CASA and Government mates, invent a new airspace classification!

[Geoff Fairless]

Australia though SUP H50/22 continues to defy worldwide attempts to standardise airspace classification by inventing a new one. Class U for "unknown anywhere else in the world"!

Instead of complying with ICAO and introducing either Class D or Class E airspace, CASA has decided that it knows better than the rest of the world, and has introduced a hybrid that it continues to insist is Class G!
I have to assume that this is because the Minister has directed CASA in the AAPS 2021 Para 17 as follows: The airspace classification system to be used in Australia is specified below: (below contains the ICAO classifications).

Instead, and to quote:
As carriage and use of a radio is mandatory, all aircraft operating within the YBNA MBA will receive a Traffic Information Service providing advice on conflicting traffic between:
a) IFR and IFR flights;
b) IFR and VFR flights; and
c) VFR and VFR flights.
This will enable ATS to provide enhanced traffic information to all pilots when surveillance and/or other information warrants

So what is this? In short, it is Class D airspace without the Government, that is CASA and Airservices, taking responsibility for the separation required in that airspace by the Geneva Convention. To do that would require either a control tower (Class D) or sufficient surveillance (Class E), neither of which we poor Australians can afford.
Perhaps the new Minister, Catherine King and assistant Minister Carol Brown, can re-visit the Australian Airspace Policy Statement and just rename it the Australian Airspace Advisory Statement.

[Icarus2001]

Ahhhhh Australia, the only developing country where you can drink the water.

[Sunfish]

The key word here is “advice” that is a lawyers word.

‘’It raises the obvious question “what are we expected to do with the “advice”? Is the “advice” any good? What if the “advice” is ambiguous, incomplete, self serving, biased, not timely or wrong?

What happens to someone who won’t or can’t follow the “advice”?

This could end up like faulty towers……..Basil giving instructions to Sybil..

[KRviator]

I don't know what you're all getting so upset over. There's no separation standard in Class G - Or Class U for that matter! As long as you don't trade paint, it's all good.:} :ugh:

[43Inches]

It's not just in Australia, the FAA is still trying to nut out the problems with high traffic CTAFs such as in Alaska, where there have been multiple mid air collisions. So far the only thing working is when all aircraft have some form of ACAS/TCAS fitted, yet all agencies seem so reluctant to mandate working transponders in these areas. The last major collision was between aircraft where both had ACAS, but one had it switched off. Yes ADSB can be swamped but the system tends to prioritise close contacts so that means that unless you have 18+ aircraft within 5 miles it should still work fine. Class D can not work in the Ballina area, its way too complex to efficiently operate a tower there and blocking out airspace for CTA will then condense the VFR private traffic even further creating more risks for them. Move into the 21st century guys, get transponders, use them and its all good. As for separation standards in class G, don't collide, sounds great, but TCAS applies a bubble around those fitted so when you sneeze close to each other you get an RA and that's a mandatory report to be investigated.

[alphacentauri]

I am surprised Airservices agreed to it, if I am honest. I think it shows a lack of understanding of the issues on the Airservices management side, as well as a lack of understanding of their role.

I do have a serious question......what are the procedures in the event of a radio failure? How does the traffic information service work in this situation? Seems that the risk we are trying to mitigate is still a risk in this scenario.

I think its about time we had a fundamental look at the operating conditions of our ANSP, against the services they are obliged to provide to see which of those services may not be compatible with the commercial business model of the ANSP......like they are doing in NZ https://simpleflying.com/new-zealand-air-navigation-system-review/

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

As carriage and use of a radio is mandatory, all aircraft operating within the YBNA MBA will receive a Traffic Information Service providing advice on conflicting traffic between:
a) IFR and IFR flights;
b) IFR and VFR flights; and
c) VFR and VFR flights.
This will enable ATS to provide enhanced traffic information to all pilots when surveillance and/or other information warrants

Why the dot points? Does this not say the same thing? Who's not getting traffic?

As carriage and use of a radio is mandatory, all aircraft operating within the YBNA MBA will receive a Traffic Information Service providing advice on conflicting traffic.
This will enable ATS to provide enhanced traffic information to all pilots when surveillance and/or other information warrants

[43Inches]

But the traffic service will not be aware of any aircraft that have no transponder or are not squawking and have not broadcast their position, so we'll be back to square one of what you don't know is there will still get in your way. Or have we already forgotten that the Mangalore mid air was between two aircraft that were required to carry and use radio and under a traffic information service of which both were known to each other. So the system has already proven to be flawed... Simple answer is to mandate all capable aircraft to carry and use transponders from taxi to shut down, IFR aircraft to be fitted with ACAS and you will solve most of the problem.

