick all the boxes) the controller is not the pilot. He does not have the pertinent take off data. If the crew sound sure of what they are doing it is NOT, repeat, NOT the controller's duty to instruct them how to fly the aeroplane. All the controller can do is ascertain if they really intend use D5 and as an extra measure give them the available distance remaining. I have read that this was done. A transcript will confirm if that was the case.

[Cozmo_NS]

There is full ATC Recording (I cannot copy links), but it is on the reddit. Also there is a video from security camera. Tail strike as well. It is on twitter, username @Pedjijatar

For ATC google:AS86C ATC Recording @ LYBE 18.02.2024.

[TheEdge]

There is full ATC Recording (I cannot copy links), but it is on the reddit. Also there is a video from security camera. Tail strike as well. It is on twitter, username @Pedjijatar

For ATC google:AS86C ATC Recording @ LYBE 18.02.2024.

https://x.com/Pedjijatar/status/1759660437182783668?s=20Video (https://x.com/Pedjijatar/status/1759660437182783668?s=20)

//x.com/Pedjijatar/status/1759660437182783668?s=20

[TheEdge]

ATC:

ATC (https://www.reddit.com/r/serbia/comments/1auqs5k/as86c_atc_recording_lybe_18022024/?share_id=9A6wFOM7YttiZWxEIbJP5&utm_content=1&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=ioscss&utm_source=share&utm_term=1&rdt=58633)

[AreOut]

So are you suggesting that ATC be made aware of the weight of each aircraft and run performance data to approve and tell the pilots how much runway they need?

the ATC certainly knew the plane had PAX because it's a regular flight to Dusseldorf, the difference isn't a few meters but a kilometer, ATC may not be accountable for what happened but certainly morally responsible, some things are just clear without running any calculations

[V_2]

”A transcript will confirm if that was the case.“

not only did the controller tell them the remaining distance, he told them to stop and recalculate, and if they couldn’t make it from D5 cleared to backtrack to abeam D6.

i suspect having lined up at the wrong intersection, in haste the crew typed and searched for D5 into the EFB which spat out some numbers, but it went un-noticed that D5 was for 12R not 30L.

[Xhi]

the ATC certainly knew the plane had PAX because it's a regular flight to Dusseldorf, the difference isn't a few meters but a kilometer, ATC may not be accountable for what happened but certainly morally responsible, some things are just clear without running any calculations

Shut up, for God's sake! So many professionals told you you are talking nonsense & you keep insisting.

[SINGAPURCANAC]

https://x.com/Pedjijatar/status/1759660437182783668?t=btWCgOk3qaNwxeu9KEV_hQ&s=09


rolling.

:eek:

[SINGAPURCANAC]

So far,
crew missed d6 hp, reach d5, atc tried to correct ( three times), they have declared " able" , height was 0 ( zero) m a few hundred meters after end of runway, 15 m near oil station and bilbord at the highway- one low pass, one almost cfit at Avala hill east of the airfield,coupled with near air miss or so with another aircraft, land 40 kts higher than normal,without flaps...

what a shift!

[Globaliser]

ATC may not be accountable for what happened but certainly morally responsible, some things are just clear without running any calculationsI'm not an expert and I don't have much experience listening to ATC frequencies, but the exchange sounds like this to me: Tower: are you familiar that you entered runway via delta five intersection ASL86C: yes tora is two two actually sorry tora is one two seven three metres i assume that's [?not] enough Tower: ok calculate and call me if you need you can commence backtrack and line up abeam delta six
I have a question about ATC: If one assumes that the runway that an aircraft is to use for takeoff is clear, there is no conflicting traffic if it takes off now, and the pilot insists that the aircraft can take off from the intersection where it is, does ATC have the right to refuse to give a takeoff clearance on the basis that it looks like an odd place for the aircraft to start from?

[FUMR]

I thought my post was pretty benign...I was going say something like "what if it was from D4"...Would the controller still sit on his tongue and launch em anyway ?... But I thought that was little smart assy...:) ...BTW you can make your point without the disrespectful "CAPS" and "repeat"...This ain't FB....At least since the "like" button went away,,,I'm glad for that because I believe that the arrogance for some on here is directly proportional to the number of "likes" accumulated...B

"CAPS" and "repeat" was for emphasis and not intended to be considered disrespectful. I'm sorry if you thought otherwise. The reason I felt the emphasis was needed was because it had already been mentioned not only by myself but by others too. I'd say that the transcript confirms that ATC did what was required of them.

[AreOut]

does ATC have the right to refuse to give a takeoff clearance on the basis that it looks like an odd place for the aircraft to start from?

of course, you can't go to the grass and say "I want a takeoff clearance from here", at least not if you don't have a very valid reason

[FUMR]

of course, you can't go to the grass and say "I want a takeoff clearance from here", at least not if you don't have a very valid reason

You do give the most absurd examples in your attempts to save face and win a point.

[JanetFlight]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXzR2ZzN8v8&t=4s

[Globaliser]

of course, you can't go to the grass and say "I want a takeoff clearance from here", at least not if you don't have a very valid reasonI was asking about the aircraft being on the runway, not the grass. For context, in case anyone's missed it, there is a published TORA distance for takeoff on 30L from D5, so the airport clearly expects that some aircraft will do this.

[Sailvi767]

the ATC certainly knew the plane had PAX because it's a regular flight to Dusseldorf, the difference isn't a few meters but a kilometer, ATC may not be accountable for what happened but certainly morally responsible, some things are just clear without running any calculations

If they had 40 passengers onboard we would not be discussing this. They had 130. We also know the distance they were flying but we don’t know the actual fuel load. They might have only fueled for the short flight or perhaps they were tankering and had far more fuel. The last thing we don’t know is the amount of cargo. It might have been 10,000 lbs or it might have been zero. ATC has no knowledge of any of the above to calculate takeoff distance.
I think you will also find that there is more involved than the intersection they picked. The aircraft should have flown with the distance available. The aircraft is capable of accelerating to V1 and stopping in 4700 feet with a full load of people and fuel for 500 miles. There are other factors involved. I suspect they had an incorrect takeoff power setting as well as the incorrect runway Intersection.

[Equivocal]

I have to say that AreOut has, for the very first time in more than 20 years contributing to this site, made me consider blocking a poster.

To be more constructive, a quick Google suggests this is not the first time something similar has happened. I have no idea if the same systems were used for performance calculations but perhaps there is an easily missed HF gotcha.

More generally on the ATC/pilot responsibilities, as an ex-controller myself, I concur with pretty much all explanations to suggestions that ATC made an error. Listening to the recording it sounds like the controller did a pretty good job in, perhaps, difficult circumstances. Applying European ATC procedures there was little more that the controller could have done in the circumstances (that is to say, it was not inevitable that the TORA would be inadequate, and I have seen lightly-laden jets get off in remarkably short distances).

There are so many variables that contribute to take-off performance calculations, the only people who will really know the runway length required will be sitting at the front of the aircraft. The principle generally applied is that pilots fly the aircraft and controllers stop them banging into each other - crossing that boundary should be limited to suggestions only and these will rarely be necessary. The UK introduced a procedure a few years back whereby ATC was supposed to warn a pilot if they were about to start an approach below minimum (for AreOut's benefit, approach minima are another thing that are affected by many factors and are the pilots' responsibility to calculate) - it was a complete shambles and, IIRC, the CAA guy who designed the procedure was ripped to shreds in court when the CAA tried to prosecute a pilot for landing below minimum.

[EDML]

An ATR42 would have been easily able to legally take of with 1283m TORA.

They operated daily with full pax loads from EDLW (Dortmund) in the 90s with 800m + 200m stop way.
Pretty interesting visual experience on the flight deck.

However, no one would do that on a long runway to avoid 1000m more taxi.

[OldnGrounded]

I would like to see pictures of the track of the aircraft on the ground. They finally had a positive rate of climb when they crossed the Autobahn at 50', and that is ~1500m past the end of the threshold. Very lucky to have got airborne :uhoh:​​​​​​

The AvHerald article description was seriously scary, even without knowing anything more when I read it:

"Following a collision with the high precision approach lights of runway 12R past the end of the runway the aircraft became airborne about 500 meters/1650 feet past the runway end, climbed through 50 feet AGL about 2050 meters/6700 feet past the runway end . . ."

[megan]

I have a question about ATC: If one assumes that the runway that an aircraft is to use for takeoff is clear, there is no conflicting traffic if it takes off now, and the pilot insists that the aircraft can take off from the intersection where it is, does ATC have the right to refuse to give a takeoff clearance on the basis that it looks like an odd place for the aircraft to start from?Flying a multi engined helicopter from an airport we rarely visited, procedures conformed with heavy jet take off procedures such as V1 and reject distances, taxied to an intersection for take off on the runway and the tower called "you know you only have XXX metres from there?". All was good, but it showed an on the ball tower controller who understood helicopter operations, likely because of the resident helo operators, thumbs up Essendon.

[AreOut]

a very similar incident happened two years ago also with Embraer at EDDB

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/268534

Conclusions
The Dutch Safety Board investigated the incident and found that the aircraft took off from Intersection L5 - as the crew intended - while the performance calculation was based on Intersection K5, because both pilots accidentally selected intersection K5 instead of L5 in the takeoff performance calculation application. The selection error resulted in a slower acceleration leading to a hazardous situation in which the aircraft became airborne 443 metres before the end of the runway.

The Dutch Safety Board found several contributing factors related to the selection error:
• Accidental misselections occur commonly when using a touchscreen tool with finger-touch interaction, especially if it is used routinely and therefore quickly. The lack of system feedback about the location of the finger and the ‘fat finger’ problem contribute to selection errors when working on a touchscreen.
• The takeoff performance calculation application does not provide visual feedback about the selected intersection and runway (airport synoptic).
• The pull down menu contains selection options (runway intersections) that are not normally used by the operator.

There were several contributing factors to the propagation of the misselection:
• The cross check did not reveal the selection error because the pilots likely only focused on the performance calculation outputs, which probably did not differ as both pilots had reportedly selected the same wrong intersection.
• Passing the sign indicating intersection L5 and the available runway length could not reveal the selection error either, because the crew had this intersection in mind. Also the calculated N1 was within range of expectation. Variant flying might have widened their range of expected performance parameters.
• The crew trusted the performance calculation application.

[JanetFlight]

An humble question here, without "pointing fingers" to anyone, be it pilots or Atc'ers (that task for official entities).
To all dear colleagues reading this and flying drivers of the fantastic E-jet...
Having in mind Azul operates similar type from Santos Dumont daily dozens per day ops, with more or less the same rwy declared distances, had this very same accident plane (crew) done the correct calculations for TO data and performance, it could have been in the air without any issue at all, commencing at D5 ..?
Tanx to all.. Peace ✌️

[Sailvi767]

An humble question here, without "pointing fingers" to anyone, be it pilots or Atc'ers (that task for official entities).
To all dear colleagues reading this and flying drivers of the fantastic E-jet...
Having in mind Azul operates similar type from Santos Dumont daily dozens per day ops, with more or less the same rwy declared distances, had this very same accident plane (crew) done the correct calculations for TO data and performance, it could have been in the air without any issue at all, commencing at D5 ..?
Tanx to all.. Peace ✌️

The answer is maybe. You would need to know the passenger load, altimeter, winds, cargo load, fuel load, temp and any performance restrictions. We don’t have that information.

[DIBO]

The aircraft is capable of accelerating to V1 and stopping in 4700 feet with a full load of people and fuel for 500 miles.
which they didn't have with a 4177 feet TORA
There are other factors involved. I suspect they had an incorrect takeoff power setting as well as the incorrect runway Intersection.
To be used with some caution until official ADSB data is published, but as all other datapoints seem to be pretty consistent, it seems to indicate they accelerated very slowly the first couple of hundreds meters, direction D4
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1515x850/oy_gdc_b_04713baa72e5c434c8991314700bb4f51fb1450f.jpg


The AvHerald article description was seriously scary, even without knowing anything more when I read it:
"Following a collision with the high precision approach lights of runway 12R past the end of the runway the aircraft became airborne about 500 meters/1650 feet past the runway end, climbed through 50 feet AGL about 2050 meters/6700 feet past the runway end . . ."

The estimate of DRUK seems to be more likely
I see that Avherald is also quoting "50 feet" - but then it has form for not understanding ADS-B data. :O
At that point, height AAL would have been approx 175-200 feet - still low enough to scare the motorists ...

was still on the ground at position N44.8274 E20.2846 and climbed through 50 feet AGL at position N44.8335 E20.2673 just ahead of the motorway.
I very much doubt that at the first position indicated, they were still on the ground = plowing through the fields, as that terrain has a very slight downhill slope.
Just after crossing the airport access road (with some trees and pretty tall lighting posts) they were at around 75ft (rounded to the nearest 25) + a little extra terrain clearance from the slight downhill slope.
THe ADSB reported wind is fully cross, with a pinch of tail component. That didn't help either...

Seconds (or should I say feet) from disaster....:sad:

[rog747]

I rarely if ever, comment on this Accident Forum, so please allow me to note my observation.

I see that upon looking at the Runway Chart for Declared Distances shows a Take Off length available from from Intersection D5 on heading 12R is 2266m.

Whereas the Take Off distance from D5 on heading 30L (which they used) is just 1273m.

Using D6 for 30L is 2349m (almost the same as using D5 for 12R)

I think it is glaring that a mistake here was possibly made by the Flight Crew (or they were misled by other reasons, as yet unknown) when viewing and checking those numbers,
hence the ATC calls to remind the Crew that they were now lining up for a very short Take Off distance available.

I err to superior knowledge of course.

