Air India Runway Excursion [Archive]

Airbubba

7th Aug 2020, 21:03

How many wet season excursions is that now in India in recent years? Becoming a significant concern.

Here's an article on the subject from last year's airliner overrun season in India. Some things never seem to change.

Big questions on safety, pilot training after 5 Indian planes veer off runway in 3 day The aircraft involved are SpiceJet and Air India Express. Half the incidents occurred in wet weather, for which airlines have to ensure their pilots undergo specific training.
[/url] 3 July, 2019 9:30 am ISTNew Delhi: When the Pune-Kolkata SpiceJet aircraft, SG-275, veered off the runway at the Kolkata airport Tuesday, it was the fifth such instance in just 72 hours, between 30 June and 2 July.

It was also the sixth such incident of an Indian airline going off the runway in the last three months — the first of this spate of accidents occurred on 29 April, when a SpiceJet aircraft, SG-946, a Boeing 737-800 headed from Delhi to Shirdi, overshot the runway upon landing.

While there have been no casualties due to the mishaps, the sheer frequency of these accidents has raised questions on safety standards, particularly within SpiceJet, and on pilot training.

Of the six incidents, four aircraft belonged to SpiceJet, while the other two are Air India Express (AIE) planes.

ThePrint reached SpiceJet spokesperson Tushar Srivastava for a response on the incidents but he refused to comment while the CEO of Air India Express was unavailable for comment.

The focus on pilot training has arisen as at least half of the incidents, including the latest one in Kolkata, occurred in wet weather, for which, airlines have to ensure that their pilots undergo the mandatory monsoon-related ALAR (Approach and Landing Accident Reduction) training. ThePrint takes a look at the spate of runway mishaps and the questions they have raised.[/color]The Shirdi overrun, 29 AprilThe SpiceJet Boeing 737-800 that overshot the runway at Shirdi on 29 April had 164 people on board; all of them were safe. The aircraft overshot the runway by at least 50 m and came to a stop with all its gear on soft ground. The aircraft, which was headed from Delhi, was towed back to the apron.The Mangalore mishap, 30 JuneAn Air India Express Boeing 737-800, Flight IX-384, on 30 June veered straight off the runway at Mangalore airport and came to a stop just ahead of the end of the runway after its nose gear went over a drainage ditch. All 181 people on board the aircraft, which had made its way from Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, disembarked safely through the mobile stairs. The aircraft received minor damage.SpiceJet on soft ground in Surat, 30 JuneA SpiceJet De Havilland Dash 8-400, a smaller aircraft ferrying 43 passengers and four crew members from Bhopal to Surat, significantly overran the runway at Surat on 30 June. The aircraft, Flight SG-3722, came to a stop on soft ground just short and to the right of the localiser antenna, about 270 m past the end of the runway.

The landing occurred during a heavy downpour. The passengers disembarked through the aircraft’s stairs; there were no injuries. The airport was closed overnight while the aircraft sustained minor damage.Kozhikode ‘hard’ landing, 1 JulyAn Air India Express Boeing 737-800, Flight IX-382, landed hard at the Kozhikode airport on 1 July, with its tail making contact with the runway before it rolled on without further incident and taxied to the apron. There were no injuries.

The flight was headed from Dammam in Saudi Arabia and had 180 people on board. The aircraft remained on the ground for about six-and-a-half hours and then returned to service.SpiceJet overshoots runway in Mumbai, 1 JulyThis is yet another instance of a SpiceJet aircraft overshooting the runway in wet weather. A SpiceJet Boeing 737-800, Flight SG-6237, on its way from Jaipur ran off the rain-slickened runway 27 at the Mumbai International Airport on 1 July forcing the closure of the main runway. Passengers were deplaned normally. There was no injury to either the passengers or the crew.No respite for SpiceJet in Kolkata, 2 JulyThe latest runway incident involving SpiceJet came Tuesday when SG-275 from Pune to Kolkata landed on runway 19L and veered off towards the right due to heavy rain. Pilots took corrective action immediately to get the aircraft onto the centre line but four-runway edge lights were damaged. Nobody was injured in the incident.DGCA should review safety standards: ExpertsThe series of runway incidents have prompted experts to raise questions on the training of pilots and safety standards being maintained by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the country’s aviation watchdog.

“This points to very poor training and safety standards at SpiceJet and AIE,” said Captain Mohan Ranganathan, an aviation safety consultant and a former instructor of the Boeing 737 specialising in wet runway operations training.

“It also points to DGCA turning a blind eye to serious safety issues. The DGCA is being a facilitator for airlines and not a regulator.”

Ranganathan added that the DGCA should have grounded SpiceJet and conducted an independent safety audit by bringing in an outside agency. “The airlines appear to have ignored the mandatory monsoon-related ALAR training. The spate of incidents point to very serious failure,” he said.

“If the ministry of civil aviation and the DGCA care about passenger lives, they should ground the airlines that are incapable of safe operations during the monsoons.”

DGCA officials did not respond to the queries sent by The Print. This report will be updated when they do.

Sudhakara Reddy, president of the Air Passengers Association of India, wondered if airlines are forgoing safety to keep their aircraft in the air. “The latest is the fifth such incident in the last five days. Is it because of a rush to train pilots and keep the fleet in the sky without rest or proper training?” he asked

Another aviation expert, Mark Martin, said the “only solution” to the runway incidents was better crew training.

“Several factors are involved in such incidents — the inability to brake, unstable approach and the weather,” he said. “There is a lot of pressure on a 70-tonne aircraft flying at a speed of 300 km per hour while landing. The only solution is better crew training. It is definitely troublesome and alarming.”

[url]https://theprint.in/india/big-questions-on-safety-pilot-training-after-5-indian-planes-veer-off-runway-in-3-days/257433/ (https://theprint.in/author/ifrah-mufti/)

Airbubba

7th Aug 2020, 21:20

More on the late 'pilot' of IX1344 from India Today.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/942x828/ee1tb4qucauzzai_2__169f4446e4d695cbd34280b0372e44a5e9dba9fc. jpg

Air India plane crash: IAF pilot, Sword of Honour recipient Captain DV Sathe among 19 dead in Kerala tragedyCaptain DV Sathe along with his co-pilot and 17 passengers lost their lives when the Air India Express Boeing 737 from Dubai to Kozhikode (Calicut) overshot the runway at Karipur airport on Friday.New DelhiAugust 8, 2020 UPDATED: August 8, 2020 01:30 IST

Captain Dipak Vasant Sathe, pilot of the Air India Express flight (AXB1344, B737) died when the aircraft skidded off the runway at Kozhikode International Airport in Kerala on Friday night. As many as 16 people, including Captain Sathe and the co-pilot, have been confirmed dead by authorities.

Unconfirmed reports are now coming in suggesting that Captain Sathe turned off the engine right before the crash, saving the lives of his passengers and the cabin crew. Preliminary inputs indicate that the fuselage broke into two after the aircraft overshot the runway during its second attempt to land at the Karipur 'tabletop' airport.

There were a total of 190 passengers onboard, including 174 adults and 10 infants apart from four cabin crew members and two pilots. As per Air India Express, the flight was returning to Karipur airport from Dubai as part of the 'Vande Bharat' repatriation initiative.

A former test pilot with the Indian Air Force (IAF), Captain DV Sathe was an experienced aerial operator. He had flown the Airbus 310 for Air India before moving to Air India Express to fly a Boeing 737. Captain Sathe was also the recipient of a Sword of Honour at the Air Force Academy (AFA).

An alumnus of the National Defence Academy (NDA) in Pune, Captain Sathe stood first in the 58th course of Pune NDA from Juliet Squadron. He passed out from AFA with the 'Sword of Honour' in 1981. Apart from being an accomplished fighter pilot and a HAL test pilot, he was also an exceptional squash player.

His body along with that of his co-pilot are being kept at the MIMS hospital in Kozhikode.

Loose rivets

7th Aug 2020, 21:37

So who's going to be the first to talk about the people's requirement to be on that flight?

jaganpvs

7th Aug 2020, 22:25

127 Pilot's Course.
Wing Commander Deepak Vasant Sathe 16370 F(P) (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Database/16370)
Commissioned: 11 Jun 1981 Course: 127 Course
Service End: Retired on 30 Jun 2003
Sword of Honour and Test Pilot

AuroraAustralis

7th Aug 2020, 23:33

'Yet another 737-800 significant runway overrun.'
'… the 737-800 has a spike of serious runway overruns, measured against other comparable types'

Are you surprised, being the most populous type in worldwide service? Not the aircraft.....

Of course it's not the aircraft, but people bringing it up have a valid point. It is not the most popular type in service, and has experienced a much greater rate of overruns than comparable aircraft, even when factoring flight hours.
There are 4,900 737-800s built, and there have been 7 runway performance related hull loss accidents in the past 2 years.
There are 9,400 A320 (all variants) built, and there have been 0 runway performance related hull loss accidents in the past 2 years.
The Boeing statistical analysis ended in 2017, back then these 2 types had about same safety record, I'm curious how they compare now.
Again, it's ultimately the PIC's responsibility in most of these accidents, but the difference in rate of overruns between the 738 and 320 has grown increasingly notable in recent years; again, like alf5071h said, maybe it's just the mind forming patterns.

krismiler

7th Aug 2020, 23:41

Lack of fire brings up the possibility of lack of fuel, possibly unable to divert after the second approach. Speed obviously too high as well, especially given the conditions. Weather reporting and forecasting in India isn’t the best I’ve encountered.

The weather on arrival was pretty well set in and on the minima, not something that holding for half an hour would take care of. Whilst it was worth trying a single approach, a go around should have been planned as a diversion rather than a second attempt.

Lack of recency possibly a factor as well.

Max Tow

7th Aug 2020, 23:58

I suspect the aircraft type may be of little or no relevance:

https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20121210-politics-and-commercial-considerations-override-safety-concerns-for-dgca-760905-1999-11-30

Alleged eye-witness account:

https://sputniknews.com/india/202008071080096552-member-of-ground-crew-from-calicut-airport-shares-what-went-wrong-with-landing-/

giggitygiggity

8th Aug 2020, 00:48

For refrence, I did a quick calc of the landing distance required with the given conditions and at 60T, thought quite possibly it was heavier given the load and the likely baggage count. I'm not a Boeing chap so these are probably wildly wrong so perhaps someone can refine them, but at the least it seems porentially quite tight given the 9350ft Landing Distance Available. There was TSRA on the METAR shortly after they touched down so BA could have easily dropped significantly.

I assume they went for RWY 10 due to a thunderstorm parked over the approach for 28. They should have probably gone for RWY 10 somewhere else!

