NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin

[voyageur9]

Landing Fedex and Southwest taking off at Austin (https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-investigates-aborted-fedex-landing-texas-2023-02-04/)

[DIBO]

Too close for comfort...

Note: the left turn by Fedex plane as depicted by the FR24 'playback' in bottom right corner of picture below, is overly exaggerated (it was still more or less in the centerline at the end of the rwy)
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1026x616/kaus_airprox_77b10278ab3b8c3c4123e8ec70fe07d9281bac79.jpg

Vertical separation was already substantial by the end of the runway, but the flightpath of SWA708 (especially the RoC) moments after liftoff was kind of aah... interesting: https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/wn708#2f136f25

[JohnnyRocket]

Looks like a landing FedEx cargo plane almost crashed into Southwest Airlines plane taxiing on runway at Austin International Airport

https://twitter.com/IntelPointAlert/status/1622057477310144513

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/FDX1432 (https://twitter.com/IntelPointAlert/status/1622057477310144513)

[megan]

One comment says dense fog, whereas the link says "The incident occurred in poor visibility conditions".

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-investigates-aborted-fedex-landing-texas-2023-02-04/

[megan]

Weather reported as dense fog or poor visibility depending on source.

[ATC Watcher]

The traditional go around above a take off , the absolute nightmare of every Tower controller as you can only sit and watch. , nothing much you can do exept take a few degrees off centre line.when going around and then only if there is no parallel runway in there... Fog or no fog, makes no difference as both aircrfat cannot see ( and avoid) each other.in this configuration .

[DaveReidUK]

FR24 data is disappointingly sparse - in particular there's a 27-second gap around the point where the SWA started to roll (not helped by FR24's built-in asynchronicity between position and velocity data).

The altitude plot for the FedEx (after adjusting for QNH and runway elevation) suggests that it came within a gnat's of the runway surface and may even have touched down during the GA. At that point (again subject to the above asynchronicity uncertainty) FR24 suggests the SWA was rolling at 85-90 kts and longitudinal separation was around 500'.

Usual FR24 caveats apply, probably even more so in this instance ...

[340drvr]

Definitely low vis conditions:
KAUS 041247Z 00000KT 1/8SM R36R/1800V2400FT FZFG VV002 M01/M01 A3043 RMK AO2
KAUS 041218Z 00000KT 1/4SM R36R/1800V2400FT FZFG VV002 M01/M01 A3043 RMK AO2 T10061006

[voyageur9]

From FR24

https://twitter.com/i/status/1622067973111308288 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1622067973111308288)

[wd-15717]

Fully realize SOP in the US is clear to land even when the runway is occupied, but how on earth do you give that clearance in zero visibility conditions?

Between this and JFK near miss, I think it’s time for the FAA to revisit some atc protocols.

(I believe JFK was entirely fault of AA pilots, but “NY style” atc didn’t help matters)

[ATC Watcher]

Between this and JFK near miss, I think it’s time for the FAA to revisit some atc protocols.
(I believe JFK was entirely fault of AA pilots, but “NY style” atc didn’t help matters)
And what makes you think it is ATC at fault here ? Looking at the FR24 construction it looks like one is slowly lining up and take off ,( with or without clearance) with another on finals . Nothing much else . For all we know it could be Southwest who has to "revesit" something .

Most of the incidents like this I saw in my carreer were when a "ready for immediate departure?" request is being mishandled by the crew . If ATC played it too tight here , time will tell, but I wait to read or hear a time stamped tape before passing any judgement .
As to the go around procedure, with a take off below ,yes it is a well known loophole with no real solution . Most of the times it it solved as the go around goes above the departure ( like here) but there is no gauarantee, I saw once an A340 on a late go around continue descending and touch down the runway before going up again.

[Una Due Tfc]

Clearing the 737 onto the runway with the 767 at 3nm in LVPs is cutting it very very tight....

[BFSGrad]

And what makes you think it is ATC at fault here ?After Fedex clears the runway after landing, tower says “you have our apologies, we appreciate your professionalism.”

[jetpig32]

Interesting. I was departing 30 mins later. After much confusion from ground control on taxi out as to where everyone was, we had a 40 min hold for release time. We sat short 18L monitoring tower and shooting the breeze. Let me set it all up.
1) 18r is preferred departures in AUS in the am. No CL lights, so 1000rvr. All aircraft (well most) were requesting 18L, and ground seemed agitated.
2) There is no ground surveillance, so ground was often forgetting where each plane was. (Shocked in adsb age, there’s no low cost solution the could budget for.
3) due single runway and no ground radar, line-up-wait not utilized.
4) tower, at this time, seemed to be giving extra large spacing between departing and landing traffic. Like 10 miles. (Now I know why)

I commented on this to my FO, and said this could get messy if they tighten up arrivals/departures and someone rejected or misunderstood the immediate to clearance. I’m single rw ops, our expectation bias is line up and wait. Don’t know what took the Southwest so long as they always seem in a rush. Perhaps when he called ready, they weren’t quite, or even near the hold bars yet. Seems common for them to call ready 100m away from holding point. Tower would have no idea that they weren’t quite there yet.

[MLHeliwrench]

Interesting. I was departing 30 mins later. After much confusion from ground control on taxi out as to where everyone was, we had a 40 min hold for release time. We sat short 18L monitoring tower and shooting the breeze. Let me set it all up.
1) 18r is preferred departures in AUS in the am. No CL lights, so 1000rvr. All aircraft (well most) were requesting 18L, and ground seemed agitated.
2) There is no ground surveillance, so ground was often forgetting where each plane was. (Shocked in adsb age, there’s no low cost solution the could budget for.
3) due single runway and no ground radar, line-up-wait not utilized.
4) tower, at this time, seemed to be giving extra large spacing between departing and landing traffic. Like 10 miles. (Now I know why)

I commented on this to my FO, and said this could get messy if they tighten up arrivals/departures and someone rejected or misunderstood the immediate to clearance. I’m single rw ops, our expectation bias is line up and wait. Don’t know what took the Southwest so long as they always seem in a rush. Perhaps when he called ready, they weren’t quite, or even near the hold bars yet. Seems common for them to call ready 100m away from holding point. Tower would have no idea that they weren’t quite there yet.

I also wonder if the call of ‘rolling’ by SWA was a bit optimistic. Perhaps they were still turning on to active or otherwise not quite rolling yet.

[fluglehrer]

is there an audio? glad no crash!

[Vlad the Impaler]

Listening to the RT the tower controller seems strangely absent in the process. RVR given with T/O clearance was foggy but not yet CAT II/III ops. Nonetheless, especially without the benefit of ground radar that sounded super tight. What concerns me the most is that it's not the Tower controller who calls abort. Its the FedEx crew just before they call going around. I don't want to hang the atc out to dry but on the RT replay alone that is total dereliction of duty for me. I speak as a 20yr tower ATCO well used to low visibility ops.

[mike current]

And what makes you think it is ATC at fault here ? Looking at the FR24 construction it looks like one is slowly lining up and take off ,( with or without clearance) with another on finals . Nothing much else . For all we know it could be Southwest who has to "revesit" something .

Most of the incidents like this I saw in my carreer were when a "ready for immediate departure?" request is being mishandled by the crew . If ATC played it too tight here , time will tell, but I wait to read or hear a time stamped tape before passing any judgement .

You don't play it tight in Low Vis conditions. There are parameters to meet to ensure Cat 3 protection.
Take off roll must commence by inbound at X miles.. landing clearance received no later than X miles etc.
These are UK rules but I'm sure the FAA must have similar otherwise how do you safeguard Cat 3 operations?

(I don't know whether this incident was in Cat 3 conditions, but the safeguarding in Low Vis must offer protection of some sort).

[Zeffy]

(I don't know whether this incident was in Cat 3 conditions, but the safeguarding in Low Vis must offer protection of some sort).

At the beginning of the recording, FedEx checks in as a Cat III arrival.
https://forums.liveatc.net/atcaviation-audio-clips/austin-tower-fedexsouthwest-runway-incursion/msg75658/

[DaveReidUK]

I also wonder if the call of ‘rolling’ by SWA was a bit optimistic. Perhaps they were still turning on to active or otherwise not quite rolling yet.

FR24 have now released (slightly) more granular data which provides more detail around the SWA's runway entry and line up.

The 737 appears to have been stationary for approximately 20 seconds between lining up and starting to roll (stated purely as a matter of record, no judgement implied).

[ATC Watcher]

The 737 appears to have been stationary for approximately 20 seconds between lining up and starting to roll
and there lies the problem .
Just llistened to the audio , SW was clear to line up and take off with the mention there was a heavy 3 miles out , if SW was not ready for an immediate take off he should have advised ATC. At 140 Kts you are doing 2,5 NM a minute .so from the time youreceive the instruction to line up until Vr you,ve got just over a minute , doable routinely by good professionals but you cannot taxi slow and waste 20 seconds standing still in this configuration .. That said this is a very tight clearance from ATC , not really to be done in LVP Ops. I would say.as the arriving aircraft cannot monitor where the departure is on the runway,

[MLHeliwrench]

FR24 have now released (slightly) more granular data which provides more detail around the SWA's runway entry and line up.

The 737 appears to have been stationary for approximately 20 seconds between lining up and starting to roll (stated purely as a matter of record, no judgement implied).

it would be interesting to line the timing up with the ATC inquiry ‘are you rolling?’ As well as the SWA response. If SWA 737 was only 5 seconds lining up before rolling maybe FedEx would of landed.

[deltahotel]

With that weather (Eng anti ice on and cold) the 737 was probably doing a static run up iaw adverse weather procedures. I don’t know the timing for the 737, but 757 is 10s and 767 is 30s.

[Speed_Trim_Fail]

With that weather (Eng anti ice on and cold) the 737 was probably doing a static run up iaw adverse weather procedures. I don’t know the timing for the 737, but 757 is 10s and 767 is 30s.

It’s been a while but dragged from the memory banks; 30 seconds, minimum 70% N1 when engine anti ice is required and OAT is 3 degrees or lower, so almost certainly they will have being doing a run up.

[Quartz-1]

VASAviation on Youtube has an animation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjoDn8zQgb8

[Flch250]

Incredible. Listen carefully. Who was the controller? Who told SW to abort? I can’t post links yet so add prefix to below.

forums.liveatc.net/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=16950.0;attach=11576

[DIBO]

VASAviation on Youtube has an animation
which is just that, and a completely incorrect animation

While on twy B northbound and even turning east and crossing the holding point, it did not record once, a speed less than 8kts with 6 second recording intervals.
Only in the middle of the pianokeys it recorded a reducing speed of 3kts, followed by an interval of about 25 seconds, with the next update just 100ft down the rwy, on the bottom of the 'L' (of 18L) at 19kts rapidly increasing.

[mike current]

At the beginning of the recording, FedEx checks in as a Cat III arrival.
https://forums.liveatc.net/atcaviation-audio-clips/austin-tower-fedexsouthwest-runway-incursion/msg75658/
ah ok thanks.. certainly no Cat 3 protection if an aircraft is lined up on the runway ahead in the last 90 seconds of the approach!

[DIBO]

it would be interesting to line the timing up with the ATC inquiry ‘are you rolling?’ As well as the SWA response. If SWA 737 was only 5 seconds lining up before rolling maybe FedEx would of landed.
IF, big if, the LiveATC archives are perfectly clock synchronized, so that each half hour archive starts exactly on the hour or in this case on H+30:00, then the events were:

UPDATE: it seems LiveATC archives are NOT perfectly clock synchronized, so an up-to-the second synhro with FR24 is unreliable

* 12:39:06 SWA "cleared for takeoff, copy the traffic" doing 9kts almost at the end of the eastward turn towards the holding point line
* 12:39:21 FDX "TWR confirm cleared to land" about 2.5nm out
* 12:39:52 SWA FR24 recording 3kts in the middle of the pianokeys
* 12:40:02 TWR "SW confirm on the roll"
* 12:40:05 SWA "rolling now"
* 12:40:19 SWA FR24 recording 19kts at the bottom of the 'L' (of 18L)
* 12:40:21 FDX FR24 recording 139kts over the middle of the approachlights (520ft from the pianokeys)
* 12:40:24 FDX "SW abort "
* 12:40:25 SWA FR24 recording 48kts about 400ft more down the rwy
* 12:40:27 FDX "Fedex is on the go" at 138kts just in front of the rwy at 100ft (unadjusted)
* 12:40:31 SWA FR24 recording 74kts 200ft beyond the aiming point
* 12:40:33 FDX FR24 recording 140kts over the aiming point at 75ft (unadjusted)
* 12:40:37 TWR "SW708 roger, turn right when able" <<=== makes me believe that TWR interpreted the "SW abort" call as coming from the SWA
* 12:40:42 SWA "Negative" doing 119kts down the rwy

[BFSGrad]

Incredible. Listen carefully. Who was the controller? Who told SW to abort?My interpretation based on voice recognition, it was the Fedex pilot that called abort, which seems highly unusual.

Regarding the static engine run-up requirement, if 737 procedures require such a delay in take-off, it seems inappropriate to accept a take-off clearance knowing the arriving aircraft is called on a 3-mile final.

[DIBO]

My interpretation based on voice recognition, it was the Fedex pilot that called abort, which seems highly unusual.No doubt about it, it was the Fedex pilot who made the "SW abort" call.
The controller's silence during this event was deafening....

[exlatccatsa]

Juan has a video out already. He is not happy.
https://youtu.be/SvUOHa8n7aQ

[sectordirector]

Does anyone know what type of separation was being applied? If the local controller wasn't applying visual, then there was no separation from the time FDX was on 3 mile final.

[BFSGrad]

After listening to the audio a few more times, a couple of additional observations:

1. ATC doesn’t query SWA status until a full minute after issuing takeoff clearance, which was coincident with calling FDX on a 3 mile final. At the status query, FDX would have been within 1/2 mile of the runway threshold. This query also seems to confirm that the local controller has no visual contact on SWA and had no other surface detection capability such as ASDE that could establish the SWA position/status.

2. I think it likely that the local controller thought that the “southwest abort” call was from SWA and indicated a RTO. The subsequent “you can turn right when able” is much more typical of an instruction to an aircraft on landing rollout or RTO rollout. If the instruction was intended for SWA after takeoff, it would have been inappropriately vague and made no sense given that SWA was to fly 170 after departure.

[dr dre]

2. I think it likely that the local controller thought that the “southwest abort” call was from SWA and indicated a RTO. The subsequent “you can turn right when able” is much more typical of an instruction to an aircraft on landing rollout or RTO rollout. If the instruction was intended for SWA after takeoff, it would have been inappropriately vague and made no sense given that SWA was to fly 170 after departure.

SWA was given instruction for a left turn to a heading after takeoff, a right turn would take them across the departure path of the parallel runway.

It definitely seems as if ATC mistook FedEx’s “Southwest Abort” transmission as coming from SWA.

A massive stuff up by ATC but SWA should’ve queried the takeoff clearance, or told ATC they could not roll fast enough, and given FedEx a clear signal to go around.

I can’t help but wonder if lax US ATC and radio added to this, a habit of issuing landing clearance before a takeoff clearance to an aircraft that hasn’t even entered the runway yet is bad enough in VMC, in LVO it’s just dangerous. Plus FedEx’s transmission “FedEx is on the go” - unclear what their intentions were with that, and then telling SWA to abort which confused everyone and wasted valuable seconds.

It’ll probably be written off as an isolated incident but to me it’s symptomatic of an undisciplined culture.

[Chiefttp]

First of all, Austin’s airport isn’t busy enough to clear a 737 to takeoff in front of a 767 on 3 mile final, flying a Cat 3 approach no less. Actually no airport is that busy! The Tower controller either reverted back to calls and sequencing he normally makes in VFR conditions. Good on the FedEx crew to realize the spacing wasn’t correct. The Southwest crew may have some explaining to do when they’re sitting at the end of the big table. I had a similar situation a few months ago when an approach controller gave us a tight turn to base and we rolled out 2 miles in trail of the preceding aircraft. When we queried him about our spacing, he discontinued our approach. Accidents and mistakes happen, but clearing another jet to takeoff at a small airport, while another jet is on 3 mile final in Cat 3 Wx is inexcusable.

Dr Dre,
FedEx’s call of “on the go” is clear to me? It means he’s executing a go-around. It’s common terminology, perhaps a carryover from the US Military, because we said it every time we executed a go-around, curious what you would prefer he say? As far as an undisciplined culture, that’s your opinion. How’s the air at the heights you dwell in?

[daelight]

What a fright. Seems from first impression that there was a 'confirmation bias' strong withe the controller re: SW , in that that outfit is 'usually' fastest around the field and so 'should' have been off and away in plenty of time before the FDX heavy was over the keys? Day in - day out ops and it seems small biases creep in which are only brought to light in cases and challenging conditions such as these.

Btw, I think the SW was far faster than 48kts some are quoting from FR24. The FR24 data is a good 20 - 30 seconds behind the audio, so am certain SW was just on or past V1 even by the time the FDX called abort.

[RatherBeFlying]

When would TCAS come into play? I'm guessing it's suppressed until SW lifts off, but what would it be showing in the two cockpits once SW is in the air and between a rock and a hard place?


