18 Injured CX880 after RTO.

[Avinthenews]

CX880 RTO (http://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1706055-20230624.htm?spTabChangeable=0)

[BuzzBox]

For what it's worth, the SCMP claims the RTO was due to a burst tyre.

11 injured on Cathay Pacific flight departing Hong Kong, after ‘tyre bursts’ and take-off aborted (https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3225238/11-injured-cathay-pacific-flight-departing-hong-kong-after-tyre-bursts-and-take-aborted?module=lead_hero_story&pgtype=homepage)

[herewego75]

CX880 RTO (http://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1706055-20230624.htm?spTabChangeable=0)

I would like to point out to both the leaders of CX and the media reading this. Even after an email from the DFO thanking the crew for their professionalism.

NONE of the crew got paid for this flight. Possibly both pilots and Cabin crew (both Westerners and local Hong Kongers) lost money.

These are the conditions CX crew face. The Media reading this should be writing stories about this!

All these professional pilots will leave if they continue to lose money because of things out of their control. This is grossly unfair and needs to be addressed.

Next time what happens if the crew take the issues into the air with them because they are financially pressurised?

CX are pushing their crew into corners.

[atakacs]

Sorry to ask a dumb question but why would they no be paid for their service?

[Babyjet_dododo]

Sorry to ask a dumb question but why would they no be paid for their service?

That flight is about 30 credit hours (to and fro), the cancellation would have resulted in reduction in productivity hours so their loss of pay is anywhere between $5000 HKD (most Junior Cabin Crew) to $40000 HKD (most senior flight crew) because of a RTO

[BuzzBox]

Next time what happens if the crew take the issues into the air with them because they are financially pressurised?

A Captain who makes a GO decision on that basis should not be a Captain. Period.

[Oasis]

No captain at cx would think of the financial implications during an event like this, but it doesn’t help morale when you go through this event and look at your paycheck at the end of the month.

you potentially saved lives, but made less money for the trouble.

I hope an exception can be made in cases like this

[HundredPercentPlease]

That flight is about 30 credit hours (to and fro), the cancellation would have resulted in reduction in productivity hours so their loss of pay is anywhere between $5000 HKD (most Junior Cabin Crew) to $40000 HKD (most senior flight crew) because of a RTO
So, having put it back on stand the FO reminds the Captain of how much pay they've just lost. Captain orders an emergency evacuation on stand, with a slight smirk....
/conjecture

[PukinDog]

Likely the brake temps were already too hot before takeoff as the pilots may have been over-riding the brakes in order to taxi slowly to get more pay.

when tyre burst and takeoff was stopped, remaining brakes overheated.

they did a precautionary disembarkation.
people sustained injuries.


i have a feeling had mgmt not cut pilots pay this may have not happened as brakes/tyres would have been much cooler before takeoff 😂

At least some minor injuries are always inevitable when using slides for an emergency evac from a widebody with 250+ pax many of whom will be elderly, possibly infirm, very young etc.

Knowing injuries are a consideration and apparently able to taxi back to the gate area, curious why evac w/slides was ordered rather than simply deplaning via airstair or gate? Crowd (pax) control on the ramp as a consequence of using multiple exit points simultaneously also comes with its own set of safety issues, and certainly there would at least be trucks and equipment responding to the hot brakes/ wheel assembly on that side.

Seems like there must be more to the nature of the problem than what's been reported.

[Progress Wanchai]

Sorry to ask a dumb question but why would they no be paid for their service?

Because they are weak. They are weak as individuals. They are weak as a group.

The pilots were in industrial action for better pay and conditions. This was temporarily suspended three years ago to assist the company through covid. To clarify, the pilots suspended industrial action, management didn’t. And the pilots reaction to this action? Nothing. Now three years later the company is making public announcements of being profitable again. And the pilots reaction? Nothing, apart from the elected AOA chairman making media announcements regarding resignation rates. This is how weak people undertake industrial action.

Then there’s the GC and their self elected alternate chairman. Where’s their leadership? Roar by name, mouse by nature. Rarely has a group of representatives reflected the cowardly nature of their membership better.

The strong have left. The weak remain. Read the seniority list. It names them in reverse order of their courage and leadership abilities.

[VforVENDETTA]

Busrt tire/tires on takeoff roll? What can cause overheated tires after the long taxi to 7R? Slow taxi, which includes lots of braking? Heavy weight can exasperate. Is this the price of no block guarantee pay by cx which isn't done by any airline we've heard of? Was it worth the price cx?

After an RTO (even starting with dead cold brakes) brakes will always overheat on a heavy aircraft. Let alone after a long taxi to begin with. Temperature begins to rise at a rapid rate resulting in tire deflation. After that the brakes will catch fire. They certainly will smoke a lot. Very thick smoke. Fire crews observing will almost always call out brake fires. If you're at the gate and there's no jetbridge driver, you have no choice but to evacuate having been told the word "fire".

