AF447

[Concours77]

AF447. Yeah that one. My memory actually is getting better with age. To wit: I recall from early thread, either TechLog or Rumours, that the Vertical Stabilizer/Rudder was found somewhat separated and distant from the impact with the sea. There was discussion linking the loss of HF Comms with loss of VS which contained HF antenna. It was reported that the HF antenna was elsewhere on the fuselage, so that theory was sunk. Researching the possible re-engining of the 747 into a twin, I found A330 architecture, and lo! HF antenna is located in the leading edge of the A330 Vertical Stabilizer.... for whatever that might mean. I was never satisfied that PF pulled on the stick start to finish. Occam would say he had a reason, perhaps in concert with loss of all directional control..... just sayin'

[HOVIS]

In a stalled condition, the tail will hit the sea first, breaking off, probably. This was all covered in the other threads. No idea where you got the idea that the HF Antenna is fitted elsewhere. It's public knowledge.
Also, the CVR transcript said nothing about loss of directional control or ECAM warnings for hydraulic systems or rudder lost.
Let it go eh. 👍

[Locked door]

Pilot error after a simple tech failure, this has been done to death.

What is far more interesting is why two supposedly competent pilots were unable to recognise that 10 degrees nose up and 10000ft per min descent rate is a stall. The Captain realised as soon as he entered the flight deck but by then there was insufficient height to recover, hence his comment “we’re dead”.

If only they’d initiated the airspeed unreliable checklist, or performed an FNC or simply set 2.5 degrees pitch and 90% N1.

Ultimately pilots don’t make mistakes on purpose which begs questions of their training and attitude.

LD

[Dont Hang Up]

I was never satisfied that PF pulled on the stick start to finish. Occam would say he had a reason, perhaps in concert with loss of all directional control..... just sayin'

02:13:40 (Bonin) But I've had the stick back the whole time!

[Gary Brown]

Pilot error after a simple tech failure, this has been done to death.

What is far more interesting is why two supposedly competent pilots were unable to recognise that 10 degrees nose up and 10000ft per min descent rate is a stall. The Captain realised as soon as he entered the flight deck but by then there was insufficient height to recover, hence his comment “we’re dead”.

If only they’d initiated the airspeed unreliable checklist, or performed an FNC or simply set 2.5 degrees pitch and 90% N1.

Ultimately pilots don’t make mistakes on purpose which begs questions of their training and attitude.

LD

I don't think the CVR transcript supports what you say about the Captain's reaction, or his words - https://tailstrike.com/database/01-june-2009-air-france-447/

[GarageYears]

I don't think the CVR transcript supports what you say about the Captain's reaction, or his words - https://tailstrike.com/database/01-june-2009-air-france-447/

It doesn't take much to Google the last words heard on the CVR... the official transcript is 'tided up' and substitutes a (!) for the expletive - the word's said were "****, we're going to crash" said by the occupant of the right seat. And then

But what you were or weren't satisfied with isn't important - the evidence was in the CVR recording the entire time. I mean there's this: "But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while".

And then of course there was the FDR data.

Let it go.

[Concours77]

02:13:40 (Bonin) But I've had the stick back the whole time!Right...I should have been more explicit."Holding the stick back without apparent reason...." A reason could have been lack of yaw control at lower AoA...​​​​​​​Captain DuBois: "Watch your lateral..." ​​​​​​​Don't know that "intact at impact" was established without doubt... I work on cold cases, and it's been slow...

A poster in an early thread formalized duff airspeed in an acronym: 'UAS' Unreliable airspeed, usage became ubiquitous. A sign of lack of acknowledgement by industry til this crash?

Stall recovery til this crash involved "maintain back pressure and full power"

Fine for an approach Stall, but not at altitude. "I don't understand, we have the engines..."

HopIng for additional improvements to the flight manual...unfortunate the CVR is sequestered... modifying eye witness testimony is a serious crime here in the US.
Won a case on suppressed testimony. (The lawyers did, I was just the investigator)​​​​​​​

[punkalouver]

If only they’d initiated the airspeed unreliable checklist, or performed an FNC or simply set 2.5 degrees pitch and 90% N1.


An important part of doing this when a crisis happens is to have already gone through your mind several times previously that about 2.5 degrees is what you want along with about 90% N1(or whatever is applicable to your type). Yes, you may deviate somewhat from this due to powerful instincts from unusual airspeed indications but you are more likely to quickly recognize that you are deviating away from where you always want to be in cruise.

If this important target is not very familiar to you, it is less likely that you will think amid much confusion of what your target is when other things do not make sense. You may find yourself chasing an airspeed as that is all you are truly familiar with.

[Concours77]

"If this important target is not very familiar to you, it is less likely that you will think amid much confusion of what your target is when other things do not make sense. You may find yourself chasing an airspeed as that is all you are truly familiar with." ....... punkalouver
As I recall, one of the last transmissions included "...turbulences....FORTE...!" Well, on top of all the goofy readings, it may have been too unstable in the cockpit to see the panel anyway....They had blundered into the red, and the crazy climb may well have been a thunderboomer lifting everything up and up. Then they blundered out, and lost lift, much of their thrust, and the rest of their composure.... The Pitot tubes were due to be replaced, AF was too cheap to fit BUSS, and Pitch and Power was too obvious, too much nonsense and poor luck squeezed it out of the consciousness of our lost pilots...

[blind pew]

‘ POOR LUCK!’
Substitute ‘lack of professionalism’

[pilotmike]

Stall recovery til this crash involved "maintain back pressure and full power"
​
Seriously?

[john_tullamarine]

There are a squillion posts spread over a dozen threads, starting here

AF 447 Search to resume - PPRuNe Forums (https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/395105-af-447-search-resume.html#post5303737)

[Locked door]

Stall recovery til this crash involved "maintain back pressure and full power"



Dear god tell me you aren’t a professional pilot. Full back stick has NEVER been part of the stall recovery on any commercial aircraft.

Are you saying that was an Air France SOP? If it was it explains the pilots behaviour and why they killed everyone on board.

Stall recovery is taught at the very start of any pilots training, and always involves reducing the AoA by lowering the nose, increasing thrust to assist acceleration and gently easing into a climb once flying speed is achieved.

[42go]

Good Lord, spare us....................

[DaveReidUK]

I don't understand why JT didn't simply close the thread, having provided a link where every aspect of the accident that could possibly be discussed has already been.

[ehwatezedoing]

Stall recovery til this crash involved "maintain back pressure and full power"
Fine for an approach Stall, but not at altitude. ​​​
Not fine anywhere unless you are inverted :E

[ATC Watcher]

I don't understand why JT didn't simply close the thread, having provided a link where every aspect of the accident that could possibly be discussed has already been.
I agree as there is nothing " new" that came out so far that would justify reopening this discussion . There are just one thing that could perhaps help : to be able to read a detailed report on the test flights made by Airbus on their A340 test bed somewhere in Spring 2010 trying to reproduce the event.. Rumors at the time was than one flight did not go well and was only recovered at very low level. The report of those flights never was made public as far as I know. , hopefully one day we might see it and that might shed some new light. Maybe.

[Carl Spaatz]

All air crashes are due to human error. Zero air crashes are due to pilot error. AF447 crashed due to human error. To wit- Airbus placing the sidestick where it's not visible to other crew members.

[john_tullamarine]

I don't understand why JT didn't simply close the thread,

I'm just a bear of very little brain (with apologies to Milne) ... all too hard to do that.

The series of threads, however (and once you sort the wheat from the chaff), have a lot of very useful stuff from many very knowledgeable folk. Just a great pity that circumstances conspired to make it all a bit too hard for the crew at the time with due consideration of their, perhaps limited, knowledge base.

[Concours77]

Please accept my deepest apologies... I believed that at lower level, the procedure was "at low level, minimize altitude loss, full power...." after all, the aircraft "cannot Stall". In Normal Law, that allowed for a stick (alpha) controlled by the computer...no? Pilots were accustomed to cavalier inputs. "Mayonnaise stirring"

[First_Principal]

...
I'm just a bear of very little brain (with apologies to Milne) ... all too hard to do that.
...


As long as you don't become wedged in a great tightness and have to go off yer grits for a week you'll be ok :)

The light touch on the moderating button is appreciated, even if it means more work to sort out locally.

[Concours77]

Verdict due April 17, 2023. Now that the burden of making a criminal finding is lifted, one hopes many sacred cows will be profaned.... Airframer, Regulator, Investigator. Now an impossibly incestuous, highly conflicted and untouchable gang, maybe justice will see change. Let's see if AIR, EASA, BEA, and France can be saved the incredible cost of investigating and pardoning themselves...

....par exemplar

[tdracer]

Concours, I've got a couple axes that need to be sharpened. Since you've obviously got an ax to grind, would you minding taking care of mine while you're at it? :rolleyes:

[Concours77]

Concours, I've got a couple axes that need to be sharpened. Since you've obviously got an ax to grind, would you minding taking care of mine while you're at it?  Heh heh.... always appreciate your humor. You are flying a widebody twin, crossing the Atlantic... it is fit with two Pitot Probes that are known to be unreliable... Let's call them Thales by name. Replacements, call them Goodrich, are available, but your airline is dragging its heels on replacing the defectives...Well, the bad boys choke on ice and freeze up...AUTOPILOT OFF. MASTER CAUTION, Etc. You are Sky King, in rest, and the two gents up front, aren't, well, ​​​​​​​familiar.... ​​​​​​​adios... ​​​​​​​that could easily be construed as criminal negligence, from around these parts. One of many sloppy things surrounding this wreck...​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[hans brinker]

All air crashes are due to human error. Zero air crashes are due to pilot error. AF447 crashed due to human error. To wit- Airbus placing the sidestick where it's not visible to other crew members.

I agree. And since it is AB SOP to sometimes use the sidestick, and hardly ever use the thrust levers (other than T/O and Landing), it would have made more sense to have a single mid-stick, and dual thrust levers on either side of the cockpit..... (or interconnecting them, or even better, have them move with the control surfaces, thrust levers included...)

[punkalouver]

I agree as there is nothing " new" that came out so far that would justify reopening this discussion . There are just one thing that could perhaps help : to be able to read a detailed report on the test flights made by Airbus on their A340 test bed somewhere in Spring 2010 trying to reproduce the event.. Rumors at the time was than one flight did not go well and was only recovered at very low level. The report of those flights never was made public as far as I know. , hopefully one day we might see it and that might shed some new light. Maybe.

If it has never been made public, could you tell us how you know about it? From someone with direct knowledge? It would be interesting to even hear the basic details.

[ATC Watcher]

If it has never been made public, could you tell us how you know about it? From someone with direct knowledge? It would be interesting to even hear the basic details.
It was public : there was an article in the Liberation newspaper in France in 2020 mentioning those flights , it said one apparently even went to Guyane to recreate the tropical conditions . The "interesting one " is supposed to have occured near Mt De Marsan in France in the Airbus test area . and was seen on radar by Civil ATC and mentioned on an ATC forum. . Then a serie of posts /rumors on a French Aviation forum ( Radiocockpit, now closed) mentionned this flight, one arguing they were close to evacuate ( this test A340 has an in-fligh evacuatuion door ) Rumors or exagerrations perhaps, but it would have been easy for Airbus to stop them , as some of their staff were on the AF447 thread on this peraticular forum at the time , all defending Airbus , but they did not on this occasion . More I do not know. .