​

[FlightDetent]

Low altitude TCAS is restricted to 'traffic advisory' no matter how close they get (good reasons behind this).

If the airport was not running active LVPs, which is unclear, it would be interesting to know how the FDX came to declare a cat III approach.

[Locked door]

When would TCAS come into play? I'm guessing it's suppressed until SW lifts off, but what would it be showing in the two cockpits once SW is in the air and between a rock and a hard place?


​


TCAS is automatically set to TA below approx 800R so both A\C would probably have got a TA once Southwest was airborne. Once one A/C climbs above 800R they might possibly get an RA unless the manoeuvring to avoid had already created enough lateral or vertical separation.

[ATC Watcher]

The videao posted by Blancolirio is once again extremely good at explaining things, focusing on the CAT3 protection area is a very good point as it proves that the line-up clearance should never have been given in the first place.
What amaze me here as in the JFK incident is that the phraeology is all gone all over the place.,where common US slang is replacing the official phraseology that was introduced just for that : to avoid ambiguities and confusions. and the US seem to go back to 1960s type of operations What is sad to see is that the young generation seems to pick up tehe bad habbits of the previous one. and I agree with Blancolirio finla reamark that we are getting one R/T transmission away from a major accident in the US if this is not rectified.

[bean]

Same controller; different incident. no blame on ATC this time but, Aus really need to tighten their act https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AX8iHTTiEx8

[olster]

The last video is interesting. The Virgin crew were evidently uptight about the SW pushing in front. However, in the context of US ops the uncontrolled ramps and ambiguous control authority has caused confusion for non based nationalities. JFK being a classic example. Personally I would have let it go and I speak as a Brit and long time ago ex VS. To be frank and in particular I found the questioning of the SW crew rather embarrassing. If you are going to operate into the continental North America you need to understand the local m.o. There is no point having an aeronautical equivalent of road rage just because the operation is different from Hounslow international.However the previous incident relevant to this thread is a shocker. Continued errors nearly leading to catastrophe. The loss of SA from ATC and SW is spectacularly alarming.

[Farmer106]

FedEx’s call of “on the go” is clear to me? It means he’s executing a go-around. It’s common terminology, perhaps a carryover from the US Military, because we said it every time we executed a go-around, curious what you would prefer he say? As far as an undisciplined culture, that’s your opinion. How’s the air at the heights you dwell in?

Why not stick to standard ICAO phraseology? Fedex XY going around?

[bean]

The last video is interesting. The Virgin crew were evidently uptight about the SW pushing in front. However, in the context of US ops the uncontrolled ramps and ambiguous control authority has caused confusion for non based nationalities. JFK being a classicum example. Personally I would have let it go and I speak as a Brit and long time ago ex VS. To be frank and in particular I found the questioning of the SW crew rather embarrassing. If you are going to operate into the continental North America you need to understand the local m.o. There is no point having an aeronautical equivalent of road rage just because the operation is different from Hounslow international.However the previous incident relevant to this thread is a shocker. Continued errors nearly leading to catastrophe. The loss of SA from ATC and SW is spectacularly alarming..When BA had their own terminal they always called for push on JFK ground.
All airliners on JFK ground call for taxi from their respective alleyway. Leaving it to ground crew to judge when to push in AUS is pathetic
This controller also appears to be half asleep in both videos.

[ApolloHeli]

...FedEx’s call of “on the go” is clear to me? It means he’s executing a go-around. It’s common terminology, perhaps a carryover from the US Military, because we said it every time we executed a go-around, curious what you would prefer he say? ...

ICAO Standard Phraseology (See DOC 9432) states: "4.8.3 In the event that the missed approach is initiated by the pilot, the phrase “GOING AROUND” shall be used."

There are no notified differences from ICAO Standards and Recognised Procedures in the U.S. AIP regarding this phraseology, therefore "on the go" is not an acceptable call.

[ATC Watcher]

FedEx’s call of “on the go” is clear to me. It means he’s executing a go-around. It’s common terminology, perhaps a carryover from the US Military

Well it is not clear to me as a European Controller and Pilot. This US terminology is prone to be misunderstood outside the US and Fedex does fly a lot outside the US.
Now listening to the 2nd tape between tthe Virgin and SW it looks like not only the Virgin but also the Air transport was not familiar with the local uncontrolled ramp practices , 2 a/c of of 4 on the frequency in a 3 min R/T sequence would indicate there is a problem that needs to be looked at I would say .

[waito]

Why not stick to standard ICAO phraseology? Fedex XY going around?
Right. So simple.

go around as a coupled fixed term, understood by any Aviation pro. unambiguous.

going around: even contains info who performs it. The party transmitting it.
While this may not be the major contributing cause, it's quite easy to reintroduce. True Aviation English
​​

[wiggy]

.When BA had their own terminal they always called for push on JFK ground.
.

Must be honest I don't remember it that way (last there with BA just pre-Covid)...yes there was a least one gate where you had to call ground into addition to ramp because you infringed the inner on push, but other than that you pushed with solely company and then first spoke to ground for your clearance to exit the ramp...may be mis remembering, open to correction.

Only did AUS a couple of times, must admit I found the ramp set up a bit odd.

[bean]

Ok just going on vids

[Chiefttp]

Question for my English brethren, at one point, did you use the term “overshoot” to mean a “Go Around”?
I do believe that this incident, as well as the JFK near miss will place a new emphasis on standard and clearer communications.

Flight Detent,
You asked
, “f the airport was not running active LVPs, which is unclear, it would be interesting to know how the FDX came to declare a cat III approach.”.

With the prevailing visibility, the only option FedEx had was a Cat3 approach. Not sure what you mean by “active LVPs”. This may be another example of different procedures in different nations. For example I flew a 767 into Ontario California a month ago, and the visibility went from 2 miles to 1200 RVR…there wasn’t an announcement that Ontario was operating LVPs (I assume that means low visibility procedures) we just set up for the Cat 2/3 approach into Ontario and landed. If the airport has a Cat 2/3 approach then it’s assumed it’s working and operational and no official announcement needs to be made. They do announced if SMGGSs procedures are in effect because that will dictate our taxi routes and procedures on the ground..just curious.

[deltahotel]

I used ‘overshoot’ in the military, only ever heard ‘Go Around’ civilian and have no idea what uk mil uses now.

hth

edit to add that I think ‘go around’ was in/coming in when I left the RAF a very long time ago

[bean]

UK atc now say ""go around i say again go around; acknowledge
Much safer than US phraeseology

[seahawks]

ATC since 80’s.
UK did use overshoot when I started, think it changed to go-around late 80’s early 90’s.

[Chiefttp]

Bean,
I’ll just throw this out there,
If a Tower Controller states “Go Around, I say again Go Around”
My reply would be “Callsign xxx , On the Go” 40 years of using that phraseology, especially in the military, will be difficult to change, .

[bean]

England and America'; Two great countries seperated by a common language

[alfaman]

ATC since 80’s.
UK did use overshoot when I started, think it changed to go-around late 80’s early 90’s.
It was the mid eighties, I think, not long after I started: ironically, as I recall it, the change was driven because the "overshoot" term was ambiguous. It was sometimes used in the US to denote the area beyond the runway, so had caused confusion with someone trying to land "over" an obstruction on the runway, rather than break off the approach & climb away. As I recall it, "go around" was the preferred US term then, so it's strange that it's morphed into something else since, such that US aviators don't recognise it.

[Flch250]

Listening to the RT the tower controller seems strangely absent in the process. RVR given with T/O clearance was foggy but not yet CAT II/III ops. Nonetheless, especially without the benefit of ground radar that sounded super tight. What concerns me the most is that it's not the Tower controller who calls abort. Its the FedEx crew just before they call going around. I don't want to hang the atc out to dry but on the RT replay alone that is total dereliction of duty for me. I speak as a 20yr tower ATCO well used to low visibility ops.
That is what I heard too. Sounded to me the FedEx driver issued the go around command.
Never heard that before. You? Wonder how the guys with hot coffee on the ramp view that?

[lederhosen]

On some aircraft when set up for an automatic landing (for example the 737 in my experience) the autopilot has a tendency to trip out if an aircraft infringes the protected area when lining up. So you need more separation in low visibility operations. In Europe when LV procedures are declared it would be a clear controller error to let an aircraft line up and depart in this way in front of an autolanding aircraft.

[ATC Watcher]

In Europe when LV procedures are declared it would be a clear controller error to let an aircraft line up and depart in this way in front of an autolanding aircraft. Indeed it would. But so is clearing an aircraft to land when the runway is still occupied. The controller here cleary applies the "Minimum Runway Occupancy Time - clear to land" procedure . In Europe in my time in LVP you had to wait until the preceeding has declared that the runway is clear ,and the more so when you have no ground radar to veryfy where aircraft.are, as it appears to be the case here in Austin. But maybe things changed in the meantime in the FAA procedures.

[Chiefttp]

In the US, it is implied that when the wx is below 800/2 or vis is low enough for Cat2/3 ops we hold short at the Cat2 hold short line painted on the taxiway. Also, for informational purposes, in the US when you overshoot a runway, it means that you’re airborne and rolled out off of runway centerline. Again, this may be a carry over from Military ops. At every US Pilot training base’s there are usually 3 runways, one for T-38’s, another for T-37’s (or T-6’s nowadays) and a longer center runway for emergencies etc. it was drilled into us in Pilot training to never “Overshoot” your runway as it sets up a conflict with jets flying to the other two, not much different from Any large airport with parallel approaches. So overshoot means a failed airborne line-up with your intended landing runway. If you land and roll off the end of the runway that is called overrunning the runway, not overshooting it. I recently read a book about The RAF in the fifties. I noticed the use of many different words for the same object than what us Yanks use. Examples are Bonnet vs Hood for your car, wings vs fenders on cars , reheat vs afterburner, etc etc…my favorite is the pronunciation of Al-you-minium, vs A-loo-min-um. Or Jag-gwu-are vs Jag-gwar.

[MPN11]

Only 30 years as a Mil ATCO in UK, so the concept of clearing an aircraft to land with an occupied runway ahead [especially in low-via conditions] strikes me as crazy. However, my experience of Civil operations is minimal. Your ball, play it as you will.

[Seat4A]

Did not see this posted above

https://twitter.com/avgeekjake/status/1622372165638316032?cxt=HHwWgIDTpfK46YMtAAAA


Other images https://twitter.com/jonostrower/status/1622369201863401473

[waito]

40 years of using that phraseology, especially in the military, will be difficult to change, .
Back to entry level salary could drive changes, I say.

😋

​​​​​

[BFSGrad]

Disappointing to see all the squabbling about “on the go” when this (non-standard) phrase likely had no impact on the incident. I think it very likely that all involved clearly heard “Fedex, on the go” and understood its meaning, improving situational awareness for both the local controller and SWA. The two phrases that likely degraded situational awareness at a critical time were Fedex’s highly inappropriate “Southwest abort” and SWA’s “negative” with no identifier.

Curious to know what was the trigger for Fedex to go around. Visual on SWA? Intuition?

[waito]

This was serious, a near miss with mostly blind participants. And avoidable.

I am curious about the findings regarding ATC and the Southwest Crew actions in LVP. And communication was substandard from all 3 of them. At some point they had little more than guessing who said what and who meant what.

And a crew that expects anybody else to know that they need >30s additional rwy time for runup? Serious?

[Forestman]

Must be honest I don't remember it that way (last there with BA just pre-Covid)...yes there was a least one gate where you had to call ground into addition to ramp because you infringed the inner on push, but other than that you pushed with solely company and then first spoke to ground for your clearance to exit the ramp...may be mis remembering, open to correction.

this is my recollection of JFK too, although it’s 8 years since I was last there.

[Orange future]

Only 30 years as a Mil ATCO in UK, so the concept of clearing an aircraft to land with an occupied runway ahead [especially in low-via conditions] strikes me as crazy. However, my experience of Civil operations is minimal. Your ball, play it as you will.It is indeed.
The phraseology should be changed to "permission to land" as thats all you are getting.

[Fly-by-Wife]

The two phrases that likely degraded situational awareness at a critical time were Fedex’s highly inappropriate “Southwest abort”.
I'm not sure I would agree with that - given that the controller didn't issue any instruction to SWA to stop / abort, the FedEx probably did the right thing in telling the SWA to abort thus preventing the SWA from continuing it's take off and climbing into the FedEx's path as it went around. Desperate measures...

[Rozy1]

I'm not sure I would agree with that - given that the controller didn't issue any instruction to SWA to stop / abort, the FedEx probably did the right thing in telling the SWA to abort thus preventing the SWA from continuing it's take off and climbing into the FedEx's path as it went around. Desperate measures...

If FedEx knows SW is right beneath them, and possibly will climb up into them, TURN AWAY. In imc conditions, you won’t turn into a Cessna on downwind or any other traffic. Just fly parallel to the runway, start a climb and call the tower for a better heading and altitude.

To expect an ac to do a (possibly) high speed reject, based on another pilot’s command, when no runway hazard exists and the ac is capable of flying is not reasonable.

[sectordirector]

This was serious, a near miss with mostly blind participants. And avoidable. I am curious about the findings regarding ATC and the Southwest Crew actions in LVP. And communication was substandard from all 3 of them. At some point they had little more than guessing who said what and who meant what. And a crew that expects anybody else to know that they need >30s additional rwy time for runup? Serious?

No doubt some serious training issues will be forced to surface.

[Flightmech]

As highlighted in post #63, The FedEx captain probably saw it all unfolding in the HUD/EFVS system (not installed on the F/O side)

[DaveReidUK]

the FedEx probably did the right thing in telling the SWA to abort thus preventing the SWA from continuing it's take off

Though, as I'm sure you're aware, he wasn't successful in doing so.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Any word(s) yet on whether NTSB and/or FAA have obtained the CVR of either or both aircraft involved?

Recalling Air Canada 759 in San Francisco (2017), also a very close call, the CVR of the AC aircraft was not preserved, iirc, and some observers believed its contents would have aided the post-incident inquiry. (Wonder if FAA is going to issue a SAFO after this latest incident?)

[MPN11]

If FedEx knows SW is right beneath them, and possibly will climb up into them, TURN AWAY. In imc conditions, you won’t turn into a Cessna on downwind or any other traffic. Just fly parallel to the runway, start a climb and call the tower for a better heading and altitude.
.Which is why, in my former world, aircraft overhoot to the ‘dead side’ of the visual circuit. OK, big Civ airports don’t do that stuff, but just drilling down the centreline with somone seemingly taking off underneath you seems … err … hazardous?

Not sure that one Captain telling another Captain what to do with his aircraft is a great idea either, tbh. ATC should have had a much firmer grip on the whole scenario from when the FedEx was c. 8 miles out and anticipated the potential scenario.

[ATC Watcher]

This was serious, a near miss with mostly blind participants. And avoidable.

I am curious about the findings regarding ATC and the Southwest Crew actions in LVP. And communication was substandard from all 3 of them. At some point they had little more than guessing who said what and who meant what.

And a crew that expects anybody else to know that they need >30s additional rwy time for runup? Serious?
A very good resume of the situation .
@ BFSGrad
Disappointing to see all the squabbling about “on the go” when this (non-standard) phrase likely had no impact on the incident. I think it very likely that all involved clearly heard “Fedex, on the go” and understood its meaning, improving situational awareness for both the local controller and SWA.
So you asume everybody understood the Fedex was going around because they were all 3 locals Americans. Are you sure the Fedex would have used another phraseology if the SW had been, say Aromexico or Virgin ? The poor pharsology , or lack of even , is what we discuss , and "on the go" was the most obvious one , but : " Abort" and "Negative" are as bad. if not worse.
Where I agree with you is that this "on te go" did not have a major effect on this incident , the controller lining up with someone on a CATIII approach , and the SW taking 20-30 second to start knowing that there is someone 3 miles out are the real causes and am sure will get them tea and biscuits a some point.

That said, going around over a take off with both aircraft remaining on cente line is a known loophole , well identified, but still out there despite many incidents worldwide. .

[Ollie Onion]

Let’s face it, lining up an aircraft in Low Visibility Operations with another aircraft on 3 nm final is just dumb at the highest level and highly unusual. The RT calls are just shuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic.

[waito]

Are we sure about 3NM Final when Southwest passed the hold short position and entered the runway?

​​​​​​BTW, what are the current LVP regulations?

[AerocatS2A]

Are we sure about 3NM Final when Southwest passed the hold short position and entered the runway?

​​​​​​BTW, what are the current LVP regulations?

ATC told SW that FedEx was on 3NM final.

[Lake1952]

https://youtube.com/watch?v=SvUOHa8n7aQ&si=EnSIkaIECMiOmarE

[hitchens97]

I've always been fascinated why in the US the "Cleared to Land" from ATC is often given as soon as the Tower is called regardless of if traffic is still departing, or other traffic is landing ahead, or if some plane is crossing, whereas in the UK, it's only given when nothing else is on the runway or due to land or take off ahead of you?

I would assume the UK one is "safer", but perhaps the US way is easier for ATC, and also doesn't stress the crew waiting for a low altitude clearance.

Also which one is the International default? And is there any legitimate reason why you want to have two different ways? Is there something uniquely different about UK and US airports which means both types are needed?