[Geoff Fairless]

Alphacentauri - you think Airservices "agreed" to SFIS, about which you are surprised. I took part in preliminary Zoom meetings with Airservices and can assure you that they invented it, CASA is simply their echo chamber when it comes to airspace. Various royal commissions into other aspects of government refer to this as "regulatory capture". I also totally agree with your comment about Airservices business model.

43 Inches - I agree that eventually "ATC" might devolve to separation based on "sense and avoid". However, I also believe that this concept is much further in the future than we are being led to believe by the driverless car industry and the driverless drone industry. The question I am posing is what do we do in the meantime?

The point of this thread is that ICAO provides rules and procedures that member nations have signed up to, they include the airspace categorisation. The Minister is allowing CASA and Airservices to ignore those rules and procedures and invent a hybrid which may or may not work. (I am also pretty sure the Minister would not understand the nuances) Airservices claims to have written a safety case around SFIS, but has refused to release the document. CASA OAR wrote a report about Mangalore which apparently decided SFIS would not work. I say apparently because the report was removed from the CASA web site almost as soon as it was posted. No doubt at the behest of Airservices. The very essence of a safety case is that it should be public (not to mention how a publicly owned government agency is allowed to have secrets!). So my only conclusion has to be that it contains conclusions that SFIS created either a Class A (unacceptable) or Class B (can only be accepted by a General Manager) risk that is being withheld from the flying public.

ICAO tells us that we can choose Class G, E or D (C, B and A are not necessary). In my opinion, a Class D Tower with enhanced low level surveillance would provide acceptable safety. You also assert that "Class D can not work in the Ballina area, it's way too complex to efficiently operate a tower there and blocking out airspace for CTA will then condense the VFR private traffic even further creating more risks for them." I'm not sure whether you are an air traffic controller or pilot, but I can assure you that I have seen Class D operations in far busier environments than Ballina, and they work just fine. ATC facilities need to be concentrated where they will have the most safety effect, statistically this will be around runways where there is "competition" for the airspace caused by speed and other performance differentials. Classically, a Control Tower resolves these issues by knowing pilot intentions, and aircraft performance, in order to ensure that pilots, IFR or VFR, are in the right place and the right order to operate the aerodrome safely and efficiently. The fact that other pilots may avoid the airspace only serves to remove flights from the terminal airspace that do not need to be there. This removes the "way too complex" you refer to and is in use all over the world.

[Sunfish]

and class D at Ballina creates one more effing East Coast road block for Recreational aircraft.

[43Inches]

Alphacentauri - you think Airservices "agreed" to SFIS, about which you are surprised. I took part in preliminary Zoom meetings with Airservices and can assure you that they invented it, CASA is simply their echo chamber when it comes to airspace. Various royal commissions into other aspects of government refer to this as "regulatory capture". I also totally agree with your comment about Airservices business model.

43 Inches - I agree that eventually "ATC" might devolve to separation based on "sense and avoid". However, I also believe that this concept is much further in the future than we are being led to believe by the driverless car industry and the driverless drone industry. The question I am posing is what do we do in the meantime?

The point of this thread is that ICAO provides rules and procedures that member nations have signed up to, they include the airspace categorisation. The Minister is allowing CASA and Airservices to ignore those rules and procedures and invent a hybrid which may or may not work. (I am also pretty sure the Minister would not understand the nuances) Airservices claims to have written a safety case around SFIS, but has refused to release the document. CASA OAR wrote a report about Mangalore which apparently decided SFIS would not work. I say apparently because the report was removed from the CASA web site almost as soon as it was posted. No doubt at the behest of Airservices. The very essence of a safety case is that it should be public (not to mention how a publicly owned government agency is allowed to have secrets!). So my only conclusion has to be that it contains conclusions that SFIS created either a Class A (unacceptable) or Class B (can only be accepted by a General Manager) risk that is being withheld from the flying public.

