EK 231 20 December DXB IAD near crash?

[Consol]

Does anyone have any photographs, video or eye withness statements that might actually prove this event took place as speculated?

[DaveReidUK]

Does anyone have any photographs, video or eye witness statements that might actually prove this event took place as speculated?

Not that I've seen, other than the initial reports of course - but bear in mind that an aircraft departure at 3 am isn't particularly photo-friendly from either on-board or on the ground.

As the saying goes, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence ...

[Airbus_a321]

@ de fumo
I looked out and saw we were on profile to plough through a huge flock of gulls, with no avoidance forthcoming. I took control and ducked below what would have been a multiple strike.

.:{:{:{:D:rolleyes:

That was a good one
All this in a heavy widebody jet after take-off to avoid birds. Let us know more of your flying stories :D

[42psi]

Cheeky bugger, it wasn't a bunt or anything like it - just a reduction in the climb rate for a few seconds and less than 100' to clear below the birds. Also manoeuvred a jumbo around the ****ehawks circling over the dump at the end of Delhi's r/w. I find it deeply concerning you would willingly plough through a flock of birds - there goes another slave to the FD!

I'd suggest some study of bird behaviour might help in future.

The reaction of most birds/flocks when startled is to achieve speed to avoid danger.

They do this by descending and turning downwind - at the same time.

Planning to pass under them is probably not the optimum choice in most cases.

[3Greens]

@ de fumo
I looked out and saw we were on profile to plough through a huge flock of gulls, with no avoidance forthcoming. I took control and ducked below what would have been a multiple strike.

.:{:{:{:D:rolleyes:

That was a good one
All this in a heavy widebody jet after take-off to avoid birds. Let us know more of your flying stories :D
my thoughts exactly; must have missed that section of performance A when it mentioned that trick that invalidates all your segments climb perf.

[172_driver]

my thoughts exactly; must have missed that section of performance A when it mentioned that trick that invalidates all your segments climb perf.

I don't know.. your segment climb performance is a big academic when you sit in the pointy end and have to act on the go.
I can relate, a flock of birds at an inconvinient place for the time being. Your reactions may vary but my natural instinct has been to stay on the runway instead of rotating and plough through. You have to evaluate the threats on the fly.

[yarpos]

There's simply zero hope left in this industry. At a time where we're supposed to be proving to the general public why it's not a great idea to let automation take over our profession, this stunt only proves otherwise why us humans should be replaced... I can only hope now that the pace at which ultra high speed rail services get developed globally picks up so I don't have to worry about whether or not my life is in the hands of a robot, or otherwise someone who probably doesn't know how to tie their own shoe laces.

yeah cause there is no automation on trains is there

[glofish]

My knowledge of perf A tells me it climbs a whole lot better on two engines, than one or none! (And a few seconds of gently converting the profile to speed and converting it back again, isn't significantly going to affect the overall climb profile. PS That occasion was a medium jet at about 1500', I dunno if folks are thinking it was very low level or just after rotation or something - it wasn't). Valid point about birds diving, but anyway, it worked and we were enough below them to avoid whatever they did, going over wasnt going to work, exactly following the FD was deffo the worst choice. Anyway, point is, I think the windows should be used anytime in the flight that there is, or could be anything to see! Even in the cruise - I cringe when people hang up yellow vests/checklists and the like. Given the discussion at hand, I'm truly shocked we have some supposed pilots advocating following the FD no matter what!
I second that. Guess Sully would as well. Not everyone has smooth water below.
About evasive action: Swallows might be able to do that, but a couple of formation flying big fat Canadian Geese will eventually just continue their path. Try to cope with such an impact and a slight evasive action might suddenly look very attractive and any climb performance a subsidiary problem. Or simply replace the word bird with helicopter and ask yourself if the FD commanding second segment is still appropriate?

[FlightDetent]

I'm truly shocked we have some supposed pilots advocating following the FD no matter what! Except nobody did, nevermind.

[Harbour Dweller]

EK the world's safest airline. How reputable is JACDEC

https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/emirates-retains-title-as-worlds-safest-airline

[Less Hair]

Not reputable.

[DaveReidUK]

EK the world's safest airline. How reputable is JACDEC

Already discussed earlier in the thread.

[Willie Everlearn]

I apologize if this has already been pointed out but, there have been several suggestions that manual flying skills need to be improved by relying less on automation to fly the aircraft. A number of boasts about how some 'hand fly' to high altitude in an effort to keep those manual skills sharp. While that's all well and good, this issue was on the runway during takeoff. The takeoff manoeuvre is probably the most repetitive manual manoeuvre a pilot will ever perform. Both in real life and simulated life, so while an over reliance on automation is in itself an important issue pilots need to address, I fail to see how any recommendation for additional manual flying skills relates to this event. If I understand this event correctly, the automation wasn't engaged until the aircraft was placed in a positive and normal climbing attitude and from that point onward, ops normal.
Some assume that all pilots are taught when to look through or ignore the FD never mind when they clearly see GIGO. I often wonder about that?
Willie

[1201alarm]

Willie,

it is all linked together: selecting the wrong people to be pilots, not training them properly on the fundamentals of flying, then leads to a culture of automanship/SOPship instead of airmanship. A system emerges which is perpetuating itself: not properly selected and trained pilots will create incidents, which will lead to stricter automation policies and tighter flight data monitoring, and a more punishing culture, since the people judging and punishing also don't know better, and the vicious circle continues. Grandchildren of the magenta line.

You need the basic ability to keep your aircraft in a safe envelope at all times, in all flight phases, at all altitudes, by flying pitch an power. Period. This is not negotiable.

Once you have mastered this, you can start to become part of a companies culture, which uses automation to its full benefit, which however also regularly practises hand flying, including FD off and autothrust off.

Such companies exist, and they have some rules, when not to hand fly, and also a non-written culture when it is appropriate to do so. In such a culture, the flight data monitoring guys will also judge you, however they will know that regular appropriate handflying is part of the job, and it will not be a nitpicking exercise like one guy who said that he was called to the office for manually avoiding stall warning in a wind drop instead of waiting until the AP drops out when approaching stall.

Most pilots will understand what I mean. And this does not mean non-discipline towards SOPs or cowboy-style flying.

In such a culture, you develop a different look on your instruments, you will instinctively realise when a FD is useful and when it is indicating sheeeeeed. Your instrument scanning will also be much better in fully automated flight. You will have much more capacity to oversee everything that is happening around you, your situational awareness will increase tremendously. Your eyes will constantly wonder around, all the instruments, outside view, etc, and you will never be just staring on a FD, because you know how to position your ship in the air and you let it fly. You will not stir your stick or yoke.

Once you have reached that level, you will never ever missrotate in such a blatantly wrong way as it seems has happened on that 777.

[safetypee]

Willie, the logic of your argument is sound - agreed; however, the issue is not automation per se, but in the use of technology, computation, displays.

Unfortunately the regulators do not appear to appreciate that point of view. At best they require operators to define a policy / philosophy for the use of automation (read technology), but neither policy or philosophy are sufficient to prevent accidents - that requires people.

[blind pew]

It’s about developing a scan, being able to computate said information and react to it.
The inability of being able to carry out such a task has been demonstrated many time, one of the worst demonstrations was with an Air India 747 that rolled on its back after a simple, single horizon failure. Latterly Airfrance 447.
Its not very different to target fixation.

[Dropp the Pilot]

"Manual flying" at many airlines (including the airline in the spotlight) means disconnecting the AP but leaving the FD and ATHR connected.

This is not only of zero value in maintaining, developing, or recovering any piloting skills, in many cases it exposes your passengers to risks.

Flying any SID out of any European airport in this fashion results in one of the two people in the flight deck being lost from the monitoring role, and the second of two being lost as soon as ATC gives a "direct to xxxxx" clearance and his head wobbles down to the CDU. A non-monitored flight deck at 2000 feet is not a good look.

I do recall my brave cockpit companion proudly announcing to me during taxi in LHR that he had decided to hand-fly the Dover departure.. I had to tell ground control to "say again" the taxi clearance as it took a few seconds for me stop laughing at the idea.

[Superpilot]

Like most things, there's a time and place. Busy international airport, forget it. Greek Islands, fill your boots.

[cessnapete]

It is not just the ME and FE airlines that mandate continuous full automation. You would perhaps think that airlines with the experience to know better would allow manual handling when conditions are appropriate.
But even British Airways mandate continuous Auto Thrust selection from take off to touch down on all types.
Manual handling is usually defined as “manual control of the aircraft Flight Path and Velocity” So the only time a BA pilot flies “manually” is every six months or so when practiced in the Sim!
The last BA pilots allowed full manual handling during normal route operations were the B747- 400 crews, where the SOP was Autopilot disconnect / Autothrottle disconnect.