[Ollie Onion]

Well this is from the ICAO guidance on separation between arriving and departing aircraft on the same runway using LVP’s:

“The experience in some States is that to achieve this, the departing aircraft must commence its take-off run before the arriving aircraft reaches a point 6 NM from touchdown.”

In fairness it does say the spacing can be reduced to the departing aircraft being airborne before the arriving aircraft reaches 2nm where they have suffience surface movement radar to allow monitoring of the taxiing aircraft. I don’t know what kind of kit this airport had.

[Del Prado]

Was it definitely LVPs? LVPs when vis is below 600 metres (or 200’ cloud base) and landing clearance ‘should’ be given by 2 miles, ‘ must’ be given by 1 mile or told to go around.
Pilot can ask for LVPs/CAT 3 approach but generally won’t be given protection unless LVPs declared.

[DIBO]

Are we sure about 3NM Final when Southwest passed the hold short position and entered the runway?
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/582x102/swa708_lu_99a3eedafd32f0f310eb73b6179d4e02ce5d75f9.jpg

The moment SWA turned into the rwy (heading change from 090° towards 174° and beyond), FDX was just under 2nm from the threshold.

ATC told SW that FedEx was on 3NM final.

But that information was passed on by TWR when SWA was still on twy B, either still going northbound or maybe already in the eastward hold short position.
As LiveATC recordings are not reliably timestamped up-to the second, synchronizing it with FR24 timestamped data, is unreliable...

[ethicalconundrum]

As the operator of a small plane, and sometimes operating out of large airports(visual or common IFR, no CAT), I have often heard; "Bonanza xxxxx cleared for takeoff, no delay". Since I'm generally in the way at PHX, or SAN or SJC I take no umbridge in the ATC wanting me up and moving so Real Planes can resume operation.

I can't say I've ever heard "no delay" used with the bigger metal and if it's even in ICAO phraseology or just a warning to me to GTFO now. What about 'immediate takeoff'? Or, 'expedite takeoff'? Of course this does not include the violation of the CAT III obstruction of the transmit antenna by the SWA.

[hitchens97]

ATC told SW that FedEx was on 3NM final.

Typically wouldn't an ATC say something like "Traffic on 3 mile final, Cleared for Takeoff, No Delay" or is the No Delay just assumed. Presumaby it's also somewhat dependent on the traffic, a Cessna 172 on 3 mile final is a bit different than a 777.

[ApolloHeli]

...Also which one is the International default?...

ICAO DOC4444 PANS-ATM (Air Traffic Management) states*:7.10 CONTROL OF ARRIVING AIRCRAFT
7.10.1 Separation of landing aircraft and preceding landing and departing aircraft using the same runway
Except as provided in... Chapter 5, Section 5.8, a landing aircraft will not normally be permitted to cross the runway threshold on its final approach until the preceding departing aircraft has crossed the end of the runway-in-use, or has started a turn, or until all preceding landing aircraft are clear of the runway-in-use.
Note 1.— See Figure 7-2.
Note 2.— Wake turbulence categories and groups are contained in Chapter 4, Section 4.9 and time-based wake turbulence longitudinal separation minima are contained in Chapter 5, Section 5.8.
Note 3.— See 7.6.3.1.2.2.

7.10.2 Clearance to land
An aircraft may be cleared to land when there is reasonable assurance that the separation in 7.10.1 ...will exist when the aircraft crosses the runway threshold, provided that a clearance to land shall not be issued until a preceding landing aircraft has crossed the runway threshold. To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, the landing clearance shall include the designator of the landing runway.

My interpretation of the above is that the ICAO SARPs seem to be more in the spirit of the European/UK attitude to issuing landing clearances, however in my (limited) searching I can't find anything that expressly prohibits issuing a landing clearance to an aircraft a reasonable distance from the threshold while only departing traffic is obstructing the runway ahead of them (the apparent "US" practice).

*I've omitted references to exceptions for gin-clear pre-approved exemptions to these rules...

[Ollie Onion]

With the weather ‘RVR was at 1400, mid point 600 and roll out 1800 feet’ it would be amazing if it wasn’t LVO conditions.

[FlightDetent]

Sounds like a clarification of what AWO/LVP actually is and having an ruleset to follow for the ground movements could be a good result of this. If handled with the depth it requires by the NTSB.

Because, apart from the crew being not sluggish, there were no defences broken. As in not in place.

Not taking any high ground here. The European side had the guidance yet it took many lives lost to understand what compliance is.

https://simpleflying.com/linate-airport-disaster/
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20011008-0

The benefit of standardised aviation vocabulary (phraseologies) is probably forever not found in the US, rejected by the collective immune system like a transplanted organ.

But the rest of us flying in other globe quadrants are not doing much of a stellar job either. And outside of the Beautiful Country, in multinational comm environments, it is a major mistake. Much attempted plain English, longwinded and descriptive, i.s.o. focused and specific.



​​​​
​​

[Seat4A]

Posted by Reuters February 6, 20236:31 PM EST

Quotes from NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy:

"a FedEx Boeing 767 cargo plane and a Southwest Airlines 737-700 that nearly collided were "probably under 100 feet (30.5 meters) vertically from each other," according to preliminary information on Monday from the investigation."

and
"Both cockpit voice recorders in the incident were believed to have been overwritten, Homendy said."

Link https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/fedex-southwest-planes-believed-under-100-feet-apart-ntsb-2023-02-06/

[dr dre]

So you assume everybody understood the Fedex was going around because they were all 3 locals Americans. Are you sure the Fedex would have used another phraseology if the SW had been, say Aeromexico or Virgin ? The poor phraseology , or lack of even , is what we discuss , and "on the go" was the most obvious one , but : " Abort" and "Negative" are as bad. if not worse.

And there are plenty of non US backgrounded pilots flying for US airlines as well.

While not related to this incident here's a glaring example of very poor phraseology by US ATC (in addition to unnecessary aggression) that caused confusion and frustration and could've led to a safety incursion:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWOOKQlEe5s

But it's not just the lax phraseology, there's also the lax procedures and the laisse faire culture, things like clearing an aircraft to land off a CAT III approach while a preceding departing aircraft hasn't even entered the runway yet. You don't really see this in any developed aviation environment outside the US.

[megan]

Wonder how a crewless all computer freighter would have handled this? Go pilots. FedEx pilot calm on the radio after the event, situational awareness doesn't get any better, kudos to the crew. :ok:

[FlightDetent]

Oh well. Another case where compound HF elements caused an incident, which would never happen if handled by properly calibrated tech, being promoted as crew heroism.

A simple case:

A) If RWY not confirmed safe to land by 600 ft, a missed approach results.

B) If approaching traffic closer than 3.6 NM and departing acft still short of the holding point, disapprove or cancel the line up clearance except if ceiling 1000+ AFE and VIS 3+ NM.

That is not even aviation science.

[Oilhead]

It appears that there is a bravissimo culture in some areas of US ATC, where the concept of safety challenge and just culture is simply missing. It’s their way , and that’s that.

[giggitygiggity]

Wonder how a crewless all computer freighter would have handled this? Go pilots. FedEx pilot calm on the radio after the event, situational awareness doesn't get any better, kudos to the crew. :ok:
Surely the ai/automation would have coordinated directly with the intruder aircrafts ai/automation and negotiated a better solution when it calculated the risk of collision was too great.

Im not for this technology yet as obviously it needs decades of work, but it’s foolish to pretend there aren’t solutions (and indeed better solutions) to this airprox using automation.

[Flyhighfirst]

Posted by Reuters February 6, 20236:31 PM EST

Quotes from NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy:

"a FedEx Boeing 767 cargo plane and a Southwest Airlines 737-700 that nearly collided were "probably under 100 feet (30.5 meters) vertically from each other," according to preliminary information on Monday from the investigation."

and
"Both cockpit voice recorders in the incident were believed to have been overwritten, Homendy said."

Link https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/fedex-southwest-planes-believed-under-100-feet-apart-ntsb-2023-02-06/

Isn't it about time that recorders stored enough data that they can’t be overwritten or destroyed in any way by the crew?

[MPN11]

Isn't it about time that recorders stored enough data that they can’t be overwritten or destroyed in any way by the crew?
24 hours should be easily achievable, with modern technology. The idea that a crew/system can delete relevant data seems so wrong.

I recall the huge magnetic tapes in ATC in the 70s … anything questionable on any frequency and one of the first tasks was “impound the tapes”.

[BFSGrad]

Isn't it about time that recorders stored enough data that they can’t be overwritten or destroyed in any way by the crew?
Hasn’t EASA required 25 hour CVRs in new construction since 2021? The technology has been available for a long time. NTSB recommended extended duration CVRs back in 2018.

[sectordirector]

It appears that there is a bravissimo culture in some areas of US ATC, where the concept of safety challenge and just culture is simply missing. It’s their way , and that’s that.

SWA and ATC cluelessness, no sense of urgency in a hair-on-fire scenario. Only FDX broke the chain at the last minute.

[ATC Watcher]

SWA and ATC cluelessness, no sense of urgency in a hair-on-fire scenario. Only FDX broke the chain at the last minute.
Yes, but it ended with around 100 ft vertical separation, a little less rate of climb from the 767 and a bit more on tehe737 and it would have ended in a mid-air collision above the runway. It ended well due pure luck,
On the other hand there will always be someone ( a Capt Hinsight) that will say that If the Fedex had landed " normally" and descelerated behind anthe accelerating 737 possibly the separation would have been greater and consequently the risk of collision would have been smaller.
You never win in this situation .
But we should not base safety standards on luck.

[DaveReidUK]

On the other hand there will always be someone (a Capt Hindsight) that will say that If the Fedex had landed " normally" and decelerated behind the accelerating 737 possibly the separation would have been greater and consequently the risk of collision would have been smaller.

I doubt that anyone who has looked at the traces would think that.

A rather more sobering "what-if" is to consider what the outcome would have been had the 737 paused for as little as 10 seconds longer during its run-up checks before rolling. That scenario doesn't bear thinking about.

[Errwolf]

I'm not an ATC guy nor familiar with the setup at KAUS, but I can find some areas where ATC separation standards were not met and procedures were not followed, all citations from FAA JO Order 7110.65W and emphasis mine.

Any ATC pros/part 121 types please let me know if I am on target with the ATC duties, or even in the ballpark.

3−10−3. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION

a. Separate an arriving aircraft from another aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold until one of the following conditions exists or unless authorized in para 3−10−10, Altitude Restricted Low Approach.

1. The other aircraft has landed and is clear of the runway. Between sunrise and sunset, if you can determine distances by reference to suitable landmarks and the other aircraft has landed, it need not be clear of the runway if the following minimum distance from the landing threshold exists: (a) When a Category I aircraft is landing behind a Category I or II− 3,000 feet. (b) When a Category II aircraft is landing behind a Category I or II− 4,500 feet.

2. The other aircraft has departed and crossed the runway end. If you can determine distances by reference to suitable landmarks and the other aircraft is airborne, it need not have crossed the runway end if the following minimum distance from the landing threshold exists: (a) Category I aircraft landing behind Category I or II− 3,000 feet. (b) Category II aircraft landing behind Category I or II− 4,500 feet. (c) When either is a category III aircraft− 6,000 feet.

3−10−5. LANDING CLEARANCE

b. Procedures.

1. Facilities without a safety logic system or facilities with the safety logic system inoperative or in the limited configuration must not clear an aircraft for a full−stop, touch−and−go, stop−and−go, option, or unrestricted low approach when a departing aircraft has been instructed to line up and wait or is holding in position on the same runway. The landing clearance may be issued once the aircraft in position has started takeoff roll.

3−10−6. ANTICIPATING SEPARATION a. Landing clearance to succeeding aircraft in a landing sequence need not be withheld if you observe the positions of the aircraft and determine that prescribed runway separation will exist when the aircraft crosses the landing threshold. Issue traffic information to the succeeding aircraft if a preceding arrival has not been previously reported and when traffic will be departing prior to their arrival.

3−10−7. LANDING CLEARANCE WITHOUT VISUAL OBSERVATION When an arriving aircraft reports at a position where he/she should be seen but has not been visually observed, advise the aircraft as a part of the landing and separation clearance that it is not in sight and restate the landing runway. PHRASEOLOGY− NOT IN SIGHT, RUNWAY (number) CLEARED TO LAND. NOTE− Aircraft observance on the CTRD satisfies the visually observed requirement.
der 7110.65W, Air Traffic Control

[WillowRun 6-3]

SLF/attorney intruding, apologies in advance.

I don't see it as "luck" - the non-occurence of a mid-air. It was the result not of random chance, but instead the reserves of safety-system building blocks (for want of a better more precise term) which kept the Swiss nonaligned. The FedEx crew had enough reserves of SA and its correlate - readiness to take immediate action - to see the problem before it was too late. I regret risking semantics here.... but: was it "luck" that prompted the UA pilot in SFO in 2017 to say, "where's this guy going? He's lined up on the taxiway." My set of older UA FCOMs (obtained legit, I swear) probably don't have an operational guidance instructing pilots what to say when they see this exact situation as on the 28 taxiway. It was that individual pilot's reserves of the fundamental "factor inputs" which, ka-thunka ka-thunka, yield the aviation safety system.

So I don't think it's indulging in ascribing heroism to PIC of the FedEx aircraft for intercepting the situation. Okay yes it points once again to the "cowboys and bad guys" mentality of lots of my Yankee compatriots when it comes to R/T, but that issue is entirely a different problem-solution cause-and-effect chain.

As for seeing NTSB honcho say CVRs were overwritten, Expletive. House T&I Reauthoirization hearings have begun. Better get this done, methink(s).

Apologies for SLF/att'y incursion amongst aviators.

[MPN11]

So, Members if the Jury, who is to blame for this near catastrophic mid-air over the airport?

SW for taking too long to get moving?
FedX for trundling down the glideslope when cleared to land?
Or ATC for lacking SA in foggy conditions and issuing unsafe clearances to BOTH aircraft?

Sorry, but as a former ATCO at very busy Mil airfields, I blame ATC 100%. The rest is semi-aligned cheese-holes.

[SINGAPURCANAC]

I would like to ask USA colleagues what is exact benefit of doing land/take off c1earances your way?
e.g. you have one a/c 4Nm final RYR11 at 00
you have one a/c at holding point DLH 22 at 00

Option 1. Ryr 11 continiue app, landing clearance will be given shortly ( traffic info)at 00
DLH 22 clear for immediate take off ,...( traffic info) at 00
DlH 22 departs at 01 or so
Ryr 11 clear to land at 01 or so
ryr 11 on ground at 02

Option 2. RYR 11 clear to land...(traffic info) at 00
DLH 22 clear for immediate take off ....( traffic info) at 00

DLH 22 departs at 01 or so
RYR 11 on ground at 02

??
Thanks for clarification.

[hans brinker]

And there are plenty of non US backgrounded pilots flying for US airlines as well.

While not related to this incident here's a glaring example of very poor phraseology by US ATC (in addition to unnecessary aggression) that caused confusion and frustration and could've led to a safety incursion:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWOOKQlEe5s

But it's not just the lax phraseology, there's also the lax procedures and the laisse faire culture, things like clearing an aircraft to land off a CAT III approach while a preceding departing aircraft hasn't even entered the runway yet. You don't really see this in any developed aviation environment outside the US.

Dissenting opinion. Not talking about operating procedures. I’ve flown all over the EU and a bit of Northern Africa for about 7 years, for the last 18 years North and Central America. Speak multiple languages, did ATC in Spanish and French when I worked there. English is not my first language. There’s no excuse for the absolutely appalling language skills many foreign carriers pilots have that fly international. That definitely includes the carriers from Southern Europe, and definitely Asia. There is no way some of those pilots in the video should be considered English proficient level 4, and as such, they should not be allowed to fly international.

[BFSGrad]

I would like to ask USA colleagues what is exact benefit of doing land/take off c1earances your way?Pointless to discuss benefits of “our way” as either methodology of granting a landing clearance requires ATC to maintain situation awareness, which was clearly lost and causal to this incident.

[ATC Watcher]

@ Willow Run6-3 , quote :
SLF/attorney intruding, apologies in advance.
I don't see it as "luck" - the non-occurence of a mid-air. It was the result not of random chance, but instead the reserves of safety-system building blocks
Apologies accepted. nobody is perfect ;) You see there are no "reserves" as you put it in Safety management , just layers and back ups. Fedex did not save the day, he improvised a self made solution ouriside the box, "SW abort" which had no effect , The "Luck" I was talking about is the luck they did in not hitting each other during the go around manouvre , because in this geometry , none of the 3 participants had a clear SA and could see the other one, The Fedex was above the SW and could not see it, the Fedex could not be seen by the SW because it was behind , and the controller could not see both because of the Low vsibility. The correct procedures were not followed : i.e. wrong landing clearance by ATC, wrong line up clearance by ATC , no reaction by SW to an immediate take off instruction wrongly issued by the controller , no monitoring of the actual departure by the controller, no go-around ordered by the controller, no traffic info given by the controller after the go around , no apparent side step made by the Fedex, etc.. and on top of that wrong non-standard phraseology used .all around.
Yes the fact they missed by 100ft above the runway was caused by pure luck, or fate as we call it, but definitively not by "reserves" in the safety system .

