P2 Engine handling.

[cessnapete]

I’ve noticed in some flight deck videos during take off P2 handling, the Captain handles the Thrust Levers. Do some airlines have SOPs preventing P2 from rejecting the takeoff?
In my airline when it is a copilot’s handling sector, the P2 handles the aircraft from start up to parking. (Except during the Monitored Approach SOP)
The P2 handles his own Thrust Levers and can reject the take off if .required. The Capt of course can call Stop at any time.
But it appears the second in command is not trusted to call an RTO in several airlines.

[FlightDetent]

Carefully worded it is. :)

[Max Angle]

Do some airlines have SOPs preventing P2 from rejecting the takeoff?
The vast majority of the worlds airlines follow the recommendation of both Boeing and Airbus which is that the P1 should make the decision and handle the RTO.
BA (who you presumably work for, as do I) for reasons which have I never heard fully explained or justified, choose not to.

[FlyingStone]

Some airplanes (like the 737 with it's three-step RTO manuever) have a disadvantage when it comes to handling the RTO from the RHS, so it makes sense that the captain will perform the RTO.

Typically the captain will be the most experienced pilot on the flight deck and (typically) the person to make the best judged decision to perform an RTO or not. Unlike a go-around, an RTO is not always the safest option and can easily lead to the aircraft going to the valley beyond the end of the runway in some scenarios, even when rejecting well below V1. You'd want the most experienced person performing that decision whether to reject or not, based on the input from the FO side as well, of course.

[john_tullamarine]

Typically the captain will be the most experienced pilot on the flight deck

More importantly, the buck stops with the PIC so he/she should be the one to do the deed, aircraft systems permitting.

[FlightDetent]

Any rumors who else apart from BA deleagtes the (non-reversible) action to SIC?

Because it is not Boeing and Airbus recommendation, it's the established standard of doing things.

[cessnapete]

I would like to think that the reason for the SOP, is BA selects and trains it's P2s to the high standard required. They even let the P2 taxi the a/c! Some operators do not, even with RHS steering fitted.

[STBYRUD]

Be that as it may, going against a manufacturer's recommendation is very hard to explain to your insurance in case of an incident...

Apart from that - I'd hope that every company trains both pilots to the same standard!

[FlyingStone]

But I suppose not to the high enough standard to let the PF select thrust reversers on landing? :}

[FlightDetent]

Or to make a decision at minima. Or take the correct decision at minima after they had become captains. 👀

[vilas]

The issue of P2 Takeoff is a bit complicated. The recommended training for it is called seat oriented. CM1 is trained to take decision and carry out the reject. The CM2 who becomes PF is only trained to do PM duties on a reject. So there's a role reversal at a critical time. Especially in a low speed reject where the full rudder and sliding the foot up for differential braking may be required any delay and excursion is a reality. In another real life incident Captain taking off in 737 at 114kts. his back rest collapsed and the backward movement caused throttles being pulled backed by 20% N1 which they didn't notice. He promptly handed over controls to copilot. Copilot not trained in PF duties in a reject just kept the aircraft straight. The V1 was 144kts correct decision for copilot trained to reject would have been to stop. The capt recovered, took over controls and carried out the take off but due to the reduced thrust aircraft got airborne beyond the available runway length hitting the boundary wall. Luckily they got away with minor damage. In my opinion copilot also needs to have ability to reject.

[Denti]

It is an interesting discussion. In all airlines i flew in the decision to reject a take off was and is only up to the captain. However back in a previous airline when we switched from our in house SOP to Airbus SOPs, which included the FO starting engines, taxying and parking the aircraft (if the parking system allowed it), the question came up if the FO should have the authority to reject a take off as well. Some trainers tested that in the spare time in normal simulators, a few go/no-go decisions by the Captain and then the same for the FO. One thing stood out, that every FO rejected a take off for a sudden emergency electric configuration which ended with a high speed runway excursion. Not necessarily very scientific, but it put that topic to rest.