[paulross]

It was public : there was an article in the Liberation newspaper in France in 2020 mentioning those flights , it said one apparently even went to Guyane to recreate the tropical conditions . The "interesting one " is supposed to have occured near Mt De Marsan in France in the Airbus test area . and was seen on radar by Civil ATC and mentioned on an ATC forum. . Then a serie of posts /rumors on a French Aviation forum ( Radiocockpit, now closed) mentionned this flight, one arguing they were close to evacuate ( this test A340 has an in-fligh evacuatuion door ) Rumors or exagerrations perhaps, but it would have been easy for Airbus to stop them , as some of their staff were on the AF447 thread on this peraticular forum at the time , all defending Airbus , but they did not on this occasion . More I do not know. .

SLF non-aviation engineer here. I'm curious, how relevant would the behaviour of an A-340 be to the accident flight that was with an A-330? I know the FBW and cockpit is the same between the two types, but the actual aircraft aerodynamics and behaviour, is that 'similar enough'? Or is it just that Airbus did not have an A-330 with and evacuation system and thought that they could learn something useful from the A-340?

[punkalouver]

It was public : there was an article in the Liberation newspaper in France in 2020 mentioning those flights , it said one apparently even went to Guyane to recreate the tropical conditions . The "interesting one " is supposed to have occured near Mt De Marsan in France in the Airbus test area . and was seen on radar by Civil ATC and mentioned on an ATC forum. . Then a serie of posts /rumors on a French Aviation forum ( Radiocockpit, now closed) mentionned this flight, one arguing they were close to evacuate ( this test A340 has an in-fligh evacuatuion door ) Rumors or exagerrations perhaps, but it would have been easy for Airbus to stop them , as some of their staff were on the AF447 thread on this peraticular forum at the time , all defending Airbus , but they did not on this occasion . More I do not know. .

It would be interesting to find out if Airbus removed protections for stalls on those flights and then intentionally entered one. If so, I wonder if there are any people or structures in their test area. Might be wiser to do any intentional stalls, or at least prolonged ones over water.

[fdr]

Pilot error after a simple tech failure, this has been done to death.

What is far more interesting is why two supposedly competent pilots were unable to recognise that 10 degrees nose up and 10000ft per min descent rate is a stall. The Captain realised as soon as he entered the flight deck but by then there was insufficient height to recover, hence his comment “we’re dead”.

If only they’d initiated the airspeed unreliable checklist, or performed an FNC or simply set 2.5 degrees pitch and 90% N1.

Ultimately pilots don’t make mistakes on purpose which begs questions of their training and attitude.

LD


letting go the controls would have saved their lives... It works far more often than not, planes generally want to fly unless the trim has been compromised by thrust/THS mismatching (Perpignan) or by cg shift (National) or by loss of a primary flight control UAL232 etc. There are very few aircraft that releasing the controls and power to idle will not stop gyrations.

[fdr]

SLF non-aviation engineer here. I'm curious, how relevant would the behaviour of an A-340 be to the accident flight that was with an A-330? I know the FBW and cockpit is the same between the two types, but the actual aircraft aerodynamics and behaviour, is that 'similar enough'? Or is it just that Airbus did not have an A-330 with and evacuation system and thought that they could learn something useful from the A-340?

very similar. the event wasn't related to a thrust couple/THS mismatch, this was purely a transient instrumentation and degradation of control laws that should have been a yawn, but the response was random in the face of utter SA loss. Loss of ADC data is not unheard of event, and yet crews get started sideways with it quite rapidly. An Airbus FBW is actually an elegant system, it is really nice when working, crosswinds are still a bit awkward, but the bit that makes them nicer when working normally results in guys n girls often having issues when degraded control laws apply, the main thing being the missing dog to bite the pilot if they don't remember to use manual trim. The addition of the U bit to the C* law keeps the pilot in contact with the trim condition of the plane... (MCAS excepted, a plane with limited SAS functionality, and "FBW" being braided steel cables mainly) A330 and A340 are common architecture, there is negligible change, and aerodynamically, an AF447 type input on the 340 would have resulted in an AF 447 splash in an A340 too. Come to think of it, holding full back stick in a B727 will end up the same way, it did many years ago.

I cannot recall any aircraft that will allow a full backstick input without relief, that won't result in a headline, well, maybe the Ercoup, that had some curious limitations of control authorities.

[fdr]

AF447. Yeah that one. My memory actually is getting better with age. To wit: I recall from early thread, either TechLog or Rumours, that the Vertical Stabilizer/Rudder was found somewhat separated and distant from the impact with the sea. There was discussion linking the loss of HF Comms with loss of VS which contained HF antenna. It was reported that the HF antenna was elsewhere on the fuselage, so that theory was sunk. Researching the possible re-engining of the 747 into a twin, I found A330 architecture, and lo! HF antenna is located in the leading edge of the A330 Vertical Stabilizer.... for whatever that might mean. I was never satisfied that PF pulled on the stick start to finish. Occam would say he had a reason, perhaps in concert with loss of all directional control..... just sayin'

Not sure I'd agree with you there sparky... if the THS had departed the scene, the next thing that happens is a very rapid nose down pitch rate develops, usually fast enough to achieve negative g loads that result in failure of the main wings in downward bending overload. Even from a stalled condition, that pitch rate would result in accelerated speed rapidly ending up with wing structural failure before an impact, following your assumption that the tail was far enough away that it separated airborne, which means a substantial height. From a stall condition, where there is no load issue that is going to break tail that has more than chewing gum holding it together, I would expect.... above 8000' AMSL, a loss of the tail will take the wings off before water entry. With a low speed, impact, separation of the tail is not unusual, and the area around the stab connection is robust, I would think it makes a darn fine sea sled at that point. The FDR showed no evidence of a change in the structure or aerodynamics or response of the aircraft to control positions. There was nothing wrong with the plane until it "alighted upon the water" , once the pitot heads had cured themselves.

That AF 447 was the 5th UAS case for AF and F-Troop wasn't on top of the game is disappointing. A lot of dead people and grieving families arising from a company that should have been on top of their game. France has a long history of competency in aviation, mon dieu!, they have M. Marcel Dassault, the designer of beautiful aircraft, he must have Italian blood there somewhere, (the Falcon 10, 20 & 50 are beautiful to fly, so was the MIrage), and yet, AF has parked B747s in Papeete, New Delhi, A340s in Toronto, and sundry other planes in untidy piles. dive their cars, fly their planes love their food and lifestyle, but what happens in front of the flight deck door?

[Concours77]

"Not sure I'd agree with you there sparky... if the THS had departed the scene, the next thing that happens is a very rapid nose down pitch rate develops, usually fast enough to achieve negative g loads that result in failure of the main wings in downward bending overload." ???? Where had it been suggested by anyone that the THS had separated the aircraft? That is bizarre...Separation of Vertical Stabiliser/Rudder, as in JAL Mt Fuji, or AA 587, or UAL232...yes..... Once Stalled and in an extreme "mush" (nose up, high angle of attack) aft stick may have been a temporary solution to total loss of control... one doesn't want to entertain that a pilot would see a high descent rate and pull, if it was established in a Stall, and he knew it. Bear in mind that the Airbus does not necessarily drop its nose on Stall entry.Shake, yes, but it was designed to be longitudinally stable. If the Stall was entered, and became established in a reasonably stable mush, that would explain how they missed Stall entry...​​​​​​​Fact is, the mushed Stall regime might have been the purposeful work of the A340 test ship. The test crew, finding themselves in 447's established descent profile, could not get the Nose Down, and recovered only after accepting a very unknown and bizarre attitude and out of control platform... ​​​​​​​and they knew what to expect... ​​​​​​​With respect, Will ​​​​​​​

[megan]

how relevant would the behaviour of an A-340 be to the accident flight that was with an A-330The only difference is the number of engines paul, airframes identical.

[Bidule]

It was public : there was an article in the Liberation newspaper in France in 2020 mentioning those flights , it said one apparently even went to Guyane to recreate the tropical conditions . The "interesting one " is supposed to have occured near Mt De Marsan in France in the Airbus test area . and was seen on radar by Civil ATC and mentioned on an ATC forum. . Then a serie of posts /rumors on a French Aviation forum ( Radiocockpit, now closed) mentionned this flight, one arguing they were close to evacuate ( this test A340 has an in-fligh evacuatuion door ) Rumors or exagerrations perhaps, but it would have been easy for Airbus to stop them , as some of their staff were on the AF447 thread on this peraticular forum at the time , all defending Airbus , but they did not on this occasion . More I do not know. .

To start with, I am not working for Airbus and have no relationship with them.
If you refer to the original Radiocockpit (rcoco), it has never been known as a reliable source of information, and it was closed much before 2020 (I would say about 2006-2007). The next Radiocockpit (radiocockpit.fr I think) was closed in about 2014.

"Seen on radar by Civil ATC" and what? Was the Civil ATC then aware of the nature of the test flight? Seeing a deep descent and a low altitude recovery - it it was that - on a radar does not mean that it was the "replay" of AF447. It could have been any other test that Airbus needed to carry out.

I appreciate that we are on a Rumours site but some facts may be checked a bit time to time.

By the way, were these flights known by the AF447 families and referred to during the various legal/court sessions?

.

[ATC Watcher]

"Seen on radar by Civil ATC" and what? Was the Civil ATC then aware of the nature of the test flight? Seeing a deep descent and a low altitude recovery - it it was that - on a radar does not mean that it was the "replay" of AF447. It could have been any other test that Airbus needed to carry out..
Indeed, good point , however normal daily Airbus test flighs do not do this . Anyway .I do not remember the exact points made at the time , that was 12 years ago but there were a few reports of that fight in the discussion . Pity the site closed not to be able to check the archives..
By the way, were these flights known by the AF447 families and referred to during the various legal/court sessions?
I have no idea ,maybe they were, I have not been following the day to day proceedings of the trial . However one has to remember that this was in 2010 before the hull was found and CVR/FDR were recovered . so I can guess the results of these flights did not deliver any additional useful technical info anymore after the FDR/CVR were read . I would nevertheless like to see the report of that flight. .

[netstruggler]

Indeed, good point , however normal daily Airbus test flighs do not do this . Anyway .I do not remember the exact points made at the time , that was 12 years ago but there were a few reports of that fight in the discussion . Pity the site closed not to be able to check the archives..

I have no idea ,maybe they were, I have not been following the day to day proceedings of the trial . However one has to remember that this was in 2020 before the hull was found and CVR/FDR were recovered . so I can guess the results of these flights did not deliver any additional useful technical info anymore after the FDR/CVR were read . I would nevertheless like to see the report of that flight. .

The hull and CVR/FDR were found in 2011.

[ATC Watcher]

The hull and CVR/FDR were found in 2011.
indeed , typo, 2010 was meant not 2020, correctred now.