@ MPN 11 quote :
Sorry, but as a former ATCO at very busy Mil airfields, I blame ATC 100%. The rest is semi-aligned cheese-hole
I do not like to apportion blame, and certainly not before a proper investigation report is available. FR24 and ATCLive radio are great tools but we know it is not 100% reality , especially regading the exact timing of things .But so far, yes it looks like poor ATC.
W
​​​​​​​But what I see here is a system that has deteriorated over time . It not so much to blame the individual controller here, but rather ra system that allows this mess to sound like "normal" . But who trained the guy to do this , who supervises him and finds it OK ? This is more the issue for me.

[dr dre]

I would like to ask USA colleagues what is exact benefit of doing land/take off c1earances your way?

One could say if the international standard method of clearances was being observed at Austin then the controller would’ve been aware of the position and movement of SWA entering the runway and then rolling to a safe separation distance before issuing the landing clearance to FedEx. Instead they just issued two clearances under the assumption that their would be no conflict, and maybe diverted their attention to something else rather than the unfolding conflict.

A lax safety culture and short cuts. If the International standard of issuing take off and landing clearances had been followed this incident would not have occurred.

[WillowRun 6-3]

ATC Watcher, thank you for the explanation and additional discussion.

[pattern_is_full]

So, Members if the Jury, who is to blame for this near catastrophic mid-air over the airport?

SW for taking too long to get moving?
FedX for trundling down the glideslope when cleared to land?
Or ATC for lacking SA in foggy conditions and issuing unsafe clearances to BOTH aircraft?

Sorry, but as a former ATCO at very busy Mil airfields, I blame ATC 100%. The rest is semi-aligned cheese-holes.

SA is everyone's job - however I agree that SA is the one and only job for ATC, and that was clearly a fail... call it 95%+. Overall SA, and forgetting the word "immediate!" in the TO clearance.

I'd ding SW a little bit for counting too much on ATC's TO clearance when they knew (or should have absorbed from the tower comms) that the situation was tightening (spacing, weather, darkness) and not a good time and place for a 20-second delay after lineup (if accurate). I always try to save a little brain-juice for "the big picture" even if ATC gives a clearance - if only to check final and the runway myself when possible.

(As I said long ago on these forums, the goal of SOPs is not to tick boxes, but to avoid an accident - if you tick all the boxes and still have an accident, you're just as potentially dead.)

I'd ding Fedex, less, for trying to play ATCO (which muddied the waters - who was saying "Abort" and what did it mean? And took up a little time - again if accurate). And also perhaps assuming too much that the clearances would actually work.

But I wasn't there, cockpits are demanding places for either TO or landing (esp. CAT III), and with the weather/time, everyone was flying blind (literally).

[ATC Watcher]

Something I forgot to mention yesterday , and which has not been mentioned so far, is the apparaent unawareness of the seriousness of what happened and the self congrartulations in the end to reinforce them in their convinctions that they did themselves everything rght and it was all the fault of the SW...: The controller telling the Fedex " we appreciate your professionalism " and Fedex replying " Thank you " in a happy voice. This trends to prove to me that the deviances from normality we saw are deeply embedded in the system, at least in Austin.

[22/04]

I think we are discussing cultural differences and the exchange between the Southwest pilot and the Virgin one where the former mentions "a little freedom" points to this. In the U.K. it isn't only the job of ATC to have SA, but at a controlled airport it is to control. Pilots by and large do what he says. I remember a controller once said of an airfield "all this is mine and nothing moves without my say so." The U.S. seems to leave a little more to pilots.

I am pretty sure that here after both this and the JFK incident the controllers would have been relived of duty afterwards and not sure if this happened. Such a culture is widespread her for a variety of non-accusatory reasons - for example if a train driver passes a red signal even by a little bit the train can't proceed and a new driver must be found.

I fin the concept of an uncontrolled ramp a little extraordinary too. Presume the call "push back and start approved" is rarely heard in the U.S. Could lead to an expensive argument in court I would have thought.

Oh and the use of the word clear for anything other than take off or landing clearance still seems to happen - I must listen for the use of vacate in U.S ATC.

Tin hat on against incoming from the U.S.

[172_driver]

The controller telling the Fedex " we appreciate your professionalism " and Fedex replying " Thank you " in a happy voice. This trends to prove to me that the deviances from normality we saw are deeply embedded in the system, at least in Austin.

To med that sounds like a controller who knows he f*cked up and probably wanted to admit that, to relieve his chest. What should he reply?

[ATC Watcher]

To med that sounds like a controller who knows he f*cked up and probably wanted to admit that, to relieve his chest.
Possibly .Only the controller himself can tell you exactly what he meant, but I am not that convinced that he realises that he is also a fault here, since a few minutes later he does exactly the same : i.e. clearing the American 808Q , also on a declared CAT III approach to land while the runway is still occupied ( by the Fedex) so either the guy does not know what a CATIII aproach requires, or it is an accepted normal deviation of the LVP procedures.

[waito]

I can't see any major issue in what FedEx Crew performed. Only thing is, they should've called out "going around" first, then maybe suggest Southwest to react like stop. Why FedEx went around so late? Well, we can't judge. This is very dynamic, they might have thought it works out at first. Even after the assumed major delay due to SW runup test.

I can imagine a sort of "non-constructive" role of the SW crew in happily accept the jump in front of the arriving traffic and doing whatever served themselves. Hope they learn from it, if that's the case. Hope it's not systemic to get advantage at sb elses' expense.

I can see a major screw from ATC, and to be honest, the conditional landing clearance was not the major issue. FedEx would have continued the approach almost as long waiting for the clearance. The major screwup is to let come a/c as close each other in poor vis conditions. And risking ILS signal quality by interference. I guess also a systemic one if executed by the same controller.

BTW, how often is low vis in Austin?

[DaveReidUK]

Why FedEx went around so late? Well, we can't judge.

Out if interest, is there a verified, time-stamped version of the ATC audio that can be overlaid on the vertical profile ?

That said, using either the track or the audio to try to establish definitively the point that the GA was initiated would need to take account of (a) the delay while the CF6s spooled up and (b) the likelihood that Aviating took priority over Communicating.

[BFSGrad]

Something I forgot to mention yesterday , and which has not been mentioned so far, is the apparaent unawareness of the seriousness of what happened and the self congrartulations in the end to reinforce them in their convinctions that they did themselves everything rght and it was all the fault of the SW...: The controller telling the Fedex " we appreciate your professionalism " and Fedex replying " Thank you " in a happy voice. This trends to prove to me that the deviances from normality we saw are deeply embedded in the system, at least in Austin.It was mentioned back in my post #13 responding to your post #11. I interpreted the local controller’s apology as 100% ATC mea culpa. I think by the point when the apology was issued, the local controller realized how badly he FU’d. He may have also realized that Fedex tried to bail him out when asking the 2nd time for a landing clearance. In effect Fedex was saying, “I don’t like the way this situation is developing, but I’ll stick with it a bit longer to allow YOU to do your job.” Ultimately, Fedex had to call the go around when it should have been called by ATC. Again, Fedex covering for ATC.

[waito]

... using either the track or the audio to try to establish definitively the point that the GA was initiated would need to take account
Well, I didn't even bother to look at the timestamp. According to Avherald, GA was initiated at 150' AGL, 1000FT from threshold. Whatever the fidelity of that info is.

I call the GA potentially late because FedEx could have chosen to go around when they detected the SW 737 on the rwy possibly messing up ILS.

On the other hand, what did the FedEx Crew really see, detect., and when?
Does HUD Guidance with RNAV work without ILS signals these days?
​​​​​​

[WideScreen]

Something I forgot to mention yesterday , and which has not been mentioned so far, is the apparaent unawareness of the seriousness of what happened and the self congrartulations in the end to reinforce them in their convinctions that they did themselves everything rght and it was all the fault of the SW...: The controller telling the Fedex " we appreciate your professionalism " and Fedex replying " Thank you " in a happy voice. This trends to prove to me that the deviances from normality we saw are deeply embedded in the system, at least in Austin.
I agree with you on this "conclusion", the undesirable waved off with a BBQ level amicably "thanks".:ooh:

Not to say, Blancolirio his pay-off in this subjects' video also warns for another Tenerife in the making, an A380 on top of a 777-300ER ????

[Chiefttp]

FedEx may have delayed his go-around to see if the razor thin spacing that Tower controller caused by issuing the take-off clearance to SW would work out. This happens often in VFR conditions, NEVER in Cat 3 conditions because……drumroll please………you can’t SEE the jet in front of you. The FedEx Captain knew the spacing with SouthWest was suspect, and from the subsequent conversation and confusion between tower and SW regarding where the SW jet’s position was in the takeoff sequence. At that point, The hairs on the back of the FedEx captain’s neck probably prompted him to Go-around. I’m not sure why he didn’t off-set from the runway centerline just to give himself an increased safety buffer from SW’s projected flight path. The Tower controller seems to have made a totally unnecessary error to expedite traffic flow, at a quiet airport, by issuing SW a takeoff clearance in CAT 3 conditions. The SW crew, if they knew that FedEx was on a 3 mile final should never have made the radio call to Twr that were holding short, ready to go. Tower thanking FedEx for his “Professionalism” was his attempt to hopefully avoid a report of the incident, and also perhaps, acknowledgment that FedEx saved the day, and averted a disaster. If the Southwest crew knew FedEx was on final, they should be having “Tea and biscuits” (as you Brits like to say) with their Chief Pilots and the FAA. I’m sure there will be no tea and biscuits for the Tower controller.

[BFSGrad]

If the Southwest crew knew FedEx was on final...SWA did acknowledge the traffic on final. In ATC’s takeoff clearance, tower says “traffic 3-mile final is a heavy 767.” Included in SWA’s takeoff clearance read back is “copy the traffic.”

[Chiefttp]

SWA did acknowledge the traffic on final. In ATC’s takeoff clearance, tower says “traffic 3-mile final is a heavy 767.” Included in SWA’s takeoff clearance read back is “copy the traffic.”

I was giving them the benefit of the doubt, but I agree they knew FedEx was on final. This whole incident can be summarized by
“What were They/He Thinking” “Tea, no biscuits “ for all! Fed Ex, good SA.

[waito]

Looks like we mostly all agree. Overall picture looks clear and simple enough to me in this special case and its visibility restrictions.

Will FAA introduce changes? what's your guess?

[Equivocal]

Will FAA introduce changes?one hopes that a proper investigation will result in any changes that are needed. But, on the face of it, if the existing procedures had been applied, this incident would not have occurred.

[Chiefttp]

I’ll throw this out there for discussion. SouthWest’s call to Tower, stating “Southwest Holding short Rwy 18L , we’re ready” was totally unnecessary and One can argue was the catalyst of this entire incident.

Number One, Why make that call? Who cares?. It accomplished nothing except to clog up the Tower freq with unnecessary chatter while another aircraft is attempting to fly a Cat 3 approach.

Number 2, This call prompted the Tower controller to issue a dubious takeoff clearance, which, if the call was never made, the Takeoff clearance would never have been issued.

Number 3, it set up a situation where SW had to rush his takeoff roll, if he were even aware enough to realize how close FedEx was.
And this call possibly caused Tower, out of habit, to clear SW for takeoff, once Tower issued the takeoff clearance to SW, he may have realized he made a mistake, but Hoped, Southwest would make a quick takeoff and no harm no foul.

Sometimes, my F/O will call Tower to state we’re holding #1 for takeoff even though we both see there is arriving traffic on final. I will speak up now to remind them, a Holding #1 call is not necessary and serves no purpose most of the time.

[Mookiesurfs]

It’s possible that:

1. Fedex assumed SWA aborted and that’s why Fedex flew straight ahead over the runway.
2. Tower assumed SWA aborted and that’s why they gave them a right turn instruction, typically a runway turn off call.
3. SWA assumed Fedex went around and that Fedex knew SWA took off and that Fedex had made a sidestep maneuver for lateral separation.

No one should have had to make these assumptions. There was unclear and non standard phraseology from all parties involved which led to confusion and a lack of clear control of the situation.

[AerocatS2A]

I’ll throw this out there for discussion. SouthWest’s call to Tower, stating “Southwest Holding short Rwy 18L , we’re ready” was totally unnecessary and One can argue was the catalyst of this entire incident.

Number One, Why make that call? Who cares?. It accomplished nothing except to clog up the Tower freq with unnecessary chatter while another aircraft is attempting to fly a Cat 3 approach.

Number 2, This call prompted the Tower controller to issue a dubious takeoff clearance, which, if the call was never made, the Takeoff clearance would never have been issued.

Number 3, it set up a situation where SW had to rush his takeoff roll, if he were even aware enough to realize how close FedEx was.
And this call possibly caused Tower, out of habit, to clear SW for takeoff, once Tower issued the takeoff clearance to SW, he may have realized he made a mistake, but Hoped, Southwest would make a quick takeoff and no harm no foul.

Sometimes, my F/O will call Tower to state we’re holding #1 for takeoff even though we both see there is arriving traffic on final. I will speak up now to remind them, a Holding #1 call is not necessary and serves no purpose most of the time.
Is there no requirement in the US to tell Tower you are "ready"?

[waito]

I’ll throw this out there for discussion. SouthWest’s call to Tower, stating “Southwest Holding short Rwy 18L , we’re ready” was totally unnecessary and...

we all know it serves one purpose: rattling at the cage.

[DIBO]

It’s possible that:

1. Fedex assumed SWA aborted and that’s why Fedex flew straight ahead over the runway.
2. Tower assumed SWA aborted and that’s why they gave them a right turn instruction, typically a runway turn off call.
3. SWA assumed Fedex went around and that Fedex knew SWA took off and that Fedex had made a sidestep maneuver for lateral separation.

No one should have had to make these assumptions. There was unclear and non standard phraseology from all parties involved which led to confusion and a lack of clear control of the situation.
'Assume' should not be in the aviation dictionary, except for 'assume your responsibilities'

1. Fedex assumed SWA aborted and that’s why Fedex flew straight ahead over the runway. ==> if FDX was not 100% confident about what was going on around them, they should at least have added to their 'is on the go', a clarification such as 'standard missed', 'climbing to xxx', 'sidestepping left',... which would have improved the SA of all involved
2. Tower assumed SWA aborted and that’s why they gave them a right turn instruction, typically a runway turn off call. ==> TWR understood the 'Southwest abort' as an action report from SWA and acknowledged it with a 'roger'. The subsequent 'negative' to TWR's 'turn right', could have been very usefully complemented with 'lifting off', 'too low', .... improving again the SA for all
3. SWA assumed Fedex went around and that Fedex knew SWA took off and that Fedex had made a sidestep maneuver for lateral separation. ==>Three assumptions in a row.... what else do we need for the Swiss cheese holes lining-up. Given the climb-out profile of SWA just after lift-off, they were pretty unsure what was going on above them, if you ask me

[DIBO]

Is there no requirement in the US to tell Tower you are "ready"?
Indeed, was also my first reaction when I read that post (a bit flabbergasted) and attributed it to 'cultural' (EASA-FAA) difference, so I resisted replying until this 'cultural' difference is confirmed

we all know it serves one purpose: rattling at the cage.
so, this confirms my above reply, I think

[Mookiesurfs]

Indeed, was also my first reaction when I read that post (a bit flabbergasted) and attributed it to 'cultural' (EASA-FAA) difference, so I resisted replying until this 'cultural' difference is confirmed


so, this confirms my above reply, I think

Except in vis as low as this AUS tower can’t see you and doesn’t know where you are until you tell them.

[sherburn2LA]

Even in good vis the tower must be a ways away from the runways in some places. It is a year or two since I had a license and I was only in a bug smasher but I would always call on reaching the line or the end of the queue or how can you be identified ?. Admittedly we would not call again as number 1 if we had already identified as number 3 or 4. Perhaps that is what was meant.

[sectordirector]

Thirty five airports in the United States including Kahului and Providence have ASDE-X surface radar which would made the B737 exact position evident to the tower. Austin-Bergstrom does not have surface radar.

[Equivocal]

Except in vis as low as this AUS tower can’t see you and doesn’t know where you are until you tell them.I do hope you don't really mean that!

[sectordirector]

Is there no requirement in the US to tell Tower you are "ready"?

FAA JO Order 7110.65 paragraph 3-9-10: note: "Turbine-powered aircraft may be considered ready for takeoff when they reach the runway unless they advise otherwise."

However with 1/8 mile visibility and no surface radar, there was no way for the tower to observe that.

[AerocatS2A]

FAA JO Order 7110.65 paragraph 3-9-10: note: "Turbine-powered aircraft may be considered ready for takeoff when they reach the runway unless they advise otherwise."

However with 1/8 mile visibility and no surface radar, there was no way for the tower to observe that.

Thanks, that's not the case here in NZ and surrounding regions so we would always call ready as soon as we are ready and it's not cage rattling or anything other than letting Tower know we are ready and they can depart us when it suits them.

[BFSGrad]

However with 1/8 mile visibility and no surface radar, there was no way for the tower to observe that.Local controller query if SWA was rolling would also seem to confirm tower had no visual on 18L surface movements. Looking at airport diagram, looks like tower is around 3,000 ft from the approach end of 18L. Given reported RVRs and darkness (30 min prior to sunrise), seems reasonable to conclude tower had no visual.

