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View Full Version : Staines, UK 1972, June 18th.


Trinity 09L
18th Jun 2022, 08:24
Today is the 50th anniversary, a service will be held at the local church, and a further re dedication of the memorial at the site nearby.
There is no other suitable section on pprune to recognise this event. The mention of the aircraft or call sign is not accepted here.

tubby linton
18th Jun 2022, 09:49
Here is a link to the Pathe news report in the immediate aftermath of the accident
https://www.britishpathe.com/video/VLVAYW78QA0JSMO49FBKE0FWPFN0-UK-WRECKAGE-LIES-IN-FIELD-NEAR-LONDON-AIRPORT-AFTER-TRIDENT

Haraka
18th Jun 2022, 09:51
Saw the smoke from my room in the top floor of Chelsea College Hall of Residence ........

blind pew
18th Jun 2022, 10:09
As I was on afternoon airport standy whilst P2 was on earlies.We had been together since being paired up on advance flight; but what happened afterwards changed my career forever.
Pity the National Geogaphic program continued to fudge the truth.

Trinity 09L
18th Jun 2022, 10:41
The only reference on BBC appears as a local new item, not on the main channel.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-surrey-61822837

FYI I was driving alongside the northern runway when the aircraft departed, and when I arrived at the Crooked Billet was diverted away.
in 2003 I wrote to BA, BAA, Spelthorne council and Thames water, as there was no memorial, and in 2004 the memorial was established.

Bergerie1
18th Jun 2022, 10:53
I lived near Simon Ticehurst's parents when it happened and saw the devastating effects that that accident had on them. Not only from the loss of their son but also from the public controversy afterwards. The ripples that spread out amongst the relatives and friends of those who die in such events spread far and wide and should never be underestimated.

And this makes for very sober reading:- http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/witness/june/18/newsid_3001000/3001756.stm

Warmtoast
18th Jun 2022, 11:09
There's a long article on Wiki here: British European Airways Flight 548 - Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_European_Airways_Flight_548)

GeeRam
18th Jun 2022, 13:39
My late father was an early arrival on the scene. He was a serving Met Police dog handler, and was on duty in plain clothes patrol, along with another dog handler, in the grassed area between KGV and Wraysbury reservoirs as part of the security patrols in place at the time of the Army anti-terrorist patrols when intel indicated the IRA had acquired some RPG's and might try and take down an airliner on take off or landing at Heathrow. There was a fair number of Army personal around the airport at that time.
The aircraft passed almost over my Dad's head about 15-20secs before it impacted, and he guessed it had crashed beyond by the instant silence, and he and the other handler, made their way back to where they had parked their cars to put the dogs away by which time sirens etc., drew them to the direction of the scene. It was sadly the 2nd air crash scene he had to attend during his 30 years service, the first being the crash of the Viking into houses of Kelvin Gardens in 1958.

Kiltrash
18th Jun 2022, 13:43
At the time o was residing in the Eastern end of Staines ( now on Thames ) neat the Crooked Billet ( now gone ) and iirc we were on a walk through the park backs to where the accident occurred and heard but not seen the crash. .Within 20 minutes the area was swarming with blue lights .. then the smell of unburnt fuel hit us. Never to be forgotten ..
Always even now look over from the Southbound M25 when passing the A30 junction towards the power pylon

pax britanica
18th Jun 2022, 13:48
I lived in Stanwell Village at the time and should have been playing cricket but had a summer cold. Miserable day. Phone rings, my father from work BEA Maintrol . He never rang from work as it was always a busy job he just said Oh just seeing how you all are . When he got home he said they had a flash message from LHR Tower that a plane had reposted crashed just south of Heathrow. In fact we were way off track but who knows what might happen with a plane in trouble. My sister was in Staines High Street and heard and felt an almighty thud, she was probably on 150-200 meters from it. Stanwell was a BEA/BOAc / LHR company town , Opposite neighbours Airport Fire Service and sister at Ashford Hospital next door but one Staines Police Sergeant.
Everyone knew someone connected with it . Later in week I saw the accident site itself , very moving because the plane was more or less intact with the tail section broken off.

Not a day I wiil l forget

DaveReidUK
18th Jun 2022, 14:34
Long and detailed thread from 10 years ago, worth a read: G-ARPI - The Trident Tragedy: 40 years ago today (https://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/488300-g-arpi-trident-tragedy-40-years-ago-today.html)

blind pew
18th Jun 2022, 15:13
My wife was nursing there and the staff was put on standby for multiple casualties..she rang home to see if it was me when they discovered there were few survivors as I often went in early ..thrilled to be a second officer even if I wasn't fully trained or trusted.
As Bergerie stated about the families..Jerry's destroyed...sister emigrated, mother became an alcoholic then had a stroke whilst his dad,who had been shot down during the battle of Britain whilst on a one way trip to bomb Berlin, was just sad. The question I was always asked by Dorothy "did Jeremy kill all of those people".
I wonder how those responsible were able to sleep at night along side those who facilitated the cover up.

t211
18th Jun 2022, 17:32
I worked for Smiths Industries from 1971 till 1979 and when PI crashed the Management in the Aviation Section were like Headless Chickens until the cause of the accident was known i started my own airline Career in October 1979.