[GarageYears]

To start with, I am not working for Airbus and have no relationship with them.
If you refer to the original Radiocockpit (rcoco), it has never been known as a reliable source of information, and it was closed much before 2020 (I would say about 2006-2007). The next Radiocockpit (radiocockpit.fr I think) was closed in about 2014.

"Seen on radar by Civil ATC" and what? Was the Civil ATC then aware of the nature of the test flight? Seeing a deep descent and a low altitude recovery - it it was that - on a radar does not mean that it was the "replay" of AF447. It could have been any other test that Airbus needed to carry out.

I appreciate that we are on a Rumours site but some facts may be checked a bit time to time.

By the way, were these flights known by the AF447 families and referred to during the various legal/court sessions?

.

It's the internet - nothing ever 'goes away': https://web.archive.org/web/20230000000000*/radiocockpit.fr

Simply type in "waybackmachine" in your search and then the URL of the site you want and you will see a series of dates when the site was crawled and can explore the ENTIRE content as snapped on that day.

- GY

[Concours77]

"The FDR showed no evidence of a change in the structure or aerodynamics or response of the aircraft to control positions."

Check the Rudder traces, and re-read CVR. Especially make note of Hdg, altitude, power and control positions at the moment Autopilot quit....review "jet upset"... add in the "zoom climb"; would be interested in your remarks...

[Lake1952]

One bit of automation logic that might have helped further doom this already confused and disoriented crew was the fact that the stall warnings cut out below a certain IAS, say 80 kts (I forget the exact speed). So here they were with almost no airspeed which silenced the stall warnings, and when one of the pilots correctly lowered the nose causing the IAS to climb above the cutoff value, the stall warning indicators all started their warnings again. This led the crew to believe that their corrective action was causing the stall, and they promptly reversed their action which silenced the warnings. It is entirely possible that had the stall warnings not ceased to warn below that certain airspeed, they would have recognized their situation sooner. And the proper corrective action causing the warnings to reactivate simply confused the situation further.

[Concours77]

One bit of automation logic that might have helped further doom this already confused and disoriented crew was the fact that the stall warnings cut out below a certain IAS, say 80 kts (I forget the exact speed). So here they were with almost no airspeed which silenced the stall warnings, and when one of the pilots correctly lowered the nose causing the IAS to climb above the cutoff value, the stall warning indicators all started their warnings again. This led the crew to believe that their corrective action was causing the stall, and they promptly reversed their action which silenced the warnings. It is entirely possible that had the stall warnings not ceased to warn below that certain airspeed, they would have recognized their situation sooner. And the proper corrective action causing the warnings to reactivate simply confused the situation further. I think the "cutoff" value was "60 knots", Incorporated so the StallWarn would not activate on the ground. It was determined, at least on thread, that a better trigger would be "weight on wheels", "WOW". Which makes more sense. Stall is not a function of airspeed. Stall is a result of exceeding a critical Angle of Attack. To WIt: 447's velocity through the air at impact was approximately 240 knots... Was she Stalled? ...... Boy Howdy

[ATC Watcher]

It's the internet - nothing ever 'goes away': https://web.archive.org/web/20230000000000*/radiocockpit.fr

Simply type in "waybackmachine" in your search and then the URL of the site you want and you will see a series of dates when the site was crawled and can explore the ENTIRE content as snapped on that day.

- GY
Thanks Garageyears, did not know this feature. indeed nothing seem forgotten on internet , better memory than my wife ! But it is the original Forum thaf followed radiococo that would need to be recovered, not this one which started in 2014 and which was basically junk news.. I will try to find it when I have time .

[pilotmike]

To WIt: 447's velocity through the air at impact was approximately 240 knots.
From known, verifiable sources: ​​​​​The aircraft struck the ocean belly-first at a speed of 152 knots (282 km/h; 175 mph), comprising vertical and horizontal components of 108 knots (200 km/h; 124 mph) and 107 knots (198 km/h; 123 mph), respectively. ​​

[Check Airman]

What is far more interesting is why two supposedly competent pilots were unable to recognise that 10 degrees nose up and 10000ft per min descent rate is a stall. The Captain realised as soon as he entered the flight deck but by then there was insufficient height to recover, hence his comment “we’re dead”.

LD

The PM knew how to recover from the stall. The PF didn’t know, or didn’t recognise it.

The PM was unaware that the PF had been pulling back. HUGE DESIGN FLAW. The PF only stated that after the CA entered the cockpit. In the heat of the moment, I’ll forgive the PM for not asking the bleeding obvious “by any chance are you pulling back on the stick?”

In some jobs, you can’t have bad apples.

https://youtube.com/shorts/EwuUrIL0gn4

[Concours77]

What was the condition of the A/C when AP quit? 1. Descending 2. 300' Low 3. Rolling Right (15 degrees)? 4. Heading off by 10 degrees (Right) MASTER CAUTION. AUTOPILOTOFF STALL(cricket)STALL(cricket)STALL etc . (From memory...check me mike) ​​​​​​​RHS corrected, right....? ​​​​​​​Stall recovery training....sufficient?​​​​​​​
​​​​​​​

[Concours77]

From known, verifiable sources:

Do you know the difference between speed, and velocity?

[MechEngr]

I know this one - speed is a scalar measurement, velocity is a vector measurement requiring both speed and direction. A vector may be divided or described by components, which are also vectors.

However, one might express only the scalar part, the speed, of a vector sum. So a forward velocity and a vertical velocity can be combined but only the resulting speed reported.

[Concours77]

I know this one - speed is a scalar measurement, velocity is a vector measurement requiring both speed and direction. A vector may be divided or described by components, which are also vectors. Which one hurts the most when we hit? I'll fly in the horizontal part of the aircraft thank you...

[tdracer]

Do you know the difference between speed, and velocity?
What in the world is your point? They hit the water at a speed of 152 knots - of which the horizontal component was 108 knots and the vertical component 107 knots (NOT ~240 knots as you earlier claimed). Horizontal or vertical doesn't make much difference - they'll both kill you with a sudden stop...

I think the "cutoff" value was "60 knots", Incorporated so the StallWarn would not activate on the ground. It was determined, at least on thread, that a better trigger would be "weight on wheels", "WOW". Which makes more sense. Stall is not a function of airspeed. Stall is a result of exceeding a critical Angle of Attack. To WIt: 447's velocity through the air at impact was approximately 240 knots... Was she Stalled? ...... Boy Howdy
AOA was invalidated below 60 knots because it takes a minimum airspeed for the AOA vane to provide a meaningful measurement. This is a common engineering practice - below whatever speed is judged as a minimum for a reliable measurement, the output is labeled "NCD" or "No Computed Data". Similar limitations are on airspeed (typically 30 knots) and Mach (typically 0.10 Mach). Adding "On-Ground" to the AOA validity is a complication and has failure mode implications (and WOW isn't the most reliable indication in the world). As a designer, I doubt it would have ever occurred to me that an otherwise airworthy, flyable aircraft would ever get down to an indicated airspeed of 60 knots in-flight and that was a condition I needed to design for.
ure, in 20-20 hindsight perhaps that would have helped the PF to figure out he was doing something really stupid, but the bottom line was that he was not a competent pilot or he would not have kept pulling back from 30+ thousand feet until they hit the water. Had he sat on his hands instead of panicking and pulling full back, the aircraft would have been just fine.

[Concours77]

What in the world is your point? They hit the water at a speed of 152 knots - of which the horizontal component was 108 knots and the vertical component 107 knots (NOT ~240 knots as you earlier claimed). Horizontal or vertical doesn't make much difference - they'll both kill you with a sudden stop... AOA was invalidated below 60 knots because it takes a minimum airspeed for the AOA vane to provide a meaningful measurement. This is a common engineering practice - below whatever speed is judged as a minimum for a reliable measurement, the output is labeled "NCD" or "No Computed Data". Similar limitations are on airspeed (typically 30 knots) and Mach (typically 0.10 Mach). Adding "On-Ground" to the AOA validity is a complication and has failure mode implications (and WOW isn't the most reliable indication in the world). As a designer, I doubt it would have ever occurred to me that an otherwise airworthy, flyable aircraft would ever get down to an indicated airspeed of 60 knots in-flight and that was a condition I needed to design for.ure, in 20-20 hindsight perhaps that would have helped the PF to figure out he was doing something really stupid, but the bottom line was that he was not a competent pilot or he would not have kept pulling back from 30+ thousand feet until they hit the water. Had he sat on his hands instead of panicking and pulling full back, the aircraft would have been just fine. ​​​​​​​I think I made somewhat the same point as you just did, or at least it was my intent.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​As a designer, would you have placed either stick to be out of sight of the other pilot...? Hard to believe you would.... ​​​​​​​In fact, are they? Very, very difficult to believe both Captain and PM would not have at least sneaked a peek. ​​​​​​​Thanks

[Check Airman]

Very, very difficult to believe both Captain and PM would not have at least sneaked a peek. ​​​​​​​Thanks

Sneaking a peak is not something that would occur to the PM. Why would he? I’ve had weird things happen, and I’ve never thought to look at the sidestick.

Furthermore, depending on the lighting setup, the PM may not have been able to see the other sidestick, even if he tried to look over.

If the 330 is similar to the 320, the CA (from the Jumpseat) would not have been able to see the sidestick either.

Design flaw?

Lastly, one can hardly blame Airbus for making 60kt the stall warning cutoff. How could someone foresee a situation where an airplane of that size would be in the air at that speed? I’m willing to bet that that feat has not been replicated.

[MechEngr]

Which one hurts the most when we hit? I'll fly in the horizontal part of the aircraft thank you...

Why are there goats in the clouds? (Far Side reference from Gary Larson.)

https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/54b52dbde4b09c18186752fd/1556289591508-EQARS4C1NP2J02AZWBEF/Farside.jpg

[MechEngr]

...

Design flaw?

Lastly, one can hardly blame Airbus for making 60kt the stall warning cutoff. How could someone foresee a situation where an airplane of that size would be in the air at that speed? I’m willing to bet that that feat has not been replicated.

The flaw I can see is that in a fully automated plane the secondary mode for primary sensor failure should be secondary instruments, which the pilots are supposed to rely on already - a pitch and power schedule. If they are good enough in a black-out instrument only flight for the pilots why would they not be sufficient for the automation? Add in some monitoring of the altitude to close the loop on power and it should do better than the pilots can.

Certainly at some point the ice melted to give reasonable airspeed values and then the descent rate can be combined with it to give an approximate AoA to validate against the AoA sensors; was there some reason Airbus chose not to do this? Instead of WoW perhaps a non-zero descent rate could be the way to validate the AoA?

[Concours77]

Sneaking a peak is not something that would occur to the PM. Why would he? I’ve had weird things happen, and I’ve never thought to look at the sidestick. Furthermore, depending on the lighting setup, the PM may not have been able to see the other sidestick, even if he tried to look over. If the 330 is similar to the 320, the CA (from the Jumpseat) would not have been able to see the sidestick either. Design flaw? Lastly, one can hardly blame Airbus for making 60kt the stall warning cutoff. How could someone foresee a situation where an airplane of that size would be in the air at that speed? I’m willing to bet that that feat has not been replicated. The AoA is the instrument responsible for StallWarn, right? Wouldn't the AoA vane have been pinned at way past critical, AlphaMax the entire descent, regardless IAS? This story about "StallWarn inop below 60 knots" sounds like a red herring....the rate of descent was astronomical...my point at Impact: linking airspeed to StallWarn, not AoA vane operation (except when both are legitimately affected with low velocity,......etc.... ) ???

thanks!