[waito]

Still Southwest Crew rattled the cage.

IIRC somewhere it's mentioned they weren't close to HP yet. And accepting jumping in front of a 3 nm final approach in low vis and knowing a static runup is due at takeoff, we can guess what their goal was:
Hitting the road.

Good discussion though what an honest "ready" means.

[MPN11]

As it appears from the audio that these were the only aircraft of frequency at the time, what was the rush? Is SW one of those airlines that has tight schedules, and usually scoots off at high speed as soon as the opportunity arises? That might have influenced the controller's 'thinking' more than the impending arrival of the Fedex ... a sort of automatic reaction.

Not excusing the controller, just trying to get my head around "WTF was he thinking?".

[AerocatS2A]

As it appears from the audio that these were the only aircraft of frequency at the time, what was the rush? Is SW one of those airlines that has tight schedules, and usually scoots off at high speed as soon as the opportunity arises? That might have influenced the controller's 'thinking' more than the impending arrival of the Fedex ... a sort of automatic reaction.

Not excusing the controller, just trying to get my head around "WTF was he thinking?".
Audio clips like this are often stripped of everything not pertinent to the incident, I wouldn't read anything into it. The recent JFK incident recordings didn't have any other radio traffic either.

[bean]

Audio clips like this are often stripped of everything not pertinent to the incident, I wouldn't read anything into it. The recent JFK incident recordings didn't have any other radio traffic either.
The clip is actually annotated to say this is real time unedited

[DIBO]

Audio clips like this are often stripped of everything not pertinent to the incident, I wouldn't read anything into it. The recent JFK incident recordings didn't have any other radio traffic either.
The LiveATC halfhour recording contained only one other traffic leaving the freq a minute or so before FDX checked in. Only 3 parties on the frequency when they incident occurred. Not implying the controller wasn't handling other freq's.

[ATC Watcher]

The LiveATC halfhour recording contained only one other traffic leaving the freq a minute or so before FDX checked in. Only 3 parties on the frequency when they incident occurred. Not implying the controller wasn't handling other freq's.
Indeed . ,We have to take LiveATC for what it is , mainly the recording by spotters of R/T using mostly small hand held VHF receivers posted on Internet. Not only the times stamps are not verified, but can be intentionally clipped out by the scanner itself ,but most importantly it only records line of sight , so some ground transmissions can be missed if broadcast by a remote transmitter out of sight of the spotter receiver small antenna. So caution in drawing "facts" from it. Same in the JFK runway incursion case btw..

[22/04]

Tower thanking FedEx for his “Professionalism” was his attempt to hopefully avoid a report of the incident, and also perhaps, acknowledgment that FedEx saved the day, and averted a disaster. If the Southwest crew knew FedEx was on final, they should be having “Tea and biscuits” (as you Brits like to say) with their Chief Pilots and the FAA. I’m sure there will be no tea and biscuits for the Tower controller.

This in UK terms both a loss of separation incident in IFR LVP and an airprox and would certainly be investigated here.

As an aside do ATIS in the USA include the phrase "low visibility procedures in progress" or anything similar.

Appreciate in lots of places you don't get the frequent grim weather we do.

[Mookiesurfs]

I do hope you don't really mean that!

I do actually mean that, and in low vis situations at airports without surface movement radar, that’s how it works. It’s a good idea for everyone involved to slow down and keep a tight lock on situational awareness on days like this. One guess is we had a mixing of VFR habit and low vis procedure. Yes, sometimes carriers will rattle the cage with unnecessary holding short calls in decent wx to prompt a quick release from tower. However, in low vis the call is required to let tower know the aircraft position. In this situation the required call may have reflexively prompted tower’s VFR habit of clearing the aircraft for t/o if possible.

[Chiefttp]

22/04,
I fly a 767 for a large cargo operator. Been doing it now for 3 decades, plus military flying. I can’t recall an announcement that Low visibility procedures are in effect. It is assumed when the visibility decreases to the point where a Cat 2/3 approach is necessary to land. I preface this with the fact that at many airports, during low visibility conditions, the ATIS may announce that SMGCS procedures are in effect, which changes taxi routings and procedures. As I stated in a prior post, a few weeks ago we planned a CAT 1 ILS into Ontario California. About 15 minutes prior, the ATIS displayed that the RVR was 1000. We checked to see if a CAT 2 or 3 approach was available, it was, so we briefed it, and flew the approach and landed. No announcements by Tower, or special procedures required.
Also some posters asked whether calling Tower to state you’re ready for takeoff is not mandatory. About 90% of all airports I fly to, know where I am, and it’s best to not clog the tower freq with extraneous chatter.

[FlightDetent]

As an aside do ATIS in the USA include the phrase "low visibility procedures in progress" or anything similar It was shared up thread there's no such thing for them (simplified, and now fishing for a response).

[BFSGrad]

7110.65: ATIS must include latest weather, and instrument approach and runway in use.

AC 120-57: ATIS should include initiation of SMGCS procedures.

FAA lists KAUS as an approved SMGCS airport.

While I was unable to locate the KAUS SMGCS plan, I did look through the SMGCS plans for KRIC and KSTL (publicly available). Both plans follow the template provided by AC 120-57. I assume the KAUS SMGCS plan is similar. I did not find anything in any of the SMGCS plans or AC 120-57 that would have favorably impacted the outcome of this incident.

I’m puzzled which procedures specific to “low visibility ops” would have prevented this incident.

[FlightDetent]

I’m puzzled which procedures specific to “low visibility ops” would have prevented this incident. Thank you for looking those up and sharing.

In some other parts of the world, the protection of the ILS beam would preclude authorising the line-up for traffic this close. Irrespective of any specific limits on minimum separation and there would be some. Probably for CAT III = 200m = 1/8 SM even the airport would be not authorised to operate without ATC ground radar, at all.

Sorry to say, the position of the departing airplane seem to have been done procedurally. That does not qualify for LVP here, but reeks of Los Rodeos instead.

Do US operators utilize (the old) CAT IIIb 75 m?

Repecting that things are being done differently mostly for good reasons, just trying to learn.



​​​​​​

[BFSGrad]

In some other parts of the world, the protection of the ILS beam would preclude authorising the line-up for traffic this close. Irrespective of any specific limits on minimum separation and there would be some. Probably for CAT III = 200m = 1/8 SM even the airport would be not authorised to operate without ATC ground radar, at all.​​​​​​7110.65, 3-7-5 already provides that protection; i.e., basically says ATC must not authorize access by aircraft or vehicles to ILS critical area of runway in use when wx less than 800 or 2 and the landing aircraft is inside the FAF.

The above procedure is not dependent on imposition of “low visibility ops.”

[Chiefttp]

Flight Dentent,

Good discussion, BFS Grad stated in so much as we (U.S.) don’t have any official announcement of “Low Vis” Ops in effect. But if the Weather is below 800-2 there are different hold short lines one must stop at to protect the ILS clear zones. I will provide a photo of the Cat 2 Hold line that we have to stop at if the wx is below 800-2. In the case of this incident in Austin, there was a Cat 2/3 hold short line on the other side of the runway, probably because that’s where the localizer antenna was located. On the side where SouthWest lined up, there was none because the localizer beam would not be affected by holding short of the runway at the normal hold short line.


https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/958x623/20a317fc_5d10_41be_944d_21372f2abc73_ff26433e256995a0a30dbb2 9a39c2416763c3561.jpeg
The lines closest to the aircraft are the Cat 2 (also used for Cat3 ) hold lines. We hold short of this line when wx is 800-2 or lower. We are expected to know this, and no announcements are necessary.The line closest to the runway is the normal Hold line. Hope this helps.

[DaveReidUK]

In the case of this incident in Austin, there was a Cat 2/3 hold short line on the other side of the runway, probably because that’s where the localizer antenna was located..

Do you mean the glideslope antenna ?

[FlightDetent]

Appreciate. I am certain it's all the same in essence and result, like riding a scooter vs. skateboard. Better yet, throwing a ball left or right-handed, and we are now discussing the grip differneces of opposite dexterity.

Sorry I hesitate posting better explanation about our side's *metric" way of handling lo-viz, to avoid embarrassing myself a bit of study is required to pass the message properly.

​​​​​​When conditions deteriorate below mark, the airport / ATC / vehicles / light and navaid crews / pilots go on a declared 'yellow alert'. The rules are specified and form Low Visibility Procedure (set) and Low Visibility Operations commence.

For instance in-trail approach spacing could change from 2.5 to 6 miles, but local procedures may vary.

The terminology is officialy AWO (all-weather operations) which nobody uses. LVO instead, using LVPs. For crews those are LVTO, CAT II/III approach, landing and rollout, and LVP taxi.

Hence reading here about FedEX calling a CAT III approach (themselves) sent the brains spinning at first. For us we double check with ATC that LVO is active (Airport is running the LVPs and ATC play their part of the game accordingly) and then fly the approach based on OpSpec and crew authorisation. No need, benefit or effect of any such call.
​​​​
Do I get it right, that the implicit adjustment of procedures (but not called low visibility procedures :E​​​​​​) for <1\2 SM was not adhered to by allowing the 737 onto the runway in the incident here? Would the 'best practice' be different if the approaching airplane did call only CAT II or not called any special approche type at all? (understood that 1/8 leave only one chocie IRL)

[FlightDetent]

Do you mean the glideslope antenna ?Yes, he does, and you missed a smiley emoticon. :ok:

Staying focused, it is the localizer signal which needs protection that results in the increased longitudinal separation under AWO.

https://aerossurance.com/safety-management/sia-b777-autoland-localiser-re/
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=139628

[ATC Watcher]

Seems some of you mix up a bit CAT III and LVP , and ILS critical protection areas.
As a reminder : LVP is an ICAO procdeure appliacble when you go below CAT I minimas. The ICAO definition is here , not sure if the FAA one differs. AIR OPS DefinitionsLow visibility procedures (LVP) means procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe operations during lower than standard category I, other than standard category II, category II and III approaches and low visibility take-offs. (IR-OPS Annex I)

Low visibility take-off (LVTO) means a take-off with a Runway Visual Range (RVR) (https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Runway_Visual_Range_(RVR)) lower than 400 m but not less than 75 m. (IR-OPS Annex I)

Note that ICAO requires LVP for all departures below 550m RVR, not just LVTO.


CAT IIi definitions for once are the same for both FAA and ICAO :
​​​​​​​CAT III A DEFINITIONS
ICAO and FAA definition. A category III A approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height or a decision height lower than 100ft (30m) and a runway visual range not less than 700ft (200m).

Then we have the ILS critical protection areas : ICAO definition :
​​​​​​​the ILS critical area is an area of defined dimensions about the localizer and glide path antennas where vehicles, including aircraft, are excluded during all ILS operations. The critical area is protected because the presence of vehicles and/or aircraft inside its boundaries will cause unacceptable disturbance to the ILS signal-in-space;

The exact protection area varies from airport to airrport depending on the exact location of both the Gilde ad localizer antennas, For CAT II and III Ops an additional buffer is applied . In KAUS here , on both sides there are well marked ILS CAT III protection area holding lines, clearly visible on Blancolirio video posted earlier here.

Now we can continue this very interesting discussion using facts.

[pattern_is_full]

For the record, the FAA specifies LOC-critical protection areas only at the far end of the runway (between the antennas and the runway end). See page 33 of the .pdf (page 2-11 of the document).

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FINAL_SIGNED_Order_6750_16E_ILS_Siting_Criteria_06-09-2014_for_Web_posting%5B1%5D.pdf

Therefore an aircraft holding on the approach end (piano keys) of the runway is not in a localizer-critical area - at least in the US.

Of note, KAUS has exactly one (1) ILS-critical ladder-marking on the entire airport - across the dedicated taxiway east of the incident runway leading to/from the TxDOT ramp.

https://www.google.com/maps/search/Austin+airport/@30.2031242,-97.656435,645m/data=!3m1!1e3

[22/04]

Worth mentioning that LVPs do have commercial impact though as fewer aircraft can be handled. Typically at Heathrow BA will pre-emptively cancel ( or be asked to be the operator to cancel) if they are forecast to persist. Guess that may happen in U.S. and happens when snow is forecast?

Still seems to me the U.S. leaves more decision making to aircrew and ATC controls a bit less.

[Equivocal]

For the record, the FAA specifies LOC-critical protection areas only at the far end of the runway(between the antennas and the runway end). See page 33 of the .pdf (page 2-11 of the document).
I’m not sure whether I’m misunderstanding something in your post but in my part of the world (EUR), the principal difference between CAT I and LVO/AWO is that the Sensitive Area is also protected for CAT II/III approaches.

[FlightDetent]

Now we can continue this very interesting discussion using facts. Respectfully, at least the first definition posted is EASA IR, not ICAO.

We need to understand without an inferiority complex, US aviation as a whole is the global technology leader in aeronautics. What usually happens is their empirical habits are studied, adjusted, formalised, and later ICAO guidance comes out of it. The world audience then can enjoy a structured regulation package, but the experienced pioneers don't have the imminent need to adopt that word by word anymore.

Indeed, most of the all-weather ops expertise is actually a UK+French-born science and does not really fit the above storyline. However, the main document https://store.icao.int/en/manual-of-all-weather-operations-doc-9365 is built on top of EASA and FAA harmonized practice.

A free copy: https://www.skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/2983.pdf. Other parts of the world implement accordingly, for example here: https://www.caas.gov.sg/docs/default-source/pdf/ac_aoc_18_1_all_weather_operations.pdf

Among other guidance, EASA issues CS (certification specification, equivalent of FARs with a standalone legal status) for the airborne hardware https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/certification-specifications/cs-awo-issue-2

ATC Watcher kindly check the latest developments https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/topics/All-Weather-Operations-0, notably, LVTO now starts at 550 meters.

But I agree, the feeling of 'hey look guys, really, you don't seem to understand what you are doing' is hard to push aside when reading about how this incident unfolded.

[ATC Watcher]

@ FlightDetend :
Thanks for the update and corrections , Indeed the LVP text I put in reference is Air Ops from EASA that I believe(d) is a copy/resume from ICAO.
kindly check the latest developments https://www.easa.europa.eu/community...r-Operations-0 (https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/topics/All-Weather-Operations-0), notably LVTO now starts at 550 meters.
And thanks for that one too, I knew they were working on it but was not aware the manual was finalised and published last month . I see we are now officially moving slowly into what I call the grey area of GBAS CAT III autoland using tools that are brand new with little validation .
The brand new Turkish A330 now turned into a museum in Kathmandu airport should remind us of the limits of such blind reliance on RNAV-AR in Low visibility but that is off topic and a different story.

Again thanks for all the additional info you provided . very educative.

[FlightDetent]

I learned about the new EASA regs here, at PPRuNE. :ok:

My hunch is that EASA was 100% ICAO compliant, just that pasting their guidance without the new update did not feel like the best deal for your audience.

Looking forward to your next post, learning about things beyond the crew duty horizon is a great thrill.

For the THY A330, it is also a reminder humans are capable of being incapable without much prior warning or recourse. :hmm:

[waito]

7110.65, 3-7-5 already provides that protection; i.e., basically says ATC must not authorize access by aircraft or vehicles to ILS critical area of runway in use when wx less than 800 or 2 and the landing aircraft is inside the FAF.

The above procedure is not dependent on imposition of “low visibility ops.”

FAF means up to a dozen miles and 3-4 minutes!!

Elsewhere I picked up, in active LV Ops, protected area must be clear once arriving traffic is 2NM from treshold and landing clearance given, or may be delayed to 1NM out if arrival is informed to expect late landing clearance.

Anything but a clear picture to me what ATC is supposed to do.

And 1NM out with a potentially distorted ILS signal up to this point does not sound comfortable to me.

Should FedEx have aborted the arrival at 1NM out? Or is this too European? And they did have the ldg clr already, and were left with just an assumption of somebody else moving thru the ILS.

[Chiefttp]

Waito,
Remember, the FedEx aircraft had an enhanced vision system (FLIR) or something similar, so He may have been able to see the progress of the Southwest jet’s takeoff role and was hoping the timing would work out. I guess we will all learn soon what was going through the minds of all 3 parties involved in this episode. As a pilot, I’m always disappointed at all the publicity and media attention when an incident occurs, and then the subsequent quiet, inattention, and delay once the final investigation is published.

[punkalouver]

It’s possible that:

1. Fedex assumed SWA aborted and that’s why Fedex flew straight ahead over the runway.
2. Tower assumed SWA aborted and that’s why they gave them a right turn instruction, typically a runway turn off call.
3. SWA assumed Fedex went around and that Fedex knew SWA took off and that Fedex had made a sidestep maneuver for lateral separation.

No one should have had to make these assumptions. There was unclear and non standard phraseology from all parties involved which led to confusion and a lack of clear control of the situation.

I suspect it is correct in that the controller believed that the SW aircraft had rejected the takeoff(based on him hearing what Fedex said) and therefore simply told SW to turn right when able to exit the runway. That would explain the lack of instructions from him Initially as he wasn’t aware of the conflict.

