Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel [SH-T HOT] Break’ F-35C Crash

[SpazSinbad]

Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel [SH-T HOT] Break’ Resulted in South China Sea F-35C Crash, Investigation Says 21 Feb 2023 https://news.usni.org/2023/02/21/pilot-error-after-sierra-hotel-break-resulted-in-south-china-sea-f-35c-crash-investigation-says
“...The mishap pilot (MP) attempted an expedited recovery breaking overhead the carrier, an approved and common maneuver, but the MP had never performed this maneuver before, and it reduced the amount of time to configure the aircraft and conduct landing checks,” the report said. “As a result of the compressed timeline and the MP’s lack of familiarity with the maneuver, the MP lost situational awareness and failed to complete his landing checklist. Specifically, the MP remained in manual mode when he should have been (and thought he was) in an automated command mode designed to reduce pilot workload during landings.” The ramp strike followed a routine mission of just under four hours for the junior officer pilot and his wingman....

...JASON 406 entered the “groove,” or the final approach to the carrier, and was moving too slowly. “The [pilot] realized that the jet was extremely underpowered as the jet became slow and continued to descend (settle),” the investigation continued. “At this moment, [the pilot] manually pushed the throttle to military power and then went to maximum afterburner once he realized that the airplane was in a perilous state, failing to climb.”... the LSO told the pilot the speed was too low. A second later the LSO told the pilot to wave off and hit the afterburners.

Data recovered from the F-35C after the crash showed that after the turn the F-135 engine on the aircraft shifted to flight idle – the minimum throttle position for the engine – and remained there until the pilot attempted to accelerate two seconds before hitting the ramp on Vinson....

...Ultimately, investigators determined that “pilot error was the cause of the mishap. However, the error was not conducted in a reckless manner nor with malicious intent,” reads the report. A Navy spokesman told USNI News that, due to the crash, the pilot has been removed from flight status but is still in the service.

Additionally, investigators recommended that aviators stop performing Sierra Hotel Breaks, that policy require F-35C pilots to always use Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP) throttle assists and that heads-up displays include indicator lights showing when flight aids are activated.""

36 page mishap redacted report PDF: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23686824/f-35c-records-for-release-redacted-v2.pdf (8Mb)

[fdr]

Energy state by any means is a fairly basic requirement, be it by alpha or IAS... if we have dumbed down the driving to the point that the landing mode selections for automation are the actual cause, and not the failure to actually manage the energy state of the plane, then we should pack up our bags and turn off the lights, and go to Creech and drive smarter drones. :(

[SpazSinbad]

For sure there was a pilot helmet fire with the explanation for that awful power up sound just before the ramp strike thud in the video:
"...Data recovered from the F-35C after the crash showed that after the turn the F-135 engine on the aircraft shifted to flight idle – the minimum throttle position for the engine – and remained there until the pilot attempted to accelerate two seconds before hitting the ramp on Vinson...."

Pilots do make errors for whatever reason. The night F-35A landing crash/ejection at EGLIN AFB by a senior F-35A pilot attempting to land unwittingly 50 KNOTS too fast. What can one say. DON'T DO IT?!

Eglin F-35 Crash Blamed on Landing Speed, but Software, Helmet, Oxygen Also Faulted | Air & Space Forces Magazine (airandspaceforces.com) (https://www.airandspaceforces.com/eglin-f-35-crash-blamed-on-landing-speed-but-software-helmet-oxygen-also-faulted/)

[SpazSinbad]

Extract from front pages of Ramp Strike Report:
COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE F-35C CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP OF 24 JAN 22
"...3. I have directed my staff to execute the following recommendations:
a. To consult with the manufacturers of the F-35C and Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) to develop the following:

(1) An intemal indication (Helmet Mounted Display and/or audio tone) to alert a pilot that the aircraft has reached on-speed Angle of Attack (AOA) in the power approach mode without Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC) Delta Flight Path (DFP) engaged. To avoid this indication during level flight, this symbology or tone should only be triggered above a given rate of descent and below a given altitude.

(2) An external indication that an F-35C is in power approach and APC/DEP is not engaged. This extemal indication will need to be visible to the Landing Signal Officers (LSO) while the aircraft is on final approach. This would provide the LSOs the opportunity to intervene earlier in a landing attempt, preventing a similar reoccurrence of an airplane approaching the ship without appropriate thrust....

...c. To collaborate with NAVAIRSYSCOM on the following:
(1) Update the F-35C Flight Manual to reflect that F-35C pilots shall fly APC/DFP when recovering aboard the carrier. The current F-35C Landing Checklist, Step 4 is: APC/DFP — As desired.

(2) Consult with manufacturer of F-35C to incorporate internal HMD and/or audio tone to alert pilot that the aircraft has reached on-speed AOA in the power approach mode without PLM engaged...."

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23686824/f-35c-records-for-release-redacted-v2.pdf (8Mb)

Then there is this in the report: YIKES!
"8. ...The investigation determined the cause of the mishap to be pilot error. The pilot entered the carrier break, bringing the throttle to Flight IDLE, allowing the aircraft to slow to approach speed. Once approach speed was achieved, the F-35C landing checklist was not fully completed by selecting Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP), leaving the aircraft operating in Manual Powered Approach (PA) Control Laws (CLAW).

9. During the start, middle, and in-close portions of the landing approach, the pilot applied corrections via stick inputs under the assumption that the aircraft was in either APC or DFP PA CLAW. These corrections did not engage the engine to provide additional thrust as the aircraft was still operating in Manual PA CLAW with the throttle still at Flight IDLE. The aircraft developed a rapid sink rate during the in-close portion of the landing approach and a manual engine power demand was not added until 2.6 seconds prior to impact. This late power addition was insufficient to prevent the aircraft from striking the ramp...."

[SpazSinbad]

This old info may be of interest: Semper Lightning: F-35 Flight Control System 09 Dec 2015 Dan “Dog” Canin

"...The ability to tailor the airplane’s response as a function of its configuration and flight regime is the beauty – and potential curse – of FBW. If control engineers get it right – if they define the modes properly, put the transitions in the right places, and give the pilot the right feedback – then control is intuitive. But if they make the various modes too complicated, or the feedback (visual or tactile) isn’t compelling, then modal confusion can set in and bad things can happen.

Some mode changes occur without our knowing, which is fine as long as we don’t have to change our control strategy. An example is the blend from pitch rate command at low speed to g-command at high speed. This transition is seamless from the pilot’s perspective. Other changes require us to change our technique, which is okay if we command the changes ourselves and they’re accompanied by a compelling change in symbology. Examples are the transitions from gear-up (UA) to gear-down (PA), and from CTOL to STOVL.

There are few areas, though, where a mode change is important but not obvious, which is where pilot discipline and training come in. For example, the CV airplane has three different approach modes, easily selected using buttons on the stick and throttle. Two of these modes – APC and DFP[3] – are autothrottle modes, indicated by a three-letter label on the left side of the HUD. The third mode – manual throttle – is indicated by the absence of a label…arguably not the most compelling indication that you’re responsible for the throttle. This interface will probably evolve; [yes sireebob] in the meantime, we need to be disciplined and to make doubly sure we’ve got APC engaged before we turn throttle control over to George...."

https://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=187

[Sailvi767]

It’s interesting that the Navy has withheld the accident pilots name. This is not the norm at this stage after a accident.

[Mogwi]

Just proves that pilots are smarter than engineers. No matter how good the system is, a pilot will find a way of screwing it up. Been there!

Mog

[Lonewolf_50]

There is an assertion that this maneuver had not been done before. OK, if that's true, then I ask:
If you haven't practiced it during FCLPs, or over an airfield, why are you doing it over the ship?
(The hot break and compressed timeline to get into the groove)

[BFSGrad]

Reads like the military version of Asiana 214.

[SASless]

Mog,

Or. have the engineers made the aircraft far too complex and Pilot's become so reliant upon the machine they lose both flying skills and the ability to effectively control the aircraft systems?

"Children of the Magenta" disease now creeping into Naval Aviation?

It would be interesting to see a video of F-35 Pilots flying approaches to a Carrier (in cockpit view of both hands and the pilot's head with view ahead of the aircraft) and compare those to existing video's of F-18 and legacy aircraft to see the difference in pilot workload and involvement (call it the human/machine interface).

You might find this article relates to what appears to have happened in the F-35 Accident.

The one exception is the F-35 is single pilot and thus the absence of a second pilot eliminates the ability for a check and verify ability that is facilitated by the inclusion of a second human pilot.

The article references a Video which is excellent viewing having watched it before.

https://airfactsjournal.com/2020/09/stepping-down-in-automation-the-real-lesson-for-children-of-the-magenta-line/

[uxb99]

Does one instance of pilot error remove you from flying? Seems a bit harsh.

[Not_a_boffin]

Mog,

Or. have the engineers made the aircraft far too complex and Pilot's become so reliant upon the machine they lose both flying skills and the ability to effectively control the aircraft systems?

"Children of the Magenta" disease now creeping into Naval Aviation?

It would be interesting to see a video of F-35 Pilots flying approaches to a Carrier (in cockpit view of both hands and the pilot's head with view ahead of the aircraft) and compare those to existing video's of F-18 and legacy aircraft to see the difference in pilot workload and involvement (call it the human/machine interface).

You might find this article relates to what appears to have happened in the F-35 Accident.

The one exception is the F-35 is single pilot and thus the absence of a second pilot eliminates the ability for a check and verify ability that is facilitated by the inclusion of a second human pilot.

The article references a Video which is excellent viewing having watched it before.

https://airfactsjournal.com/2020/09/stepping-down-in-automation-the-real-lesson-for-children-of-the-magenta-line/

This reads more like a basic switchology thing, followed by some fairly basic lack of SA on the pilots behalf. It would appear he did not engage APCM having screamed into a truncated break, throttled back to idle and then apparently not noticed his sink rate until too late. The difference here is that no-one on the ship could be aware that APCM wasn't engaged. Normally there are external indications to the LSO that all the gear - and the hook are down and locked. Hence the recommendations for LM and NAVAIRSYSCOM.

F/A18 are mainly single seat as well. Only the D, F and EA18G variants have a RIO.

[Asturias56]

Does one instance of pilot error remove you from flying? Seems a bit harsh.


depends - if you write off a small trainer - maybe not - if it gets into 9 figures the DEW line beckons

[Mogwi]

Or. have the engineers made the aircraft far too complex and Pilot's become so reliant upon the machine they lose both flying skills and the ability to effectively control the aircraft systems?

Indeed!

Mog

[fallmonk]

depends - if you write off a small trainer - maybe not - if it gets into 9 figures the DEW line beckons
What at about the millions of taxpayers £/$ to get you to that standard? Assuming he/she is cleared and was a accident, would it not be good practice to give them a chance to redeem them selfs ?
Maybe with some more deck landing training?

[fitliker]

Just proves that pilots are smarter than engineers. No matter how good the system is, a pilot will find a way of screwing it up. Been there!

Mog

Make anything idiot proof and Mother Nature improves the idiot , Mk 2
or to be accurate , attempt to make anything idiot proof :)

[SASless]

The difference here is that no-one on the ship could be aware that APCM wasn't engaged.

In the scheme of things you sure found the absolute least important.

Perhaps the solution to your priority. problem is removing the Pilot from the situation and go Pilot-less with UAV/Drones.

Then some non-Winged Pogue could drive these thing by remote control.....but then who or what would be needed to look over that shoulder?

Did you consider why the concern about Pilots and Automation conflict exists?

The question the Board might not have asked....and answered is what effect would the Pilot correctly engaging the auto systems had on the outcome?

Is the Automation capable of accomodating pilot errors such as happened by showing up hot, high, and close aboard or would it order a Missed Approach and Go Around on its own?

[Flying_Scotsman]

When the report said "...an approved and common maneuver, but the MP had never performed this maneuver before,..." relating to the break did they mean ever or just on the F-35 over the carrier? I started teaching breaks to students at the piston training stage of pilot training and it was a normal method of arriving in the circuit (pattern) on every aircraft I flew. If you take away raw flying skills and rely on more and more automation then this is the outcome.

[Not_a_boffin]

In the scheme of things you sure found the absolute least important.

Perhaps the solution to your priority. problem is removing the Pilot from the situation and go Pilot-less with UAV/Drones.

Then some non-Winged Pogue could drive these thing by remote control.....but then who or what would be needed to look over that shoulder?

Did you consider why the concern about Pilots and Automation conflict exists?

The question the Board might not have asked....and answered is what effect would the Pilot correctly engaging the auto systems had on the outcome?