172_driver
18th Jun 2022, 17:48
blind_pew,
I understand it's a subject full of nasty memories, but you've opened it up for discussion. I have just read the Wikipedia story about the accident. What happened, do you mean?

c52
18th Jun 2022, 18:12
Have I missed something, or have papers that were to be secret for 50 years been released today?

tubby linton
18th Jun 2022, 18:35
The papers were actually released very quietly in 2006

treadigraph
18th Jun 2022, 18:46
For years I thought it had happened while I was in the UK, but more recently realised I was actually still in Kenya at the time, aged 8. My mother encouraged me to read as much of the paper as possible every day from probably aged 5 or so to improve my reading skills, so it must have had extensive coverage in the East African Standard as I do recall it. Just a couple of months after the Addis EAA VC-10 crash which claimed the life of a family friend which I also remember reading about in the paper at time. (Parents never hid bad news stories from me - got ballocked by sister for mentioning Shuttle Challenger crash in front of her children when they were 5 and 2, which I was somewhat non-plussed by as I doubt they had any inkling of what I was talking about...! )

blind pew
18th Jun 2022, 21:21
Not at all, just look at what's going on in Ukraine or with the health service and even the 737 max debacle.
I'm lucky and far better men than me haven't been as fortunate especially those in the war.
I've had 55 years of flying plus two paragliding flights today in spite of the heat wave. (39,C).

It would be classed as a training accident nowadays basically caused by ignoring the manufacturers operating recommendations and introducing an ill conceved and ridiculous, inefficient noise abatement procedure.
The warning signs were ignored just as they had been prior to the Munich disaster.
P2 was not qualified, the captain was unfit and everything was wrong with the company stall procedures in practice including an absence of one which was hastily written, back dated issued to all pilots after the accident and included in the manuals presented at the inquiry.
Fortunately the high standard amongst the majority of the pilots followed by the merger with BOAC philosophies changed everything but not before a few more accidents.
Don't believe everything you read on wiki.
I would be interested if the inquiry testimonies have been published and if someone can supply a link as there are a couple I omitted to properly read when I discovered them hidden in the old BA museum.

bean
19th Jun 2022, 07:42
National Archives hold the inquiry transcripts

Asturias56
19th Jun 2022, 07:54
Rather oddly not long after the wreckage was cleared the site was sold for housing. An old friend moved in there when the houses were finished. She said the developers hadn't realised there WAS any undeveloped space in Staines until the crash report.

ZFT
19th Jun 2022, 08:24
I still have quite vivid memories of RPI being towed passed British Eagle hangars minus its tail around July 68 Have a photo somewhere

treadigraph
19th Jun 2022, 09:00
Rather oddly not long after the wreckage was cleared the site was sold for housing. An old friend moved in there when the houses were finished. She said the developers hadn't realised there WAS any undeveloped space in Staines until the crash report.

As far as I can tell, the crash site is still undeveloped - the housing estate on the other side of Colne Brook was already starting to get under way when the accident occurred.

I think it was roughly here (https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.4368222,-0.5077555,359a,35y,39.42t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en)...

fireflybob
19th Jun 2022, 10:45
If my memory is correct Mandatory Occurrence Reporting came as a result of this accident inquiry and recommendations. I believe BEA had a similar near miss when the LE droop was retracted below min speed and it was reported internally but no action had been taken. This aspect was covered in the accident report.

Discorde
19th Jun 2022, 11:24
I still have quite vivid memories of RPI being towed passed British Eagle hangars minus its tail around July 68 Have a photo somewhere

It was 'PT which had its tail torn off by the Ambassador and was scrapped. 'PI was repaired and returned to service. Both were parked at Hatton Cross for a while. In summer '68 my student vac job was at Air Canada Commissary, located next to the Eagle hangars. The engineers at HC were happy for us to take a look around during lunch breaks. One of the Tridents (can't remember which) had a series of gashes along the trailing edge of one of the wings. The BEA chaps told us it was where one of the Ambassador's spinning props hit the Trident. Sobering experience.

DaveReidUK
19th Jun 2022, 12:57
It was 'PT which had its tail torn off by the Ambassador and was scrapped.

Papa India also lost its entire fin, rudder and h/stab when hit by the Ambassador.

ZFT
19th Jun 2022, 13:22
It was 'PT which had its tail torn off by the Ambassador and was scrapped. 'PI was repaired and returned to service. Both were parked at Hatton Cross for a while. In summer '68 my student vac job was at Air Canada Commissary, located next to the Eagle hangars. The engineers at HC were happy for us to take a look around during lunch breaks. One of the Tridents (can't remember which) had a series of gashes along the trailing edge of one of the wings. The BEA chaps told us it was where one of the Ambassador's spinning props hit the Trident. Sobering experience.

RPT was effectively chopped in half. RPI lost the tail only.

Edit - DUK already answered

pax britanica
19th Jun 2022, 13:53
I saw the ill fated BKS Lizie on approach while on a bus from Richmond to Hounslow-it flew over us. Not long after a big pall of black smoke from the general direction of 'The Airport'. I ahve followed Blind pews commentary over a few eyars because a school friend of mine was at Hamble with ST and was very cut up about it. He went on to BOAC and the back to short haul in the merger


PB

Discorde
19th Jun 2022, 15:48
RPT was effectively chopped in half. RPI lost the tail only.

Edit - DUK already answered

I stand corrected! Thanks for your input.

D

chevvron
19th Jun 2022, 17:23
I was training for my Aerodrome Control rating in Glasgow Tower that day when Scottish Centre told us the terrible news.
As I was in my first year, we hadn't yet done the BEA Course at Viking House but we found out all the different things that had to be done on the Trident two years later when we did the course on the Trident Systems Trainer; we didn't do the 'all moving' sim as this was booked H24.

WHBM
19th Jun 2022, 18:20
Papa India also lost its entire fin, rudder and h/stab when hit by the Ambassador.
The damage to Papa India in the Ambassador accident looked sufficient to have written the aircraft off in most situations, repairs must have cost much of the value of the aircraft.

Once back in service the tail was wrecked again when it was in the hangar, a Comet on an engine test outside overrode its chocks, lunged forward, and brought the hangar doors down on it. A further major repair.