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/660x354/ldist_f0cf4fb6c045caf977a813fb6bf3c60043b20b45.png

ILS 10 plate for refrence.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/869x1198/ldista_b604374ac348af84a99e9bae9ce528357428830d.png

From the Indian AIP https://aim-india.aai.aero/eaip-v2//25-05-2017/eAIP/EC-AD-2.1VOCL-en-GB.pdf

RAD_ALT_ALIVE

8th Aug 2020, 01:36

Perhaps another reason that they may have elected to use RWY10 for the second approach is that it has lower minimums.

As people are mentioning the possibility of low fuel state, then the scenario of a missed approach to the west with a return into the east (with the benefit of greater chance of a successful approach) would be something that might have made sense to a skipper under pressure.

Rapid D

8th Aug 2020, 02:18

The fact is that the 737-800 has a spike of serious runway overruns, measured against other comparable types, with presumably operation of these by comparable crews. As with the MD-11 overturning on landing accidents, you can't get away from one type having significant issues at a specific point in operations compared to its peers.

Did you at all consider that these overruns had nothing to do with the airplane type. Research all of them and post again if pilot error was a factor. The recent PIA A320 accident. Why wasn't that caused by the aircraft vs pilots? That's your theory right? Aircraft type causes accidents...

Airmann

8th Aug 2020, 02:37

So far the aircraft (737-800) and pilots/training (of Spice Jet and AI Express) has been mentioned.

What about the condition of INDIAN RUNWAYS!!

St_Elmo

8th Aug 2020, 03:38

The pilots would have been flying on the limits of their FDTL, due to the current restrictions there are no layovers internationally, the flight time from DXB to CCJ is 4 hours as per FR24, they would've departed an airport in India 3-4 hours away from DXB, that morning.
Add to this the lack of job security, the drastic pay cuts, the monsoon, the lack of braking action reporting equipment, the quality of the CCJ runway, the punitive policies by the regulator and airlines. Its is all the slices of cheese aligning together, leading to this unfortunate incident.

fox niner

8th Aug 2020, 05:05

I understood that as they went over the cliff, one of the aircrew quickly shut down both donks. Which is easily done with one hand, in one move, on the 737NG. Probably saved a lot of lives, if correct.

FMS82

8th Aug 2020, 06:33

There are 4,900 737-800s built, and there have been 7 runway performance related hull loss accidents in the past 2 years.
There are 9,400 A320 (all variants) built, and there have been 0 runway performance related hull loss accidents in the past 2 years.

To make a fair comparison, you'd need to include the -600, -700, and -900, if you are comparing to all A320 variants built.

Nonetheless, your point stands. the 737's seems to star in many of these overrun headlines (also in somewhat more benign inicidents that end up with just some wheels in the grass/arrester strip and dented ego's). With fleets this big and (assumingly) being operating similarly challenging environments (wet poorly maintained runways) and by similarly gifted/talented aircrews, it is striking how much more often we see 737's going of the edge.

And yes I know human brains (including my own) are particularly useless at interpreting these types of statistics, and we really like seeing patterns that reinforce our own biases...but still...

vilas

8th Aug 2020, 07:05

in gust conditions with speed fluctuations 737 needs to flown to hold flight path. Airbus holds the flight path with ATHR holding the speed it easier to handle. GS mini is better concept than flying a fixed addition which needs to be bled during flare. Besides 737 800 airframe is known to break up in excursions due to manufacturing compromises. There was documentary on this.

SOPS

8th Aug 2020, 07:53

If the weather was really bad and there was a thunderstorm over the field .. what were they doing there in the first place?

avionimc

8th Aug 2020, 08:23

What about the condition of INDIAN RUNWAYS!!
If I remember correctly, most runways in India are not grooved, making them more prone to hydroplaning.

George Glass

8th Aug 2020, 08:31

I have many thousands of hours on the B737-800.
Its not the aircraft.
B737-800 does just fine on a wet runway.
Pre Covid there was a B737 takeoff or landing every 3 seconds somewhere around the world.
Not the airport.
2800 meters with an ILS.
Like thousands of other B737 Pilots I have always had great confidence in the aircraft.
If you’ve got a HUD it’s about as good as it gets in difficult conditions.
No experience numpties should spare us all their no nothing commentary.
Boeing has had the misfortune of selling hundreds of aircraft to operators who don’t know what they are doing.
The never ending story...............

lucille

8th Aug 2020, 08:37

If the weather was really bad and there was a thunderstorm over the field .. what were they doing there in the first place?

With TS/RA you never know how bad the weather is until you arrive at the MDA. Also it’s very localized and changeable. 5 minutes either way and it might have been an uneventful approach and landing.

And then there’s the elephant in the room, no one ever talks about - the well disguised pressures on crew to not divert because of cost and inconvenience to the company. Careers are made and broken on managements perceptions of a pilot’s propensity to divert.

Always easy to criticise from the comfort of an armchair.

CargoOne

8th Aug 2020, 08:40

The pilots would have been flying on the limits of their FDTL, due to the current restrictions there are no layovers internationally, the flight time from DXB to CCJ is 4 hours as per FR24, they would've departed an airport in India 3-4 hours away from DXB, that morning.

With or without covid, do you really expect the airline to schedule a crew layover instead of return flight 2 sectors by 4 hours each???

ACMS

8th Aug 2020, 09:19

lucille

mmmmm, I’m not flying with you then.......

SOPS

8th Aug 2020, 09:30

lucille

Really??? At both airlines I worked for.. TS within 10 nm of the field .. no take off or landing allowed.

alf5071h

8th Aug 2020, 10:17

Having asked the question earlier - 'what is the basis of the landing performance (OLD/FOLD, actual) and thus what could be, should have been expected in these conditions', there is no response. Any 737-800 operators on line, or not knowing …

How does the -800 differ from previous variants; adequate performance, but more difficult to be precise in approach and landing speed, touch down point, crosswind. A 'slippery', aircraft, a bit of a handful, better if flown fast; any comments ?

The overrun area, irrespective of length, condition, etc, does not respect rank, status, qualifications, or experience once beyond the end of the runway.

ManaAdaSystem

8th Aug 2020, 10:41

SOPS

You used to fly for EK? I've been to DXB when there was CB's all around. Not often, but it happens. EK did not stop all operations that time. Never seen EK diverting when flying into airports in India either. CB's all around BOM. Ops normal.
India is a nightmare in the monsoon season. What looks like a long runway may have a long underrun. 27 BOM is one example. None of the runways are grooved. They are often very uneven, so you bounce along after landing with the tires hardly in contact with the surface. Add tailwind and a heavy 737-800 with high approach speeds (higher than the A320, I firmly belive this is a big factor in the overrun competition). This is a very challenging situation. You need to put it down exactly where you are supposed to. Or before. -800 has a pitch of 0 degrees on final with FL40. Time and time again I see pilots ending up high on short final because of this. You have to keep the nose down to avoid it. Max brakes, max reverse, FL40.
From 737 captains post higher up, about 2400 m landing distance and 11-13 kts tailwind... This was a bad set up form the moment they started the approach.

I don't think the captain should be praised as a hero just yet. How old was he, BTW?

flightleader

8th Aug 2020, 11:19

May I humbly request all to stop questioning the pilots decisions in this case. They had paid with their dear lives. There is absolutely no point saying “they should have done that, they shouldn’t have done that”.

Published technical data are flight tests figures done in a certain condition. In my 30 years of real life commercial jet flying, there is no two sets of conditions that are the same. No two runways are the same, the same runway is also not the same with different depth of water/contaminant. Let’s not forget water/ contaminant in real life is not uniform. A B777 or A330 stopping performance is better than a B737.

Here are some questions. Did you notice some tires have more grooves than others on the same aircraft? Does this impact the stopping performance? Which type of tires your airline chose to use and did they made that decision purely based on economics instead of functionality? Did the manufacturer specify standing water depth limit for landing? Are these tires suitable for a place with over 3000mm of annual rainfall? Does the airport report standing water depth?(not common).

Every incident gives some valuable lessons to the industry. Let’s just focus in learning’em.

St_Elmo

8th Aug 2020, 12:05

With or without covid, do you really expect the airline to schedule a crew layover instead of return flight 2 sectors by 4 hours each???
Understand the logistics of a Repatriation flight, its not just one sector, a ground time of 30-40 mins and push back. They board 10-15 passengers at a time, the passengers wear their personal protective equipment the airline provided on on the jet way. After landing you have to wait in the airplane for an hour if someone landed before you and there is rush at the immigration, to avoid over crowding the airport.
Its not the 8 hours of flying that matters, its the duty period.

MissChief

8th Aug 2020, 12:06

For a country with heavy air traffic and annual monsoons, one would have assumed that India would have invested in grooved runways and ground weather radar at all major airports. Sadly, India remains a very weak nation in terms of quality of its aviation infrastructure.

parkfell

8th Aug 2020, 12:17

MissChief

Perhaps their investment in Space should be diverted into aviation?

TimmyTee

8th Aug 2020, 12:37

flightleader

Doing this is a one step plan to one day repeating any mistakes they made.

To suggest that we don't learn from their mistakes out of respect/grief is ridiculous.

I hope this view isn't a common way of thinking in the airline culture of that region..

rohitkapoor181

8th Aug 2020, 12:48

aterpster

8th Aug 2020, 12:54

flightleader

You are contradicting yourself. First, you don't want pilot decisions questioned in this case. Then, you conclude that valuable lessons can be learned from this accident. Well, that requires a complete examination of the facts, an analysis of those facts, and conclusions.

alf5071h

8th Aug 2020, 13:21

TT, et al, lest we make the same mistake.

Learning involves being able to identify contributing factors, context, relevance, influences on human behaviour, and then applying these to other situations.

Starting from the statement '… learn from their mistakes …' assumes too much, akin to allocating blame.

Better to consider that the crew were attempting to do their best in the circumstances, as they understood it at the time, and from this, learn.

We can only truly learn from our own mistakes. Viewing the mistakes of others with hindsight, only constructs situations as we now see them.

flightleader #57 :ok:

https://www.ergonomics.org.uk/common/Uploaded%20files/Publications/CIEHF-Learning-from-Adverse-Events.pdf

https://hbr.org/2011/04/strategies-for-learning-from-failure

https://safetydifferently.com/a-short-introduction-to-human-and-organizational-performance-hop-and-learning-teams

https://facultyeportfolioresource.weebly.com/uploads/2/1/5/3/2153229/journalkeepingchapter.pdf

P.S. re tyres https://www.futuresky-safety.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/FSS_P3_NLR_D3.3_v2.0.pdf
Also see references by Horne, NASA.

parkfell

8th Aug 2020, 13:47

Or you could take the view that you need to learn from other people’s mistakes as you won’t live long enough to make them all yourself.
There is no doubt that the crew were “attempting to do their best in the circumstances” but unfortunately the options narrowed and they eventually “painted themselves into a corner”.