[DaveReidUK]

I see that upon looking at the Runway Chart for Declared Distances shows a Take Off length available from from Intersection D5 on heading 12R is 2266m.

Whereas the Take Off distance from D5 on heading 30L (which they used) is just 1273m.

Indeed so - see my earlier post.

A 12R takeoff from D5 would give a 2266m TORA/TODA/ASDA, in fact not much different from a 30L takeoff from D6 (2349m)

[Xhi]

I rarely if ever, comment on this Accident Forum, so please allow me to note my observation.

I see that upon looking at the Runway Chart for Declared Distances shows a Take Off length available from from Intersection D5 on heading 12R is 2266m.

Whereas the Take Off distance from D5 on heading 30L (which they used) is just 1273m.

Using D6 for 30L is 2349m (almost the same as using D5 for 12R)

I think it is glaring that a mistake here was possibly made by the Flight Crew (or they were misled by other reasons, as yet unknown) when viewing and checking those numbers,
hence the ATC calls to remind the Crew that they were now lining up for a very short Take Off distance available.

I err to superior knowledge of course.

In the ATC tape the controller clearly asks (at 1:23)

"are you aware that ... TORA is 1273 m. I assume that's not enough. Calculate and call me"

So the blame lies squarely with the crew. They ignored a very specific warning. I find that very hard to grasp!

[Globaliser]

Indeed so - see my earlier post.A 12R takeoff from D5 would give a 2266m TORA/TODA/ASDA, in fact not much different from a 30L takeoff from D6 (2349m)And not to labour my earlier post (https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/657667-air-serbia-e195-runs-into-runway-lights-belgrade-2.html#post11600359), but the aircraft replied to ATC along the lines of: ASL86C: yes tora is two two actually sorry tora is one two seven three metres i assume that's [?not] enough

[ATC Watcher]

@ DIBO : Quote:
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
The aircraft is capable of accelerating to V1 and stopping in 4700 feet with a full load of people and fuel for 500 miles.
which they didn't have with a 4177 feet TORA
But were they at MTOW?
Anyway local rumors are that CRM and authority gradient played a role with a very experienced (Italian) Capt with a wannabee on right seat. Time will tell a bit more.as the blame game has started..

[TBSC]

ATC recording (https://www.reddit.com/r/serbia/comments/1auqs5k/as86c_atc_recording_lybe_18022024/)

[MerseyView]

a very similar incident happened two years ago also with Embraer at EDDB

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/268534

Conclusions
The Dutch Safety Board investigated the incident and found that the aircraft took off from Intersection L5 - as the crew intended - while the performance calculation was based on Intersection K5, because both pilots accidentally selected intersection K5 instead of L5 in the takeoff performance calculation application. The selection error resulted in a slower acceleration leading to a hazardous situation in which the aircraft became airborne 443 metres before the end of the runway.

The Dutch Safety Board found several contributing factors related to the selection error:
• Accidental misselections occur commonly when using a touchscreen tool with finger-touch interaction, especially if it is used routinely and therefore quickly. The lack of system feedback about the location of the finger and the ‘fat finger’ problem contribute to selection errors when working on a touchscreen.
• The takeoff performance calculation application does not provide visual feedback about the selected intersection and runway (airport synoptic).
• The pull down menu contains selection options (runway intersections) that are not normally used by the operator.

There were several contributing factors to the propagation of the misselection:
• The cross check did not reveal the selection error because the pilots likely only focused on the performance calculation outputs, which probably did not differ as both pilots had reportedly selected the same wrong intersection.
• Passing the sign indicating intersection L5 and the available runway length could not reveal the selection error either, because the crew had this intersection in mind. Also the calculated N1 was within range of expectation. Variant flying might have widened their range of expected performance parameters.
• The crew trusted the performance calculation application.

It isn't 'very similar' at all.

L5 still gives over 2000m, a do-able TORA for an Embraer E295 payload/weather permitting. The problem here was that they calculated for a much longer distance and hence the performance figures will suggest a lesser Thrust setting and lower flap setting than they might need if they had put in the correct intersection.

1300m is NOT a usual TORA for a E295 (or I doubt an E195), and if this distance was relayed to them, it should have been immediately obvious that something was wrong.

[Bosi72]

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1515x850/oy_gdc_b_04713baa72e5c434c8991314700bb4f51fb1450f.jpg

The estimate of DRUK seems to be more likely

:sad:

The photo from your post is old.For accurate distances, you can use official charts (scroll to the bottom of page) https://smatsa.rs/wp-content/uploads/aip/trenutna_publikacija/2024-01-25/25-Jan-2024-A/2024-01-25-AIRAC/html/eAIP/LY-AD-2.LYBE-en-GB.html#AD0911161450244

[Herod]

Globaliser: I picked up on that phrase as well. The captain saying to ATC "I assume that's not enough?" Effectively passing to ATC the decision on whether he has enough runway. In no way is that acceptable. If he doesn't know, he shouldn't be there. I don't just mean the holding point, but the LHS.

[Cozmo_NS]

From exyuaviation (still cannot post links, sorry):

1. The plane almost experienced a disaster immediately after takeoff, because it barely avoided a huge billboard located on the approach road of the airport, almost perfectly aligned with the inserted runway. ILS antennas are light structures, but if the plane had hit the billboard, it would have disintegrated on the spot, and probably crashed in the middle of the highway, killing who knows how many people. On FR24, it can be seen that immediately upon take-off, the plane turned very slightly to the left, thereby saving itself.
(The billboard is mentioned by a passenger who sat next to the right wing. They flew about 20 meters left from billboard at about 5-6 meters of height above highway).

2. The statements of AvHerald and other media that the plane started flying only 500m after the end of the runway are correct for two reasons. 12R does not have extended approach lights as 12L has, so the plane did not hit them as some write, also, after the end of runway 30L there is a downhill that descends a few meters towards the approach road of the airport from the highway. The plane did not take off from the runway at all, it careened off of it, collided with the ILS antennas, the ground "droped out from under the plane" while it was flying more or less horizontally, and then it accelerated and began to climb slowly. This can be seen in detail: AIP SMATSA Precision Approach Terrain Chart RWY 12L/R.

[Sailvi767]

which they didn't have with a 4177 feet TORA

They did not however lose an engine or abort. The aircraft’s actual takeoff distance should have allowed them to get airborne on the runway. There are additional issues at play. It might be that seeing the end of the runway coming up the aggressive and perhaps early rotation and tail strike reduced performance.

@ DIBO :
But were they at MTOW?
Anyway local rumors are that CRM and authority gradient played a role with a very experienced (Italian) Capt with a wannabee on right seat. Time will tell a bit more.as the blame game has started..

4700 feet is the balanced field length to allow the aircraft to either continue the takeoff with a engine failure and be at 35 feet over the end of the runway or abort and stop on the remaining runway. It is not the actual takeoff distance which would be shorter.

[what next]

Globaliser: I picked up on that phrase as well. The captain saying to ATC "I assume that's not enough?" Effectively passing to ATC the decision on whether he has enough runway.

It is impossible to know what he meant with that phrase. There are several non-native speakers involved, communicating in short sentences. Maybe what he really inteded to say was: "I assume you want to say that's not enough?" which would have quite a different meaning. We all have heard countless examples of non-perfect communication in our CRM courses.

[Cozmo_NS]

nedeljniknin on Instagram has a video recorded by passenger.

They are all lucky to be alive.

[DIBO]

I picked up on that phrase as well. The captain saying to ATC "I assume that's not enough?" Effectively passing to ATC the decision on whether he has enough runway.
Well, CVR transcript will make an interesting reading, me thinks... Especially with some 'rumors' on CRM and attitude issues.

For me this transmission will explain a lot "yes tora is two two actually sorry tora is one two seven three meters i assume that's not enough"
* preceding comm's were: initial ATC taxi instruction to D6 / pilot reporting approaching D6 / ATC explicit line-up via D6 instruction
* "yes" as an answer to "are you familiar that you entered runway via D5" is a big fat lie, being caught red handed making a (excusable) mistake. But more importantly, this is the start of a continued "face loss" cover up, digging one's hole deeper and deeper
* "tora is two two actually..." continued face loss avoidance, reading on the spot some EFB data which clearly was not briefed beforehand. The only 22xx TORA on the airfield is D5 for the opposite runway (12R)
* "actually sorry tora is one two seven three meters" quickly correcting on the spot the reading of EFB data, and getting the correct 30L TORA (once more confirming this was NOT briefed before by the crew - as never planned on using D5)
* "i assume that's not enough" this is not passing on to ATC the decision of T/O rwy length required (which is of course totally and technically impossible). This is simply the mouth voicing what the startled brain concluded (and concluded correctly if I might add).
From there on, the hole digging continued. I wonder from that moment on, what exactly went on in the cockpit CRM wise, switching in a hurry from standard OPS, to short field OPS with a full pax load and (hopefully) a moderate fuel load.
EDIT: too many doubts about interpretation of ATC recording and who is transmitting what.

OK, I've put on my flak-vest now...so here we go.
In a way I somewhat agree with one much criticized poster, not that ATC has in any way any T/O rwy length responsibility nor authority, as long as there are no published restrictions on intersection use. (wouldn't be surprised to see in future some restrictions published on D5 intersection use - potentially dangerous for 30L and of no use in the 12R context.)
But ATC do has controlling responsibility and after at least 5 instructions/confirmations on D6, answering "YES" to "are you familiar that you entered runway via D5" is a big NO, NO. Especially with traffic already lining/lined up via D7 as no. 2, this D5 confusion on the runway, delaying the release of the D7 traffic. If the response was "aah sorry, my mistake" and no other traffic near or on the rwy, then some patience and leniency would be in place. But with this smartass answer, "vacate rwy, taxi down A to D6 holding point as no. 2" would be in place. Nothing to do with hindsight, everything to do with smartass control.

[V_2]

One thing that ATC may be open to criticism for, is the use or lack of stop bars. Was D5 stop bar lit, does it even have them? Shades of the recent Tokyo crash perhaps. Not heard of any mention of this factor so far here. For example I’d like to think this event wouldn’t happen in the UK, where stop bar use and obedience is meticulous.

[DIBO]

In case that RVR is 400 M or greater, aircraft can be separated without usage of stop bars.
installed yes, in use (most likely) no, as weather was CAVOK

[BFSGrad]

Listening to the audio linked in post #74, where is the takeoff clearance for 86C? I hear the LUAW at D6, the incorrect D5 entry, the discussion of TORA from D5, and the offer to backtrack to D6. Next heard is “86C, is everything OK?”

[Chiefttp]

Back in 2005 I was taking a checkride in a C-17. For those who don’t know, the C-17 is a heavy 4 engine military transport that can takeoff at close to 600,000 lbs. it has a STOL capability that allows us to takeoff and land on a 3500 ft (1066 meters) runway. We were flying into Richmond Virginia and asked for a visual approach to Runway 25 to accomplish an assault landing. Rwy 25 was only 5000 x 50 ft long/wide. ATC cleared us for the approach, but then he asked what type of aircraft? We told him a “C-17” He then asked if that was a type of Cessna. We told him we were a heavy 4 engine jet transport. He then informed us that Rwy 25 was very short and only 50 ft wide. We told him we were aware of that and the jet was more than capable of landing on that runway . He asked us again, and then resigned himself to watch our approach. He was obviously uncomfortable about this scenario, but we explained yet again we were cognizant of the runways dimensions. He was amazed after we landed with room to spare. I still remember how concerned he was and we thanked him for his professionalism and concern that day.
It seems like the ATC controllers in this incident went above and beyond to inform the crew of the Embraer of his concerns as well.

[CecilRooseveltHooks]

nedeljniknin on Instagram has a video recorded by passenger.

They are all lucky to be alive.

Thanks for the info. Chilling to see, and a long time after tail strike till they got out of ground effect / off the grass.

[ATC Watcher]

Listening to the audio linked in post #74, where is the takeoff clearance for 86C? I hear the LUAW at D6, the incorrect D5 entry, the discussion of TORA from D5, and the offer to backtrack to D6. Next heard is “86C, is everything OK?”
The recording is missing ta few transmissions ,the usual thing with spotters hand held recordings posted on Internet right after an accident . Hence my standard reservations on using those to post "blaming " comments . .. There was a take off clearance issued.

[ReturningVector]

A 195 would be able to takeoff with 1250 meter using ECS off and static takeoff, given it is not at max t/o weight.

However, that would require the highest flap setting for T/O which doesn’t appear to be the case judging from the on board video.

[akademik]

Globaliser: I picked up on that phrase as well. The captain saying to ATC "I assume that's not enough?" Effectively passing to ATC the decision on whether he has enough runway. In no way is that acceptable. If he doesn't know, he shouldn't be there. I don't just mean the holding point, but the LHS.

I think it was ATC who said "I assume that's not enough", not the pilot. Sound recording is cut off and pilot responses at that time are not included.

[AreOut]

nedeljniknin on Instagram has a video recorded by passenger.

They are all lucky to be alive.

here it is

https://www.instagram.com/p/C3kiwrvIS5U/?hl=en

"In a way I somewhat agree with one much criticized poster, not that ATC has in any way any T/O rwy length responsibility nor authority"

hah I agree about that and I agree that ATC is not accountable here, but somehow it's just another redundancy step that one could expect here from an experienced ATC(bear in mind not a single jet airliner has ever took off from that position), confused pilot going to the wrong position cutting his runway for 1 whole kilometer and saying "2-2 no 1-2" would ring an alarm and just telling the pilot "please go back to default position"(no reasons needed) would have prevented all of this

[Avman]

It would seem that AreOut has changed his tune a little but still wants to attribute some blame on the controller. He talks of what an experienced controller may have done. Now I only listened to the ATC tape once, but I thought that it was first a youngish female controller handling the traffic (possibly a trainee) and that at the point the aircraft entered via D5 an older sounding male controller stepped in. Was that not so? If I'm correct that would be her coach who, by definition, would be experienced. If a pilot states that he can take it from that position it is not for the controller to enter into an argument with him.

