US Navy TexanT6 crash fatal 10-23

[havoc]

FOLEY, Ala. (AP) — A U.S. Navy training plane that took off from Florida crashed Friday in an Alabama residential neighborhood near the Gulf Coast, killing both people in the plane, authorities said.

Zach Harrell, a spokesperson for Commander, Naval Air Forces, said both people in the T-6B Texan II training plane died, but they weren’t immediately releasing their names. No injuries were reported on the ground.

Foley Fire Chief Joey Darby said responders encountered a “large volume of fire” with a home and several cars engulfed in flames. Firefighters were able to make “a quick stop on the fire,” the chief told local news outlets.

The crash occurred southeast of Mobile, near the city of Foley and the town of Magnolia Springs. Darby called the neighborhood a “heavily populated” residential area. No firefighters were injured, he added.

The plane had flown out of Naval Air Station Whiting Field, about 30 miles (48.28 kilometers) northeast of Pensacola, Florida, Navy spokeswoman Julie Ziegenhorn said.

The U.S. Department of Defense and the Navy were set to handle the investigation, the Baldwin County Sheriff’s Office tweeted.

[megan]

Foley in my day was an out lying field used for circuit training. No fire fighting or rescue facilities.

[Ugly Jet Captain]

BB 207 on Flightaware.

Looked like it was maneuvering in box at 8K and lost engine. Prop blades in crash photo show no rotation is why I assume that. They were right over Foley but is too short for Texan to use legally. It looks like they may have been trying for Callahan. That was about 9 miles west of crash site.

The Flightaware at about 35 minutes shows them at 8K and 250 knots. As they head west they lose attitude but speed also drops off very quickly which could be an ADS B anomaly. It is pretty linear so it makes me think it’s accurate. Losing an engine and feathering it should produce a much longer glide and different profile than what is there.

The other possibility is they did eject and we are seeing the post ejection result on Flightaware. News is sketchy but there is no report they ejected. My assumption is they rode it in as that likely would have been reported. Someone mentioned on Facebook about incapacitated crew, but the maneuvers just prior were all normal and at that altitude extremely unlikely.

Why the poor glide profile and why they didn’t eject are mysterious. No ATC replay I can find.

In the end it is a tragic outcome with lots of questions.


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[Smilin_Ed]

This is a single engine aircraft so I doubt there is a capability to feather.

[212man]

They were right over Foley but is too short for Texan to use legally. It looks like they may have been trying for Callahan. That was about 9 miles west of crash site

I’m not sure the legality of the runway length would be uppermost in my mind if I’d lost my engine.

[OK465]

https://quizlet.com/36895716/t-6b-propeller-flash-cards/

Re: feathering

Number of engines is irrelevant.

edit: BTW Foley runway is 3700' long. Wouldn't use it in an F-105, but sounds fine for a T-6B with limited options.

[OK465]

3000' minimum runway length for emergencies below 3500' pressure altitude.

page8image1064766432 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING
250 LEXINGTON BLVD SUITE 102
CORPUS CHRISTI TX 78419-5041
CNATRA INSTRUCTION 3710.17C
Subj: CNATRA GUIDANCE FOR T-6 OPERATIONS
Ref: (a) NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100
(b) NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100
CNATRAINST 3710.17C
N33
23 Apr 15

page8image10647990561. Purpose. To publish guidance for flight operations in the
T-6 Texan II, in order to ensure safe and efficient use of this
asset.
2. Cancellation. CNATRAINST 3710.17B
3. Action. Comply with subject guidance. Submit recommended
changes to Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) N33.
a. Minimum Runway Requirements:
(1) A 4,000 ft minimum for dual operations and 5,000 ft
minimum for student solo operations shall apply. This length
has been demonstrated to be safe for all normal dry operations
at Mean Sea Level (MSL) up to 3,500 ft pressure altitude. When
operating at pressure altitudes in excess of 3,500 ft, a minimum
runway length in compliance with references (a) and (b) takeoff
and landing data or 5,000 ft, whichever is greater, should
apply.
(2) All operations on runways other than dry may
significantly increase the stopping distance required. Minimum
runway required in this case should be per references (a) and
(b).
(3) At the discretion of the Aircraft Commander, minimum
runway length recommended for emergency field selection is 3,000
ft when operating below 3,500 ft pressure altitude and 4,000 ft
when operating above 3,500 ft pressure altitude.
(4) Landing on runways less than 4,000 ft in length is
prohibited except in an emergency, where a wave off is not
practical.

[Big Pistons Forever]

This is a single engine aircraft so I doubt there is a capability to feather.

Harvard 2 has a Pratt and Whitney PT6 engine which is feathered prior to every shutdown. Feathering the prop after engine failure is the SOP and makes a very significant difference in glide performance

[Bob Viking]

I’m guessing that either you have mis-typed your post or you have such a fundamental misunderstanding of how the T6 Texan engine works that it might have been best to not have contributed to such a thread.

I’ll admit that it’s been a long time since I’ve flown a turboprop (Tucano in 2002)
that I thought I should double check my knowledge and nomenclature. Chapter 1, para 18 confirms what I remember.

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/520317/response/1248501/attach/3/Tucano%20Aircrew%20Manual.pdf?cookie_passthrough=1

So I have to ask. Was it a mistype or a total lack of knowledge of military turboprop trainers (or aircraft for that matter)?

BV

[ASRAAMTOO]

It seems amazing and especially tragic that 2 folks can die following an engine failure at altitude in a military training aircraft equipped with modern ejection seats. More so as they appear to have overflown a 3700' runway first. My thoughts to those closely involved.

[Two's in]

It seems amazing and especially tragic that 2 folks can die following an engine failure at altitude in a military training aircraft equipped with modern ejection seats. More so as they appear to have overflown a 3700' runway first. My thoughts to those closely involved.

Unfortunately, it's not a rare event. It is often related to cognitive dissonance, where as humans we attempt to resolve mental and physical conflicting scenarios by utilizing denial, rationalization and other unproductive defense mechanisms to try and reach a state of psychological comfort. When pilots haven't accepted the loss of the aircraft is likely, they will often fixate on other actions that don't change the outcome. In a military trainer, not using the ejection system in time is an obvious example of cognitive dissonance.

We obviously don't- know what happened here, but that's what cognitive dissonance is.

[B2N2]

According to the type certificate data sheet this is a feathering propeller as you would expect.
If they were in a designated maneuvering area do they have a designated alternate landing site?
If they were in the maneuvering area what type of maneuvers were practiced?
Chances of a mechanical failure after which they attempted to fly home and they encountered an Inflight breakup?
Flight control malfunction followed by loss of control?

[beardy]

Two people are dead. My condolences to their relatives. There are times when speculative posts and corrections are inappropriate.

[B2N2]

Two people are dead. My condolences to their relatives. There are times when speculative posts and corrections are inappropriate.

There is a difference between respectful discussion and malicious gossip.
This is an aviation forum and this is what we do, discuss all aspects of aviation including its darker sides. With respect we are all free to choose to participate or not.

[ex-fast-jets]

I'm with beardy.

There are times to hold back before speculating, and wait for official investigations to be concluded before offering personal - and possibly unsubstantiated - opinions which might be right, but might also be wrong, and which could be even more distressing to those more closely linked to the individuals who are now no longer with us.

Some might even read this forum.

Yes - it is (supposed to be) a rumour forum, but there are times and places..........

The family and friends will be having a difficult time without any an-wanted comment at this stage.

If the families are reading this stuff - my condolences to you all, and there but for the grace of my God, go I.

[West Coast]

I'm with beardy.

There are times to hold back before speculating, and wait for official investigations to be concluded before offering personal - and possibly unsubstantiated - opinions which might be right, but might also be wrong, and which could be even more distressing to those more closely linked to the individuals who are now no longer with us.

Some might even read this forum.

Yes - it is (supposed to be) a rumour forum, but there are times and places..........

The family and friends will be having a difficult time without any an-wanted comment at this stage.

If the families are reading this stuff - my condolences to you all, and there but for the grace of my God, go I.

As am I. Never understood the need to opine on accidents while lacking the relevant information to do so.

[OvertHawk]

As am I. Never understood the need to opine on accidents while lacking the relevant information to do so.

We've always done it, entirely understandably - but we did it in the privacy of our crew rooms and bars.