The salient aspects of the CVR transcript, if ever published, will be a valuable source of material for the CRMIs.

One Q yet to be answered : was the Command gradient a significant factor?

King on a Wing

8th Aug 2020, 14:01

Still wondering how a deadly lethal hull loss of a completely operational airplane can make anyone a hero … 🤔

riobo

8th Aug 2020, 14:06

Perhaps their investment in Space should be diverted into aviation?

Sorry, this reads like ignorance and ugly prejudice.
India's airports are crap like most of the rest of its infrastructure, true.
Factually, most of India's wasted resources which could help remedy the infrastructure are spent on government mismanagement of funds, not on space, which has an allocation of 1.8 bil. Out of a 460 bil total budget some 60 bil is spent on defence, 90 bil on debt servicing, 40 bil on various subsidies.
These other areas are more legitimate targets for pointing out where reductions could be made (if one ignores the basic issue that a poor legal and regulatory framework means that diverting more funds into a new area will not necessarily mean proportionately better results).
One might as well say, the US should shut down NASA and divert the money to stockpiling ventilators, PPE, better roads and bridges, water systems in Flint, etc.. But that would be stupid and counterproductive, because NASA has disproportionate value to the US technological edge and is not such a large part of overall spending.
The same is actually true of India, if one is actually interested in looking at the facts rather than in spewing frankly quite ugly and disgusting prejudice.

WillowRun 6-3

8th Aug 2020, 14:15

"Perhaps their investment in Space should be diverted into aviation?" (parkfell)

But investment by India in ISRO allows the country, and its cadres in air and space law salons, to say it has become a "space-faring" state. There is no equivalent glamour in asserting status as a "sky-faring" or "high-fidelity aviation" state. (Whether the latter type of technical and managerial finesse is a prerequisite for the former, can be an interesting question.)

White Knight

8th Aug 2020, 14:18

One Q yet to be answered : was the Command gradient a significant factor?

I read in the one of the daily rags that there were two captains at the controls. That's always been a bad ingredient in the accident recipe!

They are often very uneven, so you bounce along after landing with the tires hardly in contact with the surface

So much so that VABB 27 was oft described as landing on a potato field and I would agree wholeheartedly with that!

White Knight

8th Aug 2020, 14:26

This came to mind

https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/2-19...ai-27-may-1985 (https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/2-1987-lockheed-tristar-g-bbai-27-may-1985)

That was however, thirty five years ago and we'd like to believe that CRM, Human Factors, Performance Calculations, Sim Training, WX Info and so on may have improved a little.

TimmyTee

8th Aug 2020, 14:33

Legitimate question, do those above whom are suggesting that we "let them be" and don't delve into their actions, happen to either be or have Indian heritage?

-I can't remember the last time I saw multiple posts on here arguing for no investigation/learnings after a deadly crash which clearly had factors that could and almost certainly should have been mitigated..
If an State aviation body took that attitude it would be criminal negligence

parkfell

8th Aug 2020, 14:56

WillowRun 6-3

I had already come to that conclusion a few years ago. Perhaps the politicians need to press the reset button and think again.......chances probably remote

alf5071h

8th Aug 2020, 15:21

parkfell, #65 :ok: ( - 800 per manual ?)

But what will we learn, individually or collectively; how, why, apply …
I doubt that your 'no doubt' can be proven; individual opinion, judgement, interpretation of CVR etc.
Also we cannot tell what options the crew had, what they saw or believed; as above a drift into 'error', 'blame' is very difficult to avoid - because we are human.

A skill in aviation is to avoid the corner points; go around, diversion. What we might see as a corner position now, could have been a landing opportunity to the crew at the time, but with hindsight it wasn't.

White Knight, TT,
CRM, HF, etc. It is difficult to define these terms, thus they can mean different things to different people - cultures, context.

Nowadays investigators and regulators (mis)use these terms as an alternative for 'error', and accident reports are overwhelmed with 'failures' in CRM, HF, monitoring. What is overlooked is to ask why.
It is difficult to prove that CRM, etc, are a benefit; whether or not, we dare not consider otherwise, thus why are these factors reported in accidents; - an inability to explain human performance.

The weakness, the issue to be learnt, is that the regulations and accident reports expect these safety initiatives to work all of the time. People are surprised that crews don't behave as excepted, that humans are human and occasionally behave contrary to expectation, thus 'blame' the crew.

CRM, monitoring, yes, but they only work until they don't, then, unfortunately we seek to 'blame' someone.

FLCH

8th Aug 2020, 15:47

https://avinashchikte.com/2020/08/08/dont-blame-the-pilot-just-yet/?fbclid=IwAR2kG3faTjyvxaGeUYyOZgPZQwk_SMmdUhgSjb0rRgftzbXJxE GUgbfR2mc

Opinion and insight about the pilot from one of his personal friends.

Bergerie1

8th Aug 2020, 16:13

FLCH

Thank you for a very timely post. I hope others who post here read the account in the link and think before they post.

Airbubba

8th Aug 2020, 16:16

A little more on the crew from a press conference (mostly in English, parts in Hindi and Malayalam) held today by Civil Aviation Minister Hardeep Singh Puri.

The captain was 59 years old, joined Air India Express in 2013. He had 10830 hours of flight time, 6662 in command and 4244 in command of the 737.

He had landed at Calicut 27 times.

The first officer had 1073 hours total time.

Minister Singh Puri (wearing the blue dastar) visits the accident site:

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/759x422/puri_a066c3de1a1752fc5df2dd850d579f9b6d9bde8d.jpg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/759x422/puri2_8a259985c7004d2f2756d8546334afd50d91387c.jpg

vilas

8th Aug 2020, 16:19

The captain has always done well before this accident will always remain. If anything is found wanting then it's only human but will help prevent recurrence. I remember NTSB Chairman in 2000 James Hall saying"I am a history major. I believe past is prologue. But all accidents are not acts of God. We take what we learn so it doesn't happen again. But that ain't gonna happen if nobody says anything". So investigation will have look into everything.

pattern_is_full

8th Aug 2020, 16:20

It is my understanding, gleaned from 737-800/900 pilots on these forums, that the higher likelihood of a tailstrike (due to the stretched tail) means those aircraft approach and land in a slightly flatter trajectory, at higher speeds (to compensate for lower AoA as well as weight).

Came up particularly in reference to the AA/Jamaica overrun, and also one at O'Hare (runway 9R, snow/ice, can't recall the carrier - maybe United 1977, Dec. 30, 2015).

And thus it can be harder to nail the perfect speed and flare and avoid a long touchdown or a float in those conditions - less tolerance for small errors. Which can be made even tighter with a slick or compromised runway and/or a tailwind or a Vref additive for gusts.

Nothing to do with deceleration hardware engineering - just that there is more speed to get rid of.

And not necessarily accidents - sometimes just embarrassing "incidents" into the overrun, EMAS, or grass.

ManaAdaSystem

8th Aug 2020, 16:39

Can't comment on the -900, but tail strike worries on the -800 relate mostly to take offs. On landing you fly at the most with a 3 degres nose up, nowhere near tailstrike. The only time you float is when you hold the nose up more and more during flare, or you carry too much speed. At FL40 you don't need much nose up at all. Where pilots go wrong on the -800 is they go high at the very end, like below 100-200 ft, then try to correct and may end up with a last minute speed increase and float because of this. I've seen this many times, and if you add tailwind it gets worse.

We are only as good as our last landing. What we did 30 years ago matters very little. And being a nice guy doesn't mean you are a good pilot.

WHBM

8th Aug 2020, 16:40

FMS82

Indeed. But I'm not conscious of the other recent variants of the 737 having anything like this record of serious overruns. And it seems it's all round the world, including US operators. The 737 (with or without these other subtypes) is not a majority of aviation, but the records are there. It would be good to analyse, objectively, and indeed without some of the fanboy/skygod approach we see above, just why it is such an outlier in runway overruns. It must surely reflect in hull loss insurance premiums.

I'm sure there were those who described the MD-11 as "amazing" etc, notwithstanding its record.

ManaAdaSystem

8th Aug 2020, 16:47

The -800 is a very different beast than the -700. Not so much on paper, but you can feel this when you operate on shorter, contaminated runways. The short field version of the -800 is a much better aircraft than the standard -800 in runway limited situastions.

parkfell

8th Aug 2020, 17:02

parkfell

Amazing how you've managed to resolve the priorities of a fairly complex nation in one sentence. You might as well say remove Donald Trump to reverse global warming. Please let's stick to inputs on the topic at hand and leave such comments/conversations to Twitter.

What are your thoughts on how to improve the Indian aviation infrastructure?
The money needs to come from somewhere?

rohitkapoor181

8th Aug 2020, 18:40

Privatize, the money will come - an airport like Calicut with a 3mio+ pax/yr would surely be a profitable bet. Governments shouldn't be in this business apart from framing and enforcing regulation, but that's a personal opinion.

White Knight

8th Aug 2020, 19:04

White Knight, TT,
CRM, HF, etc. It is difficult to define these terms, thus they can mean different things to different people - cultures, context

True. But it seems to work here at Emirates, what, with 150 plus nationalities sharing the flightdeck!

Willie Everlearn

8th Aug 2020, 19:15

I think Monsoons have been a part of India’s geographic reality for at least ...
Well, for a very long time.
You’d think grooved runways would be an easy sell for Indian airlines to their government for at least ...
Well, a very long time.
Yet, that doesn’t seem to get much traction.
Looking at India’s aviation safety record I have to wonder, like Pakistan, if their might also be licencing issues contributing to that record.
From my past experience, I’d be suspicious of ex-IAF ‘Officers’ and their historic nepotism. Not to mention their actual competence level.
Until more is known I wouldn’t paint this Captain with that brush, but I will reserve judgement.

White Knight

8th Aug 2020, 19:15

May I humbly request all to stop questioning the pilots decisions in this case.

The first thing that stands out here would be the decision making! Let's not beat around the bush....

parkfell

8th Aug 2020, 19:48

..........India's airports are crap like most of the rest of its infrastructure, true........
........Factually, most of India's wasted resources which could help remedy the infrastructure are spent on government mismanagement of funds, not on space.........if one is actually interested in looking at the facts rather than in spewing frankly quite ugly and disgusting prejudice.

As India is a democratic country, it is up to the elected politicians to decide how their resources are spent.
It is up to the electorate to decide which parties they vote for.
So you disagree; that is absolutely fine. There is no need to be somewhat melodramatic. There will be many views posted that you disagree with. Calm down. Think of your blood pressure, as this is purporting to be your first posting. Stick with the facts, and keep emotions under control.