[Check Airman]

The AoA is the instrument responsible for StallWarn, right? Wouldn't the AoA vane have been pinned at way past critical, AlphaMax the entire descent, regardless IAS? This story about "StallWarn inop below 60 knots" sounds like a red herring....the rate of descent was astronomical...my point at Impact: linking airspeed to StallWarn, not AoA vane operation (except when both are legitimately affected with low velocity,......etc.... ) ???

thanks!

Standing by to be corrected if I’m wrong…

The AoA generates the stall warning, but there must be some lower limit below which it will be considered invalid, otherwise you could be sitting at the gate with the stall warning going off, for example.

The engineers made a decision to disregard the stall warning if the speed is below 60kt, which is well outside even the flight test envelope. I’m pretty confident that’s the only time an Airbus has been that slow without wheels on the pavement.

[Check Airman]

The flaw I can see is that in a fully automated plane the secondary mode for primary sensor failure should be secondary instruments, which the pilots are supposed to rely on already - a pitch and power schedule. If they are good enough in a black-out instrument only flight for the pilots why would they not be sufficient for the automation? Add in some monitoring of the altitude to close the loop on power and it should do better than the pilots can.

Certainly at some point the ice melted to give reasonable airspeed values and then the descent rate can be combined with it to give an approximate AoA to validate against the AoA sensors; was there some reason Airbus chose not to do this? Instead of WoW perhaps a non-zero descent rate could be the way to validate the AoA?

How would the automation know when the ice had melted though? You can only use automation to back up automation so far.

The design flaw I hinted at was that it’s practically impossible to know what the other pilot is doing until the airplane has responded. By the time the PM found out, their fate had already been sealed.

I haven’t reviewed the report recently, but if I recall, the PM recognised the stall and was the only one to apply forward pressure. By that point, they were below 60kt, and the stall warning sounded again. I’ll pardon him for being thoroughly confused at that point, as I’m sure most of us would be.

[PJ2]

Up to 447, momentary loss of airspeed data had occurred in thirty-one other A330 a/c, all of which landed uneventfully with a log-book entry made.

Nothing changes regarding actual a/c velocity with loss of ”indications” of velocity. If Bonin had done nothing, this almost certainly would have been just another logbook entry.

Revisiting the accident with a view to theorising or even just offering observations first requires the respectful familiarisation with the substantial public record here and elsewhere, all available data from the recorders and the entire range of BEA work accomplished.

PJ2

[Concours77]

Flying along, all seems fine. The pilots were perhaps a bit tense, they spent some time in ruminating about what was coming. Something didn't agree with the AP limits, so it tripped out. Did the pilots ever acknowledge the Law degrade? If so, PF seems to have forgotten what was different about it, loss of Alpha Prot, and that twitchy roll axis? From the endless pull on the stick, he had to have been locked into Normal Law, mentally....to the end. Normal Law permits a sloppy, mayonnaise stirring stick. A friend flew the A320 and loved it. He had thousands of hours in it and it was his favorite ac until he ended his career as Captain in the 777. In 2012, I asked him in all of his time in the bus, how many times it switched out of Normal Law....."not once". I then asked him if he could explain Alternate Law 2a.... "never heard of it"...hmmmm​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Boeingdriver999]

Am I the only person that is embarrassed by this thread? :rolleyes:

[fdr]

Am I the only person that is embarrassed by this thread? :rolleyes:

Nope.

[megan]

I then asked him if he could explain Alternate Law 2a.... "never heard of it"...hmmmmPlease educate us what Alternate Law 2a is.Originally Posted by Boeingdriver999 View Post (https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/651909-af447.html#post11408504)
Am I the only person that is embarrassed by this thread?I came for the comedy.

[captainsmiffy]

I’ve heard of 1a, 1b, 1c and 2…..

[PJ2]

Am I the only person that is embarrassed by this thread? :rolleyes:
Nope!

[pilotmike]

Do you know the difference between speed, and velocity?
Yes - perfectly, thank you.

You might have noticed that within the quote, the horizontal and vertical components were clearly quantified. Just as MechEngr patiently explained for you, just after you asked the question. So there you have it, at least 2 highly qualified professional Engineers (and probably many more) who clearly understand scalar speeds and vector velocities.

Now my question… Do you know anything useful at all? Or are you best to stop, shut up, and stop quipping, in your efforts to discredit everything that doesn't fit your pathetically narrow viewpoint? The more you bleat on, the less smart you're coming across.

[Concours77]

Sneaking a peak is not something that would occur to the PM. Why would he? I’ve had weird things happen, and I’ve never thought to look at the sidestick. Furthermore, depending on the lighting setup, the PM may not have been able to see the other sidestick, even if he tried to look over. If the 330 is similar to the 320, the CA (from the Jumpseat) would not have been able to see the sidestick either. Design flaw? Lastly, one can hardly blame Airbus for making 60kt the stall warning cutoff. How could someone foresee a situation where an airplane of that size would be in the air at that speed? I’m willing to bet that that feat has not been replicated. 60 knots? "Indicated"? Why? AoA is a primary (mechanical) Stall sensing instrument. The vanes could conceivably freeze, but if so, why not Direct Law? Why would AB rely solely on IAS in the middle of an UAS EVENT to generate the aural warning? AOA was always in the Stall, and is there "Unreliable AOA"? As above, MechEgr brings up an excellent question!! If Pitch/Power is enough for the flight crew to rely on, why would the aircraft "rely" on something different? Also I am looking at a pic of the A330 cockpit...the Stick is in line with the pilot's knees...I do not "see" a "stick invisibility" issue... ​​​​​​​great resp​​​​​​​ect, ​​​​​​​Concours ​​​​​​​

​​​​​​​ad. PF may have had his tray table out, there's that​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Concours77]

QuoteOriginally Posted by Pilot DAR "I have never flown a jet. I have trained many pilots who have moved back GA airplanes from having flown jets. The more I have done this training, the more I have learned to watch out for pilots who have unproven confidence in their piloting skills in types with much less performance than they are used to. Just because it's small, does not mean it flies like thebig/powerful/automated planes they were used to.


. I Started flying in 1971. In the Cessna 150. On the second lesson we did Stalls. The third, Spins, (which used to be a requirement for PPL).... The fourth, unrecovered Stall into a Spin. Instructor flew us to 7000 feet. Power on, pulled the yoke. Right at Stall, he kept pulling, then additional pull. Nose up, Stalled, Horn very loud. Yoke well back. Sinking quickly, shaking, extremely disconcerting. He then pushed the yoke forward. Then came the Spin. Debrief, I asked how long the a/c could be held in a Stall, Nose Up? "All the way down..Just cuz it's big, doesn't mean it won't behave like a little one?? Did 447 PF have the same instructor I did? Did he try putting the Nose Down to break the Stall, and was put off by the Aircraft wanting to Spin? He learned in gliders? Had he ever Stalled a 330? Doubts...​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​I think that may be why why he kept the a/c in mush... "But we have the engines. ..." Hoping those big motors would save the day?​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Vessbot]

Why would AB rely solely on IAS in the middle of an UAS EVENT to generate the aural warning?

The stall warning is not generated from airspeed, it's generated from AOA, just as you'd expect. It's inhibited by airspeed below 60.

[Concours77]

The stall warning is not generated from airspeed, it's generated from AOA, just as you'd expect. It's inhibited by airspeed below 60. ​That's my point... why would the StallWarn be inhibited by airspeed, whatever the value, when AOA was WORKING?

STEAL MY AOA, KILL US ALL

[Concours77]

So...PITCH AND POWER. WHY PITCH? When the AP quit, the Nose was low, so was the a/c... Wasn't there an OVERSPEED WARN?​​​​​​THE STALLWARN WAS SPURIOUS. Overspeed was legit. Correct both with NU?​​​​​​​Well, yes, but too much?. There was STALLWARN. Based on a disagreement among ADIRUS


​​​​​​​.Help me out here, Vessbot​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[fdr]

​That's my point... why would the StallWarn be inhibited by airspeed, whatever the value, when AOA was WORKING?

STEAL MY AOA, KILL US ALL


cuz when you are taxying it makes it difficult to hear your clearances....

[fdr]

So...PITCH AND POWER. WHY PITCH? When the AP quit, the Nose was low, so was the a/c... Wasn't there an OVERSPEED WARN?​​​​​​THE STALLWARN WAS SPURIOUS. Overspeed was legit. Correct both with NU?Well, yes, but too much?. There was STALLWARN. Based on a disagreement among ADIRUS


​​​​​​​.Help me out here, Vessbot​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​


the overspeed was.... "legit"???

which accident are you referring to? Is this an A330 with Thales Pitot static that iced up in extreme icing that defeated the thermal capability of the system and gave spurious KCAS? or some other event where the occupant of a plane held full back stick one his SSC till splashdown?

[Concours77]

the overspeed was.... "legit"??? which accident are you referring to? Is this an A330 with Thales Pitot static that iced up in extreme icing that defeated the thermal capability of the system and gave spurious KCAS? or some other event where the occupant of a plane held full back stick one his SSC till splashdown? From whence "overspeed"? Wasn't that a warning given the aircrew? I was not aware the static ports were plugged.... As for the STALLWARN, how was that generated? Can you allow for the pilot thinking the alert was authentic? Or was the warning actually: STALL CRICKET DISREGARD STALL CRICKET DISREGARD..... ​​​​​​​best regards fdr

[Concours77]

fdr... I have offered a possible reason why the PF "pulled continuously..." I trained that fifty years ago. In a C150. Instructor set up a stick back Stalled nose high mush. Pushing forward on the yoke created an immediate spin.... Was Bonin unwilling to push fully forward? Had he tried, and gotten an immediate spin entry? Which he RECOVERED with more NU? I think he KNEW the plane was Stalled, but ND was terrifying.... On the DFDR I would be looking for a forward transit of RHS stick, followed by a ROLL/YAW Couple... Thanks, much respect​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Vessbot]

fdr... I have offered a possible reason why the PF "pulled continuously..." I trained that fifty years ago. In a C150. Instructor set up a stick back Stalled nose high mush. Pushing forward on the yoke created an immediate spin.... Was Bonin unwilling to push fully forward? Had he tried, and gotten an immediate spin entry? Which he RECOVERED with more NU? I think he KNEW the plane was Stalled, but ND was terrifying.... On the DFDR I would be looking for a forward transit of RHS stick, followed by a ROLL/YAW Couple... Thanks, much respect​​​​​​​

​​​​​​​No, none of this happened

[Concours77]

No, none of this happened Has there been a Simulation of the five minutes? Programmed directly from the DFDR?