Is the Automation capable of accomodating pilot errors such as happened by showing up hot, high, and close aboard or would it order a Missed Approach and Go Around on its own?
You know what the LSOs do don't you? Why they are there - and have been since the inception of naval aviation.......

[SpazSinbad]

The F-35C pilot was recognising & waiting for an LSO wave off because: "...94. The MP explained that he thought the LSO[s] were going to wave off his attempt to land because he was fast at the start to in the middle of the landing attempt...." This was a bad pilot attitude. Pilot flies the aircraft not the LSOs. They advise mostly and then they COMMAND - which must be OBEYed - with the WAVE OFF being mandatory, no matter what anyone thinks.

About 'breaking into the circuit'. The F-35C pilot had not carried out an SHB (Sh-tHot Break) at the carrier. Breaking into the circuit is standard procedure and well practiced. There is always going to be a first time (and watch out for the second time) for everything. This lad's first time was not to be repeated apparently. Otherwise as the report says the F-35C pilot was a good nugget. Sad that he FRABBED it UP.

[Lonewolf_50]

The F-35C pilot was recognising & waiting for an LSO wave off because: "...94. The MP explained that he thought the LSO were going to wave off his attempt to land because he was fast at the start to in the middle of the landing attempt...." This was a bad pilot attitude. Pilot flies the aircraft not the LSOs. They advise mostly and then they COMMAND - which must be OBEYed - with the WAVE OFF being mandatory, no matter what anyone thinks.

About 'breaking into the circuit'. The F-35C pilot had not carried out an SHB (Sh-tHot Break) at the carrier. Breaking into the circuit is standard procedure and well practiced. There is always going to be a first time (and watch out for the second time) for everything. This lad's first time was not to be repeated apparently. Otherwise as the report says the F-35C pilot was a good nugget. Sad that he FRABBED it UP.
Spaz, if you'll indulge me, please explain the difference between a normal break and a sh1thot break? I have an idea, but may be blind to a few particulars.
I have seen and flown the difference in a "short break" (at the numbers, downwind end end) versus a normal break (at the numbers, upwind end) in a trainer aircraft, but that's not quite at F-35C speeds.

[Easy Street]

To this landlubber, the proportion of naval aviators' flying time spent developing and maintaining competence in arrested landings is ridiculous. It was one of the UK's reasons for going STOVL with the Sea Harrier and then the F35B. Accordingly I don't share SASless's dim view of F35C throttle automation and associated pilot deskilling. The primary reason for putting a human on board modern fighters is to take tactical and ethical decisions which we do not currently entrust to computers. The less time which can be spent rehearsing domestics like takeoff and landing, the more is available to rehearse combat skills. Eventually we will get to a point where the sole occupant of a combat aircraft is a passenger ahem, WSO, giving instructions but having no direct control of the aircraft. Automation did not fail in this case: the human failed to engage it. A familiar story. The actions demanded by the reviewing officer look like good ones to prevent recurrence. One F35C might turn out to be a relatively small price to pay when set against all the CQ flying that automation, properly used, could save over the aircraft's service career.

[Lonewolf_50]

To this landlubber, the proportion of naval aviators' flying time spent developing and maintaining competence in arrested landings is ridiculous. {snip rant}
One F35C might turn out to be a relatively small price to pay when set against all the CQ flying that automation could save over the aircraft's service career.
I guess you called it yourself in the opening of your post: landlubbers tend to lack a clue.
I ran into similar uninformed opinions among the USAF.
I am not sure if you are aware of this, but the F-18 has had a "let HAL fly it" feature for well over 20 years.
That does not offer any excuse to ignore both proficiency and fundamental skills.
Likewise with instrument flying.

[SpazSinbad]

Spaz, if you'll indulge me, please explain the difference between a normal break and a sh1thot break? I have an idea, but may be blind to a few particulars.
I have seen and flown the difference in a "short break" (at the numbers, downwind end end) versus a normal break (at the numbers, upwind end) in a trainer aircraft, but that's not quite at F-35C speeds.
HEHEH. IIRC the accident report explains well enough? I'd have to go look now. My deck landing experience started with an A4G Skyhawk 'rolling deck landing' (touch and go) aboard HMS Eagle back in late 1971. Being completely new to deck landings I was not authorised to arrest / catapult as were the other members of VF-805 - all experienced deck landers. About one month later I day qualified and later night qualified as an A4G deck lander aboard HMAS Melbourne - that is all I know. We knew nothing of an SHB but I guess may have carried out our own 'quick circuit' if we were late for CHARLIE TIME (arrive at carrier for DL). I've said before elsewhere I think that at first the A4Gers did NON-standard carrier circuits at 400 feet - the old Sea Venom height. This was great because it allowed a LEVEL base turn to pick up the meatball in the MIRROR halfway around, to fly the meatball for a shorter straightaway and less time to FRABup. :} During my cruise late 1971 aboard MELBOURNE the USN trained A4G LSOs convinced VF-805 CO (ex Sea Venom) to fly at the NATOPS height of 600 feet downwind. SADLY this meant a descending base turn which could be difficult to master as a newbie while also carrier landing, but hey I'm still here.

The USNI news 'LIGHTING' article has a NATOPS carrier circuit diagram so that explains a lot: (the caption is not correct - the diagram shows an ordinary Hornet carrier circuit - read the accident / mishap report for the SHB details [which is OK by the USN when required])
JPG: https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/us_navy_day_case_1_landing_pattern.jpeg
article: Pilot Error Caused South China Sea F-35C Crash, Investigation Says - USNI News (https://news.usni.org/2023/02/21/pilot-error-after-sierra-hotel-break-resulted-in-south-china-sea-f-35c-crash-investigation-says)
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/544x654/us_navy_day_case_1_landing_pattern_6e3a50b8eabecc4057ba7fcfc 0677ade309dc49e.gif
JPG shows Super Hornets likely about to break into CVN carrier circuit - as per diagram - for DLs.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1537x977/uss_abraham_lincoln_cvn_72_over_flown_by_super_hornets_pdf_6 698f2e4e9e9188c8edbd0d2b62d93cd47cef3e2.jpg

[Easy Street]

I guess you called it yourself in the opening of your post: landlubbers tend to lack a clue.
I ran into similar uninformed opinions among the USAF.

I think you misunderstand. F-18 might as well not have an autoland feature, given that its pilots are required to maintain competence in manual landings, which forces practically all deck landings to be flown manually. But USN leadership deserves great credit for the progress it has made, and continues to make on automation. Are the leaders who have moved the culture away from "manual first" uninformed or clueless as to the relative value of CQ? For evidence of how much further the Navy is down this road than the USAF, see MQ-25.

For the avoidance of doubt, this is a compliment for naval aviation.

[SpazSinbad]

Page 22 of mishap report has this for SHBs (perhaps there's a more extreme version? Probably :} ).
"...Aviation Mishap
77. The MP led his flight from two thousand feet to the initial when the flight deck was ready for the fixed wing recovery. Approaching the ship, the MP initiated an expedited recovery to the downwind. An expedited recovery maneuver is when an aircraft initiates a turn to downwind from either behind the ship or over the top of the ship. Based on airspeed, break location, and Gforces applied to an aircraft, there are various types of expedited recoveries (also referred to as a Sierra Hotel Break (SHB)).

78. The expedited recovery maneuver is commonplace in naval aviation and it can reduce the amount of open deck time as a ready deck is waiting for a recovering aircraft. During an expedited recovery, an aircraft uses G-forces to decelerate over the course of a 360-degree turn, dropping the landing gear when the aircraft is below landing gear transition speed. When breaking aft of the ship or overhead the ship, a pilot has a reduced amount of time to configure the aircraft and conduct landing checks. An expedited recovery reduces the amount of open deck time and can increase flight deck efficiencies. When breaking upwind of the ship, a pilot has more time to configure the aircraft for landing, trim the airplane, conduct landing checks, and prepare for the approach turn to landing.

79. Before the Mishap Flight (MF), the MP had never initiated an expedited recovery from overhead the ship. On 24 January, it was his first attempt. The MP was a previous Top-5 Nugget and a Top-10 ball-flyer within CVW-2, indicating that his landing performance at the ship had been exceptional for a first-tour junior officer (JO).

80. The MP discussed the proper execution of an expedited recovery with other members of his squadron. The MP wanted to try a “benign first attempt” at breaking overhead the ship. The MP explained that other JOs had performed the maneuver overhead the ship and he wanted to attempt it before the end of deployment. The MP described hearing from CVW-2 LSOs that an expedited recovery can reduce open deck times, but he did not feel pressure to perform an expedited recovery on 24 January from the CVW-2 LSOs or anyone else...."

[SpazSinbad]

There is a lot of technical detail about 'automatic carrier landings' that could be extracted but I doubt the 'doubters' want to read it. Both the Super Hornet and F-35C have a version of the "MAGIC CARPET" (now known under different acronyms respectively). This automation reduces FCLP & CQ requirements because even NUGGET pilots do well when it is enabled. Super Hornet nuggets apparently don't use it all the time - or initially - so that they are well practiced in manual landings before going 'auto'; so that IF auto fails they can revert to manual, so to speak. I have not read that F-35C nuggets use 'manual' but perhaps they do during FCLP. When F-35C nuggets use 'auto' for DLs they have excellent nugget results.

[RAFEngO74to09]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4p2YtWylFo

[fdr]

The F-35C pilot was recognising & waiting for an LSO wave off because: "...94. The MP explained that he thought the LSO were going to wave off his attempt to land because he was fast at the start to in the middle of the landing attempt...." This was a bad pilot attitude. Pilot flies the aircraft not the LSOs. They advise mostly and then they COMMAND - which must be OBEYed - with the WAVE OFF being mandatory, no matter what anyone thinks.

Presumably the waiting was concluded at around the time of the ramp strike.
Was that an attempt to teach the LSO something? The logic of waiting for a wave off when the flight path or energy state is already ugly seems to be a fundamentally flawed plan.

Irrespective of the amount of bells and whistles that are incorporated into the system, and displayed by whatever means, somewhere there is a speedo and an alpha indexer, and the assumption that a mode that is selected is going to work as advertised comes with historical examples of unfortunate outcomes. Should we remove the wings from the pilots uniform and replace it with a stylised Nintendo hand piece?

Automation is great, it does not and never will replace the need for monitoring of the system performance, and if that is inconvenient, then there are jobs begging at McDonalds and Carl's Jnr that are easier on the demand of monitoring of systems performance.

AZ 214, AF447, Pierre le Luberjack, Bangalore, even the Too loose A330-300 test flight deal.... assuming automation is going to work every time is fine if you have really good life insurance or religion.

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks for the video link. I did not realise the SHBs are now banned? I'll have to reread the report more closely. Also the wordy host tells us that the F-35C pilot was injured enough to lose his medical flight status but then later outlines he has the second worse FNAB (whatever) result "keeps wings but won't fly again' if I heard talk correctly. A few times MOOCH mumbles acronyms I cannot fathom but hey 'what's new'. :}

Oops missed 'fdr' point about 'waiting'. Perhaps I misconstrued the point. "IT was not me Chief". I can only go on the pilot words in the report. The pilot kept going hoping to save the approach. He did get waved off but too late.

Monitoring the approach is of course a requirement but this pilot had a helmet fire. I'm reminded of the Eglin AFB F-35A pilot at night attempting to rectify HMDS faults during his FAST approach. These two pilots were trying to do TOO MUCH and needed to GO ROUND AGAIN - but too late. CRASH.

Recently (a few years ago) LSOs used a NINTENDO/ATARI gizmo to fly an aircraft approach for reals. I've not heard anything more (probably for good reason). :} I'll go get the link to the story....

SMOOTH LANDING
https://navalaviationnews.navylive.dodlive.mil/Portals/59/Documents/2018_01Spring.pdf (9.4Mb)

“From left, VX-23 test pilots Lts. John Marino and Christopher Montague, who are also landing signal officers, monitor an F/A-18 Super Hornet with degraded ailerons as it successfully lands aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) during March 21 testing of the Precision Landing Modes flight control system, which has been updated to account for failing aerodynamic surfaces. (U.S. Navy photos by Buddy Denham)”
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1620x1050/ataribanzailsos_695e82625ab14f70a00e1fa0b64ef5b2abd1dae9.jpg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1630x1050/ataribanzailso_9794e25a22090ba4ad91b5a69edf0b84556d90f3.jpg

[SpazSinbad]

SMOOTH LANDING by Jeff Newman and MC1 Josue L. Escobosa NAVAL AVIATION NEWS Spring 2018 Volume 100, No. 2

...“What we were looking at is, in the event we have a casualty with JPALS, what other options would we have to recover unmanned aircraft?” he added.