Best strategy is to stop the aircraft and have fire crews get in position for the inevitable brake fires. Not to put an aircraft which has a chance of burning down in a fire with a full load of fuel right up to a terminal building.

Who decides its OK to taxi an aircraft with less than all its tires anyway?

All in hindsight. FWIW

[Oasis]

There was no fire though, was there, I couldn’t even see smoke coming from the tyres in the evacuation videos.

[Near Miss]

It isn't even Monday morning yet, and already the quarterbacks are hitting their keyboards, as they sit in their armchairs.

[Rie]

they did a precautionary disembarkation.

Do you even know what a precautionary disembarkation entails? First post... Clearly don't understand what happened.

[CaptJackSparro]

It'd be a bit naive to think poor pay leading to poor morale across the company played no part in the decisions leading to this
swiss cheese

[Koan]

The Independent called the evacuation "botched"? The photo/video clip I saw appeared to show it at the gate.

Did fire or heavy smoke erupt?

Our mob's procedures call for the option of prompt deplanement uising normal doors it being well known that a full EVAC command will invariably result in some injuries. Nobody needs Captain Hindsight here but it is sometimes better to leave them on board.

https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/cathay-pacific-tyre-bursts-hong-kong-b2363489.html

[Zi Peng]

Oh well if the indipendent said so ……
There are obviously a few questions but we still don’t know exactly what happened, I heard all sorts of rumours and read all sort of rubbish.

[Verbal Kint]

According to The Townsville Refueller:

RTO @ 125 kts due PFD airspeed indication blank/incorrect.

Small fire in #9 wheel assy taxiing to gate.

ISM overhead pilot discussions re: handling of small brake fire & self-initiated evacuation from the cabin. Partial evacuation carried out, a few injuries resulted.

Meanwhile flight crew still on the flight deck writing up eTechlog, presumably unaware ISM had commanded an evacuation.

Looking forward to the next 5 years of joint CRM exercises 😒

[Rice power]

before 80 kts I will stop for a Master Caution, System malf, coinfig warn, unusual noise or vibration, tire failure or slow acceleration.
Between 80 kts and V1 I will stop for an eng fail, any fire indication, pred w/shear warn or any condition where I think the aircraft is unsafe to fly.
If it is as alledged then anyone see a prob here.
Hey blogs, what is the memory items for flt with unreliable airspeed?
The days of any excellence at CX are long past.

[bonzaboy]

before 80 kts I will stop for a Master Caution, System malf, coinfig warn, unusual noise or vibration, tire failure or slow acceleration.
Between 80 kts and V1 I will stop for an eng fail, any fire indication, pred w/shear warn or any condition where I think the aircraft is unsafe to fly.
If it is as alledged then anyone see a prob here.
Hey blogs, what is the memory items for flt with unreliable airspeed?
The days of any excellence at CX are long past.
Definitely should not stop on a heavyweight aircraft from 125 knots for unreliable airspeed.

[joblow]

It would be interesting to know what the airspeed discrepancy was . I personally would have done a quick cross check against the standby ASI and used that as ref to disregard the faulty system
However a decision had to be made in seconds so until more facts are known you cannot fault the decision to abort, however I would not taxi the aircraft to a bay at the terminal following a high speed abort .
as for the report that the chief purser elected to call for an emergency evacuation without consulting with the captain , that totally blows my mind . We shall see in time if that is what actually happened
great CRM failure for future courses if this is the case
plus a new sim training module

[ACMS]

Well to my mind “a/c unsafe or unable to fly” covers the IAS loss or disagree. I’d rather stop at 125 knots and take my time dealing with hot brakes than take the IAS problem into the air, fly around doing the unreliable airspeed checklist for an hour……IMHO. What the CN did was totally reasonable..

[Tiger pork]

ACMS, I don't think that an absolute like the words..Totally reasonable..is apt until we know what the actual factoids of the event were. It appears that there was NO speed disagree message on the EICAS apparently and possibly the speed anomaly was voiced by the relief pilot/s.? In that case..it would be reasonable to continue and take the issue gear up!!

[Rice power]

Manage the risk, that is your sole responsibility.
A high speed abort with the potential brake issues (potential overrun on 07R would be interesting or have we forgotten V1 is predicated on ALL the systems working as stated) vs taking an aircraft into the air with (rumoured) 1 of 3 airspeed indicators not working
➢ Flaps Extended . . . 10 degrees and 85% N1
➢ Flaps Up . . . . . . . . 4 degrees and 70% N1
(Practiced numerous times during recurrent training. Takes 5 minutes max. Power+attitude = performance, as taught to abinitio pilots before they solo)

Counter scenerio, lose an airspeed indicator in the clb/cruise-does that render the aircraft unsafe to fly?
As stated, any excellence at cx has long left the room.