Personally i am undecided. We trust FOs with nearly everything else in many airlines, but not with the go / no-go decision.

[safetypee]

Of those choosing Captain action for all RTOs, how do procedures account for the time taken in communicating, reassessment, and then acting in change of control with respect to the definition of V1 (first stopping action commenced), and thence any effect in the already scan margins in stopping distance.

[Chesty Morgan]

Captain has his hands on the tiller and throttles and feet on the pedals if FO is PTakingoff.

Change of control is implied at captain's call of stop, no real "handover" of control is required.

[safetypee]

CM, thanks.

However, there will be a time difference between a 'hands on thrust' identification and self action, vs communicating the identification, and subsequent action by whoever, after confirmation; i.e P2 handling, deciding and acting, will be faster than alerting, waiting for Captain's mental appreciation, and then either acting.

Cognitive delays; small but important where there is little margin.

Then there is cognitive dissidence. P2 calls stop, Capt says no - continue; who has physical control, who has a suitable mental appreciation of actions required during a continued takeoff.

PF flys, PM monitors the overall situation; - why then change the SoP in specific circumstances - which implies that the circumstance can be identified - unnecessary mental workload ?
e.g. a confirmable engine failure or just a bang, a gut feeling, uncertainty … how, who decides.

[InnerLoop]

CM, thanks.

However, there will be a time difference between a 'hands on thrust' identification and self action, vs communicating the identification, and subsequent action by whoever, after confirmation; i.e P2 handling, deciding and acting, will be faster than alerting, waiting for Captain's mental appreciation, and then either acting.


The captain decides and acts; I'm not seeing the extra time involved.

Is the edge case you're thinking of that an engine quits and the FO controls the rudder so fast and perfect that there is no yaw, and the Captain's feet are on the floor so he doesn't know and needs to be told? I suppose in this one, there would be a difference.

Then there is cognitive dissidence. P2 calls stop, Capt says no - continue; who has physical control, who has a suitable mental appreciation of actions required during a continued takeoff.

The P2 doesn't call stop, and doesn't get invested into a course of action that is then reversed.

[safetypee]

IL thanks,
In the first instance where the Captain decides and acts, it is assumed that s/he has recognised the situation. If not, then the P2's alert (as a handling PM !) starts the Capts time consuming assessment, decision, and action.

Re 'stop'; yes I assumed a decision.
An alert as above is more relevant, but the opportunity for dissidence remains - thoughts opposed to actions, although the latter is a risk with over emphasised assertive training - CRM.

[FlightDetent]

You are coming across as extremely hard to understand this time, ST. Please don't assume people are in agreement with your observations just because there is little or no objection or additional details coming from the others.

While your logic is usually flawless, you seem to be applying it at an odd angle to reality here, which is a simple and well-established procedure.

The decision is done by the PIC and since he has hands on the THR LVRs he will act accordingly. The rest of the crew is advised as a first priority as the situation unfolds. Typically FO don't need to be told a rejected manoeuvre is taking place, however, the call-out triggers the action sequence for everyone.

For the FO the responsibility is to clearly announce what he sees, such as "unreliable airspeed" (GO decision but only above 100 kts) or "engine fire". Cue here, by the time the F/O sees an alert coming up with bells and whistles, the PIC can hear that too and proper circuitry gets energized.

My personal CP:FO hrs ratio is 1:2 so not that experienced left seater at all. Total flight time is about 5:1 over the average company FO. In most training events I will recognize and call out a non-announced failure (engine spool down) faster than my colleagues while being the PF. Not by skill but by previous training exposure (and I keep 1 eye head down which is by no means a dogmatic technique). Four edge cases:
- FO incapacitation approaching 100 ktś (lo-speed and hi-speed borderline)
- tyre burst
- loss of visual reference above 100 kts
- airspeed discrepancy affecting the CM1 side.

The current recipe works without leaving major gaps exposed.