At the PI accident there was apparently considerable searching of engineering repair documents to see if anything arising from those could have contributed to the stall. A very unlucky aircraft.

tubby linton
19th Jun 2022, 21:56
To return to the fatal accident can anybody help me with a few questions in the final report ?(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f154ed915d1371000365/4-1973_G-ARPI.pdf)
Firstly who a few people who are named in the public enquiry were?
Captain Evans and two unnamed FO who demonstrated three take off and landings in December 1972?
Captain J W Jessop , named as one of the assessors.
Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?
Would the aircraft clock have any input to the FDR?
When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?
At the bottom of page four is a note about the delay on starting the take off roll may have been due to a low pressure warning light in the stall recovery system, how did the enquiry come to this conclusion?
Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?
At the first stall warning the autopilot disengages. On a more modern aircraft there is a hierarchy for how the aircraft produces warnings. I take it that the autopliot disengaging would have produced an aural warning but would the stall warning have suppressed it?
In a modern aircraft with a speed trend arrow I encourage my colleagues not to reduce power or try and clean up unless there was a positive acceleration trend to avoid wallowing around in a low energy environment where the only get outs are reducing height or adding power but this seems to have been standard practice and resulted in many cases of speed loss in Trident operation. This seems to be utterly criminal and trying to avoid a noise complaint rather than preserving the safe operation of the aircraft seems like the tail is wagging the dog.

DaveReidUK
20th Jun 2022, 06:47
Jack Jessop, later awarded the CBE, was at the time Deputy MD of Northeast and subsequently Director of Safety Services at BA.

Asturias56
20th Jun 2022, 07:19
" On a more modern aircraft "

regretfully many of the features we take for granted on modern aircraft were bought at the cost of lives lost in accidents like the Staines one

bean
20th Jun 2022, 09:02
Jack Jessop, later awarded the CBE, was at the time Deputy MD of Northeast and subsequently Director of Safety Services at BA.
He was also type rated on the Trident 1E which is why he was a technical adviser to the enquiry

Alan Baker
20th Jun 2022, 09:15
The damage to Papa India in the Ambassador accident looked sufficient to have written the aircraft off in most situations, repairs must have cost much of the value of the aircraft.

Once back in service the tail was wrecked again when it was in the hangar, a Comet on an engine test outside overrode its chocks, lunged forward, and brought the hangar doors down on it. A further major repair.

At the PI accident there was apparently considerable searching of engineering repair documents to see if anything arising from those could have contributed to the stall. A very unlucky aircraft.
Fifty odd years ago many repairs were carried out that would seem ridiculous today. Think of the TWA 707 that had its nose destroyed by a bomb in the cockpit at Damascus. Boeing built a new nose section and shipped it to Syria, where the aircraft was repaired and put back into service.Today, the cost of labour results in a write off even if the damage is technically repairable. This applies to cars as well as aircraft.

Jn14:6
20th Jun 2022, 09:48
Thought the replacement nose section came from G-ARWE, W/O at Heathrow?
#

blind pew
20th Jun 2022, 10:03
To return to the fatal accident can anybody help me with a few questions in the final report ?(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f154ed915d1371000365/4-1973_G-ARPI.pdf)
Firstly who a few people who are named in the public enquiry were?
Captain Evans and two unnamed FO who demonstrated three take off and landings in December 1972?
Captain J W Jessop , named as one of the assessors.
Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?
Maybe to select which sides nav instruments were followed..but not sure
Would the aircraft clock have any input to the FDR?
When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?
We had wind up clocks each side
Initially pitch hold? You then pulled speed lock?
At the bottom of page four is a note about the delay on starting the take off roll may have been due to a low pressure warning light in the stall recovery system, how did the enquiry come to this conclusion?
Guess.. pete Chapman and Dennis woods were either side ..Dennis accepted an interception take off in a viscount..pete went after PI in a trident..both said at the trident museum knees up that they made written submissions but were not presented along with many others
Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?
no
the first stall warning the autopilot disengages. On a more modern aircraft there is a hierarchy for how the aircraft produces warnings. I take it that the autopliot disengaging would have produced an aural warning but would the stall warning have suppressed it?no..they would have a lot of flashing lights both red and amber
In a modern aircraft with a speed trend arrow I encourage my colleagues not to reduce power or try and clean up unless there was a positive acceleration trend to avoid wallowing around in a low energy environment where the only get outs are reducing height or adding power but this seems to have been standard practice and resulted in many cases of speed loss in Trident operation. This seems to be utterly criminal and trying to avoid a noise complaint rather than preserving the safe operation of the aircraft seems like the tail is wagging the dog.
precisely and it's what cat's eyes cunningham stated..it wasn't flown as designed..at times we whipped the flaps in at 500ft and throttled back way below climb power until 3 000 ft spreading noise far and wide..I've seen us descend during particularly thermic days. Noise points were timed from start of roll..between 65 and 90 secs iirc occasionally we would get stick stick shakes and George childs amongst others quizzed us and went bananas as we were taught to ignore the stick push as it malfunctioned..which was true as a mate with Fred Terry flying had it fire upon rotation..Fred being a tough cookie just successfully fought it.
PS they didn't understand perceived noise limits so we routed over relatively open countryside north bound between Slough and maidenhead ..I lived at Taplow roughly where a heavy T1 would increae to climb power.. literally you would get waves in a glass of wine..
we also had odd guys in both sense of the word including a manager or two, who would do their own thing like leaving take off power on and bringing in the flaps themselves whilst hand flying..looking out of the window for the measuring point..yanking the throttles back..then opening up again..
can't throw too many stones as once whilst RHS I got to VNE by 3 grand in a dc9'51..minimum noise exposure for those with beach villas ..Happy days

ZFT
20th Jun 2022, 10:08
Fifty odd years ago many repairs were carried out that would seem ridiculous today. Think of the TWA 707 that had its nose destroyed by a bomb in the cockpit at Damascus. Boeing built a new nose section and shipped it to Syria, where the aircraft was repaired and put back into service.Today, the cost of labour results in a write off even if the damage is technically repairable. This applies to cars as well as aircraft.