ICAO tells us that we can choose Class G, E or D (C, B and A are not necessary). In my opinion, a Class D Tower with enhanced low level surveillance would provide acceptable safety. You also assert that "Class D can not work in the Ballina area, it's way too complex to efficiently operate a tower there and blocking out airspace for CTA will then condense the VFR private traffic even further creating more risks for them." I'm not sure whether you are an air traffic controller or pilot, but I can assure you that I have seen Class D operations in far busier environments than Ballina, and they work just fine. ATC facilities need to be concentrated where they will have the most safety effect, statistically this will be around runways where there is "competition" for the airspace caused by speed and other performance differentials. Classically, a Control Tower resolves these issues by knowing pilot intentions, and aircraft performance, in order to ensure that pilots, IFR or VFR, are in the right place and the right order to operate the aerodrome safely and efficiently. The fact that other pilots may avoid the airspace only serves to remove flights from the terminal airspace that do not need to be there. This removes the "way too complex" you refer to and is in use all over the world.

The problem is not that class D won't work AT Ballina, but the problem is the multiple close CTAFs causing this problem and the traffic between them. If this was a simple case of one airport that is saturated by its own traffic that would be a simple answer of, yes, a class D is required to sort it out. However, as it is, Ballina and Lismore traffic already have IFR approach conflicts and then there's all the private traffic between several ports. Hence why I say this has more in common with the issue in Alaska than any other place in Australia, lots of CTAFs in close proximity all with their own traffic blasting randomly in all directions.

In regard to ACAS/TCAS, this is nothing new to aviation. I'm not at all saying the aircraft takes over and flies, it is a system that first of all alerts a pilot to other aircraft in proximity, and then some will direct a course to avoid. Being alerted that something is near you is all that is required, with almost all giving you some picture of where it is. Radio alerts are vague and prone to communication error, both in what is said, overtransmits blocking information and lastly interpretation and understanding there is a conflict, let alone being unfamiliar with local terms a local may use, fine in light traffic, ask for clarification, in heavy traffic another conflict will come up while you clear up your ambiguities. A device in the cockpit that says something is close, and look out, is much easier for all to understand and the required technology has existed for 30 years. TCAS/ACAS are a last line of defense, this is after you have communicated via radio and looked out the window to see and avoid. Talking is fine when you have 2-3 aircraft communicating, several aircraft in a similar location will just turn into a squeal of noise. Class D is not a quick fix, it requires infrastructure and provision of trained controllers, plus fields like Lismore will be severely impacted by the airspace, let alone the large amount of through traffic as Sunfish points out.

Lastly a PA-28 almost collided with an ATR in Albury Class D airspace when there was pretty much no other aircraft in the area. This line from the report "The crew of the ATR were aware that there was traffic in the area but did not assess the position of the PA-28, in relation to their aircraft until activation of the TCAS TA". So Controlled airspace, Class D, radio communication, three parties aware of traffic, and TCAS most likely saved the day.

[tossbag]

and class D at Ballina creates one more effing East Coast road block for Recreational aircraft.

Not if it was done the way Class D was meant to be done :cool:

[KRviator]

and class D at Ballina creates one more effing East Coast road block for Recreational aircraft.I don't think it'd be a huge issue. The Class C step is 8500, so they'd 'probably' install E between the two, which you could transit, same as Camden (though that'd G/D, not E/D, admittedly...). Realistically though, the only destination you wouldn't be able to fly to would be the Gold Coast, but if you're going north in anything sans VH- on the side, you're going to hit the Gold Coast C steps 20NM after Ballina anyway. If you're going beyond the GC, then you'll need to be inland and that'll take you clear of any Class D at Ballina.

I don't have an easy answer, but See and Avoid, even Alerted See and Avoid, is fraught with danger when you have sufficiently different performance classes in the same airspace. About the only thing I could think of in the short term would be to mandate every aircraft in the BA be fitted not only with radio, but ADS-B or the EC-device equivalent. They're small & cheap enough now there's not really any excuse for anyone not to have one, IMHO, no matter where they fly.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

The fact that other pilots may avoid the airspace only serves to remove flights from the terminal airspace that do not need to be there.

And puts them where the JQ Airbus just missed the Jabiru, about 20 km away from BNA.

[KRviator]

And puts them where the JQ Airbus just missed the Jabiru, about 20 km away from BNA.And that is precisely why the US idea of going straight over the top of LAX, SFO etc works. Yes you need clearance if <10,000, but you can do it and safely as everything is either well above you and descending, or well below you and taking off or landing. Of course, you can go above 10,000 and do it without clearance, too, IIRC...

[Geoff Fairless]

TIEW - I believe that has got more to do with instrument approaches being designed without any thought to airspace classification or traffic separation. That's fine in Class C or D airspace with ATC present, but silly in Class G regardless of the speed differentials. The non-aligned IFR approach for a Cessna 172 may be fine, but high performance aircraft should arguably have separate IFR approaches that keep them above bug-smasher altitudes until aligned with the runway.

[No Idea Either]

All this talk about how a Class D tower would affect Lismore, etc, then how does Hobart and Cambridge get around it? I operate a B73 into HB all the time with lighties in the Cambridge circuit. Seems to work out OK……….

[43Inches]

All this talk about how a Class D tower would affect Lismore, etc, then how does Hobart and Cambridge get around it? I operate a B73 into HB all the time with lighties in the Cambridge circuit. Seems to work out OK……….

You are comparing what can be effectively handled as a second runway at Hobart, with sighting from the tower and ground radio contact, to managing another airfields airspace 15 miles away. The Hobart/Cambridge runways are almost parallel vs Ballina/Lismore runways that have directly conflicting approach and departure paths. Then significant traffic moving between numerous other ports in the area. Nothing in common at all. Problem here is Ballina is in a pool with Evans Head, Lismore, Casino, and several other small strips nearby with heavy RAA traffic. And where do they want to go for a scenic jaunt? the coast, Ballina etc. Just mandate that everything that can do, equip with some sort of Transponder so those that have ACAS/TCAS can see them, easy, problem for big stuff fixed. Scenario with all having transponder, A320 approaches, "Hey Bob there's something hovering around our IAF", "OK, I'll slow down, see if you can contact them and get intentions", they talk and separate or come up with some other solution as to avoidance. Scenario without Transponder class D, "Bob we just ingested something large through the left engine, I think it was a Jabiru", "Ok I'll tell the tower someone must've violated CTA without a TXPD".

[Clinton McKenzie]

You couldn’t make this stuff up.

A cabal of people in one part of CASA (with the support or acquiescence of ATSB and Airservices) will go to almost any lengths to make sure that RPT passenger jets continue sharing uncontrolled airspace and uncontrolled aerodromes with aircraft that are not required to be fitted with transponders nor certified as airworthy by CASA (nor any other NAA) and being flown by pilots who aren’t licensed by CASA nor certified as medically fit by CASA (nor any other NAA). Meanwhile, in a different part of CASA a different cabal of people (supported by the medical industry) is running a sham process in an attempt to produce ‘evidence’ to justify an expansion in the scope of CASA Avmed’s empire (even potentially capturing drone pilots).


CASA’s invented ‘Schrödinger's Pilot’ - A pilot of a light aircraft, sharing uncontrolled airspace and aerodromes wth RPT passenger jets, who is simultaneously ‘acceptable’ and ‘not unsafe’ without a licence and medical certificate issued by CASA at the same time as being ‘unacceptable’ and ‘unsafe’ without a licence and medical certificate issued by CASA. You don’t know which until you open the box to find out what symbols are painted on the light aircraft and find out to what organisations the pilot belongs.

It all makes perfect sense. On the planet Coosebane.

With their current collective wisdom and expertise I reckon they’d make a more cost-effective contribution to the safety of air navigation if one cabal concentrated on just digging holes and the other on just filling them in.

[43Inches]

The biggest problem is that controlled airspace DOES NOT stop collisions, as far as traffic lights don't stop them. You still have to have the human element make a decision as to compliance with instructions. Planes and cars will rarely fly into each other on purpose, they collide when they think it's clear around them, have a little box squawking at you when things get close and you take notice. ATC gives you a false impression of safety because everyone should be doing as told, which means you are perfectly set up to have problems when they don't, ie reduced lookout, because I assume someone else has made the path clear. As I said earlier a PA-28 almost collided with an ATR in Albury airspace in plain view of the tower, but only TCAS alerted the ATR crew that there was an aircraft in proximity and prompted a go-round. Also the Metro vs the Cirrus in the US recently, at a controlled airport. Mandate carriage and use of transponders to all mandatory radio areas, TCAS/ACAS is the only thing that will make significant difference without severely limiting airspace.

[Clinton McKenzie]

And the biggest problem with your logic is that although ‘controlled airspace DOES NOT stop collisions’ (and nor do traffic lights), controlled airspace (and traffic lights) are more effective than nothing in preventing collisions. It’s a simple concept: In which airspace would you prefer your loved ones to be carried in the back of a 737: G or some other classification?

I could be wrong. It may be that we’d all be safer if all airspace were G.

[No Idea Either]

43 inches, you’re right, Cambridge is very close to Hobart, probably not a good example…

[43Inches]

And the biggest problem with your logic is that although ‘controlled airspace DOES NOT stop collisions’ (and nor do traffic lights), controlled airspace (and traffic lights) are more effective than nothing in preventing collisions. It’s a simple concept: In which airspace would you prefer your loved ones to be carried in the back of a 737: G or some other classification?

I could be wrong. It may be that we’d all be safer if all airspace were G.

There are benefits for safety in Class D, but our concept of CTA is no different to the 1950s, two way VHF with simplistic procedural based separation. There is still no more protection from errors or rogue aircraft in the non Radar class D environment than 50 years ago, so conflicts will continue to happen. Collisions in CTA have occurred at a regular rate throughout history, the major thing that has happened that has changed all that is the adoption of TCAS/ACAS. My argument is that class D will offer marginal safety benefit (eg PA-28 almost hit an ATR in Albury) for greatly increased cost and complexity. Where TCAS has proven itself over and over in successfully alerting and avoiding collisions. Mandating some form of TCAS/ACAS interpretative device be fitted to smaller craft as well as VHF radio would solve this very quickly.

By the way separation between VFR and IFR in class D is not provided by the tower, only traffic information. Positive separation is provided only between special VFR and IFR. So outside of tower visual contact, in VMC, IFR can still be passing VFR at close range even with clearances on the basis of see and avoid, which does not fix the problem at Ballina.

[tossbag]

I challenge any of you to overfly any Class D tower in the US. That's how it's done. And Sunfish could overfly at very modest levels, without having to talk to them, shock, horror, indignation. Oh the humanity.

[43Inches]

I challenge any of you to overfly any Class D tower in the US. That's how it's done. And Sunfish could overfly at very modest levels, without having to talk to them, shock, horror, indignation. Oh the humanity.

I don't think flying overhead at 4000-5000ft would interest the locals when they are more interested in 500ft up and down the coast. And its all fine when both parties are compliant, when someone becomes non compliant, that's when having a Transponder will tell everyone where their non compliance is heading. After all conflict mostly occurs when at least one party is not where the other expects them to be. So if one aircraft (especially one invisible to radar) is not doing what they are supposed to, how is a tower going to fix that? In Albury the tower didn't do anything to prevent the collision, the TCAS did.

[tossbag]

How do they manage the 'non-compliance' in the States??

[43Inches]

Same as us, big sky, natural scatter theory. However because of the large amount of aircraft flying collision rate is somewhere around 10-20 per year and 200 reported near collisions.

The majority of collisions occur in or near the traffic pattern. There are 500 or so towered airports and around 20,000 non towered airports in the USA. Meaning that around 2.5% of airports have a tower service, yet 22% of collisions in the traffic pattern occurred at towered airports, meaning on that evidence you are more likely to collide at a towered airport than non towered. It would be interesting to see traffic stats as well though, obviously tower services are vital for very high density areas, but that number shows a huge amount of accidents still occur in CTA as opposed to outside.

[tossbag]

I guess you can make a stat say anything you like.

How many collisions would have occurred at those towered aerodromes if they were non-towered?

[morno]

Transponder mandate’s don’t do anything when farmer Joe doesn’t turn it on. How many times do you ask a light aircraft in a CTAF if they have their transponder on, and then suddenly a diamond appears?

[Sunfish]

How about a simple rule? “No entry to a ten mile circle below 5000 ft without operational transponder and radio. The radio to be tested against the afru?” That should go close to guaranteeing GA and RAA aircraft or sqwawking and on frequency.

Personally, I’ve noticed that some circuit traffic makes a full stop and waits when RPT announces their imminent arrival. Unless I’m close to fuel emergency level (which,is never, so far) I always defer to RPT. Maybe a rule giving RPT a ten minute window might work. No GA operations within the window?

[tossbag]

That should go close to guaranteeing GA and RAA aircraft or sqwawking and on frequency.

Personally, I’ve noticed that some circuit traffic makes a full stop and waits when RPT announces their imminent arrival. Unless I’m close to fuel emergency level (which,is never, so far) I always defer to RPT. Maybe a rule giving RPT a ten minute window might work. No GA operations within the window?

Yet MORE rules?? Come on mate...........If there's anything that an Australian likes more than more rules, I'm yet to find it.

How about using your effing brains?

[PPRuNeUser0201]

You couldn’t make this stuff up.

A cabal of people in one part of CASA (with the support or acquiescence of ATSB and Airservices) will go to almost any lengths to make sure that RPT passenger jets continue sharing uncontrolled airspace and uncontrolled aerodromes with aircraft that are not required to be fitted with transponders nor certified as airworthy by CASA (nor any other NAA) and being flown by pilots who aren’t licensed by CASA nor certified as medically fit by CASA (nor any other NAA). Meanwhile, in a different part of CASA a different cabal of people (supported by the medical industry) is running a sham process in an attempt to produce ‘evidence’ to justify an expansion in the scope of CASA Avmed’s empire (even potentially capturing drone pilots).


CASA’s invented ‘Schrödinger's Pilot’ - A pilot of a light aircraft, sharing uncontrolled airspace and aerodromes wth RPT passenger jets, who is simultaneously ‘acceptable’ and ‘not unsafe’ without a licence and medical certificate issued by CASA at the same time as being ‘unacceptable’ and ‘unsafe’ without a licence and medical certificate issued by CASA. You don’t know which until you open the box to find out what symbols are painted on the light aircraft and find out to what organisations the pilot belongs.

It all makes perfect sense. On the planet Coosebane.

With their current collective wisdom and expertise I reckon they’d make a more cost-effective contribution to the safety of air navigation if one cabal concentrated on just digging holes and the other on just filling them in.

I have to say, your ‘dig’ at RAA is simply flawed. RAA pilots are allowed to undertake certain activities. These are, operating up to 600kgs, day VFR not upside down, 2 pob, no multi engine, With a PPL for example, one may fly just about anything with unlimited pax, IFR, upside down, night, (with ratings, yes). The training for a PPL is different to RAA for this reason. The inference that RAA pilots are incapable to self separate is rubbish. It maybe an inconvenient truth that the limitations applied to those with an RAA pilot certificate are sufficient to permit actually flying an aeroplane safely within a busy airspace (controlled or uncontrolled) with a self declared medical and the rules have been ‘scaled’ appropriately. RAA pilots are not trained to the level of a CPL because it’s simply not needed for the activities they undertake. However, you’ll find that many RAA pilots are actually dual qualified including active ATPL’s that choose to fly in their past time in a non-complex operation for fun.

And whilst the pilot license is not recognised by other NAA’s, go and try to convert your internationally compatible Part 61 licence by simply filling out a form…. Additionally, Australia isn’t the only place that has bespoke licensing for certain activities such as sport aviation, so what’s the problem? Most RAA pilots will never even want to use their licence overseas anyway and if I’m right, I don’t think you’ve previously been complementary towards Australia’s obsession with ICAO compliance, particularly within the aviation medical space.

[tossbag]

And whilst the pilot license is not recognised by other NAA’s, go and try to convert your internationally compatible Part 61 licence by simply filling out a form

I converted my Part 61 licence to an FAA Foreign Based licence by..........filling out a form. Went to the fisdo, had my logbook checked and was flying the next day.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

In Albury the tower didn't do anything to prevent the collision, the TCAS did.
That's because TCAS was more or less invented to prevent collisions in controlled airspace.

No entry to a ten mile circle below 5000 ft without operational transponder and radio
The Jabiru had both. Transponder just wasn't transmitting altitude.

[PPRuNeUser0201]

I converted my Part 61 licence to an FAA Foreign Based licence by..........filling out a form. Went to the fisdo, had my logbook checked and was flying the next day.

I stand corrected!

[43Inches]

That's because TCAS was more or less invented to prevent collisions in controlled airspace.

TCAS has no idea what airspace it's in, it sees and tells you to avoid with regard to anything and even multiple targets, as long as they have working transponders.

[tossbag]

That's because TCAS was more or less invented to prevent collisions in controlled airspace.

Dude, you're a pretty smart fella, but really?

[Clinton McKenzie]

I have to say, your ‘dig’ at RAA is simply flawed. RAA pilots are allowed to undertake certain activities. These are, operating up to 600kgs, day VFR not upside down, 2 pob, no multi engine, With a PPL for example, one may fly just about anything with unlimited pax, IFR, upside down, night, (with ratings, yes). The training for a PPL is different to RAA for this reason. The inference that RAA pilots are incapable to self separate is rubbish. It maybe an inconvenient truth that the limitations applied to those with an RAA pilot certificate are sufficient to permit actually flying an aeroplane safely within a busy airspace (controlled or uncontrolled) with a self declared medical and the rules have been ‘scaled’ appropriately. RAA pilots are not trained to the level of a CPL because it’s simply not needed for the activities they undertake. However, you’ll find that many RAA pilots are actually dual qualified including active ATPL’s that choose to fly in their past time in a non-complex operation for fun.

And whilst the pilot license is not recognised by other NAA’s, go and try to convert your internationally compatible Part 61 licence by simply filling out a form…. Additionally, Australia isn’t the only place that has bespoke licensing for certain activities such as sport aviation, so what’s the problem? Most RAA pilots will never even want to use their licence overseas anyway and if I’m right, I don’t think you’ve previously been complementary towards Australia’s obsession with ICAO compliance, particularly within the aviation medical space.I did not intend to have a ‘dig’ at RAA. My apologies if my thoughts were expressed such that they could be interpreted that way. My ‘dig’ is intended to be at the absurdly contradictory attitudes of different cabals inside the ‘safety’ regulator.

I don’t think an RAA pilot would be any less competent at arranging separation if s/he had 2 passengers on board rather than 1.

I don’t think an RAA pilot would be a greater risk to the passengers on RPT jets in the vicinity if the RAA pilot had 2 passengers on board rather than 1.

I don’t think an RAA pilot would be a greater risk to themselves or anyone else if s/he flew aircraft fitted with a transponder.

Do you know who decided that RAA pilots become ‘unacceptable’ and ‘unsafe’ if they have 2 passengers on board rather than 1, and on the basis of what data? I don’t know who made that decision, but I do know it’s not on the basis of any coherent analysis of data and risk.

I am guessing you are allowed to drive a car in the rain, at night, with more than one passenger on board?

And there are ‘self-certified’ pilots who go ‘upside down’.

But if I, as the holder of a pilot licence issued by CASA, fly to Ballina with 2 passengers on board a light aircraft that has an airworthiness certificate issued by CASA, a maintenance release issued by a LAME and fitted with a serviceable TSO transponder and two VHFs, I’m a dangerous criminal if I don’t have a medical certificate issued by CASA, despite the fact that it’s fine for me to drive there with 6 pax in my Mazda CX-9.

If that makes sense to you, we’ll have to agree to disagree.

(BTW: You should put in a response to CASA’s ‘review’ of medical policy, if you haven’t already. The medical bureaucracy and industry is just itching to add RAA folk to the list of guinea pigs in the medical certification system.)

[43Inches]

In theory if you held a heavy rigid licence you could drive a coach with 80 private passengers on it to Ballina completely self certified. Oh sry theres an eye test when you do the licence that you can tell the difference in colour of traffic lights and see beyond the windscreen.

[Geoff Fairless]

Dude, you're a pretty smart fella, but really?
If you believe Google, the commonly accepted drivers for TCAS were:
1. On September 25th, 1978, a Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) flight 182 collided with a Cessna 172 near San Diego Airport. Total fatalities: 144. TCAS development was initiated by the FAA
2. 1986 when an Aeroméxico DC-9 collided with a Piper Archer over Cerritos, California causing 82 fatalities (15 on ground). Soon after, the FAA mandated that airliners in U.S. airspace be equipped with TCAS.

[Clinton McKenzie]

I think there's not a meeting of minds about what you meant by 'controlled airspace', Geoff. Were those incidents or at least the second one in the Class of airspace which dare not speak its name Downunda: E? Controlled for IFR and not for VFR? And "U.S. airspace" sounds like all Classes of airspace.

[PPRuNeUser0201]

Thanks Clinton for clearing that up. You do make some valid points.

interesting, and off this topic, under Part 43 all your dreams come true (sarcasm) with Experimental aircraft being able to operate with 6 pob without having been signed off by a LAME, regardless of whether the pilot built it or not.

I totally agree with you regarding the premise of CASA having no understanding of the existing base line risk, and therefore allow a total mish-mash of standards apply depending on who you are instead of the risk you’re generating. Hopefully this will be addressed in the near term.

I do think however, the the draft Ballina airspace report they just published does start to address these concerns at Ballina.

[tossbag]

If you believe Google, the commonly accepted drivers for TCAS were:
1. On September 25th, 1978, a Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) flight 182 collided with a Cessna 172 near San Diego Airport. Total fatalities: 144. TCAS development was initiated by the FAA
2. 1986 when an Aeroméxico DC-9 collided with a Piper Archer over Cerritos, California causing 82 fatalities (15 on ground). Soon after, the FAA mandated that airliners in U.S. airspace be equipped with TCAS.

I get it Geoff but no ATC would say 'if I f@ck up, TCAS will save the pilots and pax' regardless of what brought TCAS about it's no excuse for what happened at Albury in this case or in any other scenario. The ATC would be dismissed if they used that excuse. None of us know what was going on in the tower at the time this happened so I won't make a judgement but to fall back on 'TCAS was developed to save this scenario' is sh!t.

[Geoff Fairless]

I think there's not a meeting of minds about what you meant by 'controlled airspace', Geoff. Were those incidents or at least the second one in the Class of airspace which dare not speak its name Downunda: E? Controlled for IFR and not for VFR? And "U.S. airspace" sounds like all Classes of airspace.
Hi Clinton,
Both incidents were pre- "alphabet airspace", however let me explain......
The US then, as now, can be thought of as a big bowl of Class E (then it was called Controlled airspace - VFR exempt). The US then evaluates the conditions within the Class E to judge whether they warrant "more ATC" or, what is now, a higher airspace classification.
Starting with Class E. It is everywhere from FL180 (Class A above that) down to 1500 Feet AGL or 700 feet where an aerodrome approach is published. (Basically the altitude where the IFR flight is forced to become a visual flight). In Class E all IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights and traffic advisories of VFR aircraft are issued if detected by ATC. The US en-route control centers (US spelling) manage Class E airspace, including military IFR traffic.
Next, take an aerodrome, is uncontrolled airspace acceptably safe? If so, does it need a CTAF. If uncontrolled is not acceptably safe, then, if certain requirements, such as on-ground radio comms can be met, the Class E is taken down to ground level. This continues the IFR protection down to the runway. (Don't laugh, I have seen it working, and it does!)
The next step-up is a Tower. Class D airspace was derived from how most of the rest of the world operates aerodrome traffic circuits. Indeed, the UK still recognise an Air Traffic Zone (ATZ or MATZ if military) around an airport. Even if Class D airspace is not authorised by their CAA, pilots still have follow instructions from any ATS unit established at an aerodrome. Too complicated for this thread, but I can explain if necessary. The US recognises the ATZ by authorising Class D airspace, normally out to about 5NM. These are the so-called VFR Towers, which include most of the military air bases and do not necessarily have surveillance or a separate approach control. They are surrounded by Class E airspace, within which the Center continues to separate IFR aircraft, handing over to the Tower when pilots report visual or are established on the instrument approach. The Tower in Class D handles all VFR traffic, sequencing them for the runway with the IFR.
To qualify for Class C then a Tower and surveillance must be available, Class C is only established where needed and may top out at 5-6,000 feet. Class B is the same and recognises that even a VFR aircraft will be subject to radar vectoring and separation with the traffic stream for the runways. Class B corridors are tailored to the approaches and normally top out around 10,000 feet. Don't forget Class E surrounds all of this, so moving between classes is seamless for IFR aircraft and does not require additional clearances.
And yes, it would work in Australia, and would be far more logical and less restrictive to VFR flights, while protecting all IFR flights. It would however need the Minister to stop Airservices being a revenue generating operation and order (her) organisation to become a public service.

[Geoff Fairless]

Hi tossbag,
You are correct, no individual ATC would "say" such a thing and, if you remember, ATCs had to be strictly forbidden from continuing to try and separate once a TCAS manoeuvre had commenced.
TCAS is supposed to be a last line of defence, when everything else has failed. I can ask, however, why Albury is still operating as it did in the 1950s. Elsewhere in the world, such an airport would have locally based radar and approach control service.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

TCAS has no idea what airspace it's in, it sees and tells you to avoid with regard to anything and even multiple targets, as long as they have working transponders.
The drivers for TCAS were preventing airliners hitting each other or something else with a transponder. Without the other aircraft having a transponder, the system is useless. The airliners operated in CTA. Usually the only place other aircraft had transponders or were mandated to have them was in CTA. It was a fallback to an error in the ATC system, either by ATC or pilot. Nowadays the preponderance of transponder equipped aircraft allows its use to be available OCTA. That's just a bonus.

[Geoff Fairless]

I'm pleased to be able to bring this thread to a close now that CASA has released a review of Ballina airspace.

It recommends pretty much everything for which I, and others, have been fighting.

I will continue my comments on the new thread "CASA-Draft Ballina airspace review 16/6/22"

[missy]

I'm pleased to be able to bring this thread to a close now that CASA has released a review of Ballina airspace.

It recommends pretty much everything for which I, and others, have been fighting.

I will continue my comments on the new thread "CASA-Draft Ballina airspace review 16/6/22"
Pity as the ATR near collision in AY TWR is very concerning.