Unfortunately a lot of people now don't see the difference between a private group of half a dozen people in a pub and a worldwide forum seen by anyone and everyone where they can say what they wish whilst hiding behind anonymity.

[T28B]

I trust that our membership will keep such discussion as is to be had professional in tone.
Very sorry to see the loss of the crew. :(

[gums]

Agree with all to just sit back and wait a bit. OTOH....
The pics show a literal smokin' hole, as if a near vertical inpact and not a stretched out debris field. And I agree with several about not punching out. We shall see.
Being 40 miles east of their field and with more than a few Naval folks here plus some friends that trained there, anything the investigation can find to prevent another crash is crucial.

So here's a nickel on the grass.

[averow]

This is an excellent comment. "Pushing on" in spite of irretrievable situations can be very common in these types of tragedies. RIP.

[Mozella]

Unfortunately, it's not a rare event. It is often related to cognitive dissonance, where as humans we attempt to resolve mental and physical conflicting scenarios by utilizing denial, rationalization and other unproductive defense mechanisms to try and reach a state of psychological comfort. When pilots haven't accepted the loss of the aircraft is likely, they will often fixate on other actions that don't change the outcome. In a military trainer, not using the ejection system in time is an obvious example of cognitive dissonance.

We obviously don't- know what happened here, but that's what cognitive dissonance is.
I hear what you're saying, but these guys (one of them anyway) was a Naval Aviator. They weren't two rich guys fooling around in a Beach Bonanza. We Naval Aviators are specifically trained to avoid cognitive dissonance. We're also trained to keep in mind that an Aviator is more valuable than even the most expensive aircraft and when it's time to toss the airplane aside, then you don't worry about the consequences. Still, highly trained professional pilots don't like the idea of giving up on an airplane which might be safely recovered. We may never know exactly what happened here, but I think it's safe to say plenty of people would expect an engine failure (if that's what really happened) to have a better outcome than the death of two young men.

The entire south end of Baldwin County is covered with airports. Since my day, many of the Navy OLF's are no longer in use, but the runways are still there. Plus the area is literally covered in huge sod fields, even more so than when I learned to fly here back in the days of the T-34B. My options if the engine decided to shoot craps (I thought about it ALL the time) were to jump out or make a forced landing. With nothing wrong other than an engine stoppage, making an emergency landing either on an airport or in a field was considered a good option and we practiced exactly that down to pretty low altitude. It's actually pretty difficult to find a place in this area where you are not in gliding range of either an airport or a suitable field unless things go wrong at very low altitude.

Of course, the T-34 and T-6 are not the same and I have NOT flown the T-6. Plus I am ignorant of the SOP when it comes to a high altitude engine stoppage. I also don't know about the capability of the ejection seat. However, the T-6 is a relatively simple airplane and I suspect an engine-out emergency landing is well within the capabilities of the aircraft. Perhaps a Naval Aviator with experience in the T-6 can chime in here because I have some questions.

Is it reasonable to think that the instructor would elect to make an emergency, engine out landing? Single engine front-line fighters or attack airplanes mandate an ejection when the engine quits. Forced landings in those rare cases when the ejection fails to function have sad endings in nearly every case. Is the T-6 the same?

Does the seat have sufficient performance so that if he misjudged his glide and it became apparent that a safe landing could not be made, they could safely eject at a few hundred feet? I would assume so, but I don't know.

I suspect there is more to this story because a simple engine failure leading to the death of two guys just doesn't make sense to me.

[OK465]

some T-6 numbers:

ejection seat: altitude 0 to 35,000 ft. airspeed 0 to 370 knots.

uncontrolled: min ejection altitude 6000' AGL. Safe ejection possible in 10,000 fpm descent. controlled ejection: recommended 2000-3000' AGL.

forced landing: high key 3000-2500' AGL, trained to proficiency

(family member was a T-6 instructor....and T-34)

Single engine front-line fighters or attack airplanes mandate an ejection when the engine quits.


Not the F-16. There have been numerous successful engine out landings, one notable at the old NAS Glenview, down thru the wx.:eek:

I suspect there is more to this story because a simple engine failure leading to the death of two guys just doesn't make sense to me.

Agree.

[fdr]

The PC-9 design has a good safety record overall across a lot of operators. birdstrike features high in losses where fatalities occur. Engine failures are usually resulting in ejection or successful landings. MAC's ended up with one crew ejecting the other not, which is about par for the course for sharing cockpits airborne. CFIT, very few cases, but one notable one far away in a land needing civil works programs on their buildings was pretty untidy. For an aircraft that goes from basic to advanced training, the PC is a very effective and reliable and safe platform. OBOGS issues... not alone in that score, refer 22's... etc.

The Navy safety mags were always great reading and hammered home target fixation, cognitive overload, dissonance by another name. As the oceans were littered with F8's, SLUFs, F4's, Whales, A6's F14's F18s, scooters, etc that still had drivers installed at splashdown, it is no wonder that Fitts, Jones, and others added to the global knowledge of why ejections don't occur. The PC-9/T6 record suggests that the training around the world has been excellent, it is more likely that incapacitation causes such an outcome, our sharing space with birds that as yet don't have ADSB fitted is a perennial problem.

Statistically for this type dissonance is not likely to be a culprit.

R.I.P. guys.

[Chronic Snoozer]

I'm with beardy.

There are times to hold back before speculating, and wait for official investigations to be concluded before offering personal - and possibly unsubstantiated - opinions which might be right, but might also be wrong, and which could be even more distressing to those more closely linked to the individuals who are now no longer with us.

Some might even read this forum.


I can only think of one reason ‘some’ might be reading this forum.

[megan]

Draw your own conclusions if you will. :sad:


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[Less Hair]

A breakup.

[TBM-Legend]

This is a single engine aircraft so I doubt there is a capability to feather.
The PT-6 can be feathered...

[B2N2]

A breakup.

Thats what I’m thinking.
With the skill level involved one would think that an unsuccessful outcome has to be the result of unexpected and sudden events.

[sycamore]

Does the T6 have `Command Ejection` from both seats....?

[EvaDestruction]

some T-6 numbers:

ejection seat: altitude 0 to 35,000 ft. airspeed 0 to 370 knots.

uncontrolled: min ejection altitude 6000' AGL. Safe ejection possible in 10,000 fpm descent. controlled ejection: recommended 2000-3000' AGL.

forced landing: high key 3000-2500' AGL, trained to proficiency

(family member was a T-6 instructor....and T-34)



Not the F-16. There have been numerous successful engine out landings, one notable at the old NAS Glenview, down thru the wx.:eek:



Agree.

You answered my question regarding training for engine failure, thanks.

I don't understand why they rode it to the ground and then hit a house? The guy in the USMC C-130 rode it to the ground and found a field.

Surely a mysterious accident. RIP to the deceased.

[RetiredBA/BY]

some T-6 numbers:

ejection seat: altitude 0 to 35,000 ft. airspeed 0 to 370 knots.

uncontrolled: min ejection altitude 6000' AGL. Safe ejection possible in 10,000 fpm descent. controlled ejection: recommended 2000-3000 (tel:2000-3000)' AGL.

forced landing: high key 3000-2500 (tel:3000-2500)' AGL, trained to proficiency

(family member was a T-6 instructor....and T-34)



Not the F-16. There have been numerous successful engine out landings, one notable at the old NAS Glenview, down thru the wx.:eek:



Agree.

Those ejection seat numbers look a bit odd. I believe the T6 has a. Martin Baker Mk 16 seat which has 0/0 capability when level.

Even in the older seat like the Mk 4 which I used in anger, could be used in descent to a level which was at least equal to 10% of your ROD.

So, in a 10,000. fpm descent one could probably survive if ejecting at 1000 feet or higher.

Strange and very sad accident..

[OK465]

Sorry for the confusion. It is a 0/0 capable seat. Those numbers just describe the entire envelope in terms of airspeed and altitude individually. Create your own speed/altitude combination within those two ranges.

edit: And that out of control 6000' min altitude is a recommended altitude just like any aircraft has a recommended loss of control ejection altitude. The ones I flew it was usually 10,000' AGL.

[Machinbird]

The aerial view of the crash site shows what appears to be roof damage in all directions (blue tarps) indicating a high energy near vertical impact.

The purpose of discussion of accidents serves to narrow the initial realm of posible causes and serves to focus the discussion.

