Nimrod XV 256 accident (1980)

[Distant Voice]

Yesterday, (17th Nov), was the 40th anniversary of the tragic accident involving Nimrod XV256. This was one of the first military accidents in Scotland that should have been covered by the 1976 Fatal Accident and Sudden Deaths Act, but no FAI took place. I don't suppose anyone informed the families of those that died that, according to Scots Law, their loved ones were not employed at the time of the accident and as such did not "die in the course of their employment".

I have been reading the official MoD Military Accident Summary, dated 3rd June 1982, and I am struck by two statements in the document that beg investigation by an independent legal body (inquest/FAI), had one taken place.

"Prior to every aircraft movement an airfield search for birds was made and on this occasion the search, made in semi-darkness, did not reveal any roosting birds"

"During the period 30 minutes before and after first and last light, take-offs and landings are not permitted unless operationally essential."

I have two questions that could have been put to MoD by an independent inquiry, (1) How effective did you expect a search in semi-darkness to be, bearing in mind that over 77 large Canadian geese were missed, and (2) If dawn was at 0719 hrs why was an aircraft allowed to take-off before 0749 hrs? N.B Sunrise was at 0804 hrs.

DV

[Sandy Parts]

Please ensure correct information is used - the report says "the aircraft flew through a dense flock of sea birds..." and "After the accident 77 dead sea birds were found on or near the runway".
Sea birds are generally members of the gull family. There is no mention of 'large Canadian Geese' in the report. A search of the airfield would not have included fields outside the airfield.
Link (https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121203134748/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AirSafetyandAviationPublications/MAAS/1980s/19801117RafNimrodMr2.htm) to the report.

[Captain Radar....]

Yesterday, (17th Nov), was the 40th anniversary of the tragic accident involving Nimrod XV256. This was one of the first military accidents in Scotland that should have been covered by the 1976 Fatal Accident and Sudden Deaths Act, but no FAI took place. I don't suppose anyone informed the families of those that died that, according to Scots Law, their loved ones were not employed at the time of the accident and as such did not "die in the course of their employment".

I have been reading the official MoD Military Accident Summary, dated 3rd June 1982, and I am struck by two statements in the document that beg investigation by an independent legal body (inquest/FAI), had one taken place.

"Prior to every aircraft movement an airfield search for birds was made and on this occasion the search, made in semi-darkness, did not reveal any roosting birds"

"During the period 30 minutes before and after first and last light, take-offs and landings are not permitted unless operationally essential."

I have two questions that could have been put to MoD by an independent inquiry, (1) How effective did you expect a search in semi-darkness to be, bearing in mind that over 77 large Canadian geese were missed, and (2) If dawn was at 0719 hrs why was an aircraft allowed to take-off before 0749 hrs? N.B Sunrise was at 0804 hrs.

DV
(1) They weren't geese and the search was SOP. (2) The take off restriction before and after first light wasn't in place at the time. it was a subsequent action.

Can't see the point of your post. Perhaps you ought to get rid of it or think of another way to stir up hurtful issues after 40 decades.

[212man]

I don't suppose anyone informed the families of those that died that, according to Scots Law, their loved ones were not employed at the time of the accident and as such did not "die in the course of their employment".


How could the pilot and co-pilot be considered "not employed at the time"?

Please ensure correct information is used - the report says "the aircraft flew through a dense flock of sea birds..." and "After the accident 77 dead sea birds were found on or near the runway".
Sea birds are generally members of the gull family. There is no mention of 'large Canadian Geese' in the report.

Maybe he got his 'facts' from here: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19801117-1

[tucumseh]

I think perhaps the main point is being missed. An investigation is awaited into the deaths (as distinct from an Inquiry into cause of the accident), and I believe we await the first Fatal Accident Inquiry into Service deaths in Scotland. DV will correct me if there's been one in the last couple of years since he had the law changed. While I can't speak for them, I do know some families think the same.

[Distant Voice]

How could the pilot and co-pilot be considered "not employed at the time"?

That's the ruling of the Lord Advocate and the Crown office, not mine. I got the FAI act amended in 2015 and had the stupidity removed.

DV

[Distant Voice]

I think perhaps the main point is being missed. An investigation is awaited into the deaths (as distinct from an Inquiry into cause of the accident), and I believe we await the first Fatal Accident Inquiry into Service deaths in Scotland. DV will correct me if there's been one in the last couple of years since he had the law changed. While I can't speak for them, I do know some families think the same.

Nothing since the law was changed. In fact the revised FAI act will have issues because it has been link with 'active service' in Scotland, and I do not know of any.

DV

[Distant Voice]

The take off restriction before and after first light wasn't in place at the time. it was a subsequent action.

So the risk was not ALARP at the time of the accident. What happened to the runway bird scarer?

DV

[Distant Voice]

Please ensure correct information is used - the report says "the aircraft flew through a dense flock of sea birds..." and "After the accident 77 dead sea birds were found on or near the runway".

Please see
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19801117-1 (https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19801117-1)


DV

[Distant Voice]

How could the pilot and co-pilot be considered "not employed at the time"?

