Yet Another Fatal Wirestrike

[KiwiNedNZ]

This time in Louisiana.

Update on Bell 407 wirestrike near New Orleans (https://www.fox8live.com/2021/12/14/helicopter-crash-closes-i-10-bonnet-carre-spillway/)

[twinstar_ca]

Bell 406, eh.... :suspect::ugh:

[Sikpilot]

Another skud running failure. Sad.

[helihub]

The news reports would suggest that weather (low cloud/vis) was a factor, suggesting that "fatal wirestrike" is likely to be secondary to P1's decisions on the weather.

So should the title of this thread be "Fatal decision on weather"?

[Bell_ringer]

The news reports would suggest that weather (low cloud/vis) was a factor, suggesting that "fatal wirestrike" is likely to be secondary to P1's decisions on the weather.

So should the title of this thread be "Fatal decision on weather"?

Choosing to fly in poor conditions isn’t of itself fatal.
It’s the poor judgment a couple of decisions later, to continue, which decides the outcome.
If you want to get into semantics, a fatal accident is rarely the first attempt in similar conditions, just the first time they failed to get away with it.
So, you could argue the decision happened long before that day, if statistics are anything to go by.

[wrench1]

For reference, here are the wires without the fog.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1371x410/xscreenshot_2021_12_15_at_14_39_19_google_maps_26184de4137d3 1039f50c0462d16cee7870199fa.png

[industry insider]

Chilling pictures here:

https://www.wafb.com/2021/12/15/helicopter-rotor-blades-severed-after-clipping-power-lines-new-photos-show/

[Bell_ringer]

Who in their right mind would want to bomb along at speed, low-level, in those conditions.
That is darwin award material.

[212man]

https://fb.watch/9X7D85CVeJ/

[megan]

212, it almost looks like the pilot is coming out of the door in the last 100' or so, any ideas of what it might be?

[Arnie Madsen]

Some highlights from the article....

--- He was a Marine for 13 years, a volunteer firefighter, an Eagle Scout and even worked for the coroner’s office.
--- Paramedic for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) in Baton Rouge for just over four years.
--- His dedication to safety leaves them wondering how this could have happened.
--- “We are trying to wrap our minds around it because he was the king of safety,” said Harrison.
--- Flight instructor ... owned a flight school
--- Member of the FAA safety team

Denham Springs pilot killed in helicopter crash remembered as clever, joke-loving husband, father | Crime/Police | nola.com (https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_bfbf5e00-5db8-11ec-b402-1f6943b022f1.html)

[KiwiNedNZ]

Sounds like one of those "Do as I say Not As I Do"

[finalchecksplease]

Sounds like one of those "Do as I say Not As I Do"

Could be that but it also could be a case of (perceived) commercial pressure.

Over 10 years ago a good friend of mine sadly died while flying in the Gulf of Mexico, just before Christmas as well, and "inadvertent IMC" was a big contributor in his accident. I considered him to be a very safety conscious pilot and just like some reactions in the article linked above by Arnie Madsen I found it hard to understand why he went flying that day seeing how safety focused & cautious he normally was.
It was only after his funeral I found out the real reason he went flying there, while taking time off from his full time job, was because of financial reasons. I'm pretty sure that played to a great degree in his decision making process and got him into this situation which sadly cost him his and his passengers lives.

[212man]

212, it almost looks like the pilot is coming out of the door in the last 100' or so, any ideas of what it might be?

I did read elsewhere that he was ejected, but I cannot clearly discern what is coming off in the video - although it does look like a door

[Arnie Madsen]

.

As well as removing the rotor and gearbox the wires appear to have cut thru the cabin about waist or chest height.

.

[aa777888]

As well as removing the rotor and gearbox the wires appear to have cut thru the cabin about waist or chest height.
Yes, it did appear in the video that there was not much left of the cabin after the wire strike :(

[FH1100 Pilot]

As with so many accidents, we will never know...*can* never know how a pilot that people referred to as "the king of safety" ended up in such a situation. There is no logical explanation for it - and it makes no sense at all. If we look back at accidents that have occurred, we are often inclined to scratch our heads and go, "...How...?" How many other "kings of safety" have we known who've come to their premature demise in an unexplainable pilot-error accident?

In the end, all we can say is that the 407 pilot was human and we humans are prone to making mistakes, and sometimes those mistakes kill us. Fate? Wrong place/wrong time? Just unlucky? Who knows. Have I made such mistakes? Oh yeah! More times than I can count, if I'm being honest. Looking back...I mean...there must be a kind and generous God somewhere for me to still be alive. And I'm not just talking about flying; I ride motorcycles too and over the years have had some *extremely* close calls. Who's to say who lives and who dies? It's sad when things like this happen. All we can do is redouble our resolve to not deliberately put ourselves in situations like that in the future...and then hope we can stick to it.

[helonorth]

There is also the possibility that the pilot wasn't all that into safety after all and may have been taking chances. Seen it before. I don't have to "redouble my resolve" not to fly low level in horrible visibility.

[twinstar_ca]

To me, we saw the last 1.5 seconds of a brother's life. I hope we can learn what we can from what we saw. Remember the old adage... "Learn from the mistakes of others... we don't have enough time to make them all ourselves".... RIP, brother

[FH1100 Pilot]

There is also the possibility that the pilot wasn't all that into safety after all and may have been taking chances. Seen it before. I don't have to "redouble my resolve" not to fly low level in horrible visibility.
So I guess that means that you'll never fly a helicopter ever again. I'm personally happy about that, and I'd wager that the rest of the industry is too.

[Hilico]

One instance where having a CVR fitted would not have helped. I am not making that point flippantly - trying to determine the reason(s) it was flown that way will rely on more than just examining a transcript.

[helonorth]

So I guess that means that you'll never fly a helicopter ever again. I'm personally happy about that, and I'd wager that the rest of the industry is too.
I'm not tracking, chief.

[Bell_ringer]

One instance where having a CVR fitted would not have helped. I am not making that point flippantly - trying to determine the reason(s) it was flown that way will rely on more than just examining a transcript.

There aren’t new ways to kill yourself in an aircraft.
There shouldn’t be surprise about these fatalities, the reasons are almost always the same: supreme confidence in your own abilities coupled with having got away with it before.
Not everyone will have realised how close they got to shuffling off their mortal coil and instead pat themselves on the back (or get patted on the back) for a job well done. Different personality types process situations differently. Our faults are baked in at birth.

[Two's in]

Any casual perusal of Aircraft Accident databases will demonstrate that fatal accidents are no respecter of experience or flight time. The only flight that will kill you is the next one you take. The only mistake that will kill you is the next one you make. There are established accident models that show complacency is a very cyclical thing, the organization I flew with assumed you were fairly unsafe up until the first 500 hours, and then after that, every 500 hour cycle was time to remind pilots they were at greater risk of having an accident. This accident had all the classic hallmarks - speed inappropriate to visibility, height inappropriate to speed. If he knew the route he didn't remember the wires, if he didn't know the route he should have anticipated the wires. Nothing complex here, just another tragic statistic that will continue to grow.

[helonorth]

Any casual perusal of Aircraft Accident databases will demonstrate that fatal accidents are no respecter of experience or flight time. The only flight that will kill you is the next one you take. The only mistake that will kill you is the next one you make.
There are mistakes and then there is behavior that borders on the suicidal. You may get away with the "mistake" of flying low level and high speed in the fog a few times but you will have a very short career.