The first of several options tested, the non-coincidentally named Aircraft Terminal Approach Remote Inceptor — or ATARI, after the iconic video game company — would give LSOs the ability to remotely take over an aircraft from up to five miles away and land it on a carrier by observing and fixing errors in its glideslope and lineup.

Denham said LSOs make for a natural first option to take over a distressed aircraft because they already oversee carrier approaches from the time an aircraft is three-quarters of a mile away until it touches down. Working in teams of two, LSOs monitor a pilot’s deviations from glideslope and centerline, call up corrections to the pilot as needed, and grade the pilot’s performance during debrief. “They’re always working to improve touchdown performance and safety, so we can capitalize on the fact that they can see deviations and correct errors,” Denham said.

Much like the gaming system it’s named after, the ATARI features a joystick that an LSO uses to control an aircraft.

“You’re effectively using small joystick controllers to guide a 40,000-pound airplane, and it’s almost like you’re playing a video game,” Denham said.

Wanting to quickly demonstrate ATARI’s capability, NAWCAD engineers worked with Boeing last year to outfit a VX-23 Super Hornet with a surrogate UAV capability, allowing the manned jet to receive the ATARI’s flight-control signals from a carrier deck. It marked the first time a Super Hornet has had a full stick-and-throttle surrogate capability installed into its flight control system, Denham said.

This proved a quicker developmental option because the F/A-18s would have a safety pilot from VX-23 onboard who in the case of an emergency could take back control of the aircraft, Denham said. “Being able to rely on the safety pilot was integral,” he added. “It allowed us to move more rapidly.”

Originally tested in 2016 on a Learjet performing shore-based approaches, the ATARI system underwent further shore testing and quality assurance with the retrofitted Super Hornet, at which point VX-23 felt confident enough to test the system at sea.

Aboard Lincoln, the ATARI demonstration endured the same high sea states as the PLM testing.

“There was some nervousness because the sea state was so bad. Back on the airfield, testing was benign,” said Lt. John Marino, the VX-23 pilot who flew the outfitted F/A-18, and the first aviator to land on a flight deck using ATARI. As during the PLM testing, Marino first had to perform three approach-to-wave-offs to ensure all conditions and surrogate systems were safe and that the ATARI system could indeed take over the aircraft while at sea. Beginning with the fourth approach, Marino and the LSOs performed roughly 40 touch-and-goes. “I was really impressed with the LSO’s ability to get me to touch down,” Marino said. “The conditions were difficult, and it was impressive the system worked the way it did. On a calm day, it would have been a little bit boring, but this was definitely more challenging.”

“The deck was pitching significantly and yawing and rolling,” Denham said. “It was particularly difficult to land that day, and we showed it’s possible to use this system even when the conditions aren’t ideal. So I guess we were fortunate to end up in high sea states. All in all, a successful trial.”

A fully self-contained van outfitted with the ATARI system and a data link up to the outfitted Super Hornet was brought aboard Lincoln and set up behind the LSO platform so engineers could watch the approaches in real-time, monitor safety-of-flight data and ensure passes were going smoothly. The van recorded flight data for engineers to analyze later and allowed VX-23 to test their systems without having to install them aboard the carrier.

Though not intended to be a primary method for recovering aircraft, ATARI would provide a relatively inexpensive backup system in the case an LSO needs to step in and use their expertise and training to safely guide an aircraft. “We don’t have unmanned carrier-based vehicles in the fleet today, but they are coming soon,” said Dan Shafer, a NAWCAD air vehicle engineer. “This is a potential alternative landing method, and our system performed well.”

Even though it tested well, Denham said the ATARI is merely the first alternative landing system his team has developed, and by no means the one that ultimately will be pursued for fleet-wide implementation. His engineers will now analyze the data collected aboard Lincoln and make adjustments for further at-sea testing.

“The question was, is it even feasible for the LSOs to land an aircraft from their location, and the answer was most definitely yes,” Denham said. “We can put that in our options for emergency backups and say we know we can do it from the LSO station.”

Denham called the ATARI system the “lowest-tech option” of those being considered and said the others would aim for a more autonomous approach using aircraft sensors.

https://navalaviationnews.navylive.dodlive.mil/Portals/59/Documents/2018_01Spring.pdf

[BFSGrad]

I'll have to reread the report more closely. Also the wordy host tells us that the F-35C pilot was injured enough to lose his medical flight status but then later outlines he has the second worse FNAB (whatever) result "keeps wings but won't fly again' if I heard talk correctly. A few times MOOCH mumbles acronyms I cannot fathom but hey 'what's new'. :}My understanding was that the F-35C pilot, while injured in the mishap, is losing flight status due to performance deficiency (but keeping wings). The LSO, who was much more seriously injured, will lose flight status due to medical disqualification.

[SpazSinbad]

My understanding was that the F-35C pilot, while injured in the mishap, is losing flight status due to performance deficiency (but keeping wings). The LSO, who was much more seriously injured, will lose flight status due to medical disqualification.
Thanks for the clarification.

[SpazSinbad]

I have looked for 'shbs banned' but did not find it - perhaps because the assertion is on another forum which may remain nameless. :} To clarify with this weird USN 'merican wording at the end of the mishap report:

"4. The IOs do not recommend modifying CV NATOPS in the following areas for the reasons described below:
a. [i]Modifying CV NATOPS procedures to ban expedited recoveries or SHBs. Although the expedited recovery was a factor in time compression for the MP, the execution of a 400 KCAS expedited recovery over the LSO platform was not directly the cause of the mishap. ‘This mishap occurred because the MP failed to select APC/DFP at any point during the 27 seconds between the lowering of the landing gear and subsequent impact with the flight deck.

b. Requiring overhead maneuvers to occur forward of the ship or extending aircraft further upwind than 4nm from the ship. When leading a division, the flight lead needs to break no later than overhead the ship or dash-4 will be greater than 4nm up wind of the ship. Case-1 weather requires at least 3000 feet and 5 miles visibility with the Mini Boss responsible for maintaining sight of aircraft up wind of the ship (for safety considerations).

c. Utilizing the Extended Landing Pattern (ELP) for daytime operations. With an extended pattern, there would be more time for a pilot to complete landing checklists and prepare the aircraft for landing. The ELP is undesirable, however, for several reasons. Due to visibility in the tower, it limits the ability of the Air Boss to monitor aircraft during their approach turn. Aircraft like the E-2 face challenges locating their interval for determining when to initiate their break downwind."

[T54A]

Reads like the military version of Asiana 214.

you beat me to it.

[fdr]

Monitoring the approach is of course a requirement but this pilot had a helmet fire. I'm reminded of the Eglin AFB F-35A pilot at night attempting to rectify HMDS faults during his FAST approach. These two pilots were trying to do TOO MUCH and needed to GO ROUND AGAIN - but too late. CRASH.

Eglin was way outside of the envelope at the other end of the spectrum, but at least it was still subsonic... FBW places the driver outside part of the feedback loops, but the soft squishy stuff still has an ASI, an E indexer or other to show the energy state. If the commands are accepting of the SA that exists where the guys n' gals have bad days because the CB popped on their HMD, or the mode didn't change, then we may be at the thin edge of some large orders for replacements for the wrecks that are going to stack up. For an aircraft that has been designed to give unparalleled sensor fusion and information to the driver, that there appears to be a hint of a trend to loss of SA to the pilot with expensive outcomes, seems to need a bit of a rethink.

The helmet fire itself is not the problem, it is having a helmet fire, and without a greater emergency existing, continuing with a wild ride without the advantage of having a season ticket. We can always sell tickets to spectators to come and see the impromptu rapid disassembly of seriously expensive assets conducted with flair.

Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently?

[SpazSinbad]

Hang on. "...Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently?" Who is suggesting this? It seems the mishap pilot has been benched because he did not wave off compounded by all the reasons in the accident report to qualify as PILOT ERROR. I don't know if he has a chance to come back but Naval Aviation has many stories (many not public and historical) about pilots not qualifying as deck landers for one reason or another. Some were able to get back to being qualified after more training. Them's the breaks of naval air. I'm reminded of a Super Hornet Senior CAG pilot punching out at night behind the CVN because he thought he was in auto throttle when he wasn't. A PLAT video shows the ejection. Pilot was rescued OK but what happened after I do not know. To date there have been many F-35C carrier landings without any particular incidents AFAIK. Mostly reports are good with comments about how accurate the aircraft can be flown to the deck such that the target wire is changed more often because it is hit so often during a good approach. Nuggets particularly are noted to transition to being good deck landers with minimal training beforehand, such that deck qualifying day/night is a breeze (green glow has been eradicated from USN HMDSs whilst USAF has been tardy changing over it seems). BooHoo USAF. USN pilot calls the ball in auto throttle but he ain't.

Wot's on the PLAT? See GIF. (does not show PLAT screen for the video below)

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1680x1050/ilartsindicationsplat_5461f40c8882ae3dbe83173ec4dba17126d4e8 dc.gif

Video title: Hook 2014 PLAT/ILARTS Night Eject F-18E Super Hornet Approach USS CARL VINSON Pilot Rescued OK HELO

Hook 2014 PLAT/ILARTS Night Eject F-18E Super Hornet Approach USS CARL VINSON Pilot Rescued OK HELO - YouTube

[SASless]

Just a thought....how long is the Pre-Landing Check List and how is it presented....Mental recall only, written in a Check List , presented digitally, or just by Pilot Memory?

The comment about the Pilot not selecting the correct Throttle Mode during the 27 Seconds following lowering the Landing gear and the aircraft striking the Ramp....without some basis of the workload the Pilot was confronted with during that time period begs expanding upon by the investigating Officer.

How many items on that Check List?

Is there a "Finals" Check List for limited to critical items only...Gear Flaps, Throttle, AFCS, Radar, etc..

There seems to ample evidence the Pilot was being over loaded and just failed to admit it and initiate a Go Around on his own.

A carrier landing is difficult under any circumstances....and in a very short abbreviated landing circuit there is a lot of acuities going on that pose a distraction.....called handling of the aircraft....that interferes with the house keeping side of business.

No matter how good you are or have been....every landing is a test of your skill and ability. and of the aircraft and its systems, and of external support and assistance of the Carrier.

Habits are hard to break.

Having George flying your approaches is a gift from the Gods.....until George makes a mistake or is given confusing directions by the Pilot.

Auto Pilots are pretty reliable as are Humans....but no matter how capable the Auto Pilot can be....they have to be set up properly both by the Engineers but also the Pilot of the Aircraft.

In this accident I do not see anything that triggered a warning to the Pilot of impending disaster as the aircraft did not warn him and he himself did not tweak to the fact there was a problem of his own doing.



For Not a Boffin.....even the LSO's were not aware of a problem until the very final moments as they. had no indication of a problem from any one or any thing.

[Not_a_boffin]

For Not a Boffin.....even the LSO's were not aware of a problem until the very final moments as they. had no indication of a problem from any one or any thing.

Which was the entire point of my post which you seemed to think was "absolutely the least important". The LSO have visual indication of everything else, gear down and locked, hook down etc. They don't have visual ID that APCM is engaged or not - which was the thrust of the recommendations to NAVAIRSYSCOM and LM to look at it.

The LSO is the last link in the safety chain - and in an SHB, they have limited time to tell whether on or off glideslope. If they can't visually or aurally ID that all the main items are "green" then they can't provide that function and can't wave-off in time.

None of which gets away from the fact that it was pilot error. If you're at min throttle - for whatever reason (too much trust in the machine, failure to follow checklist, simple switchology), the simple fact is that you can't be following the meatball, sink rate must be below requirement. The meatball must have been at least amber, if not red.

[SASless]

At what point in the approach did the aircraft sink below the Glide Slope and the Pilot and LSO's detect the aircraft was not correcting that deviation?

Check the video timeline and see how little time exists between that determination and the time the Pilot ejected and the time it took for the aircraft to strike the Ramp.

That suggests the demand for additional power came late in the approach remembering the Throttle was in Manual thus the Computer flying the aircraft had a constant power setting right to that point.

We call it Pilot Error....but a lot of things happened to set him up for failure.

As the Pilot he has the final repsonsibility not the LSO's although one can argue the LSO's have ultimate authority if they issue a Wave Off command.

Did the Pilot advance the Throttle at all before ejecting.....or did he not have the time to do do?

We know Navy Carrier Pilots receive training about the importance of making a Ejection decision when things go wrong as even with modern Seats delay can fatal.

[Not_a_boffin]

At what point in the approach did the aircraft sink below the Glide Slope and the Pilot and LSO's detect the aircraft was not correcting that deviation?