[1200firm]

I brief a 70 knot check, as well as the SOP 100 knot check. Why wait till 100 plus knots for an RTO for unreliable airspeed?

[BuzzBox]

I brief a 70 knot check, as well as the SOP 100 knot check. Why wait till 100 plus knots for an RTO for unreliable airspeed?

The 100 knot cross-check is an Airbus thing. Boeing uses 80 knots.

[Dingleberry Handpump]

I brief a 70 knot check, as well as the SOP 100 knot check. Why wait till 100 plus knots for an RTO for unreliable airspeed?
One of ‘those’ that makes up their own SOPs..

[Oasis]

One of ‘those’ that makes up their own SOPs..

I'm even safer than him, I brief a 20 kt speed check, then a 40, 60 and 80 kts check... Can never be too sure!

[BuzzBox]

I'm even safer than him, I brief a 20 kt speed check, then a 40, 60 and 80 kts check... Can never be too sure!

Absolutely. I’m surprised more people don’t call V1-10, just to be safe. :E

[buggaluggs]

At the end of the day the whole RTO debate is irrelevant noise IMO, for whatever reason, the skipper wasn't happy, the call was 'Stop!', they successfully completed the procedure, end of story! The actual issue is who called for the emergency evac once they'd successfully returned to the bay, and why? Rumor has it that it was initiated by the cabin crew and/or pax, and the cockpit crew were unaware of what was happening until it was well underway!
Clearly the adrenaline levels would have been somewhat elevated all around after the RTO, but I think the CX spin doctors might have their work cut out for them when the CAD report is published.......

[Fly747]

There won’t be a CAD report. As someone was injured it is an accident and will be an AAIA investigation.

[BuzzBox]

There won’t be a CAD report. As someone was injured it is an accident and will be an AAIA investigation.

Guess who has investigators seconded to the AAIA and also guess where the AAIA's Deputy Chief Accident and Safety Investigator formerly worked?

[Fly747]

Guess who has investigators seconded to the AAIA and also guess where the AAIA's Deputy Chief Accident and Safety Investigator formerly worked?

That’s right Buzz; what could surprise in HK?

[Toshirozero]

Guess who has investigators seconded to the AAIA and also guess where the AAIA's Deputy Chief Accident and Safety Investigator formerly worked?
The Transport and Logistics Bureau AAIA 'advisor' is ex CAD Exec, an odious deceptive pygmy troll who is there to do the CAD's bidding
The Transport and Logistics Bureau are entirely complicit
Chief Accident and Safety Investigator is a CAD manager, under a dodgy transfer process not included in any civil service codes
AIA's Deputy Chief Accident and Safety Investigator is ex CX safety
The investigators are all CAD inspectors
The AAIA is not independent, in any sense.
It was functioning as required by the ICAO SARPS when the first Chief Accident and Safety Investigator was there.
When CX and the CAD didn't like the heat, they maneuvered that problem out of the way. LegCo know all this and the PAC have an open case on the CAD for numerous issues reported over the years, some criminal, vis the AT3 system

[Toshirozero]

Who initiated the evacuation is the question. There's some info rattling around about unruly pax.

[Toshirozero]

If a report is ever published. which is unlikely, with the obvious and formerly stated conflict of interest issues throughout the entire organisational set up at Govt and operator level, the report will have been cleaned up of anything useful. Waste of a HK$ 10 million per annum budget

[Koan]

Not much a cockpit crew can do if panicked passengers start popping doors or the cabin attendants initiate evacuation.

[Toshirozero]

Has the AAIA notified CX that an ICAO Annex 13 investigation is officially underway in accordance with CAP448B?
Until CX are notified accordance with the AAIA SOP manual, the CAD led and ex CX staffed Investigation Authority are just collecting information.
As there are no CX investigation reports published on the website, ipso facto, there have been no investigations of CX.
Worth following up as the CAD are that devious.

[ACMS]

V1 would be somewhere near 150 knots, so 125 knots is quite reasonable to reject the TO “if you consider the A/c is UNSAFE or unable to fly”

Simple really.

He made a call, he did the right thing, they all lived……...
They were safe and in NO danger…..He’s done his job.

As they say, “better to be on the ground with a problem wishing you were in the air than in the air with a problem wishing you were on the ground”

The CN is a good guy, lots of experience and he doesn’t deserve all the “Monday morning quarterbacking”

[Rice power]

The CN involved may well be a great guy but that does not render the decision beyond analysis.
17 people claiming injuries, a CAD investigation initiated and the aircraft damaged as a result, all for 1 failed airspeed indicator(alleged) which does not render the aircraft unsafe for flight.
I doubt the insurer will take such a benevolent approach.