My take is that all blame lies with the Captain of that flight. He is in command and he should know where he is. He was given an adequate wake up call which, for reasons only known to him, he appeared to ignore. As also mentioned, the CRM aspect will be interesting, if the recording still exists that is!

[AreOut]

"and that at the point the aircraft entered via D5 an older sounding male controller stepped in. Was that not so?"

it was, maybe at that point he should have just told the pilot to go to D6 without offering any options and recalculations "you have made the mistake please go to D6"

it's not the blame it's just that I would expect some redundancy at such an important part of the flight

see the Chiefftp post ( https://www.pprune.org/11600766-post86.html )

just asking the pilot for the type of the plane and telling him that no such plane has ever took off from that position would maybe make the pilot reconsider his decision, but I still think that making the mistake on the runway should raise the alert of the conroller and correcting that mistake should be the least painfiul thing to do

[Request Orbit]

hah I agree about that and I agree that ATC is not accountable here, but somehow it's just another redundancy step that one could expect here from an experienced ATC(bear in mind not a single jet airliner has ever took off from that position), confused pilot going to the wrong position cutting his runway for 1 whole kilometer and saying "2-2 no 1-2" would ring an alarm and just telling the pilot "please go back to default position"(no reasons needed) would have prevented all of this

The redundancy step was re-iterating the position and TORA and double-checking they were happy to accept. What do you want next, controllers thinking a crosswind approach looks a bit dodgy and instructing the pilot to go-around because they saw a tail strike once? You have to trust that a pilot knows what their plane is (and isn’t) capable of, and how to fly it, or the system doesn’t work.

[Bosi72]

When you read performance from the magazine
https://www.flyingmag.com/embraer-e190-e2-jet-shows-short-field-prowess/#:~:text=The%20company%20said%20the%20E190,scheduled%20to%20 open%20in%202025.

[Avman]

"and that at the point the aircraft entered via D5 an older sounding male controller stepped in. Was that not so?"

it was, maybe at that point he should have just told the pilot to go to D6 without offering any options and recalculations "you have made the mistake please go to D6"

it's not the blame it's just that I would expect some redundancy at such an important part of the flight

see the Chiefftp post ( https://www.pprune.org/11600766-post86.html )

just asking the pilot for the type of the plane and telling him that no such plane has ever took off from that position would maybe make the pilot reconsider his decision, but I still think that making the mistake on the runway should raise the alert of the conroller and correcting that mistake should be the least painfiul thing to do

Unfortunately your argument has no validity whatsoever. You don't seem to be able to grasp the fundamental point which is that, further to what he already did, it was not the controller's call to fly the airplane on behalf of the pilot. Please try hard to understand that and stop flogging a dead horse.

[Globaliser]

just asking the pilot for the type of the plane and telling him that no such plane has ever took off from that position ...How do we know that no E195 has ever taken off from there? We do know that the TORA was 1,273 metres. Is that not enough in the right conditions?

I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.

[DIBO]

When you read performance from the magazineI think you're still better off, reading performance on pprune ;)

BTW, article is about the -E2 generation, new, better, larger wing, performance not comparable to the -E1 (as in this incident)

[AreOut]

How do we know that no E195 has ever taken off from there? We do know that the TORA was 1,273 metres. Is that not enough in the right conditions?

I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.

different plane (E2)

[Request Orbit]

How do we know that no E195 has ever taken off from there? We do know that the TORA was 1,273 metres. Is that not enough in the right conditions?

Equally, how many people have actually seen max performance takeoffs of modern jets? Just because you watch someone use 1700-1800 metres to take off as standard doesn’t mean the aircraft isn’t capable of doing a lot better. If the pilot says they can do it, who are you to disagree? For an ATCO to even police the takeoff in the way being suggested requires so many assumptions about things they’d never know - or be expected to know - that it’s not even close to being reasonable.

I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.

A large proportion of EGLC movements are still E190s (and still include E1s) and the published TORA is still 1199m. And off runway 27 the climb out needs to clear Canary Wharf, which implies a slightly better rate of climb is available on the E190 there than the E195 showed here.

[DIBO]

How do we know that no E195 has ever taken off from there? We do know that the TORA was 1,273 metres. Is that not enough in the right conditions?
Sure, depending on the engine option installed and with the right, but unusual, conditions (empty, just a drop of fuel, favorable MET conditions, etc) runway needed can go down to 800-ish meters.

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/581x441/e195_apm_e51789a521584adeacbcb076fcd22111acf75531.jpg
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.Bear in mind that in the incident the remaining runway was all there is (sort of*). At EGLC the physical strip is longer, with a TORA of 1199, the TODA is already 1457m.

*sort of: for obvious reasons not included in any official published data nor usable in perfo calculations, but the airport design gave them in their mishap, 11% (~140m) more concrete with the 'lead in' taxiways in front of the runway end.

[Consol]

Equally, how many people have actually seen max performance takeoffs of modern jets? Just because you watch someone use 1700-1800 metres to take off as standard doesn’t mean the aircraft isn’t capable of doing a lot better. If the pilot says they can do it, who are you to disagree? For an ATCO to even police the takeoff in the way being suggested requires so many assumptions about things they’d never know - or be expected to know - that it’s not even close to being reasonable.



A large proportion of EGLC movements are still E190s (and still include E1s) and the published TORA is still 1199m. And off runway 27 the climb out needs to clear Canary Wharf, which implies a slightly better rate of climb is available on the E190 there than the E195 showed here.
You're not comparing like with like here. A LCY departure has flaps , v speeds and thrust settings determined by the runway length, obstacles and conditions. Typically most types would use a greater flap setting than on a long runway. Canary Wharf does not have to be cleared, there is an emergency turn to the right.
A BEG departure would have probably planned less flap, greater flex thrust reduction and speeds appropriate to this and so use a lot more runway.

By the way does anyone know if the tail was struck in this fine display of airmanship?

[AreOut]

By the way does anyone know if the tail was struck in this fine display of airmanship?

yes and according to Serbian media the plane has already been written off

[CVividasku]

the ATC certainly knew the plane had PAX because it's a regular flight to Dusseldorf, the difference isn't a few meters but a kilometer, ATC may not be accountable for what happened but certainly morally responsible, some things are just clear without running any calculations
Despite many negative comments about your message and reasoning, you are more than right.
Just keep in mind that you have the full story, especially its ending, which the ATC didn't have, and it's always difficult to take a big decision like refusing a takeoff clearance, but you are more than right.

Aviation safety comes from the multiplication and superimposition of many barriers, the TEM model counts a small dozen of them.
It was very unlikely that this plane would be able to take off. Even less likely that the acceleration stop distance in case of failure at V1 would have been within the available runway distance.

Some airfields in similar configuration will ban takeoffs from such intersections.
Either because they don't offer as much runway as other intersections (even if some airplanes could takeoff with the available distance)
Or because they can be mistaken and pilots are deemed more likely to wrongly depart from there. So again, even if some airplanes could takeoff safely from there, they still ban takeoffs from there.


What most posters are missing, when they remind that ATC has no way of doing the perf calculations and that the ERJ could takeoff in only 1200m, what they are missing is that such takeoffs are planned properly from the cockpit preparation stage, at the gate. If the crew planned an intersection and they're trying to takeoff with half the runway missing, it's very different from a situation in which they plan the takeoff from the beginning on the shorter portion.
Also, we don't really have the proper timeframe in the recording, but it's likely the captain said they could takeoff from there very quickly. Whereas you need quite a long time to do a proper performance calculations.

I wouldn't be surprised if, in the near future, some changes were made in the LYBE local regulations about intersection use...

[Rick01]

Sorry, but he was no "more than right" than the takeoff distance remaining on this flight was "more than enough"... the controller flagged the potential problem, the controller asked the question, the crew ignored the obvious warning from ATC that perhaps the chosen intersection may not have been appropriate to depart from... there is no blame on ATC here. The "barrier" you speak of was unable to be raised any higher by the controller, who was not privy to the calculations and decisions that were made and taken on the flight deck. The choice to take off from D5 lays solely and squarely with the flight crew, who messed this up royally.

[MercedesBenz240]

Here are my 2 cents

First of all I have to say that in the most important part of the ATC communication recording, the pilot communication has clearly been cut. Deliberately or not, I don't know. This phrase ''Yes, TORA is two two, actually, sorry, TORA is ah One Two Seven Three Meters, I assume that is not enough.'' is said by the controller. It's the same voice, same accent, that's clear as day. There appears to be some confusion with this part.

The most plausible theory I read so far which is what I think happened in that day is this one and I will quote user V__2:
''I suspect having lined up at the wrong intersection, in haste the crew typed and searched for D5 into the EFB which spat out some numbers, but it went un-noticed that D5 was for 12R not 30L.''

What I suspect happened: The pilots turned at D5 by mistake. They suddenly realised they had lined up at the wrong intersection and in a hurry to leave the active runway instead of back tracking they immediately started to recalculate new TORA from D5. In a hurry they mistakenly selected D5 for rwy 12R where they got 2266 meters of available runway which would be more than sufficient in this case. There is no Embraer instructor captain who would consciously elect to start the take off run of a fully loaded E195 with 1200 meters of runway available. Unless they were looking for a suicide attempt.

Psychological factors come into play:
Confirmation bias: Even though we know for a fact that they were given the exact correct TORA from the ATC, my suspect is that in their mind they were convinced they had 2226 meters of TORA. They were suddenly overwhelmed trying to recalculate everything on an active runway and the ATC information which they were given didn't properly kick in. The initial confusion of the TORA from the ATC: ''Yes, TORA is two two, actually, sorry, TORA is ah One Two Seven Three Meters'' might have been an additional factor.
Tunnel vision: We know that at least the captain was based in BEG and should be very familiar with the airport. This leads to the idea that just based on the vicinity of the aircraft with the terminal building he would easily tell that this is not a correct position to depart. However in a hurry (and maybe a little embarrasment for a instructor captain to turn at the wrong intersection) and busy looking at the EFB, it is very possible that he might have missed this important hint.

There are also unconfirmed rumours that the FO was on a line check flight. CRM issues is very possible plus unfamiliar pilot with LYBE. Combination of embarrassed instructor captain trying to get out of the situation as quick as possible + unexperienced and nervous FO.

Anyone feel free to correct me whether this chain of events is possible or not, thank you.

[JanetFlight]

Regarding this very incident here i cant stop thinking about the local policy we have here at the airport i presently work and wich our Colleagues in the ATC/Tower have regarding Intersections Take Offs.
Talking about LPFR, Faro, Southern Portugal.
Basically NO T/O is allowed by our local ATC from any taxiway intersection, be it a 747 or a Piper Cub...only allowed from normal rwy beginning, be it 28 or 10.
We have two twys by 90 degrees angles with the RWY in use, F or C, and two rapid exit, G and D.
Rwy 2.490 meters, good enough for almost every living plane out there, and also some nice RESA//CWY.
For instance, recently a team of very light planes (those who do Acrobatics at night with lights and flares and bla bla bla) were denied to TO from any intersection, despite the fact both pilots explained their very machines could TO and land within "a mail / postage stamp" :)
Last summer a super STOL Quest Kodiak wich we all know can land in a Pizza, was also denied for the very surprise of both pilots...wich they calmly then accepted and taxied till the very beginning of 28.
The reason given by ATC, and totally accepted and understood by all pilots without further discussions on the frequency, is the fact LPFR has no published declared distances from any instersection, except those published for the entire RWY, even though some cases are more than obvious to be feasible and doable.
So, im not trying to input any fault here to pilots or atc'ers in this BEG incident, however i thought it could be curious this fact here, wich for sure could also be used by other Airports Authorities and ATC services around the world, in some particular cases.

About those colleagues above who wrote about London City, i think its more peculiar the case of Santos Dumont in Rio, wich one rwy is 1260 meters and the other 1323 mts, and used by AZUL embraers similar to BEG incident, and even GOL 737-800 and also TAM/LATAM Airbuses 319s.

[Grunf]

Here is the video from inside the a/c while taking off:

Air Serbia flight take off

[Request Orbit]

You're not comparing like with like here. A LCY departure has flaps , v speeds and thrust settings determined by the runway length, obstacles and conditions. Typically most types would use a greater flap setting than on a long runway. Canary Wharf does not have to be cleared, there is an emergency turn to the right.
A BEG departure would have probably planned less flap, greater flex thrust reduction and speeds appropriate to this and so use a lot more runway.

I’m not trying to pin down exact performance to the metre here. I’m talking about whether there’s enough examples out there that from the perspective of an ATCO, it would seem plausibly possible for the stated TORA to be achievable. Unless we’re also now expecting ATCOs to know what a pilots planned flap and thrust settings are on top of everything else that’s been implied, they’re irrelevant to an ATCOs immediate expectation. If the pilot says they can make that, who are you to police it?

Again, from the ATCO perspective, Canary Wharf doesn’t have to be cleared if it starts going wrong, but 99.9% of 27 deps will climb above it. In terms of plausibility the performance is there.

In the case of this incident, it seems fairly obvious that it was never going to work from D5 with the cockpit setup the way they did. I’m quite happy for the pilots to pin down whether it would actually have worked had it been done correctly. Either way I think far too much of this thread has been dedicated to a non-existent ATCO “moral responsibility” which only became apparent with hindsight and knowledge of variables an ATCO has no way of knowing.