I am sure BA researched their SOP with great patience and train to proficiency. Exactly: their much famed monitored approach (slast will elaborate though probably you knew each other before my birthday) puts the decision to GA on the PnH, because he is better suited to evaluate. That's what happens during take-off when the PF = FO = RHS and the PIC makes the failure announcement, takes the decision, and calls out the manoeuvre as his hand moves the thrust levers. To save time and avoid confusion the hand is placed there once TO THR is achieved.

[safetypee]

FD, I agree with your views; my devilment looked for the detail.

An objective was to test the reasoning behind some of the procedures, how people think about remote possibilities, and the possibility that in such situations there is no unique answer.
A conclusion could be to decide which pilot will have the better detection and awareness, if not necessarily the better judgement, then who acts, when, in a rare time critical situation.

I would not challenge any particular operation without knowledge of their reasoning behind it, but concern remains about many unsatisfactory outcomes when apparently good plans and procedure exist.

It doesn't matter who does it, provided it is done as well as possible in the situation.
The situation, context is everything; focus on that.

Re Steve, monitored approach, we have corresponded; agreement in part, but again it depends on context.

[InnerLoop]

IL thanks,
In the first instance where the Captain decides and acts, it is assumed that s/he has recognised the situation. If not, then the P2's alert (as a handling PM !) starts the Capts time consuming assessment, decision, and action.

I always (from the West side of the Atlantic) thought P1 means Captain and P2 means FO. Before we continue, is this right? Honest question. If so, then the only way I can interpret your phrase "P2's alert (as a handling PM)" is a tongue in cheek note that under the system of only CA aborting, the P2/FO (while handling/PF) is simultaneously being saddled with the other's role as PM and thus overloading him and making him ineffective (while leaving the CA doing nothing.) Well, if we take that PM role off of that pilot and put it in the left seat, then we have the CA/P1 doing the PM job (which is the actual case), thus equipping him perfectly to do the assessment and decision with no clock needing to be started by the other seat.

Are there any scenarios that have a significant chance of going unnoticed by the Captain so that he's reliant on the FO telling him?

Who has the wider scope of attention available to look at the engine instruments, and caution/warning system, and overall totality of the situation, and integrate all of these things into a decision?

Re 'stop'; yes I assumed a decision.
An alert as above is more relevant, but the opportunity for dissidence remains - thoughts opposed to actions, although the latter is a risk with over emphasised assertive training - CRM.

If there's cognitive dissonance on the part of the FO or they get locked into some decision tree that is too complicated to make the right call in a second, and I'm riding in the back, I would sure hope the system is designed around defaulting to simply continuing what's already happening, and completing the in-progress maneuver as is already habit over dozens or hundreds or thousands of repetitions in normal flying; and not triggering a high speed abort based off that.

[FlightDetent]

The correct terminology gets complex when trainers and cruise captain FOs enter the team, not needed now. Perhaps for the sake of this specific discussion, we could narrow it down to

PIC (rank) who is seated on LHS. Has the ultimate authority and final responsibility
F/O (rank) who is seated on RHS.

There are only two cases,

i)
PIC acts as PF and is steering the plane, TLs included. Despite some black-and-white academics, indeed he is monitoring the inside of the cockpit as well, and that means not just the PFD.
FO is the PM. His responsibility to monitor and clearly announce. He follows any sequence of drills in the support role as required.

ii)
FO is the PF who is steering the plane. Any of the trained, rehearsed and briefed trajectories which will be selected to match the events unfolding.
PIC assumes the role of PM. He will execute the support actions for the FO during any drill which is being called by either of them or might follow automatically in the SOP sequence.

Dissecting the immediate moment after a failure, for both GO and STOP, requires us to describe who will
+ observe
+ announce
+ respond
+ confirm
+ evaluate
+ decide
+ declare
+ approve
+ overrule
+ act
+ correct

For clarity, it's best also to say whose hands are guarding the TLs at the moment of failure.