[helonorth]

Any casual perusal of Aircraft Accident databases will demonstrate that fatal accidents are no respecter of experience or flight time.
Why do companies want to hire pilots with a lot of experience? I did some casual perusing and searched "aircraft accidents by experience level". The first thing that popped up was this from the American Journal of Epidemiology. It's 19 years old but I'd say still relevant.

An excerpt:

"Flight experience, as measured by total flight time at baseline, showed a significant protective effect against the risk of crash involvement. With adjustment for age, pilots who had 5,000–9,999 hours of total flight time at baseline had a 57% lower risk of a crash than their less experienced counterparts (relative risk = 0.43, 95% confidence interval: 0.21, 0.87)."

https://academic.oup.com/aje/article/157/10/874/290156

[Fun_police]

Those wires would have been on a chart.

obviously a lot of bandwidth would have been devoted to looking outside but it seems not a lot was given to flight planning…

[Twist & Shout]

Those wires would have been on a chart.

obviously a lot of bandwidth would have been devoted to looking outside but it seems not a lot was given to flight planning…

How long will it be before one of the “EFB” apps for iPad actively warns you, if you are approaching a charted obstacle below a safe height - like a data base TAWS?
We have two fantastic app’s in Australia that warn you when approaching “airspace” etc allready.

Not talking “certified”, or fool proof, but having your iPad turn red and say “Warning, warning” might save someone.

[aa777888]

Garmin Pilot, which I fly with, does that for both obstacles and terrain, but not power lines. If you are exploiting your 1/2 mile vis./clear of clouds, U.S. class G privileges at an appropriate speed, terrain warnings have to be off because you are generally so low terrain warnings are continuous, and obstacles, i.e. radio towers, are rarely a surprise. Power lines, on the other hand, continue to be a near invisible and serious threat.

However, the modern Garmin GTN series panel navigators can be equipped with HTAWS that includes a substantial U.S. power line obstacle database. It's been available for years. I've not had the opportunity to fly with that technology, unfortunately, so can't speak to it personally.

[FH1100 Pilot]

If the 407 pilot was going VFR from Baton Rouge to Lakefront, New Orleans, he'd want to intercept the south shore of Lake Ponchartrain and then scoot just north of New Orleans International. His plan probably looked something like this.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/814x322/407_665e720d7e04fa21ccb18f8771f7aedc59feeb3f.png

Even a casual glance at the New Orleans chart would show the big powerline cutting north/south across the western part of the lake, just east of where I-55 and I-10 merge. It is unbelievable that a pilot who was familiar with that area would *not* know about it. New Orleans is a tricky place to fly around. There are powerplants and refineries and all kinds of obstacles that can trip up a helicopter pilot. The nearest tower of that powerline south of I-10 is about 500 feet from the roadway. The next tower is out over the water(!), about 250 feet north of the Interstate. The wires themselves were not marked, and I'd bet that they were invisible until just before impact. Not a good situation.

The other thing is that we know that inland fog is never universally even. It can be patchy...thicker in some spots, thinner in others. This particular day was not a "zero/zero" fogged-in, can't-see-sh*t, sort of day. Dash cam video of the event shows fairly good visibility on the ground. Maybe the pilot had good ground contact and it was sunny above, and maybe he thought he was doing okay. Who knows. I haven't seen any info on how fast he was going, so I'm not sure where people are getting some of the numbers they're reporting.

Those of us who fly for a living don't get to turn down flights just because we're not feeling it, or just because we think the weather might be (or become) too bad to fly. If the weather is above "minimums," we go flying (unless there's a huge squall line or "something" that's definitely coming that would make launching unsafe). You can't really say, "Well...ahhhh...there might be some fog between here and there, and so I'd rather just cancel the flight today, boss." You won't be a professional pilot for long if you do that more than once or twice.

Our (usually non-pilot) bosses are generally not dumb; most of the time they're familiar with basic-VFR minimums as they apply to airplanes and helicopters here in the U.S., and they expect us to be capable of flying in them. If the weather is "generally" flyable, our bosses expect us to fly and use our superior judgment to not crash and kill them. And that's what we do. Most of the time.

At PHI, our over-water cross-country weather minimums were 500/3. The problem is, even 500/3 can turn into zero-zero very unexpectedly. I was once flying along at 500', fat dumb and happy under a very dark overcast. Visibility underneath was, like, ten miles or more. All of a sudden, the clouds in my area let loose and I was suddenly engulfed in heavy rain. With my vast 2,500 hours of experience, I said something profound like, "ZOIKS!" They hadn't taught us about that in training. The forward viz was so bad that I honestly considered popping the floats and setting it down on the water. But luckily I was over a shallow part of the Gulf of Mexico and a platform soon appeared - on which I landed. That was 1987. In the following years, I have diverted around weather, done a 180, and even landed in a field or two to wait out an improvement. I'd like to say that I always maintained nice and comfortable "VFR" conditions throughout my flying career, but it just ain't so. We fly helicopters. And helicopters sometimes fly in some crappy weather.

To say, "Well I would never fly in such bad weather as that 407 pilot!" makes the person talking (or writing) sound foolish and silly. Of course you would, if you're really a commercial helicopter pilot. The key is to do something else before it gets so bad that you hit something. The unfortunate 407 pilot did not, and sadly he paid the ultimate price. He's not the first, and probably won't be the last.

[helonorth]

New Orleans is a tricky place to fly around.
New Orleans is not a tricky place to fly around and after reading the rest of your post, I'm as amazed as you are that you're still alive.

[Sir Korsky]

Those of us who fly for a living don't get to turn down flights just because we're not feeling it, or just because we think the weather might be (or become) too bad to fly.

Not quite true. Pick your employer carefully.

[Sikpilot]

There but for the Grace of God go I

I would think that all of us that spent any time as PIC flying helicopters can tell a story how by some miracle they didn't die on one particular day. I learned my lesson back in 1986 flying an R22 not to fool with the weather and that lesson stayed in the forefront of my brain for thousands of hours since.


Joshua seemed like a giving person. RIP Marine

[megan]

Anybody with experience with power line warning systems such as this?

https://www.safeflight.com/helicopter-systems/products/powerline-detection/

[rrekn]

Yeah, I've flown with them on a HEMS AW139. They do warn of power lines, including any that you're flying over or near. Hence when you're flying in a city, it goes off most of the time and just becomes a nuisance.

Best system to avoid power lines is to include them in a HTAWS database to provide specific and detailed warnings of any wires coming up.

[[email protected]]

Frankly, it never ceases to amaze me how people can be so bloody stupid - yes, sometimes you get caught out by the weather, yes there are pressures to get the job done, yes we are human and make mistakes - BUT, that flight at low level in an obstruction rich environment in such poor weather was STUPID - plain and simple.

If you go down then slow down - I have hovertaxied in cloud and fog to get a job done and gone under and over wires - it can be done safely if you do it slowly and know when to say NO.

[haihio]

If the 407 pilot was going VFR from Baton Rouge to Lakefront, New Orleans, he'd want to intercept the south shore of Lake Ponchartrain and then scoot just north of New Orleans International. His plan probably looked something like this.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/814x322/407_665e720d7e04fa21ccb18f8771f7aedc59feeb3f.png

Even a casual glance at the New Orleans chart would show the big powerline cutting north/south across the western part of the lake, just east of where I-55 and I-10 merge. It is unbelievable that a pilot who was familiar with that area would *not* know about it. New Orleans is a tricky place to fly around. There are powerplants and refineries and all kinds of obstacles that can trip up a helicopter pilot. The nearest tower of that powerline south of I-10 is about 500 feet from the roadway. The next tower is out over the water(!), about 250 feet north of the Interstate. The wires themselves were not marked, and I'd bet that they were invisible until just before impact. Not a good situation.

