Close Call at Foggy VCE

[Lake1952]

Kudos to the Ryanair crew!

https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/ryanair-737-on-foggy-runway-urged-inbound-a321-to-abort-after-controllers-headset-blunder/155021.article

[DaveReidUK]

ANSV report (in Italian only): https://ansv.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/10-relazioni-brevi.pdf

[Lake1952]

This occurred last October. New reports recently issued. The AvHerald writeup makes a point about a potentially serious event being reported only in Italian with the lack of an English version. They also criticize the fact that the report on this incident was issued with several other unrelated reports. They obviously feel that this incident was significant enough to deserve greater emphasis.

Synopsis: Extreme low visibility conditions, Ryanair cleared to line up and wait. An Iberia flight was on final. Ryanair never received their takeoff clearance because the incoming tower controller plugged his headset into the wrong port. Controller seemed unaware that Ryanair never acknowledged T/O clearance. Iberia continued approach down to 400 feet before getting a command to go around. At same time, Ryanair did an expedited exit off the runway after attempting to contact the IB flight to execute a go around.


https://avherald.com/h?article=50e6ad33&opt=0

[punkalouver]

This occurred last October. New reports recently issued. The AvHerald writeup makes a point about a potentially serious event being reported only in Italian with the lack of an English version. They also criticize the fact that the report on this incident was issued with several other unrelated reports. They obviously feel that this incident was significant enough to deserve greater emphasis.

Synopsis: Extreme low visibility conditions, Ryanair cleared to line up and wait. An Iberia flight was on final. Ryanair never received their takeoff clearance because the incoming tower controller plugged his headset into the wrong port. Controller seemed unaware that Ryanair never acknowledged T/O clearance. Iberia continued approach down to 400 feet before getting a command to go around. At same time, Ryanair did an expedited exit off the runway after attempting to contact the IB flight to execute a go around.


https://avherald.com/h?article=50e6ad33&opt=0

The only problem is that the Ryanair attempted to contact the Iberia on 121.5 to tell them to go-around. My suggestion would be to do this on the tower frequency.

[flyingtincan]

According to the report their initial call (to the tower) was on the tower frequency.
Which presumably would have been heard by IB?

[ATC Watcher]

As far as I can see from the report the Iberia was not clear to land ,only clear for approach then ordered to go around : and for me the Ryanair did the right things , and calling on 121,5 is the first thing to do when facing a communication issue.
As we all know frequency can go u/s or been blocked without warning and we always keep this in mind.
That said , the ergonomic of the headset plugs was an incident waiting to happen .. I am sure this confusion happened before .

[meleagertoo]

Bizarre to try to make contact on Guard when you'd be 99% certain they wouldn't be monitoring it on finals - surely no one does that? Few enough monitor it in the cruise!Especially when you'd be 99.99% certain you would get them on Tower...I don't understand the logic of that decision.

[ATC Watcher]

Bizarre to try to make contact on Guard when you'd be 99% certain they wouldn't be monitoring it on finals - surely no one does that? Few enough monitor it in the cruise! Especially when you'd be 99.99% certain you would get them on Tower...I don't understand the logic of that decision.
The report does not says that the transmission to go around was on 121,5 . in fact I think it was done on the TWR frequency ,because the report says the controller "heard it and issued twice the same go around instruction" , but the Iberia took 14 seconds to acknowledge it, adding another hole on the cheese layer.

[kraznyoctbyar]

Bizarre to try to make contact on Guard when you'd be 99% certain they wouldn't be monitoring it on finals - surely no one does that? Few enough monitor it in the cruise!Especially when you'd be 99.99% certain you would get them on Tower...I don't understand the logic of that decision.
I used to fly in a platform fitted with ARC 210 Radio. We always set it to T/R + G. G being Guard. Yes.. We do constantly monitor Guard, in our neck of woods here. Cheers.

[punkalouver]

The report does not says that the transmission to go around was on 121,5 . in fact I think it was done on the TWR frequency ,because the report says the controller "heard it and issued twice the same go around instruction" , but the Iberia took 14 seconds to acknowledge it, adding another hole on the cheese layer.

"With over a minute of silence on the tower frequency the B738 crew observed the landing traffic descending through 1200 feet and transmitted that they were holding on the runway, however, there was no response, the A321 continued the approach. The B738 crew radioed a go around instruction on the guard frequency, again without reaction, and began to move to vacate the runway."

According to the link (a) transmission of holding on runway on tower frequency. (b) Transmission to go-around on guard frequency.

[Denti]

Bizarre to try to make contact on Guard when you'd be 99% certain they wouldn't be monitoring it on finals - surely no one does that? Few enough monitor it in the cruise!Especially when you'd be 99.99% certain you would get them on Tower...I don't understand the logic of that decision.
Many airlines have the requirement to always monitor Guard on the second set. Yes, even during approach. Of course, there is that place where it is, for practical reasons, nearly impossible to do so as some hapless VFR guy will probably do an even more useless practice pan on Guard. That actively discourages monitoring guard and this post highlights that, sadly.

Thank god, it is the only place i know that has something that, too bad it bleeds a few hundred nautical miles into mainland europe.

[jimjim1]

ANSV report (in Italian only): https://ansv.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/10-relazioni-brevi.pdf

Google Translate of the report. Document contains 10 incident reports and is 33 pages long in total. Won't likely be there for ever. If you want it forever download and save it.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HfVWhvszbaEY62jE8GPIV1xt3gwByKbF/view?usp=drive_link

Google Translate is a right faff now. Download doc, upload it to GT, choose languages, download result, which has same name as original !!! Took a while to work out, failed as a web page. Anyway, it's free and works pretty well it seems to me. I don't think it used to do docs as long as this.

[ATC Watcher]

"With over a minute of silence on the tower frequency the B738 crew observed the landing traffic descending through 1200 feet and transmitted that they were holding on the runway, however, there was no response, the A321 continued the approach. The B738 crew radioed a go around instruction on the guard frequency, again without reaction, and began to move to vacate the runway."

According to the link (a) transmission of holding on runway on tower frequency. (b) Transmission to go-around on guard frequency.
Yes, maybe, but ,as I said, this is not what the official ANSV report says :
After a series of unsuccessful communication attempts, with possible overlap between the calls of the CTA TWR and
some calls from the RYR crew, which reiterated its presence on the runway, the same crew of the latter aircraft, in a
communication largely unintelligible, addressed the A321 (which was at the time approximately 1.8 NM from TDZ
RWY 04R, at 600 feet QNH, descending GP), reporting that he was on RWY 04R and mentioning the term “go around”.
A few moments after the communication from the RYR , the CTA, probably using the handset, called the A321
instructing him to go around (instruction repeated twice), informing him of the runway occupation status. The LIPZ TWR
transmission ended when the A321 was approximately 1.2 NM from TDZ RWY 04R, at 500 feet QNH, descending on
the GP; approximately 14 seconds later the A321 , approximately 1.0 NM from TDZ RWY 04R, readback the instruction.

and later the report says :
​​​​​​​​​​​​​​From the examination of the facts it also emerges that the CTA for over 2 minutes was unable to realize that he was not able
to communicate with the aircraft on the frequency, ........ Only after the frequency intervention of
the RYR crew who addressed the A321 approaching the same runway reporting that he was on RWY 04R and mentioning the term “go
around” the CTA managed to resolve the transmission problems.
Those both para indicate to me at least , than all these transmissions occurred on the same TWR frequency and not on 121,5.
​​​​​​​But waiting to be corrected.

[DaveReidUK]

The report does not says that the transmission to go around was on 121,5 . in fact I think it was done on the TWR frequency, because the report says the controller "heard it and issued twice the same go around instruction"

Unless of course the tower had been monitoring 121.5

[meleagertoo]

Many airlines have the requirement to always monitor Guard on the second set. Yes, even during approach..
Astonished to hear that. My company reccommend monitoring it in the cruise or above Fl100 when operational requirements permit but on European short haul thats largely impractical as the second box is in almost constant use for company, handling, wx etc.
It strikes me as being all but reckless to add guard to the brouhaha of much of the European environment at low levels, and on a STAR or approach simply insanity. What possible function can it have there, risking missed comms due to one of the many European abusers of the system relating football scores, whistling or making duck-noises or farts? The useful and valuable Practice Pan 'nuisance' is vastly less intrusive than that.

[Steve1968]

I land and depart with box 2 on 121.500 on all the time and only the other day i heard an aircraft being cleared to land at Schiphol whilst in the cruise,( followed by the bollocking he got for not changing to tower ) seems pretty logical to keep it on below 10000 rather than turn it off as tower have access to this frequency at the push of a button.

[alfaman]

I land and depart with box 2 on 121.500 on all the time and only the other day i heard an aircraft being cleared to land at Schiphol whilst in the cruise,( followed by the bollocking he got for not changing to tower ) seems pretty logical to keep it on below 10000 rather than turn it off as tower have access to this frequency at the push of a button.
Not in the UK, in my experience: the dedicated distress & diversion agencies will be, but normal operational staff will be dealing with their frequencies, not listening out on 121.5 just in case. Other countries may differ, of course.

[Timmy Tomkins]

Italy: Lessons learned after Milan?

[Sleeve Wing]

A little bit of thread creep here with reversion to accepted use of 121.5
All credit to the Ryanair crew who were sufficiently ahead of the game/situationally aware, to say "Stuff you. Something is wrong here.Let's go back to square one and sort it out."
Sometimes it's language confusion, sometimes it's national attitudes. The bottom line is that a quick realisation possibly saved 300 lives......... Think Tenerife.
Well done, ladies and gentlemen.