Check the video timeline and see how little time exists between that determination and the time the Pilot ejected and the time it took for the aircraft to strike the Ramp.

That suggests the demand for additional power came late in the approach remembering the Throttle was in Manual thus the Computer flying the aircraft had a constant power setting right to that point.

We call it Pilot Error....but a lot of things happened to set him up for failure.

As the Pilot he has the final repsonsibility not the LSO's although one can argue the LSO's have ultimate authority if they issue a Wave Off command.

Did the Pilot advance the Throttle at all before ejecting.....or did he not have the time to do do?

We know Navy Carrier Pilots receive training about the importance of making a Ejection decision when things go wrong as even with modern Seats delay can fatal.

The narrative timeline has 11 seconds between entering the groove and the ramp strike. At some time in the first six seconds according to the narrative, the pilot realised he was off glideslope and sinking and advanced the throttle (although the flight data part of the narrative also suggests that he only advanced the throttle two seconds before the ramp strike). At the groove plus six seconds point, the LSO made first call for power, followed by a wave-off one second later. Four seconds later, the aircraft hit the ramp and the pilot ejected.

So the pilot got into the groove with throttle at idle and for whatever reason failed to notice - SA again - until too late. The fact it's a very short approach doesn't help, which is why some form of visual / aural alert to the LSO that (as per gear and hook) the aircraft is in the correct mode for recovery would have helped. That extra six seconds between entering the groove and the first LSO power-call might have resulted in a successful wave-off. That's why they have that authority.

[fdr]

Hang on. "...Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently?" Who is suggesting this? It seems the mishap pilot has been benched because he did not wave off compounded by all the reasons in the accident report to qualify as PILOT ERROR. I don't know if he has a chance to come back but Naval Aviation has many stories (many not public and historical) about pilots not qualifying as deck landers for one reason or another. Some were able to get back to being qualified after more training. Them's the breaks of naval air. I'm reminded of a Super Hornet Senior CAG pilot punching out at night behind the CVN because he thought he was in auto throttle when he wasn't. A PLAT video shows the ejection.

Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently? I don't think I am "suggesting" that, I am stating that as an observation of what we are seeing people occupying the window seat while relying on automation to do the job. I would have been happy not to see a CAG jettison his ride in there brine, nor read of Elgin's high speed pass from a tight fitting helmet, or a known deteriorating energy state for unrecognised error. This is not isolated to a fleet or service, the airlines have an irreducible level of USAs that occur and have clear wave off policy, yet our drivers continue and land. Expectancy seems to rule the roost.

Years ago, driving a 777 all night to get to 24R @ LAX, beautiful morning, (it's so-CAl..) youngster PF. traffic, normal LAX lineups. Passing 1,000', guy in front misses the only available HS exit that doesn't have a SW tail stuck on it, yet slows down and taxies at a crawl, with the only free off ramp the 90 at the end. Cockpit chat, "expect this to be a GA..." my youngster comments, "... but we are stabilised.....". @ 400', I call "G/A" to the guy on the controls, and tell ATC we are going around. Pleasant scenic of Marina del Ray in the tight RH pattern. Question from approach, " from tower, what was the reason for the G/A?", Hmmm... "noise abatement". "huh?" "noise abatement, there was a plane on the runway, didn't want to make a big noise". It isn't just the flight crew that get target fixation, or task saturation, or helmet fires. The activity we do needs constant comparison of desired state to actual state, to detect the slip. We have a natural confirmation bias from prior successes that the situation we have is not that bad or is salvageable, assuming we actually know we have a slip between expected and actual conditions. Having a helmet fire is not unusual or unexpected, it becomes a problem when the 1st person participant doesn't recognise the overload conditions and act to reset the situation to one where they aren't leaving teeth marks on the elevators.

[flighthappens]

Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently? I don't think I am "suggesting" that, I am stating that as an observation of what we are seeing people occupying the window seat while relying on automation to do the job. I would have been happy not to see a CAG jettison his ride in there brine, nor read of Elgin's high speed pass from a tight fitting helmet, or a known deteriorating energy state for unrecognised error. This is not isolated to a fleet or service, the airlines have an irreducible level of USAs that occur and have clear wave off policy, yet our drivers continue and land. Expectancy seems to rule the roost.

Years ago, driving a 777 all night to get to 24R @ LAX, beautiful morning, (it's so-CAl..) youngster PF. traffic, normal LAX lineups. Passing 1,000', guy in front misses the only available HS exit that doesn't have a SW tail stuck on it, yet slows down and taxies at a crawl, with the only free off ramp the 90 at the end. Cockpit chat, "expect this to be a GA..." my youngster comments, "... but we are stabilised.....". @ 400', I call "G/A" to the guy on the controls, and tell ATC we are going around. Pleasant scenic of Marina del Ray in the tight RH pattern. Question from approach, " from tower, what was the reason for the G/A?", Hmmm... "noise abatement". "huh?" "noise abatement, there was a plane on the runway, didn't want to make a big noise". It isn't just the flight crew that get target fixation, or task saturation, or helmet fires. The activity we do needs constant comparison of desired state to actual state, to detect the slip. We have a natural confirmation bias from prior successes that the situation we have is not that bad or is salvageable, assuming we actually know we have a slip between expected and actual conditions. Having a helmet fire is not unusual or unexpected, it becomes a problem when the 1st person participant doesn't recognise the overload conditions and act to reset the situation to one where they aren't leaving teeth marks on the elevators.

So a guy flying a multi-crew aircraft, as the Non-Flying pilot while conducting a stabilised approach for 2 minutes, is comparing that situation to a nugget, in a single seat, high energy fighter flying an approach with a significantly changing energy state, that even with automation requires significant manual inputs, with only 11 seconds in the groove- all this against a moving target.

Yep, I can see the parallels.

[retoocs]

Just a thought....how long is the Pre-Landing Check List and how is it presented....Mental recall only, written in a Check List , presented digitally, or just by Pilot Memory?

The comment about the Pilot not selecting the correct Throttle Mode during the 27 Seconds following lowering the Landing gear and the aircraft striking the Ramp....without some basis of the workload the Pilot was confronted with during that time period begs expanding upon by the investigating Officer.

How many items on that Check List?



From the report.

42. The F-35C Landing Checklist is:
1. Landing Gear – Down
2. Hook – Down (as required)
3. Land/Taxi Lights – As required
4. APC/DFP – As desired

[SASless]

refocus,

From the USNI article posted back in the Thread.....

After the turn, the pilot didn’t engage the two landing assist tools on the fighter, the Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC) and the Delta Flight Path (DFP), which automate some of the pilot’s necessary tasks for landing on an aircraft carrier. When activated, DFP automatically adjusts the throttle to keep the aircraft on correct glide scope to land on a carrier, while the APC maintains the fighter’s angle of attack.

[SpazSinbad]

'SASless' I would not trust a USNInews article about NavAv for them to get the details correct unless the author specialised in the matter. I read what you highlighted and thought 'that does not seem correct' but then did not try to puzzle it out at the time. The F-35C has automation that cannot be taken away as mentioned I think in the Dan Canin article.

My old brain always reverts to 'meatball, line up and airspeed (Opt AoA). Trim to that (the A4G held that attitude very well still with fast ailerons/elevators) controlling glideslope with throttle and AoA with elevator and line up with aileron. It is a twinkletoe business that keeps one occupied for a few intense concentration tunnel vision seconds. Nothing else will do. My skin crawls reading the F-35C mishap pilot was at flight idle for so long even lining up in that state. That was the time to wave off, given other bits were not OK, according to the pilot but then again I was not there - it was not me chief. For sure the LSOs need to know when the F-35C is in manual. I would have thought that was in the ball call. "Callsign Fuel Manual (or not)".

[SpazSinbad]

F-35C Slow Motion Arrest USS NIMITZ OK Number Three Wire
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5C78Bgot_xA
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/817x550/cartoons_spudlocker_nan_buaero_jul70_small_record_c26e0a705a 5e2e39986a28a85b82980b2b40f07d.gif

[retoocs]

For sure the LSOs need to know when the F-35C is in manual. I would have thought that was in the ball call. "Callsign Fuel Manual (or not)".

Based on the various podcasts discussing PLM, they are going to PLM only, no manual mode. For PLM to fail, other flight systems would have to fail too. No one brought up the fact that someone would leave it off.

[SpazSinbad]

I find the modes on/off confusing. The gaggle of LSOs on the platform (it has another name also) have a bunch of dials and screens SO I'm guessing that an indicator about the status of the PLM/whatever OR NOT could be shown despite whatever the pilot says during ball call.

[fdr]

So a guy flying a multi-crew aircraft, as the Non-Flying pilot while conducting a stabilised approach for 2 minutes, is comparing that situation to a nugget, in a single seat, high energy fighter flying an approach with a significantly changing energy state, that even with automation requires significant manual inputs, with only 11 seconds in the groove- all this against a moving target.

Yep, I can see the parallels.
apparently not, you missed the point, the helmet fire wasn't in our plane, it was ATC. Re-read.

[Chronic Snoozer]

I don't think that is a helmet fire fdr. That just sounds like a regulation gherkin that ATC throw at you from time to time.

[Mozella]

I don't get it. It's been a long time since I was doing this kind of stuff, but we used to enter the break at the ship in a similar way quite often. Of course a Sierra Hotel break was not always possible or appropriate. For example, when returning from a 35 or 40 plane Alpha strike with the pattern full of aircraft , we entered between 250 and 350 knots and made a normal break to downwind so as to fit in with the existing traffic. The idea was to slot into your place in line without any unnecessary gap to the plane ahead but also without extending upwind very far which would cause an extended downwind leg and that burns up precious fuel. It was all about judgement and it was a low stress event, if you can consider any landing on a carrier "low stress".

However, when returning from the Northern BARCAP in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam Conflict, we left station only after being relieved by the guys from the subsequent launch. Consequently, we were last to recover and often the ship was waiting for us having already recovered all the other aircraft except the ready tanker and the helo. The pattern was empty and the ship was eager to complete the recovery without delay. In that case, my flight of two normally approached the ship in a steep decent with the leader's power set just above idle (to give the wingman something to work with) and the oil cooler door open which produced a wonderful howl which was the hallmark of the F-8 Crusader entering the break at high speeds. The goal was to arrive at the ship just above flight deck altitude, close aboard the starboard side so the guys on the 0-7 level in the island could get a good view.

You wanted to look your best because it reflected on your squadron reputation. People were watching, so if you were the wingman you tucked in as tightly as you dared and then got even a little bit closer to the leader, hoping that you didn't touch him and wind up in a big ball fo flaming metal. How embarrassing that would be. And the leader tried to be silky smooth, giving his wingman the best chance to fly a really tight formation. If you were good at it, you hit the break with ultra smooth maneuvering and little or no throttle movement. Airspeed would be right around 600 knots or a bit more, making close formation flying even more challenging. There is a reason the Blues and Thunderbirds fly around at about half that speed.

When abeam the island, the leader and wingman would break together in a 6.5g "fan break", throttle at idle, and speed brakes out. The wingman would use a bit less g in order to gain a little separation at the 180.

The idea of lighting the burner in the break, as this F-35 pilot apparently did, makes no sense. The idea is to slow down, isn't it? The F-35 pilot in question, it seems to me, entered the break too slowly and lit the burner in order to sustain a high g turn to downwind. I don't get it.

Back to my Sea Story. So after 180 degrees of turn you find yourself at the 180, usually with too much speed to lower the gear and (in the case of the Crusader) raise the wing. You turn in anyway and when you slow sufficiently you configure your fighter for landing somewhere around the 135 or 90 degrees to go. We had APC but using it it was optional. However, knowing if it was engaged or not was NOT optional. I always read the landing checklist, EVERY TIME. And I never had a gear-up pass or a ramp strike caused by not knowing the configuration of my airplane.

That seems rather obvious and at first glance it seems as though it would be pretty simple. But flying a high performance fighter is rather complicated and not everyone can do it well. That's why it's so important to place the best people in the cockpit based on their ability and (as someone once said) the "content of their character". Using gender or skin color or any other social metric to assign fighter pilots is no way to run a military force.

Bottom line: When appropriate, making a Sierra Hotel break is normal and it's surprising that any fighter pilot operating around the ship who achieved the rank of Lt. had never performed one. Something isn't quite right. It sounds to me like this guy was in over his head and found himself performing a maneuver everyone in his squadron should find easy enough to complete safely. You don't like a 650 knot break? Enter at 550 knots. Can't hack a 7g break, use a 6g turn. Can't configure the airplane for landing by the time you hit the groove if you're too hot at the 180? Break a little bit long or extend your downwind and accept a "long in the groove" grade by the LSO.