Meanwhile SW may be assuming that FedEx is on the ground(didn’t understand their go around transmission because they were busy) and then heard the ATC turn right transmission( meant to turn right onto a taxiway) at a couple of hundred feet and rejected the idea of doing a low level turn and preferred to talk to departure, not fully aware yet of an aircraft above them as there is TA only at low altitude.

T. O. M.

[punkalouver]

Right now, it is assumed that low visibility operations were in effect and therefore, the SW aircraft should not have been cleared onto the runway while Fedex was on a 3 mile final. Perhaps correct but are we sure that low vis ops actuallybwere in effect. Fedex said they were doing a Cat III ILS but were they actually cleared for a Cat III ILS? I have seen pilots decide to do the low vis approach and the lower minimums without any ATC clearance to do so. Therefore, no protection. We do know the RVR. Was it high enough for CATI approaches at that time?

Maybe someone can find the approach controllers clearance on Live ATC.

[waito]

Waito,
Remember, the FedEx aircraft had an enhanced vision system (FLIR) or something similar, so He may have been able to see the progress of the Southwest jet’s takeoff role and was hoping the timing would work out.

Does this also imply ILS signal quality is less important during EV guidance? ILS only as backup source? Anybody knows?

[JanetFlight]

Many moons ago when i was a lil innocent lil kid, i remember a specific episode from my lovely Tweety & Sylvester, and with another cartoon/animal that i cannot remember now wich one it was.
They were three together in a dark room, where we as TV (kid) viewers could seen their eyes, but they couldnt see each others...only their voices were audible to them.
I really think of that episode right now,,, FDX was thinking where SWA could have been, but without any certainty...SWA was thinking where FDX was but without certainty....TWR were listening both but with no clue at all what were they doing or where were they...
It all ended well...but...

[ATC Watcher]

Does this also imply ILS signal quality is less important during EV guidance? ILS only as backup source? Anybody knows?
Well at the very begining of the tape, the Fedex says .." for a CAT III ILS" , he mentions ILS so it was an ILS approach , As far as I know EFVS, as you call it ithe US, is only to replace visual aquisition below DH , it is not an approach system as such. Or are you allowed in the US to use EFVS to make "visual approaches " in IMC ?

[BFSGrad]

FAF means up to a dozen miles and 3-4 minutes!!My shorthand was perhaps a bit too short. The actual text reads:

‘…whenever an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS outer marker (OM) or the fix used in lieu of the OM.’

[DIBO]

Maybe someone can find the approach controllers clearance on Live ATC.
Basically it was "cleared ILS 18L approach"

Here's a link to the edited version of FDX1432 on KAUS APP, with following warnings:
* substantially edited to combine the 2 half-hour recordings and to remove silent periods & exchanges concerning other traffic
* this was a multi-frequency recording, traffic was light so probably no exchanges are missing, but no guarantee
https://forums.liveatc.net/atcaviation-audio-clips/austin-tower-fedexsouthwest-runway-incursion/msg75669/#msg75669

[ZOOKER]

The whole thing is beyond belief.
An aircraft is cleared to land, and then another is cleared for take-off ahead of it?
In poor visibility?
The ATCO appears to be largely 'out of the loop'.
Some very alarming incidents have occurred over the last few years, caused by some very basic errors.

[hitchens97]

I think we are discussing cultural differences and the exchange between the Southwest pilot and the Virgin one where the former mentions "a little freedom" points to this. In the U.K. it isn't only the job of ATC to have SA, but at a controlled airport it is to control. Pilots by and large do what he says. I remember a controller once said of an airfield "all this is mine and nothing moves without my say so." The U.S. seems to leave a little more to pilots.

I am pretty sure that here after both this and the JFK incident the controllers would have been relived of duty afterwards and not sure if this happened. Such a culture is widespread her for a variety of non-accusatory reasons - for example if a train driver passes a red signal even by a little bit the train can't proceed and a new driver must be found.

I fin the concept of an uncontrolled ramp a little extraordinary too. Presume the call "push back and start approved" is rarely heard in the U.S. Could lead to an expensive argument in court I would have thought.

Oh and the use of the word clear for anything other than take off or landing clearance still seems to happen - I must listen for the use of vacate in U.S ATC.

Tin hat on against incoming from the U.S.

I note that in the UK "Cleared to Land" is only given when there is nothing on the runway and nothing expected to be on the runway, whereas in the US "Cleared to Land" seems to basically mean there may be a whole bunch of things happening - cross traffic, someone taking off on your runway, etc. but I'll make sure its clear by the time you get to minimums.

The question in my mind is that is there *any* reason why the US and UK need to be different? And if not, why is there nobody working to standardize protocol globally?

[pattern_is_full]

The question in my mind is that is there *any* reason why the US and UK need to be different? And if not, why is there nobody working to standardize protocol globally?

Might as well ask why the UK uses the £ and the USA the $.

The latter being probably one element - pressure from various parties to keep the traffic flow moving, and the pursuit of the amighty $, in the face of growing congestion. Or getting by with just one controller (and his/her salary) at zero-dark-30 by combining APPROACH and TOWER and only using the radio once ("Cleared to land" subsuming "Cleared for the approach" as well). And ultimately leading back to the: shareholders, executives, politicians, their donors, and voters-with-an-interest.

[mike current]

The whole thing is beyond belief.
An aircraft is cleared to land, and then another is cleared for take-off ahead of it?
In poor visibility?
The ATCO appears to be largely 'out of the loop'.
Some very alarming incidents have occurred over the last few years, caused by some very basic errors.
The complete absence of any risk awareness is staggering. Could have been up there with the worst of all times..Tenerife, Uberlingen.. Prevented only by divine intervention and a bit of pilot initiative and technology.
The fact the the same guy is still there to greet them on their second approach is also mind blowing.
Stay safe out there!

[megan]

TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?

https://www.tiktok.com/@monster21_yt/video/7197600597493812485

[AerocatS2A]

TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?

https://www.tiktok.com/@monster21_yt/video/7197600597493812485

Come on, it’s obviously Microsoft flight sim or something, don’t give clicks to that garbage.

[sectordirector]

The complete absence of any risk awareness is staggering. Could have been up there with the worst of all times..Tenerife, Uberlingen.. Prevented only by divine intervention and a bit of pilot initiative and technology.
The fact the the same guy is still there to greet them on their second approach is also mind blowing.
Stay safe out there!

A bit of internet surfing to ATC websites such as PointSixtyFiveDotCom will reveal some of the opaque background to your completely spot on assessment.

[FlightDetent]

are we sure that low vis ops actuallybwere in effect. Fedex said they were doing a Cat III ILS but were they actually cleared for a Cat III ILS? From the US based pilots above, with some of their regs already quoted, it seems what we call LVO is implied below 800 m visibility (200 reported here).

Hence the FDX's appropriate call they were actually going for one.

Neither of which is an issue.

Absence of AT-Controlling the situation BEFORE it developed this ugly is the open wound.

Secondly, sounds like a field-ready cookbook of LVPs does not exist for the stakeholders to use. (For the US peers: Think about the DG procedures: Red Book, TI, separation tables, NOTOC, Emergency response drills... Most of the membership here learned and deals with loviz ops in a similar fashion, its treated as a specific case by each party involved. A formalised guidance for the people on the job is one of the several requirements to gain the approval from governing authority).
​​​​​​
Chiefttp Do you also get the feeling that without the EVS, if just simply flying blind, the crew may have been able to abort the approach with an earlier decision?

[DaveReidUK]

Come on, it’s obviously Microsoft flight sim or something, don’t give clicks to that garbage.

Quite cleverly done, if we ignore the fact that it features neither a SWA 737-700 nor a 767 of FedEx.

Oh, and the weather ...

[Chiefttp]

​​​​​​
Chiefttp Do you also get the feeling that without the EVS, if just simply flying blind, the crew may have been able to abort the approach with an earlier decision?

Of course, but there was probably a delay in the cockpit as they digested the incredulous takeoff clearance given by Tower, and accepted by Southwest, while simultaneously trying to fly a Cat3 approach. My guess is there Was enough confusion, and uncertainty concerning the location of Southwest, and the FedEx crew decided to go-around to be safe. Our 767’s don’t have the “enhanced vision system” so I don’t know what the FedEx Capt can see. Hopefully it afforded him a view of the situation, which helped him arrive at his decision to go around.

[WideScreen]

TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?

https://www.tiktok.com/@monster21_yt/video/7197600597493812485

Come on, it’s obviously Microsoft flight sim or something, don’t give clicks to that garbage.

Quite cleverly done, if we ignore the fact that it features neither a SWA 737-700 nor a 767 of FedEx.

Oh, and the weather ...
Of course, computer generated and different livery, though this does not imply, it needs to be served off right away.

The bad thing of this emulation is, the 767 does seem to have (nearly) the same speed as the 737 just a couple of seconds in its ground-roll, which seems unlikely from the flying physics.

Or so to say, a close encounter, though maybe just a little less, as the TT video suggests.

Anyway, nice work, to get this put together. Even when not 100% correct, it gives the public a good impression how tight this happening was.

Maybe one for the JFK RW incursion too ?

[DaveReidUK]

Anyway, nice work, to get this put together. Even when not 100% correct, it gives the public a good impression how tight this happening was.

On the contrary, it's completely unrepresentative.

Note how the SWA rolls as soon as it enters the runway, for example. That's way different from what happened.

[WideScreen]

On the contrary, it's completely unrepresentative.

Note how the SWA rolls as soon as it enters the runway, for example. That's way different from what happened.
Yes, the video is not a 100% correct representation of what happened, though it gives the general public (and politicians) a good but simplified idea, that this issue is not something theoretical, but a real-world example about things nearly going wrong. Nothing more, nothing less. This influences the public/political opinion, because the incident can't be shrugged off any longer and when used properly, it can be highly valuable to get the air-travel industry the things/funds needed to implement the proper measures (For example to obtain a ground radar at KAUS).

[Bergerie1]

There are systems which are reasonably mature which could assist both pilots and ATCOs. Worth a look:-
https://www.skybrary.aero/articles/airborne-separation-assurance-systems-asas
https://www.asas-tn.org/workshops/5th-workshop/session-3/5_ATSA_SURF.ppt
https://www.asas-tn.org/workshops/final-seminar-paris-14-15-april-2008/session-3/1_Runway_incursions.ppt (https://www.asas-tn.org/workshops/5th-workshop/session-3/5_ATSA_SURF.ppt)

[BFSGrad]

Yes, the video is not a 100% correct representation of what happened, though it gives the general public (and politicians) a good but simplified idea, that this issue is not something theoretical, but a real-world example about things nearly going wrong. Nothing more, nothing less. This influences the public/political opinion, because the incident can't be shrugged off any longer and when used properly, it can be highly valuable to get the air-travel industry the things/funds needed to implement the proper measures (For example to obtain a ground radar at KAUS).So a false narrative is OK as long a “greater good” is achieved? That’s how it works in politics. Let’s work hard to ensure that’s not how it works in aviation safety. Had SWA skedaddled as expected (or reported a delayed takeoff roll), there likely would have been no incident.

As for getting the needed funding, the annual budgets for the City of Austin, state of Texas, and U.S. Federal Government are $3.6B, $60B, and $6T. ASDE-X cost is in the neighborhood of $20M. Funding is not the issue.

[hitchens97]

Might as well ask why the UK uses the £ and the USA the $.

The latter being probably one element - pressure from various parties to keep the traffic flow moving, and the pursuit of the amighty $, in the face of growing congestion. Or getting by with just one controller (and his/her salary) at zero-dark-30 by combining APPROACH and TOWER and only using the radio once ("Cleared to land" subsuming "Cleared for the approach" as well). And ultimately leading back to the: shareholders, executives, politicians, their donors, and voters-with-an-interest.

does the uk system any worse at traffic flow. Heathrow and Gatwick are pretty intense at peak

[FlightDetent]

​​​​​​Of course, ..... what the FedEx Capt can see. Hopefully, it afforded him a view of the situation, which helped him arrive at his decision to go around.Bad wording on my side. I was aiming at the exact opposite, an ugly fringe of the technology interaction. Whether "by being able to see the traffic through EVS, the decision to abandon perhaps arrived somewhat later compared to a case when the other traffic position would have been clearly uncertain". I.e. the pilot being confused and analyzing how that was going to work actually brought him closer.

[FlightDetent]

does the uk system any worse at traffic flow. Heathrow and Gatwick are pretty intense at peakBallpark figure perhaps not exactly at those airports, in-trail separation between arrivals goes from 2,5 NM to 6. Flow reduction of 50% is expected, but actually, the taxi becomes the real bottleneck namely when deicing the outbounds.

A-CDM and Eurocontrol flow control do a stellar job, IMO.

N.B. what seem to have happened in the discussed case apparently was not the approved way to handle <1/2 ops over there either.

[AerocatS2A]

Yes, the video is not a 100% correct representation of what happened, though it gives the general public (and politicians) a good but simplified idea, that this issue is not something theoretical, but a real-world example about things nearly going wrong. ​​​​​​​

I couldn’t disagree more. Either present facts or don’t present anything at all. Presenting some half-arsed made up visualisation of what might have happened doesn’t do anyone any favours. That kind of video should either be clearly labelled with a watermark to say that it is little more than fantasy or it should stay on the sim enthusiasts home computer where it belongs.

[DIBO]

OK, to break this TikTok nonsense, let me play the devil's advocate...

Maybe it was SWA708 that saved the day after all....
If they has acted upon the "SouthWest abort" call and slammed the brakes, the fast shrinking horizontal separation at the beginning of the incident, would have shrunk dramatically faster at a moment when the vertical separation was almost non-existent.
SWA708 did not act upon the "SouthWest abort" call because:
* they simply missed the call
* they heard the call, but decided it was a bad idea to RTO with the FDX traffic right behind, and continued T/O with a rather shallowish initial climb profile
* they heard the call, but couldn't RTO because they were well beyond V1 (which I doubt)

A previous poster excluded the aspect "luck" being a part of the outcome of this incident, but even without knowing the exact separation details, I think that all involved were lucky SWA didn't slam the brakes for whatever reason...

[DaveReidUK]

A previous poster excluded the aspect "luck" being a part of the outcome of this incident, but even without knowing the exact separation details, I think that all involved were lucky SWA didn't slam the brakes for whatever reason...

And, by the same token, all parties were lucky that SWA only spent 20 seconds stationary, running up, before rolling.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Okay, I'm withdrawing the previous comment which purported or attempted to assert that "luck" played no part here.

[WideScreen]

So a false narrative is OK as long a “greater good” is achieved? That’s how it works in politics.
It's not a false narrative, it's somewhat off. Instead of humbug, feel free to create another one, closer to your reality and publish it on PP, large scale media will see and pick this up.

Let’s work hard to ensure that’s not how it works in aviation safety. Had SWA skedaddled as expected (or reported a delayed takeoff roll), there likely would have been no incident.
skedaddled ????

No incident: I think, you are wrong. The SWA clearance, with Fedex on 3 Miles out on a Cat III landing, was just off.

As for getting the needed funding, the annual budgets for the City of Austin, state of Texas, and U.S. Federal Government are $3.6B, $60B, and $6T. ASDE-X cost is in the neighborhood of $20M. Funding is not the issue.
Maybe not the absolute amount of funding, though the politically motivated distribution obviously is, otherwise KAUS would have had ground radar. Having a video like the by you despised TikTok one, 100% realistic or not, will certainly help to get politicians to move on this subject.

[mike current]

A bit of internet surfing to ATC websites such as PointSixtyFiveDotCom will reveal some of the opaque background to your completely spot on assessment.
Thanks. Wasn't aware of that forum.
I'd like to say eye opener but in reality there are similar conversations at many ATC units around the world.

[AerocatS2A]

It's not a false narrative,

Absolutely a false narrative. It has no place on this website.

[WideScreen]

Absolutely a false narrative. It has no place on this website.
When one is from the school, that only absolute and proven info can be posted at PP, of course, this is a false narrative. Though, that also implies, only official accident reports can be posted here, all other info is unproven and potentially wrong.

When one understands that items "develop" from something potentially partly wrong, into something correct, such a video is just the first step to come to a better result/understanding. It gives all readers the opportunity to "learn" what happened, based on the video and the comments about its correctness (keep in mind, I myself did write a note about the SWA speed compared to the Fedex still in the air). Most people will simply need something visual to understand the closeness of this call, not being able to create a mental picture of this happening.

So, feel free to provide a better video yourself ;-)

[DaveReidUK]

such a video is just the first step to come to a better result/understanding.

Why do we need a video at all ?

What does it contribute to our understanding of the event ?

Does the author have access to any information that isn't already in the public domain ?

[Lake1952]

TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?

https://www.tiktok.com/@monster21_yt/video/7197600597493812485

Tower: "1432, you have our apologies. We appreciate your professionalism. "

[FlightDetent]

Must I say, this thread has been a nice information exchange. If you want to keep that memory, don't search the internet for

/xenforo/threads/austin-incident.5262/page-3






https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1037x177/snippet_32b9e4d195a55bd85e9fe89e0e069b34ce15b91f.png

You have been warned.

[DIBO]

TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?

https://www.@##[email protected]/@monster21_yt/video/7197600597493812485 (https://tenor.com/nl/view/stop-stop-it-enough-please-stop-gif-17413567)

And you do realize it was still nighttime??