[Check Airman]

Has there been a Simulation of the five minutes? Programmed directly from the DFDR?

https://youtu.be/n-hbWO0gL6g

[MENELAUS]

You’re patently out of your depth. The only similarity to your Cessna experience is that both aircraft stalled. The crew had erroneous information. And failed to revert to basics to recover. Repeatedly. Until the situation was irrecoverable, which, the Captain eventually realized but was in no position to do anything about it. Either through a lack of training, or command gradient hence inadequate CRM, and a design shortfall. To add to the confusion the stall warning kept disappearing and reappearing as they burbled in and out of stall with half arsed recoveries and in addition Les Wombles at AIB didn’t think anyone would achieve those sort of speeds over a prolonged period and removed the nuisance component of the warning. To further compound the issue the weather was appalling and entirely conducive to this sort of icing. The upshot was redevelopment of the ADC’s/ air data heating and repeated exposure for all pilots, be it Team A or Team B, to these sort of UAS events in the simulator. And a review of the inherent culture at the company concerned.

[vilas]

The pilots in front when the speed disappeared and AP tripped had no proper understanding of alternate law and of course no clue to unreliable speed procedure. In alternate2 law flight path is maintained. Only wings level were required to be ensured. When you are caught in a situation to which you have no clue then the fear factor can come in and then action taken have no logic or rationale. Pilot was thinking of climbing all the time before it happened so that was in his subconscious and unreliable airspeed after takeoff has TOGA 15. So the bizarre actions appear to be combination of the two. Stall warning comes from AoA not speed but AoA probe is an aerofoil which requires certain dynamic pressure to stay afloat to measure and below certain speed 60kts in this case it may have just flopped was unable to register anything and was taken as non computed Data and rejected for stall warning. It may not have been designed so but it may be functional reality of the system. Has the crew just held the status quo for a minute the accident wouldn't have happened because the speed came back but by then they had put the aircraft in a region where not even test pilots go.
Anyway it's too late to discuss unreliable speed as Airbus now has mathematically calculated airspeed which they call it digital back up speed. This doesn't require any anemometric input. This supervises the ADR calculations and in case of all ADRs going rogues their speed indications are replaced by the Digital Backup Speed. A350 does it automatically A320 does it through ECAM actions.

[punkalouver]

When you are caught in a situation to which you have no clue then the fear factor can come in and then action taken have no logic or rationale.

This can be an important yet little discussed factor. The factor where irrational fear takes over and the instinctive overrides the rational. One poster on another forum described it as your lizard-brain.

Does anybody reading this have a strong phobia? It can make one do irrational things. It can be overwhelmingly powerful yet rarely encountered. Example: person with a strong phobia of snakes is walking down the sidewalk of a busy street and suddenly has a close encounter with a snake. They suddenly turn and run and are hit by a car while darting toward what must be a safer place……… the street. People wonder why would anybody run in that direction. Because the lizard brain took over completely and logic disappeared. There was an overwhelming desire to suddenly be anywhere but near the snake. If you don’t have a phobia like this, you may not be able to understand the feeling one gets from it.

A dash-8 pilot flying into Buffalo encounters an artificial stall warning well above the stall speed because of a misconfigured stall warning system. He is on final approach and relatively close to the ground. Inexplicably, he pulls the control column full aft and holds it there until an actual stall occurs. Why would someone ever have such a reaction? It doesn’t make sense. But perhaps the lizard brain has taken over and it doesn’t want to hit the ground by lowering the nose. These sorts of reactions vary.

While the bad reaction of the dash-8 pilot may not be due to a specific phobia, I suspect that it originates from the same of the instinctive survival area of the brain. Phobia reactions can vary from overwhelming fear(snake encounter) to just extreme nervousness(speaking in front of a crowd). The first one is the brain in a life or death situation

Many of us are not fully aware of how we will react under various surprise scenarios. Sudden surprise encounter may be the the important factor.

As for one possible remedy for what happened on AF447 due to it being an Airbus……always be ready to use that takeover button. During takeoff may be a good example. One would think that the pilot not flying, especially when it is the captain, would have their thumb resting on that button as they may only be a very brief time to react…..and that may not be the best time to depend on the summing of side stick inputs.

Of course, the downside of that theory is that the person having the irrational reaction could press the takeover button. But they are acting irrationally, so they will probably forget to do so.

[vilas]

​He said: “**** Airbus man. This is the kinda **** we don’t like about it. You know, there’s so many computers we don’t, we don’t know what it ******* does sometimes.”​​​​​​
This is phobia. Experienced American Airlines A321 captain's words after takeoff. Airbus doesn't do anything like that. During takeoff from Newyork for 14 to 17kts crosswind suddenly kicks left rudder from 8° to 25 degree causing more than 30° bank and hits runway marking board during rotation which permanently bent the wing leading to a write off. They almost lost control could have crashed. It's simply ridiculous.

[Concours77]

vilas... " Anyway it's too late to discuss unreliable speed as Airbus now has mathematically calculated airspeed which they call it digital back up speed. This doesn't require any anemometric input. This supervises the ADR calculations and in case of all ADRs going rogues their speed indications are replaced by the Digital Backup Speed. A350 does it automatically A320 does it through ECAM actions. ​​​​" ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ Is that BUSS? Back Up Speed Scale? An option on A330, which Air France took a pass on?​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​Still goes to ALT LAW 2 B ??​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ Begs the question, should duff IAS have trIggered a change to ALT LAW ? Much ado about a condition that needs merely Pitch and Power? ALSO, AoA is the critical instrument? Where was the AoA instrument? Right, not equipped with one...​​​​​​​How much money did Air France save on F-GCZP....?​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
​​​​​​​

[vilas]

" Anyway it's too late to discuss unreliable speed as Airbus now has mathematically calculated airspeed which they call it digital back up speed. This doesn't require any anemometric input. This supervises the ADR calculations and in case of all ADRs going rogues their speed indications are replaced by the Digital Backup Speed. A350 does it automatically A320 does it through ECAM actions. ​​​​"​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​

Is that BUSS? Back up Speed Scale? An option on A330, which Air France took a pass on?​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
No! Backup speed scale is an older mod. It doesn't calculate speed just shows a green band like TCAS to fly based on AoA. That also came after 447 as a remedy. Digital back up speed is actual speed displayed on speed tape that pilot flies. It is calculated by injecting weight, load factor and AoA in lift equation. It has different indication for pilot to know it's calculated speed.
​​​​​​​

[Concours77]

No! Backup speed scale is an older mod. It doesn't calculate speed just shows a green band like TCAS to fly based on AoA. That also came after 447 as a remedy. Digital back up speed is actual speed displayed on speed tape that pilot flies. It is calculated by injecting weight, load factor and AoA in lift equation. It has different indication for pilot to know it's calculated speed. Long time coming. Is anomometric the new back up?​​​​​ So. Flight into known icing with triple redundant pitot probes known to be susceptible to packing up in an Aircraft that would likely startle our flight crew is not criminal? (Rhetorical)..... thanks vilas, much respect​​​​​​​

[Concours77]

punkalouver "Many of us are not fully aware of how we will react under various surprise scenarios. Sudden surprise encounter may be the the important factor."

Holy. S. ​(Sacre. M.)​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Concours77]

punkalouver..."A dash-8 pilot flying into Buffalo encounters an artificial stall warning well above the stall speed because of a misconfigured stall warning system."

The Stall Bug had been set for Anti Ice. FO switched off Anti ICE, but neglected to move the Stall Bug associated with the system.Captain had assumed the higher Stall trigger was now set for an actual Stall... Still, why did he pull? He didn't. At least not right away. ColganAir SOP for low level STALLWARN was "Minimize Altitude Loss, Full Power". Which, oddly enough, was Air France's also. Cannot push, and minimize altitude loss... As I recall

[Boeingdriver999]

He pulled instantly and kept 50-100% back pressure on column until he killed everyone 27 seconds later. And the FO put the flaps up unprompted.

You know nothing about what you’re talking about and are an excellent troll.

Here is the digitised FDR/CVR video produced by the NTSB which demonstrates your total ignorance.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=lxywEE1kK6I&t=4s

[megan]

You know nothing about what you’re talking about and are an excellent trollHe has a long, long history in that regard.

[vilas]

vilas... " Anyway it's too late to discuss unreliable speed as Airbus now has mathematically calculated airspeed which they call it digital back up speed. This doesn't require any anemometric input. This supervises the ADR calculations and in case of all ADRs going rogues their speed indications are replaced by the Digital Backup Speed. A350 does it automatically A320 does it through ECAM actions. ​​​​" Is that BUSS? Back Up Speed Scale? An option on A330, which Air France took a pass on?​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​Still goes to ALT LAW 2 B ??​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ Begs the question, should duff IAS have trIggered a change to ALT LAW ? Much ado about a condition that needs merely Pitch and Power? ALSO, AoA is the critical instrument? Where was the AoA instrument? Right, not equipped with one...​​​​​​​How much money did Air France save on F-GCZP....?​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
​​​​​​​
​​​​​​​What Air france delayed installing was not the BUSS because it was simply not deviced yet. Actually BUSS was thought of because of AF447. To my knowledge the pitot static equipment which was installed on AF was prone to icing and a better euipment became available which they delayed installing. Stall warning comes fro purely AoA speed has nothing to do with it. But the low speed stability in alternate law which pitches the nose down comes from speed. When speed is not available control laws change to alternate2 which looses the pitch down capability but stall warning remains available since it comes from AoA.

​​​​​​​

[VH-MLE]

I came across the YouTube video below from a PPRune forum a couple of years ago. The video does a great analysis of startle factor & how we, as humans, are wired. It is well worth the 30 minutes of viewing time in my opinion.

https://youtu.be/BBpqvPujZgM

Cheers

VH-MLE

[MechEngr]

​​​​​​​What Air france delayed installing was not the BUSS because it was simply not deviced yet. Actually BUSS was thought of because of AF447. To my knowledge the pitot static equipment which was installed on AF was prone to icing and a better euipment became available which they delayed installing. Stall warning comes fro purely AoA speed has nothing to do with it. But the low speed stability in alternate law which pitches the nose down comes from speed. When speed is not available control laws change to alternate2 which looses the pitch down capability but stall warning remains available since it comes from AoA.

​​​​​​​
If the stall warning was purely from the AoA sensor, why did the warning cut out without a large attitude change in the aircraft?

[Locked door]

Because the stall warning is inhibited below 80 knots (IIRC) indicated as no one would ever try to fly that slow. That prevents nuisance warnings on the ground when the aoa vane droops due to low/zero airflow.

The only time the back stick was released the speed increased above the inhibition threshold causing the stall warning to restart. The PF’s response was to pull full back stick again which slowed the aircraft back below the threshold causing the stall warning to stop again.

[vilas]

If the stall warning was purely from the AoA sensor, why did the warning cut out without a large attitude change in the aircraft?
Triggering of stall warning is from AoA. But below 60kts the system takes it as non computed data and rejects the input to stop the warning.

[Concours77]

Triggering of stall warning is from AoA. But below 60kts the system takes it as non computed data and rejects the input to stop the warning. I guess my question becomes why would indicated airspeed have any effect on STALLWARN.​​​ Was AF447 having AoA sensing issues as well? Much has been made of the change in flight law, seems a serious outcome to have for the cockpit to go sideways due to iced pitots? Roll Direct especially? In turb? ​​​​​​​sorry if this is a dumb question? ​​​​​​​thx vilas​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Locked door]

No. The aircraft had a temporary issue with the ASI’s that recovered quickly and to any competent pilot an ASI is a convenience item. You can easily fly without any speed indications.

The rest was pilot error. Huge errors.

[SQUAWKIDENT]

I came across the YouTube video below from a PPRune forum a couple of years ago. The video does a great analysis of startle factor & how we, as humans, are wired. It is well worth the 30 minutes of viewing time in my opinion.

https://youtu.be/BBpqvPujZgM

Cheers

VH-MLE

That is an excellent video. I've flown into Duxford many times as a PPL. Food for thought. Much to learn.

[Concours77]

No. The aircraft had a temporary issue with the ASI’s that recovered quickly and to any competent pilot an ASI is a convenience item. You can easily fly without any speed indications. The rest was pilot error. Huge errors. Agree... So I guess the next question is why did the AC computer invigorate the STALLWARN? And change (degrade) FlightLaw ? The computer reacted as it did due to malfunctions of a convenience instrument? "Seeking to understand is not seeking to exonerate..."

Thank you for your response....!​​​​​​​

[MechEngr]

The computer system is designed with the concept that only 1 subsystem will fail at a time. It determines this by comparing the outputs and using the output that at least 2 of 3 agree (within some tolerance) on. In the case of the ice accumulation, one pitot tube plugged - that left 2 in agreement. Then another pitot tube plugged leaving all 3 in disagreement as the stored pressure would have depleted at different rates due to the moisture bleed port.

That's what triggered the change in control law - the system had 3 different opinions on what the dynamic pressure reading was and there was no winner.

I think the stall came about because when the PIC was handed control he slightly pulled the sidestick back while trying to maintain roll orientation. At that altitude and airspeed the plane was close to stalling and the slight mishandling pushed it to give the warning - the pilot then did what would have been fine if the control law was "normal" and gave it full throttle (causing a hard pitch up) and pulled back, confident that the alpha protection would prevent the stall that was already occurring.

Once the altimeter started unwinding I expect that, even if it was noticed, it would take remembering "how an airplane flies" to convince the pilot to shove the nose down and increase the rate of descent in order to exit the stall and resume normal level flight. I think that at some point the pitot tubes cleared and if they had reset the flight computer it would have recovered hands off because enough valid data would be available. To do that would require knowing that the control law had changed - which the PIC did not appear to know.

[Concours77]

"I think the stall came about because when the PIC was handed control he slightly pulled the sidestick back while trying to maintain roll orientation. At that altitude and airspeed the plane was close to stalling and the slight mishandling pushed it to give the warning - the pilot then did what would have been fine if the control law was "normal" and gave it full throttle (causing a hard pitch up) and pulled back, confident that the alpha protection would prevent the stall that was already occurring."


Had the StallWarning been a result of temporary (close to) AOAcrit exceedance, he would have known the AC was in ALTLAW, right? He also would have known ROLLDIRECT was in charge of ailerons, right? The aircraft will NOT Stall in NORMAL LAW. Why would STALLWARN not be sufficient notice to pilots of a change in control action? If the STALLWARN Will sound in NORMAL LAW, would he not expect ALPHAPROT To control AoA?

Thanks for responding, food for thought.

[Locked door]

Relying on the protections to prevent a stall has never been an SOP. Flight control protections are the LAST LINE OF DEFENCE, they should never be used to solve a problem because if they fail you’re screwed. That’s why the Airbus stall recovery has ALWAYS been to reduce AOA and accelerate, never “just pull back and let the protections sort it”. It is not a reasonable course of action for an Airbus pilot to gently pull back and let normal law protect you from a stall. The aim is to always fly inside the envelope but have protections if you inadvertently reach the edge, never to go intentionally to the edge and rely on protections to look after you.

There has been an industry wide change in emphasis (all a/c types) in recent years where before a consideration was to minimise height loss whereas now the priority is to aggressively break the stall then recover, as the new emphasis actually results in less height loss.

[Concours77]

ahHAH.... "There has been an industry wide change in emphasis (all a/c types) in recent years where before a consideration was to minimise height loss whereas now the priority is to aggressively break the stall then recover, as the new emphasis actually results in less height loss." That makes perfect sense. If "Minimized height loss" was the goal, how to judge that? Especially when near the deck, even in the sim? Pucker ttime.This suggests to me that Approach to Stall on short final was done in Normal Law?? Wouldn't high altitude Stall Warning be "break the Stall? Many thanks, Locked door​​​​​​​

[Locked door]

Don’t misunderstand, the priority was always to reduce AOA and increase thrust to end the stall and fly away. Previously the guidance was to recover the descent as soon as flying speed was achieved whereas now the guidance is to delay the recovery until the aircraft is really moving as some pilots were trying to recover too early causing a secondary stall.

The priority is, and always was, get the nose down and get the thrust on. What the AF pilots did is inexplicable.

What flight control law the stall training was done in is irrelevant, as the recovery is done inside the flight control envelope unless it is mishandled, in which case the training would be done again until it was done right. I suspect most training is done in alternate law as you can’t fly a recovery until the first sign of a stall, and you can’t achieve the first sign of a stall in normal law.

[Concours77]

"The priority is, and always was, get the nose down and get the thrust on. What the AF pilots did is inexplicable." So what we're left with is, were AB aircraft in Normal Law when practicing Approach to Stall down low? Training is important here, I think, the possibility for startle/confusion is clear, at least to this non big rig pilot ...

And..."I suspect most training is done in alternate law as you can’t fly a recovery until the first sign of a stall, and you can’t achieve the first sign of a stall in normal law." So, clearly PF AF447 knew the STALLWARN was legit, and he had to know they were in some type of AlternateLaw....which also means he knew AoA was a load factor request, and Roll was in DIRECTLAW...​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Thanks for your patience Ld​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[tdracer]

And..."I suspect most training is done in alternate law as you can’t fly a recovery until the first sign of a stall, and you can’t achieve the first sign of a stall in normal law." So, clearly PF AF447 knew the STALLWARN was legit, and he had to know they were in some type of AlternateLaw....which also means he knew AoA was a load factor request, and Roll was in DIRECTLAW...​​​​​​​Thanks for your patience Ld​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Actually, I'm pretty much convinced that the PF did not know he was stalled - it's simply inconceivable to me that a trained pilot who thinks they are in a stall would continue to hold full back pressure for several minutes while the altimeter unwound to zero.
I suspect he heard the 'You can't stall' and in the heat of the moment either didn't recall the 'in Normal law' part - and/or he never comprehended they were not in Normal control law. Further, he either didn't hear the "Stall Stall", or didn't comprehend it.
To me, this is a danger in telling pilots that you can't stall an aircraft unless it is in fact physically impossible to stall it (there are a few aircraft designs where the basic design precludes being able to get it into stall - I think the 'Verieze' falls into the catagory) - because in a startle/panic situation they may not recall any provisos to the 'can't'.

[Check Airman]

Actually, I'm pretty much convinced that the PF did not know he was stalled - it's simply inconceivable to me that a trained pilot who thinks they are in a stall would continue to hold full back pressure for several minutes while the altimeter unwound to zero.
I suspect he heard the 'You can't stall' and in the heat of the moment either didn't recall the 'in Normal law' part - and/or he never comprehended they were not in Normal control law. Further, he either didn't hear the "Stall Stall", or didn't comprehend it.
To me, this is a danger in telling pilots that you can't stall an aircraft unless it is in fact physically impossible to stall it (there are a few aircraft designs where the basic design precludes being able to get it into stall - I think the 'Verieze' falls into the catagory) - because in a startle/panic situation they may not recall any provisos to the 'can't'.

Agreed. The PF suffered from a fatal combination of poor training and/or systems knowledge.

I also have a theory that he also suffered from automation dependency. He was just trying to keep the FD centered, because he’d never flown without them.

[Concours77]

Agreed. The PF suffered from a fatal combination of poor training and/or systems knowledge. I also have a theory that he also suffered from automation dependency. He was just trying to keep the FD centered, because he’d never flown without them. Aren't the Flight DIrectors "OFF", either automatically, or turned off as a checklist item in UAS? From the CVR. "I have no vario..." (VSI).​​​​​​​ So if he mistrusts vertical speed, his descent is not acknowledged until 4000 feet: "We better pull, we are at 4000..." ​​​​​​​Afraid I rely alot on what and how they talk on CVR....it is the only eyewitness account we have. For good or ill, it suggests they (all three) never understood the airplane..​​​​​​​ Except at the end of the recording...​​​​​​​Captain: "Pitch ten degrees...." Then impact...I have a theory why he said that. He was one of the first at the accident scene...it was a witness statement...​​​​​​​

[Vessbot]

The FD's disappeared with the data loss, and then reappeared at +6000 fpm. You betcha he was following the FD with soda-straw vision on the one item most burned-in as the main concept of flying the airplane

[Concours77]

The FD's disappeared with the data loss, and then reappeared at +6000 fpm. You betcha he was following the FD with soda-straw vision on the one item most burned-in as the main concept of flying the airplane

Fair enough...were they reliable? That's an important question.... who flies stick and rudder in an electric jet?

[vilas]

Ever since AF447 happened and till the final report came out and even well after that this subject has been beaten to death with over 30000 posts till it was closed. And we are starting afresh treading the same path again.

[john_tullamarine]

If it all gets too much of a repetition, we can lock it. However, let's leave it run for a little while to see if it dies a natural death first. If it gets onto generic matters there may be some training and/or learning value ?

[vilas]

The discussion cannot add much to technology that existed in AF447 because in the past thread it has been thoroughly analysed, questioned, even misquoted and subsequently corrected. What the pilots did and why did they do what they did also has been discussed. The process went on for years. So there was nothing left to learn. Now the only interest should be what has Airbus done to avoid repeat or improve the outcome. With the latest modification it's virtually impossible to repeat 447 because in A350 it deals with it automatically without any pilot intervention and provides alternate speed to fly. In other aircraft like A320/330 it's auto detected and pilot is provided with actions to switch to alternate speed. So UAS now only is an issue with unmodified aircraft or aircraft with older modification where pilot identification of the situation is necessary before using the modified display to fly.

[MENELAUS]

Amen to all the above; the 350 can even utilize the data being fed to the engines as additional back up. And GPS altitude. So, very clever in a Sorbonne kind of way and Airbus has moved on. Hopefully training organizations, airlines and pilots for that matter have as well by adopting regular exposure to UAS scenarios and unreliable airspeed. The 330 checklist for unreliable airspeed is very difficult to simulate, as by definition the very scenarios that you’re trying to emulate are nebulous and subject to change.
So it takes a very good instructor to run those sessions, understand them properly, teach at the same time and, demonstrate the procedures. Not just a question of activating the BUSS, although that does tend to be the final result. I can’t speak to the other Airbus types. And team B seemed easier overall.
At the end of the day it’s back to the old recall drills of pitch and thrust; in the old Jumbo it was 2 and a half, two and a half, and two and a half. 2.5 units of pitch, 2.5 units of thrust on the thrust resolver scale on the quadrant, 2.5 on the standby or other AI…. all derived from different sources. Will that maintain level flight at all points of the envelope ? No. Prob not. It will however prevent you pancaking an aircraft in to the sea. AIB have similar drills, dependent on stage of flight, take off, climb etc.
This thread should be laid to rest; some of the comments from the OP ( in particular about stall recovery procedures ) are frankly trollworthy and show us in a bad light.

[Check Airman]

Fair enough...were they reliable? That's an important question.... who flies stick and rudder in an electric jet?

Lots of people do. I think you should read the full accident report. You’ll find a lot of information there.

[Mr Optimistic]

Out of curiosity, did Airbus modify the stall warning logic, ie the 60kn lockout?

[alf5071h]

The dust has settled on this accident; time to look at the residual patterns in this and other complex events.

Consider the human; not stick and rudder skills. The crew were qualified pilots; more training for them implies more training for all qualified pilots. If not why not, why would we be different.

The indications are that in this incident and similar, the circumstances exceeded human capability at that time in that situation. It is difficult to change human limitations, so change conditions of work.

Modified pitot tubes. BUSS recognises the importance of speed in surprising, albeit temporary situations. New research on how to alleviate the limitations of 2 out of 3 logic if all three systems fail (EASA).



Designing for Situation Awareness in Complex System

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mica-Endsley/publication/238653506_Designing_for_situation_awareness_in_complex_syste m/links/542b1ada0cf29bbc126a7f35/Designing-for-situation-awareness-in-complex-system.pdf?origin=publication_detail

Note: "Expertise, therefore, can be seen to play a major role in the SA process. For novices or those dealing with novel situations, decision making in this environment will be an arduous task, requiring detailed mental calculations based on rules or heuristics, placing a heavy burden on working memory."

Expertise / novice relates to individual capability, not total flight time or which seat you sit in, it involves what is known (know what and know how), what can be recalled and related too in exceptional circumstances.


The Effectiveness of Airline Pilot Training for Abnormal Events

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0018720812466893

"… during a real flight, pilots’ responses frequently differed from accepted standards and showed greater variability."


An analysis of flight crew response to system failures

https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/7139377/an-analysis-of-flight-crew-response-to-system-nlr-atsi

"The results show that in 17% of the sample, crew response to system failures was inappropriate. The percentage of inappropriate flight crew response decreases from 25% for earlier generation aircraft to 4% for the newest generation.
The percentage of inappropriate response shows differences when various systems are compared, the lowest percentage of inappropriate responses occurs for flight control system malfunctions (8%), the highest percentage for instrument failures (48%). 11% of the investigated cases of inappropriate flight crew response involved wrong detection, 38% involved wrong diagnosis/decision and almost 51% involved wrong action.
Annunciators have a pronounced effect on the probability of failure detection.
Inherent cues play a relatively large role in decision failures. Inherent cues such as vibration, loud bangs etc., can be compelling, but are often not very conclusive or even misleading."

[Lake1952]

Out of curiosity, did Airbus modify the stall warning logic, ie the 60kn lockout?

They didn't need to get rid of the feature, just emphasize that it is there in the first place in case someone else tries to recover from a stall when they're already under 60 kts.

[gums]

Salute!

Thanks, JT, Td and vilas.

Many lessons to be honored with that tragic crash, and prolly more than crew coord, systems knowledge, side stick implementation, and such.

When I first read the CVR beside the FDR I cried... screamed at those guys. The first pics of the plane on the floor of the sea hit me as something from my past. I had been there ....... you know, you can not stall this plane, why am I going down so fast but the plane is not shaking or rolling a lot, and horns are going on and off.... Oh well....

I would invite those who wonder what some of us are talking about, then go to the closed thread and wade thru all the opinions, real world experiences and the technical stuff. Otherwise......

Gums sends....

[Concours77]

alf5071h , 29th Mar 2023 07:14"The dust has settled on this accident; time to look at the residual patterns in this and other complex events. Consider the human; not stick and rudder skills. The crew were qualified pilots; more training for them implies more training for all qualified pilots. If not why not, why would we be different."

What a breath of fresh air. I couldn't have put it that way in a million years . (Obviously?) I have tried to ask questions from the point of view, (not that I could ever imagine the level of emotions) of the flight crew, shocked, puzzled, angry, etc. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​frustrated.​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​You put it well...and I am personally grateful. ​​​​​​​I have learned, alot. Thank everybody for every post. Every one....​​​​​​​

[Vessbot]

The dust has settled on this accident; time to look at the residual patterns in this and other complex events.

Consider the human; not stick and rudder skills. The crew were qualified pilots; more training for them implies more training for all qualified pilots. If not why not, why would we be different.



I'm not sure what you mean by considering the human without the stick and rudder skills, as it applies to this. The crew were qualified pilots in the sense of an official requirement being met by a bunch of boxes being checked, but lacked the stick and rudder skills necessary to meet the situation. To more training being required for them implying more raining being required for all qualified pilots, yes and yes.

[vilas]

I'm not sure what you mean by considering the human without the stick and rudder skills, as it applies to this. The crew were qualified pilots in the sense of an official requirement being met by a bunch of boxes being checked, but lacked the stick and rudder skills necessary to meet the situation. To more training being required for them implying more raining being required for all qualified pilots, yes and yes.
All that was required was indoctrination (even on ground would do) that when in alternate law at cruise level you leave the pitch alone and just keep wings level and if pitch change is required don't make it without looking at PFD to ensure that the pitch is below 5°.

[blind pew]

They were not fit to fly the sector having spent the day sight seeing including a helicopter flight (the pilot was interviewed on French TV) so they started one of the most demanding night flights already fatigued, let alone the shag fest the skipper was on, who chose to leave two relatively (for the forecast conditions) inexperienced copilots to navigate through a virulent ITCZ. PNF was on the cusp of not being current and they found themselves in an area of thunderstorms that everyone else avoided. Having been extremely fatigued twice and hallucinating I can guess how they felt..but both of my occurrences were driving; the second in a 30 mile stretch of contraflow on the A1M after.I had driven up from Darkest essex to Piercebridge to take the father of P2 at staines to Sutton Bank and get him a ride in a K21..he had been shot down during the battle of Britain and spent the war in the stalaglufts. Dropped him home and decided I would stop at the first services which were closed. I must have fallen asleep three or four times..no where to stop and heavy traffic.
So whilst you write about control laws, visible or not sticks..pitot icing..it is a complete waste of time as none of them were fit enough to operate a clothes mangle let alone Airbuses best.
PS I had 13 years RHS and 6,000+ hours on Jets when I first flew through the ITCZ located over the South Atlantic on the death cruiser. I did 20 transits in my first 3 years. At no time was the captain out of his seat and at times the second captain joined us. The crossing varied from benign to severe turbulence and one of the two occasions I hit the Turbulence button in 6 years. This disconnected the auto throttle, autopilot and trim with the flight director directing cruise pitch attitude. There was one transit where we couldn’t find a way around any of what looked like line squalls. 447 had better radar and info than we did.

[Check Airman]

Shouldn’t take 2 CA’s to fly through the ITCZ. FO’s at many airlines successfully meet the challenge every day.

[Concours77]

Shouldn’t take 2 CA’s to fly through the ITCZ. FO’s at many airlines successfully meet the challenge every day. Fair point. Of those, how many would volunteer to do so under the same circumstances?? Without hitting the books, and not foregoing all that fun in Brazil? Even In the Simulator? Had a neighbor in 2009, who was A320 Captain for UAL. Of the thousands of hours in the Bus, he admitted the aircraft had never been in other than Normal Law.. ​​​​​​​"A very sweet flying airplane..." ​​​​​​​modest tailwinds, Will

[blind pew]

Was because either the second didn't trust the first or was too frightened.
In my first flag carrier I came across a captain who decided he would take the next days flight on holiday rather than sit down the back with captain X ..he wasn't alone. I did one Rio with a skipper who was that frightened that he sat in first class rather than using crew bunk.
I have to admit I had a very scary time in it having transmitted the ITCZ then handed over to the other crew when the forecast was wrong and they flew a missed approach and forgot the gear for a long time knowing that they then didn't have alternate fuel and that RIO ATC had successfully vectored two aircraft into terrain over recent years.
With the radar sets of the 70s it was always a team decision on which way to go..at times not easy and I did make a mess once out of southern Africa when I diverted off track for over half an hour before I realised that we were the only ones doing so to discover that I had tweaked the radar toi low and it was ground returns that looked like CBs.
I was fortunate in that I'm not a nervous pax and if I'm going to die then hard luck. In my first outfit one operating captain went and hid in the toilet when the going got rough and not because he had his opera singer girlfriend along.

[pilotmike]

I have to admit I had a very scary time in it having transmitted the ITCZ then handed over to the other crew
You're not alone! Show me someone who isn't scared ****less after transmitting the ITCZ!
I was fortunate in that I'm not a nervous pax and if I'm going to die then hard luck.
Luck is perceived differently by different people. Others may disagree with your perception of luck.

[Check Airman]

You're not alone! Show me someone who isn't scared ****less after transmitting the ITCZ!


I suppose it’s a matter of what one’s accustomed to. By virtue of my home base, I deal with it quite often. LVP on the other hand…not so much.

[ATC Watcher]

The human factors aspects are well described in the final BEA report pages 100-102 . Worth reading them back as I just did.
one correction however : On the crew Fatigue the BEA writes (on 1.16.7 )
: The investigation was not able to determine exactly the activities of the flight crew members during the stopover in Rio, where the crew had arrived three days earlier. It was not possible to obtain data on their sleep during this stopover. This lack of precise information on their activity during the stopover, in particular in relation to sleep, makes it impossible to evaluate the level of fatigue associated to the flight crew’s duty time.
I know the BEA had the exact info , but was prevented to use it by the SNPL which argued successfully that what happens in lay over free time is purely in the private sphere and cannot be mentioned and used in the report.
However some of it was leaked in the press , but a sound analysis of the rest periods would have helped making recommendations to AF on this matter. . In the Colgan report the NTSB went into that area, and issued recommendations on rest and minimizing fatigue for commuting pilots , that ultimately did help in changing old habbits..
Pity the BEA was not allowed to go into this in this case.

[blind pew]

Just a reminder that Air France management realised that there was something seriously wrong with the lack of professionalism and brought in four extremely qualified outsiders to advise them, one was ex military/ ex American major, the second was ex hamble/ BOAC/ BA who had learnt the handshake which would have gone down well across the channel and iirc the other two were European or Scandinavian.
Seems to have done the trick.

[Vessbot]

All that was required was indoctrination (even on ground would do) that when in alternate law at cruise level you leave the pitch alone and just keep wings level and if pitch change is required don't make it without looking at PFD to ensure that the pitch is below 5°.

Hard disagree. Reactions like this don't happen as a result of an "indoctrination." They're a result of repeated practice, to where a normalcy in one's gut, in that flight state, is felt.

I highly doubt that in the extreme stress of the situation, they could consider what control law they were in, anyway ... and from that to infer what's a good vs. bad idea to do with the pitch, with respect to the protections available. No, once the chips are down like that, and the person's looking at the world through a soda straw, all they will do is bring their ingrained habits and thought processes, at the most base level. No higher processing will occur. If those base actions are only to chase the flight director (because that's all the person has ever done, and that's their conception of "flying," then that's what they're gonna do. And if that flight directions is +6000 fpm, well there you have it.