The other thing is that we know that inland fog is never universally even. It can be patchy...thicker in some spots, thinner in others. This particular day was not a "zero/zero" fogged-in, can't-see-sh*t, sort of day. Dash cam video of the event shows fairly good visibility on the ground. Maybe the pilot had good ground contact and it was sunny above, and maybe he thought he was doing okay. Who knows. I haven't seen any info on how fast he was going, so I'm not sure where people are getting some of the numbers they're reporting.

Those of us who fly for a living don't get to turn down flights just because we're not feeling it, or just because we think the weather might be (or become) too bad to fly. If the weather is above "minimums," we go flying (unless there's a huge squall line or "something" that's definitely coming that would make launching unsafe). You can't really say, "Well...ahhhh...there might be some fog between here and there, and so I'd rather just cancel the flight today, boss." You won't be a professional pilot for long if you do that more than once or twice.

Our (usually non-pilot) bosses are generally not dumb; most of the time they're familiar with basic-VFR minimums as they apply to airplanes and helicopters here in the U.S., and they expect us to be capable of flying in them. If the weather is "generally" flyable, our bosses expect us to fly and use our superior judgment to not crash and kill them. And that's what we do. Most of the time.

At PHI, our over-water cross-country weather minimums were 500/3. The problem is, even 500/3 can turn into zero-zero very unexpectedly. I was once flying along at 500', fat dumb and happy under a very dark overcast. Visibility underneath was, like, ten miles or more. All of a sudden, the clouds in my area let loose and I was suddenly engulfed in heavy rain. With my vast 2,500 hours of experience, I said something profound like, "ZOIKS!" They hadn't taught us about that in training. The forward viz was so bad that I honestly considered popping the floats and setting it down on the water. But luckily I was over a shallow part of the Gulf of Mexico and a platform soon appeared - on which I landed. That was 1987. In the following years, I have diverted around weather, done a 180, and even landed in a field or two to wait out an improvement. I'd like to say that I always maintained nice and comfortable "VFR" conditions throughout my flying career, but it just ain't so. We fly helicopters. And helicopters sometimes fly in some crappy weather.

To say, "Well I would never fly in such bad weather as that 407 pilot!" makes the person talking (or writing) sound foolish and silly. Of course you would, if you're really a commercial helicopter pilot. The key is to do something else before it gets so bad that you hit something. The unfortunate 407 pilot did not, and sadly he paid the ultimate price. He's not the first, and probably won't be the last.


There’s no function to give you a “ like” on here so I’ll just have to type it.

[Bell_ringer]

Frankly, it never ceases to amaze me how people can be so bloody stupid - yes, sometimes you get caught out by the weather, yes there are pressures to get the job done, yes we are human and make mistakes - BUT, that flight at low level in an obstruction rich environment in such poor weather was STUPID - plain and simple.

If you go down then slow down - I have hovertaxied in cloud and fog to get a job done and gone under and over wires - it can be done safely if you do it slowly and know when to say NO.

Couldn't agree more.
Cultures get created (Kobe Bryant crash being another case in point) where safety is a box ticking exercise, that justifies tackling any flight no matter what.
All the fellow cowboys out there can then find plenty of reasons why it wasn't the pilot's fault and shrug their shoulders.
That's why we will keep getting statistics, there are just so many that will read this and be thinking I've done worse, or I would have succeeded.

The only saving grace here is that no one else got to pay for such stupidity, apart from the insurer, who I can only hope repudiates the claim.

[[email protected]]

The only saving grace here is that no one else got to pay for such stupidity, apart from the insurer, who I can only hope repudiates the claim. Apart from his family, sadly paying a very large price.

Completely agree about the pseudo-safety culture - box-ticking does not make for safe flying.

[Bell_ringer]

Apart from his family, sadly paying a very large price.


It’s tragic how the family is always forgotten.
When the lawyers and insurers come looking at the estate to pay for the mistake, it can leave loved ones destitute trying to fight it.
The pain continues long after the crispy bits are scraped off the sidewalk.
It’s worth remembering this before testing how pointy the pointy end of the risk envelope really is.

[Arnie Madsen]

.

When this first came on the news I went on Google Street View .... started at the wrong end and traveled over 10 miles before coming to where power-lines crossed the road at the west end ...... Looked like clear sailing with no obstructions other than street lamps and even they had no overhead wires .

Not excusing the pilot but the 11 mile bridge would have initially been a good VFR reference because one side is open water and the other is forest and swamp

The very tall power-line and towers continue across miles of that forest and miles of that open water so either way he would have encountered them trying to stay under the fog.

Like I said , not excusable but makes his choice more understandable under those conditions.

Picture shows the four lanes of highway he was flying over ..... On the very right is a railroad track with typical low level power lines but they are not the ones he hit.
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1448x608/bonnet_carre_bridge_c7044b7d651c0cd0a40ea0ddcae1ee1aa6fa48f3 .jpg

[the coyote]

Experience counts, there is no way around it. Just gain experience, and you will find it gets easier to say no AND to honor your responsibility to uphold the safety of those on board above anything else. Rather than be a ********. Just have the humility before you gain that experience to simply be cautious and operate only within your personal limits regardless of what perceived pressure you have. Put your ego away for goodness sake.
Such a senseless loss.

[[email protected]]

Such a senseless loss. And just before Christmas - one can't help feeling for his 3 sons and his widow who will associate Christmas with his passing for many years........what on earth was he thinking?

[Gordy]

I have waited a few days before posting. Very sad accident and we will continue to have these types of accidents moving forwards. Some on here have made comments that I disagree with, but that is the beauty of the herd.

I teach "Flying in the Wire Environment" to one of the large power companies--every linemen who flies and every pilot on property, (70,000 Sq. Mile territory), goes through the class, and I have hit and survived a wire strike, so I "may" have some insight.

In my mind it comes down to CRM, be it multi-crew or single pilot.

Communication either to ones self or flying partner as to the location and proximity of wires and hazards. Verbalize the hazard while flying.
Situational Awareness, which covers systems, location, where are the wires in relation to you, fatigue, human factors etc including "continuation Bias
Decision Making, choosing to fly in the wire environment or choosing to sit it out.

To those who have said he was stupid and cannot believe people would do this, I say it is human nature. Even in the companies where there is no pressure to fly, pilots still try........

I leave you with these words, and say RIP fellow pilot ...
"The readiness to blame a dead pilot for an accident is nauseating, but it has been the tendency ever since I can remember. What pilot has not been in positions where he was in danger and where perfect judgment would have advised against going? But when a man is caught in such a position he is judged only by his error and seldom given credit for the times he has extricated himself from worse situations. Worst of all, blame is heaped upon him by other pilots, all of whom have been in parallel situations themselves, but without being caught in them. If one took no chances, one would not fly at all. Safety lies in the judgment of the chances one takes."

— Charles Lindbergh, journal entry 26 August 1938

[Hot and Hi]

You - and Charles - couldn’t have said it any better.