When I was going through the training command we were killingh on average 1 person per week and we avidly read the CNATRA weekly accident report to better understand the numerous ways you can have a bad day.

I think FDR is probably pretty close to the truth with his thoughts on bird strikes. If proven, perhaps some reinforcement of the canopy or other structure would be warranted.

[MarcK]

The aerial view of the crash site shows what appears to be roof damage in all directions (blue tarps) indicating a high energy near vertical impact.
The fire engines are still on scene, and the number of tarps indicates that they were in place prior to the accident. I would guess leftover hurricane damage and not related to the crash.

[Doctor Cruces]

some T-6 numbers:

ejection seat: altitude 0 to 35,000 ft. airspeed 0 to 370 knots.

uncontrolled: min ejection altitude 6000' AGL. Safe ejection possible in 10,000 fpm descent. controlled ejection: recommended 2000-3000' AGL.

forced landing: high key 3000-2500' AGL, trained to proficiency

(family member was a T-6 instructor....and T-34)



Not the F-16. There have been numerous successful engine out landings, one notable at the old NAS Glenview, down thru the wx.:eek:



Agree.
And an F16 out of Bentwaters in the Eighties. Had engine failure just off the top of the SID (Long time ago but IIRC somewhere north of Coltishall towards the North Norfolk coast and10000 feet) and made it unpowered all the way back to Bentwaters.

[RAFEngO74to09]

All the tarps in the photos are from recent hurricane damage - not debris from the accident.

[Less Hair]

Thanks. So one impact only.

[LOMCEVAK]

edit: And that out of control 6000' min altitude is a recommended altitude just like any aircraft has a recommended loss of control ejection altitude. The ones I flew it was usually 10,000' AGL.

It is worth noting that the recommended minimum abandonment height is determined by the altitude lost during the recovery pull-out rather than the capabilities of the ejection seat. You will always be able to eject safely at a lower height than the recommended minimum abandonment height.

The minimum abandonment height that we use in the PC-21 is 4000 ft and, from memory, we used 3000 ft in the Tucano.

[finfly1]

" about 30 miles (48.28 kilometers)"

That is just silly. Does anybody actually LOOK at their press releases before they are published?

[OK465]

LOMCEVAK, thanks for the clarification.

Generally, the manual for the ejection seat equipped aircraft I'm familiar with used the phrase, "If not recovered by 'x' altitude AGL, eject."

In practicality, this was the typical safety hedge, leaning towards the unlikeliness of an actual recovery from spin/departure conditions before reaching the minimum altitude required in the actual pullout + some buffer recovery completion altitude above terrain level. The aircraft I flew with 10,000 AGL as recommended ejection altitude could all be pulled out in quite a bit less than 10,000' with flying speed regained and no rushed secondary departures. The hedge was against the odds of regaining controlled flying speed below 10,000 AGL if you already couldn't do it above 10,000'. Really wasn't ROD dependent.

If you departed an F-4, for example, at 3000' AGL, I fully understand the ejection system could get you out safely with timely action. It's been done of course. You could depart an A-7 at 5000' AGL for example, and because of the 100% reliability of a recovery not even need to honor the 10,000' out of control ejection recommendation that also applied to the A-7.

More explicit guidance like that for F-100F spins...."After one turn, recovery is not possible"....was much more definitive, regardless of altitude.

It's just a shame these guys couldn't get out at 6000'....or any altitude.

[MightyGem]

" about 30 miles (48.28 kilometers)"

That is just silly. Does anybody actually LOOK at their press releases before they are published?
Well, I know we always say that 30 miles is 50ks, but this site says 48.28:
https://www.metric-conversions.org/length/miles-to-kilometers.htm

[OK465]

more info

https://www.yahoo.com/gma/navy-identifies-flying-instructor-student-194848936.html

[Chronic Snoozer]

You answered my question regarding training for engine failure, thanks.

I don't understand why they rode it to the ground and then hit a house? The guy in the USMC C-130 rode it to the ground and found a field.

Surely a mysterious accident. RIP to the deceased.

There is nothing 'mysterious' about it. We don't know all of the facts yet. We do know a lot about aviation accidents generally and specifically ejection seat equipped training aircraft accidents. As many posters have said, it is ill-advised to speculate publicly. Wishing that on a public internet forum is as futile an exercise as it gets. The reason you don't 'understand why' is precisely because we are not in possession of all the facts. Your comparison with the USMC C-130 accident and the implication that the pilots might have 'rode it to the ground and then hit a house' betrays an ignorance of aviation matters. You are free to speculate as you wish, this is a public forum, however please understand that idle commentary on cause and reasons may be ignored and categorised as irritating.

[BrogulT]

I read about an incident with a Slovenian PC-9 where the student pilot ejected but the instructor stayed in and landed the plane. Does anyone know how the ejection system is configured on the USN T6B in question? Specifically, can the instructor eject both pilots? Or would the student have been required to pull the lever herself ? (and perhaps been unable to for some reason)

[Chronic Snoozer]

I read about an incident with a Slovenian PC-9 where the student pilot ejected but the instructor stayed in and landed the plane. Does anyone know how the ejection system is configured on the USN T6B in question? Specifically, can the instructor eject both pilots? Or would the student have been required to pull the lever herself ? (and perhaps been unable to for some reason)
Google "command ejection" or "interseat sequencing" to get an idea of how it works.

[Old Boeing Driver]

The aerial view of the crash site shows what appears to be roof damage in all directions (blue tarps) indicating a high energy near vertical impact.

The purpose of discussion of accidents serves to narrow the initial realm of posible causes and serves to focus the discussion.

When I was going through the training command we were killingh on average 1 person per week and we avidly read the CNATRA weekly accident report to better understand the numerous ways you can have a bad day.

I think FDR is probably pretty close to the truth with his thoughts on bird strikes. If proven, perhaps some reinforcement of the canopy or other structure would be warranted.
The blue tarps are from the recent Hurricane Sally damage........

[Ugly Jet Captain]

I relooked at the speed and altitude and this would appear that there was a definitive point of LOC. The aircraft is in the box maneuvering and comes out of a turn. It looks like the aircraft was under control and speed was controlled and then there is a rapid loss in both altitude and forward speed. That would indicate a spin and in the case of a Texan it would be flat as the tail is not stalled in a spin(trainer). That would explain the near vertical but flat impact. It would also happen post ejection to the aircraft.

Looking at the data it makes me question a failed ejection. Here is what the manufacturer's page says about the ejection system.

The aircraft has a through the canopy ejection system with a Martin Baker Mark US16LA zero/zero ejection seat. When the pilot pulls the ejection handle, they will always eject; if the redundant canopy fracturing system fails, they will eject through the canopy without injury.

In other words, the canopy glass has a charge in it that fractures the glass and if it fails the seat is designed to power through it. This is different than most designs where the canopy comes off the rails when ejecting and the glass is shed intact. I don't know enough about the seats to pass judgement but wonder if the seats were fired and the ejection sequence failed and incapacitated the crew.

Loss of a crew is a tragic event and I hope the accident investigation yields answers.


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[PPRuNeUser0211]

Looking at the data it makes me question a failed ejection. Here is what the manufacturer's page says about the ejection system.

The aircraft has a through the canopy ejection system with a Martin Baker Mark US16LA zero/zero ejection seat. When the pilot pulls the ejection handle, they will always eject; if the redundant canopy fracturing system fails, they will eject through the canopy without injury.

In other words, the canopy glass has a charge in it that fractures the glass and if it fails the seat is designed to power through it. This is different than most designs where the canopy comes off the rails when ejecting and the glass is shed intact. I don't know enough about the seats to pass judgement but wonder if the seats were fired and the ejection sequence failed and incapacitated the crew.


Canopy shattering with secondary breakers on the seats is fairly common in FJ types, this isn't unusual. Harrier, Hawk, Tucano (slightly different) all do the same thing.

[Lonewolf_50]

Canopy shattering with secondary breakers on the seats is fairly common in FJ types, this isn't unusual. Harrier, Hawk, Tucano (slightly different) all do the same thing. IIRC, so does the T-45 (Hawk derivative).
I find my self puzzled and sad. I can only estimate, as above, something like an LOC (Ugly Jet Captain may be right) and (possibly) a bird strike. Bird strikes are not all that uncommon in that training area.