Back in May 2016 I wrote to Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who was Lord Advocate between Jun 1979 and Nov 1981, and asked him why FAIs were not undertake for a number fatal military accidents during his time in office. He told me,

I remember these accidents as I remember discussing them with a senior RAF officer when we met at a service in Glasgow.
I have no memory of discussing an FAI and since I got your e-mail it has occurred to me that members of the Armed Forces may not have been considered as employees and if so the Act would not apply. Yours sincerely James Mackay

I have another letter in which it is made quite clear that the MoD was not prepared to consider service people as employees as such a status would have implications far beyond their rights under the FAI act.

My post is not about "stirring up hurtful issues of after 40 (decades ?)", but filling in important gaps so we can learn from mistakes by exposing flaws in the way we operate. In fact that is one of the prime purposes of an FAI. I believe that it is also important for families to be presented with a fuller picture of what happened on that day, and the events which followed (or didn't follow)

DV

[Just This Once...]

I think the distinction being made DV is that the site you link to contains a narrative that is not from the official report, together with an extract from the official MAAS report.

I've no idea who wrote the unofficial narrative but it lost me with the "aircraft came down on the relatively soft tree-tops of a forest of young pine trees" bit. They were pretty big pine trees, of that there is no doubt.

[Distant Voice]

Just This Once: I suspect that narrative (link) and the Accident Summary are based on the official BOI report, for which I can not find a link.

DV

[Just This Once...]

I very much doubt that the BOI report would include the formation being used by the birds at impact or anything about soft tree-tops. Looks like the opinion or hazy memories of a single individual. In no way does it look like the typical language used in BoI reports.

[salad-dodger]

Sandyparts provided a link to the front page of the official report in post #2.

[Distant Voice]

Sandyparts provided a link to the front page of the official report in post #2.

That is just a non technical summary, prepared by MoD, for parliament. It is not the official BOI report

I have all four pages of the summary, not just the first page.

DV

[salad-dodger]

That is just a non technical summary, prepared by MoD, for parliament. It is not the official BOI report

I have all four pages of the summary, not just the first page.

DV
So you have the full summary, you have read it, but you chose to cite the ASN over the MoD summary for bird types?

I guess you must have your reasons.

[ShyTorque]

The copilot and I joined the RAF on the same day and were good friends. We went down our separate paths at the end of BFTS. His loss was tragic (not forgetting the tragic loss of the aircraft captain).

The original accident report definitely said the birds on the runway were gulls; this is the first reference to geese I’ve ever seen.

Aircraft routinely do take off in the dark!

[Chugalug2]

From the Haddon-Cave Nimrod review :-

2.38.1 Nimrod MR2 XV256: The first Nimrod to be lost in an accident was Nimrod MR2 XV256 on 17 November 1980. Shortly after take-off from RAF Kinloss, the aircraft flew through a dense flock of seagulls. Ingestion of a large number of birds into the engines caused a significant loss of power and the aircraft crashed in woods close to the airfield. Although, tragically, both pilots were killed in the accident, their skill in crash landing the aircraft ensured that their crew survived.

From 'RAF Commands.com' :-

1980 Nimrod Crash, Info wanted[RAFCommands Archive] (http://www.rafcommands.com/archive/05495.php)

When I was at Kinloss in 1989, the crash of this particular a/c was still fresh in the memory. It is worthy of note that the crash site was still plainly visible in the trees at the time. It is my understanding that, after power was lost, the pilot attempted to ditch in the sea but never made it. I was also informed that a crew member ran quite a distance from the aircraft with a broken femur and that (if memory serves) 126 dead birds were found in the wreckage.

[falcon900]

As far as I can see, this thread is simply Distant Voice using the anniversary of the accident to bang his drum yet again. The facts of this tragic accident seem to have been all too clear at the time, and it is in my view wholly inappropriate for DV to assert that the takeoff was in violation of a curfew which did not exist and that an incidence of birdstrike must mean that the airfield search was inadequate simply to promote his argument.
In so far as he has a point, it has already and repeatedly been made elsewhere.

[Distant Voice]

As far as I can see, this thread is simply Distant Voice using the anniversary of the accident to bang his drum yet again

And what drum is that?

[Thud105]

DV, 40 years ago an aircraft taking off tragically hit some birds and crashed. A tragedy, but sadly, **** does happen. But what - exactly - is your point? That military aircraft shouldn't fly in the dark, or that they shouldn't crash? Both of these propositions are curious, and if implemented would severely curtail any air force's ability to function. So again - and with the great respect, what - exactly - is your point?

[tucumseh]

Big birds are an awkward subject. One brought down ZG708 in Glen Ogle. Allegedly. No claim was made as to breed. Just that it was BIG.

But I think it is fair, on an aviation forum, to highlight the inconsistencies that exist within UK countries whenever there is a military fatality. Remember the ill-conceived Coroner's Act proposal after the XV230 Inquest. MoD and government clearly agreed with the Scottish system of ignoring military deaths, and wanted to severely curtail the powers of Coroners. Distant Voice, alone, got the Scottish system changed. When both systems are implemented consistently, and fairly, then by all means stop the drum.