I recall BOAC grafting on a wing section from a destroyed donar aircraft outboard of the engine on a 707 following a catastrophic Conway incident during an engine run up in the late 60s, maybe very early 70s

pax britanica
20th Jun 2022, 10:26
BOAC did indeed repair a 707 where the wing virtually fell off as a result of a ground fire. A schoolfriends father was one of the project engineers.

I imagine that this kind of engineering was more feasible back then due to less complex materials and production methods and certainly wouldnt be possible on 'plastic aeroplanes'. . I wonder how far an ace car mechanic of the 60s would get with even a fairly humble 2020 family car

bean
20th Jun 2022, 10:26
Thought the replacement nose section came from G-ARWE, W/O at Heathrow?
#
Correct, it did

ZFT
20th Jun 2022, 12:00
Correct, it did

I understood this was a myth and Boeing in fact built the replacement nose section?

Alan Baker
20th Jun 2022, 12:19
I understood this was a myth and Boeing in fact built the replacement nose section?
It is a myth. There is photographic evidence of the new nose section being shipped. The nose from G-ARWE was used in the construction of the Convair 580 based Total In Flight Simulator.

Discorde
20th Jun 2022, 15:10
@ Tubby Linton and WHBM

Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?

From memory, this switch determined whose heading/track select control (P1 or P2) was controlling the autopilot and flight director. In track mode the drift (sensed by the Doppler Janus system) was automatically applied to heading.

When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?

Lateral: possibly heading, but probably track, with crew own-navigating to Epson NDB.
Vertical: indicated airspeed lock, gradient of climb therefore dependent on thrust setting.

Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?

No; in the 'PI accident perhaps the well-documented breakdown in crew harmony might have resulted in P1 doing the R/T rather than P2.

Blind Pew's tech knowledge is almost certainly better than mine.

At the 'PI accident there was apparently considerable searching of engineering repair documents to see if anything arising from those could have contributed to the stall. A very unlucky aircraft.

Logic suggests that 'unlucky aircraft' would be a rare freak of statistics rather than victims of some sort of malign force. And yet . . .

Trans-Canada Airlines CF-TJM ran off the end of R28R on 6 November 1963 (details from ASN and pics here (https://www.steemrok.com/cftjm/cftjm.html)) following a rejected take-off with insufficient runway distance remaining. The extensively damaged aircraft was rebuilt and returned to service, only to be destroyed in a training accident four years later.

blind pew
20th Jun 2022, 20:22
Thanks Discorde
to understand further especially P2 who was blamed by certain parties for lack of ability; I did my baron flying with him, a guy ex fleet air arm chippies who chucked in his commission and a horny old hurribomber pilot who had left a wing tip and aileron on a tree stump and if it wasn’t for the direction the valley turned he wouldn’t have got out of it. After my instrument rating I had lots of hours to burn..I had seriously messed up on tests ..and I went over the new forest and did a few straight stalls..one of which flicked and I ended up fully inverted looking up at my brief case. I told pat about it and we looked at the aircraft which was obviously bent, probably from a cocked up barrel roll..and pat said to me « ace if bullsh@t was a trombone you would be a full brass band »
The 4 of us were permitted to do one night stop and we chose Amsterdam and the red light area with quite a few beers. The morning I flew Ams - Ostende where Jerry took over to fly airways through a virulent front back to hamble where the rest of the fleet was grounded. We got into some serious sh@t and Jerry said to pat Should I reduce to turbulence speed..NO… a minute or so later there was an almighty bang, a scream and pat yanked back the throttles whilst Jerry continued flying.

lesson two
the atmosphere in BEA was extremely toxic and it was obvious that we weren’t wanted and that many didn’t want us in the RHS.
I was at base with Jerry, he was paired with another course mate who went onto the VC10 with me which was an experiment by BOAC to take us directly into the rhs and part 1..I failed my first check.
The 4 of us came back from prestwick for the Trident 2 differences course but towards the end we were told that the board of trade would not accept our partial training..you will read there was an argument in the inquiry where lord lane said he believed captain holdstock..the guy who had visited the latter’s office was the guy who put down land flap at noise point instead of selecting it up..he went on to fly Concorde.
I flew with number 2 in management and a turncoat who also became a big cheese in my first weeks..they would not let me fly the aircraft except with the autopilot engaged and way above Terra firma. That was the sort of trust they had in us before the accident.
We all tried fiddling with the flap lever to see if it would inadvertently move but it wouldn’t.
Based on my experience Key, like Several others who found flying the trident at speeds way on the backside of the drag curve, plugged in the autopilot very low and whilst accelerating which led to it pitching up, loosing speed..pitching down..la la la..the flaps were selected in at noise by Jerry and he would have throttled back..they got the clearance up to six zero which all three were required to write down on their NAV logs ..P3 on a table to his right and the others under their respective DV windows…and Key who had been recently refused a training appointment and not a happy bunny ordered Jerry to « put it in » and possibly pointed in the direction of the height acquire box adjacent to the droop lever. Under SOP it was Keys task ne Jerrys next task was to select the droop in, monitor the engines and his instruments.
It was a simple use of an abrivated command to select flight level six zero in the height acquire box being mistaken from select droop in..
At that early stage I certainly hadn’t managed to sort out a scanning system which included all of the front panel..a BEA special with the third horizon next to the captains left knee..
The last working accident investigator told me two snippets..the simulator did not replicate the aircraft in pitch and that a clever individual stuck a plastic bag o​​​​​​ver the levers to preserve the evidence coz it started to rain..this actually destroyed it.
lastly our union rep stated that by examining the bulbs they were able to ascertain which ones had been illuminated..if the filament had power it burnt.
.

old-timer
20th Jun 2022, 21:05
Appalling how they covered up the truth & so sad for P2s family, entirely unjust, same as politics to this day , bury the truth....