Tell us what your formula for aviation improvement?

73qanda

8th Aug 2020, 20:43

Three questions that should be addressed in the investigation;
What methods did Air India Express use to promulgate SAFO 19003 to flight crew?
Was the accident crew aware of the existence of the SAFO?
Did the accident crew receive any training or guidance related to the SAFO?
SAFO 19003

Purpose: This SAFO cancels and replaces SAFO 15009 and warns airplane operators and pilots that the advisory data for wet runway landings may not provide a safe stopping margin especially in conditions of Moderate or Heavy Rain.
Recommended Action: Directors of Safety and Directors of Operations (Part 121); Directors of Operations (parts 135, and 125), Program Managers, (Part 91K), and Pilots (Part 91) should ensure pilots verify, prior to initiating an approach, that the aircraft can stop within the Landing Distance Available using a RwyCC of “2” whenever there is the likelihood of moderate or greater rain on a smooth runway or heavy rain on a grooved/PFC runway.
A quick OPT calc using a flat runway and CC2 gives an auto brake stopping distance exceeding 3000m.
Is every 737 pilot fully aware of this SAFO issued in 2019?
If you say “SAFO 19003” to a 737 Captain they should immediately know what you are talking about......is that the case?

srjumbo747

8th Aug 2020, 20:47

Willie Everlearn

Yes of course it does. Just witnessing their arrogant attitudes (not all of them) in the airport going through immigration or on the radio speaks volumes.
I’ve heard Indian turboprops saying they don’t need any spacing behind large jets.
Some of the more senior pilots got others to carry their bags up the stairs of the aircraft and you have really made me think about the nepotism.

jaganpvs

8th Aug 2020, 22:37

First reports on what may have gone wrong

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/kerala-plane-crash-air-india-express-plane-landed-1-km-beyond-runway-threshold-at-high-speed-2276381?pfrom=home-topscroll

The Air India Express Boeing 737-800 aircraft which fell into a gorge at Kozhikode airport had landed more than 1 kilometre down the length of the runway in windy and rainy conditions.

Sources within the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the aviation watchdog, which is leading the investigations into the accident, have confirmed that this is a key factor that they are looking into before reaching a conclusion on whether the remaining length of the runway was sufficient for the aircraft to have stopped safely. What is clear is that the runway surface was wet, a factor that would have impacted the braking performance of the aircraft after it touched down.

Unable to decelerate sufficiently, the Boeing 737 went off the end of the edge of the runway, fell 35 feet into a gorge and slammed into the airport's perimeter wall before coming to a full stop

https://c.ndtvimg.com/2020-08/o0ng68no_air-india-express-plane-crashkeralaafp6502_625x300_08_August_20.jpg

https://c.ndtvimg.com/2020-08/rsjid938_air-india-express-plane-crashkeralaafp_625x300_08_August_20.jpg

https://images.newindianexpress.com/uploads/user/imagelibrary/2020/8/9/w900X450/Kerala_Plane_Crash_AP.jpg

lucille

8th Aug 2020, 22:43

lucille

Really??? At both airlines I worked for.. TS within 10 nm of the field .. no take off or landing allowed.

No take off. I agree.
No landing? Not so much. With radar, you try to make safe, cautious decisions. Note - I NEVER advocated flying through a cell. Not all heavy rain comes out of a cell.

With those rules, your airline may as well rule out flying in the tropics during the wet season.

Australopithecus

8th Aug 2020, 22:48

73qanda

Well, not necessarily. My airline does not identify the regulatory source of operational guidance or policy. So while we are aware of and adhere to the revised performance data, this is the first time I have encountered that nomenclature.

7478ti

8th Aug 2020, 22:50

Another accident that simply didn't need to happen. This event once again underscores the many decade need for GLS/GBAS, LAND3/AIII, RNP, and being able to land into the wind, ...perhaps also along with the critical need for assured runway rubber deposit and groove/PFC maintenance, in addition to considering installation of EMAS at critical runway locations.

The B737NG is a terrific safe jet when operated as designed, on any adequately maintained runway. Though tailwinds ought to typically be avoided, to assure margin for unexpected tailwinds when necessary, I've safely, successfully, and easily landed it many times in well over 25 kts of direct tailwind, during specific flight tests, even to up-slope gradient runways at elevations up to ~6,100 MSL.

We simply need to give this flight crew the benefit of the doubt, until the investigation is completed, and all the facts known. They gave their lives doing their best, and it's the least we owe their families.

WillowRun 6-3

8th Aug 2020, 23:21

On aviation infrastructure, riobo, you've made a category error with regard to the U.S. budget. The problem isn't imbalance of priorities, rather it's a kind of dilution or diversion. Every Congressional Committee and Subcommittee empowers legislators (by virtue of their being rostered on them) to influence who spends the funds and how their performance is monitored, the result being akin to the "200 Spielbergs" situation observed when Chicago airport cops dragged a passenger off a flight a few years ago. Substitute less than top-drawer competence for cellphone vid cameras.

The ISRO budget hasn't been claimed here as wasted or mismanaged (I didn't claim that and don't see that parkfell did, either). But it's a matter of priority. With runways you admit are not up to some standard we all could agree does apply, and with the geographic and climatological predicates unchanging, you're still contending that at least some of the rockets and satellite funding should not be reallocated? - that this should not even be considered? (Not to dwell on anti-satellite tests, but....)

And solution proposed by rohitkapoor181, to allow and encourage privitization, isn't that significantly inconsistent with what your post identified as a "poor" legal and regulatory framework?

PJ2

9th Aug 2020, 00:26

The recorders should be in excellent shape - do they have them yet?

Airbubba

9th Aug 2020, 00:58

Yes, the Civil Aviation Minister said in his Saturday press conference that the CVR and FDR were recovered almost immediately after the mishap.

India's Aviation Minister Hardeep Singh Puri visited the scene of the crash on Saturday, where he announced the recovery of the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, which could prove crucial to investigating the crash. He praised the lead pilot and said it was too early to say what the precise cause of the accident was.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53706976

Teddy Robinson

9th Aug 2020, 01:02

Two things come to mind.

Regardless of ability, landing 1000m into a limiting contaminated runway with a tailwind and ravine at the end is time for a go around.
These are the mistakes we are paid not to make, but mistakes are human and accidents happen.

Why on earth was this runway not grooved ?

Did people just pocket the cash and hope for the best ?

flightleader

9th Aug 2020, 02:04

TimmyTee

9th Aug 2020, 02:15

how about we explore all possible factors, including pilot error? What does the outcome of whether someone dies or survives have to do with factual information? Don’t want to sound cold, but regardless of the outcome, the errors that were made are facts.

TimmyTee

9th Aug 2020, 02:16

Grav

9th Aug 2020, 02:27

Personal and purely theorical thought: I don’t know if shutting down the engines and consequently losing all the reverse thrust is worth the reduced risk of post crash fire. I am not so sure that in a few seconds the temperatures of the engine core would drop below a safe level, not to mention the fact that other sources can start a fire (sparks cause by friction, severed wires, other objects hit by the plane, etc.). I’m curious to see in the report if the engines were actually shut down and how this affected the consequences of the impact.

Turnleft080

9th Aug 2020, 02:40

PORT TO PORT - INDIA'S NO 1 VESSEL POSITION (http://www.porttoport.in/headernewsdet.php?newstitle=6489)
The last prang about 10 years ago I thought would of brought to the attention for these mesa airports
to install net barriers that could be extended for the duty runway. Something that can absorb 60T at 40kts

Callicutt Kid

9th Aug 2020, 02:53

Use to operate into Callicut Airport on the same type.The monsoon rains in Kerala are the heaviest I have ever seen compared to other tropical regions I operated to.
With that and in combination of poor runway conditions and general lack of infrastructure at the airport the Swiss cheese lines up pretty quickly.
Sad to see these “occurrences “still happening.
Ex AIX Driver.

Wannabe Flyer

9th Aug 2020, 04:56

I also wonder how you could switch off an engine to save lives? At what point? I’d prefer he be using max reverse right up until A complete stop. If he managed to shut them down after that point then good stuff. But how would that line up with him not surviving?
&
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x917/20b2f467_a044_443f_b0c7_bb4b0acb1c7d_4d75a2f0dd6f311a5141506 21d6f6200acf1b520.jpeg
& the stupidity in reporting continues. As is the nature there is a rush to start a narrative of making people into hero’s or villains. A post from a so called relative is going viral about how he came in for a belly landing because it was raining & there was no choice & switched off the engines. Surprisingly the media is lapping this up.

C310driver

9th Aug 2020, 05:00

From the cockpit picture posted above, it’s clear that the forward thrust levers are at/near the forward stop (max thrust) and both reverse thrust levers are stowed. Both engine start levers also seem to be in the idle detent (engines running), from the angle the picture was taken.

It seems puzzling why some members here, are putting the PIC on a pedestal and lauding his (presumed) actions, when the reality of this aircraft cockpit configuration speaks for itself. That throttle quadrant was set up for a max thrust go-around in panic mode (evident since the flap handle is still in flaps 30/40 whereas the standard go-around flaps setting of the -800 is flaps 15(2 engines) or flaps 1(1 engine inoperative). Also, the landing gear lever seems to be in the down position & the autobrake selector seems to be set at 3. For any non-pilots wondering, the speed brakes will auto-retract if the thrust levers are advanced after touchdown. That explains why the speed brakes & ground spoilers are stowed in the post crash images.

Why they didn’t go-around earlier, from this horribly unstable approach, I don’t know (CRM? Cockpit gradient? Get there itis?)

73qanda

9th Aug 2020, 05:02

Well, not necessarily. My airline does not identify the regulatory source of operational guidance or policy. So while we are aware of and adhere to the revised performance data, this is the first time I have encountered that nomenclature.
Yip good call.
My angle is that we should look closely at how the latest in-flight runway performance information makes its way from the manufacturer and issuing Regulator to the Airline and finally to the PinC. Is that being done well enough considering the critical nature of the information?
Does the PinC have a clear understanding of when different condition codes should be used? If not why not?
This isn’t aimed at the PinC of the accident flight in any way. It’s just something that needs looking at IMO, Industry wide.

mayam13

9th Aug 2020, 07:07

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1431x874/cattura_163b2409cdc2546a5afba2956b913acf2b7b6573.png
looks one approach to 28, then 10 ?
The pilot appears to have done a TOGA, having done that, he should have landed at the alternate RWY at nearest Kannur (60 miles away) instead of coming back to the rain ravaged destination. The reserve fuel for Kannur is likely consumed in the two missed approaches which explains why there was no fire.

parkfell

9th Aug 2020, 07:17

My bad for not being precise enough with my words earlier.

