Korean Air A330 off runway in Phillipines

[Liffy 1M]

This accident was reported a couple of hours ago: https://www.aviation24.be/airports/cebu-international-airport-ceb/korean-air-airbus-a330-overshoots-runway-during-landing-at-mactan-cebu-international-airport/

[treadigraph]

Ouch!

https://twitter.com/ABrown27656891/status/1584243559049224222?s=20&t=6J-2pRcFAcC6R4ogFMOeKg

[ex-EGLL]

Breaking: Korean Air Airbus A330 Crash Lands In The Philippines (msn.com) (https://www.msn.com/en-ca/travel/news/breaking-korean-air-airbus-a330-crash-lands-in-the-philippines/ar-AA13hR8y?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=1c0460f93b8b4ca882f7369ef1dd3432)

[joeyr]

It was a landing after two go-arounds. Many companies prohibit landings after the second go-around. A flight to their alternate would have saved the day.

[DaveReidUK]

Two approaches, 13 minutes apart, followed by 40 minutes holding and then the third and last approach.

[TBSC]

FfxdpTYXgAQuq_x (2048×1536) (twimg.com) (https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FfxdpTYXgAQuq_x?format=jpg&name=large)

[Lonewolf_50]

It then overshot the runway, leading to an evacuation via emergency slides.
So far, no report of fatalities. The terse communication from Korean Air (from the link in the OP) says something about casualties.
Guessing some injured, none dead, and hope that the "none dead" turns out to be true.

[fdr]

RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding. The damage to the RHS suggests that CAAP may need to revisit the definition of" frangible". That could have been a lot more serious than it has been. The boys were lucky to not hit the tank trap head on, FO probably needs shoes re-soled. 1998 model -300, the insurance payout will be less than the repair costs. Write off is probably a good call by the pundits. The last approach is pretty much on speed and close to G/S crossing the coast, no gross error up to that point. passing the last high speed (TWY H) they are still doing 98 Kts GS, and they lose another 8 kts in the next ~ 3000'. That's about -0.02g deceleration, which is pretty much nothing at all. The CVR will be interesting, and the DFDR/QAR will also tell a story. Strange things occasionally happen, like HDA-323, so, determination of crew performance and decisions will be quite dependent on the facts, and they will be available at least to the operator. CAAP normally is nice to deal with, but accident reports are not one of their fortés. Things that can happen... FCTL-FLAP LOCK, etc... HYD SYS ....Hold onto the vegetables and eggs until the facts develop, as some of this looks like it was reasonably flown, yet didn't work to the expectation of the passengers, particularly those with bags in the forward hold. Lucky live animals are usually stowed in the rear holds.. Flap Config, Thrust reversers look curious for a cross country into the rough. :ok:

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/ffxllncwaaa9irm_64e67ca46d991a23cb32f39cb0578c0324d24e23.jpe g


The photos are taken some time after the "alighting", the spoilers may have bled down, or may have been stowed by the crew, even though there is no overwind exit door or windows.
Would want to see the flap position, that looks like CONF 2 or 3 not Full (would expect to see more of the flap track canoe as a pointy bit... they hang down a fair way below the flap TE.) The slats look like they are in the intermediate position.









[fox niner]

It is quite an achievement to exit the far end with 80 knots, despite an LDA of 3310 meters.
I read on avherald that apparently they didn’t have anti-skid and also one reverser was not working.
my lido info of RPVM lacks a chart for an ils, but this plane went through a localizer antenna…(?)
Diversion might have been a better idea instead of holding for 40 minutes.

[jolihokistix]

https://japantoday.com/category/world/korean-air-plane-overshoots-runway-in-philippines#comments


https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/828x549/de68969f_f4c5_4724_86f0_0d6ae1c478ad_77e2d6d5d41b83e1de0b07e 9430dca5b74db0f89.jpeg

[By George]

Whether intentional or not I would be very reluctant to criticize the crew until more details emerge. Tropical downpours, in my opinion, are a very underestimated threat, especially with no centreline lights or grooving. Visibility and braking action can change in a heartbeat. It only needs a few additional factors or system failures to go pear shaped. I feel for the crew they will be in a dark place at the moment.

[DaveReidUK]

my lido info of RPVM lacks a chart for an ils, but this plane went through a localizer antenna…(?)

Looks like mostly approach lights wrapped around the fuselage, but there may well be bits of LLZ antenna there too, given the proximity:

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/615x754/cebu_04_end_610602aca675439682871f051add634e67c78042.jpg

[Timmy Tomkins]

It would be interesting to know what the weather was like at alternate/s

[Good Business Sense]

Mactan was always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Back to real basics. Always briefed "slippery when dry" :-)

[golfbananajam]

It was a landing after two go-arounds. Many companies prohibit landings after the second go-around. A flight to their alternate would have saved the day.

<sarcasm> if you can't land after your second go-around, how do you get the plane on the ground? I has to land, even if it's somewhere else.</sarcasm>

[slast]

According to a series of messages reported on AvHerald apparently from a passenger, it appears that the first approach was followed by a relatively normal go-around. The second approach resulted in a very hard touchdown which the author felt occurred just AFTER a go-around had been initiated. "I noticed he began to pitch back just before hitting the runway. Perhaps he noticed we had a fast approach? The impact was a single loud bang, louder than any rough landing I’ve ever experienced."

Subsequently there was an emergency landing briefings from flight deck and cabin crew. 3rd approach "touchdown, [which] was completely smooth, unshaky, and a buttery impact. Passengers began clapping at the seemingly anticlimactic result, since we were bracing for the worst."
Then "I did not feel any braking force. I could sit up straight without resisting a forward force. I did not hear the engines engaging, or revving up, for reverse thrust. I had my wife and I resume safety position just as the flight attendants started back with the shouted instructions again. Time felt simultaneously slow and fast. We placed the complimentary pillows between our heads and the seats just before we ran off the end of the runway. The grinding halt felt like it lasted roughly 5 seconds."

Entirely speculative of course: but could indicate that the impact after 2nd approach resulted in significant damage, holding was to diagnose issues, 3rd approach deliberately gentle touchdown to minimise further gear damage, but resulted in over-run?

[DaveReidUK]

The reported absence of both braking and reverse thrust could hint at an aircraft that doesn't know it's on the ground.

[Pilot DAR]

an aircraft that doesn't know it's on the ground

But as long as the pilots know....?

[fdr]

The reported absence of both braking and reverse thrust could hint at an aircraft that doesn't know it's on the ground.

A ground/air sensor issue looks like a good spot to be considering. That is well recorded in both the QAR and DFDR data stream. Being KAL, there will be a lot of dialog as well back to Ops by SATCOM, and crew are likely still in one piece if not shorter than before. Ground/Air sensing has messed up landings on various aircraft previously, usually is memorably bad outcome. Smart planes don't behave well in that case, many items fail to function... like brakes (design dependent) ground spoilers, thrust reverse... just the stuff necessary to stop after landing.

