An Inconvenient Truth [Archive]

Chugalug2

31st May 2021, 09:53

26 Years ago, on 2nd June 1994, Chinook Mk2 ZD576 crashed on the Mull of Kintyre killing all 29 on board. I can do no better than to quote this from Amazon :-

Mull of Kintyre, Scotland, 2 June 1994. 29 dead.

RAF Air Marshals blamed the two pilots. Their position was that the onus of disproving negligence was on the deceased.
When the pilots were eventually cleared in 2011, Ministers and the Crown Office decided that was the end of the matter – true cause and culpability was now irrelevant. Why? Who benefitted?
The clues lay in what MoD had concealed. The families, Fatal Accident Inquiry and Parliament were lied to. For example, all were told that evidence removed from the crash scene before investigators arrived had been examined and could not have caused any harm. This outright lie was later exposed when documents MoD had denied the existence of were uncovered. This and other fresh evidence is examined here for the first time.
The ends of justice have been defeated by those charged with administering it. Once again it is left to the public to publish the facts.

ALL PROCEEDS TO CHARITY

A new Kindle book has just been published. I believe it will be followed by a paper back edition in due course. Long time members will recall the bitter fight fought here to restore the pilots' reputations. That was only the start. It led to a campaign that revealed a scandal involving certain senior RAF Air Officers subverting UK Military Air Safety and of the cover up of that by their successors that exists to this day.The Inconvenient Truth : Chinook ZD576 - Cause & Culpability £3.99
The Inconvenient Truth : Chinook ZD576 - Cause & Culpability eBook: Hill, David, Blakeley, John: Amazon.co.uk: Kindle Store

Lordflasheart

31st May 2021, 18:26

Bravo Mr Hill and Mr Blakeley !

It's a complicated subject, but even if, like me, you're a 'Bear of Very Little Brain' or if you believe in 'My Masters Right or Wrong' (Not me any longer) you will be able to see why they thought they could get away with it, and why current management are still looking the other way and bending the system, for all sorts of similar events.

Who Speaks for the Dead ?

Not anyone responsible for these past and current travesties of safety and justice and the persistent management lies.

Who would want to work for these people ?

LFH

...

Engines

1st Jun 2021, 17:25

Chug,

Thank you for the link - just bought it as a Kindle book - and a riveting read it is. It makes one of the most cogent arguments I've seen regarding the scale of the failures and gross failures of duty by the relevant RAF senior officers. There are many, but the book correctly (in my view) homes in on the illegal decision to clear the aircraft for service. It also makes clear that the original RAF Board of Inquiry was wholly deficient in completely ignoring the airworthiness (or not) of the aircraft. Yes, people should be prosecuted.

What makes things even worse, to my mind, is the RAF's long standing failure to learn the lessons. I can confirm that the Chinook 'Servicing Instruction' to have the crewman check the security of the DECU connectors in flight (to me, a totally astonishing piece of paper) was STILL issued around 2016. For all I know it's still in place. The Hawk ejection seat accident at Scampton was (again, my view) mainly caused by the issue of an illegal and inadequate Technical Instruction by the RAF - who afterwards claimed that they couldn't find any records of any of the meetings that were held to decide to do it. That's admitting to a massive failure of basic record keeping and documenting airworthiness related decisions. And the MAA didn't even blink over that. As I've said before - having a nice shiny set of regulations in place doesn't help if the people on the ground don't comply with them - and if their superiors don't care (or don't know) that they're not being followed. And if their QA systems don't work.

I know that the RAF is chock full of totally excellent engineers and technicians - I've had the honour to work with more than a few. But it seems that the higher leadership of the RAF had (and probably still has) created a culture where getting aircraft in the air (especially to carry out a high profile VIP mission) is more important than crossing the i's and dotting the t's. Those i's and t's always come home to roost. I urge all RAF engineers to read this book, inwardly digest, and get ready to say 'NO' the next time they get told to do something like this. And maintain a 'work book' so that any time you 're told to do something plain wrong, you record it.

Best Regards as ever to all those excellent RAF engineers and technicians doing their very considerable best,

Engines

Lordflasheart

1st Jun 2021, 18:54

...
DECU connectors ........

I remember wondering how one could safely re-make this sort of connector if it was found to be disconnected in flight (That is what the 'every 15 minutes' check is for - Right ?) - bearing in mind it would probably be live at the time.

Looking back to the last couple of pages of this aged thread - https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/395650-haddon-cave-airworthiness-sea-king-et-al-merged-29.html - I see you experts were discussing this subject in 2012, and the NAO referrred to it in critical terms in their report of September 2000.

Somebody in the know must be able to confirm that this problem has been properly sorted by now ?

LFH
...

SASless

1st Jun 2021, 19:13

I am in the process of reading the book and am taken aback by what I am reading.

As I am an American and not very familiar with the RAF/MOD, Scottish Law, and other aspects of the investigations, inquiries, boards, and other legal processes....I am reluctant to get into the details.

As a former Special Agent Investigator for the US Navy and a former US Army Chinook Pilot, I understand the value of a thorough and complete investigation of all evidence, obtaining detailed accurate testimonial evidence and the penalties that can accrue for intentional withholding or tampering with evidence or tampering with a witness or potential witness or Jury along with the concept of Perjury.

My questions go to how have all of those accused of those kinds of misconduct escaped prosecution?

Chugalug2

2nd Jun 2021, 07:26

LFH, Engines, SASless, thank you all for endorsing this book, and hopefully encouraging others to download and read it too. I think we all share a feeling of its importance, the culmination of years of research, of gathering evidence otherwise withheld from Coroners, FAI's, BoI's, and SI's. Military Air Safety is no longer safe in the hands of the MOD/RAF. Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation must be made truly independent of the MOD/RAF, and of each other.

In the meantime it is incumbent on all aviators, be they aircrew, engineers, or indeed neither, to make themselves familiar with what airworthiness is and how it must be sustained from start to finish of an aircraft's life. Too many of us are content to leave that to others. When those others are ordered to subvert the regulations and suborn them, then the result is often yet another fatal air accident and/or the loss of entire fleets, often causing the loss of entire capabilities. That will continue until the RAF leadership bites the bullet and faces up to the illegal acts of certain RAF Air Officers and of the continuing cover up of that since.

That we have far to travel along the road of reform is made clear by the DECU connectors issue mentioned above. That the MOD's baleful influence extends to many other national institutions is obvious from the follow up action resulting from the tragic death of Red Arrow Sean Cunningham. An illegal RTI led directly to this fatal accident yet it was not the RAF that was brought to book, but rather Martin Baker which was prosecuted by the HSE and convicted. When Air Safety is treated so arbitrarily we are on a slippery slope that will not end well for any of us. It has to change!

One final word. Engines, you call for RAF engineers to do their job and say NO when given an illegal order (the "something like this" you mention). I can only but endorse your call, but in fairness I should caution them that it is still MOD ministerial policy that such illegal orders are allowable and that it is an offence not to obey them! The rot is at the very top of the RAF and it is up to the RAF leadership to resolve it rather than just leaving those at the workface to try to do so. Unlike your RN experience where you have rightly celebrated the top cover extended to you by your superiors, those you urge to resist, rather than having such protection, are instead answerable to those issuing those same illegal orders. We urgently need an independent Regulator to enforce the Regulations and expose those seeking to subvert them.

SASless you ask why such illegality has not been prosecuted. It is because operator, regulator, and investigator are to all intents and purposes one and the same; the MOD and its various subsidiaries. That will continue until the MOD is made subject to the authority of an independent Military Air Regulator and Air Accident Investigator who are in turn independent of each other. Until then UK Military Airworthiness will remain compromised and avoidable fatal air accidents will continue.

Cornish Jack

2nd Jun 2021, 11:23

The rightful efforts to 'right the wrongs', evident in this incident seem to carry a feeling of puzzlement that such a travesty of 'justice' should occur - Why?
You are dealing with the 'principles' of high office in a large 'corporate' organisation - for parallels, consider the Post Office Postmasters disgraceful saga - which, apparently, still continues. Lives ruined , unnecessary deaths - it is not a novel situation.
We still live in a society which shields the powerful from the consequences of their intentional, or inadvertent, ineptitude and there is nothing to suggest an appetite for change.

dervish

2nd Jun 2021, 13:26

As Engines says, fascinating and utterly riveting. Superbly written. As the book says, how sad that the employers of the deceased, and the legal authorities, show no interest in establishing true cause and culpability. Cornish Jack, you got it in one.
I finished it this morning and had a wee walk out to look over to Kintyre. RIP on this the 27th anniversary.
BZ

blind pew

2nd Jun 2021, 13:41

So far up to the FADEC bit, utterly enthralling and appreciate the depth and legal stuff. Sadly a lot of parallels with the Lane Inquiry especially protecting those at fault and ignoring Cat’s eyes Cunninghams’ testimony..the test pilot.
Had à late mate from across the border who knew most of the victims from the security services.

El Grifo

2nd Jun 2021, 16:27

Downloaded !!
Thanks for the heads-up !
El G.

ShyTorque

2nd Jun 2021, 18:19

I’m glad all this extra information is finally coming into the public domain. Very soon after the accident a lot of evidence was hidden, or at least ignored. I had left the service not long before but already knew of some of the stuff that was going on. It was astounding that the Mk2 was ordered into squadron service at all without a formal Release, even more so for such a flight as this tragic one - which took place almost immediately after those responsible for test flying it had pronounced they had no confidence in it.