At this very moment, the facts are yet to fully surface. Instead of saying all the ‘the pilots should have done or should not have done’, let’s just explore possible contributing factors besides pilot error. Every aviation accident/incident I came across had some form of human error. Pilots, dispatcher, ATC, mechanics, etc. They flew the way that got themselves killed, no doubt that was an error. The investigation will eventually elaborate all the details.

You seem first to say that “pilot error” should not be discussed, and yet you say:

“they flew the way that got themselves killed, no doubt that was an error”.

I wouldn’t disagree with you. Their options reduced until they landed downwind & it ended in tragedy.
There are clearly other contributing factors which lead to this accident.

What isn’t in dispute is that a perfectly serviceable aircraft is now an insurance write off with tragic consequences.

Unless you can persuade those i/c PPRuNe that it is inappropriate to do so, that is exactly what the contributors will do. They will analyse the information as it becomes available. Different points of view will emerge. Disagreements will surface.

That is the nature, the very life blood of what PPRuNe does.

The FDR & CVR have been recovered. The investigation has commenced and hopefully an interim report will be published next month.

That will generate comment, as was recently demonstrated with the interim PIA 8303 report.

Dixi

9th Aug 2020, 07:24

i met a guy who wanted to apply to my gig,all of a sudden he comes out with this story:
"you know i am tired of flying the 737 here ,especially during monsoon times it is really hard.
Sometimes we have to do 6 go arounds before being able to land at destination".

C310driver

9th Aug 2020, 07:53

Your question can be answered by an official source after the preliminary investigation report is published or by the airline itself. We will never know the MEL items open on that aircraft unless you have access to the Airplane Technical Log for VT-AXH or the airline engineering/technical department.

For any failures in-flight, it hasn’t been reported as yet if the pilots informed ATC or their ground operations about any technical issues affecting their approach & landing capabilities.

andrasz

9th Aug 2020, 08:10

From the cockpit picture posted above...
Seems to have been removed, or am I missing something ?

From the photos seen so far it appears to have gone off the end of the runway with a substantial speed for that kind of damage to occur. I would not be surprised if the FDR reveals yet another attempted G/A after reversers deployed...

FullWings

9th Aug 2020, 09:16

It would be interesting to know if AXB do much training in baulked landings. From what has surfaced so far, it appears that it was a deep touchdown on a contaminated runway with a considerable tailwind component. There is also some evidence that they were trying to get airborne again at a late stage. Since the EK accident in DXB, many airlines have put increased focus on stability and the option to reject up to reverser selection.

I prefer to think of pilot actions (or inaction) as opposed to “mistakes”, at least until something official comes out. They may have done things that were incorrect but we don’t know yet whether that was due to SOPs, technical failures, training, environmental issues, incapacitation, etc.

TimmyTee

9th Aug 2020, 09:56

C310driver

Surely they didn’t do a 15kt tailwind landing, on a shortish runway, heavy, in driving rain on a smooth runway, and NOT select Max autobrake??

Unless they ran the numbers for the reciprocal prior to the first approach, reckon there was even enough time to crunch the numbers for this on that short reversal and approach?

pineteam

9th Aug 2020, 10:19

Did you at all consider that these overruns had nothing to do with the airplane type. Research all of them and post again if pilot error was a factor. The recent PIA A320 accident. Why wasn't that caused by the aircraft vs pilots? That's your theory right? Aircraft type causes accidents...

I asked a friend of mine who's flying the 737-800 to do the landing computation at the exact same weather condition and runway as I did on A320 CEO with Sharklets. For standard condition and a weight of 60T the VAPP on 737 is 138kt versus 135kt on A320. The landing distance with manual braking is 1207 meters versus 1153 meters on A320. So unless I'm missing something the 737 is slightly more prone to overrun the runway than an A320.

ManaAdaSystem

9th Aug 2020, 10:55

TimmyTee

Hole #1. Wet, non grooved, slightly limited runway.
Hole #2. Tailwind landing.
Hole #3. Long landing.
Hole #4. Autobrake 3.

Bad decision and/or a very poor understanding of the situation.
Now we just need FL30 to add an extra hole in the cheese.

Regarding thrust levers at the forward position, that could have been caused by the impact. Time will tell.

alf5071h

9th Aug 2020, 10:56

parkfell, #110 :ok: et al,

'Error'; a word in many languages, but it has to be used in context - more often not so; thus 'error' is very emotive. If we choose to use error, then add explanation, context; failure to do so restricts opportunity for learning. *

Crews do not intend to make an error, but when we attribute it after the fact we only learn from our attributions - our biased point of view, not that of the crew, operator, or regulator. We should try to learn from 'adverse events' (link #65) opposed to 'error'.

'That is the nature, the very life blood of what PPRuNe does.'

A frustration with Pprune is that it is difficult to differentiate between simmers - want to be pilots, and some pilots who act like simmers, and other contributors with interest, knowledge, and wisdom. Then the 'wait for the report' group, who then fail to read, or understand it when published - a frozen mindset. This could be the 'life blood of Pprune' - may be good for the web site, but not necessarily for aviation - wrong blood type.

The relevance to this thread is that these 'human' features can be identified in most cultures, operations, and crews. A way forward is to try to understand 'their' point of view - national culture, operations and infrastructure, and the individuals.
We must not let our culture dictate what is appropriate for others, nor without explanation attempt to force our views on them.

A lesson learnt from a discussion with a senior airline manager during an international ALAR safety promotion (India). Error and thence blame were embedded in that culture; blame (and punishment) had to be identified for closure, and although this restricted what might be learnt it did not prevent learning in their way of thinking - their culture.
The Indian DGAC did publish materials (FSF ALAR tool kit) - their format; there was a 2 hr 'blockbuster' video on monsoon conditions - every aircraft at every wet runway in India - the message 'divert or go around'.

Each to their own, a balanced view, explanation, and justification.
'Error' after the event; risk before hand.
Risk - the amount of uncertainty that crews are expected to manage in a situation.

* https://www.ida.liu.se/~729A71/Literature/Human%20Error_T/Hollnagel,%20Amalberti_2001.pdf

'… the gap between risk-control and actual risk-management. … collectively, our societies will have to agree not to lie to themselves about safety issues.' https://www.icesi.edu.co/blogs/bitacorariesgocalidadyga/files/2010/08/2-errors-and-failure.pdf

alf5071h

9th Aug 2020, 11:06

Mana #119 :ok:

http://www.pacdeff.com/pdfs/Errors%20in%20Decision%20Making.pdf

Ambiguity, Underestimating risk, Goal conflicts, Consequences not anticipated.

ManaAdaSystem

9th Aug 2020, 11:41

pineteam

At 60 tons, FL30 the -800 has a Ref speed of 142 kts, so 147 kts with the 5 kts add. With autobrake 3 and 13 kts tailwind and standing water it will stop in 2672 m. The numbers for max auto and max manual are not very much different.
FL40 gives a Ref speed of 134 kts, and 2514 m. IF FL40 was used, a lot of pilots don’t like to use FL40.
These are raw numbers, no safety margins added and standing water on the runway.
Wet performance is very optimistic given the conditions, but FL30 AB3 gives 2191 m and 1717m with max manual.
FL40 AB3 gives 2024 m and 1610m with max manual.

Add about 3 kts and 100 m for 62 tons. The flights from ME to India are often landing weight limited so the numbers would most likely be in the region of 62-64 tons. Less than max since there is not enough space to bring all the luggage that pax want to bring home.

This landing was only possible with wet conditions and a landing at the correct spot.
Standing water. No.
Slippery when wet. Just, raw data only, but not with the required margins. Not even with FL40 and max manual.

FlyingStone

9th Aug 2020, 12:02

IF FL40 was used, a lot of pilots don’t like to use FL40.

If one is landing with a significant tailwind on a 737, flaps 40 is the default choice, whether you like it or not.

Reduced flap setting into a limited runway with a tailwind is asking for trouble in any aircraft type, from C150 to 747.

aterpster

9th Aug 2020, 12:45

Why on earth was this runway not grooved ?

Are any runways in India grooved? Do any runways in India have EMAS?

single chime

9th Aug 2020, 13:14

Can't remember any grooving in India, even the newest runway in Delhi or the new airport in Bengaluru. Poor drainage too...

gearlever

9th Aug 2020, 13:22

"On Aug 9th 2020 India's Aviation Ministry reported that according to testimony by the tower controller the aircraft did not touch down until abeam taxiway C (editorial note: about 1030 meters/3380 feet past the runway threshold)"

India Express B738 at Kozhikode on Aug 7th 2020, overran runway and fell into valley (http://avherald.com/h?article=4daf960f&opt=0)

ManaAdaSystem

9th Aug 2020, 13:36

If one is landing with a significant tailwind on a 737, flaps 40 is the default choice, whether you like it or not.

Reduced flap setting into a limited runway with a tailwind is asking for trouble in any aircraft type, from C150 to 747.

You get no objections from me. Add autobrake max to your statement, and we would be happy working in the same cockpit.

Rednerib

9th Aug 2020, 13:47

I use the term 'PILOT TRAP' to describe the situation where the crew landed up. The weather was bad but well within the minima. So diversion would not have been the first choice. Approach is made in heavy rain vis. 2km (within minima). As the glide slope was US it was a non precision approach with higher MDA. AT MDA RW is not sighted hence a GA is made. Nothing seriously wrong till now. The decision is taken here to do a tear drop and land on R10 may be due to higher MDA for R10 or on the spot judgement that approach path to R10 could have been better. Here it must have been ascertained that there are no wind shear and no excessively turbulence (as far as control of ac is concerned). Second approach is made in vis 2000mts (within minima) with tail winds close to 10kts (within minima). With these two things and RW picked up close to MDA things are not all that bad especially since the RW is fairly long (9000feet) and it is at seal level temp too are not very high. Here things start converging . Landing in heavy rain with wind shield wipers at top gear and added noise and night time it would have been fairy easy to have a few knots extra speed. Depth perception is poor could result in long float and TD with excess speed and touch down at 3200 feet (about 1000 feet ahead of the designated touch down zone). Still about 6000 feet of RW is there. Situation is not all that good but not really out of hand. Only thing wrong is here that now the crew just can not afford any mistake which appears happened. Bounce, aquaplaning or any malfunction in brakes, reversers, spoilers would convert this into an accident. We will have to wait for CVR FDR to know for sure what happened. The various scenarios that could have happened (I write this knowing fully well that it might be countered by the findings, but my aim is to learn from this) are as follows 1. Aquaplaning or bounce eats up lot of RW and its an overrun. 2. Something wrong with brakes / reversers/spoilers resulting in overrun. 3. Pilots notices that they are running short of RW decides to go round which is a late call but since the call was made the crew must have assessed that it was possible to escape out. During the GA things have gone wrong may be normal delayed spool up or in such cases the engine (one or two) surges. To summarise there were many difficulties and issues in this very difficult approach which the pilots made. Singularly or even up to 3/4 issues would have resulted in no incident. Unfortunately all things just combined (all holes in the cheese aligned). And mind you I have not even touched on the fatigue factor and pressures that comes with such rescue flights which are in the glare of all top notch people. Combination of bad weather, ILS (wo glide slope), poor vis, heavy rain, water logging, tail winds, RW friction anomaly,long landing, excess speed and many other factors turned it into a lethal cocktail. RIP to the crew who did their best.

hans brinker

9th Aug 2020, 14:50

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/750x512/india_express_b738_vt_ash_kozhikode_200807_9a_9465ebddb8cbdb 031db12170cc83fa55e541db7e.jpg
From AVHerald. Not on plan B myself, so don't want to guess what the pilots were doing based on this.

Airbubba

9th Aug 2020, 15:32

Speedbrake down, thrust levers up, fuel cutoffs idle, no reverse, flaps 1?

hans brinker

9th Aug 2020, 15:39

Yeah, that's what I thought....

Also (avherald)":
"Passenger testimonies

On Aug 9th 2020 a passenger seated in the aft cabin reported that following the go around the aircraft positioned for another approach and touched down, however, [
did not appear to slow down but to accelerate again. After touchdown the aircraft overshot the end of the runway and went down the cliff, all of that happened within 15 seconds."

TopGunMaverick

9th Aug 2020, 15:56

A previous flight 6E7129 took six attempts before landing as per FR24 few hours before unfateful event. Definitely the conditions were hostile.

TopGunMaverick

9th Aug 2020, 15:59

My guess: pilot tried RWY 28 in second attempt but cancelled as raindrops carrying into wind screen of plane causing poorer visibility overwhelmed advantages of Forward wind landing. Third attempt done at RWY10 but due to tail wind pushing the plane, it landed further down (1 kms) on the airstrip.

WillowRun 6-3

9th Aug 2020, 16:28

alf5071h, disclaimers first. As SLF (and worse, attorney) and a decade less time on the forum, perhaps I should call this post off. But understanding the near-future changes percolating into the aviation safety ecosystem is a professional (and academic) interest, so here it goes.

Last item you linked is about 15 pages, heavily referenced (though not with notes), 2007 (Errors and Failures: Towards a New Safety Paradigm - Journal of Risk Research); second to last item is about 8 pages, heavily footnoted (Errors in Aviation Decision-Making: A Factor in Accidents and Incidents), by NASA Ames authors 1998. Perhaps some forum members have familiarity with these works but I'll safely presume they're for members' learning and mind-expansion. In other words, I don't speed read, not scholarly stuff like those.

Without intending to exaggerate for effect, your overall point appears to be, "it's all relative". Which is different from saying, "it's all relevant." I think the second version is what you actually mean - but your posts proceed into what reads like a theoretical direction. That discourse and information is highly important and useful, to be sure but.....in a given accident situation, is it not more important, and by far, to unearth the facts as cold hard realities first? Again it's perhaps an attorney's mindset, but there is little if anything theoretical about facts.

Not long ago I attended a presentation by NTSB Chairman Sumwalt about aviation safety and how the system, in the U.S. anyway, moves forward and doesn't move forward. Someone asked a question* about the need for better regulatory rules about pilot duty time and commuting time and fatigue issues. "We've already had that accident - Colgan Air" or words to that effect, the Board Chairman responded. There wasn't any room or space in that answer, in my understanding, for theoretical factors. It was about facts, lessons extracted, and what can be done to help solve or reduce the problem going forward. I don't pretend to know what, exactly, the proper place is for matters of theoretical content, but I do contend that deploying such matters as a kind of interference to traditional and customary accident investigation, causal analysis and safety recommendations is not the proper place.

(*SLF that I am, I did ask a question, but the one referenced was not mine.)

Ray_Y

9th Aug 2020, 16:44

With visibilty 2.000 m TWR should have seen the landing.
Ok, I missed this. Thanks. Found the METAR stating this. And light rain (-RA). So it's not very likely that they faced highly unusual conditions (standing water, hydroplaning affecting braking action), but we don't know. METAR is generic info. Actual info from Tower would be welcomed: Actual wind, actual conditions.

I also read official statement they were NOT low on fuel, diversion was still possible (Minister of Aviation)

We can't rule out another unknown technical issue, we can't rule out human error, we don't know a lot yet.

Airbubba

9th Aug 2020, 17:27

Ok, I missed this. Thanks. Found the METAR stating this. And light rain (-RA). So it's not very likely that they faced highly unusual conditions (standing water, hydroplaning affecting braking action), but we don't know.

My cousin knows a van driver who's talked with a pilot and he says that standing water and hydroplaning are common in the monsoon season in India. Do you have any experience flying there? Do you have any experience at all flying a plane? Aren't you the same guy who calls a runway change a sweepover? :ugh:

https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/634450-united-ua57-cleared-wrong-runway-sweepover-lined-up-easyjet.html

Usual apologies for professional pilot talk on PPRuNE about the control positions on the throttle quadrant.

hans brinker

9th Aug 2020, 18:06

Well, as a PP on this Ne myself, I think the Ru would like to disagree

Physel Poilil

9th Aug 2020, 18:14

I saw another Photograph. The flaps were clearly at 40

dingy737

9th Aug 2020, 19:33

gearlever

9th Aug 2020, 20:44

it appears that the throttle quadrant was removed and replaced because as shown it is back to front. As viewed from the cockpit door the speed brake lever should be on the left and the flap lever on the right and of course the numbers 1&2 for eng. Reverses , thrust levers, and start levers should have # 1 next to the left hand seat. Lever position may have been compromised.
Look here....

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/736x512/india_express_b738_vt_ash_kozhikode_200807_9a_22e413e6ea1776 bbaadcf583bf6f82570bee567e.jpg

pattern_is_full

9th Aug 2020, 20:58

I understood the picture was taken from the front, after impact there's not much to block tje view from unusual perspective

Exactly. The fact the radio panels are in the background (towards the cockpit door) is the obvious confirmation. The previous deleted whole-cockpit picture showed the pedestal front was exposed by the massive disruption of the cockpit floor, panel and skin.

I won't repost it, but several variations showing the horrible damage, and displacement of the instrument panel and FMC keyboard and such, are on the Aviation Herald (link below). Apparently the nose hit and lodged in a heavy brick or stone wall - not pretty.

To me, the control positions in the picture (plus a survivor report that the plane accelerated after touchdown - make of that what you will, hydroplaning sometimes produces a similar sensation) suggests an attempt to reject the landing and get airborne, with insufficent time (~15 sec) and/or distance left.

Reported today (Sunday Aug. 9) on Aviation Herald (quoting Aviation Minister) that the aircraft still had sufficient diversion fuel on board.

Accident: India Express B738 at Kozhikode on Aug 7th 2020, overran runway and fell into valley (http://avherald.com/h?article=4daf960f&opt=0)

gearlever

9th Aug 2020, 21:00

I found this photograph.
Not current on 738, so don't know what flap setting is shown.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/620x414/202008081142119306_black_box_recovered_from_crashed_air_indi a_express_flight_secvpf_f161b6861ac5453ea45aacf248610712b881 7a6e.jpg

dingy737

9th Aug 2020, 22:42

Look here....

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/736x512/india_express_b738_vt_ash_kozhikode_200807_9a_22e413e6ea1776 bbaadcf583bf6f82570bee567e.jpg

Thanks gearlever and others, it makes sense now. picture taken from MCP looking aft. Stand corrected.

Lookleft

9th Aug 2020, 23:16

Unless those photos were taken before the recovery of the crew (which I doubt) then you cant read anything into the position of the levers. the thrust levers and the speedbrake lever would have been disturbed during the recovery process so they probably don't reflect their positions at the time of the accident The FDR will be able to confirm the positions of the flight controls and thrust levers up until the time of impact.

RAD_ALT_ALIVE

9th Aug 2020, 23:42

topgunmaverick - with your two posts, you've highlighted one serious problem with Indian aviation!

If the previous flight had SIX attempts at landing, then it shows a huge failing in the system as well as a chronic lack of appreciation of current safety recommendations by all participants, and goes a long way to explaining the continuing appalling flight safety in that region.

It is well known that as crews attempt ever more approaches, the inherent human failings of frustration, pride, 'get-there-itis' and fear of employer-rebuke start to come into play. That's why every operator I've worked for in the last 15 to 20 years has mandated that after a second landing attempt, it is either an immediate diversion, or delay until there is NO doubt whatsoever as to the success of any third attempt.

In any case, more than three attempts were forbidden. Why, you might ask? The accident statistics have shown that the risk of something going very badly wrong increases dramatically after two attempts.

So, the Indian regulator (a disgusting cesspit of nepotism and cronyism that should instead be expending its limited abilities in encouraging or mandating that operators include such restrictions in the OM), the operators (for the most part money-hungry and unwilling to acknowledge that safety comes at a cost) and the pilots (who should know better, but to this day suffer from the clash between best-practise and outdated class / rank / age distinctions, as well as unjustifiable perception of greatness from some older left seat occupants) are all remiss.

As for the 1000m + float down the runway...in the conditions on the night, it is such a disgraceful example of pilotage that it needs to be treated with the contempt it deserves! Hero pilot? My 4rse!! How many fatal overruns does it take to convince these supposed 'top gun' pilots that the performance numbers don't lie. This captain was a class dux, a test pilot, had a great reputation. Yet on the night, it appears that he couldn't master the basics of landing in the TDZ (preferably on the aiming point) or, failing to have done that, to have made the timely decision to go around! Unbelievable.

Longtimer

9th Aug 2020, 23:57

Sadly, except for the brick wall that the cockpit hit, the pilots might have survived.

Airmann

10th Aug 2020, 02:18

And except for the hill at the end of the runway everyone might have survived

FalseGS

10th Aug 2020, 02:24

The crash site photographs show speed brakes retracted.
This is starting to look more like an attempted go around..

vilas

10th Aug 2020, 03:18

I asked a friend of mine who's flying the 737-800 to do the landing computation at the exact same weather condition and runway as I did on A320 CEO with Sharklets. For standard condition and a weight of 60T the VAPP on 737 is 138kt versus 135kt on A320. The landing distance with manual braking is 1207 meters versus 1153 meters on A320. So unless I'm missing something the 737 is slightly more prone to overrun the runway than an A320.
You are correct. B737 800 is a stretched aircraft and to avoid tail strike on To and landing the speeds are higher than previous models. On MAX to fit bigger engines it even went to ridiculous length to raise the nose wheel by 9 inches and fitting engines further forward and upward shifting the thrust line. On MAX 900 that was also not enough so on takeoff run the main wheel extends during rotation. It's highly compromised aircraft to meet certification. In India all overruns are on B737.

masalama

10th Aug 2020, 04:31

A previous flight 6E7129 took six attempts before landing as per FR24 few hours before unfateful event. Definitely the conditions were hostile.
Top Gun , I suggest you stick to your F-15 or MSFS before posting such mis-information specially in light of what happened . Please go back to the playback of FR24 on 6E7129(ATR VOBL-VOCL) 07/08/2020 and watch the altitude and profile , they made a few holds/course reversals and did 2 approaches( including the successful landing) .

For those questioning the regulator/airlines on number of approach policies before a mandatory diversion , due to a fog related incident at an airline a few years ago, the regulator did come with guidance and I know the airline I worked at changed our OM policy to maximum 2 approaches/ go-arounds due to meteorological reasons before a mandatory diversion. I would expect AI/AIE to have something similar .
I'm waiting for something official from the investigators than depending on some photos/passenger reports to make an assessment of contributing factors , causal factors and recommendations and make my own lessons learnt so that it doesn't happen again .

Sick

10th Aug 2020, 08:19

I continue to be amazed that there is little attention or monitoring given to the fact that a large proportion of 737 pilots seem to chase the VApp bug after the threshold, even to the extent of adding thrust in the flare! - Instead of TLs closed and flaring to an attitude, touching down at~Vref.

This mishandling leads to long landings and high touch down speeds.

16024

10th Aug 2020, 09:10

I think you are correct. I have had colleagues calling "speed" when the speed goes between Vref+5 and Vref.
I even had an instructor write up on a line check that I had allowed the FO to fly at Vref-5 when he meant Vref+5 minus 5!
In other words, not calling him out for applying the FCTM technique.

Not saying this applies here. Just sayin.

Fair_Weather_Flyer

10th Aug 2020, 10:24

I think you can probably guarantee the aircraft was not at the correct speed. I’ve not flown the 737 for a bit, but I remember if you let the speed get below Vref in the flare, it would get on the back of the drag curve and crunch into the deck. This is why pilots would often fly (and justify flying) well above the command speed. Even worse, when increments were added to the command speed to account for the gust factor, they would fly well above that command speed. Throw in a long landing, wet runway and maybe a glitch with the spoilers or a reverser, then such pilots could find themselves in deep trouble.

Lord Farringdon

10th Aug 2020, 10:48

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/650x400/air_india_express_plane_crashkeralaaf_08_august_20_ba889b2af 1783b0585251a69e33ab80fabfe7381.jpg

So I am a little confused. The opinion is that the crew had configured for a go around, boards are stowed, throttles forward and flaps 1 in the detent. At what point would this decision have been made I wonder? I mean surely not at 40 kts with the aircraft about to falloff the end of the runway? Yet the final resting place of the aircraft would suggest what ever forward momentum it had was effectively used up in the slide down the hill and the abrupt stop when it reached the pavement. The impact of course caused the forward fuselage section to buckle upwards and break off before sliding into the nearby wall. But none of this suggests the aircraft 'flew' off the end under T/O power as you might imagine say a failed launch off an aircraft carrier. If that had been the case, then the impact would have been some distance further on and of course casualties would have been much higher if not a complete disaster. Instead, this aircraft seems to have literally flopped off the end. I might hazard a guess that it wasn't the wall that caused the crew casualties but rather the impact with the pavement after the slide down the hill.

Just cant imagine the circumstances for all this to happen. How long does it take to spool up, how long does it take for the flaps to come up from 30 or 40 to 1 ? How close to the runway end do you have to be before you say, nah let's give this away. Or put another way, if you fall off the end at 40 kts or so, when did you make your go around decision with a 13 kt tail wind? I mean surely, before you commit to take the aircraft back into the air again, you have to have assessed there is a better that even chance the aircraft will in fact get airborne in the what's left of the runway?

The flap handle was in the flap 1 detent and this is what flap 1 looks like on a B737-800 as far as I can ascertain:

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/888x469/b737800_fl1_2b816ff712fb92e942d2352c2342ab49da8d4095.jpg

But this what the flaps looked like on the accident aircraft where you can see the flaps appear to be extended much further. Note the trailing flap devices and how their hinges are visible whereas in the image above these cant be seen. So what does this suggest? Someone has played with flap lever perhaps as part of removing the crew? Or, were the flaps still travelling as the aircraft plunged off the end? In which case this go around must have been desperate affair.

I imagine the near destruction of the engines on the slide down the slope and possibly the lights going out gave rise to the reports of 'heroic' actions by the pilot in turning off the engines.
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/620x414/flaps_6f3ab7f50bf3760a3608107aaaa063b6f9049e29.jpg

EDIT: Subsequent imagery makes it very clear the the flap lever is in the 40 deg detent.

xetroV

10th Aug 2020, 11:51

Start levers in IDLE contradict that supposed ‘heroic’ last-seconds engine shutdown.

Normal go-around flap setting would be flaps 15, but the flap lever seems further aft.

Speed brakes not extended (and speed brake lever stowed) definitely could be a major contributing factor in the overrun!

Stick Flying

10th Aug 2020, 12:07

You are correct. B737 800 is a stretched aircraft and to avoid tail strike on To and landing the speeds are higher than previous models. On MAX to fit bigger engines it even went to ridiculous length to raise the nose wheel by 9 inches and fitting engines further forward and upward shifting the thrust line. On MAX 900 that was also not enough so on takeoff run the main wheel extends during rotation. It's highly compromised aircraft to meet certification. In India all overruns are on B737.

Biggest load of garbage I've ever heard

Fursty Ferret

10th Aug 2020, 13:06

Even worse, when increments were added to the command speed to account for the gust factor, they would fly well above that command speed. Throw in a long landing, wet runway and maybe a glitch with the spoilers or a reverser, then such pilots could find themselves in deep trouble.

Exactly what I was thinking.

Seamin Stains

10th Aug 2020, 13:16

I am an expat pilot and TRI and previously worked for AIX.. in the early days of their operation, and actually was based in Calicut from 2003-2005 before moving to the Gulf from where i continued to visit the field on a regular basis untill as recently as March 2020.

Over the years the approach to RWY 10 has always been "problematic" because of its visual and environmental "characteristics". In the early days it was a visual approach only. Then they put a VOR approach, then with in the last few years because of the Indian Airports "modernization" the upgraded to an ILS RW10 approach. However the Approach minimums though lower. Have been off set by the fact that the Landing distance beyond the glideslope is less. Also the visual appearance on breakout gives the appearance of a twisted runway. And following the Glideslope to touchdown puts you 1000 Meters beyond the touchdown point. Which on a dry day with Autobrake 3 or max braking takes you to the end!!

The ATC facility at the Airfield either do not know or haven't received proper training on how to use the radar. And either are not willing to or for some unexplained reason cant give proper assistance to pilots during times of Monsoonal weather in the area.They relay on Cochin approach to give the clearance to intercept the final track inbound then contact Calicut for the approach clearance for the approach to Rwy 10. Both the approach to RWY 28 and RW 10 start from over the CLC VOR. Where 90% of the weather always is. As clearly this was the situation on that night.

In September last year(2019) the Indian DGCA put out a notice that "When the Runway Visibility is less that 2000 metres that the runway will be closed for landings. However pilots can land at their Risk. So why didnt the Calicut ATC close the airport?
I personally have eaten alot of fire form my previous company for diverting to Cochin and TRV. because i in my judgment i felt that the attempt to land on RWY10 after considering the above mentioned issues with that runway in exactly the same weather was not worth it!.
I hope that the Minister of Transport and the Dir General of DGCA will make the necessary changes to reduce the risks for Indian passengers and crews!
This is a Sad Sad day for Indian Aviation!

vilas

10th Aug 2020, 14:02

The main problem with RW10 is tailwind landing in wet conditions. All things being what they are if the airline had forbidden tailwind landing on RW10 this accident would not have happened.

vilas

10th Aug 2020, 14:05

Biggest load of garbage I've ever heard

It appears you are not fond of reading.

PJ2

10th Aug 2020, 14:13

Re position of the throttles - anything is possible here as to why pedestal controls are in the position they are - it is possible that the separate of fuselage sections pulled the cables sufficiently to change throttle positions...
. . . .
I imagine the near destruction of the engines on the slide down the slope...I don't think the aircraft "slid down the slope". There are no tell-tale tracks/ground damage* until much further down the slope. I think the aircraft "launched", not by much but enough to clear most of the slope in an arcing path until the tail hit pitching the nose down near/at the bottom of the slope.

Very sad, especially given the sense of deja-vu. A groundspeed of 176kts just prior to touchdown is significant no matter what wx conditions or runway contamination existed.

*there are two small indentations in what appears to be a "hedge-shaped" wall about half way down the slope - possible fuselage/left engine contact - hard to say.

vilas

10th Aug 2020, 14:14

Biggest load of garbage I've ever heard

https://youtu.be/HU_tj6w65NA
And this is not all. After th MAX fiasco had you kept yourself updated you wouldn't have made the ignorant comment.

lomapaseo

10th Aug 2020, 14:30

Good informative video, but your negative personal comments diminish the technical messages

FlyingStone

10th Aug 2020, 15:03

This guy has never seen a 737 upclose. "Boeing reduced the amount of flaps you can use for landing and takeoff when the 737 was stretched" Flaps 40 has been there since day 1 and unlike the 737-300/400 (tel:737-300/400)/500, which can use 1 (not -400), 5 and 15 for takeoff, NG and MAX can also use 25.

A320, which is a much newer design that the 737, also proves very well that there's no problem having only four main gear wheels on a narrowbody aircraft even with much higher MTOWs than 737-800.

Stick Flying

10th Aug 2020, 15:31

It appears you are not fond of reading.

I can read, Just don't do BS. How much Boeing knowledge do you really have (not just the Wikipedia time). You are short of facts. But there again, an Airbus Fanboy wouldn't want to acquaint themselves with ACTUAL Boeing facts.

vilas

10th Aug 2020, 17:02

Don't worry I was a training captain on the big boy the B747 and have also flown the mother of B737 the B707. So don't preach.

vilas

10th Aug 2020, 17:08

I can read, Just don't do BS. How much Boeing knowledge do you really have (not just the Wikipedia time). You are short of facts. But there again, an Airbus Fanboy wouldn't want to acquaint themselves with ACTUAL Boeing facts.
https://youtu.be/F4IGl4OizM4
Here I produce evidence of what I said. This is a work around not something great, just like the MCAS.

tdracer

10th Aug 2020, 18:07

Re position of the throttles - anything is possible here as to why pedestal controls are in the position they are - it is possible that the separate of fuselage sections pulled the cables sufficiently to change throttle positions...