[Consol]

A ground/air sensor issue looks like a good spot to be considering. That is well recorded in both the QAR and DFDR data stream. Being KAL, there will be a lot of dialog as well back to Ops by SATCOM, and crew are likely still in one piece if not shorter than before. Ground/Air sensing has messed up landings on various aircraft previously, usually is memorably bad outcome. Smart planes don't behave well in that case, many items fail to function... like brakes (design dependent) ground spoilers, thrust reverse... just the stuff necessary to stop after landing.
FDR has a valid point. If you remember the Iberia 340-600 incident in Quito Ecuador, it suffered a very hard landing which led to loss of signalling from the main gears which then caused a lack of deployment. The aircraft was written off post removal. It is just possible that something like this happened here.

[DaveReidUK]

But as long as the pilots know....?

Knowing that their aircraft is on the ground is one thing. Being able to do anything about it is another ...

[JCO7]

Knowing that their aircraft is on the ground is one thing. Being able to do anything about it is another ...

I don't know Airbus at all. Are you saying a ground/air sensing failure would prevent manual braking and manual reverse thrust application on the 330?

[HURZ]

Yes, the y did it again…. Expats not coming back or resigning and the accidents are coming back.
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!

the local crews are through out the bank incompetent. This was just a typical korean **** up.
I worked there the last years of my carreer and the storries I could tell would fill ma y evenings

[DaveReidUK]

Are you saying a ground/air sensing failure would prevent manual braking and manual reverse thrust application on the 330?

Braking may or may not have been possible (I don't know) but I suspect the A330 isn't among the few types that that have been certificated for reverser use while in the air (or while the aircraft thinks it's still airborne).

All conjecture at this stage, of course.

[twb3]

Does the spoiler handle move on an A330 with ground spoiler auto-deploy?

[Consol]

Does the spoiler handle move on an A330 with ground spoiler auto-deploy?
No it doesn't.

[fdr]

Braking may or may not have been possible (I don't know) but I suspect the A330 isn't among the few types that that have been certificated for reverser use while in the air (or while the aircraft thinks it's still airborne).

All conjecture at this stage, of course.

It's been a few years since I did any testing on a 320/330/340, but the brake system is under the manglement of the brake and steering control unit, (BSCU). The BSCU gets info from lotsa plaices. LGCIU 1/2, ADIRU 1/2, FCPC 1/2/3... (lé bus goes for FLA more than TLAs... ). The LGCIU's get the nose landing gear compressed signal, (NLG WOW for Bowing pukes) and the main landing gear L&R bogies in ground position, (MLG not tilted for Bowling dudes). The BSCU warning is actually inhibited IIRC from touchdown to 80kts on deceleration (phase 8?) which seems a little contrary. If Lé Plaine has broken the sensors for tilt on the MLG or reracked the BSCU, then switching off the Anti-skid & Nose wheel steering switch is expected to recover the brakes. you still lose TR and NWS, and as you have turned off anti-skid, then, that's fun. I just landed a jet w/o anti-skid and without normal braking system,in MNL last year, in the wet, took up all of the runway, barely touched the emergency brake system yet still had to replace all main tires, no ground spoilers and one thrust reverse cycle available... If the guys had a wet runway, no ground spoilers, no reveresers and no anti-skid, they duz got a a bit of a stopping issue.

all conjecture, but stuff happens. A crew deciding to do a G/A and then changing their mind has parked shiny bits in the weeds before too.

Never understood the warning inhibit rationale for lé Bus breaks, but then, golly, it is a wonderful advanced alerting system and everyone should have it as it is great and isnt it a shame that the dastardly B737 doesnt and well, golly, is that the grass coming up? But, I have the glorious advanced alerting system that B737 drivers can only dream about, and yet, there goes the approach lights, and, the LLZ antenna, and... whoops, lift your feet...

The auto brake function is triggered when selected, by the deployment of the ground spoilers... with MAX being modulated until the NLG WOW is made, assuming that the BSCU is working in the first place. Without the BSCU there isn't much B going along except for alternate W/O Anti-skid. The LDR for No ant skid, no spoilers, no TR is... a lot. No book handy, but it is usually at least 1.7 times the factored landing distance.

[tdracer]

I don't know Airbus at all. Are you saying a ground/air sensing failure would prevent manual braking and manual reverse thrust application on the 330?

I can't comment on brakes, but it's pretty universal on high bypass engines to inhibit reverser operation unless "on-ground" is true (although the detail logic of "on-ground" is highly aircraft dependent).
If you're wondering why, lookup Lauda 767 accident...

[fdr]

I can't comment on brakes, but it's pretty universal on high bypass engines to inhibit reverser operation unless "on-ground" is true (although the detail logic of "on-ground" is highly aircraft dependent).
If you're wondering why, lookup Lauda 767 accident...

"Louder 004" raised two things:
1. The failsafe autostow system didn't on the PW4060...
2. the modeling of controllability did not acurately account for the lift loss in the wake of the engine's reverse plume or the added drag from that cause.

A lot of negative comments were made early on about the crew's competency until the revised data was on hand, and that stopped much of the noise.A type I still fly has just dumped a plane in the dirt due to a TR deployment, they are not much fun, and the crews response when the system doesn't play ball is about the same as entering auto in an R22 with an engine failure, getting the N1 down to idle if the system doesn't is fairly desirable.

[tdracer]

"Louder 004" raised two things:
1. The failsafe autostow system didn't on the PW4060...
2. the modeling of controllability did not acurately account for the lift loss in the wake of the engine's reverse plume or the added drag from that cause.


Actually, auto-restow actually contributed to the accident. Although we never positively identified why the Directional Control Valve (DCV) changed state from 'stow' to 'deploy', a mis-rigged auto-restow sensor (indicating the reverser wasn't stowed) activated auto-restow which opened the Hydraulic Isolation Valve - providing hydraulic pressure to the reverser so that when the DCV changed state the reverser deployed.
I was directly involved in the Lauda investigation (BTW, one of the most unpleasant things I've ever done - I could never be an accident investigator, I found it too painful). They'd actually done a flight test on a 767 when they deployed a reverser in flight - but they'd done it with the engine already at idle, at 10k/200 knots. Lauda happened with the engine at max climb, 24k/Mach 0.78. Although the FADEC automatically commanded idle, at those conditions it would have taken nearly 30 seconds for the engine to reach idle - by which time it was way too late and the aircraft was already starting to break up. I participated in a wind tunnel test with a deployed reverser at Boeing Vertol in Philly. There was a rather annoying Aero S&C type that insisted the aircraft was controllable and the Lauda pilots messed - at least he did before we started testing. After he started seeing the data, he got real quiet. Although there was a time when I might have understood all those controllability coefficients, after over 15 years of working engines I'd forgotten all that S&C stuff. However at the end of the test, we did a flow visualization using hundreds of yarn tufts. THAT just anyone could understand - with the engine at high power nearly the entire upper surface of that wing was separated :eek:. They never stood a chance.