[Distant Voice]

So you have the full summary, you have read it, but you chose to cite the ASN over the MoD summary for bird types?
I guess you must have your reasons.

The ASN and the MOD summary are identical in the opening paragraphs, apart from the following.

ASN: "shortly after takeoff, at an estimated height of 20 ft, the aircraft flew through a dense flock of Canada Geese flying in arrowhead formation between overnight roosting and daily feeding grounds. It suffered numerous bird-strikes"
.
MoD: "shortly after takeoff, at an estimated height of 20 ft, the aircraft flew through a dense flock of sea birds and suffered numerous bird-strikes"

Why would anyone want to insert "Canada Geese flying in arrowhead formation between overnight roosting and daily feeding grounds", or perhaps remove it.

DV

[Chu Chu]

A vee of geese at 20 feet would be a pretty impressive sight.

[212man]

Why would anyone want to insert "Canada Geese flying in arrowhead formation between overnight roosting and daily feeding grounds", or perhaps remove it.

Well

From the ASN: Sources:
» Mike Wain
» UK Ministry of Defence MAAS 10/82

https://www.linkedin.com/in/mikewain/ ?

[Trumpet trousers]

This red herring should be easy enough to clarify: Were any dead Canada geese subsequently found either on the airfield, or in the vicinity of the wreckage?

Irrespective of the semantics, the tragic outcome was the same.

[Sideshow Bob]

DV, please take it from one who does know, they were Gulls which were congregating in a farmers field in the undershoot. The farmer had taken to using this area as a tip.

ps Chugalug2, the crew member who ran quite a distance from the aircraft with a broken femur was the Flight Engineer (his name slips my memory); he was found to be in shock, unsurprising considering what had happened to the other 2 Flight Deck crew.

[Distant Voice]

DV, 40 years ago an aircraft taking off tragically hit some birds and crashed. A tragedy, but sadly, **** does happen. But what - exactly - is your point? That military aircraft shouldn't fly in the dark, or that they shouldn't crash? Both of these propositions are curious, and if implemented would severely curtail any air force's ability to function. So again - and with the great respect, what - exactly - is your point?

My point, in a nutshell, is that there wasn't an independent and open inquiry, with cross examination. What bird strike risk assessment had been carried out for the Findhorn Bay area (end of Kinloss runway) where the winter population on Canadian geese can be around 20,000? What risk assessment had been carried out regarding 'first light' take-offs, when bird/gulls/geese are on the move? How effective can a dawn search for roosting birds be around the Findhorn estuary? An MOD in-house BOI is unlikely to admit that they were inadequate. Remember, it was the Coroner at the XV230 'independent' inquest who was bold enough to say that the Nimrod was not airworthy, and never had been, not the BOI.

For the avoidance of any doubt, I served as a Nimrod Flight Line engineering officer for several years, I do know the area and the risks involved

Waiting for a link to the BOI report to be provided.

DV

[Sideshow Bob]

Having flown Nimrods out of Kinloss for many years, I'm well aware of the issue and the development of regulations which cover it. I don't really understand why you are dragging up what is a very bad memory for most Nimrod operators, and then trying to link it to policies which were not in place at the time, just to prove a personal point or points score.

Why the focus on the bay, its the other end of the runway; the issue was with the farmer and his approach to the MOD presence. This had nothing to do with the Canadian Geese, if you are as familiar with Kinloss and as informed as you say, you would know this.

[Distant Voice]

I don't really understand why you are dragging up what is a very bad memory for most Nimrod operators, and then trying to link it to policies which were not in place at the time, just to prove a personal point or points score.

Sorry Bob, you are wrong. The Fatal Accident and Sudden Death Act 1976 was in force but was bypassed, as it was for the next 35 years. The 'collusion' between the MoD and the Crown Office of Scotland deprive military personnel of their basic rights. I don't have to prove a point, I did that before the Justice Committee in 2015; didn't see you there.

You say that the Gulls were using a farmer's field in the 'undershoot', so it was a known problem. What action was taken to overcome that problem?

DV

[Sandy Parts]

I had tried to be polite and circumspect in my post. I know the area well and some of those on the aircraft that day. The birds were gulls as Sideshow Bob has elaborated. I'd suggest if there is a campaign to wage against FAI/BOI/Scottish Law/English Law etc, it be taken to a legal forum rather than a military aviation forum.

[Shackman]

I'm intrigued at the number of 126 birds found on the runway. In early '73 I landed back at Kinloss before dawn after an AEW sortie 'up North'. On round out a large flock of seagulls lifted off the runway in front of us, nicely illuminated by the landing lights - we went straight through them with lots of thumping. A large number of birds and remains were removed from the engines and leading edges and the Shack was hosed down and declared 'S'. We were later told 126 had been found/removed from the runway as well, and I remember making out a 'Birdstrike' report including that information. What happened to it I don't know.

[Sideshow Bob]

DV, sorry I can't be as polite as my former colleague Sandy Parts, not only are you rude but you are extremely disrespectful. I am an ex member of 206 Sqn, I have many friends who were on XV256, as I did on XV230 (the crew compromised mainly of ex 206 Sqn personnel). The The Fatal Accident and Sudden Death Act 1976 is not the point, it is the aspersions you are throwing around about how flights were authorized and conducted in 1980. Try researching the regulations of the time before you try applying MAA risk management to 1980's aviation.

The main issue with your argument is that you have made a conclusion that you are trying to make the facts fit rather than following the facts to the conclusion they represent. It's the basics of accident investigation.

[MATELO]

For the avoidance of any doubt, I served as a Nimrod Flight Line engineering officer for several years, I do know the area and the risks involved


DV

My point, in a nutshell, is that there wasn't an independent and open inquiry, with cross examination. What bird strike risk assessment had been carried out for the Findhorn Bay area (end of Kinloss runway) where the winter population on Canadian geese can be around 20,000? What risk assessment had been carried out regarding 'first light' take-offs, when bird/gulls/geese are on the move? How effective can a dawn search for roosting birds be around the Findhorn estuary? An MOD in-house BOI is unlikely to admit that they were inadequate. Remember, it was the Coroner at the XV230 'independent' inquest who was bold enough to say that the Nimrod was not airworthy, and never had been, not the BOI.

DV

Surely if you were a Nimrod Flight Line Engineer Officer, wouldn't that have put you a great position to find the above answers out.

[Chugalug2]

If this had been a civilian accident, fatal or otherwise, the accident report and any other FAI/Coroners Court finding would have long since been posted here or linked to. This was an RAF fatal accident in Scotland though, with no such links, as they either don't exist or have yet to be posted. If the former then it rather underlines the OP's point, if the latter then the sooner the better to avoid any further bickering.

[Sideshow Bob]

There is only an accident summary, as was the norm then and already read by DV. Having read the summary, the actions taken to mitigate birds are normal and advice had been sort from the ABU; mitigations had been put in place in line with ABU advice.

[Distant Voice]

This was an RAF fatal accident in Scotland though, with no such links, as they either don't exist or have yet to be posted.

They do not exist. Confirmed by the Crown Office and Prosecution Service in a letter to the Scottish Justice Committee in 2015. The only 'military' FAI to have taken place was for the MOK accident and only because civilians were on-board the helicopter.

As far as I can make out the exclusion started with the XV256 accident. That is why it is important to understand the full story.

DV

[Distant Voice]

There is only an accident summary, as was the norm then and already read by DV.

Bob, most unlikely, the clue is in the word 'summary'. There had to be a full inquiry which was summarised.

In the early 1970's I was the President of a Kinloss Unit Inquiry into mercury contamination found in a Nimrod in NMSU. I had a board member to assist me and written statements taken. A full report was prepared, signed by myself and the board member, which included all statements and photographs along with conclusions and recommendation.

DV

[Sideshow Bob]

Bob, most unlikely, the clue is in the word 'summary'. There had to be a full inquiry which was summarised.

. A full report was prepared, signed by myself and the board member, which included all statements and photographs along with conclusions and recommendation.

DV

By norm, I mean that in those days full reports were not released, just summaries. Even then, summaries were not issued for all accident; it depended. Again, this was long before current data rights were in law so there was no requirement to make these things public.

[Chugalug2]

It would seem that the FAI that should have been triggered by this tragic accident was denied to the families of the deceased because of a cosy stitch up between the MOD and the Crown Office that, according to DV, probably began with this very accident . He has managed to ensure that such a disreputable stitch up has now ceased. I cannot understand the hostility that his enquiries into this fatal accident have engendered. Every time a light is shone into the murky corridors of the MOD the same knee jerk responses occur. The cover up of the illegal actions of RAF VSOs who subverted the UK Air Safety system has been exposed, not by the MOD, not by Judicial Inquiries, not by Parliament, not by the Media, but by a bunch of civilians. So nothing happens, the wagons draw closer, the cover up continues, and avoidable accidents and needless deaths continue.

If professional aviators can't be bothered to demand a reform of this rotten system they should at least desist from denigrating those like DV who work to stop the gross waste in blood and treasure going on and on.

Beating my drum? Bloody right, and I'll go on doing so!

[Distant Voice]

Beating my drum? Bloody right, and I'll go on doing so!

So will I. Many thanks Chugalug2. I hope the families get to read this.

DV

[Richard Dangle]

I hope the families get to read this.

Doubtful the co-pilot was young and single. I was at his funeral and spoke to his parents who will be long gone by now, as you have chosen an accident from 40 years ago to advance your cause (whatever it is, I'm not sure). The pilot (Captain) was an Australian exchange officer, and just in case any of his family do read this (unlikely) in my humble opinion his flying skills under extreme duress saved a lot of lives. Worth mentioning I think, since this thread has gathered some traction.

Posters of course have freedom to do whatever the site mods allow - its the internet and all sorts of folk inhabit it. Calling out RAF aircrew because they differ in their interpretation of what does and does not consitute operational acceptable risk seems a little odd on a professional military aviators forum, but whatever, to each their own. As far as the vagaries of law are concerned...beyond both my IQ and my interest level I'm afraid. If you're telling me the UK justice system is a total ****fest, I could not agree more, but for me anyway, it is what it is...not something to keep me awake at night. Again to each their own, but I tend think there would better places to have a legal discussion like this...with perhaps a more receptive audience. Just saying.

However for the sake of accuracy lets put the seabird discussion to bed shall we, it was seagulls, not geese, as any number of folk who were there at the time can testify. And while on the subject guy who got away with a broken leg was an AEOp (Flight Sergeant or a Master, I know his name, but I am not posting it) not the Flight Engineer. (There were two flight engineers onboard, as it was Nimrod Mark Two Conversion Sortie and the NCF (Nimrod Conversion Flight) was onboard in addition to the usual crew.) The second flight eng was standing on the flight deck and simply ducked behind the bulkhead and crouched on the floor prior to impact (the aircraft was only airborne for a few seconds). The impact was so soft the emergency lights did not trigger (less than 2g I think) and some of the crew initially thought they were down in Findhorn Bay (quite a few extra bodies on board in the galley and in the pax seat who were probably not paying to much attention to the departure details at that point). It was also pitch black and as anyone who ever lived at Kinloss know, the Geese transit to and from the bay at dusk and dawn, not during the dark.

Anything else you guys would like to know?

I actually don't mind discussing this particular accident as I think it highly unlikely that any relation to the deceased would be reading it and in any event the actions of the pilots on the day were exemplary, and probably heroic, in every respect.

[Chugalug2]

RD, thank you for your post. I'll defer to DV as regards any follow up info as it's his thread. You've already cleared the air and told us much of what happened. With no BoI Report seemingly in the public domain, and no FAI, the only immediate source of info would seem to be those like yourself who are prepared to recount what they remember. Let us hope that others might come forward as well to help DV in his quest.

Just to be clear, no-one is denying the need of operational risk, that is the sine qua non of military aviation. The campaign to reform UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation is to try to reduce losses other than the operational ones, so that the RAF maintains its maximum air power. The actions of its leadership have sorely affected that over the past decades.

[Richard Dangle]

With no BoI Report seemingly in the public domain

Don't know if this link will work, but anyway took me about 15-20 seconds to find with my good friend Google.

MAAS, RAF Nimrod MR2, Date: 17 Nov 1980 PDF [2.2 MB] (https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121203134748/http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C7F30CB9-9A49-44BE-8AA8-A6D222AB707B/0/maas80_22_nimrod_mr2_xv256_17nov80.pdf)

If it does work and you can read it, it appears my memory of that fateful day is pretty accurate as it endorses much of what I wrote above. To be clear, I wrote my post first, before reading it, I only searched for it because I was under the impression that, contrary to the post above, I thought - generally speaking - publically published RAF BOE summaries (I am aware they are partially redacted summaries) are accessible through the National Archives, which it appears they are.

I applaud any campaign to improve airworthiness/flight safety military or otherwise, but since this is one of those rare accidents where the cause is clear, unambigious and beyond any reasonable doubt, and the airworthiness of the type is incidental (poor choice of word maybe, but any reasonable person will know what I mean) maybe this one can be left alone. Perhaps it is best remembered purely for the tragic loss of the pilots, who against all odds, saved the lives of their crew, through their calm professionalism in the face of mortal danger. May they rest in peace.

As to DV's "mission" - it appears his beef is with the Scottish Justice System. As we all no doubt know, military law is subservient to civilian law (in the UK) and in Scotland, Scottish Law (in most matters) holds sway. Personally I find the entire UK justice system idiosyncratic in countless ways, so I wish him best with his quest, but again it seems a niche issue for this forum and discussion of it in the context of this 1980 accident seems tenuous at best.

Finally, as regards this accident I think you could hold any number of inquiries by any number of agencies and the findings would be largely identical to that which the RAF produced at the time.

Now that this has all been brought back to the front of my grey matter, I'll raise a glass to the pilots tonight.

Per adua ad astra

[Richard Dangle]

Afterthought.

Of one thing I am clear and uncompromising. The first job of any aircraft accident report, in any context and under any authority, is to learn lessons and to improve flight safety. Any other function they have is subservient to this requirement and any authority which demotes this primary requirement is doing a disservice to the progression of aviation safety. In this instance the only significant "lessons" revolve around bird control and I can confirm the lessons and subsequent recommendations were applied.

Nothing came from the "lightweight headgear" comment though - rightly so in my opinion.

[Chugalug2]

RD, thanks again for coming back. Re the link to the BoI Summary, I think DV already has that and was attempting to resolve differences between it and other sources. The type of birds being the obvious discrepancy and which you have now confirmed.

The 80's was a decade where old school military airworthiness and accident investigation came under increasing strain until being effectively broken in the end. The result was apparent with the loss of Chinook Mk2 ZD576 on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994. 29 killed, and a Reviewing Officers' Finding that brought dishonour on the reputations of both pilots and of the Royal Air Force. The start of this road to hell might be seen as the agreement between the MOD and the Scottish Crown Office that as Service Personnel were not deemed 'employed', their deaths on duty in Scotland did not justify the holding of an FAI. DV exposed this cynical act, then fought and won to get it overturned. I hope this gives some idea of why a seemingly straight forward but tragic accident in 1980 is linked with later ones affected by the grossly negligent acts of RAF VSOs and their subsequent cover up to this very day.

Finally, may I join you in paying tribute to the professional skills of the pilots who ensured that their fellow crew members survived, though losing their own lives in doing so. It was indeed in the finest tradition of the Royal Air Force. Not knowing if any of their relatives might read this thread, let there be no doubt about the esteem in which they are held.

[falcon900]

. I hope this gives some idea of why a seemingly straight forward but tragic accident in 1980 is linked with later ones affected by the grossly negligent acts of RAF VSOs and their subsequent cover up to this very day.
.

Er, no, it doesnt. There is nothing faintly sinister, unexplained , or covered up about the Nimrod crash, and hence it has no relevance to DVs ongoing campaign. It is rather self serving of Dv to use its anniversary as a catalyst to bang his drum. Again.
Ironically, I dont disagree with the general point he is making, but dredging up this particular accident and implying that there is something to be learned or uncovered by a FAI is in my view quite wrong and distasteful.

[salad-dodger]

Er, no, it doesnt. There is nothing faintly sinister, unexplained , or covered up about the Nimrod crash, and hence it has no relevance to DVs ongoing campaign. It is rather self serving of Dv to use its anniversary as a catalyst to bang his drum. Again.
Ironically, I dont disagree with the general point he is making, but dredging up this particular accident and implying that there is something to be learned or uncovered by a FAI is in my view quite wrong and distasteful.
very, very well said Falcon. A lot of good has been achieved by some very tenacious people on here. Unfortunately, I feel that DV has picked the wrong accident to try and pin his campaign to here. Then compounded by Chug jumping on the passing bandwagon and just getting it oh so wrong.

[Distant Voice]

Finally, as regards this accident I think you could hold any number of inquiries by any number of agencies and the findings would be largely identical to that which the RAF produced at the time.

The Fatal Accident and Sudden Death (Scotland) Act1976 stipulates that an FAI will be undertaken if “it appears that the death has resulted from an accident occurring in Scotland while the person who has died, being an employee, was in the course of his employment or, being an employer or self-employed person, was engaged in his occupation as such. The Lord Advocate has made it clear that this cannot apply to service personnel as they are not considered to be employees. A fact that I believe has been known by the MoD for a considerable time, and yet QR J975 clearly stipulates that "In Scotland the Procurator Fiscal inquires into fatal accidents and sudden deaths by means of a Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI). Where the death was caused by an accident at work, and in some other cases, the law requires an FAI to be held." A BOI/SI report forms just one piece of evidence in that investigation.

In the words of Lord Philips in his Mull of Kintyre review, dated 13th July 2011, “A Board of Inquiry [now Service Inquiry] was an internal process convened for Armed Services reasons to determine how a serious incident happened and why, and to make recommendations to prevent a recurrence. The Board of Inquiry was not a substitute for a legal inquiry into the cause and circumstance of death.”

In the Super Puma deliberation issued by Sheriff Principal Derek Pyle on 13th March 2014 it states, from Carmichael (the definitive textbook), that “The whole object of an impartial inquiry is to get to the truth, to expose fault where fault is proven to exist, and in all cases to see to it so far as humanly possible that the same mistake, whether it arise through fault or any other reason, is not made in the future. The public interest, in whose names inquiries are held, requires and deserves no less”. Sheriff Principal Pyle points out that “It is an opportunity for the whole circumstances of an accident to be aired in public. Witnesses are examined and cross-examined under oath and documents are considered and scrutinised. And any party interested in the circumstances is free to come to his or her own conclusion on the evidence........It is also an opportunity for an independent judge to come to his or her own conclusions on the evidence.” Service Inquiries do not determine fault and accountability.

In the case of the Nimrod XV230 accident the coroner, Mr Andrew Walker, declared “that this aircraft, like every other aircraft within the Nimrod fleet, was not airworthy and never been airworthy from the first time it was released to the service nearly 40 years ago. I see no alternative but to report to the Secretary of State for Defence that the Nimrod fleet should not fly unless, and until, the ALARP standards are met.” No in-house Board of Inquiry, or Service Inquiry, would have had the resolve or power to recommend such a course of action.

Mr Walker also recommended that “consideration be given to civil aircraft investigation replacing the Board of Inquiry system (now Service Inquiry) for investigating the loss of military aircraft”. This was brought about because board members cannot be regarded as specialists in the field of aircraft accident investigations and are not independent.

So my bottom line is that the general public, those that died in the XV256 accident and their families were denied an open independent public inquiry, along with all the ‘checks and balances’ that brings. This accident marked the beginning of the ‘collusion’ between the MoD and the Crown Office of Scotland with regards to military accident investigation in Scotland, and that is why it is important. The root cause of that ‘collusion’ had an impact for the next 40 years and still presents an obstacle to the legal completion of 2012 Moray Firth Tornado collision inquiry.

DV

[tucumseh]

Well said DV.

You mentioned the Mull of Kintyre case, and that is a classic example of authorities conflating the roles of BoIs/SIs and FAIs/Inquests. There has been an Inquiry into cause of the accident, which has been set aside (in 2011) and not replaced with anything. But given the evidence that forced that decision, the obligatory Investigation into the deaths has yet to commence. Hitherto, the 'guilty' were known, they were dead, so no investigation was deemed necessary. (Itself a decision that assumed the Board had met its obligation to consider prior negligence, which it didn't).

However, the Scottish Fatalities Investigation Unit, part of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (the broad equivalent of the Crown Prosecution Service) has gone further than the police or MoD. It has identified the crime scene (Directorate of the Air Staff in Main Building) and ruled in 2016 that this means the Metropolitan Police now have primacy. Unfortunately, as you have found out on Nimrod and Tornado, this is simply their way of offloading their obligations. Nevertheless, it was a 'brave' call to make. Perhaps he knew he was leaving! Maybe his successor will meet her obligations?

[Distant Voice]

Several interesting statements are locked away in the recently acquired copy of the BOI report;
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.

DV

[Richard Dangle]

So my bottom line is that the general public, those that died in the XV256 accident and their families were denied an open independent public inquiry, along with all the ‘checks and balances’ that brings. This accident marked the beginning of the ‘collusion’ between the MoD and the Crown Office of Scotland with regards to military accident investigation in Scotland, and that is why it is important. The root cause of that ‘collusion’ had an impact for the next 40 years and still presents an obstacle to the legal completion of 2012 Moray Firth Tornado collision inquiry.

Just to be clear, I don't disagree with the the general thrust of your point and I support your cause of "legal alignment", if I've put that correctly. Not sure about the "collusion" bit...it's a strong word and therefore would require equally strong evidence. You may well have it...please don't take that as an invitation to post it...I'm sure you've done that elsewhere :) and whilst I support your cause, for me this would be a secondary platform to discuss it. All of which has already been said, just wanted to make my support clear, before I go and look like I'm contradicting it.

My reasons for continuing posting are multiple. I have a connection through close friendship with the crew. I was on the Sqn. I served on the aircraft - at Kinloss - my entire career, and although I am no longer a professional aviator of any description, flight safety is in my DNA and I, along with probably 99% of all professional aviators, believe accident reports should exist primarily for the purpose of education and accident prevention (and not just in aviation). I am not naive..aircraft accident reports will of course get mixed up in legal due process in all sorts of ways, such is life. But that is not, and never should be, their primary function.

So with all that said (phew long preamble, sorry :))

Several interesting statements are locked away in the recently acquired copy of the BOI report;
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.



I'm not keen on the suggestion of "locked away". Everything you listed was very well known at Kinloss, both before and after the accident. RAF aircrew of the period (and probably still now - I don't know) were are all highly trained in all aspects of airmanship and flight safety. And by all, I mean the entire cadre, not just the pilots. All bird activity at Kinloss was discussed, chewed over. debated etc endlessly. I'm not entirely sure, but I don't think the whole concept of the Bird Control Unit has been around for many years previous to the accident in question...it was, and no doubt still is, all part of a rolling and continuous progression of improvement and development in all aspects of operational flight safety which continued throughout my career and one assumes continues still.

And of course the hazard of bird strike is just one tiny little piece of the huge jigsaw. There were any number of risks that we were fully aware with inherent in our job, and any number of which could have claimed us. I can't speak of all RAF aircrew, but I'm guessing most of us approached the risk in our chosen profession professionally and philosophically and then got on with it.

So lets be clear, RAF aircrew are not uninformed about any "visible" aspect of flight safety...ever. This accident occurred because of a hazard, that was 100% visible, well known and much discussed. Substantial risk mitigation was in place and was being continously improved. Whether or not it had been mitigated sufficiently is a valid cause for endless debate, of that I concur, but lets not forget there is only way to prevent all aircraft accidents and that is to cease flying. My point is this particular accident was transparent in every repect. The hazard was known by all. The hazard was mitigated by sensible measures. The remaining risk was accepted by those that undertook the task and the accident happened. Subsequently, lessons were learnt and applied.

Complex legal issues aside, from an aircraft accident perspective there is no "fog of war" here, and there never was. All that occurred was accurately, comprehensively and transparently known by all that needed to know at the time and ever since.

[Distant Voice]

I am not naive..aircraft accident reports will of course get mixed up in legal due process in all sorts of ways, such is life. But that is not, and never should be, their primary function.

Completely agree, and that is why it is important, in the event of a death, to follow up a BOI (now SI) with an Inquest or Fatal Accident Inquiry.

For the avoidance of any doubt the points that I raised in my last posting are 'lifted' from the BOI report, they are not my interpretation of sections of the report.