[PAXboy]

Money. It is always the money. If the accountants discover that automation will give better financial results on paper then that is what gets mandated.I expect they factor near miss and prangs into their spreadsheets....

[simmy]

SIN to DXB in a widebody. 0100 schedule departure but several hours late. (Me 50+ year old captain, F/O 35 year old). Glorious flying weather, DXB in sight before the descent point. F/O disconnects A/P at descent point and barely moves the controls until the flare. Me working like a one armed paperhanger complying with his requests for flaps, gear, radio calls, crew landing brief, tiny bye bye to the pax and other small distractions. I was often out of the loop and worn out when we landed. In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even! " I like a challenge he said!"

I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.

I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!

[the_stranger]

SIN to DXB in a widebody. 0100 schedule departure but several hours late. (Me 50+ year old captain, F/O 35 year old). Glorious flying weather, DXB in sight before the descent point. F/O disconnects A/P at descent point and barely moves the controls until the flare. Me working like a one armed paperhanger complying with his requests for flaps, gear, radio calls, crew landing brief, tiny bye bye to the pax and other small distractions. I was often out of the loop and worn out when we landed. In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even! " I like a challenge he said!"

I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.

I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!
I do wonder if it wasn't you that day.

Granted, a crew briefing should have been done before, as the PA, but the rest sounds like standard PM tasks, whether flying manual or not.
He might have asked/informed you earlier but what kept you from asking/ordering the automatics back on when you couldn't keep up?

We routinely fly manual from descent point till landing and if one or the other feels overloaded or out of the loop or there is any other reason someone feels like it, the automatics go back on.

[Fursty Ferret]

In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even!

No offence intended but it sounds like you were part of the problem here with the fact you didn't seem able to say "I'm knackered, would you mind keeping the autopilot in until 1000ft?" Did you discuss it after landing?

Unrelated to this thread but the smoothest flying I ever witnessed from another pilot also gave the impression that she wasn't touching the controls, even though she flew a perfect CDA from top of descent with all the automatics off.

[atlast]

The flight director is nothing but a suggestion.

[Check Airman]

SIN to DXB in a widebody. 0100 schedule departure but several hours late. (Me 50+ year old captain, F/O 35 year old). Glorious flying weather, DXB in sight before the descent point. F/O disconnects A/P at descent point and barely moves the controls until the flare. Me working like a one armed paperhanger complying with his requests for flaps, gear, radio calls, crew landing brief, tiny bye bye to the pax and other small distractions. I was often out of the loop and worn out when we landed. In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even! " I like a challenge he said!"

I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.

I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!

You felt out of the loop and worn out doing your normal PM duties? I’d suggest this attitude towards automation is at the heart of the problem.

[SandIgger]

this issue was on the runway during takeoff. The takeoff manoeuvre is probably the most repetitive manual manoeuvre a pilot will ever perform. Both in real life and simulated life, so while an over reliance on automation is in itself an important issue pilots need to address, I fail to see how any recommendation for additional manual flying skills relates to this event. If I understand this event correctly, the automation wasn't engaged until the aircraft was placed in a positive and normal climbing attitude and from that point onward, ops normal.
Some assume that all pilots are taught when to look through or ignore the FD never mind when they clearly see GIGO. I often wonder about that?
Willie
Good points, Willie. Some trainers in this airline were badly trained and carry that standard to those they train in turn. I've seen pilots here who will do whatever the FD says to until its basic mode is overridden by a protection system. Modern "automation" includes FD-guided manual (hand) flying, which is the lowest level of automation. It's handy when following a TCAS RA or following a windshear event but not so good, as Dropp pointed out, for basic hand flying except maybe straight and level.

None of that really matters, though, if it turns out the PF in this event ignored the "rotate" call or there was no "rotate" call and the PF failed to act in its absence.

The rest is just people anonymously beating their own meat over personal views.

[SandIgger]

I would agree but suggest automation-inspired laziness brings some to that point.

[metalboi69]

I still fail to understand how during a takeoff, a crew of 4 pilots failed to notice that the pitch angle was less than adequate.

How many times have you been in a jet with an initial climb out angle of less than 10 degrees nose up? Something doesn't add up.

[Maninthebar]

Do we KNOW that all 4 up front were unaware or inactive?

So far as I can tell there is no evidence that at least 2 of them were not shrieking their heads off

[metalboi69]

Do we KNOW that all 4 up front were unaware or inactive?

So far as I can tell there is no evidence that at least 2 of them were not shrieking their heads off

Well no, which is precisely why I said something doesn't add up.

[punkalouver]

I still fail to understand how during a takeoff, a crew of 4 pilots failed to notice that the pitch angle was less than adequate.



Do we KNOW that all 4 up front were unaware or inactive?

So far as I can tell there is no evidence that at least 2 of them were not shrieking their heads off
​​​​​​​
Well no, which is precisely why I said something doesn't add up.

This is part of the problem as well. A bunch of posters on this thread with some basic incident information, extrapolating into their own assumptions as if they were conclusions.

If it extends to their own flight deck decision making, that is a problem in itself, as dangerous as automation dependency.

[Smooth Airperator]

I'm still going to say the fact it was a Lady Commander has contributed to the lack of input from other pilots. I'm not judging skills, I'm just calling out things from a CRM perspective. The need to be nic(er) to the opposite sex. It's real and if you think it's boll**** then you don't understand human factors in CRM.

[Herod]

Smooth Airperator: In that case I don't understand human factors. Admittedly my experience dates from when female pilots were very much in the minority, but I found invariably that they were all of the mindset "pilot first, female second". Yes, I'm old enough to be a gentleman and open doors etc (does anyone still do that?), but once at the aircraft it was all business.

[simmy]

I wasn't knackered. When the F/O has the sector on my flights he made the decisions. Nothing worse than a nagging captain (well there is obviously.) I debriefed " there are so many comments on PPrune regarding fatigue that it should be considered as important as manual flying in a big modern aeroplane when one is likely to have a night as this was, a crew duty time to the limit, a delayed departure time and a start time when we would normally go to bed". No inflight crew relief. I am a great advocate of the automatic aeroplane. The difficulties I saw most regarding flight control during my 40 years in aviation (as military, commercial and instructing) was ignorance in handling the automatic systems. To Fursty Ferret....that's because the designer made (I assume it was an Airbus the lady was flying) it so the aircraft could be flown stick free! Happy New Year All, from Simmy, 10000 hours about on Boeings various!!!

[the_stranger]

I wasn't knackered. When the F/O has the sector on my flights he made the decisions. Nothing worse than a nagging captain (well there is obviously.) I debriefed " there are so many comments on PPrune regarding fatigue that it should be considered as important as manual flying in a big modern aeroplane when one is likely to have a night as this was, a crew duty time to the limit, a delayed departure time and a start time when we would normally go to bed". No inflight crew relief.
As a captain it is your duty to safeguard both you and your mate. If you think it is inadvisable to fly manual, you speak up. Better a nagging captain than a crash or serieus incident. And if you think advising against manual flight with good (personal) reason is nagging, Inwoner what safety culture there was.
​​​​​​I am a great advocate of the automatic aeroplane. The difficulties I saw most regarding flight control during my 40 years in aviation (as military, commercial and instructing) was ignorance in handling the automatic systems.[/]While automatics bring their own difficultiea, I don't see the link with keeping up the manual flying skills.
both need ample training and upkeep.
[Quote]
To Fursty Ferret....that's because the designer made (I assume it was an Airbus the lady was flying) it so the aircraft could be flown stick free! Happy New Year All, from Simmy, 10000 hours about on Boeings various!!!Maybe keep away from making comments about an aircraft you are not familiair with.

[3Greens]

I'm still going to say the fact it was a Lady Commander has contributed to the lack of input from other pilots. I'm not judging skills, I'm just calling out things from a CRM perspective. The need to be nic(er) to the opposite sex. It's real and if you think it's boll**** then you don't understand human factors in CRM.

perhaps, but I’d say it’s possibly more cultural than that given a local male FO coupled with a female Captain. I’m sure it was a contributing factor along with many others that help to align the holes

[Willie Everlearn]

Smooth Airperator

You may be correct.
But if you are, I have to wonder how it is that whilst hurtling down the runway on a wide body aeroplane, likely at max TO weight, blowing through V1, “Rotate” and past a series of red centerline lights, that the fairer sex could possibly intimidate even the lamest of F/Os from shouting at the top of their voice “ROTATE!!!” or simply say “I have control!”. I’d also have to ask how either pilot was given a window seat in the first place?
As I recall from their recruiting literature, Emirates only hire “the best pilots”. After all, it takes them 3 days to establish whether or not you’re one of “the best”.
So, sorry but I’m inclined to disagree with your HF CRM suggestion.
Willie

[Check Airman]

Smooth Airperator: In that case I don't understand human factors. Admittedly my experience dates from when female pilots were very much in the minority, but I found invariably that they were all of the mindset "pilot first, female second". Yes, I'm old enough to be a gentleman and open doors etc (does anyone still do that?), but once at the aircraft it was all business.