[fdr]

Actually, auto-restow actually contributed to the accident. Although we never positively identified why the Directional Control Valve (DCV) changed state from 'stow' to 'deploy', a mis-rigged auto-restow sensor (indicating the reverser wasn't stowed) activated auto-restow which opened the Hydraulic Isolation Valve - providing hydraulic pressure to the reverser so that when the DCV changed state the reverser deployed.
I was directly involved in the Lauda investigation (BTW, one of the most unpleasant things I've ever done - I could never be an accident investigator, I found it too painful). They'd actually done a flight test on a 767 when they deployed a reverser in flight - but they'd done it with the engine already at idle, at 10k/200 knots. Lauda happened with the engine at max climb, 24k/Mach 0.78. Although the FADEC automatically commanded idle, at those conditions it would have taken nearly 30 seconds for the engine to reach idle - by which time it was way too late and the aircraft was already starting to break up. I participated in a wind tunnel test with a deployed reverser at Boeing Vertol in Philly. There was a rather annoying Aero S&C type that insisted the aircraft was controllable and the Lauda pilots messed - at least he did before we started testing. After he started seeing the data, he got real quiet. Although there was a time when I might have understood all those controllability coefficients, after over 15 years of working engines I'd forgotten all that S&C stuff. However at the end of the test, we did a flow visualization using hundreds of yarn tufts. THAT just anyone could understand - with the engine at high power nearly the entire upper surface of that wing was separated :eek:. They never stood a chance.

The same guy annoyed me on the same issue. The crew of "Mozart" had a situation that was unlike any that had been trained, the simulator did not simulate the dynamics that existed.
IIRC, the thrust reduction is by way of the EEC, and was not mentioned in the MMEL/MEL as a consequential consideration. A PIMU fault was permitted a considerable time with a defect without restriction, but would impact the command to reduce thrust with a TR inadvertently deployed. Details are hazy, I recall evaluating this in a simulator to see if it could be replicated, and we could by bypassing a number of systems, the result being a wild ride. By memory around 7-9 seconds existed from onset to determine what the system fault was, to ascertain that the expected thrust feedback was not occurring, and to get the thrust coming back of CLB/CLB1 to idle. The additional info that came out of that accident was the asymmetric failure of the horizontal stab and the failure in overload of the vertical stab, resulting in a torsional failure of the aft fuselage, and a negative g failure of the wing structure. All in all a really really bad day out. Had Nikki in our jet observing a long haul op (he was thinking of buying that type) 2 weeks before the accident, whatever is said about him, he loved his airline.





One aspect of the design that concerned me was that the DCV could effectively be irrelevant if the NRV in the bypass line was defective, and permitted pressure to be applied from the bypass line.

University of Bielefeld (presumably Peter Ladkin's group) has a copy of the Lauda 004 report issued by Thailand. It is pretty brief for the event, and lacks much supporting data... but it is interesting/
https://web.archive.org/web/20110607000248/http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/LaudaAir/LaudaRPT.html#App_C

A surprisingly good precis of the accident is also found here:
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/a-reversal-of-fortune-the-crash-of-lauda-air-flight-004-7ba96f9571bf


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/623x470/0_3jqwdqvzddykwfhi_c91a936b4eacf5e385f895702ee01834702f42da. jpg
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/593x241/0_xz12joq2v9yob27r_07f35c52b40e761151088aee270391327924e24c. jpg




[fdr]

Yes, the y did it again…. Expats not coming back or resigning and the accidents are coming back.
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!

[fill in the nationality] should not fly, as simple as that.

Does that stand for the Canadian A320 trying to land on 4 aircraft on a taxiway as well?
Or the US flight crew that drove a B767 into the water off Houston spoiling the delivery time of Amazon Prime?
How about... AF447?
How about... the Rostov on Don B738?
How about... worlds wonders doing a downwards G/A in an A320 that accelerated all the way down to 50AGL?
How about a B737CL that taxies with a bit of swagger after a 4g landing in scrumpy country?
How about a B777 forgetting to climb on a departure,
How about a B777 retracting the gear on a G/A and settling onto the ground?
American Airlines flight 2341?
American Airlines flight 300?
American Airlines flight 567?
American Airlines flight 1586?
American Airlines flight 331?

etc,

should we start on Delta, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Birdseed?

The MD11F that missed the runway at Ted Stevens 2 times, having got to close to 360 kts at 3000' on the arrival into FAA airspace? With a constant litany of "WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP", counting those was tedious. Apparently the FAA licensed foreign pilot never bothered to read §91.117. What got me on that was, when he got to 1 nm final with a bit of flap, no gear and doing 260kts, @ 800'AGL, he finally decided to do a.... something, I know not what. It was best described as a wobbly RH wiggle to return to the same place in space, at same configuration, speed, and altitude, and then finally did a formal go around. Same guy decided to take off with all 3 IRS' with warnings on check position, and lost all nav functions when he hit the go bar.

KAL is an interesting place, it has some of the best engineers on the planet. It does have some institutional issues with a punitive culture, which is in keeping with being in a state of war for 70 years, so, they take punishment to a different level to what the west is used to.

There are some really good Korean pilots out there, a couple of the best are now dead, but they were brilliant. There are some that would stand their ground anywhere in the world, and do. There have been some excellent foreign pilots there, and there were some that used P-51 pretty enthusiastically. A number of foreigners were treated poorly by KAL, but not that much differently to how KAL treated Koreans, other than those that had F-5A time... You might be surprised by the statistics of events/nationality, and the absolutely dumb as dog dirt events that were done by [insert nationality]'s.

As far as this crew goes, I would think it prudent to hold off until more information is at hand before commenting on a given nationality's competency. Remember, it wasn't Indonesians or Ethiopians that designed the B/S system that ended up killing 346 people

On saving the day, there is one particular case where that certainly is a true statement, involves Stuart AFB. KAL additionally had a number of events where the decision of the PIC of non Korean nationality took a lot of effort to be swallowed.

The best helicopter pilots I ever flew with were Japanese, Japanese, French and Australian, in that order. The most impressive CRM I have ever evaluated was by a Russian pilot. The most beautiful set of hands I have ever seen fly an aircraft were attached to an Ethiopian, one who was also well known in the system, and who on entry into a room could make those red necked pilots that spent their time talking about skin colour fawn obsequiously, they had been fortunate to have this gifted man do instruction on their jumbo's. I had the previlidge of flying with Bob Hoover and Bob Love in a T28 and P51 on the same day, to have done training with "airbum" in his Pitts, and the Ethiopian landed a B744 in interesting conditions into JFK that were more impressive. The best TRI I have ever flown with was an Indian... the most knowledgable pilot I have ever worked with on aircraft technical matters was an Iranian.