I admit I'm out of touch with the modern Navy. However, if you can't keep up with airplane well enough when things get busy to the point that you cant perform the landing checklist and/or you don't know if you're in APC or not, it's time to ask them to transfer you to flying the COD or some other less challenging job, isn't it? Folks who don't measure up when it comes to showing off around the ship will NEVER measure up if they ever find themselves in real combat.

Don't try being a "hot dog" if you're really a "hamburger", or in this guy's case a "cheeseburger". I don't know if fighter pilots still use these terms, but you get the point. Said another way, "The don't wind 'em as tight as they used to".

[typerated]

I think you misunderstand. F-18 might as well not have an autoland feature, given that its pilots are required to maintain competence in manual landings, which forces practically all deck landings to be flown manually. But USN leadership deserves great credit for the progress it has made, and continues to make on automation. Are the leaders who have moved the culture away from "manual first" uninformed or clueless as to the relative value of CQ? For evidence of how much further the Navy is down this road than the USAF, see MQ-25.

For the avoidance of doubt, this is a compliment for naval aviation.

Totally.
Surely the future is not having 'aircrew' touch the aeroplane for take off or landing - these can be automatic functions - let the computer do this.
This halfway house of some auto functions is just a temporary stop on the march of progress.

Aircrew, while they still fly, will be airborne to put a human brain into battle management on the scene - essentially the job of a back seater.

[fdr]

I don't think that is a helmet fire fdr. That just sounds like a regulation gherkin that ATC throw at you from time to time.

And yet, it is exactly the same thing that happened at KSFO 28R with the latest effort to cut tails off aircraft parked off the side of a runway, but from the other side, ATC directing 6 times for the plane to go arounds, a whoopsie put down to "sorry, comms". Are we so fixated on details that actually looking that the runway is clear is too much to ask for? Is it too much to expect a pilot to cross check a MASI/AOA indexer when they have an auto throttle that they have abrogated , rightly or wrongly, responsibility to? For the F35, perhaps the APC needs a set of gold wings gifted from the drivers, and silver wings from the USAF. Or maybe, and sorry to be simplistic, maybe we should train and expect crews to cross check their instruments to confirm performance and selections, perhaps pilots should be trained to confirm a switch selection against an expected response, and in the absence of that response, to have a curiosity in the proceedings. Would save the odd occasional F35A, F35C, B777, B777, B777, ATR 72... etc.

Developing of bad habits can occur over time, or instantaneously. The instant version tends to be self evident by the ablutions that follow. Those that develop over time are insidious, and we have an expectancy that our deviation from good practice is without risk, until stuff goes pear shaped. Driving planes continues to be an education, hopefully.

“Helmet fires” (otherwise known as task saturation, mis-prioritization, situational awareness and channelized attention)

Assuming that they only relate to temporally constrained events is to miss some of the obvious implications.

In respect to temporal constraints, an 11 second window is about the time that it took to tear apart Lauda 4, It is about 15 times the available response time for a recovery of an R-22 from a throttle chop OGE^... it's 4 times the event time for an engine failure in the hover*... and, as far as SA is concerned, if the time available to ensure that you can remain in front of the elevators is inadequate for the driver to remain in front of the elevators, or to bother to look at an ASI or AOA gauge, then perhaps the training command and the RAG is needing to change their program. In the event at Eglin with the high speed landing there, the time spent leaving bite marks on the elevators was substantial.

If a day VFR recovery to the boat with a jet is reliant on the guys getting the right sequence of buttons flicked as it is a cognitive overload to check an IAS or alpha indexer, then we need to be looking at drones instead.
If it is reasonable to be dismayed by the state of SA of the AZ214 crew for loss of awareness pertaining to basic aviation skills, then there is a hypocrisy in not considering the Eglin A35A and the F35C ramp striker to be "...just one of those things..."
The failure to check performance is not a new phenomenon, e.g, serviceable F-8 Crusaders parked short of the airport in the 50s and 60s and early 70s...#
it is't restricted to nuggets, e.g., CAG Super hornet.



----------------

^ OGE hover engine failure, one certified helicopter has a Tau (time constant) from normal Nr to stall of 0.7 seconds. The FAA §27 requires a 1 second delay for showing compliance, which exceeds the time from failure to death by around 1-(0.7+(1/8.87)*0.5)= ~0.244 seconds, an eternity to meet eternity. The FAA is happy for a 200FH brand new CFI(H) to demonstrate and to teach that procedure... Now, divide the 11 seconds by 0.7...
* for an IGE hover engine failure, in a low energy rotor system the event is over and the dust is settling in less than 3 seconds. In that time, there are at least 5 control input responses that the 200hr instructor has to get right in sequence to avoid rolling his shiny little rotorcraft into a wad.
#The approach mags used to have so many of the "didn't look at AOA/MASI" events that it was hard to determine if a magazine had been previously read or not.

[57mm]

Mozella, thank you for hitting the nail right on the head. Respect from a former Air Defender.

[SASless]

How about this for an exercise.....forget all the Gucci kit available to assist in the landing of a jet on a carrier.....let's focus on the straight forward basic airmanship that occurred.

Answer the question.....at what point did the MP's effort to land that F-35 on the Carrier begin to go wrong?

Was it initial entry airspeed, height, combination of both, the addition of After Burner in the initial break, radius of turn in the initial break, and right on down the line to the point he realized it was time to eject leaving his aircraft to crash onto the carrier?

At which point would one think a Go Around Decision should have been made?

Why did he wait so long to see the Accident Chain materialize in front of his eyes?

Why did he not realize he had goofed it up to the degree that abandoning the Landing was necessary and appropriate?

He is quoted as saying he did not feel any pressure by Command or other sources that might have influenced his thinking....but does not the Navy system not do that even if it is not intentional?

Some experienced Navy Jet Pilots have suggested what some of the answers might be.

High, fast, and above the Glide Slope is a tough situation to correct in a sleek low drag Jet. just as it is in any aircraft when landing.

Are we not taught that the secret to a good landing. is a good approach to that landing.

At what point did the MP realize his approach was "unstable" or did he not ever realize that until the LSO called Wave Off at almost the same instant that the Pilot was ejecting?

The real question os "why" the very late realization it was not going to end well.

[Courtney Mil]

A ramp strike should result in the removal of the pilot’s certification. If you can’t land the aircraft, you have no business flying it. Basic airmanship. As for the “checklist excuse”, just four items? Not impressed.

[Rhymenoceros]

There are quite a few misconceptions and areas of misunderstanding on this thread that should probably be cleared up…

What stands out to me is the usual ‘facts based’ USN mishap report that completely fails to answer the question of how the pilot got himself into an unrecoverable situation. By glossing over that, this report offers little than a summary of what happened with a few recommendations that will hopefully prevent a crash when the next guy or girl screws it up. However, no effort is made to prevent future screw ups - simply the consequences.

Before I receive a barrage of incoming spears, I will start out by stating that I am 100% guilty of participating in this activity in a previous life. I’ve seen ‘expedited recoveries’ performed excellently and safely. I have also seen more than 1 pilot almost fly into the ocean attempting them. I’ve seen countless over-stresses of F18s doing this and plenty of requirements to wave off unsafe SHBs.

To start we should move away from the terminology of ‘expedited break’ or Sierra Hotel Break - it was a ***** hot break. Period. The intent was to demonstrate ability / Naval Aviator ‘spirit’ / bring morale to those watching. Very happy for someone to tell me the risks inherent in a SHB are worth saving approximately 30s during a deck recovery cycle. Additionally, in order to execute a SHB you need to generate more of a gap between you and your interval - you can achieve the exact same timing by just executing a normal break behind the aircraft ahead of you in the pattern. Finally, if you are ‘breaking the deck’ ie. the first aircraft to land in a given cycle, you aim for the deck to go green and ready for your recovery as you enter the groove. The time spent in the pattern, getting to the point in space, is irrelevant.

So how does one fly a SHB? Great question as it’s not published. It is not a standard procedure that a pilot is taught at any point in training or when in the fleet. Is it commonplace? - absolutely. But the first time you ‘attempt’ the SHB you are on a voyage of discovery guided only by the ‘gouge’ / techniques passed informally to you by your peers. What could go wrong? What we are talking about is normalisation of deviance. CV NATOPS states how you should fly the pattern and offers no alternative guidance. Fly the SHB and you are saying “noted, but I’m going to ignore that and try something else”. Again, before you come at me, baying for blood - I’ve ignored CV NATOPS and ripped it off at 7g aft of the ship in Max AB.

Why Afterburner in the break? Because it looks and sounds cool to the audience watching on the deck. Period. Why didn’t he wave off when he thought he was off parameters? Because pilots ‘shall not’ take their own wave offs in the groove - this is the job of the LSOs. Very happy to explain why another time. Why did he fail to complete his 4 item landing checklist? Because he was task saturated in a 7g, ~600ft, max performance turn whilst looking over his shoulder at the flight deck whilst panicking on how an earth he was going to slow his F35 down. I sympathise - I’ve been there.

SHBs are informally encouraged in the fleet. LSOs used to give automatic upgrades to your landing grade if you flew a safe SHB, regardless of being off parameters that would guarantee you a poor grade had you been flying a normal pattern. Do something unsafe however and all bets are off.

So to finish with something constructive. If the USN want to avoid this happening again by addressing the route cause they have two options:

Prohibit SHBs. Tricky one as it’s a grey line on what is / what isn’t and I agree with the board’s rationale on why a blanket ban creates additional problems.
Write a procedure on how to fly a SHB and like everything else you do in naval aviation, train to it. This would be my recommendation for what it’s worth (absolutely nothing).

Finally thoughts to the 5 crew members who were seriously injured by this, 3 of which whom required immediate MEDIVAC. I do sympathise with the pilot but you have little defence when consciously decide to deviate from your trained standards and attempt something you’ve never done before, that has not formalised execution standards.

[Smilin_Ed]

If circumstances put you in a position where you cannot execute a safe landing, on a ship or on a field, the Sierra Hotel thing to do is to go around before you get "in the groove,"

[sycamore]

Perhaps the APD/DFP need to be engaged automatically when the gear and hook are extended,but can be turned OFF,manually when `Brains` wants to prove he is `SH-T HOT`.....and confirmed by the LSO on getting `in the groove`...

[Courtney Mil]

Then you wouldn’t get it when training to do “touch and goes”.

[Lonewolf_50]

If circumstances put you in a position where you cannot execute a safe landing, on a ship or on a field, the Sierra Hotel thing to do is to go around before you get "in the groove,"
There is no approach that is too beautiful, nor too ugly, to wave off. The Wave Off is an equal opportunity move. :cool:

[Mogwi]

There is no approach that is too beautiful, nor too ugly, to wave off. The Wave Off is an equal opportunity move. :cool:

Absolutely true - except when you are on your last few pounds of gas. Once hit the deck, from a straight-in glide from 90 miles, with less than 90secs worth of fuel. Only reason I got back was that I had fired both ‘winders and emptied the guns. One of the (few) advantages of VL (or SRVL).

Mog

[SpazSinbad]

Perhaps the APD/DFP need to be engaged automatically when the gear and hook are extended, but can be turned OFF, manually when `Brains` wants to prove he is `SH-T HOT`.....and confirmed by the LSO on getting `in the groove`...
For some half a century USN aircraft have had a HOOK BYPASS SWITCH of some kind (the A4G was manually operated by the ground crew outside the cockpit - before FCLP/MADDLS for example). Anyhoo that mechanism as seen in the Super Hornet NATOPS may provide a way:
(I have no access to the F-35C NATOPS however I'll imagine its HBS may have similar characteristics?)

NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL NAVY MODEL F/A-18E/F 165533 AND UP AIRCRAFT 15 Sep 2008
https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-000.pdf (19.4Mb)
"...2.6.1.5 Approach Lights. The approach lights, located on the nose gear strut, provide AOA indications to an LSO during carrier landings. Three approach lights are provided to indicate a fast (red), on-speed (amber), or slow (green) AOA condition. The approach lights are powered with WoffW and all landing gear down and locked. Therefore, the approach lights are an external indication that the landing gear are down and locked. The approach lights flash when the HOOK BYPASS switch is in the CARRIER position and the arresting hook is not down, indicating to an LSO that the hook must be lowered for a carrier arrestment. The approach lights are dimmed by the WARN/CAUT lights knob.

2.6.1.6 HOOK BYPASS Switch. The HOOK BYPASS switch, located on the lower left main instrument panel, is spring loaded to the CARRIER position and is electrically held in the FIELD position.

FIELD Approach lights and AOA indexers do not flash regardless of hook position. The switch reverts to the CARRIER position if the hook is lowered.