WHBM
20th Jun 2022, 22:15
Just in passing, for those who haven't seen the damage to PI in the 1968 Ambassador accident

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/729x367/pi_1eac6f8b68dc68784eef259a90cccaf21764e57c.jpg

The damage to the written off PT which was on the next stand was not dissimilar, but the aircraft was broken just forward of the engines, so obviously a much greater financial and structural loss.

LynxDriver
24th Jun 2022, 00:42
I'm sure I recall a news programme on BBC radio following the accident, in which they were speculating whether the earlier tailplane replacement could have been a contributing factor.

blind pew
25th Jun 2022, 15:37
There was a lot of speculation but you could be correct as a few years before a Trident 1 got a triple controls stuck valve warning which originated from the beam the elevator jacks were attached to sheared it's fastenings onto the tailplane allowing the elevator to float free. If it had happened any other time....
On another sad note P2s group had a round Robin originating from P2s sister who had seen a report of an infamous, self opinionated guy claiming to have been on a course with Jerry. This wasn't true and said retired captain turned up at the memorial service in his full uniform with his dart insignia. Never on Tridents.
upset a few people.

chevvron
25th Jun 2022, 15:58
Just in passing, for those who haven't seen the damage to PI in the 1968 Ambassador accident

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/729x367/pi_1eac6f8b68dc68784eef259a90cccaf21764e57c.jpg

The damage to the written off PT which was on the next stand was not dissimilar, but the aircraft was broken just forward of the engines, so obviously a much greater financial and structural loss.
Coincidence I know but there was Comet 3 at RAE Bedford which had its tailplane removed by a Trident, the Comet being lined up on the runway while the Trident did a low approach, obviously a bit too low! . The damage was repaired by pinching the tailplane from one of the Comets which had been ferried into RAF Halton as an instructional airframe.

CAEBr
25th Jun 2022, 19:12
Coincidence I know but there was Comet 3 at RAE Bedford which had its tailplane removed by a Trident, the Comet being lined up on the runway while the Trident did a low approach, obviously a bit too low! . The damage was repaired by pinching the tailplane from one of the Comets which had been ferried into RAF Halton as an instructional airframe.

How did he manage to damage the Comet tailplane without totalling the fin as well ? Your statement implies they were both on or about the centreline, just trying to understand how a lack of vertical separation could lead to only tailplane damage.

treadigraph
25th Jun 2022, 19:19
Comet fin and rudder damaged...

Accident report here (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f4c240f0b61346000577/4-1972_G-AWZA_and_XP_915.pdf)...

DaveReidUK
25th Jun 2022, 20:14
There was a lot of speculation but you could be correct as a few years before a Trident 1 got a triple controls stuck valve warning which originated from the beam the elevator jacks were attached to sheared it's fastenings onto the tailplane allowing the elevator to float free.

I think you mean tailplane jacks - no jacks connected to the elevators on the Trident.

blind pew
25th Jun 2022, 21:02
Was my first of many technical courses over 50 years ago..sorry if I got the details wrong but sumfink broke.
As to the Bedford incident twas lots of big chiefs who were given their own discretion overshoot instruction.
Dave given that my memory of triple stuck valve flight controls warning is correct and that the tailplane incidence was driven by a screw jack how was it that it wasn't the elevator attachment? Don't suppose you have a schematic?
or maybe my incorrect use of terms as twas hydraulic rams?

CAEBr
25th Jun 2022, 21:08
Comet fin and rudder damaged...

Accident report here (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f4c240f0b61346000577/4-1972_G-AWZA_and_XP_915.pdf)...

Thanks Treadigraph

DaveReidUK
26th Jun 2022, 07:00
Dave given that my memory of triple stuck valve flight controls warning is correct and that the tailplane incidence was driven by a screw jack how was it that it wasn't the elevator attachment? Don't suppose you have a schematic?
or maybe my incorrect use of terms as twas hydraulic rams?

I think your memory is playing tricks on you (or else mine is!) - I don't recall any screwjacks involved.

The tailplane (in the days before we called them horizontal stabilizers) was moved by 3 hydraulic jacks in response to pitch (or a/p) inputs. The "elevator" wasn't really an elevator at all, it was a massive geared tab moved by a simple mechanical linkage to the stab. I suspect what you encountered was a failure of that linkage, which would indeed allow the tab to float freely.

blind pew
26th Jun 2022, 11:45
I think your memory is playing tricks on you (or else mine is!) - I don't recall any screwjacks involved.

The tailplane (in the days before we called them horizontal stabilizers) was moved by 3 hydraulic jacks in response to pitch (or a/p) inputs. The "elevator" wasn't really an elevator at all, it was a massive geared tab moved by a simple mechanical linkage to the stab. I suspect what you encountered was a failure of that linkage, which would indeed allow the tab to float freely.
memory Dave..wots that..
We used a wheel to set tailplane incidence which I presumed was linked to a screw jack but you would know better..the flight controls were fully hydraulic except for the addition of the air cylinder for the stick push which acted through the stick to effect the elevator through the hydraulics.
I presume you don't have any manuals but what I do remember was that it was extremely serious that it would have lost control of the aircraft in pitch.
Therefore the incident was likely to be the source of the article referred to earlier of loss of control caused by damage at the rear end..note not being specific as an old f@rt as all of us who flew the gripper then are.

