N72EX (Kobe Bryant) Crash Update-

[gulliBell]

Gullibell, I think it has been established that Ara was not using the autopilot - as he "should have been."

Yeah I know. That is exactly what I said. He should have been using George (the auto-pilot), but wasn't.

[gulliBell]

The Big Question is: What caused a proficient instrument pilot to screw up what "should" have been a relatively simple climb-to-VFR through a thin layer?.

The only true test of proficiency is flying in actual cloud. Which if reports attributed to pilot colleagues suggesting the accident pilot had never flown in a cloud, means previous assessments of his proficiency might not have been a valid assessment of real IMC skills. I've seen for myself first hand, newly minted IFR pilots arriving on the job site and within seconds of poking the clouds for real the first time they end up almost upside down within 30 seconds.

[[email protected]]

FH - I think the story about Ara's descent to get VMC beneath says more about his lack of IMC IFR experience than anything - making an uncontrolled (by radar or ATC) descent overwater isn't a clever move, especially if you have a normal instrument approach available at your destination.

Was he a hardened 'cloud-dodger' who only talked a good IMC flight? Was he actually fearful of IMC and would try anything to avoid it?

[SASless]

Over water IMC descent to find VMC conditions.....now who flying offshore has never done that?

Granted it is safer with Radar installed and working....perhaps even having an installed and functioning Auto Pilot.

Doing a descent hoping to find VMC over uneven terrain...no thanks.

We will. not know if that descent was by intent or was the result of a loss of control by the pilot.

As he called SCT to report climbing.....and the very short time between that transmission and loss of Radar Contact would suggest a rather abrupt change in plans if it was intentional.

[megan]

I had forgotten the initial document that prompted my previous about the pilot not being aware radar flight following had been cancelled by the issuance to squawk 1200. It's the company, Island, submission on the docket. They clearly have little understanding of how the ATC system operates.


https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/971x977/untitled0_e748626a49ec8ee67a2981156fb646dc94253ad1.png

[SASless]

Let's put this in context.

An additional service a Controller is expected to provide Aircraft he has in Radar Contact is Altitude Alerts.

The Aircraft was not on an IFR Route, it was not conducting an Instrument Approach, and was not being vectored....even while it was being handled by Controller 1 at SCT.

Compound that with the Aircraft was flying VMC at approximately 400-600 feet following highways on the ground....all the time well below the Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) for the whole flight until perhaps at the max altitude it reached before beginning its uncontrolled descent leading to the impact with terrain.

Controller 1 knew he would lose both radar and comms with the aircraft and that is why he terminated his services to the aircraft.

He did not use the required wording....."Radar Service Terminated"...but the language used and instruction to return the transponder to the standard VFR Code of 1200 speaks volumes to what was his intent.

In light of the low altitude and pending loss of comms....what service was the Controller expected to provide to the Aircraft?

Even Controller 2 assumed the aircraft was VMC and was climbing VMC (possibly through a hole he said to investigators) but was following the procedure to identify and locate an aircraft making contact with him.

[JohnDixson]

Aside to the response above by SAS: Also, the ATC radar can’t be expected to offer the performance of an onboard TF/TA radar.
(Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance).

[FH1100 Pilot]

Over water IMC descent to find VMC conditions.....now who flying offshore has never done that?

Ummm...me? Never. Not once did I do that. Admittedly, I only flew in the GOM for fifteen years. Maybe if I'd stuck around for another year I would've "had' to do it? Who knows. People often castigate and insult me because I don't have an Instrument Rating. But over my whole career, I've either stayed low or turned around or...gee, imagine this...LANDED. You know why I never "went IMC?" Because I never pretended that I could fly on instruments. Like Ara. And like so many other superior, Instrument-rated and supposedly competent pilots (perhaps like yourself)... but who've met their demise due to overconfidence in their abilities. (Plus, I've never flown any helicopter that was IFR-capable...or certified...or was able to carry enough fuel for an IFR flight after loading up all the crap.)

Granted it is safer with Radar installed and working....perhaps even having an installed and functioning Auto Pilot.

Doing a descent hoping to find VMC over uneven terrain...no thanks.

We will. not know if that descent was by intent or was the result of a loss of control by the pilot.

As he called SCT to report climbing.....and the very short time between that transmission and loss of Radar Contact would suggest a rather abrupt change in plans if it was intentional.

No, SAS. It was unintentional. I believe that Ara really thought he was still climbing straight ahead when "something" distracted him and he diverted his attention from the instruments in front of him to the left...to the center console, maybe. Then, unconsciously, his hand put some left pressure on the stick which caused the left bank which, left unattended and uncorrected, progressed into a steep, unrecoverable descending left turn.

It's funny... People act as though Ara was some incompetent, unqualified boob. They act like he was some newbie 206 charter pilot who just graduated from R-44's with a fresh Instrument ticket and no practical experience. We should remember that he was the CHIEF PILOT of that chicken outfit. To be a Chief Pilot you need at least three years of Part-135 experience. Typically, you don't get to be CP because the Director of Ops walks in one morning and says, "Oh damn, I forgot, we need a new Chief Pilot. Hey Ara, you doing anything right now? You wanna be Chief Pilot? I mean, it's either you or the other R-44 guy we just hired."

[Robbiee]

,...People often castigate and insult me because I don't have an Instrument Rating. But over my whole career, I've either stayed low or turned around or...gee, imagine this...LANDED. You know why I never "went IMC?" Because I never pretended that I could fly on instruments. Like Ara. And like so many other superior, Instrument-rated and supposedly competent pilots (perhaps like yourself)... but who've met their demise due to overconfidence in their abilities. (Plus, I've never flown any helicopter that was IFR-capable...or certified...or was able to carry enough fuel for an IFR flight after loading up all the crap.)

So you never became that "better pilot" the Instrument Rating is supposed to make you,...yet you somehow survived a career at this?

Yeah, I met a few of old guys like you during my training. With my generation though, its, "No IR? Sorry, but you're not even qualified to do photo flights in an R22,...let alone fly tourist in a straight line for five minutes over the Vegas strip!"

Yep, plenty of old guys did just fine without it, but we younger guys (well relatively younger) who have to have it keep killing ourselves in IIMC. Kinda makes you think...? :sad:

[[email protected]]

As a Chief Pilot with all that experience and an IR - Ara should have known that getting a radar service in those conditions at that height was never going to happen. He was well below MSA and was therefore responsible for his own terrain clearance.

[helonorth]

Flight following isn't going to do you much good if you're poking around in the fog and lose control of the aircraft. I don't know why ATC is even being brought into this. There was nothing they could do for him if he doesn't declare an emergency.

[SASless]

FH....get squared away....put a chip on the other shoulder will you?

Bobby was not about to spend the money to put any instruments in those aircraft you flew so you could not go IMC and survive it

The just proves your judgement was better than your flying skills....as judgement kept you from having to prove you had superior flying skills...which sounds about the way it should be.

Ara was not incompetent....he was human. and subject to all of those human frailties that are common to all of us.

He did fail to satisfactorily complete his assigned task that sad day.

I have been defending him as I can....but do have to admit his failures that we know occurred.

People liked him he was well regarded, and had been trained, tested, and certified for the Tasks assigned to him.

Yet....we see a chain of events that led to his loss along with his passengers and it is fair to seek explanations for what seem glaring errors when viewed from afar and well after the fact.

Understanding how he got trapped might help prevent some one else from winding up with similar results one day.

We do this not to impugn Ara.....but to see that his loss can provide a means to avert another such tragedy.

[helonorth]

Bobby was not about to spend the money to put any instruments in those aircraft you flew so you could not go IMC and survive it







I got there after Suggs was gone but those 206's and 407's were pretty well equipped and we were adequately trained for it. Haven't heard of a PHI offshore IIMC accident in a long, long time. I believe the 407's now all have HeliSAS. No more 206's.

[beebo]

I got there after Suggs was gone but those 206's and 407's were pretty well equipped and we were adequately trained for it. Haven't heard of a PHI offshore IIMC accident in a long, long time. I believe the 407's now all have HeliSAS. No more 206's.

No helisas in the offshore 407s, but really excellent training

[JimEli]

...
It's funny... People act as though Ara was some incompetent, unqualified boob. They act like he was some newbie 206 charter pilot who just graduated from R-44's with a fresh Instrument ticket and no practical experience. We should remember that he was the CHIEF PILOT of that chicken outfit. To be a Chief Pilot you need at least three years of Part-135 experience. Typically, you don't get to be CP because the Director of Ops walks in one morning and says, "Oh damn, I forgot, we need a new Chief Pilot. Hey Ara, you doing anything right now? You wanna be Chief Pilot? I mean, it's either you or the other R-44 guy we just hired."Scud runs, had an FAA violation, alleged illegal IMC let-down, and it appears an illegal IMC climb. That seems like a recipe for an accident...

A "Darker Shades of Blue" kind of thing.

[megan]

As a Chief Pilot with all that experience and an IRUnfortunately crab he was lacking in one area, and that was IF time, he gained the rating in 2007 and reported 68.2 hours simulated in about 2010, then 75 hours total in 2019, no reported actual so presumably all simulated. He reported 1,300 hours in the S-76 as at 2019, so experienced in type but no actual IF it would seem. It's very difficult to simulate IF in the 76 so with him finding himself in cloud for the very first time, even though he has a rating, is going to be something of a task, even without the distraction of talking to some body or pushing ident. Had a rating but no proficiency. Typical VMC into IMC with the usual predictable outcome, though it didn't need to be if he had some real IF time. As said we're all human and no one has yet found a new way to have an accident.I don't know why ATC is even being brought into thisLikewise, presumably to shine the spotlight elsewhere and have a line of reasoning (story) to feed the jury who is ignorant of technicalities. Bring on the expert witnesses.

[[email protected]]

Megan - I get all that but it therefore begs the question of how you can be allowed to hold a commercial IR with no actual IF experience - it should be a mandatory requirement for issue and currency.

[gulliBell]

...Had a rating but no proficiency.....

An hour or two in the simulator would have been useful. Time and time again I saw IR ticketed S76 pilots who had no idea which buttons to push and when. Once it is explained to them, and they get a bit of practice, they have a good foundation to then not screw up within 30 seconds when they find themselves in the real stuff. Competency in these Level D simulators should translate to competency when you need to do it for real. This simulated stuff with foggles in R44's doesn't cut the mustard as far as I'm concerned.

[Torquetalk]

An hour or two in the simulator would have been useful. Time and time again I saw IR ticketed S76 pilots who had no idea which buttons to push and when. Once it is explained to them, and they get a bit of practice, they have a good foundation to then not screw up within 30 seconds when they find themselves in the real stuff. Competency in these Level D simulators should translate to competency when you need to do it for real. This simulated stuff with foggles in R44's doesn't cut the mustard as far as I'm concerned.

If you are flying an R44, basic IF and IFR competence is sure to be better than no training. And an FAA IR certainly involves a lot more than a bit of IF under goggles as part of a VFR qualification. But it needs to be refreshed. Targetted IFR night work and low visibility procedure training, not just a bit VMC with goggles on (assuming a non-certified aircraft).

But if you are flying passengers in a complex type like an S76, with a decent AFCS, and in an area known for fog and marginal visibility, layered with complex airspace, which provides high levels of service and ways to get an aircraft from A to B and C in poor weather, then you really should be doing proper Level D simulations of what you are very likely to encounter in your job.

This isn‘t even about decent emergency training to manage the aircraft properly; it is basic competence according to aircraft and qualifications.

[gulliBell]

My key point is, many S76 pilots just don't know what button to push. I can guarantee 100% that the accident aircraft was not properly configured for what the pilot was attempting to do, irrespective of any operational decision making or radio distractions or whatever other furphies are being thrown into the mix. If the aircraft was properly configured, even if the pilot had never flown in cloud or hadn't flown simulated instrument for years, this accident would not have happened.

[SASless]

The aircraft properly configured could have flown itself to VMC with no problem at all....with a minimum of input from the Pilot.

If it had been Force Trim-ON, ATT Mode engaged, resetting the pitch attitude to a climb attitude and ensuring adequate power was applied to maintain a positive climb rate would have been all of the immediate actions required.

A couple of subsequent actions to engage the upper modes and then the Pilot would have been able to progress from the Aviating to the Navigating and Communicating while monitoring the aircraft performance.

He could have done nothing but the immediate actions for the short period of time it would take to regain VMC.

Examination of the past practices of the Pilot, Training and Checking, Operator SOP's and established procedures, review of Aircraft Check Lists would produce the information needed to show why the Pilot was not prepared to cope with a simple straight ahead climb following an IIMC event in the daytime.

The other aspects of how he got into that predicament are a different matter that also bear scrutiny.

[Torquetalk]

If it had been Force Trim-ON, ATT Mode engaged, resetting the pitch attitude to a climb attitude and ensuring adequate power was applied to maintain a positive climb rate would have been all of the immediate actions required

Immediate yes, but don’t forget that PBA working in the background; it can help so much against flapback that it can seriously spoil your day.

[SASless]

Please do explain your grave concern over the operation of the PBA in the S-76....as you keep throwing that out but never explain to the non-76 pilots why you see that as being such a big issue.

If it had been Force Trim-ON, ATT Mode engaged, resetting the pitch attitude to a climb attitude and ensuring adequate power was applied to maintain a positive climb rate would have been all of the immediate actions required.

A couple of subsequent actions to engage the upper modes and then the Pilot would have been able to progress from the Aviating to the Navigating and Communicating while monitoring the aircraft performance.

[FH1100 Pilot]

megan says: It's very difficult to simulate IF in the 76 so with him finding himself in cloud for the very first time, even though he has a rating, is going to be something of a task..,
Hah! That's rich, ma'am. Megan, I seriously, seriously doubt that the Kobe flight was Ara's first foray into IMC conditions. With what know about the weather in the L.A. area, *and* what we've come to know about Ara and his usual practices, I think it's safe to say that he was no virgin when it came flying on the gauges. He probably just got lucky on the previous times.

Then SAS sez: :Examination of the past practices of the Pilot, Training and Checking, Operator SOP's and established procedures, review of Aircraft Check Lists would produce the information needed to show why the Pilot was not prepared to cope with a simple straight ahead climb following an IIMC event in the daytime.

Look, we're not here to dogpile on Ara and beat him to a pulp. But let's face it - he did kind of screw up a bit on that last flight. Everybody keeps talking about the "should haves" of this flight. "Ara SHOULD HAVE been using the force-trim (autopilot, etc.)... or, "Ara SHOULD HAVE canceled the flight," or..."Ara SHOULD HAVE been more proficient in Instrument flight." Heh. Well, heh didn't, and wasn't. Oh! Which brings up a question: How many Commercial helicopter pilots in the U.S. are Instrument Rated and actually proficient? I don't know exactly, but I'd guess "pretty damn few." The exceptions would be guys who fly for operations that file IFR a lot - like maybe EMS and some Corporate guys.

I was once friends with a Corporate fixed-wing pilot who flew a single-pilot business jet (Beech Premier) for a very rich guy. It happens more...much more than you'd think in the Corporate world. Rich people do not like to spend money. My friend was no youngster - he was about my age. And he was a very experienced pilot. He seemed very professional - to me, at least. Hey, he flew a sophisticated jet! Riding along with him one day, we were coming back to Dallas from the rich guy's hunting camp in south Texas. Rich guy is asleep in the back. The weather was bad, and ATC told us to hold at such-and-such fix. My friend turned to me and said, "This is embarrassing. I really don't know how to do a hold in this thing." At first, I thought he was joking. But he really did seem embarrassed and chagrined, and really, truly did not know how to do a hold. He said, "In all my years, I've NEVER had to do a hold for real.". Well, I don't have an IR so I was of little help. We blasted over the fix and then floundered around, well outside of the protected airspace until ATC started yelling at him. (My only thought at the time was, "Shouldn't we be slowing down?" I mean, the Premier is a fast jet - I would've slowed the thing back to something less than hyper-speed if I knew we were going to go around in circles (ovals, actually) for any length of time.

What's my point? Not every pilot is Chuck Aaron/Yeager. Some guys out there...some Chief Pilots out there are...well...let's be kind and say "not all that great." WHY wasn't Ara using the autopilot or any level of stabilization in that sophisticated helicopter? We don't know. WHY didn't Ara slow the hell down? We don't know. WHY couldn't Ara accomplish a "simple straight-ahead climb in IMC" through a relatively thin layer? We don't know. All we *DO* know is that he crashed and killed himself....and some other people. I've said it before and I'll say it again: Helicopters...all helicopters...are VERY EASY to crash. We pilots don't like to acknowledge this fact or we think it doesn't apply to us. But it's true, and it does. Divert your attention from the task at hand for even a couple of seconds and the ship will to turn itself upside down. This "law" of helicopters does not get repealed because you fly a "sophisticated" helicopter like an S-76 or an AW-139 at night in the Bahamas. And it certainly doesn't get repealed just because you have a crap-ton of flight time.

[Torquetalk]

Please do explain your grave concern over the operation of the PBA in the S-76....as you keep throwing that out but never explain to the non-76 pilots why you see that as being such a big issue.

It is a feature of the S76 that needs careful monitoring, as it’s function changes the flight configuration which is initially established. Attitude + power = performance; except the pitch bias actuator is actively lowering that attitude to compensate for flapback/blowback. This will lead to a decrease in the initial rate of climb and an increase in airspeed. Without active intervention by the pilot, the aircraft will not maintain the desired climb-away configuration.

Of course, monitoring is necessary in all conditions and all types, but in a situation where pilot overload is to be relieved by the the use of the autopilot, simply relying on ATT mode may be very much less effective and safe compared to engaging an upper mode like IAS to aid the maintenance of the initial ATT + PWR response.

[helonorth]

No helisas in the offshore 407s, but really excellent training
That's a bummer. All Air Med had it that I know. I thought the Gulf was going that way, too.

[Fareastdriver]

Out of my 16,500 hrs rotary I did about 2,500 on the S76, a large chunk of it offshore under IFR or actual IMC conditions. I never noticed anything untoward about its handling characteristics. Mind you it had clocks and dials so I didn't have to have a degree in Microsoft to operate it.

[SASless]

Torque,

The PBA is a result of the FAA requirement for a "Positive Stick Gradient"....in quite simple terms....the faster you go....the more forward the cyclic stick position should be.....Higher Airspeed more forward the cyclic must be.....right?

Sikorsky in the 76 as did Boeing-Vertol in the Chinook discovered the cyclic stick displacement was non-linear with increased airspeeds and each thus had to find a way to make the FAA happy....ergo PBA on the 76.

On the Chinook it was DCP....Differential Collective Pitch....different but the same in result as PBA.

Over time....we disconnected the DCP or left it installed but unserviceable as it had no discernible effect in the handling of the aircraft.

On the 76....some models did much the same or built in the algorithms into the Sperry System as I understand it.

In both aircraft....sans an indicator showing the PBA/DCP displacement.....it would take a Tape Measure to tell the difference in Cyclic position.

One thing you quite correct about is the need for the Pilot Handling to monitor the Aircraft Instrument Displays and ensure the aircraft is performing as desired....that applies as FH says....to all helicopters.

I suggest you doth protest too much about PBA's potential to upset the aircraft....but you and FH are right in saying not monitoring the aircraft's performance surely can and will.

The short version is the PBA takes out of what the Pilot puts in.....but if that results in the loss of Airspeed (for example) the Pilot monitoring the instruments will note that decrease and.......put the cyclic forward again and the process repeats.

In the ATT Mode...hitting the Coolie Hat and beeping a bit more positive pitch angle into the system accomplishes the same thing.

Can you point to an example that you can use to document the PBA causing an upset with a Pilot properly monitoring the Autopilot System or was it because the Pilot was not that allowed a problem to occur?

[Torquetalk]

Out of my 16,500 hrs rotary I did about 2,500 on the S76, a large chunk of it offshore under IFR or actual IMC conditions. I never noticed anything untoward about its handling characteristics. Mind you it had clocks and dials so I didn't have to have a degree in Microsoft to operate it.

Surprised that with your experience, you noticed no quirkiness in the S76 FED. A tendency to sidestep right when lowering the collective is another.

Did the accident pilot have a degree in Microsoft? Is that what countless pilots in such accidents have in common?

[Torquetalk]

SAS, not saying that the PBA needs to be a big deal, and certainly not upset the aircraft. But it is something that could catch the unwary out, if they just set attitude and power, get a good safe climb and speed, then move to other tasks, without an upper mode in. In the context of the accident discussion, with a pilot who did not use the AFCS much, the lack of familiarity and confidence to engage an upper mode is clearly a contributor to the accident.

[gulliBell]

...the lack of familiarity and confidence to engage an upper mode is clearly a contributor to the accident.

It is unlikely he knew what buttons to push, simple as that. I used to see it all the time with S76 recurrent trainees in the simulator. Pilots with ATP tickets who would not only struggle to fly it manually on instruments, they didn't know what buttons to push when the manual flying got a bit tough for them. The key to solving that problem was to demonstrate the pushing of buttons and insist on never hands flying the thing. Simulator time is expensive and there is no time allocated on a recurrent course to teach pilots with IR tickets basic IF.

[SASless]

In the Sim and in the aircraft doing training....to assess basic instrument flying skills I used a simple method.

I fabricated a false narrative....saying we would start each session with a quick warm up period of a few minutes then get into the training...and explained we would do some simple turns, climbs, descents etc....and a quick "unusual attitude recovery".

For the unusual attitude segment I would perform the tried and true routine of having the trainee close their eyes....and I would put the aircraft through some gyrations...just enough to get them to think I was setting them up in a bank, climb, side slip or something with an odd power setting for that situation.

What I was really doing was setting them up for something far more telling.....with the fellow's eyes closed I would reach over and adjust his ADI into a ten degree bank one way or another then start the maneuvering and when I turned the flight controls over him...I had the aircraft dead flat level but recovering from a dive so the airspeed would be. higher than normal...and a power setting picked at random....but remember the Pilot's ADI would be showing a bank due to the offset I had put onto his display.

Mind you this was always in a Sim or Aircraft that had three ADI's.....one for each Pilot and the Standby/Emergency ADI. Two of the three would be showing the same and actual attitude of the aircraft.

Some guys never got the aircraft stabilized...some got it stabilized and announced the ADI problem but never cross checked the other two ADI's.

Some immediately polled the jury by looking at all of the panel to see if there had been some sort of instrument failure.

My question to some was...."Do you fly Instruments or just the ADI?".

The Teaching Point was to use everything you have available while recovering control of the aircraft....try to figure out what was going on well enough to keep the aircraft flying.

The other interesting thing was to watch a crew crash with some sort of malfunction... something relatively mundane then turn around and have them put the Autopilot to work and watch it fly an approach to the same runway with the same malfunction without crashing.

Not that the Sim exactly replicates a failure or aircraft response but to remind Pilots that sometimes getting distracted can cause you more harm than the actual malfunction or problem.

[megan]

I seriously, seriously doubt that the Kobe flight was Ara's first foray into IMC conditionsSo you're saying the pilot regularly went into IMC without logging the fact, his operator was VMC only, IMC not permitted. If that's a fact, which I'll let you prove/disprove, it points to a somewhat lax attitude to the business, in which case, if true, the accident might come as no surprise.On the 76....some models did much the same or built in the algorithms into the Sperry System as I understand itMy understanding SAS is that the system was just removed, I believe that's all they did to our machines, the Blackhawk received the same treatment. Why they retained the system as an option I don't know, JohnDixson John Dixon would have the low down.Surprised that with your experience, you noticed no quirkiness in the S76 FEDI'm with FED, 12,000 hours, we're either thick as bricks or have such superlative skills we took such things in our stride with little perception. :p ;)

[SASless]

I have asked Brother Dixson to join us here by separate correspondence as I hang upon his every word when it comes to all things Sikorsky.

He very much is a good source of information and a source of good information too.

I tried to search past threads here but did not find the posts I was looking for....made by another old Sikorsky Man In The Know that no longer visits with us here.

I suppose my experience flying A Model Chinooks with the SAS turned off kinda dulled me to merely skittish acting helicopters as the Hook could jingle your nerves a bit as you sat there with your boot toe against the chin bubble and the forward droop stops pounding themselves to death as the side slip approached 90 Degrees with an entry airspeed of a hundred plus knots when the SAS kicked off with no warning. Oddly.....the sound of the howling wind roaring through an open Pilot's Door Window lessened the clatter a bit on the upwind side. Maybe that is why the specter of the PBA mucking about with the goings on doesn't seem to have taken on the significance for me as one may have suspected it might.

I bet a Wessex could squirm a bit if a Harrier got close by.

[JohnDixson]

SAS, for some reason I did not receive your email, but have looked in here anyway. Disclaimer is that after the 76A development/FAA certification and some B model maneuverability envelope testing, I didn't have the opportunity to participate much as the machine went thru the various C models/engines.

That said, I was intrigued by the following sentence:

" My understanding SAS is that the system was just removed, I believe that's all they did to our machines, the Blackhawk received the same treatment."

I assume you meant the pitch bias actuator. It was removed from the UH-60's but not because, the pilots couldn't tell if it was working or not ( absolutely true ) but finally the Army looked at the actuator maintenance removals and used that reason to remove it. I can't recall the specifics of the S-76 PBA, so I'll try getting in touch with the man with near perfect recall, Nick Lappos.

Both ships only at the most aft center of gravity and at the highest level flight speed, would not have a slightly positive stick position slope as speed increased or decreased from a collective fixed trim point. So, you trim the ship at 156 or so,(smooth air required) and then gently nudge the stick forward to achieve 166, move the stick as require to achieve a solid data point and take a record. Now get this, one had to move the stck forward ( stable right? ) to go faster, but the trim stick position at 166 could be 1% aft of where you started at 156. UNSTABLE says the FAA and hence the PBA. Same test is done in the slower direction and the results were as I recall, similar. Having an AFCS that provides attitude hold ( in the case of the UH-60 it had both attitude hold and then, after 12 seconds, an airspeed hold loop added itself ) was not recognized as being relevant. This so called static stability regulation derived from the rather ancient fixed wing certification standards, but neither the FAA nor the Army were motivated to modify them in light of more modern basic control systems. The irony of the entire subject is that if one looks at the FAA and military approval for fly by wire aircraft, the whole concept of stick position stability and slope vs speed has gone out the window, for exactly the realization of the irrelevancy due to the factors involved doing the testing as described above! Sorry for the rant. BTW, SAS's CH-47 had a PBA ( under a different name ) early on for exactly the same irrationality.