CARRIER Approach lights and AOA indexers flash if the hook is not down..."
&
"...2.18.6 Angle Of Attack Indexer. The angle of attack indexer is mounted to the left of the HUD. It displays approach angle of attack (AOA) with lighted symbols; corresponding AOA indications are shown on the HUD. The indexer operates with the landing gear down and locked and weight off the gear. The lighted symbol(s) flash if the arresting hook is up and the hook bypass switch, on the left vertical panel, is in CARRIER. The symbols will not flash with the arresting hook up and the hook bypass switch in FIELD. The switch is solenoid held to FIELD and automatically goes to CARRIER when the arresting hook is lowered or aircraft power is removed. The AOA indexer knob on the HUD controls dimming of the symbols. All symbols light when the lights test switch on the interior lights control panel is held to TEST...."

[Courtney Mil]

Hear hear. No excuse for lack of basic airmanship, or failing to maintain essential skills. No one that smacks their jet into the ramp or undershoot has any place flying the aircraft.

[megan]

No one that smacks their jet into the ramp or undershoot has any place flying the aircraftDon't think you appreciate the difficulties that can arise operating onto a deck CM. 13 kill WWII ace and experienced test pilot Cdr. George Chamberlain Duncan carrying out suitability trials of the F9F came to grief, returned to flying six months later, and a long distinguished naval career. Spaz is an experienced A-4 deck operator and could comment.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1uEYHWKDf14

[SpazSinbad]

Meanwhile ALL YOUSE Need to know 'bout NavAv & SuchLike.... :}

FREE no need to register DIRECT DOWNLOAD URL below:

A4G-RANFAAaircraftOthers01mar23p20,032.pdf (3.6Gb)
https://1drv.ms/b/s!AuYHBzTWY83LgZI-sMAGNRG4Ypqk0Q?e=zkRhDX

Download instructions: https://www.faaaa.asn.au/our-history/spazsinbad-a4g/

Probably earlier PDF link is still there but download/viewing instructions still good.

[Courtney Mil]

I’m not convinced that 600 hours A-4 over half a century ago on the infamous Melbourne is the best basis for comment on 21st century carrier ops. But none of that has anything to do with basic pilot skills especially landing an aircraft that is highly automated on a modern carrier in fair weather, especially when it comes to recognising and rejecting a failed approach.-

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks for reading my material. 'Infamous Melbourne'? Half a century ago - certainly - hence I could not possibly comment. What is your expertise in naval aviation to comment and how long ago? You have an opinion. I have my opinion but not stated here.

[fdr]

Thanks for reading my material. 'Infamous Melbourne'? Half a century ago - certainly - hence I could not possibly comment. What is your expertise in naval aviation to comment and how long ago? You have an opinion. I have my opinion but not stated here.

"Stone nose... "; was more comfortable for a SeaKing arrival than yon' A-4G I'd wager :)

Spaz, were you the carriers propeller observer? it was around your time. Always thought it was an impressive bit of lateral thinking to check out the biologic growth level on the boat :}

[SpazSinbad]

Are you referring to 'ROCKY' Stone? I'm pleased he and his crew were OK. You would have to read 20K PDF pages (direct link above) or 19K is still available at the FAAAA website. :}

[megan]

No one that smacks their jet into the ramp or undershoot has any place flying the aircraftWith your obviously superior knowledge CM you might offer your services to the USN since ramp strikes feature heavily in their accident statistics. My personal experience is limited to the USS Lexington on an absolutely beautiful day, calm seas, in a T-28 for 7 arrests, 4 touch and goes, 1 bolter, not experienced, but an insight. Naval aviation is the only service I've heard of where the stress gets to folks where they voluntarily hand their wings in, USN study of Vietnam pilots found their stress levels were higher at the boat than when subject to AA and SAMs.

[SpazSinbad]

Stress Levels Prolly HIGH bekuz the LSO '1 wire' debriefs could be FEARSOME. :}
LSO Debrief HMS Eagle 'On The Roger' 1968

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6P9trtMnq0E

[SASless]

Megan,

Imagine getting amped up landing back aboard your Bird Farm AFTER dodging flak of all kinds, and evading lots of SAM's...and Mig-17's and Mig-21's .

Sorta puts some perspective into this carrier landing thing don't it?

Then.....you can add night, bad weather, and rough seas into the mix as well......even Jake Grafton had his own moments of difficulty landing back onboard his ship.

After all....he was who books were written about.

[Easy Street]

Imagine getting amped up landing back aboard your Bird Farm AFTER dodging flak of all kinds, and evading lots of SAM's...and Mig-17's and Mig-21's .

Sorta puts some perspective into this carrier landing thing don't it?

Then.....you can add night, bad weather, and rough seas into the mix as well.....

Which is why I find it very curious that some experienced voices in this thread seem to think that automating (with no need for manual back up) some or all of this exceptionally difficult task is a bad thing!!

[Mogwi]

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1333/crash2_03132282915a3064fa53032ee6758851244b5bc3.jpg
Ramp strikes are not a new phenomenon. This is Mogwi Snr about to take the barrier after a ramp strike on HMS Indefatigable. He had just shot down a Japanese Emily but the rear gunner put a round through his glycol tank and the donk quit short finals.

Mog

[SpazSinbad]

Reminds me of this photo: https://www.docdroid.net/kooBMJE/royal-air-force-yearbook-1988.pdf "Carrier operations were always precarious - as shown by this 809 Squadron aircraft hitting the barrier on HMS Stalker. P.H.T. Green Collection"

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1622x1050/rafbarrierhmsstalker_47e3ce3a11fb5d1dd870a03080f5cf43c477d1a 4.jpg
https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1631x1050/barrierlinebookentryrnfaamuseum_abc08bac0f8a6f31091a315c63e3 c8745f0ac9f4.jpg

[SpazSinbad]

AIRCRAFT ARRESTOR NET [RN FAA F-4K Phantom Mockup Barricade Test]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITawKXPt3MI

[SpazSinbad]

As one does wandering thru the 20K pages this gem about FireFightin' VeHicles of old was found but the 'PADDLES MONTHLY' May 2011 USN LSO news letter is no longer available online: http://www.hrana.org/documents/PaddlesMonthlyMay2011.pdf
On page 2 of the MISHAP report: "...(3) To ensure survivability of the upwind Mobile Firefighting Vehicle (MFFV) and its ability to help respond to a crash in the landing area, position upwind MFFV away from the foul line...." Some lessons need to be learned and relearned.... (see GIF)

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1151x1045/a_6intrudermanualpassboltermb5hit_2a0f083ce793c728b45f00d4e1 10c5e5f95a9511.gif

PROWLER duz somethin' simla'? (I'll have to find the URL for APPROACH Nov-Dec 2007)

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1624x1050/ea_6b_prowler_holycow_arrest_approach_nov_dec_2007_64e32150a 4f4634f3e38c585fc147f67d3b276cc.jpg
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/698x710/grampawgrummanironworks_af4000ac4ce5f5da3eb301a98f5ca3c6b4ec 79bf.gif

[Ascend Charlie]

The readers here might not appreciate how bluddy small the Melbourne was, and the balls of stainless steel needed to lob an A4 or a Tracker onto that deck. Add some seas, darkness, weather and such and the stress would be measured on the Richter scale.

A tale is told of the Oz A4 pilots being invited to shoot some approaches to a US carrier, may have been Enterprise, forgotten now. They had some fun and marvelled at the room available. Our boys invited the Yanks to come to the Melbourne for a return favour, but when they saw the size, they politely refused and went home.

[Courtney Mil]

’Infamous Melbourne'?
Yes. Rammed an RAN destroyer and a USN destroyer. How many killed? Never fired a shot in anger and had numerous other collisions, crew members killed and lost aircraft. Yes, infamous.

[SpazSinbad]

I can see how a point of view may see 'infamous' may be used depending upon viewpoint. 'Numerous other collisions' what were these pray tell? How many crew members killed (aboard HMAS Melbourne?). 'Lost aircraft' what does that mean and how many? Then of course apart from 'collisions with destroyers (not fault of the carrier steaming on flying course at night) one would need to have some comparison with other carriers and their statistics. 'Never fired a shot in anger'? Good one. Still we have no idea of your own naval aviation experience.

[megan]

Still we have no idea of your own naval aviation experienceOn the face of it Spaz, none, his resume RAF Pilot 1977-2007: F4, Hawk QWI, F-15, Tornado F3. One would think with that experience he might be cognizant of naval difficulties and why the LSO, who theoretically may be the most junior aviator on the ship, will give the most senior a no holds barred debrief, remembering that your grade for every landing made on the cruise is on the crewroom score board for all to see, besides everyone with PLAT vision on the ship having real time viewing.

Night, blue water operation, big deck pitch, only alternate Martin Baker. Stress, nah. :p

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTVj_ZSwxGE

Day time, night is better, you can't see. :p

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Ki8Ji4HQVU

[SpazSinbad]

Very interesting. Meanwhile PHANTOM FG Mk 1 Aircrew Manual Oct 1969
https://www.filefactory.com/file/288esr9hczq5/Phantom_FG%20Mk%201%20Aircrew%20Manual.pdf (27Mb)
"...Approach and Landing
9. Complete the Checks Before Landing when down-wind or as appropriate to CCA. In high ambient temperatures, fly a wide circuit to avoid excursion in and out of "7th at MIL" during the final turn.
10. The aircraft should be established on the centreline and glide path as early as possible and maintained on the glide path with small throttle movements. During the final stages of the approach, the airflow aft of the carrier can induce some loss of speed and/or height, and every effort must therefore be made to avoid being below the glide path or too slow at this stage in the approach. Datum approach speed should normally be maintained by reference to the AOA system, attempting to hold 19 units AOA which should correspond to the middle of the steady note on the audio AOA system. This should give an indicated approach speed of 140 KCAS at 38,000 lb., decreasing by 2 knots per 1,000 lb. decrease in AUW. The KCAS reading for an "on speed" AOA reading may differ by up to 4 knots from the above datum approach speed due to errors in the CADC system.WARNING:
Distortion of the audio tone may occur if XMTR is selected with either the pilot's or observer's V/UHF control selector switched to T/R +G.
11. Maintain approach power after touchdown until a positive arrestment is felt. Throttles may be slammed to MIL power after touchdown under certain conditions specified in the current NAD diagrams. Touchdown short of the wires (particularly with high sink rates) increases the probability of hook skip over the wires.
12. Carry out the Checks After Landing. If the flaps are left in the full down position, closely monitor TGT's particularly when increasing power.
13. Wave-Off. For a two engine wave-off, slam to MIL power and maintain 19-20 units AOA to climb away attitude. For single engine wave-off, slam to MAX reheat and rotate to hold 19-20 units AOA to climb away attitude. Approximately 1/3 rudder is needed to compensate for the asymmetric thrust at MAX reheat. This is particularly important with a reheated port engine to avoid getting too close to the island.
14. Bolter. For a bolter, slam to MIL power (two engines) or MAX reheat (one engine) as soon as it is clear the wire has not been hooked. Attempt to raise the nose on deck by using about ¾ aft stick. If the nose does not come up, it is important that the aircraft should not leave the end of the deck with full back stick applied as this can lead to over-rotation when in free air. Rotate the aircraft to flying attitude by reference to the ADI, the optimum being 14° true attitude. At no time during the rotation should reference be made to the AOA as the system lag can cause serious under-reading...."

[Courtney Mil]

And, strangely enough, that exact technique was used for both carrier and runway landings, even after the K was withdrawn from carrier use, with the exception of retarding the throttles after touchdown or cable engagement and use of the break chute.

[SpazSinbad]

Was your runway moving with 6 Degrees of Freedom? Was an LSO watching your every approach and grading same?