[ATC Watcher]

What I suspect happened: The pilots turned at D5 by mistake. They suddenly realised they had lined up at the wrong intersection and in a hurry to leave the active runway instead of back tracking they immediately started to recalculate new TORA from D5. In a hurry they mistakenly selected D5 for rwy 12R where they got 2266 meters of available runway
Anyone feel free to correct me whether this chain of events is possible or not, thank you.
Not sure this is exactly what happened but it makes sense and you are so far giving on good hypothesis . I have heard a comment adding that on their FMS a D5 intersection T/O is automatically giving data for 12R ,if true that could sustain your theory.
The fact ( from the pax video) that it looks like they did not take off with more flaps and power tend to go in that direction too. But for me , the cockpit authority gradient mots certainly also played a role if the crew set up given by the local media is correct.

As to the Faro example, yes this is the old German way and belief : :" Prohibit everything possibility unsafe and you will not get accidents" . But part of our job is flexibility and expedition and ATC is also about accommodating pilots requests, . Glad I could exercise all that in my career. .

[FlexibleResponse]

I thought ATC was fabulous in picking up on the aircraft type and limited distance available for takeoff and bringing it to the Captain's attention. That is not the normal job and certainly not the responsibility of the ATC controller.

It's also very unfortunate that in this instance that the Swiss cheese line up of holes of errors made by the accident crew in selecting the D5 departure was not realised by them, even when they were challenged by ATC.

It would seem that eventually that airports will need to mandate certain aircraft types or models to be forbidden from certain intersection departures...to protect errant flight crews and their passengers.

[BoeingDriver99]

I am fascinated by the ardent belief that ATC has zero responsibility in this accident. It was and will always be the PiC’s ultimate responsibility, this is not a question. But when the report comes out I hope that a causal factor will include ATCs clear doubts about the situation. And to be clear, again, ATC are not to blame. But they could have acted differently.

Thought experiment; if ATC did everything correctly, do you think LYBE ATC would behave in the exact same way in the exact same scenario tomorrow with the benefit of the knowledge of this accident?

If you think yes; then ATC are not a causal factor.

If you think they would behave differently; then ATC are a causal factor.

And again for the more emotional posters; PiC is always ultimately responsible. But there are always causal contributory factors to any incident/accident.

I standby for the usual ad hominem attacks :cool:

[ReturningVector]

Not exactly the same, but similar and using the performance tool by Embraer:

https://onderzoeksraad.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/takeoff_with_erroneous_takeoff_data_embraer_195_e2_learning_ to_reduce_the_risk.pdf

The fact that you select runway and intersection at the same time might be supportive of a D5 12R calculation.

[Request Orbit]

Thought experiment; if ATC did everything correctly, do you think LYBE ATC would behave in the exact same way in the exact same scenario tomorrow with the benefit of the knowledge of this accident?
Yes I do. I go back to the earlier question I asked that wasn’t answered. In another situation, a controller witnesses an approach in crosswinds that they thought looked dodgy, left the pilot to it, then they had a tailstrike/went off the runway. Would you now expect the controller in the future to send around any approach they thought looked marginal, just because one went wrong once? It was in the controllers power to do something about it, so they now have a responsibility to make that decision on the pilots behalf?

[AreOut]

I thought ATC was fabulous in picking up on the aircraft type and limited distance available for takeoff and bringing it to the Captain's attention. That is not the normal job and certainly not the responsibility of the ATC controller.


"not my job" would be a very bad attitude for someone occupying such a position, imagine an A380 mistakenly going to D5 instead of D7 and the ATC being well aware it won't take off "ay ay Sir you just take off and kill 200 people it's not my job to calculate it good luck here is your clearance!"

some things are just too common sense regardless if they are your job or not

[BoeingDriver99]

I agree with AreOut. The Faro situation is a farcical for example. You won’t allow a light aircraft from a tarmaced 2,000+ runway but you’ll allow an E195 depart from D5?

Which is it ATC?

We are on the exact same team. I don’t understand the eagerness to blame the crew entirely and to deny ANY culpability on ATC.

As an aside; I’ve visited every tower in every airport I’ve even been based in to bring coffee, tea & biscuits to see things from their perspective. I’ve also been to Oceanic in two different FIRs. And attended TRUCE in NATS three times.

I’ve never seen an ATCO on the jumpseat to see it from our perspective. In more than 15 years of ops.

[Xhi]

Basically NO T/O is allowed by our local ATC from any taxiway intersection, be it a 747 or a Piper Cub...only allowed from normal rwy beginning, be it 28 or 10.
We have two twys by 90 degrees angles with the RWY in use, F or C, and two rapid exit, G and D.
Rwy 2.490 meters, good enough for almost every living plane out there, and also some nice RESA//CWY.
For instance, recently a team of very light planes (those who do Acrobatics at night with lights and flares and bla bla bla) were denied to TO from any intersection, despite the fact both pilots explained their very machines could TO and land within "a mail / postage stamp" :)
Last summer a super STOL Quest Kodiak wich we all know can land in a Pizza, was also denied for the very surprise of both pilots...wich they calmly then accepted and taxied till the very beginning of 28.
The reason given by ATC, and totally accepted and understood by all pilots without further discussions on the frequency, is the fact LPFR has no published declared distances from any instersection, except those published for the entire RWY, even though some cases are more than obvious to be feasible and doable.
So, im not trying to input any fault here to pilots or atc'ers in this BEG incident, however i thought it could be curious this fact here, wich for sure could also be used by other Airports Authorities and ATC services around the world, in some particular cases.

I'm no CPL but have 3300 hrs as PPL. In my almost 40 years flying career I don't think I took off from any other point on the runway but the start more than 20 times, most usually when behind a commercial aircraft and asked by ATC to take of from some midpoint to beat the other plane that has to taxi to the far end. I fly a Zenit 750 that routinely takes off in under 150 m, "can take off & land on a postage stamp" as mentioned above. My shortest run is probably around 50 m with some headwind, but I always plan to start TO from the beginning of the RWY, no matter how long it may be. That's the way I was taught back then and it was a very strict requirement.

Yes, I've heard all sorts of arguments why I could/should start the TO from some mid-point, from time, fuel burn, tyre wear and whatever. But I will always insist on havin as much RWY ahead as I can. I see it as a matter of self-discipline. So I find the LPFR approach very reasonable and do not see why LYBE, or any other airport, could not do the same.

[BoeingDriver99]

Because the other airports operate at or close to maximum capacity and commercial airliners use Flex/Assumed/Derate thrust settings?

[Bergerie1]

BD99, When I was an active flight manager, I set up a scheme with UK NATS whereby we arranged for training pilots to give talks to trainee ATCOs and also for famil flights in the jump seats of our aircraft. Whether the scheme is still in operation after 9/11, I don't know.

[Thrust Augmentation]

Unfortunately your argument has no validity whatsoever. You don't seem to be able to grasp the fundamental point which is that, further to what he already did, it was not the controller's call to fly the airplane on behalf of the pilot. Please try hard to understand that and stop flogging a dead horse.
Eh?

If things had turned out slightly differently & all lives were lost do you think the controller would have shrugged their shoulders & walked away feeling good about their actions, or do you think they may have wanted to try a bit harder?

Person falls into a waterway & is drowning, competent swimmer who could have saved them "it's not my responsibility".....

[Request Orbit]

As an aside; I’ve visited every tower in every airport I’ve even been based in to bring coffee, tea & biscuits to see things from their perspective. I’ve also been to Oceanic in two different FIRs. And attended TRUCE in NATS three times.

I’ve never seen an ATCO on the jumpseat to see it from our perspective. In more than 15 years of ops.

It’s not for want of trying, ask your airline what their specific process is when they get asked. A lot of them it’s a straight “we don’t do that”, and even the ones that do might only offer a handful of slots on specific days every year. The demand far outstrips the supply.

[FUMR]

Eh?

If things had turned out slightly differently & all lives were lost do you think the controller would have shrugged their shoulders & walked away feeling good about their actions, or do you think they may have wanted to try a bit harder?

Person falls into a waterway & is drowning, competent swimmer who could have saved them "it's not my responsibility".....

Another baseless argument!

[Request Orbit]

As an approach controller there’s plenty of times I’ve seen an aircraft, having been given accurate distance from touchdown calls and free speed appear very high on the approach. I’ve re-iterated the distance from touchdown and asked if the pilot’s happy, and they’ve said yes. Most of these approaches end up (as far as I know) in an entirely normal landing. Very occasionally they go-around or ask - late - to be broken off and given more miles.

The logic being applied in this thread seems to be suggesting I should have re-positioned every single one of those approaches, because I didn’t feel comfortable and something could have give wrong and didn’t look right.

It’s not a jobsworth case of “not my job, not my responsibility”, it’s a case of me not being in the best position to make that call. I do not have the vast majority of the information to make that call. If you’re at 8,000 feet at 4 miles, that’s one thing, but if you’re at 5,800ft at 11 miles and want to give it a go, should I be stopping you?

[Globaliser]

I’m not trying to pin down exact performance to the metre here. I’m talking about whether there’s enough examples out there that from the perspective of an ATCO, it would seem plausibly possible for the stated TORA to be achievable. Unless we’re also now expecting ATCOs to know what a pilots planned flap and thrust settings are on top of everything else that’s been implied, they’re irrelevant to an ATCOs immediate expectation. If the pilot says they can make that, who are you to police it?Thought experiment; if ATC did everything correctly, do you think LYBE ATC would behave in the exact same way in the exact same scenario tomorrow with the benefit of the knowledge of this accident?So may I (an interested non-aviation observer) please ask again the question that I asked earlier?

What I get from the discussion is this: If the relevant bit of the ATC recording on Reddit captures only what the controller was saying, rather than both sides of the conversation, then Tower called the aircraft to (a) attract its attention to the fact that it had entered at D5 (rather than D6 as earlier instructed), (b) pass the correct TORA (after starting to say, but not completing, an incorrect figure), (c) tell the aircraft to do its calculations, and (d) inform it that a backtrack to D6 was available if needed. The aircraft then seems to have told Tower that it was OK to start from D5 (because that seems to be what Tower repeated back). It's plausible that the aircraft could take off from D5, if it was set up correctly, even though that wouldn't be normal at this airport (but everyone already knew something had gone wrong, given the D5/D6 confusion).
In this situation, is it even open to ATC to refuse to clear the aircraft for take-off on the grounds that ATC doesn't believe that the pilots have correctly calculated their ability to safely take off?

[Thrust Augmentation]

Another baseless argument!
Elaborate then?

[ATC Watcher]

This discussion is going nowhere , as some here have made up their minds regardless of the facts and are not prepared to accept them . .
It reminds me of this very friendly American couple visiting with us the grand Canyon a few years ago and arguing with me that "God made this " and when I mentioned that it was rather a few billions years of erosion , they turned very nasty ..

Intersections take off are performed everyday worldwide and if some choose not to do them , their decisions of course. Some airports have restrictions on them , some operators as well, An E195 requesting a take off with 1300m left is odd, but not impossible if light weight . so no reason to flatly refuse, just asking to confirm , if the PIC confirms it is fine , he knows his aircraft and the numbers , we don't . , that's it . This is how we work since the beginning of ATC in the 1920s.

Accusing the controller here with remarks like : " its not my job" or " its not my responsibility" or now " shrugged shoulders & walked away" is not only incorrect but insulting .: : and adding A380s and swimmers does not help your argumentation either . , Duty of care is entirely something else.

[Bergerie1]

ATC Watcher is right. He knows his business far better than most of us here. I advise you all to listen to him.

[FUMR]

Elaborate then?

I will not elaborate on an analogy which is so way off the mark that it is completely ridiculous.

[Thrust Augmentation]

Accusing the controller here with remarks like : " its not my job" or " its not my responsibility" or now " shrugged shoulders & walked away" is not only incorrect but insulting

For my part I'm not accusing anyone of anything & you are misinterpreting what I've said - ATC did a fine job in pointing out the possible issue.

Some seem to be suggesting that ATC should STFU, it's not their responsibility & that pilots know better. I'm only suggesting that anyone pointing out a potential issue should be considered

[FUMR]

For my part I'm not accusing anyone of anything & you are misinterpreting what I've said - ATC did a fine job in pointing out the possible issue.

Some seem to be suggesting that ATC should STFU, it's not their responsibility & that pilots know better. I'm only suggesting that anyone pointing out a potential issue should be considered

Incorrect conclusion by you. ATC had a duty to confirm with the pilot if D5 was his intention, reminding him that it was not D6 and giving him TORA data. He did that. We are saying that there is a point when the controller (a non pilot) has to concede to the professional in the cockpit who is flying that aircraft day in day out.

[Thrust Augmentation]

Incorrect conclusion by you. ATC had a duty to confirm with the pilot if D5 was his intention, reminding him that it was not D6 and giving him TORA data. He did that. We are saying that there is a point when the controller (a non pilot) has to concede to the professional in the cockpit who is flying that aircraft day in day out.
Point missed completely - again.............

[Request Orbit]

Some seem to be suggesting that ATC should STFU, it's not their responsibility & that pilots know better. I'm only suggesting that anyone pointing out a potential issue should be considered
No one in this thread had said ATC should say nothing. ATC most definitely (and correctly) did “point out the potential issue” as you put it.

[FullMetalJackass]

Eh?

If things had turned out slightly differently & all lives were lost do you think the controller would have shrugged their shoulders & walked away feeling good about their actions, or do you think they may have wanted to try a bit harder?

Person falls into a waterway & is drowning, competent swimmer who could have saved them "it's not my responsibility".....

More comparable & pertinent would be:

Person falls into a waterway & is drowning, competent swimmer sees this, asks if they need help, offers to throw them a life saving ring but the person who falls in says "No, it's ok, I can handle this, you carry on doing what you're doing...."