Bergerie1
26th Jun 2022, 15:08
BP,
The Trident stabilser (tailplane) trim worked differently compared to most other jet transports. DaveReidUK is correct. Alex Fisher describes some of the differences here:-
https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/2627.pdf

blind pew
26th Jun 2022, 21:26
Stand to be corrected but I seem to remember that we had to wind the trim wheel fully nose down on parking check. As Alex’s text states the elevator is moved by the trim tab. Now we all know BEA had some specials including the instrument panels and noise abatement procedures which it could be.
It could also be that I’m mixing up Douglas procedures but the shut down checklists don’t cover that.
My initial post was re a newspaper article and there was definitely an incident on landing when the flight controls disconnected themselves from the big big at the back end…
Looking at parked Tridents photos the stabs are all in fully nose down position.

blind pew
27th Jun 2022, 11:48
https://tonymadgehjg.proboards.com/thread/9975/hs121-trident-manual
The link is the most comprehensive data I can find which describes the autopilot operation inuding the azimuth switch.
Imput by some knowledgeable guys.
It also shows the after landing checklist Item of setting the tailplane to zero. It is very unlikely that this was a requirement if the whole lot was driven by an elevator tab as suggested. I asked a former colleague who was on a technical committee with Alex but he can't remember although he flew with a captain who had a triple flight controls warning in the flare as the elevator system failed.
As to comments about re trimming the elevator when in a flat spin.. all it will do is to keep your mind away from thinking this is going to hurt.
One of the guys who was a supervisory first officer described to me a stick push exercise where the aircraft wallowed on the verge of entering a deep stall, fortunately it slowly started to pitch nose down. Shortly after that the air exercise was abandoned.
On the DC9 we had an elevator boost system which activated to aid the tab controlled elevators to move as airflow at high angle of attack wasn't sufficient. The tailplane was controlled through screw jacks.

DaveReidUK
27th Jun 2022, 14:22
It also shows the after landing checklist Item of setting the tailplane to zero. It is very unlikely that this was a requirement if the whole lot was driven by an elevator tab as suggested.

I don't recall anyone suggesting that.

Allan Lupton
27th Jun 2022, 14:49
The tailplane (in the days before we called them horizontal stabilizers) was moved by 3 hydraulic jacks in response to pitch (or a/p) inputs. The "elevator" wasn't really an elevator at all, it was a massive geared tab moved by a simple mechanical linkage to the stab. I suspect what you encountered was a failure of that linkage, which would indeed allow the tab to float freely.
Yes the "all-flying" tailplane, like the other primary controls, was driven by three hydraulic jacke, one for each hydraulic system. Our logic for the triplex system arrangements was that they were part of the way we met the reliability target which led to certification of autoland. As DaveReidUK wrote, the thing that looks like an elevator is a geared tab so can we agree on these matters and debate something else?
PS I wrote "our" because I worked at de Havilland at the time, not because I designed the system.

Discorde
27th Jun 2022, 16:37
Post #59

Wow! Takes me back 45 years! Excellent link. Couple of points:

- at the bottom of each HSI is the 'drift shutter'; when switched right the caption was blank and in heading mode the autopilot/flight director would fly the heading demanded by the heading bug. When selected left the caption AUTO appeared and Doppler drift was applied. The APFD would then fly the track demanded by the heading bug.

- the moving map (Doppler driven) was never used because it was too unreliable; IIRC the original design featured a pen to physically draw a record of the track actually flown on the map.

- the T3 had an extra yaw damper to compensate for the reduced directional stability caused by the lengthened forward fuselage; flight with dampers off was demo'd during training - very unsettling!

- the boost engine reliability was poor - fortunately it was only needed occasionally - high aircraft weight on hot days or on short or contaminated runways (snow/slush).

Yes the "all-flying" tailplane, like the other primary controls, was driven by three hydraulic jacks, one for each hydraulic system.

The hydraulic systems were labelled green, blue & yellow. When needing to go back to the cabin to use the toilet the pilots would refer to 'just going back to offload the yellow hydraulics'.

blind pew
28th Jun 2022, 05:37
I baulked at reading the link at the detail and shear complexity of the Trident. It certainly was a great but complicated aircraft.
I'm surprised nowadays that I understood it all let alone knew how to tweak the systems like the cabin on a GIB or GLA descent with brakes and 10500 reverse.
Doesn't mention the sixpence/half a crown feeling at Nicosia with the approach lights fast approaching on take off though.

lederhosen
28th Jun 2022, 06:28
I remember it’s nickname was the gripper due presumably to the takeoff performance you are referring to blind pew. I mainly flew Boeings with such a surplus of performance that a full power takeoff was unusual. I did experience a jumpseat takeoff in a trident from Luton of all places and remember getting a very good view of the end of the runway. I seem to remember someone had also written ‚fastest over the threshold‘ on the back of the cockpit door. So performance overall seems to have been interesting. I do however associate it with happy holiday memories as a child mainly going to Geneva on skiing trips.

Discorde
28th Jun 2022, 11:14
It certainly was a great but complicated aircraft.

Yes, far too complicated and over-engineered (apart from T3 wings, which began to develop cracks after a few years of service). For example, gauges which showed how much pressure was being applied to the left and right wheelbrakes. P3 had to call out these figures during roll-out - utterly pointless. Quite a contrast to the B737 - no unnecessary kit unless customer-specified. No tail anti-icing - flight tests had confirmed satisfactory performance with iced-up leading edges.

I remember it’s nickname was the gripper due presumably to the takeoff performance

Apocryphal comment (source unknown) on LHR Tower freq as a T-Bird roared along the runway during take-off:

'You're witnessing de Havilland's attempt at the world land speed record.'

stephendcollins
18th Feb 2024, 13:30
Hello, do you know where I can find these papers?

bean
19th Feb 2024, 00:50
Hello, do you know where I can find these papers?
If you mean the transcripts of the inquiry, they are at the National Archive, Kew

blind pew
19th Feb 2024, 03:00
Testimonies are held in the BA heritage collection library if you can get access. Read most of them when the collection was in the old uniform store and administered by a great bunch of guys but after making an application and flying to the UK I was refused access at Waterside. There are several rumours about many of the files being withheld for 60 years as not in the public interest. Best of British.