[Robbiee]

"The readiness to blame a dead pilot for an accident is nauseating, but it has been the tendency ever since I can remember. What pilot has not been in positions where he was in danger and where perfect judgment would have advised against going? But when a man is caught in such a position he is judged only by his error and seldom given credit for the times he has extricated himself from worse situations. Worst of all, blame is heaped upon him by other pilots, all of whom have been in parallel situations themselves, but without being caught in them. If one took no chances, one would not fly at all. Safety lies in the judgment of the chances one takes."

— Charles Lindbergh, journal entry 26 August 1938

I'm confused Chuck. If the pilot is not to blame for such an accident then who is? :ooh:

[Bell_ringer]

You - and Charles - couldn’t have said it any better.

We’ve had almost 84 years of re-learning lessons, processes, procedures and regulation since chuck uttered those words.
If he were here today, I would be surprised if the thought passing through his mind wasn’t “FFS people!”

[[email protected]]

Agreed - a lot of water under the bridge and far too many accidents (so often repeatable ones). At some point you do have to blame the pilot, there is no excuse in modern aviation for ignorance of the dangers.

The 'no-blame' culture of safety management systems has helped people report near misses but it hasn't stopped the fatal accidents a SMS is supposed to prevent.

We are not pioneering as in the days of Lindbergh, we are using aircraft to do a job - or sometimes for recreation - office workers don't sit under a grand piano suspended from the ceiling by a fraying rope but that is what pilots keep doing by flying in crappy weather at low level.

[Uplinker]

Some very wise words, and a superb image about having a piano suspended above your head. Really brings it home :ok:

This is not a dig at all, but as a fixed wing pilot who spent a lot of time about 6 miles above such hazards, do heli pilots not refer to and obey MORAs?, (minimum off route altitudes). MORAs allow for obstacles up to 1000' above the surface, and electricity pylons are, what 200-300' high? which is bloody low from a flying point of view, (and below the low flying rule limit).

So if the cloud base does not allow flight above local MORA, then surely to goodness it should not be attempted, no matter what the forward visibility is perceived to be??

And why would any pilot fly en-route below the height of electricity pylons......Ever?? Surely asking for trouble?

Not having a go, just confused why anyone would do this.

[[email protected]]

Uplinker - there are plenty of us ex-mil whose job was to fly at low level and we were well trained to do it, day and night - unfortunately there are many who think they can do it without the training.

I note that the accident pilot had been in the USMC but as an aircraft mechanic and not a pilot, and he would have seen plenty of pilots go off to low fly and maybe heard tales of their exploits, probably with bad weather as a factor.

Now fast forward to him having his own licence (only 7 years of experience and probably little at low level) and he is pushing limits he has heard about but not experienced.

Otherwise I struggle to think why he would put himself in a situation that properly trained and experienced pilots would have balked at.

[megan]

You're a tough crowd. Every human endevour has its share of accidents, why should aviation be an exception? People err and at the end of the day we are left wondering why did s/he do that, at times the answer is elusive or unknowable.

Gordy is a very experienced operator yet took out some wires, be interesting for his explanation to show how easily it can happen.

My wire story. One of two pilots working for a newly established operator and putting in more than permissible duty hours, Saturday was to be a day off, at dawn Saturday morning the phone rings, a four year old child has spent the night lost in the bush in freezing weather and can we do a search. Fly to the assigned area, heavily timbered mountainous country, weather CAVOK,high recce and plot the location of a very high voltage power line, then down to the tree tops hover taxiing using the rotor wash to blow the canopy apart so as to see forest floor. Proceeding along the bottom of a valley received a message the child had been found was and asked if I could land in a clear area located just up the hill from my present location. An emotionally charged moment as my child was of the same age. Flying a 206 on fixed floats, looking down through the chin bubble suddenly saw a wire come into view, looked up and the earth wire looked to be approaching at a height just under the rotor disc, a quick and measured drop of collective and we sailed underneath to come out unscathed, ground speed at the time no more than 5 knots. God does smile on the foolish at times. Completely forgotten about wires at the time despite the recce. Why? I can't give an answer, a psychologist might.

[krobar]

HAI - Land and LIVE program (https://rotor.org/resources/hai-land-live-program/)

[Bell_ringer]

There is a BIG difference between commercial operations in the utility, rescue and agricultural sectors who have to negotiate wires constantly as part of their job - and collecting some in the fog/low cloud because you are flying below minimas.
Accidents can and will happen in that area and more often than not, into wires they are acutely aware of.
One comes with the territory the other is completely unnecessary.

[Gordy]

You're a tough crowd. Every human endeavor has its share of accidents, why should aviation be an exception? People err and at the end of the day we are left wondering why did s/he do that, at times the answer is elusive or unknowable.


Agreed, and some posters here just don't get it.... I cannot force you.


Gordy is a very experienced operator yet took out some wires, be interesting for his explanation to show how easily it can happen.

It was calm wind, good weather, good visibility, I knew the wire was in the area..... got complacent, lost situational awareness.... I was patrolling a different circuit at the time and was flying in the wire environment by choice.

PG&E did sponsor and pay for a video re-creation which forms part of the 8 hour class I teach. (Fun day---"Hey Gordy, we know you hit these wires but can you hover in front of them for 10 minutes while we film?".... Me: "Not a problem---not stressful at all"...said in a sarcastic voice). If you watched the USHST webinar 8 weeks ago you would have seen the video, they have yet to put it on their website. The video is proprietary therefore I cannot just post it, I will seek permission to post it here...give me a few days. Failing that, I am booked to present at the "Vertical Aviation Safety Conference" in Texas next year.

Here is a still from the video....me flying.... You see it?
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x995/picture1_a12c1ec1387311100caaba399f01fe6926809cde.jpg

[[email protected]]

Not a tough crowd at all - just sick of pilots taking unreasonable risks, usually for the wrong reasons and losing their lives (and taking others with them).

After 40 years in the cockpit, I realise that not highlighting the errors of others is the mistake - we hide behind no-blame culture and paper-safety from SMS so we can can keep taking those risks because we are pilots and clearly a cut above the rest of the human race (or so many of us seem to think).

Flying into a set of wires you didn't know were there is unfortunate - flying into a set you did know was there is a failure to aviate properly.

[OvertHawk]

I think the important aspect here is that we accept that we as pilots will make errors because we are human.

I thank Gordy for sharing his experience. I think everyone who is honest with themselves will have been in a situation at one time or another where we have (to use Crab's phrase) "failed to aviate properly". I know I have - because I'm human and I make mistakes.

But we have it in our power to use our judgment to reduce the chances of an error occurring and to reduce the severity of that error if it does occur.

This accident was not a wire strike per-se - It was CFIT in bad weather. That it happened that he hit a wire rather than another form of obstruction or terrain is irrelevant.

Yes we all make mistakes and we need to allow for that.

But we seem as an industry to be woefully unable to learn from the mistakes of others.

At what point do these things stop being mistakes and become recklessness or negligence?

As for being "a tough crowd"? I think we damn well should be a tough crowd to ourselves as an industry because these kind of "accidents" and near misses simply should not be happening anywhere near as frequently as they are.

[Uplinker]

Not ever a heli pilot, so not judging at all, but precisely because we are human, pilots have safety procedures and limits, such as MSAs or Grid MORAs, that we must follow to keep us safe in a dynamic flying situation.

I don't know if Helis have some sort of Grid MORA equivalent? In the airline world, flying below this or the MSA is a strict no-no, (unless approaching a runway). Obviously some helicopter Ops do involve flying low, and I understand the need to fly at tree-top height for search and rescue, or with underslung loads, but in such situations, is there not an observer to look out while the pilot is looking down, or vice versa?