[FUMR]

Point missed completely - again.............

No, not at all. Some of you just do not want to listen to professional comments made by qualified air traffic controllers and commercial pilots. For me this thread is now closed.

[BoeingDriver99]

It’s not for want of trying, ask your airline what their specific process is when they get asked. A lot of them it’s a straight “we don’t do that”, and even the ones that do might only offer a handful of slots on specific days every year. The demand far outstrips the supply.

I agree and most airlines I’ve worked for are useless in accommodating this sharing of viewpoints. So what I’m gonna do about that is go bug my CP about that today and make it happen. I think often it’s just a case of boring old logistics.

Back to the topic; ATC Watcher is clearly highly experienced but I also observe to be highly entrenched in their position. Which is understandable.

I think it would be interesting if ATC & PiCs could take a step towards the issue than away from it.

[DIBO]

Well, I'll throw in something more relevant and pilot related, hoping this ATC discussion settles and awaiting the Mod's brush to come along ;)

Compare this London City E190 departure with the incident clip:
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/903x364/e19x_to_flaps_b8bf2bd22571d571ca77ca3c98dcbbb66841c529.png

Given that Flaps 4 is the setting to be used for short field ops and at the same time it is the max. T/O flap setting, it seems that an incorrect flap setting was used on the incident E195

[kontrolor]

any ATCO giving take off clearance at TORA 1350 m on 3500 m runway should take its own part of the blame. And don't give me lectures on how CPT is ulitmately responsible for operation of an aircraft. ATCO has it own share of responsibilities in certain situations. There was NO operational or anyhow sound reasoning to allow take off at D5. They should order them to backtrack to at least D6. After decades of being ATCO on all positions (TWR, APP, ACC) I know what I'm talking about.

[Tu.114]

Incorrect, indeed, but only on hindsight. Had they used the intended and normal intersection, it would have been perfectly fit for purpose.

When the performance calculator is fed with a TORA of 2349m (as is available out of D6 on LYBE30L), it will calculate exactly that and provide data accordingly: speeds, optimum flap setting and flex value. The computer is stupid and does not follow up on what the users do with its calculation results. To keep the calculation valid, it is obviously required to use said intersection or one providing a longer TORA. If, for whatever reason, one doesn´t and lines up via an intersection providing a km less TORA, the runway distance required in accordance with the calculations will remain the same but begin and end a km further down the runway. That there is a departure end of the runway, a localizer antenna, some lights, a highway, billboards, trees and so on within that kilometer now is not the computers problem and not known to it.

So what this picture comparison shows is that the calculation seems to have been made based on a longer TORA than what was found out of D5, while the crew on the EGLC departure shown used the numbers suited to their departure.

Now, ATC... I´d dare to say that they are a service provider primarily and not there to second-guess any and all decisions by crews. If I request a runway or an intersection, I´d consider him well within his rights if he trusts me that I have satisfied myself of my aircrafts performance being suitable to this request. Of course, he may well ask if something appears fishy to him, but I´d not consider him obliged to do so. Consider tailwind: I have flown airliners with a limit at 10 kts, 15kts or even 20 kts. How is the controller to know each and every aircraft to this detail? If tailwind component is at or above 10kts, he may well advise of the component and ask whether that is acceptable to us. If I answer in the affirmative, this is based on the individual aircrafts limitations and technical status allowing this and also our takeoff/landing calculations resulting in legal and acceptable values - and with this, it becomes my responsibility to bear.

[DIBO]

Now, ATC... I´d dare to say that they are a service provider primarily and not there to second-guess any and all decisions by crews. If I request a runway or an intersection,But in this case it was clearly unintended by all parties to end-up on the rwy via D5. Even with the unreliable ATC recording, you can hear the (more faint) transmissions by ASL86C for D6, even the "AirSerbia eight six charlie approaching delta six, ready". Would you start making a fuzz, when the "service provider" ATC kicks you off the rwy, back on twy A towards D6? I presume you would accept ATC to be in its right to act upon your "proven" pilot deviation (regardless of available TORA).
Requesting an intersection departure (not published as 'prohibited'), of course is a totally different ballgame.

[BFSGrad]

More comparable & pertinent would be:

Person falls into a waterway & is drowning, competent swimmer sees this, asks if they need help, offers to throw them a life saving ring but the person who falls in says "No, it's ok, I can handle this, you carry on doing what you're doing...."
And applying the rationale expressed in a previous post, if the person in the water ultimately drowns, the decision by the swimmer not to jump in and save a life is causal to the drowning.

[Request Orbit]

I agree and most airlines I’ve worked for are useless in accommodating this sharing of viewpoints. So what I’m gonna do about that is go bug my CP about that today and make it happen. I think often it’s just a case of boring old logistics.
I take the far more cynical view that the people left facilitating the requests don’t see any immediate financial benefit of spending any time on it, but thanks for making the effort :ok: I can’t imagine either the pilots or the ATCOs are against it.

[DIBO]

And while for some involved, their year was already ruined enough, potentially more serious bad news is coming their way...
The Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, in cooperation with the police, have opened an investigation into the matter. “The police have been ordered to determine what happened on this occasion, as well as to potentially identify the responsible persons. It is necessary to check how this event unfolded, the damage to the plane, whether the passengers and crew were in danger at any time, as well as conduct interviews with employees of Air Traffic Control, the pilot and crew”, the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office said.

[Grunau Baby]

Completely ridiculous statement! It certainly wasn't 100m was it. As I said, the pilots have the numbers not ATC. ATC have no idea of the aircraft's load or total weight. They can only ask if it is the pilot's intention to depart from D5, giving him the available distance left. That should be more than sufficient. It is NOT ATC's responsibility to fly the aeroplane.
How much ridicoulous would it be if you were on TWR and whole of your family were inside that short hop aircraft ?

[BoeingDriver99]

And applying the rationale expressed in a previous post, if the person in the water ultimately drowns, the decision by the swimmer not to jump in and save a life is causal to the drowning.

Yes that would be a causal factor. I assume you believe it not to be though. Not sure why?

[AreOut]

An E195 requesting a take off with 1300m left is odd, but not impossible if light weight . so no reason to flatly refuse, just asking to confirm , if the PIC confirms it is fine , he knows his aircraft and the numbers , we don't . , that's it . This is how we work since the beginning of ATC in the 1920s.

what you are missing is this



What most posters are missing, when they remind that ATC has no way of doing the perf calculations and that the ERJ could takeoff in only 1200m, what they are missing is that such takeoffs are planned properly from the cockpit preparation stage, at the gate. If the crew planned an intersection and they're trying to takeoff with half the runway missing, it's very different from a situation in which they plan the takeoff from the beginning on the shorter portion.
Also, we don't really have the proper timeframe in the recording, but it's likely the captain said they could takeoff from there very quickly. Whereas you need quite a long time to do a proper performance calculations...

so it's one thing requesting intersection at the gate and completely another having the plane configured for takeoff with 2300m runway left and then entering the runway at the wrong place so you have only 1300m left, I'm not familiar how much time it does take to reconfigure the T/O configuration on Embraer and recalculating everything but I am willing to bet it's not significantly less than just taxiing to D6

[BFSGrad]

Yes that would be a causal factor. I assume you believe it not to be though. Not sure why?
Because an action that might interrupt an accident sequence is not always causal to an accident if not performed.

A recurring problem with this discussion is the conflation of opportunity with responsibility.

[FullMetalJackass]

And applying the rationale expressed in a previous post, if the person in the water ultimately drowns, the decision by the swimmer not to jump in and save a life is causal to the drowning.
Not in the slightest. If the person had been offered aid in the form of a life buoy but refused it, saying he was ok, then the fact that the passerby, able swimmer or not, moved along is understandable and by no means causal....

In this instance, ATC offered all the assistance they could - advising distance available and also offering a backtrack along the runway, yet the crew of the aircraft declined.

[kontrolor]

Because an action that might interrupt an accident sequence is not always causal to an accident if not performed.

A recurring problem with this discussion is the conflation of opportunity with responsibility.
BFSGrad, I couldn't agree more, with one note - we are not talking about slight error, we are talking about taking off from one third of the 3500 m long runway. If I were in tower at that moment, no argument from the cockpit that 1300 m is enough would deter me from me ordering them to backtrack at least 1000 m. FMS calculations or no FMS calculations.

[FullMetalJackass]

Yes that would be a causal factor. I assume you believe it not to be though. Not sure why?
If the person was clearly in distress and calling for help, I might agree if the risk to the competent swimmer was reasonable. However, if the person in the water was asked "are you ok, do you need assistance" and the answer is a clear "No, all is good, I'm fine", then how can you possibly say that the fact that no-one jumped into the water be "causal"?

The crew were advised they were at the wrong intersection. They were advised of the runway distance still available to them to takeoff. They were offered a backtrack to D6 to give them more space. The crew rejected that assistance. ATC can in no way be considered "causal" here....

[FullMetalJackass]

Would you start making a fuzz, when the "service provider" ATC kicks you off the rwy, back on twy A towards D6? I presume you would accept ATC to be in its right to act upon your "proven" pilot deviation (regardless of available TORA).
Requesting an intersection departure (not published as 'prohibited'), of course is a totally different ballgame.

But they wouldn't have been kicked off the runway. ATC told them - if required, you may backtrack to D6 - no departing the runway, just a 180°, a backtrack, another 180°.

[AreOut]

More comparable & pertinent would be:

Person falls into a waterway & is drowning, competent swimmer sees this, asks if they need help, offers to throw them a life saving ring but the person who falls in says "No, it's ok, I can handle this, you carry on doing what you're doing...."

bad analogy, person falls into a waterway, is visibly confused by thinking a yellow rag is a life vest(which you very much doubt it is) and says no thank you I have a life vest, whereafter you say "oh OK then" instead of throwing another ring which can certainly do no harm even if the person was right

[DaveReidUK]

How do you translate "when you're in a hole ..." into Serbian ?

[ATC Watcher]

And while for some involved, their year was already ruined enough, potentially more serious bad news is coming their way.
.The Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, in cooperation with the police, have opened an investigation into the matter. “The police have been ordered to determine what happened on this occasion, as well as to potentially identify the responsible persons. It is necessary to check how this event unfolded, the damage to the plane, whether the passengers and crew were in danger at any time, as well as conduct interviews with employees of Air Traffic Control, the pilot and crew”, the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office said..
I just hope the guys in this " Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade" are not reading some the posts on this thread to get some ideas to identify the " responsible persons" .. Serbian police interrogations are not known to be the most friendly in Europe.

[Cozmo_NS]

Serbian police in this case (and Public Prosecutor) will only determine is this a criminal act or not. The rest is on CINS (Serbian NTSB). They are not friendly to small criminals and similar, but this is different ball.

[FullMetalJackass]

bad analogy, person falls into a waterway, is visibly confused by thinking a yellow rag is a life vest(which you very much doubt it is) and says no thank you I have a life vest, whereafter you say "oh OK then" instead of throwing another ring which can certainly do no harm even if the person was right

"Visibly confused" - so now not only controllers in a tower supposed to be able to perform complex performance calculations of an aircraft from their seats in the tower - possibly by clairvoyantly knowing how much fuel the aircraft has onboard plus guesstimating how heavy it is by seeing how compressed the struts of the undercarriage are whilst noting the position of the flaps and positing how far the pilots will set the throttles, is that your next gem??? - but they are now supposed to be able to have the vision of superman by seeing that not one but TWO pilots, both with valid ATPL licences - are.... how did you put it????

Ah, yes, that's right.....
.
......visibly confused......

Talk about delusional..... *shakes head*

[CVividasku]

As an approach controller there’s plenty of times I’ve seen an aircraft, having been given accurate distance from touchdown calls and free speed appear very high on the approach. I’ve re-iterated the distance from touchdown and asked if the pilot’s happy, and they’ve said yes. Most of these approaches end up (as far as I know) in an entirely normal landing. Very occasionally they go-around or ask - late - to be broken off and given more miles.

The logic being applied in this thread seems to be suggesting I should have re-positioned every single one of those approaches, because I didn’t feel comfortable and something could have give wrong and didn’t look right.

It’s not a jobsworth case of “not my job, not my responsibility”, it’s a case of me not being in the best position to make that call. I do not have the vast majority of the information to make that call. If you’re at 8,000 feet at 4 miles, that’s one thing, but if you’re at 5,800ft at 11 miles and want to give it a go, should I be stopping you?
Except the situations are very different. There is no real risk in being too high on approach, you might just go around..
However departing from a quarter of the available runway, whereas you planned to use twice that, with a jetliner full of passengers, is a bit stupid and very likely to lead to some damage.

[AreOut]

"Visibly confused" - so now not only controllers in a tower supposed to be able to perform complex performance calculations of an aircraft from their seats in the tower - possibly by clairvoyantly knowing how much fuel the aircraft has onboard plus guesstimating how heavy it is by seeing how compressed the struts of the undercarriage are whilst noting the position of the flaps and positing how far the pilots will set the throttles, is that your next gem??? - but they are now supposed to be able to have the vision of superman by seeing that not one but TWO pilots, both with valid ATPL licences - are.... how did you put it????

Ah, yes, that's right.....
.
......visibly confused......

Talk about delusional..... *shakes head*

you do realise that both those pilots with valid ATPL licences have missed the entrance to the runway by a whole kilometer? Mistakes happen to the best. That's why it is good to correct them, in this case "you have made the mistake please backtrack to D6" without any further discussion would have been appropriate.

[FullMetalJackass]

you do realise that both those pilots with valid ATPL licences have missed the entrance to the runway by a whole kilometer? Mistakes happen to the best. That's why it is good to correct them, in this case "you have made the mistake please backtrack to D6" without any further discussion would have been appropriate.