You are welcome to your opinion, I think there is more to see when eyes are open. :)

[Veruka Salt]

Hear hear!

[blind pew]

A couple of great and informative posts

[Greta_Thunberg]

Yes, the y did it again…. Expats not coming back or resigning and the accidents are coming back.
Koreans should not fly, as simple as that. They do not understand thinking outside the box and the pom.
I can truely say after working many years for them that they are aviations idiots. Most of the time the expats saved their day!
Kinda sounds like you were the one who f***ed up your career there chief.

Was it the culture or the food that inspired the move to Korea?

[Ex Douglas Driver]

One of the photos doing the rounds shows the MLG doors are open, suggesting at the least, a green hydraulic system failure.
Media comment from Korean and local authorities said a hydraulic failure causing a brake failure, and the high speed off the end also suggest a further brake system failure beyond a G sys failure and its reversion to B sys alternate brakes.
The pax tweet about a landing under emergency conditions indicate that the crew were aware of an extended landing distance prior to the final approach.
They may have had a double hydraulics failure (Green and Blue). Comments about lack of reverse thrust (only 1 side?), could be because of the additional B hyd fail. The second hyd fail would have had to have happened while they were previously configured as the slats are in the extended and gapped position and require G or B hyds to extend.
B+G hyd fail leads to Accumulator braking with no ABS (at least 7 full brake applications through pedals, pilot limited to 1000psi with the possibility of blowing tires or under braking), #2 Reverser only, reduced flap (depending on where the slats are locked) and higher approach speeds, only 2 spoilers per wing operative, and limited diversion opportunities due no gear and slat retraction.

[safetypee]

“RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding.”
#8 fdr

“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS

Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.

[fdr]

“RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding.”
#8 fdr

“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS

Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.

#8, from my last landing there, in 2021.

[fdr]

One of the photos doing the rounds shows the MLG doors are open, suggesting at the least, a green hydraulic system failure.
Media comment from Korean and local authorities said a hydraulic failure causing a brake failure, and the high speed off the end also suggest a further brake system failure beyond a G sys failure and its reversion to B sys alternate brakes.
The pax tweet about a landing under emergency conditions indicate that the crew were aware of an extended landing distance prior to the final approach.
They may have had a double hydraulics failure (Green and Blue). Comments about lack of reverse thrust (only 1 side?), could be because of the additional B hyd fail. The second hyd fail would have had to have happened while they were previously configured as the slats are in the extended and gapped position and require G or B hyds to extend.
B+G hyd fail leads to Accumulator braking with no ABS (at least 7 full brake applications through pedals, pilot limited to 1000psi with the possibility of blowing tires or under braking), #2 Reverser only, reduced flap (depending on where the slats are locked) and higher approach speeds, only 2 spoilers per wing operative, and limited diversion opportunities due no gear and slat retraction.

That would put them in a bad position without doubt.

Both T/Rs appear to be stowed, which is odd. The main doors if they are open is definitely indicating a Green system failure which is going to be a pain, but would have been manageable, assuming that the BSCU was working, and there were no other failures. The blue and yellow are the TR powers respectively for Left and right engines... and as they are not extended, on an overrun, and a very slow deceleration, that suggests the guys had a compound problem. The fact they landed on an airport suggests that it wasn't loss of all 3 hydraulics... so am thinking Green + BSCU (G/A Sensing failure) which gives open inner gear doors, no T/R's, no ground spoilers, and alternate brakes only without anti-skid. That would put the aircraft in the weeds in most cases, outside of maybe Edwards.

Losing a HYD and another sensing system may suggest that the second landing was less than stellar, but, if no one died in this, am gonna give some latitude to the guys. The second landing may have some echoes of Iberia's -600... Going to be interesting to get the full report.... except it is CAAP land. KCASA will have more on it probably.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1096x1462/screen_shot_2022_10_25_at_6_20_52_pm_b7fa624a37554e5b7f9fd64 efd366aeb0ad388fa.png

[rock-the-boat]

I'm often surprised by the lack of empathy when topics such as this make their way onto the forum. I wonder if it's a matter of psychological relief, knowing statistically accidents will happen and that it was not to “me” that it happened? Could it be a deluded belief that there are no circumstances that provide a degree of complexity where I would run out of ideas before I run out of fuel?

There is no empirical evidence to show that this crew was less well trained or less competent than any contributor to this forum. Until we understand the complexity of the situation that this crew faced perhaps we should leave it at that.

I wonder if anybody understands what this crew is facing not just today or this week but potentially for the remainder of their lives. It is not surprising that most may not understand. These may have the luxury of an ”oops I'm sorry” if they found themselves in a similar situation. Comfortable in the knowledge that they would be cocooned by those who are concerned about their mental well-being, would be represented by those standing up for their employment rights, be defended by those who would stand up to the authorities for them, there would be those who would defend against cruelty from the press, and there would be those who stood in the community understanding that they did everything in their power to avert an accident but in spite of this an accident occurred.

What might it feel like to become the symbol of national shame, what would it feel like to be the individuals who let the company down, what must it feel like to be the people who spurred on the cruel assumptions about the competence of your fellow nationals, what might it feel like to let your family down, no longer able to look up to you in a position held in high esteem by society

It is the greatest failing of CRM that there are still those who believe that it is only the "other" who is subject to overload, and it is only the self who in the absence of any evidence is able to draw a reliable conclusion, is able to cast aspersions, and is fully in their right to demonstrate one of the core characteristics of a psychopathy; zero empathy.

Oops, if I offended you, I'm sorry.

[wondrousbitofrough]

Breaking: Korean Air Airbus A330 Crash Lands In The Philippines (msn.com) (https://www.msn.com/en-ca/travel/news/breaking-korean-air-airbus-a330-crash-lands-in-the-philippines/ar-AA13hR8y?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=1c0460f93b8b4ca882f7369ef1dd3432)

Breaking? Its broken...

[Capn Bloggs]

Oops, if I offended you, I'm sorry.
Not at all, well said. Where's the Like button, mods?

[slast]

"On Oct 24th 2022 Philippines Authorities as well as Korean Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport report, according to first preliminary investigation results a hydraulic failure had caused a brakes failure.

On Oct 25th 2022 it became known that the captain of the flight provided testimony that they suffered a hard touchdown on their second approach due to wind shear forcing them down, during the following go around a warning light regarding brakes came on. The crew therefore declared emergency, prepared for the emergency landing and performed a third approach in gusting winds and turbulence, a warning light regarding brakes pressure came on at the time of touch down and they could not slow down the aircraft."

[slast]

Since this is an ongoing and developing story with significant interest and comments, I am curious as to why the mods moved it from "Rumours and News"...... what are the criteria for this?

[olster]

Some great and prescient posts above. Particularly fdr and his assessment of nationality versus flying skill. Great pilots are made either naturally or with training or both regardless of origin. If you think the Koreans can’t fly have a look at their aerobatic team that currently knocks spots over all others. Nobody outwith the crew knows what really happened with this accident but in time honoured fashion people are prepared to instantly criticise from their armchairs before official investigation.