[ACMS]

Rubbish……
He did his job and the company and the insurers and the investigators won’t have an issue with the CN’s decision ( yes after they analyze everything, and so they should ) . The Cabin crews decision to evac without direction from the flight deck WILL be scrutinized and examined.

This actual scenario was discussed in the last round of Sims in my company and the CC examiner and all of us agreed it’s better to reject with an IAS disagree below say 100-120 knots on the 737 ( V1 around 140 ) than take the problem into the air at night possible ****ty wx and fly around for 1 hour sorting it out opening yourself up to larger threats…….because there’d be a few.

1/ they were at night
2/ they were heavy
3/ they most certainly weren’t going to continue to LAX with an IAS disagree and would be returning to VHHH in any event.
4/ they would then need to dump fuel for about 1 hour to come back below MLW.
5/ they didn’t damage the 777, the fuse plugs letting go and deflating the wheels is not damage, they are designed to do that!! The wheels and slides can and will be replaced easily.

He, IMHO with only a split second to decide did the right thing and based on what I’ve read I don’t think I would have done any different to him.

[Jester64]

They say the Airbus is designed to be flown by monkeys, but I really admire the KISS principle used in their FCTM:

To assist in the decision making process, the takeoff is divided into low and high speeds regimes, with 100 kt being chosen as the dividing line.


Above 100 kt, and below V1: Rejecting the takeoff at these speeds is a more serious matter, particularly on slippery runways. It could lead to a hazardous situation, if the speed is approaching V1. At these speeds, the Captain should be "go-minded" and very few situations should lead to the decision to reject the takeoff:


It then goes on to list 5 of the 'very few' situations...

Does the 777 books give any such similar guidance?

[Oasis]

I'll be very honest here..
Whenever I read the sentence 'unsafe or unable to fly' in the checklist as the reason for aborting over 80kts, I always thought they meant some structural failure that they just didn't want quantify simply because they couldn't. Something so bad, but indescribable, meaning lots of possible things, that are obvious.

When I read about the abort here, initially I thought, 'that's not one of the reasons to abort above 80kts!", but I was wrong, this was exactly the right call. And there's a good chance I would have taken off that night, to sort it out in the air, and I would have been wrong for doing so.

[BuzzBox]

Does the 777 books give any such similar guidance?

Yes, although Boeing uses 80 knots as the cut off. Above 80 knots and before V1, Boeing says the take-off should be rejected for any of the following:

fire or fire warning
engine failure

predictive windshear warning

if the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly

[Toshirozero]

The CN involved may well be a great guy but that does not render the decision beyond analysis.
17 people claiming injuries, a CAD investigation initiated and the aircraft damaged as a result, all for 1 failed airspeed indicator(alleged) which does not render the aircraft unsafe for flight.
I doubt the insurer will take such a benevolent approach.
A CAD investigation? Has the HK Air Accident Investigation Authority formally notified CX that an AAIA investigation is initiated in accordance with ICAO Anx 13 and CAP448B?
If they haven't by now and use the MOR as the excuse to avoid an investigation that is by definition an accident (injuries) and not a serious incident there is a cover up going on.

[controlledrest]

They should have pushed on. GMA forced POS18 onto us. These guys lost approx HKD100,00 by not completing the pattern + $ for lost patterns as they are stood down. Safety is a long way down the list for the GMA and her lap bitch Jack Bastard.

[Uplinker]

Regarding pay, If this crew did not complete their full rostered duty, i.e. fly to LAX, layover, fly home; Would they really expect to be paid the entire pay and allowances for that trip - even though they did not get off the ground in the first place ?

Having had an evacuation - for whatever reason - I think the crew would be paid for the duty they performed, and then be excused duty for at least 24 hrs ?

Could this be the reason for the "crew not paid" suggestion ?

[Xwindldg]

Can’t believe there’s people saying it would have been better to takeoff.

Let’s say they did the RTO, taxied back and everyone did a normal disembarkation like it sounds like the CN wanted? Would you then be saying he should have taken off at night, very heavy, with unreliable instruments?

I was always told the 80kt/100kt check was to check the other guy is still alive and to check the speeds are the same. Stop if it’s no to either of those!

[Oasis]

Weird thing is, airspeed on the 777 comes from the same 'source' there should not be a discrepancy? Would be interesting to find out what they saw.

[joblow]

You also have to consider that a load of fuel Would be required to be dumped had they become airborne , so although some tyres deflated and the brakes probably needed to be replaced the slides repacked all of that has to be balanced against the fuel that would have been dumped .
I cannot fault the CN decision to abort I wasn’t there , but I don’t think I would have taxied back to a bay bearing in mind the possibility of a brake fire 🔥 just my 10 cents worth

[Oasis]

Mind you that from the video, there was no smoke or fire coming from the brakes. So it's possible the brakes were fine by the time they arrived at the gate.
Perhaps they waited a while to cool before there approached the gate, someone with a flight radar 24 account can see if they waited.