Respecting a bit of slightly different flavouring here and there, we have
- the 'traditional' setup (the whole world except BA and ..... ?) sufficiently described in #18 above,
- something in between (?)
- the BA standard.

[B2N2]

When I flew charter business jets we used to brief that either pilot could initiate or call for a reject regardless of PF/PM or PIC status.
When I joined my first airline this changed to the Captain is God principle that only the PIC decides the reject. I still don’t fully agree with that concept.
US based employer so we don’t use or can’t even have ‘low’ time FO’s and at least on a Boeing everything is well within reach of the RH pilot. Spoilers can easily be briefed as an “if I forget then you do it” item and that applies regardless of PF/PM status.
The whole caveat with the PIC-decides model as that the SIC is still expected to execute the reject when the Captain is either incapacitated or otherwise incapable of making the correct decision as a Master warning at 80kts isn’t really the time or place to have a meaningful discussion about the philosophy of Boeing.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

I would like to think that the reason for the SOP, is BA selects and trains it's P2s to the high standard required. They even let the P2 taxi the a/c! Some operators do not, even with RHS steering fitted.

BA is no better or worse than any other airline. Neither are their pilots.

[cessnapete]

In my 30 + years in a Big Airline or since, I can recollect no incidents/accidents caused by an F/O calling Stop. Surely if you are P2 in a two crew flight deck your training should cover all possible scenarios in the event of incapacitation, We covered Co pilot 2 Eng handling and Go Arounds on the B747 Conversion.
It all seems faintly foolish to see airlines not confident in their co pilots ability to Reject a take off or even taxing, which I witnessed when jumps seating in the USA, some years ago.

[deltahotel]

The decision to reject the takeoff is the responsibility​ of ​
the captain, and must​ be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should​ ​
initiate the RTO​ and​ announce the abnormality​ simultaneously.

This is what Mr Boeing says in his big book of flying jets aka FCTM and that’s good enough for me. More importantly, that’s good enough for my company and that’s what we do. We do train FOs to carry out RTO in the event of the old LHS person keeling over.

[vilas]

The decision to reject the takeoff is the responsibility​ of ​
the captain, and must​ be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should​ ​
initiate the RTO​ and​ announce the abnormality​ simultaneously.

This is what Mr Boeing says in his big book of flying jets aka FCTM and that’s good enough for me. More importantly, that’s good enough for my company and that’s what we do. We do train FOs to carry out RTO in the event of the old LHS person keeling over.
Ultimately that's what matters besides the approach of the regulator will also matter. As I said in my post as long as FO is trained to reject if need be is good enough.

[B2N2]

What Boeing says isn’t chiseled in stone and brought down the mountain by Mozes himself.
TOGA switches shouldn’t disconnect critical thinking.

Let’s take the Lima example. Assuming the PIC was PF it’s feasible the PM called for a reject for something the PF had not seen and without a caution or warning.
Equally feasible the SIC was PF and rejected.

[deltahotel]

Well, yes. We expect the RHS PM to call any malfunctions to allow the Cp to make the decision to stop and we do allow (require) the RHS PM to call stop for Eng failure or any fire.

[FlightDetent]

Without any insider knowledge, I would assume the average path of FO in BA (pardon the terminology):
JFO SH- year 1 to 3
FO SH - year 4 and 5
FO LH - year 5 to 7
FO Lh - year 8 to 12 (good bids).
command course therafter

as opposed to EU LCC/ACMI path
FO P2F - year 1 and 2 (bonded salary)
FO - year 3 - 5
CAPT - year 6 onwards (fleet expansion times).

There's a signigicant overlap of experience and training received between BA FOs and CAPTs elsewhere, surely they are both qualified and capable to make the correct call. I would also suggest that apart for the loud bang cases, any FO who's inside 2 years from joining the type (4 recurrent SIMS) would be cautious and careful to take a non-reversible action to the extent that the PIC's call to execute it might come simultaneously.

If the best-practice operators can sort the responsibilites for a 2-captain or CP-INST crew, surely BA can sort theirs with FOs. Moreover if SOP exist for it.