[punkalouver]

[fill in the nationality] should not fly, as simple as that.

Does that stand for the Canadian A320 trying to land on 4 aircraft on a taxiway as well?
Or the US flight crew that drove a B767 into the water off Houston spoiling the delivery time of Amazon Prime?
How about... AF447?
How about... the Rostov on Don B738?
How about... worlds wonders doing a downwards G/A in an A320 that accelerated all the way down to 50AGL?
How about a B737CL that taxies with a bit of swagger after a 4g landing in scrumpy country?
How about a B777 forgetting to climb on a departure,
How about a B777 retracting the gear on a G/A and settling onto the ground?
American Airlines flight 2341?
American Airlines flight 300?
American Airlines flight 567?
American Airlines flight 1586?
American Airlines flight 331?

etc,

should we start on Delta, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Birdseed?


One really needs to look at accidents per million flights instead of assuming that an airline with three times as many flights having twice as many accident has a worse record. Of course, there are other variables as well including the era of the accident rate.

Regardless of the cause of the most recent accident, I’m afraid the KAL record from the not that distant past is not the best. Getting shot down twice due to navigation errors a little further in the past doesn’t look good either. Like most airlines, it seems that the last 15 years have been fairly good.

[Ex Douglas Driver]

That would put them in a bad position without doubt.

Both T/Rs appear to be stowed, which is odd. The main doors if they are open is definitely indicating a Green system failure which is going to be a pain, but would have been manageable, assuming that the BSCU was working, and there were no other failures. The blue and yellow are the TR powers respectively for Left and right engines... and as they are not extended, on an overrun, and a very slow deceleration, that suggests the guys had a compound problem. The fact they landed on an airport suggests that it wasn't loss of all 3 hydraulics... so am thinking Green + BSCU (G/A Sensing failure) which gives open inner gear doors, no T/R's, no ground spoilers, and alternate brakes only without anti-skid. That would put the aircraft in the weeds in most cases, outside of maybe Edwards.

Losing a HYD and another sensing system may suggest that the second landing was less than stellar, but, if no one died in this, am gonna give some latitude to the guys. The second landing may have some echoes of Iberia's -600... Going to be interesting to get the full report.... except it is CAAP land. KCASA will have more on it probably.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1096x1462/screen_shot_2022_10_25_at_6_20_52_pm_b7fa624a37554e5b7f9fd64 efd366aeb0ad388fa.png

It's the LGCIUs that give the ground/flight sensing - which following a double failure, could lead to a manual gear extension and a landing with no reversers.
There is a procedure for double LGCIU failure however this shouldn't contribute to a degradation of wheel braking systems.
The accident report will make for enlightening reading.

[B2N2]

[fill in the nationality] should not fly, as simple as that.

Does that stand for the Canadian A320 trying to land on 4 aircraft on a taxiway as well?
Or the US flight crew that drove a B767 into the water off Houston spoiling the delivery time of Amazon Prime?
How about... AF447?
How about... the Rostov on Don B738?
How about... worlds wonders doing a downwards G/A in an A320 that accelerated all the way down to 50AGL?
How about a B737CL that taxies with a bit of swagger after a 4g landing in scrumpy country?
How about a B777 forgetting to climb on a departure,
How about a B777 retracting the gear on a G/A and settling onto the ground?
American Airlines flight 2341?
American Airlines flight 300?
American Airlines flight 567?
American Airlines flight 1586?
American Airlines flight 331?

etc,

should we start on Delta, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Birdseed?

The MD11F that missed the runway at Ted Stevens 2 times, having got to close to 360 kts at 3000' on the arrival into FAA airspace? With a constant litany of "WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP", counting those was tedious. Apparently the FAA licensed foreign pilot never bothered to read §91.117. What got me on that was, when he got to 1 nm final with a bit of flap, no gear and doing 260kts, @ 800'AGL, he finally decided to do a.... something, I know not what. It was best described as a wobbly RH wiggle to return to the same place in space, at same configuration, speed, and altitude, and then finally did a formal go around. Same guy decided to take off with all 3 IRS' with warnings on check position, and lost all nav functions when he hit the go bar.

KAL is an interesting place, it has some of the best engineers on the planet. It does have some institutional issues with a punitive culture, which is in keeping with being in a state of war for 70 years, so, they take punishment to a different level to what the west is used to.

There are some really good Korean pilots out there, a couple of the best are now dead, but they were brilliant. There are some that would stand their ground anywhere in the world, and do. There have been some excellent foreign pilots there, and there were some that used P-51 pretty enthusiastically. A number of foreigners were treated poorly by KAL, but not that much differently to how KAL treated Koreans, other than those that had F-5A time... You might be surprised by the statistics of events/nationality, and the absolutely dumb as dog dirt events that were done by [insert nationality]'s.

As far as this crew goes, I would think it prudent to hold off until more information is at hand before commenting on a given nationality's competency. Remember, it wasn't Indonesians or Ethiopians that designed the B/S system that ended up killing 346 people

On saving the day, there is one particular case where that certainly is a true statement, involves Stuart AFB. KAL additionally had a number of events where the decision of the PIC of non Korean nationality took a lot of effort to be swallowed.

The best helicopter pilots I ever flew with were Japanese, Japanese, French and Australian, in that order. The most impressive CRM I have ever evaluated was by a Russian pilot. The most beautiful set of hands I have ever seen fly an aircraft were attached to an Ethiopian, one who was also well known in the system, and who on entry into a room could make those red necked pilots that spent their time talking about skin colour fawn obsequiously, they had been fortunate to have this gifted man do instruction on their jumbo's. I had the previlidge of flying with Bob Hoover and Bob Love in a T28 and P51 on the same day, to have done training with "airbum" in his Pitts, and the Ethiopian landed a B744 in interesting conditions into JFK that were more impressive. The best TRI I have ever flown with was an Indian... the most knowledgable pilot I have ever worked with on aircraft technical matters was an Iranian.

You are welcome to your opinion, I think there is more to see when eyes are open. :)

Pprune post of the year.
Thank you.

[YRP]

[fill in the nationality] should not fly, as simple as that

Well said, sir.

And thanks for the interesting posts on the Lauda accident, tdracer and fdr.

[YRP]

I wonder if anybody understands what this crew is facing not just today or this week but potentially for the remainder of their lives.


This is something that is distressing about our society.

We expect pilots/controllers/engineers/[insert profession here] to push the limits on performance, weather, costs. If one makes a safety call, eg a diversion, the response is often “why, it would have been fine”. Yet if something goes wrong, it is “how could you have done this”.

You can never prove the safety call was “necessary”, i.e. that there would have been an accident, and you can never prove that pressure caused an (in hindsight) poor choice.

And yet we pick on individuals who make hard calls.