I feel bad for the crew involved saying this, how would you like to have every moment following a high speed reject be scrutinized by a bunch of keyboard warriors. Something was messed up with the communication though, much to be learned from this.

[Progress Wanchai]

Regarding pay, If this crew did not complete their full rostered duty, i.e. fly to LAX, layover, fly home; Would they really expect to be paid the entire pay and allowances for that trip - even though they did not get off the ground in the first place ?

Having had an evacuation - for whatever reason - I think the crew would be paid for the duty they performed, and then be excused duty for at least 24 hrs ?

Could this be the reason for the "crew not paid" suggestion ?

While the crew are stood down surely the HKAOA is making up the 30% MPP that on average they would be receiving if not for management altering their rosters.

[Jester64]

Can’t believe there’s people saying it would have been better to takeoff.

Let’s say they did the RTO, taxied back and everyone did a normal disembarkation like it sounds like the CN wanted? Would you then be saying he should have taken off at night, very heavy, with unreliable instruments?

I was always told the 80kt/100kt check was to check the other guy is still alive and to check the speeds are the same. Stop if it’s no to either of those!

I can believe it…as any experienced pilot knows a high speed RTO comes with its risks, as demonstrated in this event resulting in 17 injuries. This risk has to be weighed up almost instantly amongst taking off with one air airspeed indication faulty (assuming the other two were valid and giving reasonable information), but this is why guidance has been published by the manufacturer to help us make such decisions during takeoff. What you may ‘have always been told’ could be just technique and if un-published, should always be taken with a grain of salt.

[Xwindldg]

I can believe it…as any experienced pilot knows a high speed RTO comes with its risks, as demonstrated in this event resulting in 17 injuries. This risk has to be weighed up almost instantly amongst taking off with one air airspeed indication faulty (assuming the other two were valid and giving reasonable information), but this is why guidance has been published by the manufacturer to help us make such decisions during takeoff. What you may ‘have always been told’ could be just technique and if un-published, should always be taken with a grain of salt.

You mean the injuries that happened during the evacuation? How many happened because of the actual RTO?

There’s absolutely no way in the world it would have been a better decision to continue the takeoff if you really did spot unreliable speed before V1.

[Jester64]

You mean the injuries that happened during the evacuation? How many happened because of the actual RTO?

There’s absolutely no way in the world it would have been a better decision to continue the takeoff if you really did spot unreliable speed before V1.

An evacuation occurred because of a high speed RTO, hence why I say a high speed RTO will always carry some risks, ie an evacuation is one of them along with the resultant injuries.

Theres a difference between unreliable speed and a single ASI discrepancy with 2 x additional ASI giving valid data (cross-checked with a GS readout). I don’t know the specifics of this incident, but no-one can categorically say at this stage if one decision was better then the other.

[Xwindldg]

An evacuation occurred because of a high speed RTO, hence why I say a high speed RTO will always carry some risks, ie an evacuation is one of them along with the resultant injuries.

Theres a difference between unreliable speed and a single ASI discrepancy with 2 x additional ASI giving valid data (cross-checked with a GS readout). I don’t know the specifics of this incident, but no-one can categorically say at this stage if one decision was better then the other.

If one of the passengers broke their leg walking through the terminal after returning to the bay would the injury have “occurred because of a high speed RTO”? Absolutely not. The RTO had been successfully carried out. People got injured going down the slides with their luggage that they were supposed to leave behind.

Taking the problem into the air and dealing with everything that goes with that would have been much, much more risky.

[Jester64]

If one of the passengers broke their leg walking through the terminal after returning to the bay would the injury have “occurred because of a high speed RTO”? Absolutely not. The RTO had been successfully carried out. People got injured going down the slides with their luggage that they were supposed to leave behind.

Taking the problem into the air and dealing with everything that goes with that would have been much, much more risky.

of course not, because the responsibility ends when the aircraft is on blocks or once the pax have disembarked (depending on OM policy / state regulation). But a high speed RTO can lead to (amongst other risks) a brake fire, and if mis-managed could lead to an evacuation which most likely always leads to injuries.

Can’t speak for the 777, but taking the problem of a single ADR / IAS fault on the Airbus into the air is not as risky as a high speed RTO. My opinion, so take it with a grain of salt. But Airbus thinks so also, hence why the ECAM for IAS discrepancy, single ADR FAULT, and even ADR disagree are inhibited above 80 knots…

[Xwindldg]

So “100kts”

”not checked, speed is different”

”well the pax might get injured going down the slides when we taxi back to the gate if we stop now…CONTINUE”

Then it’s straight into unreliable speed memory items for the climb out into the night.

[Xwindldg]

That would be madness

[Jester64]

So “100kts”

”not checked, speed is different”

”well the pax might get injured going down the slides when we taxi back to the gate if we stop now…CONTINUE”

Then it’s straight into unreliable speed memory items for the climb out into the night.Not at all, again can’t speak for the 777 procedures, but for the Airbus the memory item for unreliable speed is only executed if the safe conduct of flight is impacted….meaning for a single IAS fault on takeoff, the aircraft is flown using the remaining valid IAS and the issue is usually sorted by some simple ADR switching once airborne. Enjoy your evening mate

[Xwindldg]

Not at all, again can’t speak for the 777 procedures, but for the Airbus the memory item for unreliable speed is only executed if the safe conduct of flight is impacted….meaning for a single IAS fault on takeoff, the aircraft is flown using the remaining valid IAS and the issue is usually sorted by some simple ADR switching once airborne. Enjoy your evening mate

You're just regurgitating some quotes from the book without thinking how it would really unfold. It would be crazy to continue under those conditions if you saw unreliable speed at the 100kt call.

[Jester64]

You're just regurgitating some quotes from the book without thinking how it would really unfold. It would be crazy to continue under those conditions if you saw unreliable speed at the 100kt call.

lol…nah mate just years of experience on the bus + knowing the books, and having the confidence in such published RTO guidance whilst being presented with a similar go/no-go decision at high speed one night…I get what you’re saying - but what I’m trying to say is that you can’t categorically say that is was the right or wrong decision without knowing all the facts. I was trying to give an example of where *IF* it were indeed just a single IAS discrepancy, it can be taken into the air and dealt with quite easily, and it seems at least one large aircraft manufacture supports this.

[Oasis]

Once you have an unreliable airspeed on takeoff, you have no idea what you're going to get while you are getting airborne and the difficulty you will have managing the aircraft.
Overspeed warnings, stall warnings, perhaps a fun altitude discrepancy while you're at it? Maybe the extension wont play nice? Maybe it's all easy in an airbus, which I doubt..
One of the ex 49ers had a unreliable airspeed on departure, made it in alive and promptly took time off to mentally recover from the ordeal.
A rejected takeoff SHOULD never result in an evacuation, it did in this case, possibly due to lack of communication or just a crazy ISM or both.
It's never like in the sim.

[Jester64]

So hypothetically speaking, taking off on a short wet runway with no stop margin, wind variable, from a ****-hole non-grooved runway, the PM calls 100KTS but you look and see you have 120KT, a quick glance at the standby/ISIS and it too reads 120, the GS reads 120ish and V1 is fast approaching…you gonna stop? This is why Airbus inhibits the above ECAMs after 80 knots as outlined in my previous post.

[Oasis]

Ask yourself first if in your hypothetical scenario you would stop with an engine failure at the point you describe.

[Xwindldg]

So hypothetically speaking, taking off on a short wet runway with no stop margin, wind variable, from a ****-hole non-grooved runway, the PM calls 100KTS but you look and see you have 120KT, a quick glance at the standby/ISIS and it too reads 120, the GS reads 120ish and V1 is fast approaching…you gonna stop? This is why Airbus inhibits the above ECAMs after 80 knots as outlined in my previous post.



Yeah but it wasn’t a “short wet runway with no stop margin, wind variable, from a ****-hole non-grooved runway”, it was HKG which is our home base. The RTO was done successfully so there’s not much to argue there.

As you said, Airbus inhibits those alerts after 80kts so it’s something that’s seen. You’d have to safely diagnose it between 100kts and rotate. That’s some proper top gun stuff if it wasn’t absolutely obvious.

If you take off, are you going to continue all the way LA if you can’t solve it?

There’s been several stories of crew continuing after seeing unreliable speed before V1 and they’ve nearly ended up in disaster. Don’t remember any of the analysis of those saying a thing about it being a good decision because of possible injuries from an evacuation.

[Jester64]

So maybe in this case it was warranted, maybe not, like I said no one can say what the best decision was until all the facts are published. But I’m writing due to your statement which is what urked me in the first place I was always told the 80kt/100kt check was to check the other guy is still alive and to check the speeds are the same. Stop if it’s no to either of those! this is more like a blanket statement and someone’s technique that probably will achieve a safe outcome most of the time, but I’ve given you an example where it may not be not warranted and may result in a negative outcome, hence it’s not published procedure. I’ve never heard of such technique being taught on the airbus (or the Boeing I’ve flown).