In Gordy's still frame, above, the wires go across a valley, so the minimum height would need to be much higher than 200 - 300: above the valley floor to clear those.

Shame there isn't a GPS App like a Sat-Nav but with all the wires and pylons on, that could track and alert the pilot about the presence of either nearby. Such a thing would seem pretty useful for helicopter ops? Amazed it hasn't already been done.

[trim it out]

Shame there isn't a GPS App like a Sat-Nav but with all the wires and pylons on, that could track and alert the pilot about the presence of either nearby. Such a thing would seem pretty useful for helicopter ops? Amazed it hasn't already been done.
There are systems out there. GECO and EuroNav for example.

[whoknows idont]

Some very wise words, and a superb image about having a piano suspended above your head. Really brings it home :ok:

This is not a dig at all, but as a fixed wing pilot who spent a lot of time about 6 miles above such hazards, do heli pilots not refer to and obey MORAs?, (minimum off route altitudes). MORAs allow for obstacles up to 1000' above the surface, and electricity pylons are, what 200-300' high? which is bloody low from a flying point of view, (and below the low flying rule limit).

So if the cloud base does not allow flight above local MORA, then surely to goodness it should not be attempted, no matter what the forward visibility is perceived to be??

And why would any pilot fly en-route below the height of electricity pylons......Ever?? Surely asking for trouble?

Not having a go, just confused why anyone would do this.

I understand it must seem insane from the pressurized cabin point of view. To answer your questions: When you're flying from airport to airport then obviously you don't need to use a helicopter with all of its disadvantages. A helicopter by it's nature must sooner or later descend into the obstacle environment in order to get the job done, apart from few exceptions such as news gathering or some police work. Even if it's just for that one off-airport landing or take-off at one end of an A to B flight. Most utility work is based on constantly flying very low. Low flying is our bread and butter.

As you asked specifically about en-route: Crab already explained that scud running can be done relatively safely with helicopters due to the fact that they can fly as slow as required. When you get caught out by degrading conditions you can simply land (given the environment offers enough suitable spots).
However, adequate reduction of speed as well as the right timing for a precautionary landing both require proper perception and assessment of the current situation. That judgement is not black and white but very individual and subjective compared to the highly standardized procedures of IFR flight at three-digit flight levels. I'd say generally the line between flying safely and "asking for trouble" is a lot thinner in VFR helicopter ops.


In Gordy's still frame, above, the wires go across a valley, so the minimum height would need to be much higher than 200 - 300: above the valley floor to clear those.

Gordy wrote: "I was patrolling a different circuit at the time and was flying in the wire environment by choice."
Meaning he was inspecting another wire. This means flying right next to the line and simply cannot be done at a "safe" height.

Sounds like one of those "Do as I say Not As I Do"
Agreed.

[aa777888]

Not ever a heli pilot, so not judging at all, but precisely because we are human, pilots have safety procedures and limits, such as MSAs or Grid MORAs, that we must follow to keep us safe in a dynamic flying situation.

I don't know if Helis have some sort of Grid MORA equivalent?
In the US, in general they do not. Nothing that is mandated by the FAA. Various operators may implement their own rules and procedures in addition to FAA regulations. Some of those additional rules, procedures, systems and processes may be required to get a commercial, Part 135 operating certificate. But, in general, the answer is almost universally no.

It's apparently worth pointing out (again), that in the US, helicopter day VFR operations in Class G airspace enjoy the following weather minimum requirements: 1/2 mile visibility and clear of clouds. Class G in the US is found nearly everywhere at 600 AGL and below, sometimes 1200 AGL and below, except where Class B, C, D and E extend to the ground. The accident helicopter was operating in Class G airspace.

Of course, just because it is legal does not make it safe. And just because it is safe for some pilots does not make is safe for others. Everything is relative. Including a pilot's risk personal minimums. As was well said already, we can all stay perfectly safe by remaining on the ground. Put one foot on a step stool in your kitchen and you are asking for it!

Obviously some helicopter Ops do involve flying low, and I understand the need to fly at tree-top height for search and rescue, or with underslung loads, but in such situations, is there not an observer to look out while the pilot is looking down, or vice versa?Again, the answer is "not required", not that that isn't the norm. However, in this particular case, the pilot was merely trying to get from point A to point B and not engaged in SAR, external load, or any other sort of more complex operation.

Shame there isn't a GPS App like a Sat-Nav but with all the wires and pylons on, that could track and alert the pilot about the presence of either nearby. Such a thing would seem pretty useful for helicopter ops? Amazed it hasn't already been done.It has been done already. Indeed, the accident helicopter was reported as being a 407GXP. This model has all the hardware necessary to run the Garmin HTAWS functionality as a software add-on, as well as the Garmin WireAware add-on to HTAWS. WireAware has been around since at least 2015 and provides warnings against a vast database of power lines throughout the US. Whether or not this helicopter was equipped with HTAWS or WireAware I can't say.

All things being equal, this pilot might have been doing everything as perfectly as it could be done under those conditions. Flying slow and cautiously. He might have been perfectly cognizant of those powerlines. And yet it takes only one "rogue cloud" or a few seconds of distraction under those conditions for things to turn out differently. It's low safety margin flying and, as is plainly evident from the discussion here, there are some who believe it is too low to be allowed. Others successfully execute in this regime quite frequently. It's an argument as old as the invention of aircraft. It's risks are proven over and over again. Some are willing to run those risks. Others are not. Until it becomes outlawed entirely, there will always be pilots who are willing.

[Robbiee]

,...helicopter day VFR operations in Class G airspace enjoy the following weather minimum requirements: 1/2 mile visibility and clear of clouds

Used to be just "clear of clouds".

Has that added 1/2 mile vis. made any different?

[Uplinker]

@#58, #59, #60;

Thanks all, interesting, (but a bit scary to be honest !).

I remember in my early training days being in the back of a PA-28, with an instructor and my colleague in the front. They were flying below MORA near the Sandy television mast (UK) in legal - though not brilliant - VMC. I piped up and suggested it would be a very good idea to get above MORA - especially since none of us knew exactly where the mast was - which I am very pleased to say they did.

Re Gordy's circuit, ah, the sort of circuit with wires. Sorry, I was thinking flying circuits - Doh !
.

[aa777888]

Used to be just "clear of clouds".

Has that added 1/2 mile vis. made any different?
Couldn't tell you. It's always been 1/2 mile/CoC for me.

I've only launched into conditions that forced me to stay in Class G three times, each time primarily because of low ceilings. One time was a ferry flight. Wound up doing a "land and live" evolution (not that I felt like I was going to die, but it was impossible to get over a certain ridge line). Got a cup of coffee, waited it out 45 minutes, and was able to continue. Another time was no problem. Third time I was getting lower and slower, looked ahead, turned to the client and said, "Nope, can't go further, how about we turn around and do the area up north today, then come back here tomorrow?" Which we did, and which ultimately only put him a 1/2 hour over his minimum time for the next day, so not too bad. Low ceilings don't bother me so much, but those three flights have proven that my natural reaction is to quit when I've got less than a mile vis and have to get below 400AGL and/or 60KN. I can't imagine following a road at 100AGL at 40KN. I like a little in the bank visibility-wise. I'm also one of those guys that leaves three seconds between cars on the highway so that everyone cuts in front me all the time :}

[wrench1]

Used to be just "clear of clouds".
FYI: the Part 91 rules got changed around 2014 or so when the Part 135 EMS helicopter rules went through some big changes on minimums.

pre-2014:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2011-title14-vol2/pdf/CFR-2011-title14-vol2-sec91-155.pdf
post 2014:
https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-F/part-91/subpart-B/subject-group-ECFR4d5279ba676bedc/section-91.155#p-91.155(b)

[whoknows idont]

I can't imagine following a road at 100AGL at 40KN.

Fortunately flying from A to B at 40kn is highly uneconomic and in many situations not reasonably justifiable anyways. Especially when you factor in a fair chance of turning around or precautionary landing in the middle of nowhere.

[megan]

As for being "a tough crowd"? I think we damn well should be a tough crowd to ourselves as an industry because these kind of "accidents" and near misses simply should not be happening anywhere near as frequently as they areIn the process of being tough we need to be cognisant of the human, no human is perfect. Why do we have collisions on the roads where we operate in very benign circumstances?After 40 years in the cockpit, I realise that not highlighting the errors of others is the mistake - we hide behind no-blame culture and paper-safety from SMS so we can can keep taking those risks because we are pilots and clearly a cut above the rest of the human race (or so many of us seem to think).

Flying into a set of wires you didn't know were there is unfortunate - flying into a set you did know was there is a failure to aviate properly.From my incident can you tell me how I failed to aviate properly? Clearly an error, but explain to me in simple language why it occurred, as would be written in a incident report by investigators. Trying to lay "blame" on an individual is a failure to learn from the particular incident, examine the cause of the accident and try to learn something from it. With this particular incident we have absolutely no idea what the pilots motivations were, nor the circumstances surrounding the flight, or pressures he may have been facing. One thing we do know with accuracy, he didn't get out of bed that morning and say to himself "today I commit suicide".

Glad you've survived 40 years Crab, I survived a paltry 38 of professional, and a goodly portion of that was for a muti national listed in the top ten where we were obliged to turn the other way when rules were mentioned. Life is not as simple as you like it to be.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Fortunately flying from A to B at 40kn is highly uneconomic and in many situations not reasonably justifiable anyways. Especially when you factor in a fair chance of turning around or precautionary landing in the middle of nowhere.
Yeah, but see, there are a gazillion different scenarios and circumstances to make any hard-and-fast "rules." Every flight department is different. Every boss is different. Every mission is different.

I used to fly for a rich guy (FAR Part 91) whose home base was down here along the U.S. gulf coast. He had a hunting camp about 65 miles north - about 35-40 minutes on a good day. Easy-peasy. This part of the state is mostly flat, open farmland, and we could easily and safely do the flight at 400' agl if we had to. Except... Except there was one area...not really a "ridge"...just some higher ground that ran perpendicular to our flight path between here and there. We knew the terrain - knew the roads and knew there were no antennas or powerlines along the way. We'd done the route dozens of times over the years.

Sure enough, one day we launched under a low ceiling and were plugging along at 300-400 feet. All was good until we got to that high point, where the clouds were down in the trees. I slowed down and got down over a lightly traveled country road. I won't lie, it was tense, and I'm sure that the few car drivers we encountered thought we were crazy. After what seemed like an eternity, the ground fell away and gave us some clearance between it and the clouds. We continued on to the hunting camp. Was it horribly unsafe? I didn't think so. However, I don't think the FAA would've been too impressed. But this was before the rule changed to the "1/2-mile minimum viz" requirement.

Helicopters fly low - it's what we do: off-airport to off-airport. Sometimes, the only reason we go to an actual airport is to get fuel. And a lot of times, we fly in weather conditions that keep our fixed-wing brethren cowering like scared little girls in pilot lounges all across the nation, gazing out the window and going, "It's 900 and 2.5 out there. Look at that crazy helicopter pilot - he's gonna get himself killed! Let's get another cup of this 'free' coffee and if it hasn't improved in fifteen minutes, let's...and by "let's" I mean "you" call the boss and tell him that we're cancelled for the day."

[[email protected]]

From my incident can you tell me how I failed to aviate properly? Megan - you didn't. My comment was about Gordy's incident which was clearly a loss of SA.

Finding unexpected wires is part of life as a helicopter pilot, especially when other pressures such as life-saving are brought into the equation.

We had to be able to land pretty much anywhere, day or night, and only constant awareness and a thorough recce prevented mishaps - I have lost count of times we had a late spot of wires on final approach.

[[email protected]]

I can't imagine following a road at 100AGL at 40KN. You wouldn't have enjoyed the road from Port Stanley to Mount Pleasant Airfield (Falklands) in the dark at 30' and 30 kts then - thunderstorms all around (no IFR option) and minefields either side of the road (no landing option). :ok:

[megan]

you didn'tThat'll allow me to sleep tonight, thanks. :p Its been something I've pondered over the years, did I allow emotion to over ride reason. When EMS began as an industry I remember the advice "don't take any notice of the patient less it detract from your performance". The advice came too late for me.

Well remember a medevac of an old Vietnamese woman dressed in the typical black pajamas. She was standing in a rice paddy with the opening scene of "Apocalypse Now" playing in the background as F-5s worked over a village. Clutched to her chest she was a bundle that I took to be personal possessions. In the cruise looked back to see her sitting in the middle of the five across Huey seats, as we flew with the rear doors open the slipstream was plucking at her pajamas, the slipstream afforded a look at what she had clutched to her chest, the bled out body of a child no more than nine months old, missing both legs at the groin and an arm at the shoulder, yet the old woman was staring straight ahead through the windscreen, unblinking, with a look that said "this is how we live". Cried so much the co-pilot offered to take over, I declined, as if I was going to bring some personal restoration to sanity.

Had its black humour moments though, picked up a load of wounded ARVN solders when one of the backseaters said look at this. Turned around and one soldier was on his knees with trouser lowered to same and proudly showing his penis, or rather where it should be, severed completely at the base by a gun shot we were told, a surgeon couldn't have done a better job. He thought it a great joke, wonder if he later realised the limited options he may face in future life.

[Vortexringshark]

Yeah, but see, there are a gazillion different scenarios and circumstances to make any hard-and-fast "rules." Every flight department is different. Every boss is different. Every mission is different.

I used to fly for a rich guy (FAR Part 91) whose home base was down here along the U.S. gulf coast. He had a hunting camp about 65 miles north - about 35-40 minutes on a good day. Easy-peasy. This part of the state is mostly flat, open farmland, and we could easily and safely do the flight at 400' agl if we had to. Except... Except there was one area...not really a "ridge"...just some higher ground that ran perpendicular to our flight path between here and there. We knew the terrain - knew the roads and knew there were no antennas or powerlines along the way. We'd done the route dozens of times over the years.

Sure enough, one day we launched under a low ceiling and were plugging along at 300-400 feet. All was good until we got to that high point, where the clouds were down in the trees. I slowed down and got down over a lightly traveled country road. I won't lie, it was tense, and I'm sure that the few car drivers we encountered thought we were crazy. After what seemed like an eternity, the ground fell away and gave us some clearance between it and the clouds. We continued on to the hunting camp. Was it horribly unsafe? I didn't think so. However, I don't think the FAA would've been too impressed. But this was before the rule changed to the "1/2-mile minimum viz" requirement.

Helicopters fly low - it's what we do: off-airport to off-airport. Sometimes, the only reason we go to an actual airport is to get fuel. And a lot of times, we fly in weather conditions that keep our fixed-wing brethren cowering like scared little girls in pilot lounges all across the nation, gazing out the window and going, "It's 900 and 2.5 out there. Look at that crazy helicopter pilot - he's gonna get himself killed! Let's get another cup of this 'free' coffee and if it hasn't improved in fifteen minutes, let's...and by "let's" I mean "you" call the boss and tell him that we're cancelled for the day."

Your last paragraph shows the attitude that will keep killing helicopter pilots. I get that we operate differently to fixed wing around weather. This is because we can slow down or land as it turns crap. They can't therefore have higher mins. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have any minima.

Your story reads like you were hover taxiing at or below tree top height in cloud just to drop a dude at his hunting spot. You said yourself it was tense but I get the feeling you would do it again. Just because we CAN do that doesn't mean we SHOULD do it. Had you been on a rescue then yeah maybe that's worth it but in your case the juice ain't worth the squeeze.
I do want to note that I have never faced the commercial pressure that does appear to be the main issue

[Uplinker]

Hmmm, I didn't realise this was a willy waving exercise, #67. Next time I have to divert because of low viz at my primary destination, perhaps I won't, just to prove how macho I am.

Remind me never to use helicopters for personal transport. I mean, we could fly that low in our fixed wings, but we don't, partly because it's not very sensible and gives no margin for error, or obstructions.

Astonished to learn that helis routinely fly that low en route and ignore the MSAs and Grid MORAs or equivalent.

Not really surprising that helicopters hit wires if they fly that low.
.

[ShyTorque]

Here is a still from the video....me flying.... You see it?
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x995/picture1_a12c1ec1387311100caaba399f01fe6926809cde.jpg

Yes, I see the wire. The thought of hitting that over that valley isn’t a happy one.

However, one thing we used to stress in the military was that when flying at low level was NEVER to fly down the middle of a valley, because as well as exposing yourself to enemy fire, that’s precisely where you’re most likely to encounter wires! It’s much safer to fly off to one side, near the apex of the higher terrain. Wires have to be supported at either end and there will be poles near the top of a hill in order to string them across a valley. The poles are generally much easier to spot than the wire itself.

I’m glad to say that I’m not ever going to be in that situation again (especially the 150’ agl by night on NVG). The old heli pilot’s nightmare of trying to pull up from low level only to be held down by wires above doesn’t seem to trouble me these days.

[Jetstream67]

Agreed, and some posters here just don't get it.... I cannot force you.


It was calm wind, good weather, good visibility, I knew the wire was in the area..... got complacent, lost situational awareness.... I was patrolling a different circuit at the time and was flying in the wire environment by choice.

PG&E did sponsor and pay for a video re-creation which forms part of the 8 hour class I teach. (Fun day---"Hey Gordy, we know you hit these wires but can you hover in front of them for 10 minutes while we film?".... Me: "Not a problem---not stressful at all"...said in a sarcastic voice). If you watched the USHST webinar 8 weeks ago you would have seen the video, they have yet to put it on their website. The video is proprietary therefore I cannot just post it, I will seek permission to post it here...give me a few days. Failing that, I am booked to present at the "Vertical Aviation Safety Conference" in Texas next year.

Here is a still from the video....me flying.... You see it?
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x995/picture1_a12c1ec1387311100caaba399f01fe6926809cde.jpg

.. saw it, but sneaky feeling that with any distraction at all it wouldn’t have been soon enough

another vote for getting them in an intelligent automated warning system

[Gordy]

s NEVER to fly down the middle of a valley,

Agreed, but I was patrolling the distribution tap on the left that you cannot see.



https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/673x379/picture3_512348b27c02c6eec6a29141ba28f0754fb41728.jpg


The poles are generally much easier to spot than the wire itself.

Yep, actually we teach not to look for wires but the indicators to the presence of wires...... Here is what the poles look like on each side-----a bad haircut, ask "why would there be a gap in the trees?"......aha moment...

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/374x433/picture1_200daca540e623998bcda3230816303e173e0329.jpg
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/381x420/picture2_d36829802f40547d5a5f11a54ed903b2c3c0fbd0.jpg

[Bell_ringer]

Yep, actually we teach not to look for wires but the indicators to the presence of wires...... Here is what the poles look like on each side-----a bad haircut, ask "why would there be a gap in the trees?"......aha moment...

I still can't fathom why it isn't a legal requirement to use markers on spans like that.
You should try see and avoid on a zipline, even more exciting.

[[email protected]]

Your story reads like you were hover taxiing at or below tree top height in cloud just to drop a dude at his hunting spot. You said yourself it was tense but I get the feeling you would do it again. Just because we CAN do that doesn't mean we SHOULD do it. Had you been on a rescue then yeah maybe that's worth it but in your case the juice ain't worth the squeeze. Exactly right Vortexringshark - having a macho FIGJAM story to wow the boys in the bar just isn't worth it.

[megan]

Your story reads like you were hover taxiing at or below tree top height in cloud just to drop a dude at his hunting spot. You said yourself it was tense but I get the feeling you would do it again. Just because we CAN do that doesn't mean we SHOULD do it. Had you been on a rescue then yeah maybe that's worth it but in your case the juice ain't worth the squeeze.
I do want to note that I have never faced the commercial pressure that does appear to be the main issueCommercial pressure has a great influence on the standards employed in an operation, and the owner of a private aircraft can demand the pilot delivers him to his destination, "Torch" Lewis, an aviator of some renown, used to write a column for the B&CA magazine, one of which was about flying an ILS in zero/zero conditions in a Lodestar because his boss demanded it. Of course the article was about the stupidity of doing so, but being a young man at the time when jobs were hard to get........... A multi national company demanded that its pilot not comply with certain regulations. All off shore operations required a land based alternate (eg in event of engine failure), it was stated so in the ops manual and also a supplement in the flight manual carried in the aircraft. How do you go about ensuring you have an alternate available, you get weather reports, right? No. Having to shut down off shore on a platform because home was closed due weather was a common practice. An aircraft was once inbound home and was told to land on a platform due fog rolling in at home. On the bare bones for fuel, had they landed on the platform they would then not have sufficient to get home (no fuel on rig), using a bit of the much talked about CRM it was decided to continue to onshore and land in a paddock where a fuel tanker could reach if required. Instead a safe landing was made at home but by the time the 2 minute cool down had run its course the vis was zip and the fuel gauge read four pounds above the reserve. Pilot pointed out that had he had an engine failure off shore the result would have been less than pretty because he'd have no where to land, other than a running landing into the sandy terrain with the little high pressure tyres of a 76, rabbit burrows to contend with also. Result? Pilot not permitted to log the ICUS time because he didn't make all the decisions ie you're not permitted to practice CRM, and they did some thing dangerous to prove a point. The point was proven but nothing done. The pilots were told you will do what you're told, the crew have no place in making decisions. At one time additional lift capacity was required so a commercial operator was given a contract, off shore people soon started complaining the contractor wasn't flying while the company aircraft were. Why? Commercial folk were following the rules. Why one of the richest multi national in the world operated in such a manner was all due to the management chain and KPI.

[aa777888]

Exactly right Vortexringshark - having a macho FIGJAM story to wow the boys in the bar just isn't worth it.
Surely you mean only some FIGJAM stories aren't worth it? Because clearly not all FIGJAM stories are bad. Like your Falklands "minefield runs"?