[grizzled]

Since this is an ongoing and developing story with significant interest and comments, I am curious as to why the mods moved it from "Rumours and News"...... what are the criteria for this?

Perhaps it was moved to the "accidents" forum because it was an accident....

[Good Business Sense]

“RPVM can get pretty flooded in storms, braking action can be pretty low. The runway is crowned, but not grooved and has no PFC overlay. If there is a cross wind and heavy rain there can be ponding.”
#8 fdr

“always a black hole - not unknown, at night, to have no ILS with no VASIS/PAPI ..... always fun in a widebody. Always briefed "slippery when dry"
#14 GBS

Not questioning the accuracy of this information, but from where does it originate?
This appears to be classic local knowledge, or learned from experience, informal communication, yet most valuable in judging both the interpretation of published data, and adjustments in assessing local context - weather, runway, aircraft state, etc.

25 years of flying into Mactan in widebodies - not recently - rgds

[Pinkman]

I understand that dispatch with a T/R inop is an AD item but when the flight time is only 4.5 hours the weather must have been known… why dispatch this particular aircraft with a duff T/R to a challenging destination with appalling weather?

[krismiler]

There hasn't been an ILS in Cebu for a number of years, VOR and RNAV (GNSS) available for 04 and 22 with minimums a couple of hundred feet higher than a precision approach.

Two approaches, 13 minutes apart, followed by 40 minutes holding and then the third and last approach.

If that was the case, it sounds like he painted himself into a corner and had to get it on the ground. Manila is just over an hour away, they should have been able to divert after the first approach, after a second attempt they might have been a bit tight especially if damage had occurred, after 40 minutes subsequent holding it was probably a fuel emergency meaning they had to land

[slast]

Perhaps it was moved to the "accidents" forum because it was an accident....
.....that's in the news :)

[Liffy 1M]

Perhaps it was moved to the "accidents" forum because it was an accident....

As the thread-opener, I put it in Accidents and Close Calls, as that is where it appeared to me other recent accidents/incidents had been placed. I assume the Mods could move it if they consider that it would be better placed elsewhere.

[Pilot DAR]

I moved the thread from R&N to A&CC. I left an expiring link to it's location in the new forum. When it happened it was news. It'll fade from being news and still be an accident. If it's news, posters may post in R&N. If it's an accident, it'll be moved to A&CC. Accidents in the news may also be posted directly to the A&CC forum. If readers are interested in accidents and close calls, they are invited to read in that forum.

What we're working away from is an accident, which resides in R&N, being updated there (like accident report much later), where the update is not a rumour nor news, it's just an update on an accident.

[Cilba]

Well said!

[Cropduster]

Tdracer…I learn something every time I read one of your posts.
fdr - I nominate you for “post of the year.”

I am currently flying a Boeingsaurus, but spent nearly two decades on the ‘Busses. I really enjoyed the Airbus, especially the 330 but they certainly were sophisticated aircraft.

Not suggesting any shortcomings with the KA crew, but we had a few failures of the ground spoilers to deploy and the reversers to arm when flying on very slippery runways - especially following a very smooth touchdown. Something I rarely had to worry about. If I remember correctly, our procedure was to manually deploy the spoilers that would then send a secondary signal to allow the reversers to deploy. Does this ring any bells? Been quite a few years.

[fdr]

This is something that is distressing about our society.

We expect pilots/controllers/engineers/[insert profession here] to push the limits on performance, weather, costs. If one makes a safety call, eg a diversion, the response is often “why, it would have been fine”. Yet if something goes wrong, it is “how could you have done this”.

You can never prove the safety call was “necessary”, i.e. that there would have been an accident, and you can never prove that pressure caused an (in hindsight) poor choice.

And yet we pick on individuals who make hard calls.

There is an odd statistic between decisions of professionals and amateurs. Under stress, the difference in the correctness of a call was apparently not statistically different, the same error rates existed. The identified difference was the time to arrive at a decision. Arguably it could be said that Professionals make their confident mistakes faster than amateurs. That was for simple, linear decisions. When the events get more complex, while there has been no study that I have come across beyond the relatively simple NDM/ADM heuristics, there could be an outcome where with complex and evolving, dynamic events that the professional starts to perform better, as they have their learned decision making heuristics and may thereby retain enough bandwidth to revisit bad decisions if detecting the slip between expected and actual outcomes. This is not a cultural matter beyond the matter of concern or input to a decision process. Standard B/S CRM there. The other side of that coin is that where the decision making is so routine and easy, that no one questions the accuracy of the decision that is made, the more emphatic and certain the statement of fact, the lower the likelihood that it will be challenged.

Flight crew make decisions in dynamic, time limited situations, and may have conflicting inputs, and too frequently under a pathological management system that does not want any adverse condition to occur or be reported. For every bad event that occurs where a crew get criticized justly or unjustly, there are tens of thousands of the same family of events that are being managed usually with crews of corresponding competency. Stuff happens, humans remain the means to cope with matters that may not be preprogrammed. Our failures are pretty darned obvious, successes less so unless in very unusual circumstances.

[212man]

BBC news are saying the pax were taken to local hotels, which I find odd if Cebu was the destination!

[slast]

Pilot DAR, since I'm the one who started this particular bit of thread drift, I thank you for the clarification!
Steve

[ZFT]

BBC news are saying the pax were taken to local hotels, which I find odd if Cebu was the destination!

Maybe why they wait for their belongings to be retrieved?

[SlamBam]

Who’s going to write the final report? If CAAP does, chances are it’ll make for comical reading with several eye roll moments.

[punkalouver]

BBC news are saying the pax were taken to local hotels, which I find odd if Cebu was the destination!
Where else would they be taken for the night?

As for the assumption that the pilot paintied himself in a corner…….We don’t know what the weather was during the decision for the second approach. But if it was reasonable with Manila still as an alternate(which subsequently was no longer able to be an alternate due to performance issues related to damage) he could have been presented with a situation where a very bad landing attempt reduced the options to mediocre airports.

That is the frequent problem with alternates…….it assumes an aircraft with no performance degradation and minimal fuel.

There was a carrier with a CRJ in my country that encountered a situation of requiring to divert due to weather with flaps stuck at full. They didn’t have much fuel when they landed.

[212man]

Where else would they be taken for the night?

Wherever they were planning to go regardless of whether their aircraft went off the end of the runway - it wasn't a diversion to a strange airport! Probably more pleasant to be with family/friends/at home etc, than in some hotel room. Belongings can be brought later as if lost luggage.

[StudentPilot479]

According to a passenger on reddit or avherald, carry-ons were mostly left behind and Korean could not get on the plane to remove them - so many/most passengers had no passports to go through customs, thus stuck in hotels until they got their passports and went through customs.

[Mak79]

[fill in the nationality] should not fly, as simple as that.

Does that stand for the Canadian A320 trying to land on 4 aircraft on a taxiway as well?
Or the US flight crew that drove a B767 into the water off Houston spoiling the delivery time of Amazon Prime?
How about... AF447?
How about... the Rostov on Don B738?
How about... worlds wonders doing a downwards G/A in an A320 that accelerated all the way down to 50AGL?
How about a B737CL that taxies with a bit of swagger after a 4g landing in scrumpy country?
How about a B777 forgetting to climb on a departure,
How about a B777 retracting the gear on a G/A and settling onto the ground?
American Airlines flight 2341?
American Airlines flight 300?
American Airlines flight 567?
American Airlines flight 1586?
American Airlines flight 331?

etc,

should we start on Delta, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Birdseed?

The MD11F that missed the runway at Ted Stevens 2 times, having got to close to 360 kts at 3000' on the arrival into FAA airspace? With a constant litany of "WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP", counting those was tedious. Apparently the FAA licensed foreign pilot never bothered to read §91.117. What got me on that was, when he got to 1 nm final with a bit of flap, no gear and doing 260kts, @ 800'AGL, he finally decided to do a.... something, I know not what. It was best described as a wobbly RH wiggle to return to the same place in space, at same configuration, speed, and altitude, and then finally did a formal go around. Same guy decided to take off with all 3 IRS' with warnings on check position, and lost all nav functions when he hit the go bar.

KAL is an interesting place, it has some of the best engineers on the planet. It does have some institutional issues with a punitive culture, which is in keeping with being in a state of war for 70 years, so, they take punishment to a different level to what the west is used to.

There are some really good Korean pilots out there, a couple of the best are now dead, but they were brilliant. There are some that would stand their ground anywhere in the world, and do. There have been some excellent foreign pilots there, and there were some that used P-51 pretty enthusiastically. A number of foreigners were treated poorly by KAL, but not that much differently to how KAL treated Koreans, other than those that had F-5A time... You might be surprised by the statistics of events/nationality, and the absolutely dumb as dog dirt events that were done by [insert nationality]'s.

As far as this crew goes, I would think it prudent to hold off until more information is at hand before commenting on a given nationality's competency. Remember, it wasn't Indonesians or Ethiopians that designed the B/S system that ended up killing 346 people

On saving the day, there is one particular case where that certainly is a true statement, involves Stuart AFB. KAL additionally had a number of events where the decision of the PIC of non Korean nationality took a lot of effort to be swallowed.

The best helicopter pilots I ever flew with were Japanese, Japanese, French and Australian, in that order. The most impressive CRM I have ever evaluated was by a Russian pilot. The most beautiful set of hands I have ever seen fly an aircraft were attached to an Ethiopian, one who was also well known in the system, and who on entry into a room could make those red necked pilots that spent their time talking about skin colour fawn obsequiously, they had been fortunate to have this gifted man do instruction on their jumbo's. I had the previlidge of flying with Bob Hoover and Bob Love in a T28 and P51 on the same day, to have done training with "airbum" in his Pitts, and the Ethiopian landed a B744 in interesting conditions into JFK that were more impressive. The best TRI I have ever flown with was an Indian... the most knowledgable pilot I have ever worked with on aircraft technical matters was an Iranian.

You are welcome to your opinion, I think there is more to see when eyes are open. :)

Very rational post, hats off to you 👏

[Flyinghigh320]

From the Chart Mactan Airport only 3310 x 45 meters runway, there might be rubber spot existed plus the fact the runway is grooved. To many factors but for this type of runway in Philippines this is not out of ordinary, hence, even its privately owned it has a lot of risk factor to be account for. As my own point of view, Factors are not just based on the Pilot performance its self but must be all accounted for including the airport. It seem as i have check some website there not much to learn about the airport in Philippines as there is no report that is publish for the civil authority to be learned from it. If they were, these could have prevented. I'm sure the locals who is familiar with the Airport knows all the risk that was not published for other Airlines to study.

Hoping to wait for the investigation report to be publicly view in order to learned the cause of the incident.

[krismiler]

According to a passenger on reddit or avherald, carry-ons were mostly left behind and Korean could not get on the plane to remove them - so many/most passengers had no passports to go through customs, thus stuck in hotels until they got their passports and went through customs.​​​​​​

My passport stays on my person in an inside or front button up pocket when I travel. Replacing anything else is a breeze compared to getting a new passport in a foreign country.

[212man]

My passport stays on my person in an inside or front button up pocket when I travel. Replacing anything else is a breeze compared to getting a new passport in a foreign country.
Quite - phone wallet and passport on you during flight. Most other things can be fixed later!

[punkalouver]

Wherever they were planning to go regardless of whether their aircraft went off the end of the runway - it wasn't a diversion to a strange airport! Probably more pleasant to be with family/friends/at home etc, than in some hotel room. Belongings can be brought later as if lost luggage.
When a foreign airline crashes at a tourist destination, there is a good chance that most of the passengers were foreigners planning on heading to hotels as a first stop

Therefore, the hotel thing makes sense to me.

[212man]

When a foreign airline crashes at a tourist destination, there is a good chance that most of the passengers were foreigners planning on heading to hotels as a first stop

Therefore, the hotel thing makes sense to me.

Yes - but their destination hotel, not a new one from the airline.

[punkalouver]

Yes - but their destination hotel, not a new one from the airline.
Your original quote has hotels as plural. It now appears that you have changed it to singular. Perhaps time to admit that you have no idea of any hotel details and that most of the pax needed hotels regardless of the outcome of the flight instead of your assumption that most pax had a local home to go to.

Back to aircraft details please.

[Heavy D]

Hello FDR!
Thank you for enlightening me on the braking system logic of the Airbus A330 series. I did not know that nose strut compression was necessary for TR use, but I would think it would be a safeguard against a sudden deceleration causing the craft to slam down on its nosegear and possibly damaging same. The 737NG/MAX will autobrake as soon as the MLG wheels spin up past 60 knots. The airplane is prevented from impacting its nosegear after sudden deceleration by a redundant, failsafe system: two well-trained and proficient pilots applying aft elevator.

We are AVIATORS, gentlemen! Let's not get so complacent that we allow system shortcomings to catch us in the weeds. Happily, no one was injured, but I might guess that the return Cebu-Inchon flight may have been cancelled or severely delayed.
Your comment "lift up your feet" had me in stitches! Thank you for such an informative post!

Fly Safe!

[Heavy D]

[fill in the nationality] should not fly, as simple as that.

Does that stand for the Canadian A320 trying to land on 4 aircraft on a taxiway as well?
Or the US flight crew that drove a B767 into the water off Houston spoiling the delivery time of Amazon Prime?
How about... AF447?
How about... the Rostov on Don B738?
How about... worlds wonders doing a downwards G/A in an A320 that accelerated all the way down to 50AGL?
How about a B737CL that taxies with a bit of swagger after a 4g landing in scrumpy country?
How about a B777 forgetting to climb on a departure,
How about a B777 retracting the gear on a G/A and settling onto the ground?
American Airlines flight 2341?
American Airlines flight 300?
American Airlines flight 567?
American Airlines flight 1586?
American Airlines flight 331?

etc,

should we start on Delta, United, Lufthansa, Air France, Birdseed?