[SASless]

Good to see you joining in Brother Dixson....always appreciate your input on things.

Memory serves me we had DCP (equivalent to PBA) and also Speed Trims the worked off Airspeed to drive electric rams that worked to level the airframe to reduce drag.

We had the ability to control them through the use of momentary switches and a mode switch....On/Off/Auto.

Leaving them on in Manual and landing or coming to a a hover was a NO NO...as it put a tremendous amount of stress on the Aft Rotor Shaft.

[JohnDixson]

SAS, you’ll recall that I got a CH-47 checkout from two Boeing test pilots immediately after graduating from flight school, and recall the Differential Collective Pitch system clearly ( because I pestered those two guys about explaining the why and wherefore-the flight manual was no help and the checkout at the test board was old fashioned: take the flight manual test, fly it for 20 hrs, and get signed off. As I recall, the no-no you referred to bit a couple of USMC aviators in the similar CH-46 ).

Back to this accident: haven’t seen any indication there was an aircraft problem, and ATC provided the help they could, but they certainly can’t fly the aircraft for the pilot. Flying VIP’s in the LA basin and expecting to meet your schedule and never, never have to resort to some IFR flying? That’s a “ C’mon man “. No indication from the posts that the operation prepared for this eventuality.

TT I just saw and read your sentence: “Immediate yes, but don’t forget that PBA working in the background; it can help so much against flapback that it can seriously spoil your day.”
As I mentioned previously, its there only to provide an artificial positive stick slope vs speed, and is a series actuator,, i.e. does not apply force/movement to the cyclic. There is sufficient longitudinal control available to deal with an inoperative PBA, at whatever position it were to fail.

[JohnDixson]

Nick says that in the B, there is no PBA as in the A originally, but the PBA function was buried n the AFCS.

[JimEli]

...
It was removed from the UH-60's but not because, the pilots couldn't tell if it was working or not ( absolutely true ) but finally the Army looked at the actuator maintenance removals and used that reason to remove it. I can't recall the specifics of the S-76 PBA, so I'll try getting in touch with the man with near perfect recall, Nick Lappos.
...


FWIW, I remember it as the PBA removal being recommending by Sikorsky to the Army. Other oddities surround the PBA removal, but don't get me started.

[megan]

Other oddities surround the PBA removalPlease share Jim, start another thread if necessary, am interested.

[SASless]

That could be an interesting discussion especially if we can get some Engineers or Test Pilots to offer up some behind the scenes information on how FAA Airworthiness Rules (or CAA Rules) do not always cross over from Airplanes to Helicopters.

Imagine what the V-22 and 609 design engineers went through on those programs.....and still are.

[JohnDixson]

JimEli, see: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA183954. I’m curious about the “ other oddities” you mentioned.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Sooooo...all this talk about the PBA with reference to 72EX is irrelevant then?

Megan:So you're saying the pilot regularly went into IMC without logging the fact, his operator was VMC only, IMC not permitted. If that's a fact, which I'll let you prove/disprove, it points to a somewhat lax attitude to the business, in which case, if true, the accident might come as no surprise.
Megan, heh, you don't fly in the U.S., do you missy?

I'm not saying that Ara "regularly"' went IMC when he was supposedly VFR, but if one of his pilots can be believed, the Kobe accident was not Ara's first time punching in and doing what needed to be done. Even SAS alludes to this practice when he asked about which GOM pilot hadn't done an VFR-IMC let-down through a cloud deck? His assumption, evidently, is that it was if not exactly common, then at least routine. Getting back to the topic at hand, if Ara did it more than once, we can legitimately question what kind of judgment he had as a pilot. And from the results of his last revenue flight, I'd say his judgment was fairly lacking. YMMV.

[SASless]

FH,

if you wish to quote me....there is a "Quote" function you can use that ensures you are restating what I actually said.

It is a small point but carries some real significance as you did not quite get it right.

What I said was....."Over water IMC descent to find VMC conditions.....now who flying offshore has never done that?

Granted it is safer with Radar installed and working....perhaps even having an installed and functioning Auto Pilot."

My offshore flying was done mainly outside the United States with the exception of one Summer in Alaska.

All of that Offshore flying was done on IFR Operations with a lot of flying in Uncontrolled Airspace with no IFR Airways or Control Zones.

There is life outside the GOM.

Am I right to assume you were always at the Small Bird Table where it was VFR/VMC only?

We seem to be viewing Offshore flying through different prisms....mine from an IFR lens....and yours from a VFR lens.

Thus two different kettles of fish.

[gulliBell]

For a pilot to have 10 hours experience on type, let alone 1000+ hours experience, and not be familiar with a critical S76 system such as the autopilot (or so it seems), and not safely and optimally configuring the S76 for instrument flight each and every time such flight is necessary, is quite remarkable. What is also plainly evident is it seems to be a deficiency of knowledge more common than one might expect. It seems to me the primacy of this accident is more relevant to lack of systems basic knowledge and application rather than lack of instrument recency. One might be able to demonstrate satisfactory practical standards in a Robinson on foggles with climb, descend, turns, intercepts, etc, but go try and do that in a S76 the following day in cloud without understanding the operation of its autopilot, it probably 'aint gonna work. Or it might work once, but not the next time. Eventually you're gonna get bit.

[JimEli]

For a pilot to have 10 hours experience on type, let alone 1000+ hours experience, and not be familiar with a critical S76 system such as the autopilot (or so it seems), and not safely and optimally configuring the S76 for instrument flight each and every time such flight is necessary, is quite remarkable. What is also plainly evident is it seems to be a deficiency of knowledge more common than one might expect. It seems to me the primacy of this accident is more relevant to lack of systems basic knowledge and application rather than lack of instrument recency. One might be able to demonstrate satisfactory practical standards in a Robinson on foggles with climb, descend, turns, intercepts, etc, but go try and do that in a S76 the following day in cloud without understanding the operation of its autopilot, it probably 'aint gonna work. Or it might work once, but not the next time. Eventually you're gonna get bit.

Noting the previous year’s (2018) concurrent part 135.293/299 S-76 check flight lasted just 36 minutes, I'm sure his knowledge and ability were deeply evaluated. Chomp.

[etudiant]

Noting the previous year’s (2018) concurrent part 135.293/299 S-76 check flight lasted just 36 minutes, I'm sure his knowledge and ability were deeply evaluated. Chomp.

Always an economics issue. The pressures on a charter shop are brutal. A longer check ride costs more money, so the aim is to minimize the time. The idea that it is an occasion to learn/remind becomes secondary.

[gulliBell]

On a recurrent S76 simulator course, 36 minutes gets you to the point of having the engines running and launching off on your first traffic pattern. We do cover all the engine starting issues during that 36 minutes. You might be surprised how many students leave an engine running without oil pressure, until it doesn't want to run any more. Reset. Try again. The economics of that learning point in the simulator alone are far more economical than making the same mistake in your real helicopter.

[JimEli]

Always an economics issue. The pressures on a charter shop are brutal. A longer check ride costs more money, so the aim is to minimize the time. The idea that it is an occasion to learn/remind becomes secondary.

you get what you pay for.

[SASless]

Etudiant,

If you read back over the thread you will notice I have said several times the Pilot failed to do a straight ahead climb to VFR on Top which in a fully instrumented S-76....a maneuver that should have been very simple but he failed to rise to the occasion.

You will also notice I. have been saying he had a lot of help in failing to be adequately prepared to to do that and that there is plenty of blame to be spread around to a lot of people individually and organizations to include the FAA.

The whole sad affair smacks of complacency and failure to do right resulting in a decent guy killing himself and his passengers.

Box Checking instead of effective training, half assed Checkrides, inadequate SOP's, failed Safety Climate, cozy relationship with third party trainers, and incompetent oversight by the FAA and a general lack of professionalism....harsh wording but well earned.

The NTSB's investigation is so shallow as to be embarrassing.

It raised far more questions than it answered.

Had I given him a Check Ride in the aircraft or the Simulator....I am not sure how it would have turned out as I do not know the fellow and have not flown with him.

Most folks try to fly their current helicopter like they flew their previous aircraft....in this case Ara flew other types of helicopter...most of which probably did not have Autopilots and almost certainly were all VFR Only machines thus no actual instrument flying with his currency and so called proficiency being maintained by some limited training and a check ride at the required intervals mandated by the FAA. We all know...or should know...the difference between being current and proficient and being proficient by being current.....currency does not convey proficiency except for the FAA's Rules and the reality is those rules set folks up for disaster if they do not practice IFR flying.....which requires two pilots....one acting either a Safety Pilot or as an Instructor, vision limiting devices or flight in actual IMC weather.....and Ara was flying in a single pilot operation....how does one get that recent IMC/IFR/Simulated IMC flight time?

JimEli....sometimes what you pay for is not worth squat....beyond checking a few boxes on some FAA required paperwork.

[megan]

you get what you pay for.What's the saying, if you think training is expensive try having an accident, or, penny wise pound foolish. We had an oil company advisor who saw no value in sim training for the S-76, yet he attended yearly, when the company did relent it was once every two years, captains only, not co-pilots.

Gulli, the aircraft can have all the features in the world but unless you are using them on a regular basis you can't readily lay your hand to them, muscle memory, can recall trying to get the thing to couple for an ILS, took a while for the penny to drop. On the infrequent 412 trip always initially got caught out reaching for the heading knob where it was placed in the 76. Then again, was never the sharpest knife in the drawer.

[etudiant]

Sure learned about a new 'gotcha' in this space, who asks how current the pilot is with the plane s/he shows up in?

[gulliBell]

The foundations should be laid on the pilot initial type course. For the S76 that would be 10 full days in ground school, followed by 10 hours of dual instruction in the aircraft. Coming out of that training pipeline the newly minted S76 pilot should be in no doubt that you don't fumble about flying that thing manually in clouds, especially single pilot. Even a zoom climb to get visual above a layer. Use the tools you've been given in the way they have been designed. Sure, maintain your stick and rudder hands instrument flying when you have an instructor to monitor and check, for maintaining recency. In this case I suspect the accident pilot might not have had a sufficiently thorough type technical training foundation to rely on. And again, pure speculation, probably hadn't logged much crew room down time when the weather had clagged in with the RFM on his lap and refreshing memory from front cover to back. Everything you need to know about that autopilot is written in that book (and the Honeywell manual), and the practical application of that knowledge should be demonstrated in the aircraft on the pilot initial course.
And a more general observation. I am bewildered when pilots arrive on a $25K recurrent sim course not knowing aircraft limitations, and not knowing ECL memory items, not having seized any initiative to do an hours reading in the days prior to the course starting.

[megan]

Sure learned about a new 'gotcha' in this space, who asks how current the pilot is with the plane s/he shows up inThe question to ask is current in the task to be undertaken in that particular aircraft. For the role when Gulli and I flew together in the 76 it was day VMC, pax, sling loads and winching only. Flying at night or any IMC was a no, no, they had to be crewed by two captains, which brings a whole new set of problems too lengthy to go into here.

[gulliBell]

Having flown the S76 for a couple of thousand hours, thinking I knew the basics of what I needed to know reasonably well, it wasn't until I got on an instructors course where I had to qualify as a S76 SFI before I realized I didn't know anywhere near enough and as good enough as I needed to know. And there's the catch, not knowing that you don't know. Then when I started to do recurrent training (135.293/299) with customers who are experienced pilots you come to realize the general standard of knowledge as a cadre of S76 pilots, on average, is not where it should be. And if a check airman gives you a 36 minute annual check ride, that is something to squeal about because you're getting short changed on what you need to do your job properly.

[gulliBell]

...For the role when Gulli and I flew together in the 76 it was day VMC, pax, sling loads and winching only. Flying at night or any IMC was a no, no...

I do recall once launching into the pitch black of night to evacuate the Tuna platform. When we got there it was as bright as the sun, so much gas was being vented/flared it felt like the perspex crew windows would melt. But yeah, if it was pitch black on arrival out there, better you than me.

[Fareastdriver]

I started flying the S76 offshore in the North Sea in May 1980. It was a single pilot operation, the only limitation being that you added 200 ft. to your ILS decision height. Day, night, come Hell or high water you went. After one just made it to the coast short of fuel because a platform had refused him permission to top up with fuel did we change to two pilots on standard rig trips.

We had a secondary task known as the FART team. (Fast aircraft rescue team). This involved flying out with engineers and/or spares to rescue 332s so one had to fit a S76 onto a helideck beside the errant 332. Another was emergency oil tools to anywhere, anytime.

I was called for one in the late afternoon with the warning that I may have to night stop in Unst, which is as far north as you can go in the UK.. The cargo was a massive drill bit about two feet across. It arrived still glowing from the re-tempering so there was a delay whilst it cooled down sufficiently to be loaded without slowly cooking me. It was dark when I launched for the Murchison some 180 miles or so but the weather was going to be bright and moonlit all the way. There I was to unload, refuel if necessary and night stop at Unst. All went well and the tool was unloaded.

En route to Unst I spoke to Scottish Information who seemed a bit surprised that I was going to Unst. Because of the distance I lost contact with them and so I called up Unst; no answer. I tried the company at Unst; no answer. The island was painting nicely on the radar and it came into sight in the moonlight and in no time I was downwind in effective VMC in the full moon. I could see the runway and also the apron by the lights of the company hangar because the doors were open so I started an approach.

The air traffic controller lived over the road from the tower and he had heard me. Putting two and two together he hoofed over the the tower, switched everything on with the cry "aircraft on finals you are clear to land" I carried on and legally landed.

I positioned the helicopter outside the hangar, shut it down, chocked it and went into the hanger. In the office was the night shift having tea and butties for their break. The ripple of jaws hitting the floor was a sound to behold. They thought, having not heard a S76 before, that I was a late Dash 7 landing.

I shacked up in the Baltasound hotel and next morning flew back to Aberdeen where the crap had hit the fan. The Aberdeen controller, as they found out when somebody had enquired as to why I had not been booked in with Unst, had a severe alcohol problem and had completely forgotten about me when I took off.

He was reassigned for a short time before he left the company's employ. We carried on flying single pilot until about January 1983 before two pilots, with a bit of resistance, was imposed.

[SASless]

Gulli and Megan in the same cockpit.....now there's a thought once imagined cannot be erased!

Single pilot at night on the North Sea.....been there done that....but not for long...one night arriving back to Sumburgh in some grotty weather enjoying the simplicity of Decca 19 where a chart change and Key Change were required....cruising along at 300 feet to stay out of ice....flying with my knees.....we have progressed from those times.

Enough for the nostalgia.

I ran across this CFIT Work Sheet at the Air Safety Foundation the other night and found it interesting.

I will admit the practice of using such a Check List came late into my flying career which was first seen as being just so much eye wash and box checking.

That was until I attended a very good Safety Course put on by the HAI and I saw where having a good Safety Climate could be effective and I began to use those principles.

One of which is if you include Risk Assessments in your SMS...you actually use them and procedures set forth in the Safety Program...no matter who the Pilot is.

One of the things I fault the NTSB for in this Investigation of how that was done by the Operator and Pilot on the day of the crash....but in the years before the crash.

The Operator has had other events that could have been fatal accidents except for the blessings of good fortune.

As I worked my way through this Risk Checklist....knowing what we do from the NTSB Accident Investigation....one thing became quite clear to me....they were an accident waiting to happen,

Do that yourself and see what results you come up with at the end of this one Check List....but remember in order for these Lists to be effective guides.....they must be used and the procedures governing their use by Operator SOP's MUST be followed or it becomes just another Box Ticking exercise.

As you go through that Check List...be careful to attribute positive marks only when you know that practice to be done and not just be done on paper alone and not be effectively done....as in the 36 Minute Check Ride.


Looking back....I am sure FED, Megan, and Gulli would agree our early experiences would have not done well on this check list either.....beginning with it would never have seen the light of day. where we were emplioyed in those days.

After all....the customer had to have the morning papers and the replacement copying machine (one such night flight in genuinely rotten weather I recall with much warmth).

https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/cfit_check.pdf

[gulliBell]

Gulli and Megan in the same cockpit.....now there's a thought once imagined cannot be erased!

Never once did we have an engine explode when crewed together. megan always saved those more exciting flights for others. He always got the ship safely home whomever he was crewed with, even when the weather was almost VFR :ok:

[etudiant]

Honestly, this discussion is not confidence building. I'm just SLF, but have been happily freighted around in helicopters in the LA area, as well as around the Hawaiian Islands.
Wonderful experiences, but perhaps I should have been much more skeptical of the capabilities of the service providers.
Certainly GulliBell and SASless both suggest that the standards required are not up to their professional requirements. People have gotten killed as a result.

[SASless]

Et,

The helicopter industry as a whole does in general try to fly safe....if for no other reason the Pilot's like to get home for dinner, the Operators like to stay profitable, and the customer's like to get to and from safely.

Like any human endeavor....staying in the middle of the road and avoiding the ditches and potholes goes a long way towards achieving that for everyone.

That is why when these tragic events occur careful analysis is valuable in determining what factors played a role in their happening.

The Industry knows the paths to salvation but now and then those paths get covered up with the weeds of neglect or disuse and that sadly sometimes results in bad things happening.

When conditions depart from the nominal and begin to get to the edges is usually when those weeds under our feet trip us up.

They key is keep up with the mowing and weed whacking as best we can.

Look at the improvements in the US EMS Helicopter segment of the Industry....it took an industry wide commitment to improving safety (perhaps forced on it by all of the negative press and sheer loss in lives) but that is how aviation has operated since its inception quite like other idustries.

Ralph Nader made a name for himself in challenging Detroit Automakers for an example and we all benefited from that.

Rest easy...it is still safe to get into a helicopter....but there shall aways be risks....even with the very best of efforts to reduce them as much as possible.

[megan]

Honestly, this discussion is not confidence building. I'm just SLF, but have been happily freighted around in helicopters in the LA area, as well as around the Hawaiian Islands.
Wonderful experiences, but perhaps I should have been much more skeptical of the capabilities of the service providers.
Certainly GulliBell and SASless both suggest that the standards required are not up to their professional requirements. People have gotten killed as a result.etudiant, you need to understand that the employer sets the tone of the conduct of operations, not only sets the tone but depending on the company absolutely demands it, good or bad. You can have the very best of crews but it's of little help if the company demands are otherwise.

The company Gulli and I flew for was at the time the worlds largest company, so had deep, deep pockets, in fact could buy and sell governments. We had an operations manual written by the company that said we would operate to charter standards despite being a private operator, we paid no attention to what was written in the ops manual, if you raised the fact you were told being private we didn't need an ops manual so all was good, in all the years of operation we had never had an accident so we must be doing everything right we were told. As an offshore operator the manual demanded land based alternates for all operations, we had all the weather problems of the North Sea to contend with save for icing. Did we provide for alternates? Hell no, we didn't even get weather reports, having to shut down on a platform because home was fogged in was a regular occurrence. So what you going to do if you had an engine failure prior to the notification of home being fogged in? Seven miles away from home was an airfield with an ILS so if you had the fuel you could do a zero/zero approach and I personally was pretty sure that would turn out OK, had practiced it in the sim, but one gotcha was you may not have had the fuel, for the simple reason that flights were planned to arrive home with just the reserve fuel intact, which negated flying the extra track miles necessary to fly the ILS if the failure occurred after departure from your last platform stop. Woe betide you if you suggested alternative ways of conducting business.

One day three crews used the ILS to extricate themselves from weather, they were admonished and told they should have used the radar to get themselves visual on the coast line. Can remember getting to the coast one day and having to hover taxi to get home.

Another issue was captains were staff and subject to a yearly appraisal for a pay rise, co-pilots were provided by a contractor. Being staff was the one of the cruxs of the problem. Mangers were only in their position for about three years before they were moved on to another position (career advancement), they were given a yearly budget and that was their holy grail, coming in under budget dictated their salary increase, the bigger the gap the bigger the salary increase. No one was going to advocate spending money on infrastructure and blowing out their budget on something that we had operated without for the previous XX years.

The regulator had absolutely no interest, their lawyers going to go toe to toe with the high priced company lawyers? Not a chance.

Dr. Diane Vaughan developed the term "Normalisation of Deviance" to explain the space shuttle Challenger disaster, it has wide applicability where people are seduced into "this is how we do things around here" despite it not being good practice, unsafe, or plain illegal. All the aircrew were so seduced, me included. One saving grace was the top class equipment and excellent maintenance.

[SASless]

FH likes to bring up the Gulf of Mexico and we know he flew Black and Yellow Bell Jet Rangers of different models during his tenure down in the Gulf.

His outfit had an owner who was one of the early Helicopter Company owners who built a very large business providing offshore oil support.

He also had a reputation, even if not earned necessarily, that was similar to that described by Megan....despite being at opposite ends of the World.

I was sat in a crew room of a smallish oil company in a Kingdom on the non-Persian side of the Persian Gulf one day when the Chief Pilot asked one of the guys if he had ever worked for that Yellow/Black company.....to be told "Nope...not until I hired on here!".

That was no the right answer I judged by the look on the CP's face.

I was so impressed by that operation that I took on my room name of "Sasless"....but that is a yarn for another time.

Megan is right....an Operator's Management sets the tone and rules (written and un-written) that determine the Safety Climate....as we know from old wive's tales....."The Fish rots from the Head!".

Most see real safety as being a direct threat to profitability.... their bonus check and and promotion opportunities.

They can always blame someone else for the crash and point fingers away from them.

Sometimes they sue Air Controllers.

[212man]

The foundations should be laid on the pilot initial type course. For the S76 that would be 10 full days in ground school, followed by 10 hours of dual instruction in the aircraft. Coming out of that training pipeline the newly minted S76 pilot should be in no doubt that you don't fumble about flying that thing manually in clouds, especially single pilot..

Interesting point - bear in mind that this pilot was in a regulatory environment that did not require a type rating, let alone an initial type course, on the S76. So, who knows what his foundations were......(not meant to be a catalyst for a discussion about the rights and wrongs of regulator policy, just a statement of fact that might be missed by pilots from other parts of the world, who might have been familiar with a more formal introduction to the type)

[gulliBell]

I've always thought it somewhat odd in FAA land that you can have a complex aircraft like the S76 not requiring a type rating, but if its MTOW was only about 800lbs heavier it would. Even if it wasn't as complex. Maybe there are a few S76 pilots out there in FAA land who did the 36 minute quickie in-house course before they were signed off as good to go.

[SASless]

212man......the counter argument which is quite valid is in those other (beginning with the one you grew up within) those authorities might have gone far too far in making their system too burdensome).

I have flown a lot of differrent helicopters (purposely did not use the words "type", "Model", "Mark" or other adjective or descriptive word)....and I have found them all to pretty much fly the same to the extent when you are

leanring Monkey Memory skills it does not take that long as when you move the flight controls the aircraft all respond with the same results.

The real difference in them all (generally) is their systems and how they are constructed and monitored and controlled and the operating limitations.

We. have had that discussion before and each time we in the FAA La La Land point out our industry is thriving and has an accident rate comparable to the other more restrictive and burdensome systems of certifications.

My introduction to the S-76 was a Two Week Flight Safety course that included the full Simulator course and then actual flight in the aircraft.

Can you say that about your conversion course for the Bell 212 done by the outfit that turned you into a 212 Pilot?

Did that same company require all EC-155 Pilots to attend similar two week Initial Training courses as part of their "Conversion Training"?

Mine was under the FAA system and yours was done in a non-FAA system.

It would seem there is a difference in management policies that was the main difference between the two systems....would you not agree?

Gulli,

The FAA is ruled by the Airplane Mafia and the Helicopter side is like a red headed bastard cousin at a family reunion at times.

The Federal Air Regulations (FAR's) have always been tailored towards Airplanes and until recent times were applied equally to Rotorcraft despite the unique differences Rotorcraft possess comopared to Airplanes.

We saw one example of that in the PBA system on the S-76 and the Chinook....and we see it in the "Type Rating" concept.

The FAA reasonably enough saw Cessna, Piper, and other Light Airplanes as being very similar and not very complex thus it settled upon the Weight Limit as being the determinant for requiring a "Type Rating".

The odd way the FAR's are written....when I did my Helicopter ATPL (in those days there was a VFR ONLY version) I wound up with a Bell 47 Type Rating as ATP rides were construed to be "Type Rides".

When I did the ATPL (note there is no VFR or IFR added to that) it was in a Bell 412 and I obtained both the ATPL and 412 Type Rating with one check ride....one being a VFR portion followed by an IFR portion.


There is a group of folks that do not understand our system....that seem to think one must have a "Type Rating" on each aircraft you fly....and that is an insistence that is not based upon anything but thinking there is but one true way to salvation.

We get around the "Type Rating" business by the FAR's requiring minimum time in "Type" and a Checkride in that particular "Type" of helicopter....even for those that do not require a "Type" rating.

We get to the same destination but by a different route.....and for those who criticize our system prove they do not fully understand the difference between the two methods.

Over the years I have formed an impression that down in Oz your system of licensing is very complex with official requirements that present a burden rather than a blessing....am I right in thinking that?

[aa777888]

Sometimes a reasonably free market economy actually exists. In US aviation, the FAA only provides the most basic framework for experience and training requirements. They leave it to the insurance companies and operators to fill in the fine detail. No US operator is going to just throw somebody into an S-76 and say "Good luck!" No owner is going to let them. And, most of all, no US insurance underwriter is going to let them, either.

This system seems to work pretty well, and it is clearly not necessary for the government to regulate every single, tiny aspect of everything related to aviation. It can be difficult to find comparisons of general aviation accident rates between countries. However this Australian report seems to agree at least where US, CAN and AUS are concerned: https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/32897/b20060002.pdf

[212man]

(not meant to be a catalyst for a discussion about the rights and wrongs of regulator policy, just a statement of fact that might be missed by pilots from other parts of the world, who might have been familiar with a more formal introduction to the type)

Clearly that was wasted effort.......
Can you say that about your conversion course for the Bell 212 done by the outfit that turned you into a 212 Pilot?
No, I did two weeks systems groundschool with an instructor that normally did the LAEs (Mechanics) training, then about 10 hours in the aircraft. Seemed to work ok.

Did that same company require all EC-155 Pilots to attend similar two week Initial Training courses as part of their "Conversion Training"?

Whilst I was involved, all pilots did the two weeks factory groundschool. Prior to 2004 there was no simulator so practical training was in the aircraft, followed by non-rev hours building on type (as you know). After I left, the training staff introduced some new exercises, such as how to land with the wheels up after a rejected takeoff and how to write off an engine by using the actual 30 second rating, rather than the training mode. I tended to prefer less paperwork......

leanring Monkey Memory skills it does not take that long as when you move the flight controls the aircraft all respond with the same results.

The real difference in them all (generally) is their systems and how they are constructed and monitored and controlled and the operating limitations.

Absolutely correct, of course. Reminds me of my S-61 line training, with a local LTC that had only ever flown the 61 and had never flown with a pilot with so few hours on type - I'd just done 100 hours on the Penzance operation to meet minimum time-on-type, plus add-type TRE. After the first landing offshore, he turned to me and said "that was really great!" I looked back and said "thanks, I've been practicing landing for the last ten thousand hours....."

[megan]

They can always blame someone else for the crash and point fingers away from themExactly SAS, one of the opening paragraphs in the ops manual was a statement saying it was compulsory for all aircrew to comply with ops manual requirements and regulatory material. I made sure that the company would be unable to take a crew to court if they stubbed their toe and say it was their fault.

[Fareastdriver]

Exactly SAS, one of the opening paragraphs in the ops manual was a statement saying it was compulsory for all aircrew to comply with ops manual requirements and regulatory material

You are lucky. In about 1997 our esteemed Chief Executive decided to save some beans by stopping promotion to senior pilot. This was difficult as the career path was written in the operations manual. No problem, being an accountant, he withdrew the ops manual so the evidence didn't exist with the excuse that the ops manual was being rewritten.
About eighteen months later the new version came out; with exactly the same career path.
Guess who retired as a standard captain and missed out on his extra pension.

Not to worry as when I retired I flew for his Chinese partners who saved $10,000s employing me instead of paying him his extortionate rates for a company pilot.

[etudiant]

It seems the regulatory process matters rather less than the character of the CEO, even in aviation.
No surprise really, as SASless has pointed out.
But how do ordinary mortals get a clue about that aspect?

[megan]

It seems the regulatory process matters rather less than the character of the CEO, even in aviation.....But how do ordinary mortals get a clue about that aspectBy working for the organisation yourself is the only sure fire way, scuttlebutt will abound, but you can never be sure if the teller of the story is telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, or if the story may be tainted by the story tellers experience due to a clash of personalities or some such. The CEO may not have a handle on the actual aircraft operation, think big airline, or oil company in our case. Our company had a manual dictating the standards expected to be applied/met by any aviation contractor or the company owned operation. On at least one occasion the story filtered down that when the in country CEO asked the aviation adviser for advice relevant to what was said in the manual he was told being the CEO you can do what you like. The CEO would have found a hip pocket in a singlet of far more use.

The interesting part is we used to be audited to death by all and sundry, but no one ever picked up on glaring fault lines in the operation, it would have only taken a cursory inspection of the flight planning regimen.

Remember flying a group of company oversea VIP's out to a rig in crap weather and overhearing one of them comment to another "I thought this was a VFR operation", no, just a regular day at the office. It just reinforced how out of touch management was with what takes place at the coal face, if you want a properly run (and legal) operation you have to give the people the necessary tools, that requires, you the company, to open your wallet and not fret about the budget and your personal climb up the greasy pole..

[SASless]

Megan,

Well said!

I worked for one outfit that advertised itself as being the bee's knees with excellent engineering and an enviable safety record and at one point that was relatively true but over time the standard was undermined by the Company being sold several times and each time the assets got robbed to pay for it.

Over Beer one evening some of us began to tally up the numbers of crashed helicopters and one could only but wonder about this centre of excellence brain washing that had produced that mantra from those responsible for the decline who so eagerly engaged in climbing that greasy pole of management within the company.

Over time we had a turnover of people....some leaving for greener pastures, some being exiled to the outer reaches of the. realm, some actually making it to retirement, and some just packing it in and going to owning a taxi cab.

It was sad watching it happen....what was a really good place to work that lost its way due to the lack of proper management.

One fellow I flew with who has since passed on due to normal causes.....always uttered a Prayer immediately before hitting the Start Button on the aircraft.....I thought him being funny until a few things happened and I began that ritual myself but did so silently as opposed to his vocal incantation

His was...."Oh Lord....pllease watch over me today while I fly this under designed Bell built....(xxxxxx...Company Name omitted)) maintained.....piece of ****!".

I have a Clock from one of the Bell 212's I made the final Commercial Flight on...it was approaching 40,000 hours on the airframe and was one that I was detailed to fly Night Standby with in a place with no ATC, No Flight Following, and most landing sites were closed for the night.

The aircraft was tired...very tired...and flying it VFR in VMC weather seemed a stretch even...but the Company had taken the Contract and by God we at the coal face were going to fly if called out.

Most of us quietly agreed...depending upon the weather conditions...maintenance faults would probably prevent us from flying.

Later on the Company lost a Bell 412 doing the same contract....it simply disappeared.

Reality is a fragile....shame higher management is so protected from it.

[SLFMS]

212man......the counter argument which is quite valid is in those other (beginning with the one you grew up within) those authorities might have gone far too far in making their system too burdensome).

I have flown a lot of differrent helicopters (purposely did not use the words "type", "Model", "Mark" or other adjective or descriptive word)....and I have found them all to pretty much fly the same to the extent when you are

leanring Monkey Memory skills it does not take that long as when you move the flight controls the aircraft all respond with the same results.

The real difference in them all (generally) is their systems and how they are constructed and monitored and controlled and the operating limitations.

We. have had that discussion before and each time we in the FAA La La Land point out our industry is thriving and has an accident rate comparable to the other more restrictive and burdensome systems of certifications.

My introduction to the S-76 was a Two Week Flight Safety course that included the full Simulator course and then actual flight in the aircraft.

Can you say that about your conversion course for the Bell 212 done by the outfit that turned you into a 212 Pilot?

Did that same company require all EC-155 Pilots to attend similar two week Initial Training courses as part of their "Conversion Training"?

Mine was under the FAA system and yours was done in a non-FAA system.

It would seem there is a difference in management policies that was the main difference between the two systems....would you not agree?

Gulli,

The FAA is ruled by the Airplane Mafia and the Helicopter side is like a red headed bastard cousin at a family reunion at times.

The Federal Air Regulations (FAR's) have always been tailored towards Airplanes and until recent times were applied equally to Rotorcraft despite the unique differences Rotorcraft possess comopared to Airplanes.

We saw one example of that in the PBA system on the S-76 and the Chinook....and we see it in the "Type Rating" concept.

The FAA reasonably enough saw Cessna, Piper, and other Light Airplanes as being very similar and not very complex thus it settled upon the Weight Limit as being the determinant for requiring a "Type Rating".

The odd way the FAR's are written....when I did my Helicopter ATPL (in those days there was a VFR ONLY version) I wound up with a Bell 47 Type Rating as ATP rides were construed to be "Type Rides".

When I did the ATPL (note there is no VFR or IFR added to that) it was in a Bell 412 and I obtained both the ATPL and 412 Type Rating with one check ride....one being a VFR portion followed by an IFR portion.


There is a group of folks that do not understand our system....that seem to think one must have a "Type Rating" on each aircraft you fly....and that is an insistence that is not based upon anything but thinking there is but one true way to salvation.

We get around the "Type Rating" business by the FAR's requiring minimum time in "Type" and a Checkride in that particular "Type" of helicopter....even for those that do not require a "Type" rating.

We get to the same destination but by a different route.....and for those who criticize our system prove they do not fully understand the difference between the two methods.

Over the years I have formed an impression that down in Oz your system of licensing is very complex with official requirements that present a burden rather than a blessing....am I right in thinking that?

SASless I always wondered why such emphasis was made in the USA over factory ratings/endorsements. Personally the in house training I have had has been to a very high standard and much of the study material has been plagiarised from said factory courses. Talking to people that have done the factory courses they state they are very good yet they have not appeared more knowledgeable or proficient.
I suspect as you have eluded to it is another way of achieving the same ends and standards. Insurers as I understand give better rates or require said courses. The end result is the same though where a thorough understanding is required of all the aircraft systems.

I would rather enjoy the opportunity to do a factory course to see if there is much difference from the training I have been given.

I have flown with Pilots especially new to IFR that really do not like using the controls in attitude mode or with force trim when VFR/VMC. A reason often given is it’s not real flying or I suspect some pilots like having something to do all the time. The force trim release in the 76 can really be uncomfortable on your thumb if holding for long periods of time. It is easy to surmise that a pilot that doesn’t use the upper modes would rather fly with the force trim off. Now fly into IMC and to re-engage this system you have to look down and find a button that might not be used often... then press two more to couple.
When boat winching in the 76 often guys used to go to SAS mode which was much nicer on your thumb. However after departure they would forget to go back into attitude mode, engage the flight director and let go of the controls to watch the aircraft diverge before realising their mistake, no problem if not a bit messy VMC but big potential for serious problems IMC.
I did not trust myself to remember so just put up with the sore thumb.

It is entirely speculative but I have wondered if any of this was a factor on this flight.

[SASless]

Flying in the Bell 204/205/UH-1....most pilots that had gone through the US Army Flight School seemed to be of the notion that "all" friction was to be removed from the Cyclic and Force Trim turned off.....for their flying.

I always liked a bit of friction on the Cyclic and flew with the Force Trim ON....as I liked to be able to take my hand off the cyclic if needed (especially in the Left Hand seat) and not have a loose noodle feeling in the cyclic...or some feed back caused by the bouncing of you hand if the Track and Balance was not smooth.

Later on...Sperry Installs required a Friction Collar to be set to a minimum setting to prevent that same feedback affecting the performance of the Sperry Helicopter-Pilot system.

Your point about the amount of actions it would take to go from Force Trim OFF....HP's in SAS to Force Trim ON....HP's to ATT...and slewing the HDG Bug around, and then engaging upper modes......lending itself to distraction and worse....is very possible and in this case probable.

There is much talk about the Transponder Ident Request from ATC...but nothing being said re what you point out.

If one is familiar with the switchology....it should not require much doing to get the Autopilot up and running and flying the Helicopter. If not familiar it becomes more burdensome as the fingers just do not take themselves to the right Buttons as they would with good Monkey Memory helping out.


One real benefit to a Third Party training arrangement is if that Third Party can offer specialized courses in team with the Factory so that the best sources for accurate information is close at hand.

I saw that in action at the West Palm Beach AATC operation when the 76 Training was done by them at the Sikorsky Completion Center way out in the swamp.

We had Sikorsky Design Engineers that were available and often shared dining tables at the cafeteria with us at lunch time.

Also...that Third Party doing independent assessment of the Pilot's Performance can aid in identifying problems or weaknesses in performance that might not go reported otherwise.

I worked at one such training school that required us to fully document and assess our Trainee's Performance....provide them a complete de-brief...and provide copies of it all to their Employer.

I failed the Chief Pilot of an Oil Company Operation and the Management stood behind that action when I showed them some video's of the fellow's performance.

We gave him a change of Instructor and some remedial training and in the end he thanked us for how it was handled and that when presented the "evidence" he had to agree with our evaluation.

He did not however appreciate my having broken his Pipe that was causing the distraction from his learning in the Simulator.

I do not fault him for that lack of forgiveness.

I never did get a job offer from that outfit....for some unknown reason.

[megan]

most pilots that had gone through the US Army Flight School seemed to be of the notion that "all" friction was to be removed from the Cyclic and Force Trim turned off.....for their flyingDuring training on the Huey always used the force trim, flying Vietnam with all the formation work it was a pain in the derriere, so force trim off for all flying became the norm. Hand flying the 76 was force trim off since it was only done during periods of maneuvering, take off and landing, transit between those two points was coupled up with GPS nav engaged, can't say I ever forgot to put the force trim back on when coupling up.

[megan]

An article from Business & Commercial Aviation,contains a few new viewpoints.

https://informamarkets.turtl.co/story/bca-magazine-q2-2021/page/5/1

[[email protected]]

That's a great article and objective precis of the events and probable causes of the accident.

It doesn't paint Island Helicopters or their chief pilot in a very good light and it also highlights the shortcomings of box-ticking safety assessments which are meaningless unless there is 3rd party objective oversight of such assessments - unlikely to occur in a small outfit I would suggest.

Additional bureaucracy does not in itself bring additional safety and is often ignored because it is an unwieldy and time-consuming process - not always suited to an aviation environment where quick decisions are needed in many cases.

[SASless]

A bit far on conjecture but does frame the narrative effectively....why did the Chief Pilot ignore the very standards and procedures he was supposed to be teaching others?

As to saying doing an IMC Climb to on top was his plan all along....I think that was a patently false statement not supported by the evidence.

The suggestion that the Pilot had to communicate with ATC ignores reality....that in an emergency, even one that is self inflicted, one may deviate from the Rules as needed to deal with the emergency.....and he need not have done anything but fly the aircraft to clear air that was above him.

The statement that it was only 30 feet to go before he would have broken out is a bit lame....as there is no way to know how close he came to breaking out before losing control of the aircraft.

[airplanecrazy]

The statement that it was only 30 feet to go before he would have broken out is a bit lame....as there is no way to know how close he came to breaking out before losing control of the aircraft.

It does not change your analysis, but I suspect it was much more than 30 feet. From the ADS-B data supplied by the FAA, I estimate that the aircraft began the steep bank at 17:45:09Z at an altitude of approximately 2400' AMSL (2275' Geometric height from ADS-B + 117' WGS-84 to WGM-96 conversion), and reached a maximum height of approximately 2450' AMSL (2325' Geometric Height + 117' WGS-84 to WGM-96 conversion) at 17:45:15Z. This is higher than the reported cloud tops of 2400' AMSL, so that made me look at the cloud heights to see if the reports were accurate for the time of the crash. Watching the fire spotting videos, it is clear the tops are moving up and down, but I believe the cloud heights at the time of the crash were closer to 2700' than 2400'. This picture is from Saddle Peak, approximately 5 miles from the crash site, about 1/2 hour before the crash:

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1261x334/beforecrash_87cfa6bab9de6cb1c06f1d1228ab36459a880396.jpg
I used Google Earth (uses WGM-96) to estimate the AMSL height and distance of various features

Here is a picture at the time of the crash:
https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1257x333/aftercrash_d6494f1b4237dcbaf51fb4427697db681a6aa5f4.jpg
Notice that the feature at 2700' and 0.1 miles is barely visible, and even the closer tower and telephone poles are partially obscured.

Note: I estimate the accuracy of the ADS-B Geometric Height (WGS-84) at +/- 50 feet.

As an aside, Saddle Peak happens to be the location of the Santa Monica ADS-B antenna/receiver that collected most of the FAA data for the final minutes of the event.

[SASless]

The sad fact is he almost made it to on Top....but did not.

If we work backwards....analyzing what actions he did take....and thinking about those he could have taken...and think about the effect the all had or could have had on the outcome of the climb to On Top....there might be some good Teaching Points to be had.....most of which are already known from other such tragedies.

Repeating them might help someone else down the road from making the same mistakes.

[megan]

Repeating them might help someone else down the road from making the same mistakesIt's a sad fact of life that very few, if any, accidents don't have a precedent, each is a repeat of what's gone before. The saying is to learn from anothers mistakes because you don't have the life span to make them all yourself, trouble is remembering all combinations and permutations that can lead you to grief.

[SASless]

The lessons learned if applied become a routine...and that alone will prevent some of these tragedies.

That is why training must be effective and retained....and not merely be a box checking exercise.

Policies wisely arrived at....must be composed with every time.

After all....Lives depend upon it.

But your point is very well taken....Helicopter Pilots have an amazing talent for killing themselves in the same old ways.....we are. not very innovative when it comes to that.

[megan]

Helicopter Pilots have an amazing talent for killing themselves in the same old waysIt's not just helo jocks SAS, it's the entire human race in all endevours.

[SASless]

There has been a Settlement agreed to between the Operator ad Plainiffs.

The Court must approve that Settlement.

No details known.

Operative words....Operator....Plaintiffs.

https://abc7.com/kobe-bryant-crash-vanessa-wrongful-death-lawsuit-island-express-helicopters-altobelli/10821730/

[gulliBell]

Sensible. No point being intransigent and pushing these things to trial. It will be a very big number I expect.

[SASless]

I wonder how it is going for the Pilot's Estate and the Plaintiffs?

[airplanecrazy]

I wonder how it is going for the Pilot's Estate and the Plaintiffs?

ESPN and USA Today are reporting that the settlement includes the Pilot’s estate (but that doesn’t make it true). Your question reminded me that there is also a cross complaint against the air traffic controllers. I wonder where that stands?

[megan]

Your question reminded me that there is also a cross complaint against the air traffic controllersI'd like to see them make that one fly, controllers had zip to do with it, in fact they should put in a claim for undue stress imposed by the ambulance chasers.

[SASless]

The Ambulance Chasers (actually Hearse Chasers in this case) made a killing themselves in filing the Legal Actions....probably a full third share of the Settlement.

They are the only ones who actually "benefit" from such tragedies.