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/885x766/vfa_99greenieboard_ea063bf047edf1d5e7b6746d165705d7a728c473. gif

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1601x1050/6degreesfreedomcvn_0a55c0842147405acb3b989423d1d9fd3c4ea4d1. gif

[SpazSinbad]

Did you get to take off in this manner? PHANTOM FG Mk 1 Aircrew Manual Oct 1969
https://www.filefactory.com/file/288esr9hczq5/Phantom_FG%20Mk%201%20Aircrew%20Manual.pdf (27Mb)
"...Catapult Launch
4. Stick Positioning Device (SPD). The stabilator settings are given in Part 2, Chapter 2, Figs. 2 and 3. The SPD should be set with reference to the stabilator position marks on the fuselage (Mod. 206).
5. The importance of setting the correct stabilator angle for launch is strongly emphasised. The optimum setting results in a gentle nose-up rotation 1 second after launch which is easily checked at the fly-away attitude with a small forward stick movement. Incorrect use of the SPD (incorrect stabilator position), could lead to high pitch rates developing, resulting in a hazardous launch.
6. The SPD clutch allows wire pull out at a force between 50-55 lb on the wire. During catapult launch, wire tension up to 45 lb may occur due to the lack of mass balance in the control column. Therefore avoid pulling hard back against the wire during launch but maintain a light tension.
1. Launch Procedure
a. Carry out the Catapult Checks in the FRc's. Set the SPD to give approximately the correct stabilator angle and then check that the SPD friction clutch can be overridden. Reset the SPD to the correct stabilator angle. With the NLG extended and flaps fully down, at less than MIL RPM the L and R ENGINE BLEED captions must be on. Once MIL power is achieved the L and R ENGINE BLEED captions should go out. After the aircraft is tensioned and on signal from FDO, open up smoothly to MIL power and check that the nozzles are closed and the TGT, HP RPM and LP RPM are within limits and all warning lights out. If reheat is to be used, select MAX reheat and check the nozzles go to pre-open and then to ½-¾ open.
b. If full flaps are selected down before going on the catapult, high TGT's may be reached and the gauge should be closely monitored.
c. The aircraft should not be taxied with the nose gear extended.
d. In conditions of high temperature and humidity, the EMERG VENT knob should be left in vent for launch to avoid the cockpit misting up.
e. The fuel transfer selector is placed to STOP to avoid external tank collapse during acceleration and the fuel transfer pressure switch is set to ON to stop fuel spillage.
Launch Technique. Hold the stick back against the wire, with the elbow braced to prevent excessively high loads being applied. Hold this position through the nose-down "nod" (which may occur immediately on leaving the end of the deck) until the ADI indicates nose rise, when the stick should be checked forward to stop the aircraft rotation at an attitude of 14° nose-up. Establish a climb away and after passing 200 ft. raise the undercarriage and flaps. Complete the Checks After Take-off in the FRc's.
WARNING 1: Due to the lag in the system, the AOA (audio, visual and rudder shaker) must not be relied upon during launch and the initial climb away.
WARNING 2: A true nose-up attitude of 14° should not be exceeded during launch. Be prepared to check forward immediately if a rapid nose-up rotation is observed.
WARNING 3: If insufficient nose-up trim is inadvertently set prior to launch, the expected nose rise will not take place and excessive height loss could occur without some corrective action. In this case override the SPD with a pull force of approximately 42 lb. and then rotate to hold an attitude of 14° nose-up.
WARNING 4: The use of rudder to correct a wing drop on launch may result in overcontrolling and an excessive nose-up pitch rate. For this reason, if the aircraft starts to roll at any time in the post launch phase (due to crosswind or asymmetric stores) it should be corrected primarily with aileron, rudder being used only if aileron is not effective. However, the use of full left aileron is not recommended as this causes a loss of stabilator angle of 7° (4° post mod 273) owing to the stick being constrained to move along the arc of a circle by the SPD wire. Full right aileron causes a loss of only 1° (2·5° post mod 273) stabilator angle...."

[Courtney Mil]

The SPD was a piece of string in the Ks. Thanks for keeping on sending me extracts from the FG1 Aircrew Manual, but I have my own copy - more up to date than the version you’ve found on line. A lot of the CADC and aoa issues were modded out since 1969.

[Mogwi]

SPD was fitted to the SHAR also - but never used!

Mog

[BEagle]

Hi Courtney Mil - hope life's treating you well in France?

Did you have audio AoA in the FG1? I don't recall it in the FGR2, just the gauge and chevron indicators. We had audio AoA in the Bucc and it was very good!

[SpazSinbad]

Extracts from manuals are used for my purposes to end up in the BIG PDF. Nice that you avoid questions. Did your runways move from left to right during your approach? Did your runways have a burble? NAS Nowra had a notorious downdraught on RW 26 (now closed for good in the helo era it seems). This downdraught even caught out visitors despite being warned by the tower.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1629x1050/caribooboorw26nowra_ee49202621674cf05bae70d90cfe870b74d6eff0 .jpg
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1680x1050/caribooboofrontrw26nowra_accaa4744ff95c53a3e42b0c021b3c46f9f c26ee.jpg

[SpazSinbad]

For the fearless readers in this forum there is a lot more at the URL and an audio file and stuff: Official apology for HMAS Melbourne captain 06 Dec 2012 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-06/government-apologises-to-captain-of-hmas-melbourne/4413638
"...In June 1969, 74 American navy personnel died when the USS Frank E Evans collided with the Australian aircraft carrier during exercises off the coast of the Philippines. Although blameless, the commander of HMAS Melbourne, John Stevenson, was made the scapegoat for the accident. Mr Stevenson, 91, has just received a letter from the Defence Minister finally acknowledging he was "not treated fairly" by the government of the day and the Australian Navy...."

[fdr]

Extracts from manuals are used for my purposes to end up in the BIG PDF. Nice that you avoid questions. Did your runways move from left to right during your approach? Did your runways have a burble? NAS Nowra had a notorious downdraught on RW 26 (now closed for good in the helo era it seems). This downdraught even caught out visitors despite being warned by the tower.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1629x1050/caribooboorw26nowra_ee49202621674cf05bae70d90cfe870b74d6eff0 .jpg
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1680x1050/caribooboofrontrw26nowra_accaa4744ff95c53a3e42b0c021b3c46f9f c26ee.jpg

Plonked jets onto 26 recently, and 08, which can be an odd little approach at night too. Still open, and still no better than 45 years ago. Used to be a nice O mess though.

[SpazSinbad]

Good to know. Google Earth overhead photo had it marked with X X Xs for a long time. I'm guessing the short/long field arrestor gear has been removed?

[Courtney Mil]

Hi, Beags. Yes all is great, thanks. And you?

yes, we had audio aoa in the FG1, but never fitted to the FGR2. We still had the indexers and the gauge. It was brilliant; such a shame the 2 didn’t get it. Apart from a couple of cross checks, you could fly the whole approach looking outside. And the other good thing was, if you relied on it, you couldn’t attempt to fly a wheels up approach.

[SpazSinbad]

Earlier "P-25 mobile fire fighting vehicle (MFFV)" was mentioned pic shows the VEHICKLE nearby a "VAQ-140 EA-18G Growler launching from USS George H.W. Bush CVN-77"

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1405x915/vaq_140_ea_18g_growler_launches_from_uss_george_h_w_bush_cvn _77_crop_mffv__4eaf657d9c335a8ae4bee96d9f4169d861e2714e.jpg

“160428-N-UD666-386 PACIFIC OCEAN (Apr. 28, 2016) USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) air department Sailors assigned to the crash and salvage team test the aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) nozzle on a P-25 mobile fire fighting vehicle (MFFV) in the hangar bay. Carl Vinson is underway conducting sea trials off the coast of Southern California. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Daniel P. Jackson Norgart/Released)” https://allhands.navy.mil/Media/Gallery/igphoto/2002417115/

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1620x1157/160428_n_ud666_386_mffv_pdf_0199dfb90487a05ff325142a42bcea4c 86ae4336.jpg

[SpazSinbad]

[F-4K Phantom Ramp Strike] Aircrew Testimony, Mark Jenkins, July 2007 http://www.phantomf4k.org/index.cfm
“This incident may have led to a hull loss but I don't know, there was some talk of grafting the front end to another wrecks back end.

Ark Royal was working up off the west coast of Scotland. The weather was foul with low cloud and a rough sea. We were launched for a night AI sortie just after dusk. The sortie was routine and we were vectored back for a CCA. All the way down the glideslope was thick cloud but just at minimums we broke out underneath to see the deck almost horizontal with a very red meatball. There were shouts of "power" from all sides but the Phantom's spool up time was very slow. Eventually the nose came up and I lost sight of the deck but before that I had a distinct impression of looking UP at the red light on the end of the round-down.

A thump as we hit the deck followed. Being an ex-Vixen observer I was used to judging a landing by the noise, as we had no other input. I had experienced a few landings where an oleo collapsed and this landing sounded similar except the graunching noise came from the back. I was sure we had made a ramp strike. As we boltered down the deck flyco ordered us to go round and do another CCA. I did not want to obey this order and persuaded the pilot to divert ashore.

On the way I was getting nervous that I might have over-reacted but I was slightly re-assured when we had a runaway nose down trim that has us diving for the sea. I was even happier when, after landing gingerly at Lossiemouth, I inspected the aircraft and found the whole underside of the tail severely dented with the hook having been rammed right up inside the empennage. When they stripped the aircraft down they found every rib and stringer broken with only the skin panels holding the tail on. Had we attempted another deck landing with the tail in this condition the results would probably have been disastrous.

There was no word from the ship asking how we had got on or how we were to get back, so eventually we bummed a ride on a supply ship heading to the carrier. As I climbed back on board I was feeling quite good that I had saved the Navy an aeroplane & possibly two crew but I was quickly disabused of this with a ferocious rocket from the CO for disobeying flyco followed by "and what took you so long to get back?". My name was mud thereafter. I wandered to the back of the ship and, while viewing the large rip we had taken out of the lip of the roundown and the dents in the deck, I pondered the strange ways of senior Naval Officers.”

[Courtney Mil]

It would be useful if your link worked and pointed to the full final report. That appears to be exactly the kind of of incident that should have resulted in the pilot having his instrument and type ratings revoked pending further training and assessment. From what little you’ve provided, the main issue appears to be the instrument approach, not a carrier landing.
The pilot should have been fully familiar with runaway pitch trim and the spool up time of the Spey and the effects of 7th stage at Mil.
Sadly, you’ve just given a somewhat random link to a fraction of the full facts.

[LateArmLive]

Was your runway moving with 6 Degrees of Freedom? Was an LSO watching your every approach and grading same?


Never had a crosswind, and you never had to flare...

Let's face it, it's not that difficult. After all, if the USN can do it...sometimes...

[SpazSinbad]

'CM': I'm amazed. I'm glad that the text was sent to me many moons ago with that link provided. Perhaps you can join the website and find the text yourself. You do not seem to add value here except your pronouncements. Perhaps you can explain to what you are referring. "From what little I have provided" (perhaps you do not understand) there was a rampstrike with dents in the roundown and 'broken' tail. Don't worry I find the memories fun of our AWIs (all trained at Lossimouth in my day) briefing / debriefing me. :} Then there wuz the transferees from the RN - including AWIs - all having flown exotic machinery such as the Sea Vixen, Phantom and BUCKING EARs demonstrating/briefing their knowledge of Naval Aviation and weapon delivery and tactics.

BTW the text looks to me like the Observer, GIB (Guy in Back who tells the GIF to put the wheels down) telling a TINS (This Is No SH_T) tale about an RNFAA bigwig(s) reaction to a rampstrike and the events surrounding.
________________

'LAL': (or should it be 'LOL'?) :} Have YOU deck landed? The WOD is seldom straight down the angle deck centreline. Not that it mattered that much getting aboard HMAS Melbourne with a 5.5 degree angle deck (see video below). FLARE? :-) very funny - I was basic/advanced trained by the RAAF in 1968 so we had to FLARE the Winjeel and the Vampire. And of course we quite rightly flared the Vampire and Macchi MB326H back at NAS Nowra. An A4G Low/HIGH Precautionary approach as well as any landing with KIAS above the optimum (as seen on the indexer - or physically looking left/right to see the leading edge slats half extended) - often because of various issues when landing ashore, we would flare. I did not realise it was difficult. :}

A4G Skyhawk 876 Approaches HMAS Melbourne to Deck Land

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMH-NzMzUPA

[megan]

Let's face it, it's not that difficult. After all, if the USN can do it...sometimes...And the UK is among the many nations that can't do it at all...............unless on exchange with the US............or perhaps the Chinese. := Enough willy waving. ;)Never had a crosswind

Crosswind? Don't think its often that shore landings involve the airfield moving laterally away from you - line up, line up.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_oKf38nxng

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks 'megan' and also 'riseSirCharles' (ascendcharlie) I'll get to reply to your EXElant posts soon.... Meanwhile (and don't blame me for the poor cropping of this old photo sent to me as a JPG via e-mail) “VF-21 F-4B Phantom II about to trap on USS Midway CVA-41 1965”

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1331/vf_21_f_4b_phantom_ii_aboit_to_trap_on_uss_midway_cva_41_196 5_63d2367baa6767bb17bba61cb3df9de068c47750.jpg

[SpazSinbad]

In case some here are not aware 'megan' knows me from our time at NAS Nowra. 'megan' is a RANHFV Iroquois veteran pilot and general all round good fella. As he has made known he was trained in the USofA by the USN system in the late 1960s, thus was able to gain his wings in the T-28C Trojan deck landing aboard USS Lexington. I have mentioned not being able to have my wings confirmed by the RAN (provisional wings only upon graduatjion from the RAAF Basic/Advanced Flying Training Course at the end of 1968). My RAN wings confirmed as mentioned earlier I think once an arrest/catapult carried out.