For what must be the twentieth time in this thread, how does someone in the tower know how much space is adequate for take off? It's not as if the controller has simply said: Cleared for take off. He's TOLD the crew that they are at D5 and not D6, the controller has given them the TODA available, he has ALSO questioned them whether that would be sufficient, he's also offered them the opportunity of turning around, backtracking up the runway to D6 in order to give them sufficient space without the crew losing their position as number one on the runway - what more could the controller do? Get out and fly the damned plane for them????

Ah, I see. Next you're going to demand that the pilots MUST supply their take off calculations, preferably in triplicate, to the controllers in the tower such that these can peruse and muse about the validity of these calculations? Or perhaps you'd like someone with a green shirt, similar to those seen on aircraft carriers, to hold up a box showing figures to the crew - only these numbers will show not the weight but the TODA and the crew needs to salute snappily to the guy in the green shirt before they ..... jesus, don't you see how ludicrous this is? How many times should a controller point out an error to flight crew before they accept they f*cked up.....

PS: I note you've not explained how a controller in a tower is supposed to identify the pilots in the cockpit are both "visibly confused" - yes, they've made a mistake, don't we all? But they've had it pointed out to them. They've understood it, they were offered to redo their take off calculations and, if necessary, backtrack along the runway yet STILL elected to take off from that intersection....

That isn't "visibly confused" - that would be simply negligent, in my eyes. "visibly confused" would be lining up the wrong way on D5, being told about facing the wrong way and responding that "it's ok, the sun rises in this direction....."

[FUMR]

FullMetalJackass you may have noticed that several of us have given up trying to explain the obvious to one or two posters. It's a lost cause! :)

[V_2]

I think if the intersection had no published figures, then ATC would be partially responsible for what happened next as some keep insisting. But as D5 did have published figures, it’s a valid takeoff point and ATC gave those figures to the crew it ends up being no different to any other intersection departure. Perhaps if English was either of their native language, they would have given a better hint to the crew, or the crew would have received it better. The report will clarify if that’s a factor. (The recording doesn’t appear to have all the pilots coms.) Again Personally I’d like to see them use their stop bars, but I accept outside the UK stop bar use is generally limited to low vis as someone pointed out to me here.

the photo above looks like Flap 1 selected. With approx 1200m at an average traffic load, flap 4 and full thrust would be required. Flap 1 with de-rated thrust at same average weight would require approx 2000m. (But that would be for an engine failure at v1, the ground roll element on two engines I’d expect about 75% of those distances.)

[Cozmo_NS]

As I am familiar with LYBE, at the very end of the 30L there is ravine. No more strip, only grass (ground) but like a ravine (continuous downslope), because of the motorway that is connecting airport with highway. So they didn't take off - they where held by ground effect in the air after the tail strike and nose pull up. They only took off right before highway, approx. 6m above passing cars. So, ravine saved the aircraft. Also in left turn they were too low above suburbs (about 150 meters maximum). Lucky for them they were using 30L with only highway ahead, not any single obstacle. Everything can be seen on the video that passenger recorded, if you look closely.

If the ground was level now we be talking about worst air disaster for after 50 years in Balkans.

[DIBO]

any ATCO giving take off clearance at TORA 1350 m on 3500 m runway should take its own part of the blame. And don't give me lectures on how CPT is ulitmately responsible for operation of an aircraft. ATCO has it own share of responsibilities in certain situations. There was NO operational or anyhow sound reasoning to allow take off at D5. They should order them to backtrack to at least D6. After decades of being ATCO on all positions (TWR, APP, ACC) I know what I'm talking about.

FullMetalJackass you may have noticed that several of us have given up trying to explain the obvious to one or two posters. It's a lost cause! :)
Not trying to defend any side of the active posters on the ATC subject, but you do notice that experienced ATCO's within EASA territory, can differ substantially in opinion?

[AreOut]

For what must be the twentieth time in this thread, how does someone in the tower know how much space is adequate for take off? It's not as if the controller has simply said: Cleared for take off. He's TOLD the crew that they are at D5 and not D6, the controller has given them the TODA available, he has ALSO questioned them whether that would be sufficient, he's also offered them the opportunity of turning around, backtracking up the runway to D6 in order to give them sufficient space without the crew losing their position as number one on the runway - what more could the controller do? Get out and fly the damned plane for them????

No. Just tell them to go back to D6 to avoid any possible confusion(why even bother offering options after they acknowledged they made the mistake), whats the worst that could happen? I'm convinced these pilot(s) had the original 2200m in their head all the time, that's why flaps were at the "wrong" position.

ATC doesn't have to know specifications of the plane but he should be aware of the fact that configuring the plane for T/O takes time and that cutting the runway in half by mistake and reconfiguring it under time pressure might cause problems, especially if it involves the jet that never ever took off from that position before.

[CVividasku]

For what must be the twentieth time in this thread, how does someone in the tower know how much space is adequate for take off? It's not as if the controller has simply said: Cleared for take off. He's TOLD the crew that they are at D5 and not D6, the controller has given them the TODA available, he has ALSO questioned them whether that would be sufficient, he's also offered them the opportunity of turning around, backtracking up the runway to D6 in order to give them sufficient space without the crew losing their position as number one on the runway - what more could the controller do? Get out and fly the damned plane for them????
What should ATC do if they can feel that the pilots in a plane still on the ground are impaired, for example, drunk ?
It's close to this situation.

I would be very interested to know how much time it took the captain to answer if the takeoff was feasible from the D5 intersection.
If the answer was almost immediate (less than 10s) it is certain that the ATC could have suspected some sort of crew incapacitation.

[RickNRoll]

Kind of a reverse Swiss Cheese. After making a simple mistake that should have been fatal they got away with it.

[AreOut]

preliminary report (google translated from https://tangosix-rs.translate.goog/2024/22/02/poslednja-vest-objavljen-preliminarni-izvestaj-udesa-embraera-na-letu-ju324-nije-bilo-tehnickih-problema-sa-avionom-posada-planirala-da-poleti-sa-d6)The Center for the Investigation of Traffic Accidents (CINS) published yesterday the Notice on the initiation of the investigation into the Embraer Marathon Airlines accident on Air Serbia flight JU324 to Dusseldorf .

The preliminary report concludes that "one of the probable causes of the accident is the inadequate assessment of take-off parameters during the pre-flight preparation of the flight crew and after the decision to take off with a shorter runway length compared to the initially planned one."

This confirms Tango Six's writing as the first and only media outlet to reconstruct probable contributing causes based on the information we gathered on the night of the accident (https://tangosix-rs.translate.goog/2024/19/02/analiza-kako-je-doslo-do-ozbiljne-nezgode-embraera-195-na-er-srbijinom-letu-ju324-kontrola-letenja-tri-puta-pokusala-da-upozori-posadu/?_x_tr_sl=sr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp) . CINS states in the preliminary report that there were no technical problems with the aircraft, the engine and other systems were working normally . Therefore, the probable conclusion of the final report, which, according to the Chief Investigator's announcement, will be ready in about 3 months (https://tangosix-rs.translate.goog/2024/21/02/glavni-istrazitelj-najavljuje-kraj-istrage-o-udesu-embraera-za-najmanje-3-meseca-flajtradar-objavio-granularne-podatke-o-letu-ju324/?_x_tr_sl=sr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp) , will be a human factor .

The preliminary report does not state any conclusions or explanations as to why the crew did what they did, but only presents the course and description of the events .

The preliminary report states that the event was classified as an accident . The plane suffered major damage to the fuselage, left wing and horizontal stabilizer .

The report states that the captain was a 58-year-old Italian with type ratings for the A320 and Embraer 170, while the co-pilot was Polish with an Embraer 170 rating . This was the second flight for the flight and cabin crew after the return flight to Vienna. There were 2 pilots, 3 cabin crew members and 106 passengers in the plane .

The report recounts the course of events that Tango Six has already reconstructed and which was also confirmed by an audio recording of the conversation between air traffic control and the pilot that was found on social networks.

According to the statements given to CINS, the crew planned to take off from the position on the runway at intersection D6 , for which, as they stated, they performed a "double check of the calculation of the take-off parameters" . During the departure from the gate, the crew received clearance to taxi to intersection D6 from airport control, which they confirmed. The crew then reported to the control that they were approaching the D6 intersection, to which they received a response to prepare for takeoff from D6 , exit and line up with the runway. Then comes the message of the second controller: are they aware that they came out on D5 ?

The preliminary report states that the controller then told the crew that TORA was 1273 meters .

The crew asked the control for a minute to make checks. According to the statement of the crew, they then calculated the parameters for take-off using a hand-held flight computer in the hand-held tablet of the co-pilot . During this time, the controller informs the crew to perform the calculations and also to report if they want to go back down the runway to position D6. The crew announced 30 seconds later that they were able to take off from D5 .

Air traffic control, according to the preliminary report, confirmed the reception but with another question whether they were able to take off, which the crew immediately confirmed. Then they got the final approval to take off and the information that there was no wind .

The preliminary report then states that the plane took off leaving behind a cloud of dust and climbing slowly. According to the statements given, the cabin crew estimated that the plane had normal acceleration upon take-off. According to the statements, the flight crew made changes in the thrust of the engine in order to get as high a speed as possible. At 80 knots, the crew stated that everything was fine, while at 100 knots, they noticed that there was not enough runway length . Considering the available length of the runway and the speed at which the plane was moving, the crew decided that it was safer to continue the takeoff because they estimated that the plane would soon separate from the ground . According to the crew, the plane then started to shake and they felt an impact on some object .

After separating from the ground, the crew then heard an unknown noise from the left side and noted that the lights on the left wing had stopped working. The crew began to receive information about problems with a number of systems, the most significant of which were the flaps and non-functioning of the engine's warm air system ("bleed air"), and they proceeded to go through the appropriate "emergency" checklists .

The preliminary report then states that air traffic control asked if everything was OK since they had deviated from the approved takeoff vector. The crew replies that they are not sure but that they will most likely have to return to the airport. Soon after, they declared a "mayday" (a general danger to flight safety) . The report then states the same events that Tango Six has already reconstructed.

During a low fly-by near the tower to visually confirm that the landing gear was extended, the crew reported a problem with the flaps and increased vibrations on the plane. They decided to land at a higher speed due to problems with the flaps, but, as they said, within the prescribed limits. Apart from the occurrence of vibrations, they did not have any other problems during landing .

The report then states that the crew had no problem with the plane after landing, and after communicating with the control, according to the instructions of the control, they reached the parking position at the gate C2 of the passenger terminal . After landing and leaving the runway, the plane was followed all the time by the vehicles of the Belgrade Airport Fire and Rescue Unit. After stopping, the crew received information from the ground staff that fuel was leaking from the left wing, and quickly shut down the engine and other systems .

The crew and passengers were disembarked through the air bridge . After securing the place of the fuel leak, the authorities ordered the airport services to move the plane away from the airport building to a safer place as soon as possible, which was done. The fuel leak continued the next day, in addition to fuel leaking from the tank.

The preliminary report states that the plane dragged its tail along the RESA surface, but does not provide more precise altitudes after immediate separation from the ground . He notes that the approach lights for runway 12R are damaged and the control boxes in the middle of the lights are broken .

The antenna buried in the root of the left wing of the plane is the "monitoring antenna of the ILS system" .

[DIBO]

A moderate to poor conversion + google translation of the original pdf report.
Less readable than previous posted summary, but I'll put it here anyway, until better becomes available.

EDIT: replaced with newer, much more readable 'google translation' (but not yet proof-read)

[what next]

Less readable than previous posted summary, but I'll put it here anyway, until better becomes available.

The interim report reads as if it was compiled from contributions found in this thread (minus the blaming of ATC)...
Regarding the question posed above about how long it takes to recompute the takeoff distance: We use a tablet app for that. If the app is still open from the previous calculation then computing new takeoff data for a different intersection is a matter of five seconds. Easily possible between the question from ATC and the answer of the crew. Of course if you do it so fast there is ample room for mistakes, e.g. overlooking that a different flap and power setting is required.

[Request Orbit]

Except the situations are very different. There is no real risk in being too high on approach, you might just go around..
However departing from a quarter of the available runway, whereas you planned to use twice that, with a jetliner full of passengers, is a bit stupid and very likely to lead to some damage.

The situations are very different until the example I gave becomes one of a crash with a contributory factor of an unstable approach - hardly unheard of. Rare, but I’d guess less rare than instances of failed takeoffs resulting from using a shortened runway where the pilot has been asked “this is the TORA, are you sure?” and “are you realllly sure?” before insisting it’s all fine.

[sycamore]

Three most useless `things` in aviation,
1,The altitude above you.
2.The fuel in the `Bowser/tanker.
3.The length of runway behind you.
A clear case of `pressonitis`/loss of credibilty......

[DIBO]

The interim report reads as if it was compiled from contributions found in this thread (minus the blaming of ATC)...
Well, then that's a compliment for PPrune's AAIB ;)


We use a tablet app for that. If the app is still open from the previous calculation then computing new takeoff data for a different intersection is a matter of five seconds. Easily possible between the question from ATC and the answer of the crew. Of course if you do it so fast there is ample room for mistakesSo I take it that what in fact you are trying to say is, that you can never ever do it in around 5 second, then?

[austrian71]

Serbian police in this case (and Public Prosecutor) will only determine is this a criminal act or not. The rest is on CINS (Serbian NTSB). They are not friendly to small criminals and similar, but this is different ball.
Due to the actual political regime I would not feel confortable for any investigation, no matter of Serbian prosecutor or serbian CAA, the last elections showed enough. source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2024/757638/EPRS_ATA(2024)757638_EN.pdf

[AirScotia]

Do we know yet if they preserved the CVR?

From the ATC recording, the FO sounds extremely shaky after the disastrous take-off. Not surprising, of course, but I'd be interested to know if the FO was nervous BEFORE take-off, ie was he having a bad time in the cockpit?

There's something about the Captain asking "I assume that's not enough?" that bothers me. It's a pointless question to ask ATC. I think he's really probing to see if ATC will insist they track round again to D6, or if they'll let him away with it. So I suspect he was happy to take off from D5, which would make me wonder if they did much in the way of recalculation.

[MercedesBenz240]

Do we know yet if they preserved the CVR?

From the ATC recording, the FO sounds extremely shaky after the disastrous take-off. Not surprising, of course, but I'd be interested to know if the FO was nervous BEFORE take-off, ie was he having a bad time in the cockpit?

There's something about the Captain asking "I assume that's not enough?" that bothers me. It's a pointless question to ask ATC. I think he's really probing to see if ATC will insist they track round again to D6, or if they'll let him away with it. So I suspect he was happy to take off from D5, which would make me wonder if they did much in the way of recalculation.

It's the controller who says that, not the captain.

[DIBO]

It's the controller who says that, not the captain.
Indeed, my initial mistake also based on the incomplete and misleading ATC recording, but in the meantime rectified by several posters and confirmed just recently in the prelim report.
But still incorrectly transcribed in the AVHerald report (together with maintaining the claim that "was still on the ground at position N44.8274 E20.2846", which is nonsense)
KL immediately contacted the crew again with the information that the available length for take-off from the given intersection was 1,273 meters, with the suggestion that this was not sufficient for a safe take-off.
*KL = Beograd TWR ATC

[AreOut]

how often pilots require to get shorter position after they have departed the gate? Maybe the simplest solution is that ICAO just bans such practice?

[Avman]

how often pilots require to get shorter position after they have departed the gate? Maybe the simplest solution is that ICAO just bans such practice?

Why? You want to punish the entire class because one made a mistake? Runway lengths differ from airport to airport. If for example a particular type operates without problem and meeting all criteria from an airport with a 2000m runway. Why can they not depart from an intersection with a TORA of 2000m from an airport with a 3000m runway. As has already been explained, at busy airports this also helps with minimizing delays. One pilot makes an odd and rare error and you want to change something that has been going on for a great many years with millions of movements because of that? Go sell your idea to the Americans!

[AreOut]

departing from intersection is not the problem if it is handled at the gate, I meant changing assigned position(for a shorter one) after you depart from gate

[BFSGrad]

Maybe the simplest solution is that ICAO just bans such practice?
Banning your way to perfection, one edict at a time.

[AirScotia]

It's the controller who says that, not the captain.
If that's true, the ATC recording is missing a lot of the conversation, ie no comms from 86C until after the incident.

[MercedesBenz240]

If that's true, the ATC recording is missing a lot of the conversation, ie no comms from 86C until after the incident.
Yes that's true, I mentioned it in an earlier post. The recording has been edited and that includes cutting the comms from the pilot's side during the most important part.

[MercedesBenz240]

how often pilots require to get shorter position after they have departed the gate? Maybe the simplest solution is that ICAO just bans such practice?

Pretty much never. In this case it's not like they changed their mind halfway through taxiing, I think it's pretty much been established that the early turn was unintentional.

[AirScotia]

Air Serbia ends Marathon Airlines cooperation (https://www.exyuaviation.com/2024/02/air-serbia-ends-marathon-airlines.html)

[menekse]

Something needs to be done with pilot's selection in Europe. Some dad's money for the license and some good connections can get people killed.
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process

[V_2]

This whole things reminds me a bit of this accident, another somewhat unintentional line up that time due to poor EFB terminology. 09#T1 instead of 09-T1 and they meant very different things!
https://avherald.com/h?article=48c78b3a
again on this flight, some concern was expressed on their performance capacity, but it was overruled. There was also a flight somewhere in Caribbean but I forget the details.

“The number of incidents is increasing”. Do you have a source for that claim? Although yes I would agree with you pilot selection and training can be improved; hopefully others follow BA, TUI and a few others lead paying for suitable cadets but I won’t be holding my breath

[MercedesBenz240]

Although it's not Marathon's ePERF, this could support the theory that 12R D5 was mistakenly selected.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/embraer_ef82e80e9b49b3e1e499671ed37a948f81b66bce.jpg

[DaveReidUK]

They only took off right before highway, approx. 6m above passing cars.

Sorry, but that's nonsense, not supported by the data.

[DIBO]

Indeed!

Just after crossing the airport access road (with some trees and pretty tall lighting posts) they were at around 75ft (rounded to the nearest 25) + a little extra terrain clearance from the slight downhill slope.
in this original post I added a screenshot with ADSB data, but that was removed by the Mods when merging two of my posts (similar, but different).

Here you can see, extracted from the pax clip, the crossing of the airport access road and while still in scud-running mode, it's well above 6m
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1109x360/lybe_access_road_f759c17b5ae36be65a22f899801f139263e388d5.pn g

And few seconds later in the clip, converging onto the highway just visible in the triangle between flap and track fairing, at a height of probably 60-70+ meters (as already indicated in an earlier post by 'DR UK').

Both the AVHerald report and a Mentour.com article, still maintain to this moment that the E195 was on the ground till some 180, resp. 300 meters into the field beyond the airport fence.
Early on, the ADSB data already indicated otherwise and now the prelim report seems to indicate that the perimeter fence was not struck by the fuselage, at worst only stroked.

[Maninthebar]

I am not clear that there is a material difference between striking and stroking in THIS context.

It seems clear from the images that the body of the craft was clear of obstructions as it passed over the highway.

[Cozmo_NS]

Indeed!

Here you can see, extracted from the pax clip, the crossing of the airport access road and while still in scud-running mode, it's well above 6m
And few seconds later in the clip, converging onto the highway just visible in the triangle between flap and track fairing, at a height of probably 60-70+ meters (as already indicated in an earlier post by 'DR UK').
.

I have already mentioned - I am familiar with LYBE airport. This access road is in downslope ravine, highway is on higher ground, so they were about 6m above highway (passenger saw the billboard - not this one, but one on the highway - almost aligned with an airplane). So here they are in ground effect, because ravine starts immediately after the end of a runway. Basically - ravine saves the day. They started climbing after this access road.

[CVividasku]

Yes that's true, I mentioned it in an earlier post. The recording has been edited and that includes cutting the comms from the pilot's side during the most important part.
Shame that they cut so much...
I also thought it was the captain saying it, because I felt like I recognized the voice.
Something needs to be done with pilot's selection in Europe. Some dad's money for the license and some good connections can get people killed.
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
Where ?

The problem is that EASA is under the influence of lobbies, flight schools, airlines, and will never admit the link between flight safety and money making.

[menekse]

Where ?

The problem is that EASA is under the influence of lobbies, flight schools, airlines, and will never admit the link between flight safety and money making.
In Riga. Runway excursion
That's the final report of one of the runway excursions this airline had, they had a couple more after this one



During the investigation the pilot training records were scrutinized to reveal potential gaps in the pilot training and checking process. The available information about the training process of the pilot involved in the serious incident reveals that the pilot had the Type Rating Training Course (Initial training) for the aircraft type BD-500 (A220) from September 1 till November 26, 2020. The course training records reveal some deficiencies of the pilot’s flight skills: incorrect manipulation with the sidestick, pumping of the rudder for the directional control, untimely and inadequate rudder pedals input to ensure directional control, unnecessary application of brakes, etc. In the first Latvian CAA Skill test and proficiency check after the Rating Training Course the pilot failed due to “Insufficient skills. Lack of time.” After the additional training the test was passed.

In 2021, the pilot had further Flight Trainings. The Flight Training Records contain remarks of the flight instructors, namely, periodical uncertainty in command of the aircraft and crew and lack of exchange of flight information with the pilot-monitoring [FO] when flying manually. The investigation has analysed the all available (provided) information about the training process of the pilot involved in the serious incident and suggests that there are potential gaps in the company pilots’ selection, training and checking programs, as well as in the information exchange and analysis by the airline's training department. The investigation has no access to the information on how the operator collects and analyses the information gathered during the training process.

There is a possibility that the pilot with obvious deficiencies during the training and checking period was authorized for line operations without having additional training or another means of mitigation to minimize potential risks. A similar situation with incorrect pilot actions during the landing in crosswind and gusty conditions occurred on June 21, 2018 at the Riga International airport with the airBaltic aircraft A200-300, registration number YL-CSC [Final Report No 4-02/1-18(4-19)]. The FDR data of the involved aircraft showed the application of the right rudder pedal with a simultaneous increase of the left brake pedal application. The higher brake force application on the left-hand side main gear wheels caused the aircraft deviation to the left with a subsequent aircraft side skid.

The investigation of this serious incident concluded, that the Root cause of the incident [21/06/2018] was related with uncoordinated asymmetric actions of the flight crew in controlling of the aircraft during the landing. Analysing the actions of the airline pilots in both situations, the investigators can assume that the repeated cause of the incidents was the improper handling of the aircraft by the crews to counteract crosswind conditions. It is likely possible that the airline pilot training program has not been updated considering possible deficiencies and the previous incident.

[DIBO]

...converging onto the highway ... ... at a height of probably 60-70+ meters (as already indicated in an earlier post by 'DR UK').

I have already mentioned - I am familiar with LYBE airport. This access road is in downslope ravine ... ...
Good for you that you're familiar. I'm totally not familiar.
But I don't know what your definition of ravine is, so here is all relevant and reliable info regarding the slight downhill slope between the airport access road (so NOT the highway) and the airfield.
Given that the relevant 12R slope chart is limited to the airfield perimeter, I added as reference the 12L which starts from near the airport access road (elevations shown in meters)
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1352x796/lybe_12_terrain_profile_c21ea8a1f04cb9d766414e4e3ff64c0ff2f4 e558.jpg
Poorly readable (due to my bad image rotation software), but by the time it crossed the access road, ADSB indicated a 25ft (rounded to nearest 25) height gain in ref. to the runway, with also a marginal, but positive vertical speeds being reported since the RESA. So yes, initially I thought that the slight downhill slope was a main factor in the E195's wheels losing contact with the surface but the prelim. report seems to indicate that they even managed to clear the airport perimeter fence somehow, so terrain downslope (and clear of obstacles) was welcome, but not essential for becoming airborne.

... ... highway is on higher ground, so they were about 6m above highway (passenger saw the billboard - not this one, but one on the highway - almost aligned with an airplane). So here they are in ground effect, because ravine starts immediately after the end of a runway. Basically - ravine saves the day. They started climbing after this access road.
Here are the topographics and flight profile towards the E70 highway, followed by a view of the Lukoil billboard and the nice surrounding area (blue arrow only indication of flight direction, not altitude ;) )
https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/907x797/oy_gdc_climbout_terrain_ead610d74b5843231200e5a3209d0f65a344 2ece.jpg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1663x588/e70_crossover_point_24bff5846b7320a41dd2218799661a8400de7e1c .jpg

I leave it up to the audience to guesstimate the height flow above the E70 highway, but given the 1792ft/min RoC at that point (albeit one of the first indications that a solid RoC was being established), I don't think we'll hear much complaints about car rooftops being scratched ;)

[CVividasku]

Interesting.
But I don't see how pilot selection is responsible for something happening to a captain, years after being hired.
Anything can happen to people, they can have any life accident which will reduce their ability at work. And it's not related to selection.
However what would be very much related to selection would be an accident in pay2fly conditions.

For example this one :
https://bea.aero/fileadmin/documents/docspa/2013/sx-s130329.en/pdf/sx-s130329.en_05.pdf
The following organisational factors contributed to the crew’s poor performance: ˆ the choice of flight crew recruitment profiles by the operator, motivated by economic considerations, and inadequate airline conversion, led to operating aeroplanes with crews that were relatively inexperienced on type and in their roles as captain or copilot;

[Cozmo_NS]

Good for you that you're familiar. I'm totally not familiar.
But I don't know what your definition of ravine is, so here is all relevant and reliable info regarding the slight downhill slope between the airport access road (so NOT the highway) and the airfield.
Given that the relevant 12R slope chart is limited to the airfield perimeter, I added as reference the 12L which starts from near the airport access road (elevations shown in meters)
I leave it up to the audience to guesstimate the height flow above the E70 highway, but given the 1792ft/min RoC at that point (albeit one of the first indications that a solid RoC was being established), I don't think we'll hear much complaints about car rooftops being scratched ;)

Well, I am familiar because this is my daily route, and also I have photographed lots of JAT and Air Serbia airplanes (TO/Landings). So, google anyway is barely just a reference. So - the road that goes to the airport is on the downhill after the runway, then it goes uphill till the airport building. So that part of the road you see in passenger video is in "ravine". They flew over it in ground effect. Downslope starts after the end of the runway, then there is a hole or ravine (you can call it as you want) for access road to airport. Highway is above that road, and they started to climb just before it. I don't have rights to paste the links, so I will do it gladly when I am able to do (maybe in 2 or 3 posts more).

[FullWings]

how often pilots require to get shorter position after they have departed the gate? Maybe the simplest solution is that ICAO just bans such practice?
Unfortunately, it wouldn’t stop performance-related incidents and accidents. You can go through the approach lighting on a 12,000’ runway (see Emirates at Melbourne) if you have the wrong thrust and/or flap setting for the conditions.

In the old days you might have got away with it but most modern software tries to achieve the lowest thrust possible (for engineering costs) through multiple methods that only just collectively satisfy performance criteria. That reduces the margins if anything goes not according to plan, both inside and outside - an attempted stop even slightly above V1 will likely take you off the runway at some speed, for example. The same applies for takeoff.

There are technical partial solutions, such as RAAS (Runway Awareness and Advisory System), which if it had been fitted in this case might have cautioned them about the distance available, or generated a “CAUTION SHORT RUNWAY, SHORT RUNWAY" as they attempted to take off. There has long been talk of fitting TOPMs (TakeOff Performance Monitor) which would extrapolate current acceleration and runway left to warn if it didn’t look good, but I don’t know if any have actually made it into service with any aircraft types.

[DaveReidUK]

Well, I am familiar because this is my daily route, and also I have photographed lots of JAT and Air Serbia airplanes (TO/Landings). So, google anyway is barely just a reference. So - the road that goes to the airport is on the downhill after the runway, then it goes uphill till the airport building. So that part of the road you see in passenger video is in "ravine". They flew over it in ground effect. Downslope starts after the end of the runway, then there is a hole or ravine (you can call it as you want) for access road to airport. Highway is above that road, and they started to climb just before it. I don't have rights to paste the links, so I will do it gladly when I am able to do (maybe in 2 or 3 posts more).

What is the elevation of the airport access road at the point where it's crossed by the 30L extended centre line ?

[Equivocal]

If you don't like thread drift, please look away now.

Something needs to be done with pilot's selection in Europe. Some dad's money for the license and some good connections can get people killed.
The number of incidents is increasing, crashes is a matter of time
It is interesting that a final report for an airbaltic incident put officially the blame to pilot's selection process
A good investigation will keep an open mind and will consider all possible causes until there is evidence that it is not relevant to the accident/incident. Hopefully, time will tell whether pilot selection is in any way relevant to the AS/Marathon incident.

But the question menekse raises is interesting and can be applied to all parts of the aviation system. EASA appears to be an organisation that believes that rules make things safe; ergo, more rules equals more safe. This is easy to spot simply by reference to the Easy Access guides published by EASA, usually running to hundreds of pages of detailed rules to be followed. Some of these rules provide for flexibility and rely on service providers/operators establishing working methods to complement the rules. In truth, the rule frameworks are often pretty good, but are often let down by poor implementation and weak oversight by competent authorities.

Pilot selection and training is not an area with which I am involved closely but my understanding is that reduced modular training programmes, can result in a pilot operating commercial flights after some 250 hours of flying experience, are required to be complemented by further training by the operator. Presumably this operator training has the objective of providing the new pilot with a similar level of knowledge to a pilot who followed an old/classic/traditional career path and who often would find themselves in the right-hand seat of a commuter type of aircraft for a while before moving up to faster, more complex aircraft over a period of years. Identifying all of the knowledge and skills learned and developed during those formative years and 1500 hours or whatever is not easy. More difficult still, it transferring that knowledge to a new pilot. For those of us with many years of experience, it is very difficult to recall just how green and stupid we were in the early stages of our careers. So, this supplemental training needs to be provided by someone specifically selected for their understanding of effective training techniques, of what knowledge/skills the new pilot already has, and the gap that needs to be filled. Like I say, piloting is not my specialist area, so please tell me……who does get to do the supplemental training and how do they get selected?

There are a good many other questions I could ask, but I would offer a parallel from my days as a controller when a fair proportion of those individuals nominated to check the competence of us line controllers were quite probably the last people who should have had that responsibility 😊.
​​​​​​​

[Tech Guy]

Not only are ATC blameless, they get a "good show" for asking the captain. His decision.
I also like how they promptly shut down other non essential radio traffic and got other aircraft to clear the runway.

[Avman]

I also like how they promptly shut down other non essential radio traffic and got other aircraft to clear the runway.

Petty standard procedure.

[FullMetalJackass]

Petty standard procedure.
Pretty standard procedure is also making sure, as PIC, you have sufficient runway ahead of you to take off, wouldn't you agree?

Seems that "pretty standard procedure" was in short supply on the flight deck that day.....

[ATC Watcher]

. EASA appears to be an organisation that believes that rules make things safe; ergo, more rules equals more safe. This is easy to spot simply by reference to the Easy Access guides published by EASA, usually running to hundreds of pages of detailed rules to be followed. Some of these rules provide for flexibility and rely on service providers/operators establishing working methods to complement the rules. In truth, the rule frameworks are often pretty good, but are often let down by poor implementation and weak oversight by competent authorities.

EASA well explained in a few words. Yes , the problem is not EASA , it is the States who decides on implementation . EASA is not an accident investigation agency , it only makes rules , and the States have individually to implement them . The ( common ) training syllabus is made by EASA but the numbers of hours to train and later maintain the licenses is up to the States. And some are failing . Changing that will be difficult , Think Hungary for instance. or even France if you want an ATC example.

On pilot training and MPL, I was very skeptical when the scheme was devised, but I have to admit it works well if it is applied as it was designed for, Again EASA offered the rules to do it , but it is for the airlines to decide how to make it work. The Lufthansa group heavily relies on MPLs and from what I hear it is a success.
What some low cost airlines are dong with Pay to fly or PP2F, and atypical contracts is the flip side of the coin .

[EDLB]

Hope that the final report details, what the real cause of this poor decision making was. The PIC failed airmanship. In my opinion it is not much about the rules. If physical there is not enough runway ahead of you, you don't try. And there was plenty of doubt. ATC asked, two crew in row 0. The runway out of their window must have looked short. If you do thousands of take offs, I think they should have an idea how it should look like. And if the numbers don't add up too, why did they try. What was the real pressure behind this decision. And why failed the CRM process.

[Avman]

Pretty standard procedure is also making sure, as PIC, you have sufficient runway ahead of you to take off, wouldn't you agree?

Seems that "pretty standard procedure" was in short supply on the flight deck that day.....

That may be so but I was purely commenting on Tech Guy's post re the ATC contribution of handling the traffic situation on and around the airport.

[Sailvi767]

how often pilots require to get shorter position after they have departed the gate? Maybe the simplest solution is that ICAO just bans such practice?

Happens all the time. Usually because a flight or flights ahead are not ready to go when they get to the takeoff position. They could be waiting on weights, flight attendant demo, passengers in the Lavs or a minor issue they need to review in the Mel.

[ReturningVector]

Happens all the time. Usually because a flight or flights ahead are not ready to go when they get to the takeoff position. They could be waiting on weights, flight attendant demo, passengers in the Lavs or a minor issue they need to review in the Mel.

Or for sequencing traffic on same SID, sequencing for wake turbulence separation, CTOTs, etc

[kontrolor]

this practice should be banned. Whole departure runway should be used for every passengers carrying aicraft, period. Some precisely defined exclusions could be accepted (for turboprops), everything else is just waiting for **** to happen.

[V_2]

this practice should be banned. Whole departure runway should be used for every passengers carrying aicraft, period. Some precisely defined exclusions could be accepted (for turboprops), everything else is just waiting for **** to happen.

Using full length does not necessarily mean more runway left at rotation, quite often it just means more use of derated thrust or a delayed v2 climb profile and you rotate roughly same place anyway. You would have to ban engine flexing too for your suggestion to be actually be worthwhile. And it doesn’t eliminate human error either.

[Cozmo_NS]

What is the elevation of the airport access road at the point where it's crossed by the 30L extended centre line ?

First is like a small downslope and then the terrain is getting lower toward access road. After the access road terrain goes uphill. Highway is on higher grounds. The difference is about 10 meters or so. Not so big, but it plays important role - Embraer basically was in ground effect after the end of the runway. If the access road was in level with the runway - it would be a disaster.

[ATC Watcher]

Using full length does not necessarily mean more runway left at rotation, quite often it just means more use of de-rated thrust or a delayed v2 climb profile and you rotate roughly same place anyway..
Indeed , an anecdote : The first time I jumpseated on a A380 ( out of FRA taking off on 18 ( 4000 m ) I was extremely surprised and even a bit worried at first to see that the take off roll was started with only the 2 inner engines, and only when passing 60 Kts were the 2 outer engines throttles moved fully forward , then a rotation almost at the extreme end of the runway I was explained later it was a flex take off and due to the very long runway available, they only needed to add power on the outers at 60 Kts , to avoid possible FOD ingestion on the outers which were hanging over the runway edges,
They could easily have taken off with much less runway ( we only needed 2800m at our T/O weight on that flight) . Difficult to make a judgement if you are not the PIC of a particular flight and do not know the numbers.

Anyway this accident here is not an intersection accident , it is a take off distance/weight miscalculation one , a bit similar to the 2003 Singapore airlines 747 that attempted to take off with a TOW error of 100 tons. ( and a 330 in Australia that did the very same a few years later) so all human errors as you correctly mention. and not procedural ones.

[DaveReidUK]

If the access road was in level with the runway - it would be a disaster.

As already discussed, the data doesn't support that conclusion. The aircraft was around 175-200 feet AAL by that point.

[DIBO]

First is like a small downslope and then the terrain is getting lower toward access road. After the access road terrain goes uphill. Highway is on higher grounds. The difference is about 10 meters or so. Not so big, but it plays important role - Embraer basically was in ground effect after the end of the runway. If the access road was in level with the runway - it would be a disaster.OK, now we're getting somewhere. Your initial statement was "highway is on higher ground, so they were about 6m above highway". With 'highway' being the E70 highway, which they crossed near the Lukoil service station some 2km from the airport perimeter, the "6m above" that you indicated, was impossible, as already indicated previously by DaveReidUK.

Regarding the airport access road (some 550 meter from the 30L perimeter fence) on the other hand, there you have a point. If that would have been 10 - 15 meters above runway level (with the same 10+ meter tall trees), the outcome could have been totally different.
But an even far simpler 'what if' could have been catastrophic, if the runway design and approach-lights for 12R would have been the same as 12L, then the E195 would not have encountered only 3 lonely centerline approach-lights poles (as the rest of the dozens of lights are all embedded in the concrete), but it would have hit a forest of approach-light poles, striking the wing and engines all over the place. They would never have made it off the ground...

[Equivocal]

this practice should be banned. Whole departure runway should be used for every passengers carrying aicraft, period. Some precisely defined exclusions could be accepted (for turboprops), everything else is just waiting for **** to happen.
it is fortunate that those who actually have responsibility for making such decisions will consider all parts of the aviation system and will look at the results of the investigation before determining what changes might be appropriate. Knee-jerk reactions rarely achieve the desired outcome.

[Rick01]

Anyway this accident here is not an intersection accident , it is a take off distance/weight miscalculation one , a bit similar to the 2003 Singapore airlines 747 that attempted to take off with a TOW error of 100 tons. ( and a 330 in Australia that did the very same a few years later) so all human errors as you correctly mention. and not procedural ones.
It was an Emirates A340 (not 330) in MEL back in 2009 and it was a major mistake by the flight crew and a minor miracle that it happened where it did (they had plenty of grass beyond the end of the runway with no obstacles in order to gain speed and climb out, after one hell of a tail scrape mind you.

[AreOut]

Anyway this accident here is not an intersection accident , it is a take off distance/weight miscalculation one , a bit similar to the 2003 Singapore airlines 747 that attempted to take off with a TOW error of 100 tons. ( and a 330 in Australia that did the very same a few years later) so all human errors as you correctly mention. and not procedural ones.

it's a bit similar to A340 in Melbourne regarding to consequences but the cause was not similar, the both cases you mentioned happened because of weight miscalculation but in Belgrade we had total disorientation of the pilot(s) regarding to runway position

[Cozmo_NS]

As already discussed, the data doesn't support that conclusion. The aircraft was around 175-200 feet AAL by that point.

Here is the visual explanation I did. I am driving here almost every day. Green shade is the "hole" or "downslope" that starts after the runway end and goes all the way down to the access road, then the terrain starts to go up. Brown shade is highway - it is well above access road, some 10 meters. Red arrow is takeoff path. Yesterday I was able to watch normal takeoff so from that perspective it would be disaster if the road is not in ravine.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/833x636/as86c_7d2466e0b03fc2f514ff276bebddd5b9148495c2.jpg

[DaveReidUK]

Here is the visual explanation I did. I am driving here almost every day. Green shade is the "hole" or "downslope" that starts after the runway end and goes all the way down to the access road, then the terrain starts to go up. Brown shade is highway - it is well above access road, some 10 meters. Red arrow is takeoff path. Yesterday I was able to watch normal takeoff so from that perspective it would be disaster if the road is not in ravine.

I have no argument with your description of the topology.

Only with your conclusion:

If the access road was in level with the runway - it would be a disaster.

See my post #211.

[Ivor_Bigunn]

Cosmo NS posted:

"Here is the visual explanation I did."

Thanks for this map . Very clear and is wellworth a thousand words!!

IB

[Stan Shunpike]

...except it shows take off from a disused runway.

[Equivocal]

Here is the visual explanation I did. I am driving here almost every day. Green shade is the "hole" or "downslope" that starts after the runway end and goes all the way down to the access road, then the terrain starts to go up. Brown shade is highway - it is well above access road, some 10 meters. Red arrow is takeoff path. Yesterday I was able to watch normal takeoff so from that perspective it would be disaster if the road is not in ravine.ok. Now I’m slightly puzzled. I would normally expect the take off path to start on an be roughly in line with the runway.

[DIBO]

I would normally expect the take off path to start on an be roughly in line with the runway.The poster used an outdated Google sat image, in my post (https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/657667-air-serbia-e195-runs-into-runway-lights-belgrade.html#post11602728) you see the trajectory starting on the centreline of 30L.

[Maninthebar]

I have no argument with your description of the topology.

Only with your conclusion:



See my post #211.

I believe the poster is saying that without the falling ground prior to the highway then the aircraft would still have been in ground effect and would not have gained height to the numbers you accurately report. In other words you may both be right.