Centaurus
25th Sep 2020, 10:00
Readers of overseas aviation news will doubtless be aware of an extraordinary number of overrun accidents that have occurred in the past few years in India and Indonesia. Many overruns are the result of a press on regardless attitude despite an obviously badly unstable approach by captains who should know better. Often a culture driven loss of face affects their judgement. The September - October 2006 issue of Flight Safety Australia published an interesting "other angle" report by a first officer who watched with growing concern as the captain sat like a stunned mullet as a potentially serious situation evolved.
Definition: Stunned Mullet. in complete bewilderment or astonishment b. in a state of inertia very common in Australia. Example: Like a stunned mullet "He just stood there like a stunned mullet"
The title of the article was LONG FLOAT TO LAND.
"We had been in the air for 6 hours and, all going well, would soon be on the ground at Sydney Airport. The trip from our home airport had been uneventful, though thunderstorms and heavy rain promised to make the approach interesting. I was first officer on the B737 and pilot flying on this sector. The captain was an experienced pilot with 15 years on the B737. Before this trip I had flown a small half-hour sector domestically, so my total duty time would be around 12 hours by the time I signed off for the day. The Sydney approach controller put us at number three behind a B767 and an A320. We listened on the radio as one by one both aircraft executed missed approaches due to heavy rain and very poor visibility.
Then it was our turn. Like the aircraft before us, we could not get visual even though the approach lights were at maximum intensity. I carried out the missed approach and we were given radar vectors to position for a second approach. Unfortunately, that ended in another missed approach. We still had plenty of fuel to divert to Brisbane our alternate and we considered our options while stacked in the holding pattern with several other aircraft. Finally, we heard a couple of aircraft get visual and land. At this point, the captain took over as pilot flying. I had flown two take-offs and landings, two missed approaches and a 15-minute holding pattern and I was relieved that the pressure of flying was no longer on my shoulders, especially in bad weather. We were once again set up by approach and as I was the pilot-not-flying, my eyes were on the lookout for the approach lights outside. The rain was still very heavy and the windscreen wipers were on maximum. Finally, I saw the lights and called “visual” which the captain confirmed.
Float: The radio altimeter callout came next: “100 feet” then “50 feet”. But the descent stopped there. The captain was holding the aircraft between 40 and 50 feet and not letting it descend any further. The runway was rushing past and I was concerned that we weren’t landing. On the other hand, I was also aware that with 30 years in aviation the captain might have known something that I didn’t. Anyway, this was a long runway and we were okay for the time being. The “float” continued, and I now had to do something to alert the captain that things were getting dangerous (in a nice way). I started calling out radio altimeter heights, “40 feet, 50 feet, 40 feet”. It broke his trance and he finally made a firm touchdown.
The rain was so heavy as we taxied towards the international terminal that we had trouble making out the buildings. We did not talk about it the incident until we reached the hotel room. In retrospect, I should have been more assertive and done more to alert the captain to my concerns. It wasn’t enough to simply call out the radio altimeter heights.”
The report as published failed to mention the first officer’s subsequent actions after calling out the radio altimeter readings and seeing no reaction from the captain. Realising the captain was seemingly mesmerized and doing nothing, the first officer saw that both engines were still well above idle power. He quickly pulled back both thrust levers to idle from under the captain’s hand causing the aircraft to land heavily.
This type of ’freezing’ by a pilot caught by disbelief at what is happening is not uncommon but rarely mentioned in subsequent de-briefings. For this reason pilots of multi-crewed aircraft need to be aware of the stunned mullet syndrome.
Definition: Stunned Mullet. in complete bewilderment or astonishment b. in a state of inertia very common in Australia. Example: Like a stunned mullet "He just stood there like a stunned mullet"
The title of the article was LONG FLOAT TO LAND.
"We had been in the air for 6 hours and, all going well, would soon be on the ground at Sydney Airport. The trip from our home airport had been uneventful, though thunderstorms and heavy rain promised to make the approach interesting. I was first officer on the B737 and pilot flying on this sector. The captain was an experienced pilot with 15 years on the B737. Before this trip I had flown a small half-hour sector domestically, so my total duty time would be around 12 hours by the time I signed off for the day. The Sydney approach controller put us at number three behind a B767 and an A320. We listened on the radio as one by one both aircraft executed missed approaches due to heavy rain and very poor visibility.
Then it was our turn. Like the aircraft before us, we could not get visual even though the approach lights were at maximum intensity. I carried out the missed approach and we were given radar vectors to position for a second approach. Unfortunately, that ended in another missed approach. We still had plenty of fuel to divert to Brisbane our alternate and we considered our options while stacked in the holding pattern with several other aircraft. Finally, we heard a couple of aircraft get visual and land. At this point, the captain took over as pilot flying. I had flown two take-offs and landings, two missed approaches and a 15-minute holding pattern and I was relieved that the pressure of flying was no longer on my shoulders, especially in bad weather. We were once again set up by approach and as I was the pilot-not-flying, my eyes were on the lookout for the approach lights outside. The rain was still very heavy and the windscreen wipers were on maximum. Finally, I saw the lights and called “visual” which the captain confirmed.
Float: The radio altimeter callout came next: “100 feet” then “50 feet”. But the descent stopped there. The captain was holding the aircraft between 40 and 50 feet and not letting it descend any further. The runway was rushing past and I was concerned that we weren’t landing. On the other hand, I was also aware that with 30 years in aviation the captain might have known something that I didn’t. Anyway, this was a long runway and we were okay for the time being. The “float” continued, and I now had to do something to alert the captain that things were getting dangerous (in a nice way). I started calling out radio altimeter heights, “40 feet, 50 feet, 40 feet”. It broke his trance and he finally made a firm touchdown.
The rain was so heavy as we taxied towards the international terminal that we had trouble making out the buildings. We did not talk about it the incident until we reached the hotel room. In retrospect, I should have been more assertive and done more to alert the captain to my concerns. It wasn’t enough to simply call out the radio altimeter heights.”
The report as published failed to mention the first officer’s subsequent actions after calling out the radio altimeter readings and seeing no reaction from the captain. Realising the captain was seemingly mesmerized and doing nothing, the first officer saw that both engines were still well above idle power. He quickly pulled back both thrust levers to idle from under the captain’s hand causing the aircraft to land heavily.
This type of ’freezing’ by a pilot caught by disbelief at what is happening is not uncommon but rarely mentioned in subsequent de-briefings. For this reason pilots of multi-crewed aircraft need to be aware of the stunned mullet syndrome.