Gordomac
19th Feb 2024, 10:36
Blimey, from the nostalgia point of view, what a splendid thread. I say this now because I did time in the PPrune jail and was then de-platformed completely for having "insane" views about covid around the time of the start of this thread in 2022 I see it has been bought back to life now, 2024. I was re-admitted a year ago and this is my first read of the PI discussion.

It has had a deep impact. I was a BKS/Northeast sponsored cadet in 1971. I went, from CPL/IR/Perf A Graduation direct to RHS on NE Viscounts in 1972. Me and fsix others knew we were destined for NE Trident 1E, direct RHS as the aircraft was operated with a Flight Engineer.

A lot faster than anticipated, after the PI incident I went to Trident in 1974. PI was very alive in the minds of all of us.

I recall the cause was laid at the RHS pilot who, it was claimed at the time, raised the droop LE by mistake. The operating lever was badly designed right next to the flap lever. It was very easy and common to put your hand on the LE lever instead of the flap lever but it was not easy to select.

Flight Engineers were a great lot eh ? One on the T1E, Ozzie, rough diamond, said to me on briefing; "When Captain asks for "flap------" and you place your hand on the LE selector, I WILL beark your arm !".

To this day, I regret to say, ill informed, I still thought the cause of the incident was P2. I am sick at the thought of my lack of upbringing and thanks to Blind Pew for some much deeper input.

One thing, in NE we changed to the awful BEA SOP's even though our aircraft were not CAT111 capable. All in the view that we should all sing to the same tune wherever you were in BA (merged).. BOAC threw out the proposal but NE complied. Looking at Blind Pew's glorious name-dropping, I see why. Bort, in the BEA SOP's that we adopted, CAPT was always P1. There was no P1/s. Capt DID do all the R/t even if he was handling. He always started engines, always did the R/T, did all the taxying. P2's had T/O and Landing cards which were signed by Capt IF he EVER gave away a T/.O or LDG.(Rare for NE Captains and became almost non-existent as they all fell in line- Except Arthur Whitlock.

Being bought up in a R/C school and fearing hell if I even fibbed, I always put my time in the P2 column as there was NO P1/s. A Take-off & landing was not P1/s..

A seasoned trouble maker, and misfit into the new appalling regime, I listened to my first Base/IR renewal with a Mason in charge,Line Capt, CAA observer. FE and Check FE. Boss decided to start with me and briefed -;"Well young Gordon, this is your chance to demonstrate to me your continued ability to fly in Command, a multi-engined aircraft, on instruments, in controlled airspace." i. Everyone went breathless as I retorted;"Well, I can't do that". Asked to repeat I did so. Asked to explain, I defended that with the current SOP's (BEA), I never did any of that and didn't even do the R/T and was not, therefore, in "continued" practice.. It all went a bit quiet but I did grit, a bit, as FE stamped on my foot.

History shows that I left soon after and never looked back.

New FO in Laker. Luvley Captain called "Bird" who I never even saw before, said to me on an impossible Manch-TF(North), " Which way do you want to take it ?". I fainted. I fainted again when he insisted I stop calling him "Sir" and swop to "Bird" or he was just going to call me "Mary" "!

Sweet nostalgia indeed but very sad thoughts of Trident, Papa India.

meleagertoo
19th Feb 2024, 11:58
I'm clearly missing something. Having read this thread though reasonably carefully and thinking I knew the causes of the accident anyway I am surprised to hear there are accusations of a cover-up of which I was not previously aware, but haven't found any detail on what was alleged to be covered up, nor what the real cause was.
Can anyone enlighten me or point to any resource or anything I've missed so I can enlighten myself?

blind pew
19th Feb 2024, 12:01
Love the post Gordon.. we had one of your lot on our vc10 course in 78 where we all had to fly the BOAC monitored approach and get the aircraft in part 1. One of our guys ex T3s and from North of Watford gap believed that BEA procedures were the only way to operate an aircraft..with your fellow cloggy we could get a fantastic amount of hot air created. Another of the T3 guys had the amendment adding a stall recovery procedure issued around a month after the accident but back dated to November 1971 fully intact..for use against management if he ever had a problem. There were many good guys on 1s and 2s but none in management whose qualification was limited to mastering the handshake. Happy days

Bergerie1
19th Feb 2024, 12:56
BOAC monitored approach!! What's that?

chevvron
19th Feb 2024, 17:19
I remember it’s nickname was the gripper due presumably to the takeoff performance you are referring to blind pew.
A comparatively high wing loading contributed to that but was offset by cruising speeds far higher than those used nowadays.
Area controllers (ATC) often had problems with Tridents having to be vectored to overtake slower traffic eg 737s at the same level in the cruise.

eckhard
19th Feb 2024, 17:26
New FO in Laker. Luvley Captain called "Bird" who I never even saw before, said to me on an impossible Manch-TF(North), " Which way do you want to take it ?". I fainted. I fainted again when he insisted I stop calling him "Sir" and swop to "Bird" or he was just going to call me "Mary" "!