DV

[Chugalug2]

DV, glad to hear that you obtained a copy of the BoI that you wanted. I'd just like to make a general point here that there is a natural tendency (I experienced it myself when our squadron suffered a fatal accident at our own airfield) to 'own' such a tragedy and resent any outside intrusion. That is natural, but we are all professionals and must know that cannot be so. Every accident, especially a fatal one, has lessons for the whole aviation community and, as RD and others have already stated, those lessons have to be discovered by thorough investigation and then disseminated throughout the whole community, not only within the Service but outside of it too. This is done by BoI's/SI's and in the case of fatal accidents, Coroners' Inquests/FAI's. That the latter were ever excluded in the case of deaths of UK serving personnel was a glaring anomaly, now resolved thanks to the OP.

[Wizzo337]

I watched XV256 crash. Initially I thought, from the angle that I was watching it from, near the Med Centre, on my way to breakfast after night shift, that it had gone down near the car club. After rushing back to the line, I discovered that it was XV256 and it had gone down in the woods beyond the end of the runway with a larger number of personnel than normal. I initially thought because of the number of people on board, that it was a detachment flight, but later learned that it was a crew training flight. The previous evening, I had replaced the Aileron Trim Gearbox on XV256, so you can imagine the things that were running through my head that morning. I later learned that the runway was littered with dead gulls, not geese, which although eased my mind, did not help with the fact that we had lost two fine pilots.
I seem to remember it was the flight engineer that broke his leg, and also seem to remember he actually got back to the aircraft in a brave attempt to rescue his colleagues. I was a 19 year old JT at the time of the accident. But I remember that day so well. RIP Flt Lt Anthony & FO Belcher.
As an aside to this, I never saw myself as employed by the RAF, I served with the RAF, with many good brave men, many of whom are now gone, see you on the other side guys.

[SASless]

As to the Mull of Kintyre tragedy....with the passage of time, and the passing of the buck from one body to another and the abject lack of desire of any official body to get to the most accurate determination of facts and factors resulting in all those Lives lost....any hope there shall be that determination that can be trusted with any confidence seems a very forlorn hope.

Far too many "Seniors" failed and thus there is no appetite to take the Lid of that Bucket of Worms.

Good people died and deserve better than they received from their Grateful Government in the memorializing of their Service to the Queen and Country.

[ShyTorque]

I mentioned before that Steve Belcher, the copilot and I joined the RAF on the same day in November 1976 (although he may well have been attested prior to that due to his previous University Air Squadron membership). We lived in adjacent rooms during officer training at Henlow and although we came from very different backgrounds (his father was in the higher management of a major oil company) we became good friends. In a quiet moment, even prior to us beginning flying training, he told me that he often had premonitions that he would end up “in a smoking black hole”. I told him that he should opt out of flying training if that was how he felt. Obviously, he didn’t. I was relieved at the time that he was streamed from BFTS onto the Nimrod because it was considered to be a very safe aircraft. Little did we know; it was strange and tragic how this turned out. I often wonder how different things would have been for him had he taken my advice.

RIP Steve, you’re not forgotten.

[DaveReidUK]

As to the Mull of Kintyre tragedy....with the passage of time, and the passing of the buck from one body to another and the abject lack of desire of any official body to get to the most accurate determination of facts and factors resulting in all those Lives lost....any hope there shall be that determination that can be trusted with any confidence seems a very forlorn hope.

Far too many "Seniors" failed and thus there is no appetite to take the Lid of that Bucket of Worms.

Good people died and deserve better than they received from their Grateful Government in the memorializing of their Service to the Queen and Country.

CYA is, and always has been, a powerful motive for action/inaction.

[fdr]

The Mull of Kintyre Chinook accident has unresolved technical questions, however the whole operation that was being conducted at that time was itself a high risk flight path in adverse weather, and does not need the involvement of an inopportune technical event to have been hazardous. Heli ops at low level, poor visibility, and at speed are inherently elevated risk.

The RAAF recognised the efforts of the captain, however benefits were specified by existing policy and there was no unusual consequence as far as I recall. The RAAF has separately had a number of serious birdstrikes, some catastrophic, and some nearly so. An albatross impact on a P3 was probably one of the more fortunate ones, the bird penetrated the radome, took out the radar, pressure bulkhead, engine instruments, emergency shutdown handles (ESH) on a couple of engines, and bent the aft pressure bulkhead. #1 engine was already shutdown, and the ESH was pulled on one of the going engines. An F-111C was lost by a canopy strike at low level, which is not itself uncommon, but the F-111 was designed to operate in that environment, and the birds still won.

Pre and post the Kinloss accident, operations continued around the world with operations around times of elevated bird activity, and this remains the case with airlines today. The B737 arrival into Ciampino with severe dual engine damage, Sully over NYC, etc indicate that birdstrikes continue to be a hazard irrespective of engine design.

The UK MOD's death benefits is unfamiliar to me, but if the govt doesn't cover casualties in operations, then it would still seem odd that a state of the union, Scotland, should be the liable party. I'm missing the point on the rationale for this thread, might just be the Scottish accent. The birds don't read the report, and while probability is certainly higher around dawn and dusk, strikes happen at all times.