777x woes

[BlankBox]

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/citing-a-serious-flight-test-incident-and-lack-of-design-maturity-faa-slows-boeing-777x-certification/

[Less Hair]

What exactly has happened on that test flight? So they can't start any certification work yet?

[DaveReidUK]

"Uncommanded pitch event" are not words one ever wants to hear again in relation to a Boeing aircraft.

[Noxegon]

Well, at least they caught it before entry into service this time...

[SimonPaddo]

Boeing seem to have more than a sales pitch going on sadly

[Big Pistons Forever]

Personally I don’t see a long term future for Boeing as it is presently configured. It has been too badly broken at every level by a management culture that knew the cost of everything and the value of nothing.

[Lookleft]

Well Boeing have only had 16 years to fix this problem:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2005/aair/aair200503722.aspx

[568]

During the design phase of the 777x and due to the longer fuselage, a system like the 737 MAX (MCAS) was probably needed to satisfy the stalling characteristics of the 777x.
The CCS software of the 787 appearing in the 777x seems an interesting debate.

Considering how many great engineers Boeing once had on the 777 and other programs, it is a reflection of cost driving quality and profit!

[turbidus]

There is a stability issue with the tail section...in reality, the 777 already had this, hence the infamous "flutter" "fix" which makes the rear pax and crew seasick...

Rather that redesign the tail, which would have taken the ac out of rapid approval, BA chose the usual software fix...last test fight was what 8 months ago, and yet still no idea from BA what went wrong. :mad:

the results from several tests, as well as test flights, have been hidden, until this latest FAA report...

cert maybe by mid 2024?
Emirates was supposed to get the ac delivered in 2020....and they are not happy...now they must be livid.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Tweet linked here contains text of FAA letter.

davidshepardson (@davidshepardson) Tweeted:
.@FAANews letter to @Boeing https://t.co/0ymxWa2Vq7 (reported earlier by Seattle Times) https://t.co/9reBeqjJlD https://twitter.com/davidshepardson/status/1409179359152414720?s=20

[Big Pistons Forever]

That letter is not pretty. Fast, Cheap, Good. pick one. Sadly it is now more than 20 years since Boeing senior management picked “good” ……

[Dorf]

As long as accountants are in charge this will be the norm.

[Sqwak7700]

Well, at least they caught it before entry into service this time...

They caught the Max issues before EIS as well. They just made the financial choice to play the blame
game and deal with the fallout, rather than fix the problems. 🤔

Its not a manufacturer anymore, its a Brokerage firm. Putting out the same quality aircraft as you would get if JP Morgan was building airliners. You can thank the Fed for that. 👍

[Less Hair]

Time to move group HQ back to Seattle.

[Torukmacto]

Totally agree , take it off the Wall Street money men and hand it back to aeroplane builders .

[Wirbelsturm]

Shame it took such a sad series of accidents for the FAA to finally grow some balls and tell Boeing their processes aren't good enough.

It will be interesting to see how this effects customer deliveries and training!

[SOPS]

turbidus

As EK is struggling to fill its current 777s.. they may be happy for the delay.

[infrequentflyer789]

Wirbelsturm

Looking at the tweeted images of the letter, FAA actually told Boeing that they had in fact failed to even follow their own processes let alone comply with the FAA's.

I would have thought (and in fact the letter implies) that whether/when to apply for TIA would be the subject of much discussion prior to application so that there would be no surprises or maybe an "ok but on review we've identified some minor hold ups", whereas this letter is in effect a total slap down. So much that I wonder if the ODAs at Boeing were being pressured from above to submit when they knew they weren't ready and asked the FAA smack them as hard as possible for it so they had a big "told you so" to beat management with. Don't suppose we'll ever find out.

[GlobalNav]

Less Hair

or to Antarctica. Everyone but the engineers.

[GlobalNav]

Wirbelsturm

A shame, yes, but good news, actually, that FAA certification executives did not stand in the way of this letter authored by an FAA engineer. A glimmer of hope that FAA is taking such stands.

[Australopithecus]

I think this is the direct result of the Max fiasco, and the attendant scrutiny the FAA received. Whatever cozy arrangement Boeing used to enjoy now seems pretty frosty. I wonder if Boeing actually thought that it was still going to be business as usual after their recent behaviour?

[Big Pistons Forever]

I think it is pretty clear that Boeing management is still insisting on the cheapest way to do everything, rather then the right way, and when they are caught out it’s the usual Boeing playbook, deny, obfuscate, dissemble. The problem is the regulator is wise to Boeing’s Shyte and both it and increasingly their customers, are not putting up with it.

The 777X is Boeing’s last chance to show they can deliver a safe and compliant new aircraft design. So far it is not looking good…..

Sad really, Boeing use to be the envy of every other nation who aspired to have a commercially successful airline manufacturing industry.

[Sqwak7700]

Wirbelsturm

I have to disagree, the FAA is just acting to avoid repeat embarrassment. No balls where grown, such would act against it’s own interests.

The answer is less government, not more. The reason Boeing has, and continues to make such poor decisions, is that government always comes to pay the bill when it all goes bad. Sadly, you see it in all big industries, not just Boeing. Removal of moral hazard has destroyed them all.

If Boeing had to pay for their own messes, they wouldn’t make them in the first place. And if they did, they wouldn’t be around and the free market would fill the void.

Thats the way of big business these days. They lobby government to kill the competition with over-regulation, then they offload all the losses to the taxpayers.

Boeing “refused” the last bailout, opting for super cheap money from bonds, courtesy of the Fed. That’s like you refusing money offered by your Dad, but then turning around and asking mom for a 0% interest, no time-limit loan.

Get rid of the Fed and most of the world’s problems would sort themselves out.

[towrope]

My father is 98 years old. He started with Boeing during WWII as an engineer and become a (commercial aircraft) design exec early on. Back in the day he tells me, the engineers and the factory had good communication and respect for each others' opinions and management would listen. That's how the company's solid reputation was built. He was heartbroken about the "merger" and predicted trouble ahead once Douglas was in charge. I believe the 777X will get sorted out but at what cost to its orders I leave to the experts.

[ATC Watcher]

Back to the root of this letter ; The "Uncommanded pitch event".
"@ 568
during the design phase of the 777x and due to the longer fuselage, a system like the 737 MAX (MCAS) was probably needed to satisfy the stalling characteristics of the 777x.
Anyone has more info is this event was due to an MCAS-like feature ?

[Dan Dare]

Sqwak7700

This is where PPRuNe needs a like button. So much of the failing of the west has its roots in ZIRP (free money) and loss of moral hazard. The longer it carries on the worse the fallout will be. The Fed and other central banks behave like a parent giving their sick child sweeties instead of the required bitter medicine.

[TukwillaFlyboy]

tdracer ?
An informed option is needed.

[20driver]

I am waiting for that as well.

[568]

ATC;
Allegedly there were rumblings early on that the 777x was using the same software (FCS) from the 777, so hard to say what's going on as all this Boeing proprietary information.
I believe that most of the software for updates and patches is "offshore" so it will take time for the lab test and subsequent install of patches.
Could be that an update broke an existing install, but that is as far I would like to go until the facts (if released) are known.

[WillowRun 6-3]

@Australopithecus

It appears quite likely that in aftermath of FAA reform legislation passed and enacted into law last year that the agency heard and got the message - at least in large part. The reforms included items which were written in order to give the Congressional committees with jurisdiction for FAA authorization, oversight, and spending more effective capacity to fulfill those responsibilities.

As a previous post noted, possible that a high-integrity engineer quietly urged FAA to hold nothing back. (Kind of like the basketball coach in "Hoosiers" quietly urging the ref to eject him from the game.)

Got to wonder whether the changes made by the reform legislation with regard to delegation to Boeing were written in such a way as to give some impetus to restoring the company corporate office to the Seattle area. I swear by Chicago, but Carl Sandburg wrote of railroads, hogs and wheat not airframes and powerplants.

[tdracer]

TukwillaFlyboy

Afraid I don't have much to add. Most of what I know of the specifics is from reading the Seattle Times - just like the rest of you. In particular, I know absolutely nothing more about the "pitch upset" during flight test aside from what's in the linked article.
A few somewhat generic comments - getting TIA is always a somewhat contentious process, with the FAA/EASA wanting more and more data and the airframer wanting it granted so they can get on with cert testing. I always found it interesting that - before TIA was granted - the FAA had absolutely no problem with the aircraft flying around with a dozen or more Boeing employees on board doing/observing testing - but insisted it was far to dangerous for an FAA employee to come along and get actual first hand information regarding whatever the issue was. :*

I did have first hand experience with the Boeing "Regulatory Authority" - RA - and I often considered it borderline incompetent. There were some good people in the RA, but for the most part it was made up of mindless bureaucrats who only knew processes, not the product. Worse, the RA put specific rules in place to prevent free and open communication between the Boeing engineers (ARs - Authorized Representatives - the delegated equivalent of a DER) and the FAA. They actually prohibited the ARs from 'cold calling' the FAA - if we got a call from the FAA we could respond to it, but we couldn't simply call the FAA with an issue or question. As a result, stuff that I could have straightened out with a 10 minute phone call to my counterpart at the FAA instead turned into a week or more process of working the issue through the RA bureaucracy.:ugh:
The FAA side made it even worse - as a DER there were several FAA specialists that I'd worked with regularly. We knew, trusted, and respected each other and could have open and honest dialog. When Boeing went the delegated route, the FAA moved all those people I'd worked with out of the cert process and created a new group - staffed by new people - to interface with Boeing cert. So all those years of knowledge and trust was thrown away. Worse, the last ten years turned into a brain drain on both sides - as the Boeing and FAA experts from my generation retired, they were largely replaced with young, relatively inexperienced engineers that didn't know how to focus on the important aspects. One FAA specialist in particular (often quoted in coverage of the MAX fiasco) I had major issues with - this person only knew when to check the box that something had been done - not that it had been done well or correctly, or if the conclusions were valid, only that it had been done and they could check that box. :rolleyes:

[FlightlessParrot]

I did have first hand experience with the Boeing "Regulatory Authority" - RA - and I often considered it borderline incompetent. There were some good people in the RA, but for the most part it was made up of mindless bureaucrats who only knew processes, not the product.

This is, and has been, widespread policy over a huge range of human activities since "managers" decided that they could manage everything, whether or not they knew anything about it. So, you have to have judgement by process, which ends up with boxes to tick. The people you interacted with might have been deeply frustrated by the whole thing, too; or, they might have been box-tickers hired to fit in with the New World. It's part of the retreat from giving competent professionals some trust and respect. Everywhere, I'm afraid.

[Less Hair]

So after all those lessons learned we are blaming aviation authorities to be "bureaucrats" again? Seriously?

[WillowRun 6-3]

In the aftermath of, first, the MAX disasters; second, the decline of Boeing's engineering virtuosity and excellence in the grip of bean-counters; and third, the general issue of regulatory capture, it seems imprudent to defend FAA other than on an individual-by-individual basis. But I would NOT say NTSB, under current leadership, has become bureaucratic in the negative sense of the word. (This stuff is too important to leave to broad generalizations, so I thought I'd take your post beyond its rhetorical question.)

[Less Hair]

I hope Boeing gets the 777X sorted soon. But putting certification authorities under any new pressure now would be totally wrong from my point of view.

[Momoe]

LH,

Not wishing to take this out of context, could you expand on exactly what you mean?
There were always going to be new lines drawn in the sand after the MAX fiasco and I for one think this is good. Max issues stemmed from original classic design, that's not the case in the 777, however Boeing seem to be following the same path in that they want to avoid recertification.

[Less Hair]

It is very well possible that administrative and legal matters play a role too big these days in aircraft certification. So this is what might be perceived as being "bureaucratic". But we are just passing some big crisis where issues within some certification campaign and oversight lost have been left unnoticed by both a manufacturer and authorities. One second later facing the next problem the spin seems to start again blaming authorities for being slow or whatever. This is what I was opposing. I support certification by the book taking as long as necessary. Please don't ever press certification authorities to rush things again.

[Big Pistons Forever]

In fairness to both the FAA and Boeing, airplanes are becoming increasingly complex, particularly with mechanical, electrical, electronic interfaces. The increase in the requirement for very specialized knowledge makes it harder and harder to keep track of the unintended consequences of the introduction of new technology or changes to that technology.

Unfortunately this fact now exists in a corporate culture that incentivized short term cost savings and a regulatory framework that was never intended to provide oversight for these kinds of systems.

25 years ago an outfit I worked for hired a retired mechanic to help them out. His claim to fame was he had authority to sign out any maintenance release for every repair on any part of the Boeing 737-200. Structural, hydraulic, electrical, avionics, engine, everything. It was basically the only airplane he had worked on in his entire career and he knew the airplane so well he would get calls from overall around the world to ask for advice.

That kind of an aviation polymath is impossible to envision for any of the modern airliners. While I realize I am talking about maintenance, not design, the fact is the Boeing 737-200 was a pretty simple airplane and that simplicity made it possible to keep the big picture in focus. That is a lot harder today, especially when the only expertise for new technologies exists at the manufacturer and is proprietary.

[tdracer]

Less Hair

Less Hair, let me explain/elaborate a bit. At both Boeing and the FAA, there are "Specialists" and "Bureaucrats". The Specialists understand the system(s), figure out if it's working properly, and pass judgement. The Bureaucrats deal with the paperwork and associated processes. Pre-ODA, the Boeing Specialists dealt directly with the FAA Specialists (and visa-versa), then when we were both happy, we'd communicate that to our respective Bureaucrats and sign off the approprate forms, and the Bureaucrats handled the paperwork and did the actual cert. In some cases (e.g. Service Bulletins) - where the FAA had granted the appropriate delegations - as soon as I'd signed the approval form (8110-3), it was considered certified and Boeing could release it.
With ODA, the Boeing and FAA Specialists all but stopped communicating with each other. Instead the Specialists communicated with the Bureaucrats, who would then communicate with the others Bureaucrats, who would then communicate with their Specialists. Seriously! Since the Bureaucrats seldom knew anything about the subject matter, stuff got lost or muddled in translation, and things that formerly got done in hours or days suddenly started taking days or weeks. Often, in order to straighten out what the Bureaucrats had muddled, we'd have to wait for the Bureaucrats to set up a meeting between the Specialists (with the Bureaucrats in attendance to make sure they could check all their process boxes) so we could un-muddle it...:ugh: I can't speak for other groups, but within Propulsion, every AR I knew that had been a DER previously hated ODA.
Worse, as I noted, the FAA formed a new group to deal with Boeing. The FAA guy that was the focal for Propulsion - Tom - was a good guy and pretty sharp, but he was inexperienced at what some of the Propulsion disciplines did and how we did it. At one point we asked him - point blank - why so much stuff that pre-ODA had been routinely delegated was now being retained by the FAA. His response was he really didn't know what we were doing or how we tested the software! By contrast, pre-ODA, one of the FAA Specialists I routinely dealt with had been in my group before he went to the FAA and so knew exactly how it worked. And some of the people under Tom were simply horrible - one was so bad that his name became almost a swear word - as in if you found out your cert plan had been assigned to him, you'd been "(name)ed".

Now, I'm not saying ODA was a complete mistake - there were areas where it made a lot sense - interiors comes to mind. Every single interior configuration has to be certified - just adding or deleting a row of seats means the entire interior needs to be recertified and it was a major cost and time drain. ODA was made for that. Similarly, relatively minor systems changes on a mature system. But for certifying a new aircraft or a major derivative, ODA was a disaster. I honestly don't think the MAX fiasco would have happened with the old, pre-ODA system.

[krismiler]

So we basically have a stretched version of an existing type with larger diameter engines which needs software to correct handling issues. Sound familiar ?

Boeing can't afford another MAX debacle with a new type, a disaster with an aircraft of this size would be far worse. The FAA can't be seen to lack oversight a second time.

The entire project needs to be halted whilst Boeing and the FAA go through every step of the design and construction with a fine tooth comb and fix any deficiencies before it gets signed off. The cost of this would pale in comparison to a hull loss and the resulting consequences.

[568]

Fastfourier

"Regulatory Authority"
No such department exists at Boeing!

[568]

FlightlessParrot

Yes, you said it all and what's wrong with the world today!

[tdracer]

568

You may not like the work it does, but I can assure you it does exist.

[Anti Skid On]

krismiler

My simple brain thinks had some calculations been done in relation to C of G and balance, the design could have/should have been done so that software was NOT needed to address angle of attack and control issues.I appreciate things like the fuel load and payload will affect the balance, but with modern computing surely this could have been done at design?

[DaveReidUK]

Anti Skid On

"My simple brain thinks had some calculations been done in relation to C of G and balance, the design could have/should have been done so that software was NOT needed to address angle of attack and control issues.I appreciate things like the fuel load and payload will affect the balance, but with modern computing surely this could have been done at design?"

That's a bit like saying that in order to produce the 777X, Boeing shouldn't have used the 777 as a basis ... :O

You might have a point.

[Anti Skid On]

They used the same fuselage for everything from the 707 through to the 757 (obviously not the 747), but the wing config and/or engine placement were all different; the larger engines on the 757 meant longer landing gear too. They didn't get it wrong till the Max.

With the Max am I correct in saying the gear is the same as the classic, but the geared engines created the issues due to the pylons being different? Maybe TD Racer could comments, as he usually has great insight into those sort of things?

[Momoe]

Technical issues aside, where is the market for the 777X? We've just started to emerge from the global pandemic and pax volumes are not there; there will be an indeterminate period where volumes will rise but no-one knows if volumes will reach previous levels let alone surpass them.

[DaveReidUK]

Anti Skid On

"With the Max am I correct in saying the gear is the same as the classic, but the geared engines created the issues due to the pylons being different?"

You will find this is a great site for all 737 technical queries: The Boeing 737 Technical Site - Home Page (b737.org.uk) (http://www.b737.org.uk/)

In answer to your specific questions, while the Max's NLG is longer than that of the NG, the MLG is the same (other than the levered gear on the Max 10). The 737 doesn't have geared engines - you may be thinking of the P&W GTFs offered on the A320neo family.

[FlightlessParrot]

Momoe

Is it likely to go the way of the 380: by the time it enters service, the market will be going in a different direction?

[Less Hair]

Something big must be needed. There is not much competition left in the big heavy category?

[568]

TD,
Thanks for the correction, my minuscule brain was thinking of something else.
Regarding the work it does, I haven't directly stated that I don't like it :)

[NWA SLF]

I know I can never match the knowledge of tdracer on this subject, but might not the numerous Airbus uncommanded pitch issues make everyone more leery of certification without resolving any issue encountered? I refer most to QF72 and shortly after QF71. Despite many reviews of the systems verifying they were fail safe, only altitude saved the passengers of QA72 from meeting the same fate of the 2 MAX. Those incidents were in 2008 so would not everyone be much more sensitive to any indication the computers are assuming control? I know this is an anti-Boeing thread, but wouldn't one think the FAA and EASA will learn for everyone's issues?

[Spooky 2]

tdracer

Perhaps the guy is thinking of Regulatory Affairs which I believe now is a part Flight Test and Evaluation group?

[TURIN]

Anti Skid On

Those all had different type ratings. Boeing is trying to make the 777X a derivative type that will require as little additional crew training as possible. I assume that means similar handling qualities and cockpit as the 777(classics?)
The same happened with the Max which is where it all went wrong.

[FlyingStone]

The obvious difference being that MAX was yet another iteration of a 50 year old design, something that can't be said for the 777X, which is based on much, much newer platform, that has also seen a fairly successful variant (787) developed in the meanwhile, which also shares the type rating.

[568]

Hard to believe that the 777 first flew on the 12th June 1994.

[tdracer]

Comparisons to the 737 MAX are not really relevant to this (aside from creating additional scrutiny by the FAA). The 777 has always been a FBW aircraft, so s/w control of pitch was baked into the design from the very beginning. Flight Control software for FBW is always DAL A (Design Assurance Level) - which means flight critical (most FADEC s/w falls in the same category) - that isn't a guarantee that it's perfect, but it's as good as we know how to make it.
By comparison, MCAS was (originally) DAL C - which is not considered flight critical and is allowed to lack redundancy. That being said, the MCAS software didn't 'fail' - it performed exactly as designed. It was the design that was flawed and didn't adequately account for a bad AOA sensor.
Countless aircraft have been stretched over the years - nearly every Boeing model from the 707 to the 787 has been stretched - the exceptions being the 720 and both versions of the 717 (the KC-135, and what started out as the MD-95), and most have been re-engined at least once. Similarly, most Airbus aircraft models have been stretched. It's a well understood process and the 777X is not fundamentally different than what Airbus did with the A321neo - just on a larger scale.
I'm sure the Flight Control software is getting tweaked on the 777X to insure it behaves much the same as the original 777 - just as I'm sure Airbus tweaked the A320neo to behave as much as possible like original A320. There is nothing new or novel about this.
What I find worrisome about all this is that the 777X should be a straight forward development program - but it's not panning that way.

[slacktide]

tdracer

Are you sure you don't mean Regulatory Administration?

[tdracer]

Now that I think about it, you're probably right - Reg Admin, not Reg Auth. We always just called it "RA"

[Spooky 2]

The business card says Regulatory Affairs?

[krismiler]

The B777X will probably be the new Jumbo jet when it eventually gets into service, it will replace the B747/A380 with a twin engine modern aircraft having lower running costs. Pushing the entry into service date back a few years would give Boeing time to address all its issues and present a safe, thoroughly checked aircraft to its customers when the travel market recovers in 2024.

At that time it would be a decent option for airlines looking to replace their A340/A380s and B747s which were grounded during COVID and may not be worth bringing back given the expense of operating quad jets with a limited life remaining.

[Big Pistons Forever]

On any significant long haul run, for a given total seat count/day fewer big twin engine airplanes make more profits than more smaller twin engine aircraft. For that reason there will be a future significant market for 777X sized aircraft. The challenge for Boeing is not to Fu*k it up like they did the MAX. Early signs are not promising.....

[Una Due Tfc]

Amazing to look at the original 777 programme and compare it to the absolute proverbial show that everything Boeing have done these last 10 years or more has been. I remember when they broke the machinist and engineering unions, started the factory in Charlston to undercut the Ts & Cs of their Washington staff, cut every financial corner possible, it all added up to ruin what was once the company the rest of the world envied. When you treat your staff as the enemy, the best and brightest of them won't stay around for long...

Didn't the board cut the development budget of the 787 by a couple of billion, only to have the cascade of problems that ensued end up costing multiples of the original budget? Even before the issues over the last 12 months affecting the 787, they hoped at best to just about break even on the programme with the current order book.

They built pretty much the best airliner of all time in the original 777, and got it certified damn quick too. It's depressing to see what they have become.

[krismiler]

https://youtu.be/opQzOtnLSc8

[Mechta]

Una Due Tfc

The original 777 had its fair share of issues too. I worked on the 777 Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) in the late 90s. We had entire ship sets of the ultrasonic probes for the aircraft already in service back for rework/replacement. Most new models of aircraft will have components which don't have same performance, reliability or life as those further down the production run.

[GlobalNav]

Aircraft development routinely includes design problems and challenges. The original 777 certification was probably the most challenging, complex and yet supremely successful and as far as I know unequalled. The 777 service bears that out as well. It was a different, pre-1995, Boeing then. Blessed with world-class technical and engineering talent. Highly experienced, the envy of the aviation world. Boeing still possesses many great engineers, but it’s not the company it once was.

[DaveReidUK]

Mechta

"The original 777 had its fair share of issues too. I worked on the 777 Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) in the late 90s. We had entire ship sets of the ultrasonic probes for the aircraft already in service back for rework/replacement. Most new models of aircraft will have components which don't have same performance, reliability or life as those further down the production run.."

Yes, you could replace 777 with just about any airliner developed in the last 60 years, and the above statement would still hold true, That's just the nature of certification and service entry.

[tdracer]

I was in the middle of the original 777 design, and it did seem like a train wreck to those of us involved. AIMS and the FQIS were both very, very bad early on (FQIS used a new technology for measuring the fuel levels in the tank and it had more than it's share of teething problems). I was responsible for the engine running functional test and so spent many hours on the first aircraft (WA001) between initial engine runs and first flight, monitoring engine ground runs. At one point, we'd run engines (sometimes at power) for several hours before the engine run guys took a meal break. When we got back on the aircraft, the FQIS reported we had 20,000 lbs more fuel on board than when we'd started running engines hours earlier :confused:.

During another engine run functional test, we took a break and a young fresh faced Electrical Engineer was talking to his lead and asked if 'the 747-400 electrical system had ever been this bad'. His lead (a good friend) looked him straight in the eye and responded "the 747-400 electrical system is still this bad".

[stilton]

tdracer

Well
you can’t just leave that last statement out there !
Care to elaborate ?

[krismiler]

Now the FAA aren't happy with the flight manuals. Obviously it doesn't pay to get on the wrong side of your industry's regulatory authority.

https://youtu.be/atqGCAUZBMY

[Jonty]

Boeing dropped them in the :mad: with the MAX, the FAA are in payback mode!

[punkalouver]

Just reading a magazine article about the ODA issue.

I found this interesting: ".......the percentage of work delegated to the ODA's - measured in certification plans and deliverables within each plan - routinely tops 90% and has for years. The FAA estimated that more than 95% of certification work on the 747-400 program was delegated, a 1993 US government report said."

A different article regarding certification costs said: "The certifications costs alone on a small business jet or a small regional aircraft programs runs about $10 million per month, while larger model aircraft can cost four times that amount."

$40 million per month.

[Equivocal]

Boeing dropped them in the https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/censored.gif with the MAX, the FAA are in payback mode!To be fair, it's probably less a case of payback and more that the FAA can't afford to let through anything that might come back to bite them.

[tdracer]

Just reading a magazine article about the ODA issue.

$40 million per month.

That's low. For something like the 777X, 2x that at least during the flight test program (at least after TIA is granted and cert testing can start).

[keesje]

After the 787 development drama (2002-2011), industry & congress stood shoulder to shoulder to streamline FAA aircraft certification. To speed up the process, reduce bureaucracy and strengthen the competitive position of the US industry.The worlds airlines were ordering NEO's like there was no limit and loyal 777 customers were ordering A350s in big numbers. The pressure was on. https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/acprrarc-4202012.pdf

FAA was forced to comply, their budget re-authorizations by Congress being held hostage since 2012. Targets were being based on this streamlining and responsibility delegation by the FAA. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-508t-highlights.pdf. Boeing had the FAA in the pocket & felt invincible.. Boosted by their record orders, stock prices, and clear political support. A wining mood. Afterwards Senate & Congress faulted FAA oversight of Boeing (*!?$!)

The 777x certification strategy (certify as a 777-300ER derivative, the "changed product rule") approval, amazed many already in 2014. FAA to Fast Track Boeing 777X Certification | Frequent Business Traveler (http://www.frequentbusinesstraveler.com/2014/05/faa-to-fast-track-boeing-777x-certification/).
The 777x has new wings, engines, landings gears, tails, cockpit and systems. The fuselage has different length, load patterns, door locations, window structure. -> A new aircraft really..

The unexpected fuselage rupture during 777x ultimate load testing, has focused investigators on the used certification strategy. Changed Product Rules (e.g., 14 CFR §§ 21.19 & 21.101) and associated guidance (e.g., Advisory Circular 21.101-1B and FAA Orders 8110.4C and 8110.48A) should be revised to require a top-down approach. Whereby every change is evaluated from an integrated whole aircraft system perspective. As advised by international experts: https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/The_Joint_Authorities_Technical_Review_(JATR)_-_Boeing_737_MAX_Flight_Control_System
-> That means no patching while using reliability numbers of the previous design, when those are not representative. Or they are based on grandfathered design and requirements.

Another, more objective look was taken on new to be certified aircraft (777-9, 737-10, 737-7). Now FAA requires full compliance and is less vulnerable to the political / industrial pressure of the previous decade.
The politicians who pushed for relaxation, exemptions and delegation in the 2012-2018 period, are keeping low profiles now, want to look forward. With just a few brave exceptions..

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/768x511/11102021_faa_150148_9d89f01690fd5ff6e9c495f454d9ef3ede232a7e .jpg

[White Knight]

The B777X will probably be the new Jumbo jet when it eventually gets into service, it will replace the B747/A380 with a twin engine modern aircraft having lower running costs. Pushing the entry into service date back a few years would give Boeing time to address all its issues and present a safe, thoroughly checked aircraft to its customers when the travel market recovers in 2024.

At that time it would be a decent option for airlines looking to replace their A340/A380s and B747s which were grounded during COVID and may not be worth bringing back given the expense of operating quad jets with a limited life remaining.

Absolute rubbish yet again Krismiler. I believe I called you out in 2020 with your ridiculous thread about the end of the A380…..

[keesje]

Boeing halts 777-9 flight testing following GE9X engine issuehttps://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/boeing-halts-777-9-flight-testing-following-ge9x-engine-issue/151175.article

Details unclear but apparently after a borescope of a GE9X core, heat related findings serious enough to check all engines & halt flight testing came up.

[DaveReidUK]

That will certainly give Boeing some comfort.

[tdracer]

I talked to a buddy a few days ago who is currently working the 777X (specifically the -8F). I asked him why the program was taking so long. For a while it was 'all hands-on-deck' to fix the MAX, later on the same thing to get 787 deliveries going again. So resources were directed away from the 777X - but now that stuff is pretty much handled, what were the holdups?
He said the FAA was establishing all sorts of new requirements for cert - but hadn't figured out how to implement them yet. So it was being pretty much made up as they went...
Somehow I don't think this is going to be an improvement. :rolleyes: