Bomber Command 'Heavy' Crewing

[Downwind.Maddl-Land]

Here's a question I ought to know the answer to, but don't!

As a generalisation, standard Bomber Command 'heavy' crew composition (101 Sqn excepted) was:
Rear gunner
Mid/upper gunner
Radio Operator
Navigator
Flt Eng
Pilot
Bomb aimer/front gunner.
Many Lancaster Mk IIs and later Halifaxes were equipped with under defence armament (FN64 and Preston-Green positions respectively); my question is: who manned these positions, or was the crew increased to 8? :confused:

[rolling20]

Here's a question I ought to know the answer to, but don't!

As a generalisation, standard Bomber Command 'heavy' crew composition (101 Sqn excepted) was:
Rear gunner
Mid/upper gunner
Radio Operator
Navigator
Flt Eng
Pilot
Bomb aimer/front gunner.
Many Lancaster Mk IIs and later Halifaxes were equipped with under defence armament (FN64 and Preston-Green positions respectively); my question is: who manned these positions, or was the crew increased to 8? :confused:
I have always believed that the Wop/Ag manned the the ventral or 'dustbin turret'.
They were fitted on numerous Bomber Command Aircraft.
They were in Wellingtons' early in the war, featuring in the early attacks on the German Navy in 1939.
Most people don't realise that the Lanc was originally designed with a ventral turret and early versions of the Halifax had them as well.
Also, the Preston Green turret, was a simple fixing with a .5 MG through the floor. It was fitted I think to all MkIII Halifaxes, but was removed due to H2s.
I think the Canadians were the main users of this.


Looking at casualty lists, there does not seem to be any extra crew member carried for it,
so the Wop/Ag would have been tasked with its operation.

[stevef]

Somewhere amongst my book collection there's a reference to double navigators (Pathfinder Force?) sometimes being carried on Lancaster trips, maybe to operate the electronic apparatus. Also recall something about an eighth German-speaking crew member, presumably on board to confuse the German night fighter pilots and plotters.

[rolling20]

Somewhere amongst my book collection there's a reference to double navigators (Pathfinder Force?) sometimes being carried on Lancaster trips, maybe to operate the electronic apparatus. Also recall something about an eighth German-speaking crew member, presumably on board to confuse the German night fighter pilots and plotters.
German speaking were 101 squadron with the Airborne Cigar.
Main force crews ( possibly pathfinders as well) occasionally carried an 8th specialist crew member to operate the H2S set.

[longer ron]

Somewhere amongst my book collection there's a reference to double navigators (Pathfinder Force?) sometimes being carried on Lancaster trips, maybe to operate the electronic apparatus. Also recall something about an eighth German-speaking crew member, presumably on board to confuse the German night fighter pilots and plotters.
Yes Steve
Some Pathfinder and main force heavies had 2 'Navs' by 1944 - as you say - they operated the H2S 'set' and other electronic gizmos.
Originally I think the 2nd 'Nav' was called the 'Set Operator' but later became 'Nav 2'.
During WW2 the 'Nav 2' was not necessarily badged as a Navigator - Bomb Aimers and possibly some WOp's with the necessary experience/training also served as 'Set Operators/Nav 2'.
It gets a little confusing with the Pathfinders as they could have the Navigator as 'Nav 1' and (say) the Bomb Aimer as either 'Nav 2' or 'Bomb Aimer' (but operating the set regardless) and using the Flight Engineer as visual Bomb Aimer (many PFF Flight Engineers were trained as Bomb Aimers).
The Nav 1 and Nav 2 later (late war/post war ?) became Nav Plotter and Nav Radar respectively.

[dduxbury310]

No. 75 (NZ) Squadron was supplied with four RAF (specially-trained) air gunners on 26th September 1944, to man the make-shift belly gun, so these gunners only flew in the (eventually) six to eight aircraft on the squadron actually equipped with them. Other such gunners were posted in over following months, and quite a bit of coming and going of these man seems to be taking place. I believe these special gunners were not members of a regular crew, and so far as I know did not have a particular regular aircraft. One of them apparently became morbidly fixated on the possibility of becoming a target for a German night fighter crew with "slanted" cannon armament installed in their aircraft, and on one operation over Europe he abandoned his gun position and flatly refused to man it for the rest of the flight. Needless to say, this poor chap had no future in the RAF, and he promptly vanished from the station. I was told about this incident by the rear gunner on this aircraft (he died about 18 months ago, I attended his funeral), but this was one of his stranger stories. I do not know if the other gunners remained with squadron till end of war, as nothing much was mentioned about them in the Squadron ORB. However I do have a list of some of these men, including service numbers.
David D

[longer ron]

The Canadians seemed much more aware of the Schräge Musik upward firing guns and liked having belly 'Scare' guns - but of course it was not possible to have a 'scare gun' on H2S equipped A/C.

[rolling20]

No. 75 (NZ) Squadron was supplied with four RAF (specially-trained) air gunners on 26th September 1944, to man the make-shift belly gun, so these gunners only flew in the (eventually) six to eight aircraft on the squadron actually equipped with them. Other such gunners were posted in over following months, and quite a bit of coming and going of these man seems to be taking place. I believe these special gunners were not members of a regular crew, and so far as I know did not have a particular regular aircraft. One of them apparently became morbidly fixated on the possibility of becoming a target for a German night fighter crew with "slanted" cannon armament installed in their aircraft, and on one operation over Europe he abandoned his gun position and flatly refused to man it for the rest of the flight. Needless to say, this poor chap had no future in the RAF, and he promptly vanished from the station. I was told about this incident by the rear gunner on this aircraft (he died about 18 months ago, I attended his funeral), but this was one of his stranger stories. I do not know if the other gunners remained with squadron till end of war, as nothing much was mentioned about them in the Squadron ORB. However I do have a list of some of these men, including service numbers.
David D
Bomber Command never officially recognised the threat from 'Schrage Musik', even if the odd squadron took steps to man a downward firing gun.
Because an attack of this sorts was usually fatal, the loss was attributed to flak.
The ammunition used was less inclined to glow, so all other crews saw was a sudden fire as the fuel tanks were hit.
Even BC's own operational research scientists did become aware of the fact until after the war.

[Downwind.Maddl-Land]

I have always believed that the Wop/Ag manned the the ventral or 'dustbin turret'.

the Preston Green turret, was a simple fixing with a .5 MG through the floor. It was fitted I think to all MkIII Halifaxes, but was removed due to H2s.
I think the Canadians were the main users of this.

That was my reasoning and assumption too; I wanted to try to elicit from the readership a definitive answer or possibly a reference, as my research had drawn a blank thus far. However, an obscure (Canadian) blogsite stated that the Mid/upper gunner manned the FN 64 (when fitted); I find that counter-intuitive/hard to believe as the Mid/Upper had a far better field of view and was a more effective adjunct to the crew's survival prospects than manning the FN64 with its restricted FOV and utility!

My understanding wrt the Preston-Green fitting ('turret' is far too grandiose a term!) was that it was a late-war retrofit for Main Force Halibag IIIs and VIs that were not universally equipped with H2S, this equipment being primarily destined for 8 Gp and other Pathfinder-designated units. As a predominate operator of the more effective Halifax marks, No 6 (RCAF) Gp was, of course likely to be the primary recipient/adopter of this fit, hence their closer association with it. My understanding is that the P-G fit was retrofitted to those airframes in lieu of H2S (ie in the vacant ventral position), rather than H2S displacing the P-G installation. Willing/Stand to be corrected though!

[rolling20]

That was my reasoning and assumption too; I wanted to try to elicit from the readership a definitive answer or possibly a reference, as my research had drawn a blank thus far. However, an obscure (Canadian) blogsite stated that the Mid/upper gunner manned the FN 64 (when fitted); I find that counter-intuitive/hard to believe as the Mid/Upper had a far better field of view and was a more effective adjunct to the crew's survival prospects than manning the FN64 with its restricted FOV and utility!

My understanding wrt the Preston-Green fitting ('turret' is far too grandiose a term!) was that it was a late-war retrofit for Main Force Halibag IIIs and VIs that were not universally equipped with H2S, this equipment being primarily destined for 8 Gp and other Pathfinder-designated units. As a predominate operator of the more effective Halifax marks, No 6 (RCAF) Gp was, of course likely to be the primary recipient/adopter of this fit, hence their closer association with it. My understanding is that the P-G fit was retrofitted to those airframes in lieu of H2S (ie in the vacant ventral position), rather than H2S displacing the P-G installation. Willing/Stand to be corrected though!
I think over enemy territory it wouldn't have been feasible for the MU to man both.
My understanding is that the fitted P-G was removed as H2S became available.

[longer ron]

The Canadians seemed much more aware of the Schräge Musik upward firing guns and liked having belly 'Scare' guns - but of course it was not possible to have a 'scare gun' on H2S equipped A/C.

[rotarywrench]

My dad who flew with RCAF #434 on 6 of his crew's last 7 missions in June/July 44 had an extra MUD/AG on the crew, even one with a 2nd pilot as well. The navigator mentioned that they did not like the addition to the crew because he "fired at everything." They may have been alerted to a new danger as on the last flight, that was without a MUD/AG, the rear gunner was uncharacteristically nervously "slewing the turret for the whole flight." This mission Halifax which had a lower gun position did not have the extra gunner.

[rolling20]

My dad who flew with RCAF #434 on 6 of his crew's last 7 missions in June/July 44 had an extra MUD/AG on the crew, even one with a 2nd pilot as well. The navigator mentioned that they did not like the addition to the crew because he "fired at everything." They may have been alerted to a new danger as on the last flight, that was without a MUD/AG, the rear gunner was uncharacteristically nervously "slewing the turret for the whole flight." This mission Halifax which had a lower gun position did not have the extra gunner.
2nd Dickies ( extra pilot) were not uncommon and were usually there for their first trip to gain experience with a seasoned crew.
Unfortunately there were many who were killed or made POWs. Which meant their crews would be looking for a new pilot.
Also senior officers ( often station commanders, Group Captains usually) would accompany crews on certain missions, usually to an interesting target like Berlin. Again many didn't return. The highest ranking officer lost on Ops, though he did survive, was an Air Commodore.
Again , looking at casualty lists, crews carrying an 8th member as a gunner, looks to be extremely rare.

[FlightlessParrot]

The Canadians seemed much more aware of the Schräge Musik upward firing guns and liked having belly 'Scare' guns - but of course it was not possible to have a 'scare gun' on H2S equipped A/C.
This is a bit of a thread drift, but in what I've read (not extensive, but not tiny) I've found no suggestion that the RAF knew anything about Schraege Muzik. Could you point me to something, please, whether RAF or Canadian related?

[rolling20]

This is a bit of a thread drift, but in what I've read (not extensive, but not tiny) I've found no suggestion that the RAF knew anything about Schraege Muzik. Could you point me to something, please, whether RAF or Canadian related?
This subject was talked about on here, back in 2017. I don't think there was any evidence that the RAF or the Canadians knew anything about SM.
For what it's worth, here is my post from that discussion:


rolling20
28th Aug 2017, 16:21
Bomber Command may not have known about Schrage Musik, but in the summer of 43, 1 Group gunnery leaders were teaching their gunners to ask pilots to dip a wing to look for fighters below. This was possibly before the official advent of SM in August 43. In July 44 an intact Ju88 Night Fighter landed at Woodbridge. However the only thing that BC learned was that 'Monica' was being homed in on by the night fighters. It had no SM guns.It would be interesting to know if the captured pilot knew of, or made any references to SM. After D Day, the tide slowly turned in favour of the bombers.
Attacking a bomber from underneath with front firing guns or even a turret is in my opinion pure folly and virtual suicide for a night fighter pilot. To quote from an X user of SM with whom I corresponded: 'To shoot into the fuselage too near was dangerous because the aircraft could explode of bombs and oxygen-bottles.
We were aiming for between engines Nr 1 and 2 left side a short second and then moved away right away. In most cases the fuel tanks between the engines and wing were burning, so the boys had time to parachute from fuselage.'
There were a number of recorded cases, where bombers just caught fire in level flight and with no warning. One must wonder about debriefings and of attacks that failed, were they widely circulated? Don't forget SM did not use tracer, so no one was aware of the attack. It would seem odd though that no reports did get back to England from survivors. Freeman Dyson though mentioned before that the escape hatch on a Lanc was an inch or so too small for a fully clothed crew member to escape from with ease. However, nothing was done to remedy the situation and he calculated that 10,000 crew members died needlessly.
BC powers that be were as mentioned in Max Hastings book still telling crews to use IFF over enemy territory as crews believed it interfered with German radar, when the opposite was true. Also as mentioned here earlier, 'Scarecrow Flares' were not some pyrotechnic fired up by the Germans, but aircraft , usually fully ladened receiving a direct hit. BC seemed in both cases to have decided that moral would be affected if the truth was known. I often wonder if the same was true of SM?

[longer ron]

I tend to agree with Rolling20's view that the RAF probably knew more about Schräge Musik than was perhaps generally known by the Squadrons/Crews.Any armament expert inspecting the type (and angles) of damage to Bombers which managed to survive an air attack from below would be able to work out the likely type/layout of guns and attack method.

Prior to the Preston Green gun mounting - there had been some 'home made' scare guns fitted in the fuselage of some Halifaxes,W/C J.D. Pattison DFC of 429 Sqn seems generally credited with ordering that the mid-upper turrets be removed and the that displaced gunner would lie on a mattress on the floor as an observer, looking through a perspex blister for night fighters coming up from below.But I have not seen a primary source for that.

From
https://tailendcharlietedchurch.wordpress.com/tail-end-charlie-ted-church/rear-gunner-sentinel-of-the-skies/gunnery-training/

Preston Green TurretThe most effective of these simple Under-Defence positions was the Preston Green Mounting, which was used by several Squadrons. On 29th February 1944, a Halifax III, (LW650), took off from Boscombe Down. It appeared to be just another Halifax, with the bulging blister of H2S Radar beneath the Fuselage, but close inspection would have revealed a 0.5in. Browning protruding through the rear of the blister. The Aircraft was being used for Trials of the Preston Green Under-Defence Turret. Preston Green began with an American Mounting used by USAAF Bombers. It gave a free movement of the Gun whilst providing a firm Anchorage. Work had begun 18 months earlier when it was suspected that Enemy Night Fighters were Attacking from below. At this time, the H2S sets were looked on as an essential aid, but the production of Bombers was outstripping the supply of Radars, and it was decided to install Preston Green mountings in all Halifax IIIs. The Adapter was fixed across the Base of a bowl-shaped enclosure immediately behind the Bomb Bay. The Gunner had an aft-facing Bucket Seat within the Blister, with a tilting Back Rest. The Gun could be swung clear of its Aperture when searching, but could rapidly lock in the Firing position if needed. Had more Bomber Command Aircraft been fitted with the Preston Green Turret, this previously non-existent protection from Attack from below would have cut down the Toll taken by Luftwaffe Night Fighters using upwards Firing Cannon. Unfortunately, when H2S production increased, the Turrets were taken out, much to the annoyance of Bomber Crews.

A poor image of a Preston Green mounting

https://i.imgur.com/zU04F7e.jpg

Wallace Clarke's British Aircraft Armament Vol 1 probably has more details

[longer ron]

Jeffords - Observers and Navigators book says....

By June 1944 207 Halifaxes had been fitted with the Preston Green Gun Mounting along with 48 Lancasters and 68 Stirlings.

There may be more details on P256 but I could not view it on googlebooks and I do not have a paper copy.

[STUF]

My late father was a Navigator on Stirlings in 1942 and I think all his operational trips had a crew of 8. On one occasion, the first 1000 bomber raid on Cologne, they even had a 9th crew member, AVM Baldwin C in C No 3 Group Bomber Command. My father was shot down twice - the first in a friendly fire incident in May 1942 involving the ill fated Turbinlite operation at Tangmere, The second over Holland in June 1942 when 3 of the 8 crew were killed. My father was eventually taken prisoner and ended up
in Stalag Luft 3 along with the second pilot, Des Plunkett who
went on to have a major role in the Great Escape.

[682al]

I went into this topic (i.e. the under gun mounting) in some detail while researching at The National Archives many years ago. The facts contained in several Bomber Command files that I studied are at odds with what you tend to read in books published since the '60s (and, by extension, what you read in threads such as this.).

Bomber Command had actually picked up on the increase in attacks from beneath as early as the summer of 1942, almost as soon as the upward firing guns were trialed by the Luftwaffe. While the nature of the attacks was recognised, the means of delivering them was at this time thought to be from a steep angle of attack by the night fighter (which the majority probably were, suspicions about upward firing guns came later).

Harris attended a conference at the Air Ministry in June,1943 to discuss improvements to the under defence of bombers. The meeting was mainly about improving the field of view (particularly downwards) from the tail turret. This would eventually lead to a proposal by Fraser Nash for a two gun adaptation of the existing FN20 rear turret known as the FN220 which ultimately came to nothing.

As an interim measure, a scheme was devised by the Bomber Development Unit which consisted of a single .5" Browning as illustrated above by longer ron, utilising the original opening intended for the ventral turrets which had already been deleted. It was ackowledged as being a "lash up" right from the start. There was a version for the Stirling, Lancaster and Halifax and there was to have been a version for the Wellington but I was never able to establish if this actually went ahead. The requirement was for all aircraft of the Main Force to be equipped and also those of the Conversion Units.

Of the three installations, the Halifax was considered to be the least satisfactory and it was re-worked into what is referred to as the Preston Green mounting. I cannot say this with 100% certainty but I have been unable to find any commercial firm with such a name - it is however interesting to note that the Handley-Page representative at project meetings was a Mr. P.R.T. Green - perhaps he got given the job of improving the original installation?

The whole scheme was meant to go ahead with the usual energy and priority (Harris was probably thinking of those long winter nights on the road to Berlin and other Eastern German destinations). Installations were made on the bomber production lines and conversion sets were delivered straight to the Groups. There were some delays in obtaining the necessary conversion parts (certain parts from the U.S.A.), and some Squadrons with Mk. II Lancasters initially received the wrong conversion sets, but by the end of 1943 the work was going ahead. Each Group nominated a base for the work to be carried out. I have seen communications from the Groups indicating that the work was largely complete by the spring of 1944*, however this coincides with the period when H2S was being installed so it must have been a particularly hectic time on those airfields, gun one week, radar set the next!

In the end, and as already pointed out, the installation of H2S took priority over the under gun. Some surviving aircraft and left over conversions sets were passed on to 3 Group (for use on aircraft without H2S) and some were still in use at the war's end.

That's about as far as my research took me. What's missing from the narrative is just how much use was made of the installation by the Squadrons, i.e. were they enthusiastically received and put to use or just treated as another rush job with little practical value? I've seen individual accounts of an eighth crew member being taken on ops, sometimes a "spare bod" gunner and sometimes even a volunteer from ground crew, but I've never come across a comprehensive report from the end-users which perhaps helps explain the general level of ignorance about this topic.

* All those Airfix/Revell/Frog/Hasegawa Lancs, Stirlings and Halifaxes on the modelling forums which ought to have the gun but don't!

[rolling20]

I went into this topic (i.e. the under gun mounting) in some detail while researching at The National Archives many years ago. The facts contained in several Bomber Command files that I studied are at odds with what you tend to read in books published since the '60s (and, by extension, what you read in threads such as this.).

Bomber Command had actually picked up on the increase in attacks from beneath as early as the summer of 1942, almost as soon as the upward firing guns were trialled by the Luftwaffe. While the nature of the attacks was recognised, the means of delivering them was not immediately identified.

Saundby chaired a conference at Bomber Command in the autumn of 1943 with a view to making urgent improvements to the under defence of our aircraft (this had come from Harris). Particular reference was made to a one-off installation of a .303" gun in the lower escape hatch of a Stirling - it was a local initiative by an Engineering Officer if I recall correctly.

A scheme was devised by the Bomber Development Unit which consisted of a single .5" Browning as illustrated above by longer ron. It was ackowledged as being a "lash up" right from the start. There was a version for the Stirling, Lancaster and Halifax and there was to have been a version for the Wellington but I was never able to establish if this actually went ahead. The requirement was for all aircraft of the Main Force to be equipped and also those of the Conversion Units.

Of the three installations, the Halifax was considered to be the least satisfactory and it was re-worked into what is referred to as the Preston Green mounting. I cannot say this with 100% certainty but I have been unable to find any commercial firm with such a name - it is however interesting to note that the Handley-Page representative at the conference was a Mr. P.T. Green - perhaps he got given the job of improving the original installation?

The whole scheme was meant to go ahead with the usual energy and priority (Harris was probably thinking of those long winter nights on the road to Berlin and other Eastern German destinations). Installations were made on the bomber production lines and conversion sets were delivered straight to the Squadrons. There were some delays in obtaining the necessary conversion parts (mostly the gun mountings from U.S.A.), and some Squadrons with Mk. II Lancasters initially received the wrong conversion sets, but by the end of 1943 the work was going ahead at full speed. I have seen communications from the Groups indicating that the work was largely complete by early 1944*, however this coincides with the period when H2S was being installed so it must have been a particularly hectic time on those airfields, gun one week, radar set the next!

In the end, and as already pointed out, the installation of H2S took priority over the under gun. Some surviving aircraft and left over conversions sets were passed on to 3 Group (no requirement for H2S) and some were still in use at the war's end.

That's about as far as my research took me. What's missing from the narrative is just how much use was made of the installation by the Squadrons, i.e. were they enthusiastically received and put to use or just treated as another rush job with little practical value? I've seen individual accounts of an eighth crew member being taken on ops, sometimes a "spare bod" gunner and sometimes even a volunteer from ground crew, but I've never come across a comprehensive report from the end-users which perhaps helps explain the general level of ignorance about this topic.

These notes are taken from memory as I do not have access to my files at the moment. When I do, I'll correct any errors that have crept in.

* All those Airfix/Revell/Frog/Hasegawa Lancs, Stirlings and Halifaxes on the modelling forums which ought to have the gun but don't!
Interesting post.
However SM wasn't used until Peenemunde , 16/17th August 43. Even in early 44, only about 30% of nightfighters were fitted with it. It was usually given to experienced crews.
I haven't seen the Saundby conference notes, so cannot comment. However ,as mentioned before there are no conclusive reports of SM being used. The only thing I have ever seen was inconclusive.
When the Saundby conference would have taken place, there would have been very few SM equipped nightfighters, so I remain sceptical.
Early MK 2 Lancs were fitted with a ventral turret, but it was removed. As far as I know there were no H2S MkII Lancs and there were only about half a dozen or less squadrons were equipped with the MKII and by D Day, only 2 still flew them.
My final point is again Freeman Dyson, he maintained that BC Operational Research knew nothing about SM.
​​​​​​​If that was indeed the case, then Saundby or somebody is guilty of a cover up.

[longer ron]

That's about as far as my research took me. What's missing from the narrative is just how much use was made of the installation by the Squadrons, i.e. were they enthusiastically received and put to use or just treated as another rush job with little practical value? I've seen individual accounts of an eighth crew member being taken on ops, sometimes a "spare bod" gunner and sometimes even a volunteer from ground crew, but I've never come across a comprehensive report from the end-users which perhaps helps explain the general level of ignorance about this topic.



There is an article I saw some years ago somewhere on the net that covers at least some of the stuff in your post 682al (maybe one of the RAF historical presentations).
The RAF had enough very experienced commanders and armament/technical/tactics specialist to be able to make fairly accurate assessments of enemy activity and tactics,'Fishpond' might have helped some H2S equipped crews escape the night fighters.
I think one of the main advantages of a ventral hatch was the ability to visually check below the a/c for any approaching night fighter.
The gunner manning any ventral position might well have varied with a/c and sqn - take the Halifax - if it was still equipped with a mid upper turret then either the WOp or a 'spare gunner/volunteer' would have to man it,conversely - if the mid upper turret had been removed then a ventral gun could be manned by the displaced gunner.

[Doctor Cruces]

Somewhere amongst my book collection there's a reference to double navigators (Pathfinder Force?) sometimes being carried on Lancaster trips, maybe to operate the electronic apparatus. Also recall something about an eighth German-speaking crew member, presumably on board to confuse the German night fighter pilots and plotters.
This was 101 Sqn. They suffered the most unit casualties of any because of the nature of their work. They would often take off singly and fit into the bomber stream at various intervals in order to provide coverage for the full straem. Along with the eighth crew member, they also carried jamming equipmet particularly one that had a microphone in one of the engine compartments and whenever they discovered a night fighter frequency that was being used they would transmit engine noise to block it.

[682al]

I've edited my earlier post about the belly gun to correct a few errors.

On the subject of Schrage Musik and Freeman Dyson's oft-quoted assertion that the Operational Research people at Bomber Command never discovered this method of attack, I can only say he was wrong. My understanding is that he never worked on the study of damage to our bombers by enemy defences and he may therefore not have been privy to the information that some of his colleagues were.

As I've already stated, Operational Research staff at B.C. produced monthly reports "Enemy Tactics Against Bombers" which contained a mass of intelligence information and which duly noted the increasing ratio of night fighter attacks from below as against on the level or above, etc.

In January, 1944 the report included a description of the S.M. method :-
" In view of the relative frequency of attacks by unseen aircraft, attention is drawn to four reported cases this month in which the enemy fighter was seen to make its attack from almost vertically below. One, a Ju88, followed a Lancaster for a considerable time, positioning itself underneath the rear turret so that the gunner could not bring his guns to bear. From this position the fighter was able to open fire several times."

By July, 1944 Bomber Command had been handed an accurate description of a S.M. equipped night fighter:-
"Some fighters are carrying 20mm. upward firing cannon mounted at an angle of 70deg. to the horizontal. Aiming is done with a Revi gunsight inclined at the same angle as the guns. A tentative estimate of fighters so equipped was 10% or 20%."

I'll leave the last words to the big man himself, in correspondence with the Air Ministry:-

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/648x1593/harris_4b95b3b41ecee6c760d082f78375e48021c60d92.jpg

[rolling20]

I've edited my earlier post about the belly gun to correct a few errors.

On the subject of Schrage Musik and Freeman Dyson's oft-quoted assertion that the Operational Research people at Bomber Command never discovered this method of attack, I can only say he was wrong. My understanding is that he never worked on the study of damage to our bombers by enemy defences and he may therefore not have been privy to the information that some of his colleagues were.

As I've already stated, Operational Research staff at B.C. produced monthly reports "Enemy Tactics Against Bombers" which contained a mass of intelligence information and which duly noted the increasing ratio of night fighter attacks from below as against on the level or above, etc.

In January, 1944 the report included a description of the S.M. method :-
" In view of the relative frequency of attacks by unseen aircraft, attention is drawn to four reported cases this month in which the enemy fighter was seen to make its attack from almost vertically below. One, a Ju88, followed a Lancaster for a considerable time, positioning itself underneath the rear turret so that the gunner could not bring his guns to bear. From this position the fighter was able to open fire several times."

By July, 1944 Bomber Command had been handed an accurate description of a S.M. equipped night fighter:-
"Some fighters are carrying 20mm. upward firing cannon mounted at an angle of 70deg. to the horizontal. Aiming is done with a Revi gunsight inclined at the same angle as the guns. A tentative estimate of fighters so equipped was 10% or 20%."

I'll leave the last words to the big man himself, in correspondence with the Air Ministry:-

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/648x1593/harris_4b95b3b41ecee6c760d082f78375e48021c60d92.jpg


Interesting piece, thank you.
I think regardless of whether certain sections of BC Operational Research knew of, or didn't know about SM, is immaterial in light of the document you posted.

As I said previously , a cover up looks potentially to have taken place.
There are differing views on what was told to squadrons, if indeed anything was told to any at all.

Aircrew accounts from the period do not contain much if anything on SM attacks.
Many post war aircrew accounts make mention of not knowing about SM.
Even accounts by historical authors many years post war mention that BC had very poor intelligence and that they did not know about SM.


BC was very good during the war at supressing what it did not want known, or anything that may affect crew morale.
Jack Currie thought that the mentioning at the briefing on Peenemunde ( SM used operationally for the first time) that a new fighter was being produced, was in bad taste. Even if it was for security reasons.
Crews were told 'Scarecrow flares', (which were in essence an aircraft blowing up, possibly by SM) were a German shell fired to height.


Let us not forget as well, that the preferred method of attack by a Night fighter, with forward firing weapons, was slightly below and behind.
This may have been potentially what was seen by some aircrew.

However, if SM was known about and minuted by BC, then one wonders why more was not done to prevent SM attacks.

[longer ron]

I think it might just have been a stark choice between (say) a P-G turret or H2S and that H2S was adjudged to be more important vis a vis bombing results etc,with H2S fitted it would have been very difficult to have any sort of underside protection without (say) having a slightly extended nose Lancaster with the H2S blister fitted under the nose (similar to the H2X/'Mickey' Blister under the chin of B17's).With the B17 on daylight formation raids of course not all a/c needed H2X as the formation bombed/'toggled' when the H2X a/c dropped the bombs on target during 'blind' bombing raids.

[papajuliet]

Just found this in the book " Bomber Pilot " by Harlo Jones.........." This was because 408's Lanc IIs had a .50 calibre defensive machine gun on a free mount over a hole in the belly, meaning the crew had to have eight men. To provide the extra man, our gunners were "stolen". My rear gunner, Ralph, flew two ops while Hap, my mid-upper, flew one before the rest of the crew began our tours."

[rolling20]

Be interesting to know the dates if possible.
Early 44, 408 were still using 7 man crews. There were recorded losses of 8 man crews and even 9 man crews later in the first half of 44. The extra man was sometimes mentioned as being taken for operational experience, possibly 2nd pilot. Other times no reference was made to the 8th member.
There were however still 7 man losses at the same time.

[rolling20]

I have just found 12/13th June 44.
408 lost 3 crews on Cambrai.
Two were composed of 8 members, with each mid under gunner mentioned.
The other had 7 members, so I am guessing no mid under carried.

[WHBM]

Family question.

Mr WHBM Senior was a Nav on Halifaxes (Topcliffe, 1942-3), and later on Dakotas in Burma (1943-5). Seemingly sat behind the pilot in both, not much of a view out. So just what did the Nav do on night bombing. Celestial navigation, sure, but it was commonly preferable to be inside cloud. Visual navigation ? Then why not position at the front. Radio navigation of some sort ? Dead reckoning ?

I got the impression that in Burma, necessarily daytime, it was mostly visual and dead reckoning, but difficult from that position surely.

How many of the bomber crew were officers ? He certainly said their pilot was a flight sergeant.

[rolling20]

Family question.

Mr WHBM Senior was a Nav on Halifaxes (Topcliffe, 1942-3), and later on Dakotas in Burma (1943-5). Seemingly sat behind the pilot in both, not much of a view out. So just what did the Nav do on night bombing. Celestial navigation, sure, but it was commonly preferable to be inside cloud. Visual navigation ? Then why not position at the front. Radio navigation of some sort ? Dead reckoning ?

I got the impression that in Burma, necessarily daytime, it was mostly visual and dead reckoning, but difficult from that position surely.

How many of the bomber crew were officers ? He certainly said their pilot was a flight sergeant.
On the Halifax, the navigator was in the nose below the pilot. I assume he was to the rear of the pilot on the Dakota.
The navigator role changed throughout the war with the advent of radio navigation aids such as Gee and H2S. Celestial navigation giving way to those developments, although it was used as a back up.
Dead reckoning was all they could do in the early years of the war.
The Nav would call the time to set course, call the turns, check wind etc. His tasks were varied. On him the lives of the crew depended. Not noticing a change in wind, not turning onto a new course at the correct time could be disastrous.
The majority of aircrew were NCOs, I believe around 70%, but I stand to be corrected on that. Although promotion was rapid, some individuals going from sergeant to Squadron Leader in a year.
The RCAF towards the end of the war insisted all its aircrew were commissioned.

[WHBM]

On the Halifax, the navigator was in the nose below the pilot. I assume he was to the rear of the pilot on the Dakota.
The navigator role changed throughout the war with the advent of radio navigation aids such as Gee and H2S. Celestial navigation giving way to those developments, although it was used as a back up.
Dead reckoning was all they could do in the early years of the war.
The Nav would call the time to set course, call the turns, check wind etc. His tasks were varied. On him the lives of the crew depended. Not noticing a change in wind, not turning onto a new course at the correct time could be disastrous.

Thank you. Don't know how I got the impression that the Halifax position was behind the pilot. I didn't get these details first hand, unfortunately. They were more in the way of stories. I'm pleased you describe "on him the lives of the crew depended", because that's something I did hear first hand, but never since. Some navs were better than others, known to the pilots and indeed to the Squadron Leader. Mr W had worked in the bank previously (and subsequently), and got picked out as "good with figures". Which he always was. He had all the calculation aids of the era (I'd love to know what they were), but said he took his old school log tables booklet along with him for a bit of amusement on the way home to do the headings etc from first principles !

In the bank in the 1930s a traveller came in with a lot of US dollars to change, including an 1886 US silver dollar. So he put his own money in, surely calculated to the penny, and kept it. It went on every trip with him. I believe this was not unknown for crew members to take something along with them. As you might possibly guess, it now goes in my flight bag too. And I've long said, after hearing the repeated detail, that I reckon I could fly from Rangoon to Mandalay without charts :) .

[rotarywrench]

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x787/kitty_3sweet_adeline_002_2fe2964f4599ba9003999a8b5d0ba301576 2ca4c.jpg
Here is a picture of a PG Turret on a Halifax out of Croft, mid '44, 434 or 431 squadron. Of my dad's 34 ops, he flew his last ops with a bottom gunner 5 of 8 times and all from the 26th of June44 to the end of July44. Not all were equipped with that gun position and they switched A/C randomly.

[rolling20]

Thank you. Don't know how I got the impression that the Halifax position was behind the pilot. I didn't get these details first hand, unfortunately. They were more in the way of stories. I'm pleased you describe "on him the lives of the crew depended", because that's something I did hear first hand, but never since. Some navs were better than others, known to the pilots and indeed to the Squadron Leader. Mr W had worked in the bank previously (and subsequently), and got picked out as "good with figures". Which he always was. He had all the calculation aids of the era (I'd love to know what they were), but said he took his old school log tables booklet along with him for a bit of amusement on the way home to do the headings etc from first principles !

In the bank in the 1930s a traveller came in with a lot of US dollars to change, including an 1886 US silver dollar. So he put his own money in, surely calculated to the penny, and kept it. It went on every trip with him. I believe this was not unknown for crew members to take something along with them. As you might possibly guess, it now goes in my flight bag too. And I've long said, after hearing the repeated detail, that I reckon I could fly from Rangoon to Mandalay without charts :) .

Pleasure. Of course every crew member had a job to do and they were all a team relying on each other. If one man made an error, they all potentially suffered.
The Nav of course was a skilled job and some might argue more demanding than the pilots. They generally had at least matriculated from school and were thus well educated.
​​​​​Good luck charms like the silver dollar were common place, aircrew were a superstitious lot.I guess flying in SE Asia was interesting weather wise, compared to NW Europe ​​​​

[WHBM]

Seeing as I'm in good company here, some more questions if you don't mind.

The position in the glazed nose below the pilot seems in Halifax photos to have guns. Was the navigator expected to man these as well or were there two of them in there ?

Were the officers paid more than the sergeants for the same role ? In the family we didn't really know what the pay was, as the bank maintained him on the employment roll from 1942 to 1945, RAF pay was direct to his bank account, and they made up his military pay each month up to his (quite well paid for the time; he was in his 30s) bank position there. I don't know how many employers did this.

He more than once made contemptuous remarks about there being separate daily ration packs in Burma for officers and for men, and that the contents were exactly the same except that the men's daily pack had two pieces of toilet paper and the officers' one had three. Can that be true ?

[rolling20]

Seeing as I'm in good company here, some more questions if you don't mind.

The position in the glazed nose below the pilot seems in Halifax photos to have guns. Was the navigator expected to man these as well or were there two of them in there ?

Were the officers paid more than the sergeants for the same role ? In the family we didn't really know what the pay was, as the bank maintained him on the employment roll from 1942 to 1945, RAF pay was direct to his bank account, and they made up his military pay each month up to his (quite well paid for the time; he was in his 30s) bank position there. I don't know how many employers did this.

He more than once made contemptuous remarks about there being separate daily ration packs in Burma for officers and for men, and that the contents were exactly the same except that the men's daily pack had two pieces of toilet paper and the officers' one had three. Can that be true ?
In the Halifax nose was the bomb aimer as well. He would have been tasked with firing any guns. During night ops I doubt they were fired, but daylight raids may have seen their use.