Come on, it’s obviously Microsoft flight sim or something, don’t give clicks to that garbage.
A good comment, sometimes needs repeating.

[ATC Watcher]

Must I say, this thread has been a nice information exchange. If you want to keep that memory, don't search the internet for

/xenforo/threads/austin-incident.5262/page-3








https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1037x177/snippet_32b9e4d195a55bd85e9fe89e0e069b34ce15b91f.png

You have been warned.
The ugly side of Internet : posting unverifaible "facts" to destroy a character , and this by his own colleagues ? :yuk: What is next posting his real name and address ?
Especially in our profession one should remember Ueberlingen and the way the controller was stabbed to death in front of his small children by someone wanting revenge for the accident. All this because a sensational newspaper had released his name and already found him guilty long before the investigation team started its work. OK here it is only an incident but the logic is the same .

[WillowRun 6-3]

The Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the House of Representatives kicked off the hearing last week (February 7) to begin the process of FAA reauthorization. (For readers not quite familiar with U.S. legislative processes, authorization creates the legal mandate for federal agencies to conduct their activities; appropriations legislation is the funding. Hence authorization (and periodic reauthorization) holds by far the heavier policy implications and effects. Sorry for the pedantic detour, but after all, this is PPRuNe, where information is cheap, cheap, yet understanding may be dear.)

The Chairman, Congressman Sam Graves, stated as follows:"[R]ecently there have been incidents that reemphasize why getting an FAA reauthorization done on time is critical. On January 13th, a runway incursion occurred at JFK International Airport when two passenger planes nearly collided as one crossed an active runway. And just this past weekend, at Austin International Airport, a cargo plane was attempting to land on the same runway where a passenger plane was beginning to take off.It shows that even following the safest decade in our history, our aviation system is clearly in need of urgent attention. As Mr. Boulter says in his testimony, complacency and stagnation are equal threats to a safety culture. The previous conventional wisdom for regulating safety focused on addressing concerns after aviation accidents. Now, the FAA seeks to mitigate risks before accidents happen.In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has several open safety recommendations that warrant review. The Committee will be reviewing all such recommendations while reauthorizing the NTSB as part of the FAA bill." [Note: David Boulter is the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (Acting) of FAA.]


In reporting on the opening reauthorization hearing, the Wall Street Journal (Feb. 8) noted that current NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy (in an interview) had cautioned against, with regard to the two runway incursion incidents, saying "this is a trend." The WSJ article also quoted a former investigator for FAA and NTSB as saying, "two incidents so close together is more of a coincidence than an indication of a systemic problem." (This SLF/attorney isn't using that person's name here since he is not afaik a public official or public figure.)

However, note the comments by former NTSB Chair Robert Sumwalt, as reported by the Journal:
"the close calls didn't appear related or part of a broader trend. Both appear to have resulted from human error, [Sumwalt] said, and the outcomes point to the exceptional safety record of the U.S. air-traffic system and aviation industry. 'It shows that given there there were failures, that there was enough resiliency or enough redundancy in the system to have prevented a catastrophic event in both cases.', Mr. Sumwalt said." (emphasis in quotation added)

So, first, with regard to a video representation of the events (and/or non-events) in Austin that is highly inaccurate, count this poster as one who sees no utility or usefulness whatsoever in such a video, for informing, aiding, facilitating, or otherwise being helpful, in the nascent public policy and legislation process which ultimately will lead to FAA reauthorization. Wanting to play with computers and video programs? - fine, no problem. But posting such output here is only about ten (10) years or more behind the times (see, for example, the thread on the accident in August 2013 in Birmingham AL, UPS Fl. 1354, in which thread a good number of posters contributed very informative graphics and computational items.) And, needless to remind the serious pro's who populate this forum, the video showing Air Canada 759 in San Francisco in 2017 was indeed very informative, helpful, and so on.... but it was evidence, not fun-time.

Second, I think there is a fair question - possibly even an important question - about what meaning to take away from both incidents, whether looked at as only quite marginally related or connected to each other - or as connected in some as yet-undefined manner beyond being in close temporal proximity. Is it actually random chance that small steps in each incident - for example, the Southwest flightcrew not "aborting" their takeoff roll (if they even had heard the FedEx call) - contribued to a serious tragic accident not occuring? Or is it something other than random chance, something closer to what most people fluent enough in English to parse definitions would identify as "resiliency" or "redundancy"?

Or, . . did a previous poster make this all less interesting, by saying there are no "reserves" - the term I had tried to apply to what Chairman Sumwalt called resiliency and redundancy - but instead there are "layers and back-ups"?

[FlightDetent]

There is a trend. The top managers and leaders lying to their superiors (and ultimately the public) about the successes.

What that NTSB person aired, about resiliency and redundancy on these specific two cases is so wrong that it does not even warrant a curse word.

This last one turned out as a non-accident due to pure coincidence. And the incident happened without really breaching much if anything at all. Now, THAT happens, although one should hope not on PK8303 level, and will keep happening. And yes someone will always abuse the merit based qualification system.

The problematic layer that harness all the small ailings toghether is the key stakeholders not exercising their responsibilities in favour of political acceptance (in borader sense of the word).

Exhibit the latest: Right here, that NTBS Chairmen's statement.

​​​​​

[fitliker]

Big difference between “ready “ and “ ready for an immediate take off” IMHO
Some pilots just like to say ready so ATC does not forget about them .

[DIBO]

That's why, if applicable and when in doubt, ", ready for an immediate ?" was invented for ATC...

And the even bigger difference is between "cleared for take off" and "cleared for an immediate take off", and when acknowledged, the latter is a clearance with a commitment

[AerocatS2A]

When one is from the school, that only absolute and proven info can be posted at PP, of course, this is a false narrative. Though, that also implies, only official accident reports can be posted here, all other info is unproven and potentially wrong.

When one understands that items "develop" from something potentially partly wrong, into something correct, such a video is just the first step to come to a better result/understanding. It gives all readers the opportunity to "learn" what happened, based on the video and the comments about its correctness (keep in mind, I myself did write a note about the SWA speed compared to the Fedex still in the air). Most people will simply need something visual to understand the closeness of this call, not being able to create a mental picture of this happening.

So, feel free to provide a better video yourself ;-)

I don't want to provide a video. Do you know why? Because I would have to fabricate a bunch of the details. The video does not give a better understanding of how close they came because the video maker doesn't know any more than we do how close they came. I have no problem with presenting FR24 data on here with caveats on its limitations etc. I don't even mind a reconstruction based purely on FR24 data.

In the video, the FedEx B767 is shown "going around" flying essentially level along the runway for a period of time while the gear is retracted. This tells me the video maker has no idea how to fly a go-around (15º pitch up, positive climb, gear up, etc) and just throws the whole presentation into question. The poorly executed go-around in the video makes the encounter seem a lot worse than it probably was. The problem is that this video is getting spread around as if it is somehow factual when it is anything but (I've seen it in other non-aviation forums and it is not always understood to be fake). It has no place here.

[FlightDetent]

"an immediate take off"........... a clearance with a commitmentWhen first ATC Watcher used the 'I'-word, I had the brief idea of running a survey.

"There is a specific and exact meaning of physical nature to the word IMMEDIATE when used in connection with a take-off clearance by ATC or pilots.

Do you know what it is?

Are you confident the prevalent majority of flightdeck colleagues at your operator do? ​​​​​​"

But then, not everyone enjoys fun trivia challenges.

[BFSGrad]

Listened to comms before/after widely-publicized tower comm segment associated with this incident. Here’s what I learned:

Austin approach/departure positions were combined (same voice) and not busy.

Female voice on ground control. Tower/ground positions were not combined.

ATIS India (WN708 reported receiving, assume FDX1432 received same) stated ‘arrivals expect ILS approach 18 right, 18 left, simultaneous approaches in use.’ No mention of ‘low visibility ops’ other than reported weather.

WN708 taxi instructions were G2, G, B, report turning onto G.

About 1 minute later WN708 reports reaching G. Ground then directs WN708 to contact tower on 121.0 upon reaching 18L. Assumption is that WN708 continues to monitor ground until reaching 18L at B. About 2.5 minutes later (assuming that LiveATC files are time synchronized), WN708 contacts tower and reports ready at 18L.

After go around, FDX contacts approach and requests ‘long vectors for Cat III ILS 18L.’ Sometimes approach will ask reason for go around. Not this time.

After landing and contacting ground, Fedex receives taxi instructions but no further discussion with ground regarding incident (post-local controller apology on tower freq).

About 2 minutes after FDX1432 reports clear of 18L, same local controller withholds a takeoff clearance for an AA reporting ready for departure at 18L with another AA reported on a 2-mile final Cat III ILS for 18L.

No further discussion of incident after WN708 checks in with departure.

Same local controller issues ‘turn right when able’ instruction (twice) to AA after landing on 18L. IMO, this supports theory that, when local controller used identical instruction for WN708, he thought that WN708 had aborted his takeoff.

Regarding comment that “ready” call upon reaching runway is inappropriate, all of the departing aircraft reported “ready,” “ready for departure,” or “in sequence” upon reaching the assigned departure runway.

About 17 minutes after the FDX/WN incident, a new voice appeared on the tower frequency; i.e., local position was changed.

[megan]

The problem is that this video is getting spread around as if it is somehow factual when it is anything but (I've seen it in other non-aviation forums and it is not always understood to be fake). It has no place hereSorry if my post has caused distress or angst, it's interesting what folk take away from a post, the intent was to show what was being broadcast on television news as video of the event ie this is the real thing, filmed as it happened. If it has no place here I'm sure the Mods will adjudicate and act accordingly.

[FlightDetent]

BFSGrad Thanks. Apparently what we don't hear is the controller restricting the departing SWA (SID to 4000') to stay below the GA ALT for FDX (3000'). I wish not to hint anymore which site I copied that information from as it may or may not be true nor relevant. BTW their own thread got closed for good reasons.

megan As an irony or absurdity display of what's going on inside the media sphere. Accepted and appreciated as such.

It was another member defending it as being helpful who caused the uproar. While he might have a case that in the political world - as an empirical observation - facts as such don't help in getting funding or public support the slightest, herein eath the wolves.

[ATC Watcher]

When first ATC Watcher used the 'I'-word, I had the brief idea of running a survey.

"There is a specific and exact meaning of physical nature to the word IMMEDIATE when used in connection with a take-off clearance by ATC or pilots.

Do you know what it is? Are you confident the prevalent majority of flightdeck colleagues at your operator do? ​​​​​​"
.
A very interesting question toa ask , and a point as old as ATC exists since ICAO ( Doc 4444) does not give a value in seconds or the speed at which the aircraft is expected to move . As any experienced controller will tell you , giving an "immediate" to an Alitalia would take considerable more time for the aircrfaft to move that say a Ryanair, or for those a bit older here, a Dan Air or a Spantax whose pilots understood how ATC worked ..
Again , a bit of educational reading for those interesting , here is the definition of an immediate take off taken from Skybrary .
When given the instruction ‘cleared for immediate takeoff’, the pilot is expected to act as follows:


At the holding point: taxi immediately on to the runway and begin a rolling take off without stopping the aircraft. If it is not possible to begin taxiing onto the runway at once or if take off performance calculations mean that a standing start is necessary, then the clearance must be declined
If already lined-up on the runway: commence take-off without any delay. If this is not possible for any reason, the pilot must advise the controller immediately.

if issuing clearances for an immediate takeoff is usually to improve runway occupancy. This can apply to a runway being used only for take offs or in mixed mode use (for both for takeoffs and landings).

According ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) (https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Standards_and_Recommended_Practices_(SARPS)), in the interest of expediting traffic, a clearance for immediate take-off may be issued to an aircraft before it enters the runway. On acceptance of such clearance the aircraft shall taxi out to the runway and take off in one continuous movement. (ICAO Doc 4444, 7.9.3 Take-off clearance)

Controllers who issue instructions to a departing aircraft to line up and wait in the expectation that the subsequent take off will be an 'immediate' one are advised to add "be ready for an immediate departure" to the line up instruction. This gives the pilot an opportunity to decline the instruction if they anticipate that they may not be able to accept an immediate take off clearance.

Before issuing immediate takeoff clearance to an aircraft the controller should consider the likely time the aircraft will need to commence its takeoff roll - whilst a short haul twin jet would need 30 seconds on average, a fully loaded wide body airliner on a 12-14 hour trip would need more time, and larger engines also take longer to spool up. Also, the controller should consider how quickly and by what route the aircraft could clear the runway if instructed to do so due to non-compliance with the immediate takeoff clearance.

Controllers should be prepared to change their traffic sequence plan in a shortage of time in case of unexpected aircraft non-compliance with the immediate takeoff clearance (e.g. stopping on the runway) . Such change to the controller's initial plan may include, as appropriate:


cancelling the clearance before the aircraft moves onto the RWY;
instructing the aircraft to clear the runway;
de-conflicting the takeoff from a go around in the air;
issuing of 'stop takeoff' instruction to the departing aircraft that has commenced the take-off roll.

Miscellaneous

The procedure should take into account relevant local aerodrome factors and its use should be described in the Manual of Operations of the respective unit.
In line with normal practice, the word “takeoff” must only be used when issuing the takeoff clearance. In all other reference to a pending takeoff, the word “departure” or “airborne” should be used instead.
Although an immediate take off clearance given before the aircraft reaches the runway centreline is sometimes referred to as “rolling takeoff”, in official documents such as ICAO Doc 9432, ICAO Doc 4444 (Chapter 12) and UK CAA CAP 413 (https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/5761.pdf) only the terms “immediate takeoff” and ”immediate departure” are used.


Again , if everyone in our case here would have been trained to international standards and used standard IACO phrasology this incident would not have happenned. ( and I am not even talking about CAT III and LVP )
End of the educational minute..:cool:

[Del Prado]

The SWA clearance, with Fedex on 3 Miles out on a Cat III landing, was just off.

Can anyone confirm if LVP/LVO were in place? I read it wasn’t on the ATIS and when pilot mentions cat 3 I don’t think it’s confirmed by tower.
There are (very occasionally) times when the viz is below limits but LVPs aren’t yet in place.

I’d expect to tell pilots explicitly whether there is protection. Or is there an assumption in the US that if viz is below limits or you request cat 3 you will automatically get protection?

[FlightDetent]

:D condensed for the upcoming generation: "Immediate" = rolling take-off (myself I lost the other small details long ago).

Note to safetypee: as the people, operational environment and language evolve, would it make sense to start using this, "Rolling take-off"? Ticks all the boxes in my book, apart from needing a separate "move now!" call.

(I am not sure if immediately sounded over there, and have no desire listening to the tapes. In that environment it does not really matter - which is not a fault of anyone involved)

Del Prado Discussed some pages ago. You need to have a read, impossible to shorten.

[mike current]

Big difference between “ready “ and “ ready for an immediate take off” IMHO
Some pilots just like to say ready so ATC does not forget about them .

Any controller that thinks or feels that a pilot reporting ready puts them under pressure to release an unsafe departure should hand their licences back.

[Del Prado]

Del Prado Discussed some pages ago. You need to have a read, impossible to shorten.

Thanks! Round about post 150 for anyone else catching up.

[FlightDetent]

Pleasure. 8 minutes of reading tops.

Typing the answer to be proper, accurate and not prone to misinterpretation would take me about 3x as much. Happy to be impressed by your result after you walk the walk. :ok:

[BFSGrad]

BFSGrad Thanks. Apparently what we don't hear is the controller restricting the departing SWA (SID to 4000') to stay below the GA ALT for FDX (3000'). I wish not to hint anymore which site I copied that information from as it may or may not be true nor relevant. BTW their own thread got closed for good reasons.Other than the turn to 170, the local controller gives no other instructions to WN708 until ‘contact departure.’ On the combined app/dep feed, WN708 not heard checking in with departure, but after departure states “Southwest 708, radar contact, climb and maintain 12,000, turn left to ILEXY,’ WN708’s reply is heard. About 1.5 minutes later, departure directs WN708 to “contact Houston Center, 132.15.’ No reply is heard from WN708.

These are the limitations of LiveATC.

[FlightDetent]

Nice.

The question about LVO active turned as inconclusive because (it seems) it is implied over there and not declaratory.

Moreover, people here so far lack the knowledge what their LVPs are, to be followed by ATC for the runway environment.

[airplanecrazy]

Here is my animated video reconstruction of the event driven by ADS-B granular data provided by flightradar24 and audio from LiveATC. Please see the video details for specific information about the reconstruction, including the limitations (especially the inability to verify accurate synchronization of the audio track).

ATTN: I got a tip on the timing of the audio for the event, and I believe it is wrong in the following reconstruction. I have added a new post with the new timing, but I am leaving the following link here for future reference. I have requested time tagged audio from the FAA to know the timing with confidence, but that will take a while to get.

https://youtu.be/AtYa8fl51_s

[BFSGrad]

Again , if everyone in our case here would have been trained to international standards and used standard IACO phrasology this incident would not have happenned. ( and I am not even talking about CAT III and LVP )
End of the educational minute..:cool:A bit silly (and arrogant) to make such a pronouncement at this stage of the investigation. I would bet a large sum of money that this incident occurred because existing U.S./FAA standards/procedures were violated (and possibly airline operating procedures). If the participants didn’t comply with existing U.S. standards, why would they be more likely to comply with ICAO standards? I will go further to predict that the principal cause of this incident will be an ATC individual with known performance deficiencies that was allowed to continue to perform ATC duties, not unlike the 1991 USAir 1493 collision at LAX.