There was an accident back in the early 80's in a T-34C where a turkey buzzard hit the aircraft full on. The student was knocked out for a bit, the disoriented IP could not get the controls back as the student was bodily slumped over controls. Unable to control the aircraft, the IP bailed out. (No Martin Baker sear in the T-34C). Fortunately, the student revived before the plane hit the ground. He flew on. He made his way back (IIRC had not yet soloed at that point). Happy ending, could have been tragic.

To put the pieces of the puzzle together in this case ... a guess follows. I only offer one because of my familiarity with accidents in Navy Priimary training going back to the early 1980's ... I flew a T-6 a few times but never NATOPS qualified in one.

In this case a bird strike might disorient the crew, and then I'm not sure what happens for it to end up as it did.
How long the IP is trying to fly out of it before realizing "time to eject" remains unclear.
OR (and I am going to guess that this is more likely)
If this was an instrument flight, IP is up front with Student in back and under the bag. With a turkey buzzard style bird strike, per above, IP is possibly disabled.
Student under the bag, a disabled IP may not be conscious enough to command eject.
Student may take a while to realize that things have gone horribly wrong ... and once they do realize it's too late?

OK, that's one way that we might have lost that crew, but it could also be horribly wrong due to lack of details like "what kind of training flight was this?"
(ETA: I don't know/remember enough about the T-6Bs O2 system to guess at how that system might contribute to a loss of consciousness event. Too many details not synching up at this point).

Our two lost colleagues are shown here (https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/10/25/coast-guard-member-among-crew-killed-in-navy-plane-crash-in-residential-neighborhood/).
You now fly with angels' wings. :(
Rest in peace.

[gums]

Glad you could jump in here, Wolf. You may be the youngest Nasal Radiator to have gone thru Whiting, but possibly T28B may have you beat.

Bubba's usual FltRdr24 plot might offer a clue. The other plot doesn't show altitude on the fairly long st course, then the end. Without an airspeed sensor broadcasting, looks like we are looking at ground speed. So a near vertical flight path resembles what we see. Also, a stall/spin usually has lots more wreckage and the seats should have been used. The T-34's didn't have seats, best I recall. But this new bird has good ones.

The planes at Whiting have been under suspicion last year or two for incidents involving the OGOGS, so I would not rule out incapacitation of both folks. I don't think a bird strike up high would cause complete loss of control.

Regardless, as it is a sad day for all of us in the Panhandle. Many, many Navy, Army, Coast Guard and USAF aviators here. Active and retired.

So another nickel on the grass for you future aviators, and let's see what they can find to prevent another loss.

[sycamore]

Question again;;Does it have Command Ejection seats..?..LW50,as you have flown one,you should know....?
The descent from 8k down to about 2k seems steady ,taking about 3.5mins,with speed gradually reducing......
Does the Obogs give an `airmix`...? at lower altitudes..?

[RAFEngO74to09]

Yes - the MB Mk 16 seat for Texan II does have Command Ejection. See the MB website and click on the Specifications tab:

https://martin-baker.com/products/mk16-ejection-seat-for-t-6-texan-ii/

[Runaway Gun]

Ugly Jet Captain, can you please explain the following statement?

That would indicate a spin and in the case of a Texan it would be flat as the tail is not stalled in a spin(trainer).

[OK465]

Here's what the impact site of a T-6 in an inverted spin looks like.
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/900x600/t_6a_inverted_spin_52c086eebe04397acf7e6536ed790b170f185a89. png
https://www.airforcemag.com/investigation-instructor-pilot-error-caused-may-t-6-crash/

USAF instructor with an Italian trainee in 2019, out of Sheppard AFB. Two successful ejections on this one.

Somewhat different looking than the Foley site.

edit: Command ejection, ISS selector has to be in the both position.

edit: T-6A/B is not prone to flat spins, all are generally quite nose low.....upright, inverted or progressive ones.

[Ugly Jet Captain]

Runaway...My point was that a trainer with aerodynamic bits on the tail spins "flatter" than a fighter or other high perf aircraft. My understanding is it spins nose low but flatter than a high perf aircraft making a flatter impact more likely. This looks to have hit very flat and from the vertical. Sorry if that came off as a conclusion; it was more of an observation as to the reason the impact had the two top prop blades intact and very little forward motion evident at the site. It does not look like it was flown in control to impact was the main point I cluttered with the tail talk.

[megan]

You may be the youngest Nasal Radiator to have gone thru WhitingAfraid he's not gums, when we foreigners went through in '67 we had two eighteen year olds on course, straight out of high school when they joined the service. T-34 Saufley, T-28 Whiting, Saufley & Mainside, TH13 & H-34 Ellyson, some went to Tracker at Corpus then RAG at San Diego. Only had one major accident in our time there, solo US student lost control at Whiting in a T-28 when he had a fit on approach due to advanced TB. Grounded a whole bunch of us for a period while they tested for infection.

[Runaway Gun]

So if two blades were intact, it could be possible that they weren't spinning around 2000 RPM...

[gums]

Good point, Megan I was referring to being one of the youngest regular posters on this forum.

Secondly, I made the comment about speed and altitude plot because the one we had when I posted showed ground track only, and up to the point of impact the course was fairly straight.

[Lonewolf_50]

Glad you could jump in here, Wolf. You may be the youngest Nasal Radiator to have gone thru Whiting, but possibly T28B may have you beat. When I was doing helicopter training in Whiting (back early 80's) they were still flying T-28s at VT-6. Can't remember when they moved the last of them to Corpus Christi, as I was off to the fleet at that point. Last one left Corpus Christi in 1984. Sold a few to Venezuela on an FMS for CAS, if I remember rightly.
One of the VT-6 IPs brought a Trojan home with a dead engine through an overcast (IIRC ceilings were around 800 or 1200 feet, he was on an instrument hop and lost the engine but my memory may be failing badly). A remarkable save.
But this new bird has good ones. Yep.
The planes at Whiting have been under suspicion last year or two for incidents involving the OGOGS, so I would not rule out incapacitation of both folks. I don't think a bird strike up high would cause complete loss of control. OBOGS being a possible culprit for an LOC (loss of consciusness, not loss of control) was also on my mind as I thought through this, but my most recent memory of that was the issue at TW-1 and TW-2 with the T-45s. Wasn't clear on how the T-6B's oxygen sysetm was faring. I have an old buddy who used to work Wing level maintenance out that away, I'll see if I can dig anything out of him.

And Good Lord: if I'm young, I'll need to order a case of Geritol for the whole room! :}

[finfly1]

Well, I know we always say that 30 miles is 50ks, but this site says 48.28:
https://www.metric-conversions.org/length/miles-to-kilometers.htm

The point is the disconnect between expressing a figure to two decimal points following the word ABOUT.

[ASRAAMTOO]

Looking at the vertical profile in post 47 I can’t really see how oxygen could be an issue.

[sycamore]

Possibly CO, if they were just on airmix...but it also looks like the prop is feathered....

[KloseEnough]

I don't think CO is a likely issue in turboprops, I've only ever heard of it for piston engines. Not sure about the exact layout of the exhaust and firewall, though.

[Lonewolf_50]

I don't think CO is a likely issue in turboprops, I've only ever heard of it for piston engines. Not sure about the exact layout of the exhaust and firewall, though. The T-34C primary trainer that the Navy used for nearly 40 years had a for sure CO risk based on where the exhaust stacks were and the (abysmal) seal configuration for the sliding canopies. We had a NATOPS procedure for it and everything. Yes, it was A Known Issue.

For what it's worth, you could fly the T-28 (B and C) with the cockpit open - that was a recip with a powerful Wright Cyclone air cooled engine. Due to how and where the exhaust was configured, the pipes being a bit lower down and a bit further aft, you could have the canopy open inflight. My memory is somewhat foggy on that given how long it has been since I flew in a T-28, and I only recall one or two times that we flew with it open. We generally did not, however, when I was in training.
And before you ask: yes, we had electricity way back then.

[gums]

@ all not familiar with the T-6 OBOGS war stories, and possibly the F-22 system and so forth........

Several incidents at Whiting field and other bases raised a flag for the Navy and USMC and USAF.

The problems that USAF and USMC are looking at is not low oxygen, but contamination. In the "old" days we had oxygen bottles and monitoring their health and well-being was easy. We didn't test at our mask connection for bad fumes or oxygen content or..... Hell one system I flew with had constant over pressure so I had pure oxygen unless I disconnected the nose hose. Apparently, the F-35 also has a slight over pressure, but I'll have to talk with one of the pilots( that feature was brought up during the accident investigation of a loss this past May here at Eglin).