'AscendCharlie' has a thread about 'BeachBall' his instructor with details about some of his comments in this thread in that old thread. I've attempted to find that thread but cannot. So some details will have to be created again here that he mentions. Meanwhile to show the bona fides of the time the 'study' was made, below is a video of LCDR Barry Diamond SP/XO Senior Pilot of VF-805 in 1975 when this video was made by our ABC News TV media (I think).

LCDR Diamond Senior Pilot (XO) VF-805 mid-1975 Nite DL Quote [the venerable USN pilot above will have quoted same same]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=erpYVLH-1pQ

CMDR Peter Clark RANHFV3 1st Arrest & Catapult MELBOURNE

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KwM8-iRT0Z8
+++++++++++++++

Earlier someone (I can check) mentioned 'video of pilot control movements' during a carrier approach. This one is self evident and I'll now look for a Super Etendard chappie doing the same....

Super Hornet FA-18E Control Movements Carrier Landing

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pK9Uuk07fXU

Super Etendard Modernise SEM Carrier Approach Pilot Actions

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Po0-AFXOLg

[SLXOwft]

Complete thread drift but anyone know if a 7 on one pylon and 2 9s(?) on the other wing was a common fit? I thought the F-4B carried the 7 in the 'normal' under fuselage recesses?

PS. had to temporarily reply & quote megan #101 and SpazSinbad #103 to see the Youtube urls not blank spaces.

[SASless]

Never had a crosswind, and you never had to flare...

Let's face it, it's not that difficult. After all, if the USN can do it...sometimes...

The one thing that was missing from that comment was ":p".

That and a Ten Thousand Foot long and 150 foot wide concrete runway that is firmly affixed to old Mother Earth and a precision ILS system and no grading of the approach and landing. :rolleyes:​​​​​​​

[OK465]

That and a Ten Thousand Foot long and 150 foot wide concrete runway that is firmly affixed to old Mother Earth and a precision ILS system and no grading of the approach and landing.

Yes, there are never any accidents on 10,000' runways.

This accident was not a result of the landing surface being a boat....but of pilot ineptness. If it had been to a 12,000' runway or the Edwards lakebed, with this approach technique and auto-throttle system error, he'd have probably never made it to brick one and might have even done some damage to the landing gear at impact on the approach end overrun or from a glancing blow to the precision ILS lighting stanchions while attempting to spool up off of IDLE.

[SpazSinbad]

'fdr' said: "...Plonked jets onto 26 [NAS Nowra] recently, and 08, which can be an odd little approach at night too. Still open, and still no better than 45 years ago. Used to be a nice O mess though." Gif below is a VF-805 Squadron Line Book entry made by an ASLT about his CO an LCDR. The CO has boltered at night whilst NIGHT CARQUALLING - perhaps - after the squadron had embarked that day. CO has reached BINGO 'FEUL' (another dyslexic linebook maker :} ) after boltering [BOLTER BOLTER BOLTER] and diverted ashore to NAS Nowra.

The runway may be 08 but unlikely as 08 was off limits for any night landings by any jets at least per SOP (GCAs at any time also disallowed). So imagine RW 21. 'The BOSS' has bingoed with hook down and not carried out proper landing checks and we must concede he may have been really short on fuel (thus may have used 08 because of strong night easterly wind, bringing more stress). I was not there and don't know the exact details. The trouble with the A4G was once the engine stopped - that was it - no electrics (no nuttin'). BUT as the cartoon illustrates 'The BOSS' did not expect to be arrested so he .... to the tower and they will have / would have sent a crew to tow the aircraft back to 'J' Hangar line once the engine shut down and proper U/C locks placed. The CO would have flown props in RAAF training then SEA FURIES and others ashore at NAS Nowra then lots of Sea Venom time ashore and afloat; in aerobatic teams as well - if I have the correct LCDR in mind.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1787x1385/inadvertantarrest08niteforum_bca8944616f2b397daef9f7c641a5c6 f5cd5e7f2.gif

[megan]

This accident was not a result of the landing surface being a boat....but of pilot ineptnessAll accidents have a train of events, sometimes referred to as the swiss cheese model, when a top performing individual, as in this case, comes to grief it behooves the system to address the holes that allowed the accident to occur. Here we had a chap attempting something he had never done before, is it surprising that he might have fluffed it in the great scheme of things? What percentage of your military accidents are due to your "ineptness", or are they due to the human frailties that befall the rest of us. C-130 XV304 with a load of troops made an unintentional gear up landing at Brize Norton, There was no reaction or any corrective action from the crew when the alarm sounded in the cockpit on approach, informing the crew that the undercarriage was not lowered. No technical anomalies were found on the aircraft or its equipment and the aircraft was written oiff. None are immune.

https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/crash-lockheed-c3a-hercules-brize-norton

Chuck Yeager wrote off an F-104 that was down to your word "ineptness", the root cause though was his ego wouldn't allow the project pilot, who was skilled at the task Yeager was to attempt, to brief him on what the flight entailed, Yeagers instrument flying skills were not up to the mark and his subsequent loss of control was because he had no understanding, nor wanted to be briefed, of the effects of gyroscopic precession when the aircraft was out of the sensible atmosphere and reliant on the puffer jets for control. As Neil Armstrong commented, "He was a great stick and rudder man, but was bereft of engineering understanding".

[OK465]

or are they due to the human frailties

ineptness definitions: (dictionary.com)
ignorance, ineptitude, failure, impotence, incompetence, inefficiency, lack, shortcoming, weakness, awkwardness, inability, frailty, inadequacy, amateurishness, artlessness, boorishness,

yep.
​​​​​​​

[megan]

OK, I guess its just the word that grates, as is calling a female a "whore" when what you really mean is she will compromise herself for money or other gains, the same for blokes as well.

[Courtney Mil]

‘Spaz’ If you take the trouble to read before replying you would have seen that the “testimony” is NOT from the official accident report and, therefore does not include the full detail of the accident. What little that is there, the Nav recounts breaking cloud and seeing that they were well below the glide path. That is a terrible approach that should have been rejected at that point - especially in a K or M. it would have made no difference whether the approach was to a runway or a deck.

[SpazSinbad]

'CM' where did I say the testimony is from the official accident report? The account has quote marks from the beginning. I made no comment I just posted the account as I received it. You then claimed all kinds of things and I was dumbfounded. WUT? You are good at 'look over there' instead of LOOK HERE: RAMPSTRIKE! The article was about that primarily but you chose to ignore that and kerfuffle about other stuff. Beats me. Below is what I wrote in reply just to refresh... Have a look at the F-4 rampstrike post again. What is posted is what I was sent and nothing else.
"'CM': I'm amazed. I'm glad that the text was sent to me many moons ago with that link provided. Perhaps you can join the website and find the text yourself. You do not seem to add value here except your pronouncements. Perhaps you can explain to what you are referring. "From what little I have provided" (perhaps you do not understand) there was a rampstrike with dents in the roundown and 'broken' tail. Don't worry I find the memories fun of our AWIs (all trained at Lossimouth in my day) briefing / debriefing me. https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/badteeth.gif Then there wuz the transferees from the RN - including AWIs - all having flown exotic machinery such as the Sea Vixen, Phantom and BUCKING EARs demonstrating/briefing their knowledge of Naval Aviation and weapon delivery and tactics.

BTW the text looks to me like the Observer, GIB (Guy in Back who tells the GIF to put the wheels down) telling a TINS (This Is No SH_T) tale about an RNFAA bigwig(s) reaction to a rampstrike and the events surrounding."

[SpazSinbad]

Perhaps some thought food about CARQUALS for the future USN will not be carried out by the new jet trainer (yet to be decided). That trainer will not be required to deck land so the nuggets will go to their operational squadron (or perhaps an intermediate jet deck landing squadron) all this is not clear at moment. I suppose when the new USN training jet is decided then more detail about the new training system will follow. Partly this comes about because the MAGIC CARPETs of the Super Hornet and the F-35C have made deck landing so easy for nuggets (of course we know they have to use these aids for sure). Links to info about all this could be provided but I just wanted to mention it. AND....

Magic Carpet Ladyhawke Kraken Carrier Approach Simulation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwoSKG9SzOI

[SpazSinbad]

A4G Ops 1980 HMAS Melbourne

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Isq_bGdA0Z4
______________

RANFAA Jet Aircraft Pot Pourri: Sea Venom, Skyhawk & Macchi

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8VtL2oGQCQ
______________

Early 1970s Documentary RAN FAA MELBOURNE & NAS Nowra

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAst2T9oqzY
______________

Meagan First Catapult F-14 TomCat from SPEED & ANGELS

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dy0Zj0_eiPw

[LateArmLive]

'LAL': (or should it be 'LOL'?) :} Have YOU deck landed?

Many times, in jets still in service.

[SpazSinbad]

Good to know. EX-RAN A4G, then modified to EX-RNZAF A-4Kahus still fly today with DRAKEN USA. I'd be very happy to keep the thread on the F-35C topic however as you can see - if you read the posts - many others comment about 'other things'. That is the way of pPRUNe. Please DISTRACT ME with your insights into your experience with NavAv. TIA. AS I started this thread and have gleaned a lot of info on the F-35C over the years; I would like to see pilot comments about it for sure. Some here question my NavAv experience; as I question some others. Again 'the way of the pruners'. I'm always glad to get back on topic.

[Courtney Mil]

‘Spaz’, I’m sorry you’re having comprehension difficulties. Go back to posting your usual plethora of random aircraft carrier fanboy articles. See ya!

[SpazSinbad]

‘Spaz’, I’m sorry you’re having comprehension difficulties. Go back to posting your usual plethora of random aircraft carrier fanboy articles. See ya!
Another RANDOM assertion of yours with no reference or proof provided. You must be imbibing Pprune Juice. :} I could add 'for an SHB' but I won't. :}

[SpazSinbad]

GIF graphic for reply to 'Ascend Charlie' way back in this thread. Charlie the other thread had a CVN / Melba comparo so anyway this FORD v MELBOURNE graphic to scale was made instead. Charlie if you can point to your 'Beachball/RAAF Flying Course thread that would be great.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1600x1050/fordclasscvn_melbforum_3c8b98a4ec9b1c42d949f5da9f921f26f57ea 886.gif

[fdr]

GIF graphic for reply to 'Ascend Charlie' way back in this thread. Charlie the other thread had a CVN / Melba comparo so anyway this FORD v MELBOURNE graphic to scale was made instead. Charlie if you can point to your 'Beachball/RAAF Flying Course thread that would be great.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1600x1050/fordclasscvn_melbforum_3c8b98a4ec9b1c42d949f5da9f921f26f57ea 886.gif

Yeah, but which one had the booze? That had to help over the ramp, either in the S2 or the A-4, or giving thanks to the ocean from the sea kindly handling of the tub.

[West Coast]

I guarantee you there’s booze on the Ford. Might have to work to find it however.

[Captain Dart]

The Americans had better gear, but Melbourne had cold beer 😁

[idle bystander]

We can always sell tickets to spectators to come and see the impromptu rapid disassembly of seriously expensive assets conducted with flair.
Love it! A rewording of the original Fleet Air Arm song:
"Oh! they gave me a Seafire to beat up the fleet,
and I beat up the Rodney and Nelson a treat,
but I forgot the high mast on the old Formid
and a seat in the goofers was worth fifty quid"

[SpazSinbad]

More verses here: https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/56101-songs-happy-hour.html#post522906
&
FAA Songs | Navy Net - Royal Navy Community (navy-net.co.uk) (https://www.navy-net.co.uk/community/threads/faa-songs.36746/)

[SpazSinbad]

Perhaps the SHB mission result was influenced not by the "feel the NEED FOR SPEED" but by the "feel the NEED TO PEE"? :} Four hours (3.5 + extra preflight) is a long time....

The CRITICAL FLAW in $100 Million Fighter Jets

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVniyhKzB2k

[SpazSinbad]

Earlier 'Ascend Charlie' mentioned A4G pilots onboard USS Enterprise. Here is the thread with the story amongst others:
https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/588450-raaf-50th-reunion-3.html#post9738439

[SpazSinbad]

F/A-18F Carrier Break [5 years ago] "Bringing a section of fighters back to the boat at 500' and 480 Knots."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sz7dluAFXb0