[vilas]

Hard disagree. Reactions like this don't happen as a result of an "indoctrination." They're a result of repeated practice, to where a normalcy in one's gut, in that flight state, is felt.

I highly doubt that in the extreme stress of the situation, they could consider what control law they were in, anyway ... and from that to infer what's a good vs. bad idea to do with the pitch, with respect to the protections available. No, once the chips are down like that, and the person's looking at the world through a soda straw, all they will do is bring their ingrained habits and thought processes, at the most base level. No higher processing will occur. If those base actions are only to chase the flight director (because that's all the person has ever done, and that's their conception of "flying," then that's what they're gonna do. And if that flight directions is +6000 fpm, well there you have it.
Indoctrination is to emphasize that in alternate law with AP tripping you don't act out of a reaction and kill yourself but do nothing till you look at PFD and only do what is required. Unreliable speed is not repeatedly practiced. None of abnormal are repeatedly practiced to create a reaction. They are practiced to see what happens and what you have to do. Nothing should be done as a reaction because air is not a human habitat and invariably it will be wrong. What you do in the cockpit is a well considered action after positively orientating oneself. Otherwise demons like somatogravic illusions pop out with disastrous results.

[Vessbot]

Indoctrination is to emphasize that in alternate law with AP tripping you don't act out of a reaction and kill yourself but do nothing till you look at PFD and only do what is required. Unreliable speed is not repeatedly practiced. None of abnormal are repeatedly practiced to create a reaction. They are practiced to see what happens and what you have to do. Nothing should be done as a reaction because air is not a human habitat and invariably it will be wrong. What you do in the cockpit is a well considered action after positively orientating oneself. Otherwise demons like somatogravic illusions pop out with disastrous results.

I'm not talking about practicing abnormals (which very well can't be), but rather practicing normals: such as simply level flight without the flight director.

"Nothing should be done as a reaction," this is not the reality of how human brains work. For all the basic flight tasks (such as one of the PFD tapes or horizon moves a certain way, what should be the control response) the response from the human will be the reflexive reaction trained in over many hours of repetition (and "do nothing and keep it still" is one of these!); it will not be a reasoned logic problem (such as which way do I go around this thunderstrom, or what descent rate do I use on downwind wrt. how far traffic is strung out on final). ESPECIALLY if in the middle of a high stress, tunnel vision event.

If the proper reaction is not trained in through repetition, there's no expectation that it will be brought into the event.

We agree on that the air is not a natural human habitat. This points even more strongly to the necessity that proper reactions are trained in, because what comes natural (pull back on the stick) is in most cases the wrong one.

[alf5071h]

Vessbot re #119.

'Stick and rudder skills' - like the FAA's 'more hand flying'; whereas the human aspects relate to the cognitive skills, the thinking required for flying. (Casner, NASA http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.full.pdf)

See the second part of https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jean-Paries/publication/291268264_Lessons_from_the_Hudson/links/60808ea0907dcf667bb5abf7/Lessons-from-the-Hudson.pdf?origin=publication_detail

Paries considers the wider system issues. How many of todays Captains would benefit to the competencies of the ACCOMPLI project - page 15 (Revisit the enlightening first half of the paper at a later time.)

"Proceduralisation and automation both try to reduce the uncertainty in the system by reducing variety, diversity, deviation, instability. But the side effect is that this also reduces autonomy, creativity, and reactivity. Increasing order, conformity, stability, predictability, discipline, anticipation, makes the systems better (more efficient, more reliable), possibly cheaper, and generally safer within the confines of their standard environment. They also make them increasingly brittle (less resilient) outside the boundaries of the normal envelope. We have to recognize that there is a universal trade-off between efficiency (adaptation degree) and flexibility (adaptation bandwidth)."

The underlying point is that most accident discussions (Pprune) focus on a particular event seeking to cure the last accident, whereas the industry requires (Paries);

"i) generic anticipation schemes, providing (common) sense-making frameworks of what happens, at a level of abstraction which is high enough to wrap around all the countless and unpredictable variations of real stories and
ii) fast and efficient implementation sketches and skills, capable of forcing the available generic schemes to fit the parameters of the day, under critical time constraints."

The above might appear to be a high level academic viewpoint; but when written by a pilot they require greater thought as to implementation. For this, current pilots are the implementing experts, but require a forward looking, systemic viewpoint, together with consideration how changes in the modern world can influence us.

Many aspects relate to situation awareness; perception, comprehension. Generally this is sufficient to identify the required SOP; yet SOPs imply an assured outcome; thus reduced requirement for the projection component of SA.
SOPs 'discourage' thinking ahead, being ready for surprises.

Also; in a very safe industry, training emphasis on SOP compliance opposes the skills required to manage the unexpected.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/9o7da1hmi5fsr0z/From individuals to the evolution of safety paradigms Paries +++.pdf?dl=0

As much as I agree with the 'theory' above, the practical aspects of modern aviation training involving human imitations of awareness, surprise, and memory recall, suggest that the avoidance of challenging situations is the more practical option.

"It is difficult to change the human conditon, easier to change the conditions of work" (J. Reason). Thus the focus of improvement must move from the individual to the system, the situation - operational, organisational, personal which jointly have to be managed.

The technical aspects are reflected by safety statistics when comparing generations of aircraft - https://accidentstats.airbus.com/sites/default/files/2023-02/Statistical-Analysis-of-Commercial-Aviation-Accidents-2023.pdf
Page 21 -

[MichaelOLearyGenius]

Did they ever find out the actual cause of this accident?

[llagonne66]

Did they ever find out the actual cause of this accident?
Why don't you read the final report ?

[grizzled]

Did they ever find out the actual cause of this accident?

Do you mean PPRuners or the BEA?

[fdr]

Why don't you read the final report ?

Sea level rise.

Maybe holding ANU SSC for 5 minutes straight.

[Concours77]

Sea level rise. Maybe holding ANU SSC for 5 minutes straight. Baffling. But not entirely accurate. ANU is incorrect. Close, but not correct... Add AltLaw StallWarn, No air driven instruments for a full minute (+)...etc.etc... just sayin'...

[llagonne66]

May I kindly suggest that people interested in this long standing and sad saga start by reading all the material posted here AF447 thread 12 (https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/539756-af-447-thread-no-12-a.html#post8476687)?
Lots of very knowledgeable people have provided useful data, comments, insights, etc. that may alleviate some of the b......t we have been reading on the current thread.
And as stated by fdr and PJ2 above, I am also embarrassed by this thread.

[Ivor_Bigunn]

I am also embarrassed by this thread.

It is just restarting Threads 1 and 2 as if no new info had been obtained from the cvr and dvr. And again we get total misstatements about what Airbus Modes do.

IB

[ATC Watcher]

I concurr , reading the BEA report would also help :hmm:

[DaveReidUK]

I am also embarrassed by this thread.

It is just restarting Threads 1 and 2 as if no new info had been obtained from the cvr and dvr. And again we get total misstatements about what Airbus Modes do.

Early on in the thread it was suggested to the mods that it was serving no useful purpose.

[Concours77]

Early on in the thread it was suggested to the mods that it was serving no useful purpose. ​​​​​​​My understanding is the verdict in the lawsuit is due in a few days...

[grizzled]

My understanding is the verdict in the lawsuit is due in a few days...

There is a separate thread about the trial. If that's what you want to discuss, go there. Otherwise I agree with those who say there is nothing this thread has added to the discussion of the accident itself. If you find that particular accident interesting, read the full official report, and the hundreds of pages and thousands of posts on the original thread(s).

[Concours77]

There is a separate thread about the trial. If that's what you want to discuss, go there. Otherwise I agree with those who say there is nothing this thread has added to the discussion of the accident itself. If you find that particular accident interesting, read the full official report, and the hundreds of pages and thousands of posts on the original thread(s). There is a perspective available here upon which the trial is based, the technical, and the downfall of automation...not to mention the negligence of a flag carrier...​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[grizzled]

There is a perspective available here upon which the trial is based, the technical, and the downfall of automation...not to mention the negligence of a flag carrier... ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

ALL of which was (very thoroughly) discussed and debated on the earlier threads. So please answer this one simple question: Have you read those threads?
​​​​​​​

[Concours77]

[QUOTE=grizzled;11415193]ALL of which was (very thoroughly) discussed and debated on the earlier threads. So please answer this one simple question: Have you read those threads?[/QUOTE

Yes, read them, and participated... I know most of this thread sounds trite, and repetitive. Very discouraging having to read and reread the knee jerk condemnation of the flight crew....again ​​​​​​...

But for the outright negligence and greed of Air France, it is likely in my opinion that this accident may not have happened....not to mention the lax training and material defects of the aircraft...

The popular opinion is an unjust one...not unexpected, since the "report" was the (sole) product of those arguably responsible for the accident... All the best regards to those here, all of you...Will​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[safetypee]

Calls to close threads are like closing the mind.

Final reports can be used as definitive understanding, generally they are very good, but can be biased by a range of factors. Some reports find 'most likely' causes, others contributing factors, all with significant supposition about human behaviour; uncertainty.
We take from that what we wish to believe, we might learn, and with closure not open to further learning.

There are several issues relating to this accident which with debate could benefit safety. They are not definitive or proven; just some of the everyday uncertainties which everyone experiences.

There were 20 or so previous incidents which crews successfully managed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some crews reacted initially as AF 447, but subsequently change their course off action - why.

There are no simple answers, if any at all; just opportunity to think.
Bad apple theory, unproven and least helpful.
Situational factors more likely, levels of experience, but what experience, how gained.
Differences in training - some operators require Captains to fly the aircraft during emergencies; do relief pilots ever experience flight in abnormal conditions, degraded control systems.
Does recurrent training consider the 'do nothing' option of the drill required for the cruise situation.

Do regulators mandate more recurrent training for new threat situations, but what was the threat. 'The pilots' - using SOPs, or 'ice crystals' which should be avoided.
Safety-I vs Safety-II viewpoint, the human as a hazard, or the human a help to avoid a threat.

There is no need for the above to be proven; the safety value is in the thinking about them, which might be greater than in any final report.

[Concours77]

safetypee... Yes, precisely... My conclusion as to direct cause of this wreck I posted nine years ago...I'll post it again, as soon as I return from a flight into the California sunshine. AF447 F-GCZY 1. MECHANICAL 2. PILOT ERROR (actually two)​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​both within ten seconds of each other, after which, no recovery was possible, given extenuating events... ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Ivor_Bigunn]

From Concours77:

" My conclusion as to direct cause of this wreck I posted nine years ago...I'll post it again, as soon as I return from a flight into the California sunshine."

1) Please don't. This exactly what other readers are complaining about this thread. It is a rehash of earlier threads before the black boxes were recovered and the BEA report.

2) [Deleted]

3) Earlier you posted: "since the "report" was the (sole) product of those arguably responsible for the accident... ". So it is obvious where you are headed. But Air France and Airbus wrote the Crash Investigation Report ? Really?

This thread is an embarrassment.

IB