[Xwindldg]

So maybe in this case it was warranted, maybe not, like I said no one can say what the best decision was until all the facts are published. But I’m writing due to your statement which is what urked me in the first place this is more like a blanket statement and someone’s technique that probably will achieve a safe outcome most of the time, but I’ve given you an example where it may not be not warranted and may result in a negative outcome, hence it’s not published procedure. I’ve never heard of such technique being taught on the airbus (or the Boeing I’ve flown).


What are you checking at the 100kt call?

[Jester64]

As PF (and Captain): at the 100KT call by the PM, I look at my PFD for my IAS as per the SOP. This is where the training / published guidance / procedure ends on the Airbus...hence my pre-plan for this event (if my IAS is not at 100 knots) is I will glance to check the IAS on the standby/ISIS and then the GS readout on the ND and make the appropriate decision based on the circumstance at that instant. But in my mind it’s not a blanket reject, nor is it published procedure / guidance to do so.

I’ve given this very scenario some thought when I first moved to the left seat, for the very reason that there is nothing published telling us to reject if there is a discrepancy.

[Xwindldg]

As PF (and Captain): at the 100KT call by the PM, I look at my PFD for my IAS as per the SOP. This is where the training / published guidance / procedure ends on the Airbus...hence my pre-plan for this event (if my IAS is not at 100 knots) is I will glance to check the IAS on the standby/ISIS and then the GS readout on the ND and make the appropriate decision based on the circumstance at that instant. But in my mind it’s not a blanket reject, nor is it published procedure / guidance to do so.

I’ve given this very scenario some thought when I first moved to the left seat, for the very reason that there is nothing published telling us to reject if there is a discrepancy.

Think you need to go back and re-think about your pre-plan.

You’ll end up faffing around trying to work out which is correct and within a few seconds you can’t stop anymore and you’re committed.

[Jester64]

Think you need to go back and re-think about your pre-plan.

enlighten me I’m all ears

[Jester64]

I don’t see it that way. It’s a quick glance to cross-check the 100KT call against another another certified IAS instrument, and then if this is good, a gross error check against an entirely different source. Can be done in about 1-2 seconds…

If the PM is doing his job on the Airbus, all airspeed indications are scanned during the roll even during the low speed regime (a slight reference to this is made in the FCTM) possibly enabling a discrepancy to be identified early and a reject safely made during the low speed regime. As PF and PIC I can’t control if the PM has done this or not, hence the 100 knot call is the last chance I have to know if we have a discrepancy. But now we are in the high speed regime and quickly approaching V1 (in some instances) - hence it’s not written procedure to reject - it’s now a command decision.

My responses to you will end here. I just don’t agree with some non-published (for good reason) techniques made by instructors that are then adopted by trainees as gospel - their technique may not fit your situation / context, and could lead to a negative outcome, especially as no formal risk analysis has been performed and you won’t have any leg to stand on should you need to reference it in a court of law (or the chief pilots office).

[Climbpowder]

Once you have an unreliable airspeed on takeoff, you have no idea what you're going to get while you are getting airborne and the difficulty you will have managing the aircraft.
Overspeed warnings, stall warnings, perhaps a fun altitude discrepancy while you're at it? Maybe the extension wont play nice? Maybe it's all easy in an airbus, which I doubt..
One of the ex 49ers had a unreliable airspeed on departure, made it in alive and promptly took time off to mentally recover from the ordeal.
A rejected takeoff SHOULD never result in an evacuation, it did in this case, possibly due to lack of communication or just a crazy ISM or both.
It's never like in the sim.

This says a lot about what a respectable person you are and I can see how lost in time and space you are... you may want to get your judgment checked, but anyway, feel free to come here and make all those nice comments. ISM door was the only door that remained closed.

[Oasis]

This says a lot about what a respectable person you are and I can see how lost in time and space you are... you may want to get your judgment checked, but anyway, feel free to come here and make all those nice comments. ISM door was the only door that remained closed.

Have you considered that the reason the evacuation never happened in the front, was that the pilots stopped them in time, but were unable to cancel the order in the back?

I'm just spitballing here, as we don't know what happened, this is a rumour platform after all.
There are crazy Captains, there are crazy ISMs, I'm sure you've flown with many of them.

[CodyBlade]

The is a whatsapp that lists all the crazy Capts and crazy ISMs.

It's listed according to berserk level.

[RAT Management]

Have you considered that the reason the evacuation never happened in the front, was that the pilots stopped them in time, but were unable to cancel the order in the back?

I'm just spitballing here, as we don't know what happened, this is a rumour platform after all.
There are crazy Captains, there are crazy ISMs, I'm sure you've flown with many of them.
Crazy captains, I wouldn't say that. I've flown with guys that have a quirky personality to put it nicely. But, when it came to decisions and the job at hand they were beyond reproach. Thankfully a Cathay command is one of the toughest to attain and still means something. Something the trainers do their best to preserve regardless of the bean counters demands. If there is the slightest doubt about someone, they send the guy/gal for another Sim or check ride, nicely referred to by trainees as a chop Sim/ check. My mates and I were discussing this not long ago with the conclusion that none of us have never flown with a captain that didn't deserve it in CX!

​

[Oasis]

Crazy is a hyperbole, but there are these individuals you come across from time to time that seem a bit off in their thinking. Many in the cockpit get weeded out in time, not so sure about the cabin as it is less likely they immediately put lives at stake, I imagine.

[Ex Douglas Driver]

Airbus most certainly advocates rejecting the takeoff if an airspeed discrepancy is detected at 100kts (or before).

From their publication "Safety First" - "Unreliable airspeed at takeoff" March 2021
Monitoring Of The Airspeed During The Takeoff Roll
Case study 3 shows us the importance of the 100 kt crosscheck, which is requested in the Standard Operating Procedure. It is the last line of defense in preventing a takeoff with an unreliable airspeed indication. The flight crew should be prepared to reject the takeoff at the time of the 100 kt crosscheck if an airspeed discrepancy is observed.

Airbus Safety First article (https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/unreliable-airspeed-at-takeoff/)

[Jester64]

Airbus most certainly advocates rejecting the takeoff if an airspeed discrepancy is detected at 100kts (or before).

From their publication "Safety First" - "Unreliable airspeed at takeoff" March 2021
Monitoring Of The Airspeed During The Takeoff Roll
Case study 3 shows us the importance of the 100 kt crosscheck, which is requested in the Standard Operating Procedure. It is the last line of defense in preventing a takeoff with an unreliable airspeed indication. The flight crew should be prepared to reject the takeoff at the time of the 100 kt crosscheck if an airspeed discrepancy is observed.

Airbus Safety First article (https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/unreliable-airspeed-at-takeoff/)

Thank-you, I stand corrected.

[main_dog]

Wow. I’m actually learning something from this thread! Great discussion.

Thanks gents, esp Jester (good food for thought, plus mature reactions I didn’t even think were allowed on the prune :ok:) and ex Douglas Driver for the excellent reference.

At the end of the day split-second decision, no-one dead and airplane intact, well done. The Monday morning quarterbacking is inevitable in our profession, even Sully had a hard time justifying his decisions (and I for one would be happy to do half as well as he did in a situation half as difficult as he faced).

[raven11]

https://youtu.be/UBg_8fUD4VY

[MENELAUS]

Patently a ******* expert. From his garret in ‘Westminster’. You have to give social media its credit. An expert sat on his shiny arse around every corner.

[Climbpowder]

Have you considered that the reason the evacuation never happened in the front, was that the pilots stopped them in time, but were unable to cancel the order in the back?

I'm just spitballing here, as we don't know what happened, this is a rumour platform after all.
There are crazy Captains, there are crazy ISMs, I'm sure you've flown with many of them.

I am more careful before considering everyone else "crazy" but me... what makes you believe you will be acting so cool and professional after hearing of an explosion underneath your position and hundreds of people panicking in the middle of the night? Have a little empathy for your fellow colleagues who make less money than what you get for a house allowance.

[Jester64]

Wow. I’m actually learning something from this thread! Great discussion.

Thanks gents, esp Jester (good food for thought, plus mature reactions I didn’t even think were allowed on the prune :ok:) and ex Douglas Driver for the excellent reference.

At the end of the day split-second decision, no-one dead and airplane intact, well done. The Monday morning quarterbacking is inevitable in our profession, even Sully had a hard time justifying his decisions (and I for one would be happy to do half as well as he did in a situation half as difficult as he faced).

I’m open to always learning : )

It’s interesting the recommendations on that airbus safety publication hasn’t made its way to the FCTM - as we are told here to be ‘go minded’ and that ‘very few situations should lead to a reject’ above 100 knots, with speed discrepancy not specifically listed as one of them. Don’t get me wrong, I’m all for a reject due to a discrepancy (below 100 knots) but would be thinking twice about it above 100 knots if stop margin limited. This is why it’s important to scan all 3 speed indications early in the takeoff roll as alluded to in that safety publication and the FCTM. A good article by Airbus on RTO decision making here:

https://www.smartcockpit.com/docs/Stop_and_No_Go_Decision.pdf

What’s interesting is the percentage of RTO over-run accidents between 1961-1999 that were initiated below V1.

[mrdeux]

Patently a ******* expert. From his garret in ‘Westminster’. You have to give social media its credit. An expert sat on his shiny arse around every corner.
Not saying I agree with him at all, but he is a 777 Captain.

[buggaluggs]

Actually he's an F/O.........

[CodyBlade]

This is nothing, SQ on fire everybody sit tight.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36637421