To be completely square, if there is a risk of making a wrong call, or not making the good one, imagine this crew:
FO PM 15 years total aviation, 12 years BA, 4 years on-type (37 y.o.)
CP PF 35 years total aviation, 20 years BA, 2 years on-type (57 y.o.)

The probability in such setup is heavily skewed for the FO to make the correct decision faster and more coherently. BA decide to empower them, their choice.


That being said and returning to the original inquiry:

Anywhere else the decision rests with the commander and the action pertains to him too. If some airlines authorize an FO to make a call to stop, still the captain's action is what confirms it thus he retains a vetting chance (final decision). Removing that from the PIC is unique to BA, a single point when the scratching gets audible.

[Locked door]

Just to answer some questions above, at the Big Airline. There is a Capt and an F/O. P1 = PF for T/O, cruise and LDG. and P2 = PF for the approach. F/O’s are trained to the same handling standards as Capts from day 1. Sectors are shared 50:50, some sectors have to be Capt as P1 (eg LVOPS) or the Capt may elect to be P1 in a gnarly day depending on F/O experience.

F/O’s have a very specific list of things they can call stop for, either as PF or PM, anything else is brought to the attention of the Capt for a call of stop or continue. Once stop is called by either pilot it cannot be countermanded, an RTO is performed. Likewise if a go around is called by either pilot it must be performed.

It may be different to how other airlines do it but it works (as do other methods), it also makes the transition from right to left seat easier as the pilot has already had experience of decision making in critical phases of flight and as P1US for day to day ops.

The strap line used to be at BA recruitment that FO’s are recruited as future Captains, the man and boy ethos was dropped long ago, partly because of lessons learned from the the PI crash. There is still of course a cockpit authority gradient but it is shallower than at some airlines.

ATB

LD

[Bergerie1]

LD, You are correct except that the strap line used by BA recruitment that FO’s are recruited as future Captains was used long before the Papa India crash.

[FlightDetent]

Then the only cognitive dissonance is between the salary they pay and talent they claim to hire? From day 0 being told you are better than others, mon dieu.

(437) British Airways: To Fly. To Serve. - Cinema Advert - YouTube

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/732x717/ba2276_timeline_67a25e9a56c56e58abb5b5ca3282786149670ec5.png

[blind pew]

Seem to remember copilot taxiing a 747 managed to hit a building..second time that a 747 had taken in error that taxiway….big airlines x 2..

[blind pew]

Papa India had nowt to do with pilot selection as P2 was one of a course where a third were chopped and the week before his flat and course mate had lowered land flap at noise cutback instead of retracting all TE flap. He went on to fly Concorde..a fleet that had a chop rate of 40% at times.
The accident was a training and incredibly ignorant flying procedures accident which was covered up at the inquiry.
Unless they have been recently released the testimonies are still secret.
Smell the jet fuel.

[FullWings]

I think that what you trained for and execute with your current operator normally seems more “right” than other operators who may do it differently. I think the key here is training: if the SOPs work, and they do seem to with both approaches discussed here, then what’s the problem? There are valid arguments either way, but as professionals we adapt to requirements.

A certain large fleet in a certain large airline is close to changing from PM handled reverse and speedbrakes to PF handled, over a quarter of a century after the type was introduced. If adequately trained and practiced (and that’s going to need a LOT of both, IMO) then it should make no difference...

[excrab]

Maybe it doesn’t really matter. Airlines will decide whether to follow the manufacturer’s guidance or not. Somewhere other than BA I fly with F/O’s who experience varies from 300 hrs and three months to 10,000 hrs plus and fifteen years experience.

I’ve never once had one of them moaning about not being allowed to call stop, and nor did I worry when I was an f/o. We just get on with it and abide by the SOPs, a bit like calling “positive climb” not “positive rate”. Just because BA choose to train their F/O’s to call stop doesn’t make the training better, it just makes it different.