Military, public safety, and para-public operations often involve a very high level of complexity. More training and better equipment in this area seems to bring a level of "FIGJAM immunity" to that mission space. But the reality is, military, public, or private, the lords and masters weight the consequences and they decide on the price the organization, and the individuals that work for it, are willing/going to pay if it goes in the crapper. Don't want to wind up in the stockade? Fly the mission. Don't want to lose your job? Fly the mission.

But, but...it's probably really simpler than that. Everyone loves a challenge, helicopter pilots probably more than most. Thus there are no end of people who are willing and, more importantly, very happy, to take these risks. As long as these people exist organizations will take advantage of them, and if these people are flying for themselves, the risk is often eagerly self-assigned.

[[email protected]]

Surely you mean only some FIGJAM stories aren't worth it? Because clearly not all FIGJAM stories are bad. Like your Falklands "minefield runs"? I'm not sure I get your point aa777888 - I got caught out that night, under pressure to conduct a check-ride on the boss of the squadron with worse than forecast weather.

We were under a military version of commercial pressure and I took a calculated risk in launching on the sortie with the option of shutting down at Port Stanley if the weather took a turn for the worse.

I got it wrong and it closed in on us after we had left for MPA with no way back to Stanley and no place else to go except home.

We ended up using skills that would normally be reserved for operational, life-saving flying on a training sortie and that was my fault.

We survived due to being well-trained in that sort of flying not because we were better pilots.

Many who push the limits without being sufficiently trained, sadly end up like our pilot in New Orleans.

So, not intended as FIGJAM story, more a cautionary tale.

[Gordy]

I got caught out that night,

I got it wrong

Say it isn't so..... tongue in cheek.......

[Gordy]

I still can't fathom why it isn't a legal requirement to use markers on spans like that.
You should try see and avoid on a zipline, even more exciting.
Yep----mostly planning permission....

And for those that do not know---this is how we put up marker balls for PG&E, incidentally this is the hangar sister to the one i hit the wires with--they are identical.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/728x743/hec_1_fec5988b1e681bb14e9ba4827e8d785d433fbc5a.jpg

[blackdog7]

So just curious.....is that a single hook set up on the single engine helicopter with a human hanging off the end or is that a belly strap transforming the long dog into a poor utilities super HEC machine? I thought PG&E had a 145 for that type of work?

[Gordy]

So just curious.....is that a single hook set up on the single engine helicopter with a human hanging off the end or is that a belly strap transforming the long dog into a poor utilities super HEC machine? I thought PG&E had a 145 for that type of work?
This is an old photo, it was a single hook with belly band. We now use the On-board double hook system.

PG&E only owns 4 Black Hawks and those are operated for them by a contractor... all other aircraft on property are contractor owned and operated. There are no 145's flying on property that I know of. There are two Bell 429's on contract, but they may or may not be used for HEC....90% of the HEC is conducted using Long Rangers or 407's and there may be a few 500's.

[Nubian]

This is an old photo, it was a single hook with belly band. We now use the On-board double hook system.

PG&E only owns 4 Black Hawks and those are operated for them by a contractor... all other aircraft on property are contractor owned and operated. There are no 145's flying on property that I know of. There are two Bell 429's on contract, but they may or may not be used for HEC....90% of the HEC is conducted using Long Rangers or 407's and there may be a few 500's.

Think it should be SDG&E, not PG&E. Operated by Helistream

[Gordy]

Think it should be SDG&E, not PG&E. Operated by Helistream

Yep, they might have some. SoCal Edison is still with Astars I believe and WAPA is 407's but heard a rumor they are getting 429's.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Your last paragraph shows the attitude that will keep killing helicopter pilots. I get that we operate differently to fixed wing around weather. This is because we can slow down or land as it turns crap. They can't therefore have higher mins. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have any minima.

Your story reads like you were hover taxiing at or below tree top height in cloud just to drop a dude at his hunting spot. You said yourself it was tense but I get the feeling you would do it again. Just because we CAN do that doesn't mean we SHOULD do it. Had you been on a rescue then yeah maybe that's worth it but in your case the juice ain't worth the squeeze.
I do want to note that I have never faced the commercial pressure that does appear to be the main issue
First, I never said that I was *below* the tops of the trees. Nor was I hovering. Those are your incorrect assumptions. (You should try being a commercial helicopter pilot sometime. Then you might have some basis for posting on a helicopter forum.) Secondly, your "feeling" about whether I would do something is particularly irrelevant and nonsensical. The POINT is that helicopter flying is not as "black and white" as some people fantasize it should be.

FIGJAM? Nah. Sometimes it's FILJAM. Sometimes we're just lucky. And over the course of 35 years of doing this for money, I have occasionally been luckier than I deserved.

But also, sometimes we're good.

[[email protected]]

Dancing on the head of a pin FH1100?
All was good until we got to that high point, where the clouds were down in the trees. I slowed down and got down over a lightly traveled country road. I won't lie, it was tense, and I'm sure that the few car drivers we encountered thought we were crazy. After what seemed like an eternity, the ground fell away and gave us some clearance between it and the clouds. We continued on to the hunting camp. So you were hovertaxiing in cloud along a road at a height low enough to alarm car drivers - unless I am missing something.

You say you were lucky but you got away with it and it certainly sounds like you would do it again - that is exactly the mentality that leads to accidents like New Orleans and so many others.

PS being lucky and getting away with it doesn't make you 'good'.

And a lot of times, we fly in weather conditions that keep our fixed-wing brethren cowering like scared little girls in pilot lounges all across the nation, And that comment says everything about a machismo attitude to aviation that causes accidents

[Gordy]

PS being lucky and getting away with it doesn't make you 'good'.

And that comment says everything about a machismo attitude to aviation that causes accidents

Agreed..... This is classic "Normalization of Deviance". I'll let those who still think they can fly low level in clouds and think it is normal etc Google that......

[Dog on Cat3]

I'm confused Chuck. If the pilot is not to blame for such an accident then who is? :ooh:
I believe, Robbiee, that the higher, wider, more broad point the man was making - the one you may have perceived as a rush of wind just above you head - can be summed up thus: "Blame is for the weak"

[Bell_ringer]

"Blame is for the weak"

That's also the philosophy used when pilots refuse to take responsibility for their lack of good judgment.
It's too easy to shrug the shoulders and chalk it up to **** happens, half the reason the same accidents still happen as often as they do.

In aviation, blame should be avoided to encourage transparency, this only works in professional outfits with a professional culture.
In the civil world, once the lawyers are unleashed, it is entirely about blame - because accidents don't create themselves, and someone must pay.
So don't delude yourself about blame.
It is the weak who think they will never be blamed for the consequences of their actions.

[Robbiee]

I believe, Robbiee, that the higher, wider, more broad point the man was making - the one you may have perceived as a rush of wind just above you head - can be summed up thus: "Blame is for the weak"

Really?...'cause it read more like Chuck was saying that as long as you praise a pilot for all the times he pokes the bear and gets away with it, you can berate him for that one time he doesn't.

,...but how about we cut the crap, and just start taking responsibility for the situations we put ourselves into? :rolleyes:

[helonorth]

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And a lot of times, we fly in weather conditions that keep our fixed-wing brethren cowering like scared little girls in pilot lounges all across the nation, gazing out the window and going, "It's 900 and 2.5 out there.
It's hard to believe he's ever been involved in aviation in any capacity. My eyes rolled so far back I could see my spine.