The MD11F that missed the runway at Ted Stevens 2 times, having got to close to 360 kts at 3000' on the arrival into FAA airspace? With a constant litany of "WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP", counting those was tedious. Apparently the FAA licensed foreign pilot never bothered to read §91.117. What got me on that was, when he got to 1 nm final with a bit of flap, no gear and doing 260kts, @ 800'AGL, he finally decided to do a.... something, I know not what. It was best described as a wobbly RH wiggle to return to the same place in space, at same configuration, speed, and altitude, and then finally did a formal go around. Same guy decided to take off with all 3 IRS' with warnings on check position, and lost all nav functions when he hit the go bar.

KAL is an interesting place, it has some of the best engineers on the planet. It does have some institutional issues with a punitive culture, which is in keeping with being in a state of war for 70 years, so, they take punishment to a different level to what the west is used to.

There are some really good Korean pilots out there, a couple of the best are now dead, but they were brilliant. There are some that would stand their ground anywhere in the world, and do. There have been some excellent foreign pilots there, and there were some that used P-51 pretty enthusiastically. A number of foreigners were treated poorly by KAL, but not that much differently to how KAL treated Koreans, other than those that had F-5A time... You might be surprised by the statistics of events/nationality, and the absolutely dumb as dog dirt events that were done by [insert nationality]'s.

As far as this crew goes, I would think it prudent to hold off until more information is at hand before commenting on a given nationality's competency. Remember, it wasn't Indonesians or Ethiopians that designed the B/S system that ended up killing 346 people

On saving the day, there is one particular case where that certainly is a true statement, involves Stuart AFB. KAL additionally had a number of events where the decision of the PIC of non Korean nationality took a lot of effort to be swallowed.

"The best helicopter pilots I ever flew with were Japanese, Japanese, French and Australian, in that order. The most impressive CRM I have ever evaluated was by a Russian pilot. The most beautiful set of hands I have ever seen fly an aircraft were attached to an Ethiopian, one who was also well known in the system, and who on entry into a room could make those red necked pilots that spent their time talking about skin colour fawn obsequiously, they had been fortunate to have this gifted man do instruction on their jumbo's. I had the previlidge of flying with Bob Hoover and Bob Love in a T28 and P51 on the same day, to have done training with "airbum" in his Pitts, and the Ethiopian landed a B744 in interesting conditions into JFK that were more impressive. The best TRI I have ever flown with was an Indian... the most knowledgable pilot I have ever worked with on aircraft technical matters was an Iranian.

You are welcome to your opinion, I think there is more to see when eyes are open. :)"
Well, said, FDR! Your depth of knowledge and wealth of experience are commendable.

[fdr]

Hello FDR!
Thank you for enlightening me on the braking system logic of the Airbus A330 series. I did not know that nose strut compression was necessary for TR use, but I would think it would be a safeguard against a sudden deceleration causing the craft to slam down on its nosegear and possibly damaging same. The 737NG/MAX will autobrake as soon as the MLG wheels spin up past 60 knots. The airplane is prevented from impacting its nosegear after sudden deceleration by a redundant, failsafe system: two well-trained and proficient pilots applying aft elevator.

We are AVIATORS, gentlemen! Let's not get so complacent that we allow system shortcomings to catch us in the weeds. Happily, no one was injured, but I might guess that the return Cebu-Inchon flight may have been cancelled or severely delayed.
Your comment "lift up your feet" had me in stitches! Thank you for such an informative post!

Fly Safe!
have another read of the comment please.

The NLG controls the autobrake max rate application, the rate is modulated at a lower rate until the NLG strut compression occurs. Stops wrinkling tubes ..

The TR logic comes from the MLG untilt sensors. And I will stand corrected, but any one of those being made will permit TR to be used by the selection of TR by the flight crew.

Sorry if that was suggesting otherwise.

[Pip_Pip]

According to a passenger on reddit or avherald, carry-ons were mostly left behind

Something else it would be helpful to learn from the investigation: how to convince a plane-load of modern passengers to (mostly) leave carry-ons behind during an evacuation. :D

[Uplinker]

I'm often surprised by the lack of empathy when topics such as this make their way onto the forum. I wonder if it's a matter of psychological relief, knowing statistically accidents will happen and that it was not to “me” that it happened? Could it be a deluded belief that there are no circumstances that provide a degree of complexity where I would run out of ideas before I run out of fuel?

There is no empirical evidence to show that this crew was less well trained or less competent than any contributor to this forum. Until we understand the complexity of the situation that this crew faced perhaps we should leave it at that.

Years ago; to get an airline pilot job required an ATPL, a face to face interview with the Chief Pilot, and a SIM check.

Nowadays, there is a whole extra raft of on-line tests one has to pass - maths, verbal comprehension and IQ type pattern recognition - both written and CBT style, along with telephone pre-interviews, leading to recruitment days with group exercises etc, before one gets anywhere near the head office interview room or the Sim test.
Once employed, there is CRM training, and accident analysis leading to specific focussed training, along with regular multiple system failure scenarios in our recurrent Sims.

As far as poor weather is concerned, do pilots not still read the NOTAMS and Wx for their destination and alternate airfields during their pre-flight briefing, and fuel their aircraft accordingly?

So I think we could be forgiven for thinking that pilots should be getting ever more competent and well trained as time goes by, and this could be why there is such mystification, and perhaps even outrage, when "simple" accidents like this continue to happen?

[punkalouver]

Years ago; to get an airline pilot job required an ATPL, a face to face interview with the Chief Pilot, and a SIM check.

Nowadays, there is a whole extra raft of on-line tests one has to pass - maths, verbal comprehension and IQ type pattern recognition - both written and CBT style, along with telephone pre-interviews, leading to recruitment days with group exercises etc, before one gets anywhere near the head office interview room or the Sim test.
Once employed, there is CRM training, and accident analysis leading to specific focussed training, along with regular multiple system failure scenarios in our recurrent Sims.

As far as poor weather is concerned, do pilots not still read the NOTAMS and Wx for their destination and alternate airfields during their pre-flight briefing, and fuel their aircraft accordingly?

So I think we could be forgiven for thinking that pilots should be getting ever more competent and well trained as time goes by, and this could be why there is such mystification, and perhaps even outrage, when "simple" accidents like this continue to happen?

What is simple about this accident? Do you think that they didn’t have enough fuel on departure based on the weather forecast and notams?

[Timmy Tomkins]

What is simple about this accident? Do you think that they didn’t have enough fuel on departure based on the weather forecast and notams?
Do we know? If they were getting close to limits it puts pressure on if alternate options are tight.