They're still very much in the minority, and I've found that the "pilot first, female second" is still there. I've had no issues flying with any of them, excluding one, but she'd be a dick even if she had one.

[Check Airman]

After almost 300 replies, do we actually know what happened, or are we just assuming?

[Willie Everlearn]

Check Airman
So far, in my assessment, from the few posts I've read, I'd say only theories and conjecture so far (which admittedly, can be a lot of fun). No accurate 'from the flight deck' information available AFAIK. Most seem to see this through the lens of normal ops and what should have occurred under normal ops. Not very helpful analysis. I don't see how we can glean much from that perspective at present, knowing what we don't know. I think we have to wait for some kind of factual report. Emirates have strong SOPs. At a minimum, good crew training and other flight deck related training available to improve their flight crew skills, including CRM. So, if this wasn't a gross human error it might have been a transient mechanical event. A search through the FAA AD Database reveals a number of B777 stabilizer related issues. Could this aircraft have experienced a transient issue and distracted the crew on the runway sufficiently enough to end up with this curious result? I don't know.
Let's hope it's not down to an improperly set altitude for departure.
Willie

[Flyhighfirst]

I'm still going to say the fact it was a Lady Commander has contributed to the lack of input from other pilots. I'm not judging skills, I'm just calling out things from a CRM perspective. The need to be nic(er) to the opposite sex. It's real and if you think it's boll**** then you don't understand human factors in CRM.

I would say that just announces your sexism and unbelievable attitude stuck in the 80’s. It’s a good thing that year by year as the dinosaurs retire life gets better for everyone, including the men!

[Pilot_a321]

I'm still going to say the fact it was a Lady Commander has contributed to the lack of input from other pilots. I'm not judging skills, I'm just calling out things from a CRM perspective. The need to be nic(er) to the opposite sex. It's real and if you think it's boll**** then you don't understand human factors in CRM.
​​​​ and how many incidents in the history have been caused by a complete male crew? What was the problem then? Never before have incidents been reported as MALE CAPTAIN nearly crashes plane. What is the need to mention the gender of the capt now? And according to you the fact that 3 MEN in the cockpit did not speak is also the fault of the woman. Don't speculate nonsense.

[Check Airman]

Avherald has got hold of the preliminary report.

https://avherald.com/h?article=4f24b2d7&opt=0


The Commander stated that during cockpit preparation, she noticed that the altitude selector was set to 0000 feet and she selected it to 4,000 feet, which was also verified by the flight data recorder. The selection of 4,000 feet on the altitude selector was in accordance with the planned standard instrument departure (SID) of SENPA 2F1.

At 23:10:29 UTC, the Aircraft lifted off, and at 23:10:40 the landing gears were selected to ‘up’ position (retracted).

The Commander stated that after lift-off, and during climb, she followed the flight director command. However, the Aircraft rate of climb reached to a maximum of approximately 800 feet per minute. The flight crew were not able to adhere to published climb gradient of the SID due to the shallow climb.

At 23:11:01, the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) switch was selected and the flight mode annunciations (FMA) were changed to TOGA/TOGA. The flight directors indicated climb attitude on the Commander’s primary flight display (PFD). A flap 15 over-speed occurred as the airspeed increased towards 250 knots. The flight crew continued to their destination and landed uneventfully.

[FlightDetent]

When discussing Mike Pence's 737 over-run at LGA, with the report an unexpected bias was found in the FR24 ADS-B data. Their recording showed a hard 0 for a few hundred yards where the actual aircraft was still floating above the pavement.

The connection I am making is what if the EK231's assumed non-lift-off was also just an ADS-B mis-transmission, were they not airborne much sooner than indicated in the public domain? A bug or a feature to default for 'ground' below some small altitude. The FDM people already know.

C/A: congrats for the nice 2,200 :ok:

[DaveReidUK]

When discussing Mike Pence's 737 over-run at LGA, with the report an unexpected bias was found in the FR24 ADS-B data. Their recording showed a hard 0 for a few hundred yards where the actual aircraft was still floating above the pavement.

The connection I am making is what if the EK321's assumed late lift-off was also just an ADS-B mis-transmission, were they not airborne much sooner than indicated in the public domain? Bug or feature, to default for 'ground' below some small altitude. The FDM people already know.

I'm not familiar with the Pence incident but you are correct in that, given the reported QNH at DXB, ADS-B pressure altitude once airborne would have been negative until the aircraft reached approximately 150 ft AMSL (90 ft AAL).

FR24 always displays negative pressure altitudes as zero, and so should be treated with caution.

Edit: Just checked the Pence/Eastern thread, and the same FR24 issue applies there as a result of the QNH. In fact, it would appear that I mentioned it at the time. :O

[SpamCanDriver]

When discussing Mike Pence's 737 over-run at LGA, with the report an unexpected bias was found in the FR24 ADS-B data. Their recording showed a hard 0 for a few hundred yards where the actual aircraft was still floating above the pavement.

The connection I am making is what if the EK231's assumed non-lift-off was also just an ADS-B mis-transmission, were they not airborne much sooner than indicated in the public domain? A bug or a feature to default for 'ground' below some small altitude. The FDM people already know.

C/A: congrats for the nice 2,200 :ok:

Do the liftoff time from the report (which i guess uses FDM data) and the liftoff time from FR24 match?

I guess that would be a quick gross error Che k

[DaveReidUK]

Do the liftoff time from the report (which i guess uses FDM data) and the liftoff time from FR24 match?

Read my previous post again.

Under certain circumstances (high QNH, as in this instance), you cannot determine accurately from FR24 data the point at the aircraft has rotated.

[MrBernoulli]

The preliminary report is pretty light on any really useful detail, but to aid in understanding the 777 Flight Mode Annunciations (FMAs) expected during an otherwise normal takeoff, with autothrust in use, this is what should happen:


https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1217x1176/766065b5_1510_4733_a423_72fb03392801_1c928c014b4c09dcc4ec75c 99fa7ed682c09d939.jpeg

[SpamCanDriver]

Read my previous post again.

Under certain circumstances (high QNH, as in this instance), you cannot determine accurately from FR24 data the point at the aircraft has rotated.

That's my point

If the liftoff time from the report is before the supposed liftoff time on FR24 (when it goes above 0ft) then obviously FR24 is in error.
Although I don't know the resolution of the timing data on FR24, it should be possible to make a gross error check.
Using the time from the report, you should be able to roughly estimate where on the rwy it did become airborne. Again subject to FR24 data being sufficient

[DaveReidUK]

If the liftoff time from the report is before the supposed liftoff time on FR24 (when it goes above 0ft) then obviously FR24 is in error.
Although I don't know the resolution of the timing data on FR24, it should be possible to make a gross error check.

OK, I think I see what you mean, although I'm still struggling to understand what a "gross error check" would prove, other than the existence of the FR24 QNH issue that I previously referred to.

Using the time from the report, you should be able to roughly estimate where on the rwy it did become airborne. Again subject to FR24 data being sufficient

Yes, that's more easily ascertained from the FR24 data as it's not QNH-dependent. At the quoted lift off time of 23:10:29 (per the report) the ADS-B data shows the 777 roughly abeam twy N4.

[FlightDetent]

​​​​​For recording and display purposes, different from the source ADS-B transmission, FR24 nullifies some of the altitude data.

When an aircraft is geometrically below the 1013.25 isobaric surface, FR24 presentation would need to show negative values since ADS-B transmits level referenced to standard pressure.

Perhaps to avoid confusing the common inernaut, all sub-zero readouts are truncated. When our ilk try to convert ADS-B indicated FL back to ALT, that data is missing.

​​​​​​The cutoff layer is
FL < 0, which is the same as
ALT < (QNH - 1013.25)x27

The modest local 1018 hPa at occurrence time means displayed 0 by FR24 can be any ALT below 125 ft. (XPDR codes in 25 ft increments). Down to ELEV, that is :8.

[Check Airman]

C/A: congrats for the nice 2,200 :ok:
Thanks. maybe I should be out flying more :)

[DaveReidUK]

Yes, error is not a good naming.

​​​​​​For recording and display purposes, different from the source ADS-B transmission, FR24 nullifies some of the altitude data.

When an aircraft is geometrically below the 1013.25 isobaric surface, the FR24 presentation would need to show negative values, since ADS-B transmits altitude referenced to standard pressure which actually is a negative numeber in that case.

To avoid confusion for the common inernaut, all negative reports are truncted to 0 for FRIf FL < 0 then, for display their records.

When converting the ADS-B FL as reported FR24 to ALT, some of that data are simply not there.

​​​​​​The cutoff layer is
FL < 0, which is the same as
ALT < (QNH - 1013.25)x27

With the modest 1018 hPa at local station in the discussed case, where 0 is dispalyed by FR24 the ALT was (anything) less than 125 ft. (XPDR codes level in 25 ft increments).

Good explanation of an often (as we have seen) misunderstood FR24 idiosyncrasy.

[SpamCanDriver]

OK, I think I see what you mean, although I'm still struggling to understand what a "gross error check" would prove, other than the existence of the FR24 QNH issue that I previously referred to.



Yes, that's more easily ascertained from the FR24 data as it's not QNH-dependent. At the quoted lift off time of 23:10:29 (per the report) the ADS-B data shows the 777 roughly abeam twy N4.

Gross error check as in if the two times aren't similar, then I would say the FR24 liftoff time is almost certainly wrong.

But from reading more posts, from people such as yourself, who obviously know much more than me about FR24 data. It seems that the FR24 data is always wrong in high QNH conditions.
Therefor as you say the gross error check is redundant, if we already know its not reliable

[FlightDetent]

Good explanation of an often (as we have seen) misunderstood FR24 idiosyncrasy.Apologise sincerely for the atrocious style and grammar. Edited now again, sorry for the eyesore.

[pineteam]

Talking about Flight Radar, why do they show the scheduled time as airborne time when the scheduled time shown on Flight Radar in my outfit at least is supposed to be the off block time?
Thank you.

[DaveReidUK]

Talking about Flight Radar, why do they show the scheduled time as airborne time when the scheduled time shown on Flight Radar in my outfit at least is supposed to be the off block time?

In my experience, the STD shown in FR24 is the Out time. Can you give any examples of where it's the scheduled Off time? Where would they get that information from?

[pineteam]

This flight for example: They showed the schedule time as 15h45. This is the STD: Time we suppose to push back. However they show the actual time as 16h25 which is the airborne time. I checked on the company system this flight actually pushed back at 16h09.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1284x1478/57c5b644_ec89_4222_9082_1406aecc3212_1a946b5b54d35e0cef1f6da 437439995a1a25279.jpeg

[DaveReidUK]

This flight for example: They showed the schedule time as 15h45. This is the STD: Time we suppose to push back. However they show the actual time as 16h25 which is the airborne time. I checked on the company system this flight actually pushed back at 16h09.

OK, so your problem isn't with the scheduled times on FR24, it's with actuals.

FR24 attempts to identify, as you have noted, the time the aircraft gets airborne - that's what appears in the "ATD" column. Whether that satisfies most people's understanding of an ATD is a moot point, but that's what they use.

[pineteam]

Thank you DaveReidUK!:ok:

[procede]

Whether that satisfies most people's understanding of an ATD is a moot point, but that's what they use.

There is a reason they do not use it in CDM. ATOT (Actual take off time) is much clearer, though I guess there is the question whether this is when you start the take-off roll or after you have completed it and passed screen height.

[fdr]

Hmmm. lets try again...

res ipsa loquitur.

Sacking the crew of this flight doesn't get rid of the issue that permitted the situation to arise in the first place. That problem, like pilot skills and SA were absent from the cockpit on the day (or night). But certainly, sacking the "abberant" crew sure works as spack filler on the side of the space shuttle would.

In my humble opinion.

[Lookleft]

Seriously? A modern jet airliner is nearly flown into the ground and the discussion centres on FR24? Maybe the Mods should set up a new category of FR24 issues. The Av Herald article quotes from the report stating that the PF achieved an 800fpm rate of climb following the FD's. The airlines have successfully taken away the ability to question the information presented to the pilots and handed the control of the aircraft to the automation. Thats the real concern. It has nothing to do with gender or nationality but everything to do with Flt Ops departments training to a minimum standard.

[Dropp the Pilot]

Nothing was lost in translation

The report states that "she followed the flight director command" because she followed the flight director command.

[Time Traveller]

The trend towards the "cure-all dogmatic fundamentalism" towards company procedures, isn't just to be found at EK; I think most large Western airlines are of the thinking that, provided they can legislate/automate a procedure for every conceivable scenario, then there cannot possibly be an accident, no matter how inexperienced/low paid/basically educated/low aptitude/tired/low stick skills the crews are.

Fact of the matter is, it is ineffective, and can often be counterproductive, where we have overwhelming layer upon layer of procedure, and when the particularly dim witted stumble into conflicting SOP minutiae, rather than acting and applying airmanship, they go into meltdown, and freeze.

[SOPS]

The trend towards the "cure-all dogmatic fundamentalism" towards company procedures, isn't just to be found at EK; I think most large Western airlines are of the thinking that, provided they can legislate/automate a procedure for every conceivable scenario, then there cannot possibly be an accident, no matter how inexperienced/low paid/basically educated/low aptitude/tired/low stick skills the crews are.

Fact of the matter is, it is ineffective, and can often be counterproductive, where we have overwhelming layer upon layer of procedure, and when the particularly dim witted stumble into conflicting SOP minutiae, rather than acting and applying airmanship, they go into meltdown, and freeze.

And that’s the problem. Airmanship and common sense are no longer common.

[OvertHawk]

The real problem at the moment as regards airmanship stems form the fact that regulators, operators and training organisations are less interested in improving and restoring airmanship than they are in deciding whether it should be called "airpersonship" or "aviatorship".

To quote my favourite (and least favourite) phrase

"The trouble with making things idiot proof is that it simply encourages the development of better idiots"

[Ant T]

The trend towards the "cure-all dogmatic fundamentalism" towards company procedures, isn't just to be found at EK; . . .

I came up with an analogy to describe this - “The Safety Ratchet-Strap” ©️ 🙂

The first organisation I flew for used what I understood to be aviation grade straps for securing freight. They were pulled tight by hand (on the strap itself, not the handle), then secured by a single over-centre and latch movement of the handle that tightened it a further 2cm or so. This ensured that the strap could not be pulled too tight.

Subsequently I worked for another operator that used standard ratchet straps, that could be tightened as much as you could pull on the handle (with approx 10:1 lever, you can easily put 600-800 pounds, or more, of tension on the strap).

I found that the majority of people seemed to be convinced that the tighter they pulled the strap, the safer they were making it.

It may seem slightly counter-intuitive, but as far as I can see, the safest the system can be is when the strap is just snugly tight.

If the tie-down ring pulls out of the rail at 2000lbs force, and the strap has 10 lbs of tension in it, the ring has 1990 lbs in hand. If the strap has 1900 lbs of tension, the system will fail with another 101 lbs of jolting force.

There is a sweet-spot of maximum strength in the system, and tightening the strap beyond that point actually weakens the system.

The problem is that it is very easy to tighten the strap another click, thinking you are improving things, but no-one wants to take the responsibility of loosening the strap a click, even though it may actually be safer.

In my view, a lot of aspects of aviation safety have passed their maximum strength.

Time Traveller sums it up very nicely above -

I think most large Western airlines are of the thinking that, provided they can legislate/automate a procedure for every conceivable scenario, then there cannot possibly be an accident, no matter how inexperienced/low paid/basically educated/low aptitude/tired/low stick skills the crews are.

Fact of the matter is, it is ineffective, and can often be counterproductive, where we have overwhelming layer upon layer of procedure, and [can end up] stumbl[ing] into conflicting SOP minutiae, rather than acting and applying airmanship


In my view, there are many areas where we have tightened the “Safety Ratchet-Strap” too tight, and in places need to loosen it a click or two.

[macdo]

Common sense is not very fashionable in the 21st. century.
Display some and someone will quickly point out the error of thinking like that.
The root cause is fear of legal liability.
IMHO

[fulminn]

Common sense is not very fashionable in the 21st. century.
Display some and someone will quickly point out the error of thinking like that.
The root cause is fear of legal liability.
IMHO

Sadly true. As long as you brief it, you can basically crash in VNAV. Instead of saving the situation without briefing it(paradox example of course).

[FullWings]

I think someone pointed out earlier that this is what you get when the Children of the Magenta Line meet the Climate of Fear: It’s better to have an accident following rules, even if they are no longer sensible in the situation, than to save the day by thinking outside the box (or using common sense, as above).

It comes down in the end as to why we (pilots) are there in the first place? Is it to make sure we follow regulations and best practice as much as possible? Yes, that’s part of it, but the *real* reason we sit at the front is for the time when the rules don’t apply, or would make the situation worse. Not that long ago I attended a live training presentation on deliberate rule-breaking and how it was an essential part of safety culture; the message had obviously made it to the top that mental flexibility was paramount when dealing with situations outside the scope of normal operations.

[EcamSurprise]

I think someone pointed out earlier that this is what you get when the Children of the Magenta Line meet the Climate of Fear: It’s better to have an accident following rules, even if they are no longer sensible in the situation, than to save the day by thinking outside the box (or using common sense, as above).

It comes down in the end as to why we (pilots) are there in the first place? Is it to make sure we follow regulations and best practice as much as possible? Yes, that’s part of it, but the *real* reason we sit at the front is for the time when the rules don’t apply, or would make the situation worse. Not that long ago I attended a live training presentation on deliberate rule-breaking and how it was an essential part of safety culture; the message had obviously made it to the top that mental flexibility was paramount when dealing with situations outside the scope of normal operations.

Interestingly my airline has started in the last years to have a training day with various stretch scenarios. These are non graded and allow us to deviate from SOP etc as needed and as allowed in emergency situations. It’s been a fantastic breath of fresh air to not have to worry about what the trainer thinks but rather just focus on getting a safe outcome from the unusual scenario presented to us.

[Zeffy]

FAA has issued SAIB AIR 22-09
SUBJ: AUTOPILOT FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM:
ALT HOLD Engaged on Takeoff on Boeing Model 777/787 common fleets.

https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/dc7bd4f27e5f107486257221005f069d/2a348b837ff27073862588220063671d/%24FILE/AIR-22-09.pdf

[Dropp the Pilot]

A bulletin. Good.

Now how do we weed out the pilots who will take 350 passengers, roll them off the end of the runway and then fly blissfully towards an apartment building without it occurring to them that the situation is somewhat undesirable?

[Starbear]

And no where in the bulletin does it "recommend" simply flying the A/C. Surely they cant assume that's a given?

[alf5071h]

This issue should have been identified during design, (system specification and vendor build) and/or manufacturer checking and testing.
Perhaps Boeing did not know of this, neither the FAA - deficient process

Alternatively, the issue was identified, but accepted as a crew management task dependant on system description and procedures, although none have been identified “… this specific scenario is not explicitly described …” (FAA SAIB)

Reliance on crew knowledge and procedure is difficult to judge, perhaps biased by the Boeing philosophy defaulting to crew choice, always in the loop, desription, procedure, vice system inhibits; recent 737 history identified flawed thinking.
Also the FAA, with knowledge, could have judged the issue as not meeting the requirements, but similarly with recent history, judgement can be bypassed by self certification or poor system knowledge by those responsible for oversight.

25.1302 assumes operation by a trained crew, but if the system description is poor or non existent, then the requirement is not met: … does the simulator behave in the same way as the aircraft ?
Similar issues with the 777 AT going to ‘sleep’; modifications followed ?
This issue warrants modification, but when, by whom ?

[zambonidriver]

This issue should have been identified during design, (system specification and vendor build) and/or manufacturer checking and testing.
Perhaps Boeing did not know of this, neither the FAA - deficient process

On principle you are correct - yet it took about 25+ years for anyone to notice (maybe some other operator did encounter this but their pilot actualy had the amazing proficiency to actualy rotate the plane at takeoff...)

[CVividasku]

And EK reaps what it sows, and learns nothing.

The Joberg over-run years ago? Bad training and over relience on generated, rather than raw information.

The 777 hull loss, including a fatality? bad training and fear culture coupled with too much relience on automation.

This one? Ddidn't rotate because the FD didn't say to? Really???

Not long before leaving I had a (non) incident,complete with frog-march to the office, becaue I disconnected the AP to correct a rapidly decreasing airspeed due to windshear and the 777s habit of going into ALT CAP early.

The verdict? You should have let the automation deal with it until stck shaker.

Thise who do not learn from the past are apt to repeat it....
With such a company culture, how is it possible that they still did not crash an airplane ?
They had one hull loss but no complete crash.

[Oldaircrew]

With such a company culture, how is it possible that they still did not crash an airplane ?
They had one hull loss but no complete crash.

it’s called luck. Airlines have been using it as their primary safety program for years

[PW1830]

Good example of 'Boeingspeak" - it's not our fault!



"While altitude hold latching and TO/GA behaviors are described in the Boeing Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM), this specific scenario is not explicitly described. It is apparent that this specific system behavior may not be known to all pilots of these aircraft."

[FullWings]

There’s some of a point there, but it really comes under the umbrella of mode awareness? There are 6 autothrottle modes, 10 roll and 11 pitch ones, which is 660 combinations. OK, not all of those are likely or even possible, but there are still a significant number. Rather than trying to learn a fixed response to every possibility, it might be better to recognise that not all is well in FMA land and to correct the flightpath, either through appropriate use of automation or manual intervention...?

[Uplinker]

Exactly. This auto-thrust 'hold' mode where it goes to sleep and ignores decaying IAS, seems absolutely bonkers to me, BUT pilots should always monitor their aircraft.

If the automatics are not doing what is required, the pilots need to step in and do something about it.

That is precisely why we have pilots - can you imagine the carnage if aircraft were autonomous :eek:

[alf5071h]

Uplinker, “exactly” … exactly. :ok:
“If the automatics are not doing what is required,” this requires a plan, the knowledge of what is required; and then an awareness that the current situation is not as required.

FullWings “under the umbrella of awareness”. :ok:
Awareness is a combination of knowledge and interpretation, awareness is an attribute of human behaviour affected by many circumstantial factors, thus cannot be foreseen.

We should not judge awareness, knowledge or interpretation in isolation, but with a holistic view, try to understand all factors and points of view.
The industry needs to move on from yes - no, hard decisions, SOP culture, towards maybe - what if, skills of judgement to help manage (our) uncertainty.
Its easy for us to be certain after the fact, but remain uncertain if this view has safety value - what could we learn.

[Right20deg]

Some great points made above. Thinking back a whiles to my old airlines, we taught how and when to deviate from SOPs. Critical thinking and rule breaking were on the CRM syllabus along with managing an aircraft across cultures. Some airlines introduced checklists with steps, mid critical actions that said...." Fly the Aircraft ".... elec ##...off..reset....."Fly the Aircraft"....
Some a/c manufacturers go very quiet when something happens that they really don't like and then they take years to close off the issue.
A heavy Boeing with its (unheated) ....elevator covered in ice shaking the whole shooting match to blazes on the approach to London. No can't happen.... yes it did.... and there is the picture for Seattle. The heavy boeing with a batt bus failure that tripped off the whole AC elec system with terrible results. Can't happen say the manufacturer...probably Crew error. Not crew error, they saved the day with critical thinking.
Thank goodness for modern CRM training.
Rgds R20deg

[zambonidriver]

That is precisely why we have pilots - can you imagine the carnage if aircraft were autonomous https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/eek.gif

Well for the better or worse this is where we are going, just as with cars. Probably still 30-50 years out but I'm pretty convinced this will be the norm eventually, and, most likely, we will be better off (although zero risk is obviously not possible).
In any case out of the scope of this specific discussion.

[Right20deg]

A human pilot, while able to make an errors of judgement, mis handle, make a slip, a lapse or a mistake can do something quite special that no automation or bot can do.

The human pilot can safely ecover a badly stricken aircraft using skills, experience and fine judgements that would not be available with automation or a bot. So many examples from military and airline history.

[alf5071h]

zamboni, “… just as with cars”.
This is not necessarily the future of aviation.

Cars aim for the complete works - driverless; with hard lessons being learnt so far, accidents, fatalities. And whilst statistically safe, the performance does not match public expectation; latterly this is being alleviated by requiring a car-human combination. This too is flawed thinking, using a very poor human monitor, to monitor or take over from very complex technology.

Commercial aviation at least, appears to be starting with a man-machine combination, where the strengths and weakness of each are considered as a balanced whole (proposals for reduced crew operations).

Unfortunately this approach has yet to be introduced in system design and certification. Thus this incident represents various human weaknesses in the design and certification processes before the event, as much as the event itself; where deficiencies are currently only identified with hindsight.

A further issues if a human based safety management (design, certification, and incident investigation), with inherent human limitations (error), will be more unreliable than the operation itself. Safety management looks for error, it will find error; however who's error, safety management or operation.

“… the mind creates maps of reality in order to understand it, because the only way we can process the complexity of reality is through abstraction. … that we will frequently use an incorrect model simply because we feel any model is preferable to no model.”

“A model might show you some risks, but not the risks of using it.”
.

[fdr]

A human pilot, while able to make an errors of judgement, mis handle, make a slip, a lapse or a mistake can do something quite special that no automation or bot can do.

The human pilot can safely ecover a badly stricken aircraft using skills, experience and fine judgements that would not be available with automation or a bot. So many examples from military and airline history.

Your observation is quite valid. The reliance on automation moves the center of error usually from the pilot towards the system architecture and embedded logic, which is great when it works, and not so great when it doesn't. You don't need Kev Sullivan's cosmic radiation bit flip to mess you up, something as simple as AA 965 disclosed the hidden issue with ARINC standards. Sure, a crew should have picked up the problem, that is what we train to do and try to do, but on one dark night, the operational change resulted in reduced cognitive capacity just as the time available to avoid a disaster went to zero. Both automation and crew processes fell over in that case, but only one had any chance of being able to catch the problem but ran out of time.

Running off the end of the runway as the FD bar is zero attitudes is still incomprehensible as an SA state for any pilot that went solo in a bug smasher, or could drive a car, or ride a bike. The airline concerned needs to go and do a collective belly button contemplation as to how they ended up with that being a solution selected by a trained pilot, as it suggests a gross failure of the total system, not just the pilot, unless, the pilot happened to have a brain tumor or other cognitive impairment. Now, the B777 did have a miserable day many years ago with a high-speed RTO in Nigeria, where the AP had accidentally been engaged, and the driver felt severe restriction when pulling back on the controls. That was an ugly day out and set the manufacturer to print an AOM on the matter, but... golly, following a FD on the ground, is a weird state of affairs, and more bizarre when the guidance is illogical. What has our industry become?

[Chiefttp]

Interestingly my airline has started in the last years to have a training day with various stretch scenarios. These are non graded and allow us to deviate from SOP etc as needed and as allowed in emergency situations. It’s been a fantastic breath of fresh air to not have to worry about what the trainer thinks but rather just focus on getting a safe outcome from the unusual scenario presented to us.

ECAMSurprise,
When I flew C-17’s in the AF, we would get a sim session where they simulated a missile strike. Obviously this caused multiple simultaneous systems damage beyond your standard scenarios. As you stated, it was extremely valuable training, as there were no checklists to refer to in some of these situations. The goal was to use systems knowledge, experience, and Airmanship to get the aircraft on the ground safely. A great example of this was a scenario where a missile struck an engine and destroyed it, also causing a large fuel leak in an adjacent fuel tank feeding a good engine. Instead of trying to analyse the fuel/engine issues, we learned to open all fuel crossfeeds, thereby ensuring all remaining engines would be supplied with fuel, while we tried to land, exceptional training.

[Right20deg]

Your observation is quite valid. The reliance on automation moves the center of error usually from the pilot towards the system architecture and embedded logic, which is great when it works, and not so great when it doesn't. You don't need Kev Sullivan's cosmic radiation bit flip to mess you up, something as simple as AA 965 disclosed the hidden issue with ARINC standards. Sure, a crew should have picked up the problem
Running off the end of the runway as the FD bar is zero attitudes is still incomprehensible as an SA state for any pilot that went solo in a bug smasher, or could drive a car, or ride a bike. The airline concerned needs to go and do a collective belly button contemplation as to how they ended up with that being a solution selected by a trained pilot, as it suggests a gross failure of the total system, not just the pilot, unless, the pilot happened to have a brain tumor or other cognitive impairment. Now, the B777 did have a miserable day many years ago with a high-speed RTO in Nigeria, where the AP had accidentally been engaged, and the driver felt severe restriction when pulling back on the controls. That was an ugly day out and set the manufacturer to print an AOM on the matter, but... golly, following a FD on the ground, is a weird state of affairs, and more bizarre when the guidance is illogical. What has our industry become?
______________________________________________
You make important points. The airline responsible has a 'big issue' with training and culture, all held together with fear. The CRM and safety industry in the west has been aware of this for some time. This airline spends many days a year studying crew resource management.
The cabin crew are controlled in the severest of fashion.
To be candid...." all the gear but no idea" . Such a shame that this is the case.
Rgds R20deg

[Uplinker]

Interestingly my airline has started in the last years to have a training day with various stretch scenarios. These are non graded and allow us to deviate from SOP etc as needed and as allowed in emergency situations. It’s been a fantastic breath of fresh air to not have to worry about what the trainer thinks but rather just focus on getting a safe outcome from the unusual scenario presented to us.

That is certainly a step forwards. There are some minor things I would say or ask PM on a normal line sector, that might be deemed stupid questions, so I don't do that in the Sim. And likewise, there are minor things I would normally suggest or remind PF of that I don't in the Sim. Why? So I don't risk showing myself or the other pilot up in front of the TRE while we are being assessed. Daft, I know but that's how it goes.


Two genuine questions for B777 pilots to help my understanding of this incident and the one where the autopilot was accidentally engaged on the ground:

What is the annunciation that the aircraft is in altitude capturing phase, e.g. within 200' or whatever of the selected Alt, (like ALT* on Airbus)? Would this annunciation be displayed on the ground if that mode was accidentally selected?

Secondly, do B777 SOPs tell you to read out loud and confirm that the flight mode annunciations, i.e. selected modes, including autopilot status, are correct before take-off?

[fdr]

That is certainly a step forwards. There are some minor things I would say or ask PM on a normal line sector, that might be deemed stupid questions, so I don't do that in the Sim. And likewise, there are minor things I would normally suggest or remind PF of that I don't in the Sim. Why? So I don't risk showing myself or the other pilot up in front of the TRE while we are being assessed. Daft, I know but that's how it goes.


Two genuine questions for B777 pilots to help my understanding of this incident and the one where the autopilot was accidentally engaged on the ground:

What is the annunciation that the aircraft is in altitude capturing phase, e.g. within 200' or whatever of the selected Alt, (like ALT* on Airbus)? Would this annunciation be displayed on the ground if that mode was accidentally selected?

Secondly, do B777 SOPs tell you to read out loud and confirm that the flight mode annunciations, i.e. selected modes, including autopilot status, are correct before take-off?

Modes are displayed across the top of the PFDs, 3 primary annunciations.

SPEED MODES | ROLL/LATERAL MODES | PITCH MODES

To set up preflight, the FDs are both switched off (should already be...) and the first FD selected on should set the FD to the take-off configuration. On selecting the first FD ON, the mode should read

BLANK | [ TOGA ] | [ TOGA ] (in green). ( where [. ] denotes a highlight of the mode change).

The modes as they have been engaged will be boxed.
If the lateral or vertical modes are armed, they will display under the respective lateral and vertical.
When a mode changes, it is surrounded by a green box for 10 seconds to highlight the change, Boeing has used that since the introduction of EFIS on the B757 and B767.
The MCP selected ALTITUDE will be in magenta above the ALT tape on the PFD RHS.
Triggering TOGA on the Thrust lever switch(es) gives:

[ THR ] or [ THR REF ] | TOGA | TOGA

The pitch bar will rise to approximately 8 degrees ANU. It will start to give valid pitch guidance later in the rotation when the acceleration and target attitude get dynamically calculated. For the incident case, the pitch bar would be at aircraft's pitch initially and would have commanded eventually a pitch down as the aircraft climbed above the captured altitude.

If the first FD is selected ON and the MCP altitude is at or near the aircraft's actual height, then it will engage in

BLANK | [ TOGA ] | [ ALT ].

On tapping the TOGA switch, the incident aircraft showed:

[ THR ] or [ THR REF ] | TOGA | ALT

Selecting the window to 4000' as was reported thereafter from 00000 will not change the pitch mode, it has captured ALT at 00000.... to get the system to be correctly set for takeoff required the arduous task of setting the MCP altitude to an altitude above current altitude, and cycling the FD(s) OFF and then one at least back ON.


p 3.4 of FCTM:
"However, do not follow F/D commands until after liftoff"

p3.8
Rotation and Liftoff - All Engines
...
"Note: The flight director pitch command is not used for rotation". ...

Systems, particularly close-coupled and highly regulated systems degrade over time as a natural phenomenon. The internal selection processes and management suffer what can be considered a genetic defect from repetitive subsets of practices, policy and procedures that tend to drive the system towards the vortex of the drain. internal audit functions exacerbate the devolution as much as they guard against that, as they also result in box-ticking subsets of checklists that become pavlovian style learned responses, which skews the fundamentals that the system may have been established to achieve. One can presume that the regulator provides external guidance towards restoring the full function of a program, they do not, regulators have more interest in compliance than the effect of a vise-like grip around a program that naturally has human variability within it. External critical review is occasionally a good thing and is often a shock to management assumptions of goodness, where critical observation is accepted. This is not IOSA/USOAP or similar it is a critical review of intent, policy, practice and outcomes to determine where risk is developing within otherwise shiny and polished systems that pass with ease audit checklists, yet suffer apparently inexplicable random Disney ride events apparently out of the blue. The pilots in this case undoubtedly passed all requisite checks and standards yet, golly.

------


Below is a solution for the airlines that find this too arduous or have a system that has reached paradoxical outcomes such as this and G/As with the belly on the ground. etc. The device below avoids crews having a fixation on magenta lines while planet earth passes them by. Good SA is desirable still however, most of these guys and girls would make great MiG 21 pilots. :}

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1020x629/screen_shot_2022_05_22_at_12_34_43_am_8a4a80036d5c4d0e358d5a 33de5fc7e5d35c897e.png

[Fursty Ferret]

What is the annunciation that the aircraft is in altitude capturing phase, e.g. within 200' or whatever of the selected Alt, (like ALT* on Airbus)? Would this annunciation be displayed on the ground if that mode was accidentally selected?

Secondly, do B777 SOPs tell you to read out loud and confirm that the flight mode annunciations, i.e. selected modes, including autopilot status, are correct before take-off?

1. There isn't an alt capture FMA (in fact, ALT doesn't even show as armed when climbing or descending).
2. Yep, but you'd typically only see armed modes. I assume that ALT was active on the ground at this point.

[Uplinker]

Thank you both for your time, I know how long it takes to select all that bold font and square brackets etc. I will digest all that.

(Am loving that stripped-down Tuk Tuk !)

[Check Airman]

1. There isn't an alt capture FMA (in fact, ALT doesn't even show as armed when climbing or descending).
2. Yep, but you'd typically only see armed modes. I assume that ALT was active on the ground at this point.

There’s no alt capture indication on the 777? It just goes from flch to ALT?

[Check Airman]

The PF was incapacitated. What were the PM and relief pilot doing as the speed went though V2 with the nose on the ground?

[hans brinker]

"Manual flying" at many airlines (including the airline in the spotlight) means disconnecting the AP but leaving the FD and ATHR connected.

This is not only of zero value in maintaining, developing, or recovering any piloting skills, in many cases it exposes your passengers to risks.

Flying any SID out of any European airport in this fashion results in one of the two people in the flight deck being lost from the monitoring role, and the second of two being lost as soon as ATC gives a "direct to xxxxx" clearance and his head wobbles down to the CDU. A non-monitored flight deck at 2000 feet is not a good look.

I do recall my brave cockpit companion proudly announcing to me during taxi in LHR that he had decided to hand-fly the Dover departure.. I had to tell ground control to "say again" the taxi clearance as it took a few seconds for me stop laughing at the idea.

Only Dover departure charts I could find are from 2013 (guess it's been a while), but I see nothing on there that would make me apprehensive about the PF not using automation. Flew in the EU for almost a decade, now in the US for almost two. Almost every pilot I am paired with will hand-fly (mostly FD/AT ON due to RNAV) till 10K every leg, I will go FD/AT OFF probably once a week, both for departure and arrival. No, not on the Whitestone or Coney climb out of LGA, unless it is with someone I have flown a lot with, and not after I come in on a red eye, but pretty much anything else is fair game. There is not a single major carrier in the US that mandates automation on, and plenty that mandate that with the AP off the AT should come off for their 737s. The value you could get from hand flying with FD ON is learning to look through the flight director. It is often easy to see a trend starting and anticipating a change a of pitch, and to see the delayed reaction when the FD catches up. Yes FD off would still be better, but not always practical/legal. I strongly disagree with the notion that it is safer to just sit and monitor, because humans have time and time been proven to be terrible at that, and I also definitely believe in just having the muscle memorie from repeated control inputs will make it much easier if at some point you do need to do it yourself, for instance for a TCAS RA. I have had the AT deferred, and seen pilots struggle being able to set power, because of lack of practice.
On that subject, I fly out of KLAS where several departures have crossing restrictions at or below 8000', for traffic on the STAR on a 9000' downwind. I am on the A320 and when light it will climb at over 2000 fpm during the capture. Had several RAs due to this. The only way I have been able to prevent this is by AT OFF and reducing climb thrust (If you select V/S you lose the constraint in the altitude window as our SOP has us setting the highest altitude).

Obviously, aviation is safer due to automation compared to the 70-ties, but I believe we have gotten to the point where there there are more (potential) crashes due to blind adherence to SOP and lack of airmanship/basic flying skills because of our reliance on automation. To hear a fellow pilot scoff at the idea of hand flying what looks like a pretty basic SID does not sit well for me.

[hans brinker]

SIN to DXB in a widebody. 0100 schedule departure but several hours late. (Me 50+ year old captain, F/O 35 year old). Glorious flying weather, DXB in sight before the descent point. F/O disconnects A/P at descent point and barely moves the controls until the flare. Me working like a one armed paperhanger complying with his requests for flaps, gear, radio calls, crew landing brief, tiny bye bye to the pax and other small distractions. I was often out of the loop and worn out when we landed. In a courteous way I asked why he had decided to give up the wonderful automatics available and instead just sit staring at the instruments when he had such a glorious night outside with views even! " I like a challenge he said!"

I heard later after I had left the Company that the F/O was made Fleet Manager.

I've often wanted to tell that little tale....and now I have.
I did fly for a UK airline and during recurrent simulator training I was amazed how often the first action of pilots when an emergency was simulated was to disconnect the auto pilot. Honest!

Quick question: Did you expect him to do the radios, flaps gear, or pax brief if the AP had been on? And as the rwy was in sight and he barely had to move the controls, how much monitoring did you really have to do compared to AP on?

A a new Captain in the SIM was asked why I handed control to the FO with every emergency. My answer was that I knew he could keep the right side up, and I didn't need any distractions while figuring out what to do. Had an engine flame out as PM at TOD. PF went AP OFF the moment we got the low oil pressure warning. I made sure it wasn't a control issue, and switched AP back on. There is definitely a place for automation.

[hans brinker]

They're still very much in the minority, and I've found that the "pilot first, female second" is still there. I've had no issues flying with any of them, excluding one, but she'd be a dick even if she had one.

Not sure if that is an acceptable quote in the era of LGBTQIA2S+ or whatever it is, but I will definitely use it.

[Check Airman]

Only Dover departure charts I could find are from 2013 (guess it's been a while), but I see nothing on there that would make me apprehensive about the PF not using automation. Flew in the EU for almost a decade, now in the US for almost two. Almost every pilot I am paired with will hand-fly (mostly FD/AT ON due to RNAV) till 10K every leg, I will go FD/AT OFF probably once a week, both for departure and arrival. No, not on the Whitestone or Coney climb out of LGA, unless it is with someone I have flown a lot with, and not after I come in on a red eye, but pretty much anything else is fair game. There is not a single major carrier in the US that mandates automation on, and plenty that mandate that with the AP off the AT should come off for their 737s. The value you could get from hand flying with FD ON is learning to look through the flight director. It is often easy to see a trend starting and anticipating a change a of pitch, and to see the delayed reaction when the FD catches up. Yes FD off would still be better, but not always practical/legal. I strongly disagree with the notion that it is safer to just sit and monitor, because humans have time and time been proven to be terrible at that, and I also definitely believe in just having the muscle memorie from repeated control inputs will make it much easier if at some point you do need to do it yourself, for instance for a TCAS RA. I have had the AT deferred, and seen pilots struggle being able to set power, because of lack of practice.
On that subject, I fly out of KLAS where several departures have crossing restrictions at or below 8000', for traffic on the STAR on a 9000' downwind. I am on the A320 and when light it will climb at over 2000 fpm during the capture. Had several RAs due to this. The only way I have been able to prevent this is by AT OFF and reducing climb thrust (If you select V/S you lose the constraint in the altitude window as our SOP has us setting the highest altitude).

Obviously, aviation is safer due to automation compared to the 70-ties, but I believe we have gotten to the point where there there are more (potential) crashes due to blind adherence to SOP and lack of airmanship/basic flying skills because of our reliance on automation. To hear a fellow pilot scoff at the idea of hand flying what looks like a pretty basic SID does not sit well for me.

This forum needs a like button.

Well said sir. I’ll repeat what I’ve said before. If as PM you can’t manage the increased workload of having the PF fly the plane, maybe it’s time for some self-examination.

[Check Airman]

Not sure if that is an acceptable quote in the era of LGBTQIA2S+ or whatever it is, but I will definitely use it.

Lol. You can even say you got it from a check airman. Maybe it’s time to change my username to Check Airmission :rolleyes:

[Dropp the Pilot]

"To hear a fellow pilot scoff at the idea of hand flying what looks like a pretty basic SID does not sit well for me"

So sorry to dissappoint you. I've lost a lot of sleep over your disapproval so may be I better say it again.

Go-around? Engage the autopilot.
SID from LHR/CDG/VIE/LAX/JFK and the like? Engage the autopilot.
Somebody got lost inside the FMC and has to deselect the ILS for 30R, replace the STAR, change to 30L and also go direct BINGO? Engage the autopilot.
Non-normal? Engage the autopilot

I think the most bums on board I ever had was 473. 434 adults, 18 crew and 21 infants. I am certain that if you canvassed each and everyone of them individually precisely zero would be interested in how often I got to practice putting the aircraft symbol on the PFD in perfect alignment with the FD, reconfirming to myself that yes, indeed, it takes 63% N1 and 5 degrees pitch to maintain level flight with Flaps 5. Just like the QRH says. Just like it has been for the last 21,000 hours my taut buttocks have been sitting there.

[hans brinker]

"To hear a fellow pilot scoff at the idea of hand flying what looks like a pretty basic SID does not sit well for me"

So sorry to dissappoint you. I've lost a lot of sleep over your disapproval so may be I better say it again.

Go-around? Engage the autopilot.
SID from LHR/CDG/VIE/LAX/JFK and the like? Engage the autopilot.
Somebody got lost inside the FMC and has to deselect the ILS for 30R, replace the STAR, change to 30L and also go direct BINGO? Engage the autopilot.
Non-normal? Engage the autopilot

I think the most bums on board I ever had was 473. 434 adults, 18 crew and 21 infants. I am certain that if you canvassed each and everyone of them individually precisely zero would be interested in how often I got to practice putting the aircraft symbol on the PFD in perfect alignment with the FD, reconfirming to myself that yes, indeed, it takes 63% N1 and 5 degrees pitch to maintain level flight with Flaps 5. Just like the QRH says. Just like it has been for the last 21,000 hours my taut buttocks have been sitting there.

Any time I think there could be a GA around I leave it on. I bet you spend some of those 21K hours flying. We fly with pilots that haven't yet, and never will if we don't let them. And I already said engage AP for abnormals. And it's easy to say "just follow the QRH for the numbers", but between an A319 with an hour flight, and an A321 going transcon there is a big difference, and you fly WB, so that difference could be even bigger. And I will definitely never ask for the pax opinion.

[Check Airman]

"To hear a fellow pilot scoff at the idea of hand flying what looks like a pretty basic SID does not sit well for me"

So sorry to dissappoint you. I've lost a lot of sleep over your disapproval so may be I better say it again.

Go-around? Engage the autopilot.
SID from LHR/CDG/VIE/LAX/JFK and the like? Engage the autopilot.
Somebody got lost inside the FMC and has to deselect the ILS for 30R, replace the STAR, change to 30L and also go direct BINGO? Engage the autopilot.
Non-normal? Engage the autopilot

I think the most bums on board I ever had was 473. 434 adults, 18 crew and 21 infants. I am certain that if you canvassed each and everyone of them individually precisely zero would be interested in how often I got to practice putting the aircraft symbol on the PFD in perfect alignment with the FD, reconfirming to myself that yes, indeed, it takes 63% N1 and 5 degrees pitch to maintain level flight with Flaps 5. Just like the QRH says. Just like it has been for the last 21,000 hours my taut buttocks have been sitting there.No experience with LHR, CDG or VIE, but the last time I flew out of LAX and JFK, the AP wasn’t on until the mid 20’s. There’s nothing particularly demanding about those SIDs.



For your second example where the STAR and runway have to be changed, I’m inclined to agree with you. But if it’s a case where you’re on the approach to 30R and ATC says to sidestep to 30L, that’s absolutely a case where the AP hinders more than helps.

[hans brinker]

No experience with LHR, CDG or VIE, but the last time I flew out of LAX and JFK, the AP wasn’t on until the mid 20’s. There’s nothing particularly demanding about those SIDs.



For your second example where the STAR and runway have to be changed, I’m inclined to agree with you. But if it’s a case where you’re on the approach to 30R and ATC says to sidestep to 30L, that’s absolutely a case where the AP hinders more than helps.

Only one I haven't done is VIE, but I have done plenty others in that area. big whoopie

[hec7or]

In terms of blind rule following, my current Company which institutionally lacks SA, demand the approach brief items to be discussed on a CAVOK day the actions taken "if not visual"
ok, you could be flying into sun, but seriously

[InnerLoop]

I think the most bums on board I ever had was 473. 434 adults, 18 crew and 21 infants. I am certain that if you canvassed each and everyone of them individually precisely zero would be interested in how often I got to practice putting the aircraft symbol on the PFD in perfect alignment with the FD, reconfirming to myself that yes, indeed, it takes 63% N1 and 5 degrees pitch to maintain level flight with Flaps 5. Just like the QRH says. Just like it has been for the last 21,000 hours my taut buttocks have been sitting there.

The pilot's entire conception of flying the airplane being to follow the FD, is how the accident that this thread is about, happened. And for a matter like this, it's an error in thinking to place weight in the technical opinion of layman customers.

[alf5071h]

InnerLoop, welcome. #357 a good example of how to start Pprune activity; now you have to maintain that quality.

A question to ask is where does the mis ‘conception’ of flying originate. Perhaps ourselves as part of the industry; the mistaken belief that constraint and regulation manages safety in all situations.

We lack the appreciation - awareness that most easy situations have been encountered, but never certain; and with demand for greater flexibility in managing the remaining surprises the need is to move away from individual or component views and consider the whole.
What are the viewpoints of the trainers, management, regulators; what influence do these have on operations, and with what justification.

[InnerLoop]

InnerLoop, welcome. [...]

A question to ask is where does the mis ‘conception’ of flying originate.

Thanks. It's simple human nature to do the least actions possible to accomplish a task. After a while, the non-used actions wither away (assuming they were ever there to begin with, which is not a given).

The task of flying an airplane (properly) involves actions such as setting the attitude to the pre-known approximate level, setting the thrust to the pre-known approximate level, then while checking the results on VSI, altimeter, and airspeed, making continuous fine tuning adjustments (also heading/course deviation to make sure those are still good, and adding some aft elevator and/or trim if needed for a big turn); and if changing speed, trimming immediately one way against the thrust-pitch couple and then trimming in the long term the other way (or the same way, depending on the airplane) against the speed change; and doing the right thing with the pitch and/or trim for each flap extension, which may each have its own personality.

All of these are extraneous when you can just "keep the dot on the cross" or whatever, which accomplishes the task of completing any given flight. So, without thinking about things long term, it is no surprise that the extraneous actions/processes get dropped out. It's just the way normal brains function. (But it's naive to think that watching the autopilot do it for X thousand hours is in any way comparable to doing it oneself... this is not how brains function.)

The minimum effort to get the job done... and it's not a problem until this locked-in loop continues to run and the pilot follows the flight director into a 6000fpm climb at FL350, or follows it into level flight while on the ground. Then it's a problem.

With thinking about things long term, it's a huge fallacy to measure the success of the system by the result of each individual day-to-day flight. Each one could be (and, is) measured "successful" this way, while hiding a lurking AF447 or EK231. (I wonder what those passengers would think about their pilots' comfort and proficiency with flying raw data).

[MrBernoulli]

The Preliminary Report (No. AIFN/0016/2021, issued 16 Feb 2022) for this incident is the last official pronouncement I have seen for this near-disaster. Can anyone say whether there have been any further official reports, final or otherwise? Or has it been left 'under the carpet', in the hope that all will be forgotten?

Has Boeing added anything further to the way the 777 autoflight systems should be treated in similar curcumstances?

Additionally, does anyone know what happened to the "flight crew composed of four members divided into two sets A and B. Each set was comprised of one commander and one copilot. The Commander of set A operated as the pilot flying (PF) and the Copilot operated as the pilot monitoring (PM) for the flight"? I'm not looking for rumours (despite this website's name ...), just an idea of whether the crew involved were 'moved on' by Emirates, or whether they voluntarily jumped before they were pushed?

[MrBernoulli]

I'll take the lack of an updates as:

1. No one knows anything further.
2. No one is prepared to say what they do know .

I have a strong hunch as to which of those options is the more likely. What a shame.