Was that “Bird” Peacock? I flew with him in Air Europe. Used to smoke cigarillos? He lent/gave me his RAF flying overalls. I’ve still got them……

bean
20th Feb 2024, 01:00
I'm clearly missing something. Having read this thread though reasonably carefully and thinking I knew the causes of the accident anyway I am surprised to hear there are accusations of a cover-up of which I was not previously aware, but haven't found any detail on what was alleged to be covered up, nor what the real cause was.
Can anyone enlighten me or point to any resource or anything I've missed so I can enlighten myself?
There was no cover up. A public enquiry was held, all the evidence is contained in the enquiry transcripts which are available at the National Archives. Categorically not subjected to a sixty year restriction.
According to BPs logic it was a secret PUBLIC enquiry!!!!!

blind pew
20th Feb 2024, 05:33
BOAC monitored approach!! What's that?
According to a mate of ours.. one pilot flew and the other monitored him..
As to Mr Bean..if you had been through the training course that P2 and I had done together (including all of our advance twin training) then been stuck P2 only because our training had not been complete followed by head of training signing off on our 1179s when the board of trade refused to agree as per the inquiry then you might be qualified to spout off.

bean
20th Feb 2024, 07:50
According to a mate of ours.. one pilot flew and the other monitored him..
As to Mr Bean..if you had been through the training course that P2 and I had done together (including all of our advance twin training) then been stuck P2 only because our training had not been complete followed by head of training signing off on our 1179s when the board of trade refused to agree as per the inquiry then you might be qualified to spout off.
Typically rude
All of the "guilty management" will probably be dead by now and even if what you say about embargos is correct (which it is not) 60 years is getting much closer
No one is listening to your long standing vendetta, it is so long ago it has no relevance. Only general historic interest without animosity

Gordomac
20th Feb 2024, 09:14
Eckhard; Yes. One & only Bird Peacock.

Bean; Calm. BP has a very large fan base. Many are listening and continue to be entertained by his take on almost identical experiences'

Others; Yes. We did wind down the tail trim fully forward on shutdown. Indeed, on first powering up hydraulics, one chap would be warned that we were about to crank up hydraulics and would grab, firmly, the trim wheel.

Slightly lighter note ; Even top BEA bods didn't like the BEA SOP's. One was appointed head of British Airways Regional Division to ease help ease the Northeast/Cambrian integration. I was assigned to fly with him. All pucka BEA until we got on the aircraft and he turned to me and asked;" Want some fun today ?". I crossed my legs, said I was happily married with one and another on the way...............but, he carried on suggesting that we do things the old NE way. Leg & leg about, he P1 outbound, me p1s inbound. Real Flight Engineer on board too. Off we went doing what I was used to, what he preferred doing and back in the Vanners, I could not stop buying him drinks.

I told him I was leaving to join Fred, had convinced Gill Grey that I was going to CX and thus exiting with three days notice. He larfed, started buying the drinks.

Gosh, all a nicer way recall the past. Tad happier today.

Discorde
20th Feb 2024, 09:42
BP mentions another hole in the cheese contributing to the 'PI accident - P2 was RHS-only qualified. Normal training was for copilots to be trained as P2/P3s (panel operators) but the Training F/Os who did the panel training had withdrawn their training function as part of industrial action. So the P2 on 'PI had had less overall exposure to the total Trident operation, which might have been a factor during the mis-handling. Apologies if this recall is erroneous.

bean
20th Feb 2024, 11:53
BP mentions another hole in the cheese contributing to the 'PI accident - P2 was RHS-only qualified. Normal training was for copilots to be trained as P2/P3s (panel operators) but the Training F/Os who did the panel training had withdrawn their training function as part of industrial action. So the P2 on 'PI had had less overall exposure to the total Trident operation, which might have been a factor during the mis-handling. Apologies if this recall is erroneous.
Perfectly correct
Ergo, the training f/os were yet another peripheral contributary cause!!

blind pew
21st Feb 2024, 02:57
Julie Key posted either here or on Facebook her search for the testimonies, I had read all but one of the relevant ones.
The land flap incident a few days before the accident was carried out by P2s flat mate..his identity wasn’t general knowledge but he stayed in the company and went on to fly Concorde, lives on the island of Aphrodite but doesn’t want any contact with BA guys -his words.
I changed my opinion of Stan after I talked to two of Bergerie’s mates, one had flown with him on vanguards where he was a nice bloke to fly with but told me he had developed a nervous tic on the gripper and told me the story about being the Balpa rep for the Munich disaster and the repercussions after Jimmy Thain was sacked. The other told me about the head of training, who authorised our 1179 illegally according to the Board of Trade licensing officer and mr land flap, had completed most of his TriStar training on autopilot.
I witnessed a similar stand up argument the day before the accident and I realised three years ago the implications of Stan’s heart condition after a close friend of mine died in the Wicklow mountains after hitting one whilst paragliding. I was closely involved in all aspects which looked like he misjudged thermaling up the face and pendulumed into it based upon flight data. It was only when his widow asked me to explain the autopsy that I realised how much I had misjudged him. He was a similarly age to Stan and I had thought he was bipolar but the autopsy showed that he had had a heart attack within the last month and a fatal one in flight.
I too have mild? Heart problems which are exacerbated by being the carer for my wife who has advanced Parkinson’s which affect me with an exaggerated fight or flight response at times of stress - which is very similar to the behaviour of Stan and my mate.
If and a big IF at that you can get hold of Cunningham’s and Child’s testimonies..along with Owen’s and Evan’s and compare them you will understand that it was an accident waiting to happen because of the absolutely ridiculous noise abatement procedures.. to change configuration at times below 500ft and reduce the thrust way below climb power requires a lot of skill and alertness which some didn’t possess..it was a fabulous aircraft to fly once it was mastered but bloody hard work on approach in turbulence when you weren’t allowed to handle your own throttles or even call settings manually.
The disaster series, which I initially had an input but declined without editorial censure, made two second officers up to first and senior first rank which says it all..the blaming of Rick Flavell and that two former BA pilots allowed that to happen - one of which never operated the Trident - shows what lack of morals some have in my humble opinion.
ps if you do get access to the testimonies please post a link..there was one I didn’t read and was why I flew across to Waterside.