Clearance to land is simply one of many ATC clearances that are based on predictive conditions rather than current conditions. When ATC clears an aircraft to a waypoint or altitude, it doesn’t mean that point in space is clear at the time the clearance is issued. Instead it is based on what ATC predicts will be the conditions (e.g., adequate separation) when the aircraft arrives at that point in space.

[yarrayarra]

Does anyone know what type of separation was being applied? If the local controller wasn't applying visual, then there was no separation from the time FDX was on 3 mile final.
as there was no way of visually separating the two aircraft, the controller had to ensure that the minimum radar separation of 3nm was maintained at all times which, in this scenario, was impossible to obtain and ensure. It was never going to work!!
Further complication is allowing for the go-around with the faster approaching aircraft catching the accelerating departure.
If the departure had been a heavy with a lighter on approach then wake turbulence separation is required to be applied in the event of a go around. In this case once the arrival is inside 10 miles there’s not enough time to get the departure away taking all the factors into account.
With one at 3 miles in low visibility conditions the door was shut long ago to getting one away

[ATC Watcher]

@ BFSGrad : I am sorry that you find my remark a bit silly (and arrogant) but I maintain it . But you make a very interesting point afterwards :If the participants didn’t comply with existing U.S. standards, why would they be more likely to comply with ICAO standards?
Maybe , you probably know the US culture better than I do, but there is something to remember: when I was first introduced to International phrasology long ago the instructor told us they were code words that tiggered pre programmed standard responses. I always remembered that. For instance here using the words " immediate take off" mean you should not stop and perform a rolling take off and ATC would expect this in return.. When the crew uses instead " we're ready" this is non standard, and the same when the controller clears him saying " a heavy 3 miles out" ( also non-satandard) without mentioning the word "immediate" , there is no pre-progerammed response from the SW , he knows the Fedex is 3 miles out but does not perform a rolling take off . I could go on with other non standard words used in the encounter but I guess you get my point.

Finally when you say : ​​​​​​​ I will go further to predict that the principal cause of this incident will be an ATC individual with known performance deficiencies that was allowed to continue to perform ATC duties, so you have read his evaluation history and seen his training record, or are you basing your remark to the nasty rumors with racial undertones posted on Internet?

[MPN11]

Trial by PPRuNe Jury continues!

IMO, regardless of EASA/NATS/CAA/whatevers, it was fundamentally stupid to clear the SW onto the runway in low vis conditions with an aircraft at 3 miles … which was cleared to land. How the nuances of legislation, procedures, habits, language or whatever apply, that was such a fundamental error that I find impossible to excuse. You just don’t do that… simple 4-d logic. The rest is just background noise.

[DIBO]

Here is my animated video reconstruction of the event driven by ADS-B granular data provided by flightradar24 and audio from LiveATC. Please see the video details for specific information about the reconstruction, including the limitations (especially the inability to verify accurate synchronization of the audio track).
https://youtu.be/AtYa8fl51_s
Thank you for the good work, the first reconstruction-simulation worth looking at! And with a clear explanation of all caveats!
Appreciated the addition of the bottom-right window, as people seem to forget it was still dark... It's a pity MS Flight Sim doesn't have a model with an EVS HUD, would have been the proverbial cherry on the cake.

Regarding your question in the clip "Does tower think Southwest called out 'abort'? ".
The "roger" in TWR's response, very strongly indicates this.

* 12:40:37 TWR "SW708 roger, turn right when able" <<=== makes me believe that TWR interpreted the "SW abort" call as coming from the SWA

(and once more, next to the FDX Capt being on top of the events unfolding, SWA's missing or ignoring the 'abort' call, might prove to be a major factor in the final outcome of this mishap.)

And regarding "Did FedEx pilot call 'abort' before he could see the plane? Collision Avoidance System alarm?", my guess is that the EVS HUD played possibly a role, as the TCAS RA's, although shown on the HUD, are inactive at this low level.


For what it's worth (nothing really :O ), I did the same syncro exercise (on paper), but this time based on FDX's tx "...passing 5.4 ", which isn't a perfect marking point either, but my end-result was that the audio was 1.5sec. earlier than yours.
So unless somebody comes up with a more accurate syncro point, you did a great job!!!

[airplanecrazy]

Note: This is an updated version of my previously posted video with improved synchronization of the audio and video based upon a tip I received (which seems credible).

Here is my animated video reconstruction of the event driven by ADS-B granular data provided by flightradar24 and audio from LiveATC. Please see the video details for specific information about the reconstruction, including the limitations (especially the inability to verify accurate synchronization of the audio track).

https://youtu.be/6cTWddJvKCE

[Il Duce]

Trial by PPRuNe Jury continues!

IMO, regardless of EASA/NATS/CAA/whatevers, it was fundamentally stupid to clear the SW onto the runway in low vis conditions with an aircraft at 3 miles … which was cleared to land. How the nuances of legislation, procedures, habits, language or whatever apply, that was such a fundamental error that I find impossible to excuse. You just don’t do that… simple 4-d logic. The rest is just background noise.
100% agree. Should not have happened in any weather conditions.
And as an aside, what if the FedEx crew were not as switched on and, after receiving their landing clearance, then had r/t fail?

[EXDAC]

If HUD/EFVS was operational and in use I think FedEx would have seen the 737 engine plumes several seconds before the lights came visual. I'm a bit surprised the G/A was initiated so late.

[Chiefttp]

It’s also enlightening, when the slightest mention of the Tower controllers history and poor performance is jumped on by the woke crowd. If what they are saying is true about his past, and his performance in this event tends to corroborate these rumors, then somebody will have a lot of explaining to do. This event was his fault, the Southwest crew could have helped, but didn’t, and FedEx was the last link in the chain, thank goodness the FedEx link was strong!

[DIBO]

If HUD/EFVS was operational and in use I think FedEx would have seen the 737 engine plumes several seconds before the lights came visual. I'm a bit surprised the G/A was initiated so late.
That's why I prefer the first version of this clip (gone now), there the "SW abort" call was made over the red bars of the ALSF-2, giving it 6 - 8 seconds (but don't know anything about the 767 donks spool-up time) before the positive climb starts to appear, more or less above the aiming point.
Now it's only 2 - 3 sec. between the call and the (slightly) positive RoC.

[DIBO]

If what they are saying is true about his past, and his performance in this event tends to abrogate these rumors, then somebody will have a lot of explaining to do.Clearing out all the trash and reading through the lines, maybe it's becoming a systemic problem, keeping in place and covering up the low performers. Self regulating does not seem to work as we have seen in the MCAS saga. Maybe it's time for a FATS (as ATS service provider) and the FAA as regulatory, supervisory authority??

[DaveReidUK]

Please see the video details for specific information about the reconstruction, including the limitations (especially the inability to verify accurate synchronization of the audio track).

I'd say that was a pretty severe limitation on any attempts to determine when the GA was initiated. That, and the implicit (but quite possibly incorrect) assumption that the Aviating and Communicating occurred at the same time.

[airplanecrazy]

That's why I prefer the first version of this clip (gone now), there the "SW abort" call was made over the red bars of the ALSF-2, giving it 6 - 8 seconds (but don't know anything about the 767 donks spool-up time) before the positive climb starts to appear, more or less above the aiming point.
Now it's only 2 - 3 sec. between the call and the (slightly) positive RoC.

I have restored the link to the old version in the previous post for your reference. Based on a tip, however, my belief is that the newer version is the accurate timing. I sent a FOIA requiest to the FAA today to get the time tagged audio so that I can know for sure, but that will take a while.

[DIBO]

I'd say that was a pretty severe limitation on any attempts to determine when the GA was initiated.As the G/A can be more or less pinpointed using FR24 data, B767 drivers can add an educated guess where the TOGA doubleclick came into play. No climbing without donks spooling up :)

That, and the implicit (but quite possibly incorrect) assumption that the Aviating and Communicating occurred at the same time.That's indeed much less 'educated' guessing, but in times where Communicating is probably the (second) best effort in avoiding metal scratching, the classic A-N-C priorities might instantly change a bit.... And with no FDR material, we possibly might never find out exactly what went on...

[GarageYears]

It's 2023 folks... not 1960. When, oh, when will we get CVR recordings for the last 25 hours?

My phone stores 512GB...that's four channels for 196 hours at 44.1kHz 16-bit PCM (CD quality) audio.

True, my phone isn't fire proof or G-rated to X Gs, but then again it cost $1200 and fits in my pocket - and doesn't help save anyone's life or debrief an incident.

- GY

[FlightDetent]

BFSGrad I find your response in https://www.pprune.org/11385179-post221.html well acceptable. The unnecessary edge was caused by not noticing the pre-condition statement "if everyone would have been trained to ......... standards" (my bold), and there's no metal or egos hurt because of that. And you are saying the same thing, R'n'B or country music make no difference to a deaf person.

Same as Chiefttp I found the information seeping from the other website relevant to the dynamic of the HF failure at hand. Perhaps the remarks ATC Watcher detests so much were no longer there when I read it.

The Atlas 767 death dive was caused by an individual holding a post without the required proficiency. Arguably it was insufficient resilience in the training system which failed to prioritize merit against commercial and social pressures.

[ATC Watcher]

Trial by PPRuNe Jury continues!

IMO, regardless of EASA/NATS/CAA/whatevers, it was fundamentally stupid to clear the SW onto the runway in low vis conditions with an aircraft at 3 miles … which was cleared to land. How the nuances of legislation, procedures, habits, language or whatever apply, that was such a fundamental error that I find impossible to excuse. You just don’t do that… simple 4-d logic. The rest is just background noise.
Indeed it is the ususal trilal by PPrune. I'm just trying to say that before hanging the guy based on rumors posted on another controversial web site one should perhaps wait for the real facts to emmerge . There might be some truth in it or not, we'll see. What I see in many posts here is we have found the ideal culprit, it was an individual ATC error. caused by a sub standard guy, and the Fedex saved the day : simple , problem solved. No need to change anything , The "backround noise" you refer to is however what will kill someone some day ..

[ATC Watcher]

. Perhaps the remarks ATC Watcher detests so much were no longer there when I read it..
Indeed most of the nasty racial ones are no longer visible but the dammage is done .
The Atlas 767 death dive was caused by an individual holding a post without the required proficiency. Arguably it was insufficient resilience in the training system which failed to prioritize merit against commercial and social pressures
On the profieciency an training , that is indeed the issue: What I would love to know is if the idea of letting aircraft line up and depart when another is 3 Miles out is a deviation of normal procedures in AUS ( as the SW response to the clearance could indicate) of just that perticular controller own procedure, and if it was , was it the first time he did this or he did this since a long time and went unhallenged by his peers?. Controllers, just like Piots very rarely work alone.

[MPN11]

Indeed it is the ususal trilal by PPrune. I'm just trying to say that before hanging the guy based on rumors posted on another controversial web site one should perhaps wait for the real facts to emmerge . There might be some truth in it or not, we'll see. What I see in many posts here is we have found the ideal culprit, it was an individual ATC error. caused by a sub standard guy, and the Fedex saved the day : simple , problem solved. No need to change anything , The "backround noise" you refer to is however what will kill someone some day ..Ha! I completely agree with your last point! I waa focussed simply on the mechanics of this incident. As to comments about the controller involved, I have not bothered to find that 'other website' ... from what I've seen upthread it sounds even more 'rumoury' than much of PPRuNE! :)

[punkalouver]

It’s also enlightening, when the slightest mention of the Tower controllers history and poor performance is jumped on by the woke crowd. If what they are saying is true about his past, and his performance in this event tends to corroborate these rumors, then somebody will have a lot of explaining to do!

Kind of reminds me of the 777 given the wrong direction turn out of LA that almost hit the mountain.

[Chiefttp]

ATC Watcher,
You asked,
”On the profieciency an training , that is indeed the issue: What I would love to know is if the idea of letting aircraft line up and depart when another is 3 Miles out is a deviation of normal procedures in AUS ( as the SW response to the clearance could indicate) of just that perticular controller own procedure, and if it was , was it the first time he did this or he did this since a long time and went unhallenged by his peers?. Controllers, just like Piots very rarely work alone.”

I assure you 100%, that allowing an aircraft to takeoff in extreme low visibility conditions, with another Aircraft on 3 mile final, who happens to be flying one of the most demanding approaches an airline pilot could attempt, is Not the norm in the US! This controller made a big mistake. Personally, if I were to speculate, I’d say that the Southwest call, “ Holding Short” caused the Tower controller, out of habit, to clear SW for takeoff, (FedEx, less than one min away!) It is not normal. Despite the fact that there are no announcements of “LVP procedures in effect” at US airports, we are all quite aware of what we need to do in order to safely operate in low vis conditions. Chalk this up to the Tower Controller having a bad day, he made a quick, spur of the moment decision, perhaps out of habit, to clear SW to takeoff, then realizing his error, hoped that SW would expedite their takeoff roll. When SW didn’t expedite, He asked them if they (Southwest) were rolling. , which is further proof that he realized how tight this spacing was. It’s not a systemic issue, it’s not American cowboy mentality, its either incompetence or a simple mistake. 99.99% of Tower controllers would not clear another jet to takeoff in those conditions in front of the FedEx jet.
obviously just my opinion.

[MPN11]

Chiefttp … fair call. I had wondered, further upthread, whether a swift departure/takeoff by SW had become an ingrained expectation in the controller’s mind … however inappropriate it clearly was in this situation. I agree the r/t does tend to indicate that he’d realised he’d got it horribly wrong, but IMO a far better solution (rather than “are you rolling?”) would have been to send the Fedex around at that moment (2 miles? or a bit less) than hope SW would save the situation he had created. At least more vertical separation would have been achieved.

[airplanecrazy]

All,

I am embarrassed to say, but I have lost confidence in my reconstruction. There is possibly a five second difference between the two aircraft, so their relative position with respect to each other is in question. I am reprocessing now and will post updates when I have them. My apologies.

[atakacs]

Do we had any comment from FEDEX about the use of their FLIR devices in this incident ?

[ATC Watcher]

@ Chiefttp (https://www.pprune.org/members/487554-chiefttp) : many thanks for your explanation and confirmation this is not the norm in airports in the US . I have limited experience flying in busy airports in the US, but flying myself VFR into the country and into regional airports,over the years I've seen some weird things being done or being asked to do by ATC. , things like asked to use the parallell taxi way for landing while the main is occupied , or maintain 500ft on finals until the threshold to allow helicopters to cross below the approach path at 200ft.
.So basically asking a 737 for an immediate take off in front of a 767 3 NM out did not really sound to me as something odd in the US , and I believe that had the SW done a rolling take off this would have been a non-event. Doing so in CAT III without a ground radar to verify the distances is however a very different ball game . There we agree.and hence my inittial question : was this a normal deviation from the norm ?

[RatherBeFlying]

If the controller was used to SW expeditiously taking off when cleared, he likely expected that SW would be out of the way in time.

Not being 737 rated, it's hard to fault the controller for not knowing that the 737 needed an extended runup in the weather conditions.

[UnderneathTheRadar]

If the controller was used to SW expeditiously taking off when cleared, he likely expected that SW would be out of the way in time.

Not being 737 rated, it's hard to fault the controller for not knowing that the 737 needed an extended runup in the weather conditions.

seriously? the controller set up a scenario based on the expected behaviour of an aircraft he couldn’t see and then recleared fedex to land with no idea what the SWA was actually doing?

[MPN11]

Controlling by assumptions is not controlling..It’s guessing and hoping.

[airplanecrazy]

All,

I am embarrassed to say, but I have lost confidence in my reconstruction. There is possibly a five second difference between the two aircraft, so their relative position with respect to each other is in question. I am reprocessing now and will post updates when I have them. My apologies.

My confidence is restored. I have re-examined the data and believe the second video is +/- one second in audio timing that I received in an anonymous tip, and I believe that the aircraft are correctly positioned with respect to each other (within the limits discussed in the video description). Here are the audio times I am using:

12:38:48 southwest calls short of 18L
12:38:59 tower issues t/o clearance
12:39:14 southwest reads back t/o clearance
12:39:29 FedEx checks landing clearance
12:39:34 tower confirms landing clearance
12:39:40 FedEx Roger
12:40:10 tower checks if Southwest is on the roll
12:40:13 southwest on the roll
12:40:32 southwest abort
12:40:35 FedEx on the go

The flightradar24 granular data shows the roll starting at 2023-02-04 12:40:15Z. I will note that in my past experience, flightradar24 data timestamps are not always accurate (it depends on how well the time on the specific collector is synched).

[Lake1952]

Am I alone in doubting the wisdom of even attempting a rolling takeoff with visibility of 1/8 mile? I don't fly transport aircraft, but I have made some zero/zero takeoffs over the years from KACK in light aircraft. I always rolled down the centerline a bit before applying full power. In air carrier ops, how common are rolling takeoffs in very low visibility operations?