The OBOGS was intended to reduce ground support issues and the oxygen tank weight/space/maintenance costs and effort. Sounded great, and I sit here now sucking on a home oxygen concentrator due to my poor habits for over 50 years. BFD!!! Trouble is the sucker doesn't work real good above 10,000 feet pressure altitude. The standard systems I flew with for a few decades had oxygen bottles and a regulator you could actually turn off or select emergency pressure. The OBOGS doofers do not seem to work that way.

[cappt]

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/10/25/coast-guard-member-among-crew-killed-in-navy-plane-crash-in-residential-neighborhood/
Their names and a pic. Lots of questions here that need to be answered. I thought they had some kind of monitor now for contamination in the OBOGS? I would be so devastated if it were my daughter or son, R.I.P.

[megan]

My memory is somewhat foggy on that given how long it has been since I flew in a T-28, and I only recall one or two times that we flew with it openWhen we went through the only time the T-28 was flown with the canopy open was when doing circuits at the carrier or practicing same on shore at Barin (outlying field).


https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/690x421/batc0002_fafd1c82ac48e4354718f9cee1c96f2abc9300d5.jpg

[AnotherRedWineThanks]

30 miles might indeed be 48.28 kilometers but ABOUT 30 miles is most assuredly ABOUT 50kms

[finestkind]

Some posts made about "push on ittis". I have not seen in the posts any comment on a mayday call being made. Surely if there was a problem there would have been a call. If not than it would seem reasonable to consider either a catastrophic failure, which would be substantiated by debris scattered over an area, or incapacitation.

In answer to keeping comments respectful, totally agree. Also on accidents being discussed in crew rooms, well this undoubtedly still happens, and not on this site, this is the bigger crew room.

[gums]

@finest... et al...

The oxygen problem we are seeing is different than a simple lack of oxygen. Even if it was and not contamination, then you would not hear a MayDay call. You would see a smoking hole.

It was the same thing with our gee-loc crashes in the Viper back in the early days. No call, as the dude was unconscious. We had video recorders of our HUD and we also had a recorder in the seat to grab the last minute or so of flight conditions if we ejected. In other words, you could not lie to the accident board.

I just have this feeling that the crew became incapacitated for one reason or another and couldn't eject.

[eagle 86]

Megan there were at least two other fatals in our time.
A Vietnamese student entered the pattern at Whiting the wrong way the night before the accident you are talking about, became disorientated and lost control.
There was also one at the boat, VT5, during the period '66 - '67.

[OK465]

I just have this feeling that the crew became incapacitated for one reason or another and couldn't eject.

You know, of note, if those flightaware altitudes are correct and they were stable at 8000' initially, there is no pressure differential in the cockpit at 8000', the altitude where the pressurization system kicks in during a continued climb. There are various filters in the pressurization system. Are they active before a cockpit pressure differential is available?

I recall, even in the always unpressurized T-37 jet trainer smelling fumes at times (no not that) during various extreme maneuvering gyrations, momentary tail slide for example. The T-6 stacks are about in the same relative vertical position as the T-34, just a little further forward on the long nose, tail slide not required.

[sycamore]

Even if you turn the pressurisation on after engine start,you generally have a `bleed` to the canopy seal, on most aircraft,although pressurisation will only start at some other altitude,ie 6-8k.,otherwise it gets noisy...and cold..

[OK465]

sycamore,

From further reading, you're entirely correct. :ok: There is an independent valve that routes bleed air for both the g-suits and canopy seal, which opens as soon as weight is off the wheels as long as the main bleed air switch is in normal. The separate pressurization valve begins to open around 7500', to maintain 8000' cockpit until a little over 3 PSI differential and then it climbs with the aircraft.

The unpressurized T-37 was noisy....and cold, particularly at 25,000'.

BTW, from what my family member T-6B & T-34C instructor tells me, in addition to OBOGS incidents, the T-6 has also had its fair share of G-LOCs.

(At some point, our family evidently fell victim to some Voodoo High Priestess' 'You will become a military Primary Instructor' Curse. :})

[gums]

Good poop, Okie and syc I guess the pressurization profiles are close to what airlines use, i.e. 8,000 or so until "x" versus the old pressure differentials I grew up with. Have to review my Sluf manuals, but at 40K we had about 14K cockpit pressure. Our old schedule was about a 5 psi differential , so my Sluf numbers look about right. The 8K pressure is about 10 psi, and I live with that at my mountain cabin and used to go fish and hike and ski at higher alt - think 10,000 to 11,000 feet. So I guess the new folks in the b idness need more help than we had. Secondly, the oxygen concentrators like I use for COPD start to run out at 9,000 or 10,000 feet. So the OBOGS has to use bleed air, filter it, then get rid of the nitrogen and then....., or.... we could go back to the oxygen tanks most of us grew up with and all that would entail.

The local rags here in the Panhandle have several stories about the OBOGS complaints, and at one time some of the crews "went on strike", wrote letters and......

So I cannot rule out an OBOGS problem or another cockpit issue besides the oxygen system but maybe CO or other fumes. And I take it that the masks and regulators are similar to what we used in that you are not under pressure all the time and get ambient atmosphere plus oxygen until up around 25K, then get pressure.

[Ugly Jet Captain]

The T-6 II uses a on-board oxygen generation system, or OBOGS that has had problems for a number of years. The AIr Force in 2018 undertook a "total rework of the OBOGS with a revised software package, and changes in maintenance routines, could take up to four years to fully implement – and there still might be more work to do afterward."

That quote is from the below article:

Air Force Says It Knows Why T-6 Trainers Are Choking Pilots, But It'll Take Years To Fix (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/23598/air-force-says-it-knows-why-t-6-trainers-are-choking-pilots-but-itll-take-years-to-fix)

Also from the article

“So far, technical efforts to date and analysis of data collected have determined that pilots have been exposed to significantly changing levels of oxygen concentration,” U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Steve Kwast, head of AETC, said in a statement on Sept. 13, 2018. “The varying levels of oxygen concentration, even though in excess of what the body typically needs, has caused physiological stress that most pilots on most days actually adapt to without noticing.”

If they were down low it wouldn't be hypoxia per se, but it could be that they were getting "bad air" from the OBOGS that caused them to be impaired.

Impairment of the crew would explain no Mayday or emergency call on guard or Center (queue the indignant proper radio phraseology crowd argument here) and it would also explain the lack of ejection from such a high perch. I have no idea the Navy position on the Texan OBOGS but would bet they followed Beech's lead from the USAF fixes.

[gums]

Thank you, Ugly

Whenever there is no "mayday" call, or any other call, it's CFIT or poor judgement when down low or incapaciation. And I have personally witnessed two gee-loc incidents in the early days of the Viper. Back seat for one and watched another in my flight for another.

I have to wait for the report like all of us, but I can't see some mechanical problem with the basic airframe or motor.

[macho4050]

R.I.P. Guys

[T28B]

For Macho4050: while your kind sentiments are appreciated, they were both ladies.

[megan]

I'm assuming he was using the word in a gender neutral manner where the fair sex may be referred to as "guys", common usage in some parts.

[Fonsini]

Just my uninformed 2c.

The feathered prop tells us they were conscious. My guess - loss of situational awareness during recovery attempts by the PIC, and a young Ensign too overwhelmed to issue a Mayday or unilaterally eject.

Tragic regardless.

[beardy]

Picking over the bones and gloating speculation with your expert knowledge will be a great comfort to the bereaved.
​​​​I hope you feel good about your contribution.

[megan]

The feathered prop tells us they were consciousDon't understand how you come to that conclusion, the PT-6 prop will go to the feather position in the event of an engine failure under the action of the feathering spring and counter weights as oil pressure in the servo decreases. If manually feathering the servo pressure is dumped immediately where as in an engine failure case, and the feathering is not done manually, the prop will move to towards the feather as servo pressure slowly bleeds off.

https://www.flight-mechanic.com/pratt-and-whitney-pt6-hartzell-propeller-system/

[OK465]

Our family T-6/T-34 instructor told me something else of interest.

In the T-34C they taught both spins and circuit oriented cross-controlled departures. In the T-6 syllabus, spins are taught, but not cross-controlled departures. Minimum entry altitude for spins, 16,000'. Not recovered by altitude, they use 10,000' also in training.

Looking at that plot from 'ugly jet' driver in post #47, if accurate, it shows an altitude of 2300' and airspeed of 112 mph (98 knots) in the vicinity of Foley. Those engine-out patterns (practice or real) are flown at minimum 120-125 knots. Indications of something other than incapacitation going on here?

[gums]

Thanks, Okie. I had not seen the last data point Ugly posted if that's it.

Dunno about the T-6, as my UPT didn't have any planes with a prop. IP would yank throttles back and announce engine failure. So I was taught to get to the best glide speed or even best lowest descent AoA, then use your SA to turn to nearest field, or at least a nice place to bail.You know, FAC tells you best bailout heading if you got hit bad.

So your idea has merit and I am surprised at that low speed.

[Ugly Jet Captain]

OK465 the speed is ADS-B data driven and it is relative to position and not what the aircraft is indicating (i.e. a vertical path would theoretically indicate zero speed). It looks like a LOC and no visible bump in descent rate to show a recovery attempt. The path track shows them maneuvering in the box and the turn to the west is not towards a viable and usual "practice" field. You are correct this is way too low to be doing spin entry and recognition according to the syllabus.

This looks to be normal ops in the box doing low speed maneuvering. The aircraft recovers and accelerates from a series of low speed turns at a steady altitude of 8000'. It then accelerates in level flight (which would indicate an addition of thrust) to 250ish knots at 8000'. The rate of increase likely indicates they had a clean airplane with gear and flaps up. When reaching 250ish knots there is a loss of altitude and a loss of speed. This could be an engine failure as you don't usually lose speed and altitude especially if you just gained speed back in level flight. Something caused them to go down and slow down. (keeping in mind this is ADS-B speed so I may be reading too much into it). This burble happens after a turn to the west. They are steady on heading and level and speed decays which also could indicate a loss of thrust. This decay lasts a very short time and then they depart to a steady state descent to impact and we have no idea of actual airspeed of the aircraft given the rapid rate of descent.

Megan, good insight on the prop driving to feather in an engine failure If they had an engine failure. My experience is the low oil pressure feather event is a very slow occuring event and full feather likely wouldn't occur in the very short time from from controlled maneuvering possible engine out to LOC and impact in this case. It would seem that the crew feathered the prop is the most likely given the timeframe.

There is something else her from incapacitation, a bird strike, or some form of catastrophic airframe or control failure. The instructor had a very good reputation and was very experienced. There has to be more here than a simple LOC and spin. The acceleration while level and turn to the west and descent while losing speed then complete LOC is puzzling. Add no radio call and the mystery deepens.

The squadron is back up and flying at this time. I hope the accident team gets insight into this one. Losing two crew is tragic, not knowing what happened and preventing the same circumstance to cause another hull and crew loss would make it more so.

[OK465]

UJC,

Good comprehensive info and viewpoint. Thanks.

One comment:

I may be wrong here concerning your particular plot and what data was transmitted to who, it's been awhile, but having flown both B-738 and A330 sims with early ADS-B "In" capability simulated and displayed in the cockpit, I seem to recall our ADS-B speed data was KTAS taken directly from the displayed traffic ADCs before transmission, and was not relative position dependent (i.e. ground speed). IIRC we had a time referenced on board interval management software that was based on KTAS. Ground based info may be different. (If I'm wrong, unlike some people, I'll concede. :})

In any case, my source tells me that in the T-34 or T-6, a cross-controlled departure condition can instantly flip you inverted.

[Lonewolf_50]

EDIT: For UJC. Sorry, I missed your post, nice summary.
Our family T-6/T-34 instructor told me something else of interest.
In the T-34C they taught both spins and circuit oriented cross-controlled departures. The cross control departure that was taught was called "skidded turn stall" and it was done dirty: gear down flaps up, 100 knots (pattern airspeed).
There was a T-34C mishap in January of 2006 (https://www.ar15.com/forums/general/navy_trainer_goes_down_in_the_middle_of_the_4300_block_of_fl our_bluff__TX_they_didnandapos_t_make_it/5-431524/) in Corpus Christi that was probably that. Based on where the crash was (near the 90 position for the outlying field) and the rapidity with which it occurred, and the eye witness statements, OCF below pattern altitude so it was over in a hurry. (Might also have been an approach turn stall ... ) In the T-6 syllabus, spins are taught, but not cross-controlled departures. Minimum entry altitude for spins, 16,000'. Not recovered by altitude, they use 10,000' also in training. Ah, so they have not changed the syllabus since I last saw it. Interesting to know.
Looking at that plot from 'ugly jet' driver in post #47, if accurate, it shows an altitude of 2300' and airspeed of 112 mph (98 knots) in the vicinity of Foley. Those engine-out patterns (practice or real) are flown at minimum 120-125 knots. Indications of something other than incapacitation going on here? How strong was the wind? If someone had already feathered an engine, and had not had a successful restart, and was making for a paved surface rather than ejecting, is it possible that a pilot was making an adjustment to profile and lost control? Not gonna speculate, as it appears that a possible LOC may have been at a higher altitude.

[F-16GUY]

Tragic accident and sadly two young military aviators lost.

Having flown approximately 150 hours on the T-6 during my pilot training, I can report that the aircraft exhibits very good characteristics for a trainer. Firstly it has a very comfortable cockpit layout, and more important, it is has very nice and forgiving handling qualities. It does not flip you upside down unless you mishandle it grossly, and it will let you know way in advance when you approach the edge of the envelope. It will talk to you with increased buffet and even a stick shaker, when you approach a stall, and if you intend to spin, you have to provoke it with crossed controls during entry and throughout the incipient spin. If you center up the controls and unload a bit during the incipiant spin, it will recover instantly. Regarding the spin in the T-6, I don't remember it as being flat-ish at all.

The Mk16 Light seats are very capable, and I am not familiar with any escape system failures with this type of seat in this aircraft type. Pull any handle, front or backseat, and the sequencer will eject the rear seat first, and the front seat in quick succession, regardless if the canopy det-cord works or not.

I wonder if they were either incapacitated, if the seat failed somehow, or if they misjudged the altitude needed for recovery, and therefore did not initiate the ejection. The report will show...

[gums]

Thanks, F-16 Guy.

I would love to talk with a few recent UPT grads. but the "bug" is limiting social contact at the local pubs.

Other than the Viper and the Deuce, the other planes I flew always gave you lottsa warnings. The Viper and Deuce did not suddenly go out of control by flipping and yawing and...., they just descended. You could get the Deuce down to 90 knots in a climb and then descend at 10,000 FPM and feel real good. The Viper didn't have wing rock or even moderate buffet, it just rolled/yawed and most of the time ended up descending at 30 deg AoA until impact or using the MPO feature to rock it out.

I have always sided with the "crew" on this forum and look for mechanical failures beyond control of the operator(s). In this case, I can not see Gee Loc. I see something more insidious.

Another nickel on the grass.

[megan]

If someone had already feathered an engine, and had not had a successful restartWith the PT6 you can feather the prop without shutting down the engine, enhances the glide no end.

[Beez51]

Megan, certainly true that a PT6 can feather the prop whilst the gas generator keeps running but I suspect not in this installation. The PC9 and I suspect theT6 had a single power control lever (PCL) and to shut the engine down, a lever or tab in front of the PCL is lifted and the PCL moved ‘over the decent’ and the propeller is feathered and the fuel is cutoff to the FCU. I once managed to have one during shutdown feather when I lifted the PCL over the detent slowly and the gas generator kept running until I moved the PCL back further. Obviously not quite rigged as per the book. There is one reported incident that I am aware of where the PT6A-62 engine in aPC9 failed and both pilots swore that the PCL was moved to shutdown but the prop didn’t feather. They normally would have comfortably glided to the runway but the prop drag meant that they both needed to use the Martin Baker let down. Thankfully successfully.

I also believe that just because the engine fails, the prop will not necessarily feather. If the gas generator isn’t seized it will windmill and provide enough oil pressure to not feather the prop. With no oil pressure the feather weights and ATM will certainly feather it but it depends if the PCL has commanded the prop to feather or there is no oil pressure.

[finestkind]

Apologise for thread drift. Good points Beez 51. It was not common but no overtly rare that on shutdown in the PC9 that the prop did not feather due to misalignment of the S86 or may have been S82 (long time ago) micro. You than could sit there and watch as the prop slowly move to feather. If memory serves, up to one minute. And as you stated whilst gilding at 120kts, with air flow through the engine, and the micro connection failing, there was a lot of speculation of as to whether the prop would feather with oil px still provided. Many discussions on what to do including a stall turn, but if you couldn’t hang for more than a minute not going to work.

On the comment of the engine failing and the prop not feathering with air flow through the engine, once the S86/82 micro is made (hopefully aligned correctly) that opens a valve in the CSU that dumps the oil (return to engine) so no oil/px to stop the spring from working.

[Ugly Jet Captain]

Here are the flight track logs for BB207. This is the last 6 minutes of the data. I added a turn direction, heading change and rate of turn. Keep in mind that a standard rate turn is 3 degrees per second.

The aircraft looks to be in a steady state and in control as it exits the box and head to the SW. More than likely they were heading to an outlying field nearby. Unfortunately there is a data skip in the last minutes of the flight but in that 64 second interval the aircraft the aircraft appears to be in stable flight in a slight left turn to the south. I don't see any GLOC type data prior to that as it looks like a planned let down.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/624x358/aaaa_ba3d86c58a82490237f9a503a621012b878f6f0e.png
BB207 data from Flightaware

19 seconds after the slight left turn and an increase in the rate of descent the aircraft is over the town of Foley.at 2250' descending at 4579 ft per minute and the data ends after that. It would appear that the LOC happened between 3000-4000 (tel:3000-4000) feet and resulted in a loss of forward velocity (could be a spin as there isn't enough data). The data is pretty small at the end but the data prior to 05:21:26 shows an aircraft under control.

The LOC at a low altitude from the steady rate of descent and seemingly in control aircraft would explain the lack of Mayday or any distress call. It also would explain the lack of a bailout to a degree as the time from LOC to impact was very short. To me it looks like they took a bird impact or the aircraft had a major structural or control issue. This was not a crew that rode an aircraft in from 8000' as it first looked it is a low altitude LOC with a very short window to eject.

[gums]

Scary plot, Ugly, and many thanks.

Our experience in the Viper was no kidding gee-LOC and not oxygen system problems that have been alluded in the T6, F-22 and F-35. The GLOC usually resulted in lack of ability to do much for a minute or so - figure 60 to 90 seconds, even if able to mumble. Whereas some physiological phenomena like CO poisoning or some exhaust fumes or OBOG malfunction involving bleed air or ...... likely takes longer to recover or maybe never.

My episode was with student studly looking up over his shoulder and pulling hard, then relaxing the gee. At first I thot he was "extending" to gain energy before turning back to the bandit. We were not real low, and maybe 15 deg nose down, so I gave him 5 - 10 seconds before looking forward to see his head bouncing off the canopy rail. Gums asks..." Ski, ski!" ( had a Eastern Euro name,so to be accurate, that was on the tape). "Knock it off!!" on radio to the bandit. "I got it", says Gums while recovering and then telling the bandit we were RTB. We had adopted procedures after an LOC episode to preclude further medical problems. Student recovered fully about 90 seconds or so from when I noticed the relaxed gee, so he was likely "out of it" for almost two minutes.

The profile for this one resembles LOC (from whatever cause), and if the plane was fairly well trimmed, you would not see much variation in flight path unless one of the crew was putting pressure on the stick, even tho unconscious. The Helios crash in 2005 is one to see, although the loss of oxygen happened slowly.

Sure hope we look hard at the OBOGs.

[OK465]

UJC,

I'm a little confused by those heading change (which would seem to actually be track not heading) numbers. The two pieces of data coded red below 5000' feet show heading changes of only 22 degrees.

But a left turn from 154 to 045 would be a total track change of 109 degrees. And in the 19 seconds time shown for the turn, that would make the turn rate 5.7 deg/sec. (With an accompanying 95 knot loss of some kind of speed (even GS that's a bunch in 19 secs).

Maybe I'm reading it wrong.

[gums]

I tink your assumption is correct, Okie. We are seeing track and not heading.

So someplace below 5,000 ft we enter a "deadman's spiral" maybe. Some roll input and maybe back stick after another few seconds. Ground speed decreasing rapidly along with altitude and track changing to the left all the way. Even if unconscious, there could be control inputs from the crew. Our experience in the early days of GEE-LOC was relaxed pressure on the stick when the pilot fell asleep, so we saw little change in turn rate although aileron trim could still increase roll angle, not rate. Being as how we didn't have a moveable stick, and the thing was well away from our other arm and neither leg, then we can accept little if any pilot flight control inputs, huh?

[OK465]

The below assumes the data is accurate:

The 106 degree turn from 260 to 154 was accomplished over 64 seconds. If done the short way around to the left, this equates to 1.6 degrees per second. A fairly lazy turn here.

Then it was increased to 5.7 deg/sec. 5.7 degrees/sec is not an overly aggressive turn, but over the short period of time it was instituted indicates to me a more impending requirement to get pointed in a particular direction arose. And they are descending to an altitude associated with practice/real engine out patterns near a field used for practicing these.

It's the 5 knot per second speed decay that is more concerning. If you're at 3700' and 192 in a descent (per the data) and you intend to be at 3000-2500' (high key) and 120 or so for the profile, a rapid decel would be appropriate, but attention to stopping the decel at 120, possibly with pitch only, would be competing with, but as paramount in importance as getting pointed in the right direction for the profile. The old slow down and go down.

I believe UJC is using LOC to refer to Loss of Control, not Loss of Consciousness. The technical acronym used in the T-6 for loss of control appears to be OCF, out of control flight. Does the T-6 have a speedbrake function? edit: Further reading indicates it does.

[sycamore]

Just a thought ,or two;we don`t know what the `student`s experience is ,or what part of the training syllabus is the exercise,but it looks very much an early `general handling exercise`,at medium level,maybe a bit of aeros plus maybe a `demo `forced landing`....possibly overhead the airfield at Foley...

It could be that as part of the exercise the prop may be feathered(demo),but possibly the I/P and/or student are incapacitated/lose comms,someone recovers and turns back towards Foley ,(approx 3nm NE),but enters a spin,unable to recover from <2000ft...maybe the engine had failed,or failed to relight/unfeather....?
Lots of maybe`s/possibly etc,so we may never know...do T6s have a CVR/ADR as standard....perhaps someone from Valley may wish to contribute...?

[OK465]

From what I read, no CVR as such, but it does have a digital video recorder for mission debrief. I would think the DVR has audio, but don't know.

[Lonewolf_50]

I believe UJC is using LOC to refer to Loss of Control, not Loss of Consciousness. The technical acronym used in the T-6 for loss of control appears to be OCF, out of control flight. Correct. OCF is the CNATRA term (https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/local/docs/pat-pubs/P-763.pdf).
no CVR as such Correct.
I'd need to ask around on the debrief tool's audio capabilities.
Your relative is probably a faster source of info

[Ugly Jet Captain]

Thanks for the input. I was using LOC for loss of control. I really doubt they GLOC'd and flew for 6 minutes in a standard rate in terms of speed, descent rate, and heading towards an outlying field. There is one south of them that is used for training and it appears they left the box and were headed there. In terms of high key to the pattern they would have been heading down to about 2000 feet so they were on profile. It does not appear they were doing any high G maneuvering up until the OCF in the last two track reports. I did not carry the course changes into the last two entries but as mentioned it was about 1.65 degrees per second in the 60 second track (which is suspect with that large of a gap) and the, what I surmise to be a continued left, turn to 054 degrees at a rate of 5.75 which is steeper than a stand 3 degree per second standard rate. Again, the rapid descent from about 3500 feet to the ground in less than a minute is the question. There just isn't a lot going on prior to the OCF as there wouldn't be as they make an approach to a outlying field for entry and overhead. Hopefully an answer comes out. I just don't think from the data it is crew incapacitation.

[finestkind]

Does anyone know when any findings or prelim findings may come to light?

[Mozella]

........... snip................
The cross control departure that was taught was called "skidded turn stall" and it was done dirty: gear down flaps up, 100 knots (pattern airspeed).
............ snip.................
I can still remember quite a bit about my basic training in the Navy T-34, but nothing sticks in what's left of my brain like that skidded turn stall lesson. There was no demo; just the instructor talking me through the maneuver as you describe. As I continued to feed in rudder and opposite aileron everything seemed pretty normal and then BAM, we rolled to the outside and were inverted in the blink of an eye. It was quite spectacular and a great lesson. It was explained to me that the cause of these departures from controlled flight were usually caused by a reluctance to use a steep enough turn, but rather trying to "rudder the plane around the corner" while maintaining a reduced bank angle with opposite aileron.

[Ugly Jet Captain]

I will post when anything is made public. From the stand up of the squadron post incident I don't think there was anything that jumped out at the investigators as the aircraft in the squadron and across the system all returned to service without any restrictions or reinspections. I did hear that the subject aircraft had made an initial inbound call to the satellite field (Barin which is Navy use only) and were inbound. That would preclude any maneuvering or stall demonstrations as they were about 5 miles out and lining up for an overhead arrival in high key. I am sticking with something that upset the flight like a bird strike given the low altitude and almost immediate OCF and rapid loss of altitude.

One other thing noted to me was since this a had a free turbine the prop blades would stop on impact and not be driven to curl the blades on the prop as in a direct drive engine like a piston. It very well could be that these blades as pictured were not feathered, rather that is the pitch they were in and they did not display rotational damage due to being a free spooling turbine. That seems likely as the time to impact was so short from controlled flight and feathering the prop wouldn't be an expected reaction to a OCF.

[finestkind]

One other thing noted to me was since this a had a free turbine the prop blades would stop on impact and not be driven to curl the blades on the prop as in a direct drive engine like a piston. It very well could be that these blades as pictured were not feathered, rather that is the pitch they were in and they did not display rotational damage due to being a free spooling turbine. That seems likely as the time to impact was so short from controlled flight and feathering the prop wouldn't be an expected reaction to a OCF.[/QUOTE]
If memory serves UJC although not direct drive the few crashes I have seen still resulted in prop distortion. Tip speed would be reasonably high. I will let the people that have more recent experience comment further.

[capngrog]

One other thing noted to me was since this a had a free turbine the prop blades would stop on impact and not be driven to curl the blades on the prop as in a direct drive engine like a piston. It very well could be that these blades as pictured were not feathered, rather that is the pitch they were in and they did not display rotational damage due to being a free spooling turbine. That seems likely as the time to impact was so short from controlled flight and feathering the prop wouldn't be an expected reaction to a OCF.

The engine in the Texan II is a version of the Pratt and Whitney of Canada PT-6A which has a gas generator driving a free power turbine which in turn drives the propeller gear box. Considerable power is delivered to the propeller in the form of torque which doesn't go away if the propeller encounters an immovable object; consequently, propeller blades are bent upon impact. Just think of the connection between the gas generator and the free power turbine as a fluid coupling, which, in fact, it is, using combustion gases as the fluid. Power is transmitted whether through a fluid coupling or a direct gear drive, and propeller damage is much the same upon impact. I think it is easier to visualize, if one considers damage to helicopter main rotor blades upon suffering a blade strike, and virtually all modern helicopter engines (to my limited knowledge) use a free power turbine design.

Cheers,
Grog

[copterhead]

It seems the accident report has been shared with the media. I am not yet allowed to share a link as I mainly lurk on this forum and do not have enough posts. I have an interest in naval aviation which is why I kept an eye on any news coming out.

The newsreport I saw was by NBC 15 News. I cannot find an original document.

Sad story.

[SpazSinbad]

It seems the accident report has been shared with the media. I am not yet allowed to share a link as I mainly lurk on this forum and do not have enough posts. I have an interest in naval aviation which is why I kept an eye on any news coming out. The news report I saw was by NBC 15 News. I cannot find an original document. Sad story.
A news report (original report? dunno): https://www.nwfdailynews.com/story/news/military/2022/01/05/naval-air-station-whiting-field-navy-report-fatal-crash-rhiannon-ross-morgan-garrett/9088581002/
&
NBC 15 report: REPORT: US Navy implements changes following fatal air crash near Foley | WPMI (mynbc15.com) (https://mynbc15.com/news/local/report-us-navy-implements-changes-following-fatal-air-crash-near-foley-11-22-2021)

[gums]

Salute!
Tnx for the link, Spaz. I do not use the local NWF rag due to it being paywalled, even with a hurricane bearing down.
A sad crash, and something still does not compute. Guess I search for and read the USN accident report.
Gums sends...

[SpazSinbad]

Salute! Tnx for the link, Spaz. I do not use the local NWF rag due to it being paywalled, even with a hurricane bearing down. A sad crash, and something still does not compute. Guess I search for and read the USN accident report. Gums sends...
GOOD LUCK WITH THE HURRICANE - stay safe. I looked for the USN accident report but no joy so far.
NWFDN report PDF attached 6 pages : https://www.nwfdailynews.com/story/news/military/2022/01/05/naval-air-station-whiting-field-navy-report-fatal-crash-rhiannon-ross-morgan-garrett/9088581002/

[Lonewolf_50]

A couple of points have me scratching my head, but it all starts with awareness of
"I am in an OCF condition"
This assessment sometimes takes more time to realize than others.
After a bit of looking, the decision time (per the NATOPS and the CNATRA OCF syllabus for the T-6A/B) for ejection is basically "if in OCF, or still in OCF, at or below 6000', Eject"
(Excerpted from the pdf SpazSinbad kindly linked to)
1. Westendorf noted that Ross and Garrett — it is not clear which of them were at the controls at the time — stalled the aircraft {snip} as they approached the airfeld near Foley, a circumstance "which is abnormal for that phase of fight." Westendorf's review also notes that the two flyers "failed to initiate out-of-control flight procedures" after the stall and crashed 22 seconds later from an altitude of 3,800 feet. Also, Westendorf notes that "despite the crew's time and altitude after stall entry, neither member-initiated ejection." "... (T)aking appropriate action in these situations may have saved their lives," he concluded.
Similarly, Marine Corps Col. Jefrey Pavelko, commander of Training Air Wing Five at NAS Whiting Field, noted in his review the "... disastrous, perplexing end to this fight ..." as he also noted that a high-banked left turn preceding the stall, the lack of out-of-control fight procedures, and the failure to eject from the aircraft... remain unexplained ... ."
It is noteworthy, to me, that not too long before they entered this area near Barin field, they'd been (per other information) doing high work which may have included stall and / or spin training.
This is a common profile in primary training: you go and do your high work first, and then you head to an outlying field to do some landing pattern work.
It is not unusual for the transition from high work to pattern work be along the lines of "You have X malfunction {simulated} " and the student then assesses "How do I set up an emergency landing profile?" and so on which often ends up being an entry to the outlying field at High Key. (Not sure how many hundreds of times I did that in the years that I instructed...) The Wing commander notes a high AOB turn being abnormal for that phase of flight and uses the term "perplexing" - which it is.
I choose not to speculate further ~ yes, I have a few ideas on what may have happened but there is more than one way this could have come to pass. If the formal report (I suspect that the JAG investigation is what is being referred to here, not the mishap report) cannot present a clearer cause and effect I'll not muddy the waters.

@gums: I suspect that if you poke around the Naval Safety Center's web site you may get the "public release" version of that report, but those tend to be sparse on details.

[gums]

Salute!

Yeah, Wolf, I looked at Navy Safety for about 10 minutes today and will have to ask the Navy directly if any accident reports are public. Go ahead and try, but meanwhile I am gonna ask the news reporter where the stuff came from.
==================
Meanwhile, one of my famous flights early in the training game involved entering the pattern the wrong way. It was a simulated flameout. Was high enuf when realizing I was setting up for the spiral, and while the IP was chuckling I cut across to a decent downwind for the correct runway and made it. So a sudden high bank angle and stall opportunity was there for me. Years later I had the real deal in my Dragonfly as far as the flameout, and was very high and my flight lead and I used the alt to see how many feet required for a 360 - it was the first deadstick landing for the type and being a new plane had no published speed or procedure. Made it down great and stayed on rwy even with damaged right main gear(was shot up fairly well, heh heh).

Still too many questions for this old man, and I am sticking with some kinda incapacitation incident. Other than the AF447 discussion, I have not frequently commented on the crashes. But this one is close to home and bothers me.

Gums sends...

[SpazSinbad]

'f & l' ligatures are fraught when copy / pasted. Meanwhile the two news reports have been made into one PDF attached below.