The RAF was short of SH airframes, the Mk2 was late due to ongoing issues and this flight could and should have been passed to a fixed wing asset. However, I suspect that the SH hierarchy were so keen to save face that all common sense and sense of legality was lost.

101917

2nd Jun 2021, 20:20

At the risk of upsetting a lot of folk here goes.

Ultimately a company or an organisation, in this case the RAF, is responsible and liable for the actions (good or bad) of its employees and must take responsibility.

In this case the RAF placed the responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight on the crew.

The crew accepted that responsibility.

Leaving aside for a moment the shenanigans that the RAF got up to after the accident which were nothing short of disgraceful, but also remember the old adage 'If you lie you had better be good at it' and the RAF were not.

The rules and regulations covering RAF flying operations of its aircraft had stood the test of time.

Those regulations would have covered IFR - Instrument Flight Rules and VFR - Visual Flight Rules when a crew can dispense with IFR rules and fly the aircraft under VFR when they take sole responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight. VFR rules state the required weather minima that must be observed to fly the aircraft visually. In other words the crew need to be able to see where they are going and not find a cloud with a hard centre. If an aircraft is in cloud and cannot see the ground or the direction of flight then it should not proceed on its track below the safety height.

It is just common sense that even if you think you know where you are and trust your navigation systems you just do not press on, while in cloud, below the safety height and not being able to see the ground or terrain ahead, unless the aircraft is able to use the assistance of positive radar control. There was no positive radar control available to help the crew in this accident.

In this accident the RAF tried to cover up many of the issues and absolve themselves of any responsibility.

However, had the crew followed the rules the aircraft would not have pressed on below safety height and either back tracked or climbed. Something they should have done regardless of the NI security situation at that time or the issues the aircraft was suffering from.

There are a huge number of other aspects to this accident such as the standard of training given to the crews involved in flights carrying VIPs. The culture within the RAF. The pressure on the pilots to get to their destination with their important passengers and many other facets. In my view nobody comes out of it well, but had the pilots obeyed the rules with regard to the weather they encountered then the accident would not have happened.

Obviously, had the weather been good then the accident would not have occurred.

All accidents are the result of the 'holes in a Swiss cheese lining up' and never the result of a single error. At some point a hole needs to be covered or a link in the chain broken to prevent an accident.

The rules, regulations and operational procedures are designed to prevent just such an event. They normally work until humans get involved.

ShyTorque

2nd Jun 2021, 20:43

Obviously, had the weather been good then the accident would not have occurred.

How do you know that? Do you know the cause? No-one else does.

Easy Street

2nd Jun 2021, 21:12

I suggest ignoring the contribution by 101917 on this thread, they are presumably able to restart that particular hamster wheel on the main Mull threads should they really wish.

On Chug's perennial point about the baleful influence of senior RAF officers and the compliments to Engines on the much better influence of senior RN officers, I should point out that the current 3* air engineer at DE&S is an admiral. An opportunity for those who know of what they speak to write in and get the relevant policies changed?

jayteeto

2nd Jun 2021, 21:36

Please don’t get into a discussion with 101917. It’s the anniversary and I’ve just finished my drink in the memory of the crew.
we went over this over and over again, the only person I will discuss this with is someone who actually knows what happened. Seeing as they are no longer with us, anyone else who says they know what happened is lying. The result is fact, the reason isn’t.
RIP guys

SASless

2nd Jun 2021, 23:52

A lot of good people died that day....and have not been done well by the System......Condolences to those who lost friends, family, and comrades-in-arms that sad day!

dervish

6th Jun 2021, 10:44

Major piece in our Herald today. Not sure if it's paywalled.

https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/19352839.neil-mackays-big-read-new-mobile-phone-link-finally-solve-mystery-chinook-tragedy/

Some interesting quotes from a former RAF pilot who lost his father in the crash. Having to put chains under his seat? Reminiscent of no explosion suppressant foam. Who makes these decisions? Beyond a joke. I suppose it's hard getting all the history across in one article, but the effect on the families is clear. And a call out for solicitors to help.

megan

7th Jun 2021, 02:50

A very sobering read and impossible to comprehend how something such as this occurred, you'd be forgiven for thinking you were reading the plot line for a novel, there's definitely something rotten in the state of Denmark.

matkat

7th Jun 2021, 10:45

matkat

7th Jun 2021, 10:54

Chugalug2

7th Jun 2021, 11:33

Chug, as long as the MAA is controlled by retired senior officer they will never be impartial. At the inception of the MAA I applied fora job and was bluntly told as I had not been an officer I was never going to get in says it all really. As for the DECUs I do remember when I worked on the chinook fleet at Gutersloh watching the actuators moving themselves with no-one in the cockpit.

Fully agree with you matkat, that is why a fully independent MAA outwith the MOD should be under a civilian DG with serving personnel under him and directly answerable to him, as would be their civilian colleagues of course. No doubt lots of reasons why that would not work. I can only say that it has to, given the cost in lives and treasure of the present system.

Your alarming testimony of UFCM's during servicing is an example of the technical evidence that was conspicuous by its absence in the Mull BoI, let alone the SI into the accident which we still await, following on from the quashing of the ROs' findings by the SoS!

Dervish, many thanks for the link to to the Glasgow Herald story. Might I suggest that those interested do a pdf copy for themselves as I did. Repeated visits back seem to trigger the site paywall otherwise.

blind pew

7th Jun 2021, 17:14

Just finished it but sadly can’t post a 5 star review as I haven’t spent enough dosh with Amazon recently.
Extremely well researched, written, technical and factual. Having had a flight control issue and put out a mayday on a VC10 as well as knowing what went on with the Staines Inquiry which killed my best mate and the losses in the RAF in the 60s where one year saw nearly a daily loss of airframes I was still surprised that this stuff went on to such a degree. But with the background of Covid and the politicians I am not surprised. A late very close mate was head of ROI army intelligence and one of the first things he asked me whilst sailing 25 years ago was about it. At the time it was pilot error but the press included details of the increase in life assurance and a telephone call to father or father in law to look after my family. In light of the Boeing Max accidents, again with some racist remarks on a British pilots forum wrt pilot error, nothing changes. I’ve seen sudden 1200 % speed increase on GPS and my last company had many issues with electronic interference from Nintendo game boys and old disc players. Lastly a mate on a large twin Boeing had double failure pages come up when he transmitted on HF. Lack of shielding which would have been post 1994. I flew the first DC10ER over the North Pole where we had a track discrepancy of 30 degrees which in the middle of the artic night with less than minimum fuel wasn’t fun although there was a simple remedy and the software fault was sorted but to dispatch continually unsafe and unserviceable aircraft with the top intelligence brass on board is either complete stupidity or deliberate political tactics. I haven’t a clue but I do know wrt the IRA attacks on BEA Tridents that there was collusion between both sides. It will never be answered as the truth of the Dublin Monaghan bombings.
Well worth the read.

Bravo Whiskey 7A

7th Jun 2021, 19:45

Thanks for the heads-up Chugalug2. Just downloaded, and I look forward to reading it. This was a dreadful, dreadful injustice that took way too long to remove the slur against the pilots.

Chugalug2

17th Jun 2021, 13:05

Thanks for the heads-up Chugalug2. Just downloaded, and I look forward to reading it. This was a dreadful, dreadful injustice that took way too long to remove the slur against the pilots.

Glad to hear that you bought a copy, BW7A, and hope you find it the eye opener that I did. A dreadful, dreadful injustice indeed and way to long to be set aside, but set aside it was eventually by SoS Liam Fox. What has not been set aside though is the ongoing injustice to the bereaved who have lost loved ones in succeeding avoidable airworthiness related fatal military air accidents because of the continuing RAF/MOD cover up. The parallels with recent BBC and Met Police scandals and their associated cover ups are clear. Chickens are coming home to roost now, and sensible leadership will realise that doing nothing is not acceptable and will not let them off the hook.

A great first post, thank you. Please don't leave it so long for your next one though. We need as much support as possible to reform UK Military Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation.

Chugalug2

22nd Jun 2021, 10:38

Bravo Whiskey 7A, thanks for your PM. Reply sent but your inbox is full, so please clear enough space to receive it. Thanks.

Please note this is not a shameless attempt to bump the thread back to page one. It really isn't!

Chugalug2

23rd Jun 2021, 19:14

As promised, the paperback edition of The Inconvenient Truth has now joined its Kindle partner at a very reasonable price of £10.99, including delivery in the UK, here

https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B097F56QNR/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=

A reminder that all proceeds from both formats go to charity.

WB627

24th Jun 2021, 16:12

Thanks Chug, on it's way. I've been waiting for this to come out in hard copy, I'm not good at reading stuff off a screen.

Bravo Whiskey 7A

27th Jun 2021, 17:15

Thanks Chug.
Inbox cleared.

BW7A

----------------------------

Until you have a posting history you don't have full access to private messaging and adding urls.

Rigga

28th Jun 2021, 13:50

Got it - thanks.

Lordflasheart

4th Jul 2021, 15:44

Sir BP is probably off in the clouds again ( for real I mean) Try this - https://www.amazon.co.uk/RED-investigation-Flight-Lieutenant-Cunningham-ebook/dp/B07VTN8NVZ

LFH

blind pew

4th Jul 2021, 23:57

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1124/img_20210703_wa0005_8783981a26b364d17b4a7fdaf09dc4d1df5447a3 .jpeg
Lord flash...nah..didn't get close..too much traffic

Cornish Jack

5th Jul 2021, 11:11

Blind Pew - your 'piccy', together with a recent memory jog with another member, takes me back nearly 50 years to a night call-out in Cyprus.
An RAF Regt night drop on Ladies' Mile had 'lost' one man. Long story short, we found him, in the sea, and the recovery produced a previously unknown (generally) important difference between the standard aircrew 'Mae West' and those issued to Paras. The orange 'lifting loops' attached to the front support lobes were continuous (around the torso) in the aircrew version, but only sewn to the front fabric in the Para version. The significance, which I discovered in the worst possible circumstances, was, literally, life affecting. I chased up remedial action as far as my limited influence allowed. The result ? - as far as I'm aware, zilch. Certainly no-one in authority ever got back to me, and, it would not surprise me if the equipment was similarly deficient today.

Dave Gittins

5th Jul 2021, 12:41

Read "Chinook Crash" by Steuart Campbell last year, so now have added "An Inconvenient Truth" to my Amazon shopping list and look forwards to that.

blind pew

6th Jul 2021, 06:14

Sadly Jack things haven’t changed; the paragliding industry is a largely unregulated cottage industry generating loads of cash and gear failure is far to common. I could write a long list but a typical design/manufacturing failure was on my last harness and the attachment point of a foot stirrup where the webbing was sewn into the harness fabric. Rather than any reinforcing and multiple attachement stitching there was just one line of stitching where the webbing ran between a joint of fabric and this line of stitches hadn’t been stopped with the result it failed immediately when I used the stirrup to get my ar@e into the harness. An Irish cobbler modified it for me.
Lordflashheart post will appear out of sequence but refers to Red5 and another book by the author which was written prior to the inconvenient Truth, the result of censoring. There is a thread on the Red 5 book which I haven’t really read but the book was excellent; David’s other Chinook book starts with a preface..bit obvious..which includes asking the amount of potatoes a victim ate with the purpose of reducing the insurance payout (allegedly). I had written my post after watching the film “THE POST” about the American politicians trying to stop the freedom of press at a time of tricky dicky and another PBS documentary on the irish flight for freedom which included the irish civil war that no one talks about over there but the resentment is still simmering under the surface. My post mirrored other inquiries and practices which affected me, my father going to prison, my best mate dying in the trident crash, Afghanistan and the Gulf up to the present day with the anomalies of covid. Nothing changes and there will always be censorship and the old boys act.

Rigga

6th Jul 2021, 13:32

BP said: "Nothing changes and there will always be censorship and the old boys act."

To improve our lives, we can only do that which we can - while others can do that which they want.

cafesolo

6th Jul 2021, 15:32

I hope I may be forgiven a silly question: above are several examples of successful purchases from Amazon: I,too, would like to buy the books named, but having identified myself to Amazon,i receive a brief code from them but no indication of what to do with it. Help,please. an ancient Cafesolo.

Lordflasheart

6th Jul 2021, 18:51

Cafe - Are you buying a paper book or the €-Book ? If the latter, you may need to download the Amazon Kindle programme to read it on an iPad or other compatible device . It doesn't work so well on WIN 7 desktops. However, If you're already a customer of theirs, and you get the kindle program, acquiring the €-book should work OK. Good luck. LFH

cafesolo

7th Jul 2021, 08:46

LFH: Thanks for your reply. I wish to buy the paper book: Just tried again to feed the code appearing on my phone back to Amz on the sale page; no joy.
Kind regards, Cafe.

Chugalug2

7th Jul 2021, 09:46

Cafe Solo, this might just be part of Amazon's security process. Do you have an Amazon account and password? If so, they sometimes require you to enter a code that has been sent to your email, mobile, etc, as part of the log in process to be entered on their site. Once logged in you can then order your book. A lot of online accounts are requiring a similar authentication procedure these days. Tiresome, but it is to protect your account. I can't think why else they would send you a code. Hope that helps.

Tinribs

14th Jul 2021, 17:25

This fascinating story has many aspects from which each submitter selects his preferred without considering how each part reflects the whole;
The salient questions seem to be;
Why was this aircraft released for service in an operational situation when the test system doubted it's fitness
Why was this aircraft selected for this mission in questionable circumstances
Why did it depart with marginal; weather on route
Why did the pilots enter cloud when approaching high ground at a coastline
Why did they fly at right angles to that coast instead of a lesser angle
Why did the pilots continue in cloud below safety height

I had previously been at Aldergrove as a Canberra tp on the MU and knew little about the helicopter activities but from what I could see there was a blurring between operational missions where lives (squaddies) were at stake and other trips

Thud_and_Blunder

16th Jul 2021, 13:14

Tinribs, at the risk of provoking further outpourings from erstwhile contributors, may I point out that your last 3 'questions' assume that the aircraft was under control by the pilots at the time. For alternative possibilties, delve into the history of the Chinook (and look up the history of Undemanded Flight Control Movements within US Army and RAF service) if you like, but the sad fact is that the questions are simply not capable of being answered because no evidence survived. Two Air Marshals thought otherwise and came to a convenient (to them) conclusion; they have since been shown to have been wrong.

As an ex SH pilot with time in NI on Wessex and Chinook, I am not sure I follow your point about operational missions and other trips. I treated all lives with equal respect, no matter what the nature of the flight; I wasn't aware of any crews who acted differently.

SASless

16th Jul 2021, 13:59

Thud_and_Blunder

16th Jul 2021, 14:58

Hi SAS - I certainly was aware of the incident and referred to it in the previous thread (I'd read the original article while still serving - it should be required reading for EVERY Chinook operator). However, I'm obliged to you for the information about the Proving Ground incident; I had no idea about that aircraft's historical connection to this unfortunate aspect of the Chinook's control system.

Tinribs

16th Jul 2021, 16:46

Hi Thud
i should have made myself clearer, many aps.
A part of my input was that military missions may have an extra dimension changing the need risk/balance, I do not think and did not intend to infer some lives are more valuable than others simply that some risk to crew might be justified by the passengers situation, the need/risk/balance changes with the urgency of the trip. For instance if soldiers threatened by bad guys will die if they are not rescued the limiting conditions might be different to a routine trip. I understand this element of the military envelope was tested in the Gulf .I wondered if this trip had some underlying factor making it more urgent than it appeared, the nature of the passengers might suggest this possibility

brett s

16th Jul 2021, 18:02

Thud,

In case you have not heard of this bit of Aerobatics (uncommanded) by a US Army Chinook Crew....it is compelling reading.

I am trying to find data that will connect this event aircraft to the one seen self destructing in the "Ground Resonance" video over in "Rotorheads" forum.

A reference Iinked in that thread mentions the aircraft in the video was "the one that went inverted" earlier in its life.

The Pegasus CH-47 Chinook Helicopter video archive. (http://www.chinook-helicopter.com/video/video.html)

One of the disadvantages of a fully articulated rotor system, such as that found on the CH-47 Chinook helicopter, is the susceptibility to ground resonance. Items to consider in limiting the chances of encountering ground resonance include ensuring that all tires are inflated to 88 psi and all landing gear struts and blade dampeners are properly serviced.
The two videos below show the result of a Chinook helicopter falling victim to ground resonance. The tail number was 84-24156, and was the one that previously encountered uncommanded flight control inputs which resulted in the aircraft performing a barrel roll. After the roll incident, the aircraft was assigned to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland, and was utilized as a ground test device.
TAKE NOTE: The destruction of the airframe by ground resonance was not the intention of this test regardless of the claims made by those websites who have lifted the video from this URL.

Old-Duffer

16th Jul 2021, 18:27

Chugalug2

16th Jul 2021, 20:01

Tinribs, may I ask if you have read The Inconvenient Truth? You seem to be making similar assumptions to the ROs. The aircraft was Released to Service by means of an illegal RTS. It was not permitted to fly for any reason, operational or otherwise. The problem was no-one told those that were operating it. You would have to ask the MOD/RAF why it was especially selected for this mission. The a/c captain (and detachment commander) pleaded for a substitute type, any one would suffice. He was denied. Where was the marginal en-route weather? The only cloud that impinged on its tragically short flight was the orographic cloud hugging the slopes of the Mull. It is a well known local phenomena and the planned track should have kept them well clear of it. It didn't. Why not? That is the unresolved issue, the unanswered question that demands a new and independent air accident investigation be initiated. The MOD demanded new evidence. It has got new evidence, but it is time it stopped investigating itself and let someone else do the job, for this and every other military air accident.

I think if you read David Hill's book you will better understand that many of your questions are based on misinformation. That is something (the only thing?) that the MOD does really, really, well.

Thud_and_Blunder

16th Jul 2021, 20:13

Interesting read, O-D. The problem with being 'minded' to say anything on such a subject is that it will necessarily be subjective. Saying that there are 2 sides to the Inconvenient Truth 'coin' is like Nigel Lawson being brought in by the BBC to present the other side of the Climate Change 'coin' - by what metric does a particular issue or problem have to have exactly 2 sides? I understand that your certainty as stated in your 3rd paragraph is based on personal, or at least anecdotal, experience of dealing with the senior officers and others.

I will state up-front that I had experience of working/flying with all of the crew on the flight - I had only left the unit on which they were serving 3 weeks before the crash having been on the Flight for over 3 years. I had also done that task (Fort George) on a previous occasion. In the course of my duties I also met both of the senior officers and have my own opinions. For example, I remember the paper exercise that introduced such delights as "CR Bessbrook" et al, where at a stroke the apparent experience level of a very (to use the then-current jargon) "dilute", LCR-heavy Squadron was transformed to majority-Combat-Ready... good Senior Officer move. Some months after the crash I was tasked to fly with the other Senior Officer on the occasion of his visit to units in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a QHI I knew only to ask questions to which I already knew the answer, so when I asked him directly about his own experience of flying a Chinook (I'd already checked with the pilot he'd previously flown with) he chose to lie without hesitation.

These facts and experiences alone leave me 'minded' to disagree with your conclusion. Subjectively, of course - it's just an opinion.

As for suggestion of massive collusion, I am able to form my own opinion based on the evidence offered in the excellent book(s) and my own personal experience of life in the Royal Air Force around that sorry time. The conduct of the ex-Service members of the HoL including one who my father had taught to fly at Oxford and whose first ADC had been my brother, did nothing to persuade me that they were concerned for the welfare or best interests of the servicemen and women who had loyally served under them and who deserved their support.

Entirely subjective, and bound to remain so for as long as the MoD appears to see its role as one of obfuscation and denial.

tucumseh

17th Jul 2021, 06:39

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The publication of the book “Inconvenient Truth” (ICT) has reopened this exceptionally divisive chapter in the air force’s history. I have now divided the matter into two ‘compartments’: one deals with the physical events of June 1994 and the other the events before/afterwards.

I am minded to believe that the flight crew were in error but to what degree, I am not competent to say. As to the events afterwards, the complexities are too difficult and contradictory (if one steps beyond ICT to the other side of the coin) to make a sensible judgement, not having a balanced account of the facts.

The one thing I am certain in my mind about (and knowing some of the personalities involved) is that I don’t believe the many and often abusive comments levelled at these officers, suggesting some sort of massive collusion, is justified.

Old Duffer

I would never deny anyone their right to an opinion. But, one or two points require a response.

Firstly, to compartmentalise before/after and the accident itself is to ignore the legal obligation the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff was under (confirmed by Lord Philip, and subsequently conceded by MoD) that the aircraft was not to be relied upon in any way. Until one accepts that known fact, no serious discussion is possible.

‘Collusion’ is ‘a secret agreement or cooperation especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose’.

To believe there has been no collusion is to reject the written evidence reproduced in the book and its sequel. In turn, that implies these letters are somehow forgeries.

For example, the Chief of the Air Staff wrote to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy saying the aircraft was ‘off course by some miles’. The Board, and even the senior Reviewing Officers, had never said this, yet none demurred. CAS must have appreciated this timely cooperation.

The RAF consistently stated that the fuel computer software was not safety critical. When asked, MoD refused to produce the relevant policy directive, so it was sent to Lord Philip separately. Law Lords tend to accept documented evidence – it makes their job so much easier. That outright lie was both deceitful and illegal. The truth would have immediately cast overwhelming doubt on the safety of the negligence findings; in addition to offering a plausible cause of the accident, be it directly or indirectly.

If I could inject some humour. The ludicrous letter to the media in January 2010 from the then CAS, stating that the ‘positively dangerous’ status of the FADEC software implementation was ‘well known at the time’, is straight from a Brian Rix farce. Thanks for that confirmation CAS, that your predecessors knew it was dangerous yet signed the RTS telling aircrew it was safe. As he clearly knew none of the facts, who agreed to cooperate and mislead him? When the facts were revealed to him the following day, did he take action? No? Then he colluded with others to protect those who lied.

I leave the best to last. When the Chinook airworthiness report of 1992 was revealed in 2011, the RAF Chief Engineer at the time claimed it did not mention Chinook Mk2. It did, 284 times. Not exactly a minor or easily missed typo. Yet the Air Staff then briefed Dr Liam Fox to repeat the lie. When told the truth, Fox had the decency to retract. Again, what action was taken about a Minister being misled, causing him to mislead Parliament?

That’s a lot of people not colluding, yet telling the same lies. Who benefited?

dervish

17th Jul 2021, 08:14

etudiant

17th Jul 2021, 19:13

Old-Duffer

Tuc beat me to it, and he's too polite. You really need to read the evidence and then say why you don't agree with it. You also say the latest book has 'reopened' the case. As Mr Hill points out, the inquiries and conclusions have been set aside but not replaced with anything, The case has always been very much open. Particularly in Scotland, where the national press have published large recently, and later this month there's a BBC documentary.

I cannot understand why it is apparently so hard for TPTB to admit that mistakes were made.
The people involved are mostly retired, settling the issue would just cost a few million pounds, why let this fester?

Chugalug2

17th Jul 2021, 23:19

I cannot understand why it is apparently so hard for TPTB to admit that mistakes were made.
The people involved are mostly retired, settling the issue would just cost a few million pounds, why let this fester?
With respect, I don't think you have quite grasped the situation, etudiant. Yes, those who perpetrated the original and devastating attack on UK Military Air Safety are long retired but unfortunately succeeding serving VSOs have continued to cover up their actions, blaming resultant airworthiness related fatal air accidents on subordinates, sometimes even on the crews themselves. The good of the Star Chamber it seems outweighs the good of the Service. That serves to illustrate the lack of duty of care that pervades those high echelons. So they all have something to lose if they followed your advice (advice which is of course to be applauded).

Because of the cover up the official line is that the time of the subversion of UK Military Air Safety was a Golden Period as per the Nimrod Review. The official line to this day is that the pilots were negligent in contrast to what SoS Fox announced in the HoC. The official line today is that the Military Air Regulator and Air Accident Investigator (they are to all intents and purposes one and the same) is independent of the MOD while still being a part of it. Most such fiction is pedalled here frequently by the MOD's apologists. Oh, and no, the cost is already many billions, quite apart from the tragic cost in lives, and will be many billions more because the meaningful reform of UK Military Air Safety requires the Regulator and Accident Investigator to be independent of the MOD and of each other. That won't happen unless the cover up ceases, as the first thing that one or the other will do will be to expose the gross negligence and illegal acts of RAF VSOs in the 80s/90s and of the cover up since by other RAF VSOs, when the various accidents that resulted are properly investigated at long last and the long hard road of rebuilding UK Military Airworthiness truly commences.

Read the book, where else do you think I get this stuff?

alfred_the_great

17th Jul 2021, 23:41

tucumseh

18th Jul 2021, 04:46

And yet again, the question that must be asked: if the military air regulator and military air accident investigators are to be independent of one another and the MoD, where do they get their SQEP staff from, and to whom are they responsible?

Alfred

Have you read the Tench Report of January 1987, by William Tench, head of the Accidents Investigation Branch? Not easily found, so I'd be happy to e-mail you a copy. An enlightening read, and it will be clear why MoD had it suppressed. To understand his points, you have to appreciate that the AAIB, IF called to assist a military accident, has a very limited role. It simply reports on the evidence found at the scene; nothing more, nothing less. In a civilian accident, it looks at ALL aspects, including legal, technical and airmanship. Had this been a civilian accident, the AAIB's main question would be 'Why were the crew given an unserviceable and unairworthy aircraft?' - which, for example, its Shoreham crash report dwells on. (Yet in both cases the pilots were deemed solely to blame by authorities; indicating the real problem lies elsewhere, with those allowed to judge their own cases - the 'independence' requirement).

However, in this ZD576 case the AAIB was prevented from carrying out even its limited role, as crucial physical evidence was removed from the scene before it arrived. MoD will not say where it was taken, but no assessment of it was ever made, despite the Release to Service stating that it could cause major problems with the AFCS, fuel computers, nav and comms. MoD then lied to Inquiries that it HAD been assessed, and was benign. The best argument possible for true independence.

To resolve this does not take huge effort or manpower. If I, a bum airframe/electrical fitter, can read a few pages of a report and say 'aircraft u/s and unairworthy', can explain precisely why, and persuade a number of Coroners and two legal reviews of the fact, then it would seem I am, in that sense, suitably qualified and experienced. (And MoD deemed me so). The question is why people with this background are not welcome in the MAA. Does this explain why no BoI/SI report spells out that the vast majority of their recommendations are mandated policy? For example, 95% in the case of Nimrod XV230. In the Cunningham XX177 case, 55 of 59 were mandated; and ALL 50 factors, and ALL root causes, were MoD liabilities. Yet MoD and the HSE joined forces and lied about Martin-Baker. Not only did that transfer blame, but it diverted attention away from the inconvenient truths, more or less guaranteeing recurrence. And than Jonathan Bayliss was killed, with 12 of the factors repeated from XX177. Before considering SQEP, let's get rid of those who encouraged this, and those who stood back in silence.

Chugalug2

18th Jul 2021, 10:35

And yet again, the question that must be asked: if the military air regulator and military air accident investigators are to be independent of one another and the MoD, where do they get their SQEP staff from, and to whom are they responsible?

Well, it isn't going to be easy that's clear, but it is also clear that the loss of UK Military Airworthiness is increasingly having a dire effect on UK Air Power and hence national security. This scandal has lost us entire capabilities, viz Maritime Reconnaissance (only just beginning its faltering steps to be regained), ACO Gliding (a vital source for recruitment, but a mere shadow of its former self), and a large part of the FJ training fleet in the form of the Hawk T1 with its reserve attack capabilities. It has cost some 100 lives and much treasure. It will go on eating away at UK Military Aviation until the MOD/RAF bites the bullet, mans up to what has got us into this mess, and has Air Regulation and Accident Investigation removed from its control.

So what is to be done to get us back to objective air accident investigation and to enforcing the Airworthiness Regulations, which is the key to providing for airworthiness and then maintaining it from start to finish of an aircraft's or system's life? It will hardly come as a surprise if I say that Investigator and Regulator must be outwith the MOD, independent of it and of each other. As tuc points out, a lot of deadwood needs to be cleared out. Both authorities would be headed up by civilian DG's to which their staffs, both military and civilian, would be answerable. Both disciplines follow very complex and arcane procedures and perhaps a weakness in the present system is that Service personnel come and go in short order with scarcely time to get up to speed before they are off to follow another element of their military careers. It may well be that the SQEPs need to be more permanent, and new branches established to provide a core of professional regulators and investigators. Perhaps a mix of them with others with more recent operating and line engineering experience would work. This will all be new and very challenging. A lot will depend upon the willingness and dedication of those involved, for make no mistake the very survival of UK Military Air Power is at stake. The outcome for Air Forces that go to war against others, while riddled with a lack of airworthiness, does not bode well.

Countdown begins

18th Jul 2021, 20:22

Disgusting.
it still goes on… Waddington E3D, crew chief, EngO and Capt all threatened, allegedly, with Court a martial in 2015/2016.. was brought up on my FS course, but rapidly shut down.
FS is a joke; it’s important, except when it’s inconvenient.

falcon900

19th Jul 2021, 11:16

Having read the inconvenient truth, Red 5, and payed close attention to the litany of tragic events in recent decades, I am bound to agree with the general consensus of opinion that the MoD has a substantial case to answer, and however unlikely it is that it ever will, it cannot credibly be allowed to continue to be judge, jury and executioner when it comes to investigating "accidents".
That said, to blame everything on the "bogey man" of the faceless MoD also falls well wide of being the whole the truth, and an open minded observer would find it hard to avoid a conclusion that a dismal safety culture in the RAF was a major contributory factor in every incident.

All of that said, I continue to find myself drawn back to this incident, and what seems to me to be a major point of difference from the others, and that is the question of the Release to Service. In most instances, armed with the full benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see a rolling aggregation of causal factors, holes in the cheese, call them what you will, fatefully coming together to produce the tragic outcome. A series of acts and omissions, some deliberate, some negligent, but pretty much invariably contributed by well intentioned participants who did not for a moment think that their actions could lead to disaster.

The RTS on the other hand seems very different. It would appear that "the system" was working, in that it had identified several major issues with the aircraft, of such combined severity that it could not be test flown, let alone released to service. And yet in a hop, skip, and a jump it found its way onto the flightline, via the most bizarre construct of a newly invented type of RTS, where although the paperwork suggested the aircraft could be put into operation, the "small print" actually precluded its being flown. Why did the individual officer elect to do this? However embarassing and inconvenient (and expensive) the ongoing problems with the Mk2s were, they were not of his making. They were patently nontrivial and a clear risk to life. Why devise a new type of RTS, which, whilst providing a fig leaf to cover his own decision, he knew would more than likely not be properly understood and would not stop the aircraft being put into use? How could the signature of one man take precedence over the considerable body of contradictory evidence not to mention knowledge of many (dozens?) of colleagues, some of them senior to him? Where were the checks and balances? What was his motivation; was this one of the performance objectives he had been set by his superiors? Was he just overly ambitious for his own career ends, or did he just happen to be the cog in a much larger wheel which wanted / needed the aircraft in service at any cost?
IMHO, the root cause of this tragedy lies in the background to the RTS decision, and it is this which needs further investigation. That it was this particular aircraft which crashed, on this particular flight is simply the hand of fate.

Chugalug2

19th Jul 2021, 14:56

f 900 :-
It would appear that "the system" was working, in that it had identified several major issues with the aircraft, of such combined severity that it could not be test flown, let alone released to service. And yet in a hop, skip, and a jump it found its way onto the flightline, via the most bizarre construct of a newly invented type of RTS, where although the paperwork suggested the aircraft could be put into operation, the "small print" actually precluded its being flown.

"The System" most definitely didn't work as it was designed to. Having identified the "several major issues" BD was ignored and then briefed against. The strength of the system as designed is that no one person can subvert it, thanks to the many checks and counter checks. When Controller Air submitted the Interim Use only CAR (which you correctly state prohibited flight for any purpose, other than testing of course) at the request of the RAF, it was ACAS who then issued a caveated RTS, releasing the type into squadron service. He would have been stopped from doing so if such an action was contrary to what had been agreed upon at the highest levels. Why would they feel compelled to agree to do so then? Nobody knows, because none of them have ever been asked! No investigation into the illegal RTS has ever been made. The RAF Provost Marshall was given evidence of this and chose not to reply, never mind to act. My guess would be the primacy of getting the Mk2s back into supporting the Army in NI ASAP, but that is just my guess.

I'm afraid that we need to keep our eyes on the woods here, rather than concentrating on particular trees, be they the Chinook HC2 RTS, Nimrod Mk2 fuel systems, Hercules C1 ESF, Tornado IFF, Hawk MB Mk 10 seat, Sea King Mk 7 HISLs. etc. The woods are the original subversion of the UK Military Air Safety System in the 80s/90s and the subsequent cover up ever since. That was all perpetrated by RAF VSOs at the highest levels. Left to their own devices they will always throw a man overboard (even lesser VSOs) in order to save themselves. There needs to be an independent inquiry into this scandal. Then maybe the need for an independent UK Military Air Regulator and a UK Military Air Accident Investigator, of the MOD and of each other, might finally be acted upon and much life and treasure saved as a result.

MrBernoulli

19th Jul 2021, 16:43

Have you read the Tench Report of January 1987, by William Tench, head of the Accidents Investigation Branch? Not easily found, so I'd be happy to e-mail you a copy. An enlightening read, and it will be clear why MoD had it suppressed.
To help other readers here, I conducted a web search for the Tench Report and found it available here:

https://zkt.blackfish.org.uk/XD864/Tench_Report.pdf

Note of Caution: That particular web page seems pretty interesting, as it deals with the crash of Valiant BK1 XD864 "... on the disused airbase at Spanhoe near Harringworth Northants, with the loss of five crew at 10.38 BST on the 12th of August 1960." However, the overall appearance of the website itself gave me a slightly uneasy feeling, and I did initially wonder if it might be 'a bit dodgy'. My browser plug-ins didn't throw up any warnings, and I also carefully scanned the downloaded 55-page Tench Report PDF, but absolutely no issues were flagged.

I would still suggest being careful, unless anyone else knows differently.

Chugalug2

19th Jul 2021, 17:28

tucumseh

19th Jul 2021, 17:55

The audio file referred to by Chug is from a BBC Radio 4 piece on systemic airworthiness failings, by Angus Stickler, on 2 September 2009. It includes an interview with Lord Trefgarne, who commissioned the Tench report, and is referenced in The Inconvenient Truth. Trefgarne talks of his 'despair' at the report being suppressed. The main obstacle was CAS, ACM Craig; who, as Lord Craig, fought hard against the Chinook pilots.

Later that day, defence minister Kevan Jones was also interviewed. He accused one contributor in particular, a retired Sqn Ldr who is here on pprune, of only speaking out after he retired - claiming he did not say anything while serving.

This was an outright lie. In fact, it was his evidence to the Wiltshire Coroner David Masters a few years earlier that revealed he (the Sqn Ldr) had been party to a formal report warning of the risk of C-130s not having Explosion Suppressant Foam. MoD denied the existence of the report, and in fact any knowledge of ESF prior to the XV179 accident. Yet again, a Coroner chose to believe the hard evidence, particularly two MoD ESF specs from around 1970.

etudiant

19th Jul 2021, 18:17

With respect, I don't think you have quite grasped the situation, etudiant. Yes, those who perpetrated the original and devastating attack on UK Military Air Safety are long retired but unfortunately succeeding serving VSOs have continued to cover up their actions, blaming resultant airworthiness related fatal air accidents on subordinates, sometimes even on the crews themselves. The good of the Star Chamber it seems outweighs the good of the Service. That serves to illustrate the lack of duty of care that pervades those high echelons. So they all have something to lose if they followed your advice (advice which is of course to be applauded).

It still begs the question of why?
That a small and self perpetuating cabal of senior officials prevent honest accident investigations and smear the victims is disgusting, but perhaps it is now the norm in the UK, looking at the Post Office hounding people to their death for false misbillings created by deficient computer software.
I guess UK libel laws prevent any more effective public 'J'accuse' document beyond the 'Inconvenient Truth'.

MrBernoulli

19th Jul 2021, 19:28

You do indeed practice what you preach Mr B, by not posting the links you mentioned. :)

The only site I have discovered that covers Valiant BK1 XD864 and the Tench Report is here, but the latter is on an audio file, not a pdf. I post it because the theme of the site is of untoward interference in the BoI in order to situate the report. The quote at the top of the page should ring a few bells. plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose....

XD864 (blackfish.org.uk) (https://zkt.blackfish.org.uk/XD864/index.html)

Chug, my apologies! 🥴

This is where I got the PDF report from:

https://zkt.blackfish.org.uk/XD864/Tench_Report.pdf

That is the link that came up in my web search. I then worked the url back to get to the page about XD864, and saw the link at the bottom of that page..... and mistakenly assumed it led forward to the PDF of the Tench report. My bad, sorry!

I really just wanted people here to be able to arrive at a web page and choose to download the PDF, rather than have something download straight away. As I wrote earlier, I was initially a bit uneasy about the setup on that website. 🤔

I'll correct my previous post!

Chugalug2

19th Jul 2021, 20:21

No apologies necessary Mr B. On the contrary the Spanhoe Valiant tragedy has many eerie similarities with the Mull one. Unairworthy aircraft (not necessarily generally known then, admittedly), heavily directed BoI (seems likely given the nature and inconsistencies of the report), the operational implications of grounding the fleet if a main spar fracture had been reported by the AAIB Inspector, and a finding against the deceased pilots contrary to AP3207. The link to PPRuNe shows a spirited thread that brought out these points in 2007 et seq. How things become clearer in retrospect!

Valiant crash, Wittering, August 1960 - PPRuNe Forums (https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/267929-valiant-crash-wittering-august-1960-a.html)

Thanks for posting the Tench Report pdf

Chug

MrBernoulli

19th Jul 2021, 20:45

... the Spanhoe Valiant tragedy has many eerie similarities with the Mull one.
It certainly does!

Engines

20th Jul 2021, 11:17

There have been many discussions in this thread of the Chinook Mk2’s Release to Service (RTS). However, I don’t think anyone has mentioned how new the whole idea of an RTS was in 1994. I had first-hand experience of its introduction, and I thought my experiences might help inform this discussion.

Around 1992, what was then the MoD Procurement Executive (the (PE)) created a team to look at how aircraft were being cleared and released to service. They did this because it was apparent that it was being done in a wide variety of ways, and this was (correctly) judged to be a risk to safety. Some aircraft fleets used the CA Release as their primary reference, some used the Aircrew Manual, some used both, and everybody handled in service modifications differently. Led by a quite excellent MoD civil servant, the team produced what was known as the ‘GARP’ report – with the passing of years I’m no longer sure what that stood for, but they set out a new system for preparing what was called the ‘Release to Service’ - the RTS. In 1993, I was starting a new job as the Harrier Fleet Engineering Manager within what was then Director General Aircraft (Navy) (DGA(N). Reporting to a highly experienced and capable Commander Air Engineer, my small team was tasked with producing the Navy’s first RTS, for the Sea Harrier FRS1.

We started with the aircraft’s CA Release (CAR) as issued by Controller Aircraft (PE). By then, under GARP guidance, the CARs were being issued in a standardised format with information clearly presented in relevant sections. This formed the backbone of the RTS. We then prepared another section that listed all the Service Modifications that had been cleared by DGA(N). We then ensured that a copy of the current Service Deviation for each mod was added. And that was basically it. Except for a lot of work.

My boss, and the engineer Captain above him made it clear that my job was to assume nothing and make sure that the whole RTS was fully supported by evidence. For each Service Modification my team had to refer to advice from Boscombe and the aircraft DA and present a justification for clearance for service. For some long-standing Service Mods dating back to the Falklands that still weren’t in the CAR, this was a long job. We also worked with the RN’s air staff officers - experienced Sea Harrier aircrew. My team’s work was carefully reviewed by my Commander, then very formally reviewed by our Captain and then finally presented to our Admiral, DGA(N) himself – another air engineer officer - who signed it off. One thing I should make clear – at no stage was I pressured to include or exclude anything in the RTS. I was expected to produce a safe and operationally suitable RTS, fully supported by relevant evidence. It took time, but we got there, and when a short while later we had to repeat the process for the Sea Harrier FA2 RTS, we were in good shape.

The reason I’ve bored you all with this stuff is this – I can think of no possible universe in which my Commander, let alone my Captain and definitely NOT my Admiral, would have let me present an RTS that wasn’t supported by a fully cleared CA Release and which contained whole blank sections for safety critical systems. Let me be clear about this – I was just a joe Lt Cdr engineer, but I knew what was expected of me, and I would never have even thought of doing such a thing. Nor would any of my FAA counterparts.

Another observation. Some of you might have noted that the Sea Harrier RTS was being signed by a VSO who was an engineer. This was normal Navy practice – the RTS was (in my view correctly) considered to be a technically based and derived document and preparing and approving it was a job for engineers, not aircrew. Another reason for this was to ensure that operational pressures did not unduly influence RTS preparation and approval. In the case of the Chinook it was signed off by ACAS – an aircrew officer. I wonder what systems and procedures his staffs had for preparing the Chinook’s RTS? I wonder if they were technically competent to do that job? Were they shielded, like I was, from pressure from senior officers? And could what happened to the Chinook Mk2 RTS still be happening today on another platform? Perhaps out there in ‘SF Land’, where all sorts of stuff apparently gets ‘bolted on’?

Anyway, I hope this is food for thought. Best Regards as ever to all those good folk working hard out there to get the kit into service safely and effectively.

Engines

tucumseh

20th Jul 2021, 12:35

Good post Engines. You know I agree with all the stuff about DGA(N) and engineers.

The changes you mention were brought about by Piper Alpha (1988), Flixborough (1974), Zeebrugge (1987) and Kegworth (1989). They were implemented in 1992 at Defence Airworthiness Group level, and promulgated to us plebs on 26 March 1993; although ADRP had been running refresher courses for a while for those with airworthiness delegation. The course also covered removal of Crown Immunity.

But they didn't change the basic structure of the release documents. The RAF simply changed from using 'MoD Air Force Department Release', to 'Release to Service'. The content remained the same - Part 1 the CA Release, Part 2 the Service Deviations. The main legal issue, and the main point made by the MoK review in 2011, also remained unchanged - the CA Release was mandated upon the Service. On Chinook Mk2, it said not to be relied upon in any way, and was for ground training and familiarisation (while Boscombe sat waiting for a Mk2 to be delivered to them so they could commence testing and trialling).

GARP (Generic Aircraft Release Process) is, I think, a later change; but it's quite possible the same acronym existed. But that's for another thread(!). I'd left Air Systems by that time, but made a point of asking the lead in ALTG for a copy of the initial policy, which is dated 13 Nov 2003. I think we both know him - a Sqn Ldr (MM) who'd worked on Chinook, and I believe later returned there. My abiding memory of him is standing toe to toe in 1997 with the idiot who was managing Chinook Mk3, telling where he was going wrong and precisely what would happen, and being told to go away. He knew his stuff, and was 100% accurate. When he wasn't giving Mk3 both barrels, you could hear the same racket from downstairs on Nimrod RMPA, where his contemporaries in the RAF were having the same 'discussion'.

etudiant

20th Jul 2021, 15:27

tucumseh

20th Jul 2021, 17:53

etudiant

The Government and MoD itself still enjoys 'immunity', although individuals can be prosecuted. For example, action was initiated after the Nimrod Review against named individuals, but ceased as soon as Thames Valley Police were given evidence of prior negligence by people more senior. But they didn't shift focus, just walked away saying it was unlikely anyone would come forward with evidence. Missing the point that many had, both to themselves and Haddon-Cave.

Same on Chinook ZD576. The pilots have been cleared, but the Inquiries have not been reopened. The only official indication was from the Crown Office in Glasgow, whose Head of Fatalities Unit, David Green, stated that it was now a matter for the Metropolitan Police, as the offences were committed in London (by the Air Staff). One assumes he gave it some thought before putting it in writing. The Met have yet to respond. And won't.

Who benefits?

Perhaps the best clue as to why the Mk2 was released is the confirmation by the RAF Director of Flight Safety in August 1992 that the Army was applying pressure. But there is much more. Boscombe had stated the aircraft was only a prototype. This was generous. It did not yet meet MoD's definition of a prototype. Yet ACAS (AVM Anthony Bagnall) signed the RTS. But what pressure was being applied? Surely, even if a pilot, he understood 'positively dangerous', 'not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever' and 'we've grounded our aircraft, so should the RAF'. It wasn't an isolated memo he may have missed on his day off. It was weekly reports, over a period of almost a year. Another clue may lie in the fact he didn't actually sign a letter of promulgation, which is the authority to conduct Service regulated flying. That wasn't issued until January 1996, by his successor. Was he being clever, to avoid comebacks? An interesting question.

dervish

25th Jul 2021, 10:33

After re-reading this new book I returned to the author's previous ones. I recommend "Breaking the Military Covenant - Who Speaks for the Dead?" to all servicemen. It's a work of amazing depth and breadth and available free on Kindle Unlimited. Judging by the blurb on Amazon there were problems with a publisher, so you need to get this title, not the unofficial one.
Also, if you pick up BBC Scotland there's a new documentary about the Chinook crash on Wednesday at 2000. Part of a series "Disasters that shocked Scotland".

Chugalug2

25th Jul 2021, 13:52

Engines :-
I can think of no possible universe in which my Commander, let alone my Captain and definitely NOT my Admiral, would have let me present an RTS that wasn’t supported by a fully cleared CA Release and which contained whole blank sections for safety critical systems. Let me be clear about this – I was just a joe Lt Cdr engineer, but I knew what was expected of me, and I would never have even thought of doing such a thing. Nor would any of my FAA counterparts.

Unfortunately, in a parallel universe that is exactly what was happening. I am glad that you had all that top cover Engines, but your RAF counterparts did not. They were faced with an illegal order, i.e. 'suborn the regs and get the a/c into service as is'. What was expected of them? It transpires that issuing such an order was acceptable (confirmed in writing as MOD policy) but that disobeying it was not. We have amongst us one who did just that, but the vast majority did not of course and we all know how that ended. If your Admiral, Captain, and Commander had confirmed that order (no matter how improbable that might be) what would then have been expected of you? They did not of course and all credit to them for that, but did they just do nothing or did they confront their RAF equivalents and remonstrate strongly with them? Did they pass their concerns up the line so that they went to the very top of the RN? Were those concerns then relayed to the RAF High Command? I am puzzled as to how that same High Command was able to subvert UK Military Air Safety (ie that of the FAA and AAC, as well as the RAF) seemingly unhindered. I appreciate this was way above everyone's pay rate here, but there is usually some feedback down the line, especially if your Service is left with clean hands when another one is not. What was the word, or was there none? If not, I wonder why? After all the FAA was to have its own airworthiness related fatal air accident in due course, which can be traced back with so many others to this same aberration.

Bayek Itsarumdu

25th Jul 2021, 21:51

...a new documentary about the Chinook crash on Wednesday at 2000...

Replaced by Olympics highlights. Nevertheless, those outwith Scotland will be able to watch via the BBC iPlayer after the (rescheduled) broadcast.

bbc.co.uk/programmes/m000yc6n (noob can't post links.)

polecat2

25th Jul 2021, 22:46

It's on Sky 194, Virgin 162 and Freesat 108 on Wednesday at 2000.

Polecat

Engines

26th Jul 2021, 16:04

Chug,

I’d like to reply to your last post, which, as I read it, posed three questions:

1. What would have been expected of me if I’d been given an order to ‘suborn’ airworthiness?
2. Why didn’t senior RN engineers confront their RAF equivalents about the issues with the Chinook Mk2, and:
3. How did the actions of senior RAF officers lead to the FAA’s own airworthiness issues?

Firstly, I apologise to everyone here if I ever give the impression of being an important or good air engineer. I wasn’t. I was no more than average and sometimes not even that. I was lucky to receive a very good training and to have had excellent bosses who guided and led me to do a reasonable job.

To your first question – I trusted my superiors to be honest and right, and they trusted me to do the right thing. If I was given a reasonable order, it was my duty to carry it out. If I didn’t think it was reasonable, I was expected to say so. An example might help.

Early in my career as a Lieutenant, I was what the RAF would call the ‘JEngO’ on my first front line squadron. One of our Sea Kings landed onboard for a crew change with a whistling noise coming from the rotor – I had the aircraft shut down and saw that a section of the rotor blade’s rubber leading edge strip had worn away and was coming off. I told the crew to shut down so we could get it in the hangar and replace a section of the strip. My Senior Pilot, (with a lot more experience on the aircraft than me and senior in rank) was due to take the aircraft on its next sortie. He strongly told me that the aircraft was ‘wholly serviceable’ and that I would get the aircraft to fix when he’d finished his sortie. I replied that it wasn’t his decision, it was mine, and the aircraft was going to be shut down. The Senior Pilot got quite loud and shouty, so I suggested that we should take the discussion elsewhere - we found a quiet compartment while the aircraft was shut down and stowed.

The SP shouted a bit more, and fingers were pointed at the general area of my chest. Direct orders were given and I was asked if I understood that I'd been given those orders. However, I had no option but to tell him that the decision on serviceability wasn’t his, it was mine, and if he didn’t like it he could get on the radio and talk to my boss, the AEO (RN parlance there). After a pause, the SP snorted ‘very well then!’ and stalked off. But later that day he came to see me, acknowledged that it was my call not his, and that I’d made the right call. He reminded me that I would have far harder decisions to take in the future and that talking to the aircrew before I made them would always be advisable. Our subsequent working relationship (which included some significant operational stuff) was based on strong mutual respect and was excellent.

To your second - my guess would be that the ‘stove piping’ of the various services’ engineering systems gave very few avenues for any RN engineer to question or challenge the actions of ACAS and his staff. One senior RN AEO serving at Boscombe is mentioned in the book, and I am reasonably sure he would have had a view on the Mk2’s RTS – but it was being signed off by an ‘operator’, ACAS. I am certain that no RAF aircrew VSO would have taken the slightest notice of an RN engineer of Captain (or indeed any higher) rank. Nor would anyone in MoD, given the RAF’s grip on the higher political levels. Remember as well that at this time there was no overarching airworthiness authority that spanned the MoD and the three services – frankly, what went on in the RAF stayed in the RAF and this was generally the case for the other two services.

This reflected what I subsequently saw (yeah, hindsight, I know) as a systemic failure within the Uk’s military airworthiness management systems to look out for best and worst practice, and to then apply the lessons. There were simply no effective systems I ever encountered to get the Services (and MoD) together and ‘compare and contrast’ systems and methods to mutual benefit. In one of my last jobs working in the MoD, I tried to set up a ‘cross platform group’ to address serious issues that were affecting several platforms installing the same piece of kit. My team had developed some great ideas that could have been used by others to good effect and we’d have loved to get ideas from others. No interest at all.

To your third question – I think that Tuc could better answer that one, but I’ll give it a go. The RAF was (quite understandably) seen as the lead service on all things to do with aircraft. They had (and probably still have) strong political support at high levels, and that made ‘taking on the RAF’ a loser’s game. The RN got on with what it had been given as best it could, but there was little it could do once the RAF had effectively taken control of the MoD’s logistics support systems, I guess in the 1980s. Many of the airworthiness related decisions were taken by MoD civilian personnel, and by the 90s, the rot had set in across many departments. Could RN engineers have made poor decisions? Absolutely – humans can do that. Generally, the RN had good control mechanisms to catch them – but not always.

Sorry, this has been a long reply – but I thought Chug’s post deserved a proper response.

Best Regards as ever to all those young engineers out there today doing the right thing when it’s required. Keep on doing it.

Engines

Mogwi

26th Jul 2021, 16:34

“Firstly, I apologise to everyone here if I ever give the impression of being an important or good air engineer. I wasn’t. I was no more than average and sometimes not even that.”

Engines, as far as I knew you, you were an excellent engineer and the pilot’s friend at all times. You were also eloquent and good company. Pity about the nose-biting though!

Mog

Engines

26th Jul 2021, 17:48

Mog,

Ah, yes, the nose biting....an unfortunate example of my many failings. But by God, it was fun at the time! Not that my victims agreed....

Engines

tucumseh

26th Jul 2021, 18:44

I’ll take Engines’ mention of me as an invitation to try to answer the same (excellent) questions, from my viewpoint and own experiences.

1. What would have been expected of me if I’d been given an order to ‘suborn’ airworthiness?

When given such an illegal order I was expected, and legally bound, to challenge it. I have been given illegal orders by civilians and senior officers of two Services.
Two examples of more serious events.
When told by a civilian in 1999 to make a false declaration in airworthiness documents, I refused. He went bleating to a senior RN officer; who confirmed my refusal was an offence, and warranted a formal warning. This was upheld by our 2 Star (i/c Chinook, Nimrod, etc.), the Chief of Defence Procurement, and two Cabinet Secretaries. His decision stood, and the protection this afforded the civilian is directly linked to nine deaths – 6xRN, 1xUSN and 2xRAF. However, I have never received an illegal order from an RN officer.
In 1992 an Air Vice Marshal deemed the same refusal a dismissible offence. My sacking was avoided by Director Internal Audit, in a report to PUS, giving AML/Chief Engineer both barrels. The events preceding this form the background to the ‘savings at the expense of safety’ confirmed by the Nimrod Review; and so are linked to scores of deaths.

2. Why didn’t senior RN engineers confront their RAF equivalents about the issues with the Chinook Mk2?

I know of two senior RN officers, both I think known to Engines, who railed against the RAF policy of running down airworthiness. Both were Senior Captains; one, in FONAC, wrote saying AMSO’s policies were an ‘indictment on the way we conduct business’. Doesn’t sound like much, but it was more than most and the target was a 4 Star. But a mere Senior Captain is going to be ignored if he doesn’t have top cover.
I also recall that the letters of airworthiness delegation from AML/Chief Engineer (from April 1994) only allowed you to report problems in your own little area. That is, he didn’t want to know about systemic failures. Again, many deaths occurred as a direct result of the CE ignoring these warnings, mainly from Directors of Flight Safety. As the Government confirmed on ZD576, very senior RAF officers cannot be wrong by virtue of their rank.

3. How did the actions of senior RAF officers lead to the FAA’s own airworthiness issues?

Historically, the RN was content for suitably qualified and experienced civilians to carry out many roles the RAF demanded its own officers do. In 1991 they were transferred to AMSO, subject to RAF policies, and one step further removed from the RN. The RAF ensured they had no voice by shutting down the oversight committees chaired by these civilians in June 1991.
But it is also necessary to say the run-down of the FAA, and some 2 Star posts becoming 1 Star, meant, for example, the Sea King AEW Mk7 MAR was signed in August 2002 by an Air Vice Marshal, DGES(Air), and the RTS by CINCFLEET – a very significant change from the period related by Engines in a previous post. The project office technical staff had been stood down in March 2001, and technical leadership assumed by a civilian physiologist – who was permitted to self-delegate airworthiness and technical approvals. When XV650 and XV704 collided on 22 March 2003, the Mission System had the same status as Chinook Mk2 in 1994 – not to be relied upon in any way. Due to various interactions, this affected Comms, Nav, IFF and more. Also, the RTS allowed the use of equipment that had been prohibited in the aircraft since 1998 on safety grounds; and both aircraft had mandatory safety mods missing – again, same as Chinook. Whoever wrote that RTS had no idea whatsoever about RN Sea Kings or the Mk7 programme; but even now I find it astonishing that the squadron, at least, didn’t point these things out. The aircraft wasn’t sufficiently mature, but it was frustratingly close. The problem was not necessarily the need for more time; it was that the above non-engineer had cancelled risk mitigation contracts; and these 3 known risks manifested on the same day and were deemed the 3 main contributory factors by the Board.

A bloody mess, and I wish the MAA well should they ever decide to try to do something.

Chugalug2

26th Jul 2021, 21:58

Engines, Tucumseh, many thanks to you both for seeking to address my somewhat impertinent post. It was a sincere attempt to get beyond the Inter-Service ballyhoo and drill down to how and why UK Military Air Safety has got into such a mess and what is to be done about it.

Engines, you say that,
The RAF was (quite understandably) seen as the lead service on all things to do with aircraft..... The RN got on with what it had been given as best it could, but there was little it could do once the RAF had effectively taken control of the MoD’s logistics support systems, I guess in the 1980s....
Well, did the RN ever try? I don't find it understandable at all. The FAA was deprived of spares support from the very get go, so what did the RN High Command say or do?
The single phrase that sums up this developing scandal is that, "Evil happens when good men do nothing". If the RN High Command thought it could accommodate RAF control of its aircraft support systems it was rudely awakened on 22nd March 2003. It now shares deck space with Army and RAF aviation, fixed wing and rotary. A bring your own unairworthiness invite? No man is an island, even less so the 21stC UK Military Services. So why hasn't the RN leadership challenged that of the RAF and demanded meaningful reform of UK Military Air Safety? Even now would be better late than never. You tell us that taking on the RAF is a losers game. My answer would be that not doing so is much much worse!

I notice that you assiduously addressed my questions (for which much thanks) but avoided the very one alluded to above. Did FAA Engineers pass their concerns to the very top and what if anything did the RN High Command do to address them? I wouldn't expect SO's to do anything other than their professional very best, and it is clear that you and tuc did just that by the anecdotes you have posted here and elsewhere. BZs to you both. But what about your leadership? While you were doing your very best what were they doing? We have a very clear idea about what the RAF's leadership was doing, and it is not good. So what of the Senior Service? Without airworthy Naval Air Power the Royal Navy is as bereft as is the Royal Air Force, and its very survival is just as threatened. Why hasn't it cried out for reform?

Tuc, your story is well known to the PPRuNe readership and suffice it to say you are respected and revered for the stand you have taken on behalf of all UK Military Aviators. On behalf of them all, thank you! To coin a phrase, Air Safety Concerns Us All, and as aviators we should all strive to ensure and safeguard it. You are steadfast, along with Engines, in the superiority of the FAA system of Air Safety and in particular of the precedence of Engineers in providing for it. In the event though the RAF bulldozed through such excellence and it provided you no protection from the RAF VSO clique that set out on its monstrous mission to tear down all that you had dedicated yourself to. However, you say that you never received an illegal order from a RN officer, yet instance one who supported an illegal order given you by a Snr CS! You'll forgive me I hope if I call that splitting hairs. The RAF VSOs that continue the cover up of the illegal acts of their predecessors share the same guilt to my mind.

You both decry the blatant attacks on RAF Engineers, and their replacement with those without engineering skills and expertise, in the RAF take over of UK Military Aviation support, and yet this was done under the auspices of the RAF's own Chief Engineer! I can but add Amen to that. As far as I can see it is now only the RN that can lead the fight back to reform and restore UK Military Airworthiness, by calling for an Independent Military Air Regulator and Air Accident Investigator, of the MOD and of each other. Unless and until that happens the outlook for UK Military Aviation, whether based on sea or land, is poor if we are ever confronted by another Air Power.

falcon900

27th Jul 2021, 10:26

f 900 :-

"The System" most definitely didn't work as it was designed to. Having identified the "several major issues" BD was ignored and then briefed against. The strength of the system as designed is that no one person can subvert it, thanks to the many checks and counter checks. When Controller Air submitted the Interim Use only CAR (which you correctly state prohibited flight for any purpose, other than testing of course) at the request of the RAF, it was ACAS who then issued a caveated RTS, releasing the type into squadron service. He would have been stopped from doing so if such an action was contrary to what had been agreed upon at the highest levels. Why would they feel compelled to agree to do so then? Nobody knows, because none of them have ever been asked! No investigation into the illegal RTS has ever been made. The RAF Provost Marshall was given evidence of this and chose not to reply, never mind to act. My guess would be the primacy of getting the Mk2s back into supporting the Army in NI ASAP, but that is just my guess.

I'm afraid that we need to keep our eyes on the woods here, rather than concentrating on particular trees, be they the Chinook HC2 RTS, Nimrod Mk2 fuel systems, Hercules C1 ESF, Tornado IFF, Hawk MB Mk 10 seat, Sea King Mk 7 HISLs. etc. The woods are the original subversion of the UK Military Air Safety System in the 80s/90s and the subsequent cover up ever since. That was all perpetrated by RAF VSOs at the highest levels. Left to their own devices they will always throw a man overboard (even lesser VSOs) in order to save themselves. There needs to be an independent inquiry into this scandal. Then maybe the need for an independent UK Military Air Regulator and a UK Military Air Accident Investigator, of the MOD and of each other, might finally be acted upon and much life and treasure saved as a result.
Chug,
You seem to have applied a rather narrow and literal interpretation to my last post, en route to your attempt to detract from it, which I am struggling to understand as we seem to have reached similar conclusions and are saying similar things.
I am very much concentrating on the "woods", but do feel that there is a particular tree which could beneficially be shaken to illustrate the central strand of the issue.
Let me try again in plain, simple terms.
A seemingly sane, rational, experienced individual finds themselves in a position of responsibility and seniority. They fully understand their position and responsibilities, having worked towards them throughout their career, a career which they hope / anticipate has yet greater heights to reach. Their responsibilities include authorising the Release To Service of aircraft, a recognised and critical protection, signifying, in simple terms, that the aircraft is "safe" to be transferred to squadrons for operational use.
Along comes Chinook Mk2, by which time the project is late, over budget, and to put it mildly a known problem child. The individual has had no personal involvement in the project hitherto, so bears no personal responsibility for the problems up to that point. In seeking to discharge his duties responsibly, he decides to ignore the rumours and gossip, and familiarises himself with the body of written materials and opinion. A very clear picture emerges of serious and multiple safety critical issues, and no amount of rose tinted spectacles can transform it into a positive one.
The obvious path is to decline to issue a RTS pending resolution of the issues. Whilst every RTS will be made with some degree of residual safety risk remaining, the Chinook Mk2 residual risk was overwhelming, and could not be glossed over. It would not have required a huge degree of insight or imagination to realise that this was the correct and logical course of action.

So why wasnt it followed?

There seem to be only two possible reasons.
1) The individual saw an opportunity to win Kudos for himself by "solving" the problem at the stroke of a pen, providing much needed helicopter capacity to the line in the process.
2) He was ordered to do it.

Acting off his own bat in the particular circumstances seems a step too far given the extent of the risks, and the number of people in the know. The decision to restrict the scope of the RTS to basically preclude flying the aircraft is both a clue to his acting on orders, and one of the most cynical acts I have come across for some time. Whilst providing a line of defence should the worst happen (as of course it did, in short order) it was well understood that once the aircraft arrived with squadrons, it would be flown, the small print in the RTS being unknown / overlooked. An embarassing procurement saga could morph into a business as usual tidy up of the aircraft in service, with the odd crash here and there being swept under the carpet and likely explained as operationally related. Nothing to see here, move along....

The subsequent cover up and smearing of the pilots in this incident would surely not have been undertaken just to protect a lone officer who made a poor decision for his own ends? They only make sense in the context of his having been ordered to grant the RTS, and a full scale circling of the wagons being needed to protect those involved.

In my view, having this individuals actions examined under oath offers an opportunity to expose the whole rotten mess in black and white. The particular dramatis personae of this case have all now left the scene, but the repercussions would likely be felt by their successors. This particular tree would shed a lot of light on the wood.

tucumseh

27th Jul 2021, 10:54

Chug

However, you say that you never received an illegal order from a RN officer, yet instance one who supported an illegal order given you by a Snr CS! You'll forgive me I hope if I call that splitting hairs.

My excuse is that some of us with exaggerated centre partings have no hairs to split.

The last time I spoke to the RN Captain he was devastated over the AEW mid-air, and had come to realise what he'd been told a few years earlier by his engineers, Boscombe Down and Westland was correct. I do not know if he was questioned by the Board of Inquiry, but believe an officer of his rank should have been able to approach the President, a fellow Captain, and point him in the right direction. A key question would have been why no 2 Star review of the residual risks had taken place, which would have exposed (again) that mitigation was cancelled on the grounds the risks would NEVER occur.

As for his ruling on the matter of fraud, nothing can excuse his failure to retract when given the opportunity.

Sorry, I digress from the thread subject, but the same offences were committed on Chinook.

Chugalug2

27th Jul 2021, 17:55

falcon 900:-

Let me try again in plain, simple terms.

Having read your plain simple terms F900, it would appear that we are indeed in violent agreement. Let me be clear though, as a mere ex-driver airframe I hold the person who signed off the Chinook Mk2 RTS to be put it into squadron service, no matter how well he felt covered, as directly responsible for his actions. That he was acting under orders I have no doubt. That those orders had been devised by a cabal of RAF VSOs I consider highly probable. That those VSOs would have to be at the very top of the RAF High Command would seem unavoidable, for how else could they anticipate compliance with such an illegal order? That succeeding ones continue the cover up of what happened merely brings that original betrayal of trust and duty of care right up to the present day.

Your very particular tree does indeed warrant close inspection, I fully agree. The MOD prides itself on being to handle MPs, QCs, Coroners, and any others minded to ask awkward questions. Times they are a changing though, and awkward questions are increasingly having to be confronted. As you say, let those involved with the RTS be questioned under oath and then follow where that leads us to. It is unconscionable that VSOs continue to be protected while unairworthy aircraft sustain fatal accidents because of illegal orders issued by them. The RAF needs to lance this boil or face ever worse outcomes if it does not.

Let Right Be Done!