On pay, I think a newly qualified sergeant pilot earnt around £210 a year,. Pilot Officer around £230.
I am not totally sure , I would have to reference it.
Maybe other users have a better idea?
Either way compared to the US services, the RAF was underpaid. There was a story that a Group Captain earned a similar amount to a Lieutenant in the US airforce.
Having a bank account was a rarity in those times.
It seems he was very fortunate being paid up by the bank.

[papajuliet]

Some quick research shows ( in the book The Paladins by John James ) per annum pay scales in 1938 as follows......
corporal observer £164
sergeant observer £200
sergeant pilot £226
flight sergeant pilot £273
pilot officer £264
flying officer £331
flight lieutenant £428
squadron leader £562
wing commander £660
Presumably there was some increase in the war years but I think it shows a fair picture.

[rolling20]

Some quick research shows ( in the book The Paladins by John James ) per annum pay scales in 1938 as follows......
corporal observer £164
sergeant observer £200
sergeant pilot £226
flight sergeant pilot £273
pilot officer £264
flying officer £331
flight lieutenant £428
squadron leader £562
wing commander £660
Presumably there was some increase in the war years but I think it shows a fair picture.
I remember reading that Jack Currie ,when commissioned as a P/O ,earnt just over £20 a month.
So that would have been slightly less than the 1938 rates if he was correct.

[FlightlessParrot]

Some quick research shows ( in the book The Paladins by John James ) per annum pay scales in 1938 as follows......
corporal observer £164
sergeant observer £200
sergeant pilot £226
flight sergeant pilot £273
pilot officer £264
flying officer £331
flight lieutenant £428
squadron leader £562
wing commander £660
Presumably there was some increase in the war years but I think it shows a fair picture.

I have a recollection (perhaps erroneous) that officers had to buy their own uniforms, sergeants not. Perhaps that is still the case? Anyway, it means the financial differences were in practice less than they seemed.

[kenparry]

Uniforms: yes, long standing practice that junior ranks and NCOs were issued with uniforms from stores, but officers were and are required to buy their own. Flying kit, though, is not "uniform", it is specialist role equipment, so is all stores issue. Just as well, considering the cost of stuff such as NVG and helmet-mounted sights.

[thegypsy]

When my father's Stirling was shot down over Belgium all eight on board were killed because he had a second dickey with him otherwise it would have been seven. Feb 1943

In Jan 1942 my mother's brother had a second Pilot with him so I guess between those dates the RAF went to just one Pilot. No doubt due to losses? He survived coming down close to Hamburg in the sea and was saved by a Doctor fresh from the Russian front who was used to low temperatures .

[rolling20]

I have a recollection (perhaps erroneous) that officers had to buy their own uniforms, sergeants not. Perhaps that is still the case? Anyway, it means the financial differences were in practice less than they seemed.
I think they still do?
Jack Currie ,again, when newly commissioned: ' ...bought the cap, tunic, trousers and greatcoat from Burton's for £25; raincoat cost £3 at Burberry's; and Horne's provided the shirts and socks , with some bits and pieces for £12 7s1d'... and he drew the pilots wings from stores for nothing.

Quite a sum when he was being paid £20 a month!

[dduxbury310]

The story that officers in the military by WW2 had to purchase their own uniforms is literally true, but almost all references to this custom seem to omit fact that such officers on commissioning were paid, as of right, an Initial Outfit Grant (courtesy of the taxpayer) which was allegedly sufficient to purchase all the required items. However in real life it never was, so the disgruntled officer had to gripe about making up this shortfall. Particularly impecunious officers also had the option of purchasing second hand uniforms (usually had to be slightly re-tailored) from "the trade" and at some time during WW2 the Air Ministry even ordered (in bulk) officer uniforms in standardised sizes (like an airman!) which could be purchased (I think) at RAF clothing stores to keep prices down, using the same grant. The methods of obtaining and maintaining uniforms has evolved over the years, and in some cases (and services) an annual maintenance of uniform grant is paid to all ranks for this purpose (after the initial issue).
David D

[FlightlessParrot]

Particularly impecunious officers also had the option of purchasing second hand uniforms (usually had to be slightly re-tailored) from "the trade"....
David D

Thank you for the additional information. It is a chastening (and macabre) thought that there was presumably a steady supply of second hand uniforms; is there any record of a reluctance to wear dead men's clothes?

[stevef]

RAFVR aircrew officers minimum daily pay in pounds, shillings and pence (£ s d) according to my 1943 ABC of the RAF:

Acting Pilot Officer: £0. 11s 10d
Pilot Officer: £0. 14s 6d
Flying Officer: £0. 18s 2d
Flt Lt: £1. 1s 9d
Sqn Ldr: £1. 10s 10d

£1 in 1943 is equivalent in purchasing power to about £47.27 in 2021 (UK Office of National Statistics)

[Herod]

IIRC, in '65 the daily rate for an acting Pilot Officer was £ 1. 8 s (£ 1.40) plus 11 s (55p) flying pay. £ 1.95 decimal. Of course, back then, accommodation and food was provided, beer was about 5p a pint, and very few of us owned cars. The money was enough. Plus, of course, we were allowed to fly aeroplanes !! :ok: