TCAS RA Automation - Australian context

[ER_BN]

Airbus TCAS RA Automation (https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/stories/2023-12-safety-innovation-11-preventing-mid-air-collisions-with-smart-automation)

The above link provides introductory information on an innovation developed by Airbus that automates the RA response from a TCAS RA event. The text implies “developed” i.e. in the past tense.

Has this functionality AP/FD TCAS been fitted, tested and commissioned on any aircraft operating within Australian airspace?

The way I read the article means that as well as presenting the aural alert appropriate to the specific TCAS RA; the autopilot / flight director will automatically (without human pilot intervention) fly the aircraft as per the RA aural instructions.

Even as a “dumb” ex air traffic controller / ATM software person a few questions immediately come to mind. No doubt quite a few more come to mind in the Australian commercial pilots’ brains

Is this just a “brain fart” (not sure of French language equivalent) in the minds of some staff in Toulouse?

Given that there is considerable discussion about TCAS currently on various forums/ threads; would appreciate more knowledge if anyone has it…

[GA Driver]

Has this functionality AP/FD TCAS been fitted, tested and commissioned on any aircraft operating within Australian airspace?

Indeed it has! I think anything in the silver/orange star variety has had fitted for awhile now.

[BuzzBox]

Has this functionality AP/FD TCAS been fitted, tested and commissioned on any aircraft operating within Australian airspace?

Auto TCAS has been available on Airbus aircraft for at least 10 years. Aircraft fitted with the system regularly fly in Australian airspace, apparently without issue.

You might be interested to know the Airbus A350 will also fly a fully automatic emergency descent in the event of a depressurisation, without any pilot input. If a TCAS RA occurs during the descent, the autopilot will comply with the RA, then continue the emergency descent once clear of the conflict.

[walesregent]

Indeed it has! I think anything in the silver/orange star variety has had fitted for awhile now.

Even NAA flying around in J*’s old bangers have AP/FD TCAS so I’d imagine it’s near universal on airbuses in Aus.

[cLeArIcE]

It's been around for ages. Watch it, make sure it does what you want. If it doesn't, do it yourself like you used to. It's not exactly rocket surgery... it's a great tool.
TCAS is a funny thing. We all do it in the sim. You know its coming, go through the motions play the game etc and it's a very fony and straight forward exercise. But, the chance of somone screwing it up at 0200 half asleep over the ocean is rather high. Especially with the startle factor. Out of all the things I could bitch about an Airbus, this isn't one of them.

[ER_BN]

Thanks for the replies!

As usual my ignorance knows no bounds…..

Found appropriate websites with significant details (Airbus / Eurocontrol) to be the good primers for more info than the minimal Airbus marketing of December 2023…

If you jet pilots will indulge two more dumb questions…

1/. Do Boeing jets have a similar same level of automation as per what’s offered by AP/FD TCAS functionality in Airbus aircraft, i.e. do the Boeing aircraft fly the TCAS RA automatically?

2/. Once "CLEAR OF CONFLICT" does the aircraft automatically return to previously cleared flight level if a vertical deviation was made with the RA?

Thanks in anticipation…

[GA Driver]

Can’t speak for the boeing, but to answer #2 the short answer is yes, it returns from whence it came USUALLY around 1000’/min.
It does depend on what it was doing before the RA ie. coupled to an approach or just in NAV enroute.
It could get ugly should it happen at high level (as unlikely as that may be) the RA must be followed for obvious reasons, but where it leaves you afterward could be low on airspeed, thrust and ideas.

[ER_BN]

GA Driver Cheers!

Seemed an interesting diversion from other issues with aviation collision avoidance ie TIBA/TRA, controller shortage, ?no STCAs Seaworld, Mangalore, TCAS fitment in GA Aircraft, ADSB IN displays, ATSB R&D (ADSB IN ACAS 1 prototype like displays), rumours of CMATS cancellation, Vertiport operation. etc etc etc..

Gosh look at the time...Time to get in the Tesla and drive home from work and let the horizontal separation automation work like automated TCAS RA in a vertical sense....

Maybe ELON had more reason to call it autopilot than we all initially thought!

[das Uber Soldat]

1/. Do Boeing jets have a similar same level of automation as per what’s offered by AP/FD TCAS functionality in Airbus aircraft, i.e. do the Boeing aircraft fly the TCAS RA automatically?

787 doesn't have it. Don't know about the other museum pieces.

[deltahotel]

75/76 don't.

[Capn Rex Havoc]

ER BN - when I was doing my 380 course back in 2008, I recall the ground school lecturer showing us a slide with the percentage of TCAS RAs that had been incorrectly flown in anger. It was around 80 percent. Errors included, going the wrong direction, being too aggressive and not reacting at all. The auto TCAS on the 380 eliminated those errors.

[AQIS Boigu]

EN BN,

Works like a treat and I have had the “pleasure” of observing it in real life. Don’t touch anything and it will do its job.

On approach the RA function is inhibited below 900ft, also with an engine failure in a twin.

Airbus also permits you to go above your max altitude for a TCAS manoeuvre.

BUT as always - especially with an Airbus -according to their Golden Rules (and common sense), take over manually if required (rule #4)

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/408x518/img_7277_4b734ddbf66c483c50cac907a9ad9e7d1e155d03.jpeg

[Verbal Kint]

From memory, all the CX 350’s & most of the 330’s have it.

[ER_BN]

Folks, thanks for all the feedback on equipage, functional acceptance and associated issues of Automated AP/FD TCAS RA.

From the content you have provided I am making the general assumption, (correct me if I’m wrong), that Airbus passenger jets in Australia are equipped with an automated TCAS RA response and Boeing passenger jets are not.

Note, no judgement or opinion made, just an assumed statement of current fact, nor am I making any statement about TCAS equipment / functionality on any other aircraft in Australia, whether it be other passenger aircraft manufacturers right through to GA aircraft including helicopters.

I am now off to consume significant documentation from Airbus / Eurocontrol. I started this thread after receiving several emails / PMs identifying the simple “news item dated December 2023” from Airbus identifying a “leap of innovation” in the level of automation technology.

Seemingly it has been accepted very well in the cockpit and operates to a very high level of performance both in terms of functional correctness and in comparison with the manual human response.

Question. Is anyone aware of similar functionality being developed/implemented for Boeing aircraft?

Capn Rex Havoc, thanks specifically for the main permutations of where the human TCAS RA response may not be “perfect” and the statistic is hard to ignore.

Question. With regard to Australian ATCs, has the Thales TAAATS Eurocat system processing and human machine interface been upgraded yet to display TCAS RAs automatically on controller screens when aircraft under their control are subject to RAs?

There is an increase focus on TCAS at the moment in regards to the impact of ADSB OUT/IN, specific technology updates, increased functional capability and equipment fit / utilisation in GA aircraft (IFR/VFR).

The current en-route and terminal air traffic control system in Australian uses concepts of an ATM system where in controlled airspace radar/ADSB surveillance is available and that system utilises three levels of safety, specifically with regard to conflict detection, separation and collision avoidance:

a/. A human controller manually identifies conflicts between aircraft, manually resolves those conflicts and manually monitors these resolutions. These manual actions define a target level of safety and as a consequence appropriate controller staffing, and

b/. A ground based safety net (part of TAAATS Eurocat) nominally termed a STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert) that will alert controllers of an impeding breakdown of defined separation, i.e. vertically less than 1000ft (?600ft) and laterally slightly less than 5 nm (ENR) or 3nm (TMA). Automatically presented on controller screens and requires human manual intervention from controllers. (STCA not to be used for a target level of safety in ANSP service provision) and

c/. An airborne based safety net, TCAS, that provides collision avoidance information by visually and aurally automatically identifying traffic, automatically providing resolution instructions for immediate manual pilot intervention, (and in the case of aircraft equipped with AP/FD TCAS automatically implement resolution under pilot monitoring. (TCAS not to be used for a target level of safety in ANSP service provision).

Given the current situation of TIBAs/TRAs in Australian airspace, many people are concerned that the three levels of safety identified above have been significantly degraded to a point whereby TCAS appears to be “utilised” in service provision and not just as a final safety net.

No doubt more / further discussion on the TIBA/TRA thread.

[BuzzBox]

The following video shows the AP/FD TCAS system at work in a relatively simple "Descend" RA scenario:
https://youtu.be/6U60VjZBovA?t=30

The following is a recent Eurocontrol study of pilot compliance with TCAS RAs, using radar data. The study has some limitations, but it found compliance in only about half of the cases studied. Compliance by Airbus types was around 5-10% better than it was for the Boeings, but still only around 60%. The study did not try to differentiate between manual and automatic responses.

A key finding:

Although the assessment using radar data comes with some limitations (which could be overcome with the use of recorded airborne data, but this is not generally available due to logistic, commercial, and legal reasons), it clearly indicates that the level of pilot compliance with TCAS resolution advisories is low.

THE ASSESSMENT OF PILOT COMPLIANCE WITH TCAS RAs, TCAS MODE SELECTION AND SERVICEABILITY USING ATC RADAR DATA (https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/5842.pdf)

Airbus guidance: Safe Handling of TCAS Alerts (https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/safe-handling-of-tcas-alerts/)

[missy]

Great discussion, and yes the startle factor could go a long way to explaining.
The following is a recent Eurocontrol study of pilot compliance with TCAS RAs, using radar data. The study has some limitations, but it found compliance in only about half of the cases studied. Compliance by Airbus types was around 5-10% better than it was for the Boeings, but still only around 60%. The study did not try to differentiate between manual and automatic responses.It's been around for ages. Watch it, make sure it does what you want. If it doesn't, do it yourself like you used to. It's not exactly rocket surgery... it's a great tool.TCAS is a funny thing. We all do it in the sim. You know its coming, go through the motions play the game etc and it's a very fony and straight forward exercise. But, the chance of somone screwing it up at 0200 half asleep over the ocean is rather high. Especially with the startle factor. Out of all the things I could bitch about an Airbus, this isn't one of them.

Same, same for ATCs. When the STCA activates there is a startle factor when it occurs on a pair of aircraft that they had missed the conflicton (it happens).