Given that the 737-800 uses FADEC engines, it would be rather difficult for the throttle cables to move the thrust levers since there are no throttle cables...
It is possible that the g-forces of impact could have moved the throttles (not to mention flying debris). However if the T/R piggyback levers are lifted, it mechanically locks the throttle levers at idle so it suggests the reversers were not deployed.

FullWings

10th Aug 2020, 19:20

Or that if they were deployed, they were cancelled? Having recently done several rejected landings (in the sim I hasten to add), you are not far off flying speed and it doesn’t take that much time and distance to become airborne again. If you had touched down, autobrakes kicked in, selected reverse then realised it wasn’t working and tried to unravel all that you are in a whole different ballgame.

I think it's reasonable to assume that if an overrun was looking likely and you were still trying to stop, you would be bending the TRs backwards all the way to the end of the runway and beyond. As pointed out above, thrust levers out of idle means no reverse.

gottofly

10th Aug 2020, 19:34

I read an Indian newspaper article where it says that a ground personnel saw the aircraft bounce twice before it went off the runway.

Some of the above posts mention flaps 1 setting, the flap lever is at 40. Looks like they did not move the flap lever if they were indeed trying to go around or they simply didn’t have the time before it went off the runway.

B737Capt

10th Aug 2020, 20:29

According to Boeing FCTM after T/R deployed it's a FULL STOP LANDING!!

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1384x1510/screenshot_2020_08_10_at_21_17_21_9ab3ae9ef514b624b1b20131c8 2e8487f2afdfe1.png
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1398x1054/screenshot_2020_08_10_at_21_19_35_2a775587fcdf2446084038fb1f a55d37d86f0d39.png

By George

10th Aug 2020, 20:51

Some good speculation here and some bad. In defence of the pilot I wonder about the elephant in the room and that is aquaplaning. 9 x the square root of the tyre pressure. I have only flown the 200/300/400. On the 400 we ran the tyres around 220psi. This gets very close to a common Vref. Add water and no grooving and a little tail-wind for good measure. I have flown four different Boeings and the 737 is the only one I have experienced aquaplaning and it very nearly was my undoing once. A strange sensation and a horrible feeling of accelerating.

parkfell

10th Aug 2020, 21:02

If only the glide slope runway 28 was serviceable, a successful landing might have occurred.

Airbubba

10th Aug 2020, 22:43

Some of the above posts mention flaps 1 setting, the flap lever is at 40. Looks like they did not move the flap lever if they were indeed trying to go around or they simply didn’t have the time before it went off the runway.

I agree, an earlier picture looked to me like perhaps flaps 1, the later picture shows the pin on the flap actuator handle in the 40 notch.

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1080x1080/india_express_b738_vt_ash_kozhikode_200807_9a_9465ebddb8cbdb 031db12170cc83fa55e541db7e_2_large__700e3d6142e397ee4414b1b9 b6f9bbe135e4768f.jpg
https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1080x1082/img_20200811_wa0000_e3619f129588da5c8c8c95a834b5d201f9e2c582 _2_large__f9d72a924f575fbbf0c2842b3a58fec7a33fc9d0.jpg

C310driver

10th Aug 2020, 23:49

FullWings

The FCTM tells us to continue with normal go around procedures after a baulked landing. That’s assuming they didn’t select reverse thrust after touchdown. Another member has very kindly uploaded a screenshot of the FCTM page where Boeing says in no uncertain terms that safe flight is NOT possible if a go around is initiated after you select reverse thrust.

Since the FR24 data shows them coming in hot, and (eyewitness reports?) then bouncing twice, they may have finally touched down with very little runway remaining to stop. However the spoilers would be raised for the duration of their ground roll (assuming they were armed for landing) until the moment they advanced the thrust levers for the go around. The DFDR will reveal the actual facts. Also worth noting is the wet muddy patch of the area past the paved surface of the runway may have slowed them down sufficiently to prevent reaching Vmcu /airborne.

It’s worth noting that whenever I use Autobrake 3 on both the B737CL or B737NG, the braking provided in combination with max reverse is fantastic on both dry & wet runways. I can’t comment on contaminated runways because my operation manual prohibits taking off or landing from contaminated runways/whenever braking action is reported as poor. So they may have slowed to ~ 100kts before realising that they were running out of runway. Again, these are just my 2 cents.

Airbubba

11th Aug 2020, 01:59

An update on the investigation from the Hindustan Times.

Weather dismissed as factor in deadly Air India crash The Boeing Co. 737 appeared to touch down near the middle of the 9,000-foot-long (2,743-meter-long) runway at Kozhikode, the person said, before skidding off the end and careening down a slope, breaking into three parts.INDIA Updated: Aug 10, 2020 18:38 IST

Bloomberg | Posted by Arpan Rai

Weather conditions were within safe ranges and pilots were briefed about them by controllers just before the Air India Express jet they were flying crashed at a southern Indian airport Friday, killing at least 18 people and injuring more than 100, according to a person with direct knowledge of the matter.

The Boeing Co. 737 appeared to touch down near the middle of the 9,000-foot-long (2,743-meter-long) runway at Kozhikode, the person said, before skidding off the end and careening down a slope, breaking into three parts. The captain was experienced, with 11,000 flying hours, while the co-pilot had 2,000 hours. Neither one made a distress call, and both died in the crash. Visibility, precipitation and tailwinds were within acceptable guidelines for landing, the person said, asking not to be identified because the investigation is ongoing.

A playback on the FlightRadar24 website shows a first attempt to land the plane was aborted before another effort was made from the opposite direction. The flight-tracking site shows visibility at the airport was 1,500-to-2,000 meters, and winds were blowing at 12-13 knots, which is a moderate breeze on the Beaufort scale. Indian officials say 800 meters is sufficient visibility for landing.

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/weather-dismissed-as-factor-in-deadly-air-india-crash/story-0X6PLuv05EZI17kWYRbwyJ.html

Airbubba

11th Aug 2020, 02:08

From the New India Express.

Kozhikode plane crash: Did Air India flight land at speed higher than normal?It is suspected that the reverse thrust mode used to reduce the speed after landing probably didn’t work, which could indicate a technical fault.

Published: 10th August 2020 09:31 AM | Last Updated: 10th August 2020 09:31 AM
By Dhinesh Kallungal (https://www.newindianexpress.com/author/Dhinesh-Kallungal/1667)

Express News Service THIRUVANANTHAPURAM: The Air India Express plane involved in the accident at the Kozhikode airport on Friday night that claimed 18 lives approached the runway at a speed higher than what is ideal for a safe touchdown, sources at the airport revealed.

Also, it is learnt that the aircraft touched down on the runway well beyond the threshold mark, making it a risky landing.

Besides, it is suspected that the reverse thrust mode used to reduce the speed after landing probably didn’t work, which could indicate a technical fault.

“Normally, aircraft approach the runway at a speed range of 220-240kmph (120-130 knots). But this plane descended on the runway at over 300kmph,” said a reliable source in the Airport Authority of India.

Further, the aircraft touched down on the 2,860-metre runway (which includes the 240-metre Runway End Safety Area) at the 1,300-metre point.

The Boeing 737 with 190 on board skidded and fell off the edge of the table-top runway while landing in bad weather.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation have launched an investigation into the accident.

An inspection of the accident site also raised suspicion whether the aircraft engine had really worked in reverse thrust — a process of temporarily diverting the engine’s thrust against the forward travel to provide deceleration. According to experts, even aircraft that touchdown beyond the threshold mark can be effectively stopped if the engine is in the reverse thrust mode.After landing, the plane crossed Runway End Safety Area and broke the instrument landing system lights.

The officials who inspected the site told Express the splinters of the landing system lights were strewn on the tarmac.

“If the aircraft was in the reverse thrust mode, the splinters would have been lying on the front side,” one of them said.

“Further, around 90 metres of the sand-filled portion ahead of the runway remained almost intact, showing no signs of reverse thrust,” said an official.

The official, however, said it’s hard to believe that a senior pilot in command, who used to train Air India Express pilots, did not put the plane in reverse thrust mode in a distress condition.

“Maybe something beyond one’s judgment or imagination would have happened. We have to wait till data from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (black box) are decoded, which can give a clear idea about what happened in the last minutes,” the official said.

Meanwhile, airport sources told Express that the runway surface tailwind during the time of landing was 8 knots, while a Boeing 737 can withstand a tailwind of up to 15 knots. The sources also confirmed that when the pilot aborted the first attempt to land on Runway 28, he cited heavy wind as the reason.

Later, he approached Runway 10 after the takeoff of a Delhi aircraft from the same runway. No distress signal was sent to the air traffic control unit of the airport from the cockpit even after landing, sources said.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1235x809/criminal_9626bcb69b06da24e5446ae053b6809057ad50fc.jpg
https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/kerala/2020/aug/10/kozhikode-plane-crash-did-air-india-flight-land-at-speed-higher-than-normal-2181339.html

Turnleft080

11th Aug 2020, 03:59

Looking at the above graphic a net barrier would not of split the aircraft in two.

Australopithecus

11th Aug 2020, 04:55

Lots of things would not have split the aircraft in two.

TopGunMaverick

11th Aug 2020, 05:12

masalama

But why so many reversals?? Even when there was not flight scheduled for departure during that period? If someone looks at historical data, there are fewer 'reversals' when attempting landing of RWY28 as compared to RWY10. The only edge RWY10 has is that there is no obstacle upto 10 kms from RWY10 whereas RWY28 has a mast ELEV 621 ft. DIST. 7017m from beginning of RWY28 Bearing 104o 15' (M)

parkfell

11th Aug 2020, 07:11

How are ‘reversals’ relevant to the tragic crash?

1. Concentrate on landing deep into the runway with a tailwind.

2. Runway contamination / braking action.

3. The inadequate RESA and the steep slope / airfield boundary wall.

4. CRM / decision making by the crew. Was Command gradient a factor?

5. G/S “u/s” RW 28.

These so far are some of the relevant factors, from a non exhaustive list.

Item 3 caused the fatality

Choky

11th Aug 2020, 07:13

1. Cannot compare approach and landing performance of an ATR with a B737-8.
2. What about the wind component at the moment of landing?
3. Runway contamination?
4. Where did they made contact with the runway? (how deep into it)?

Physel Poilil

11th Aug 2020, 07:30

If it was a very long landing, - Reports say the aircraft touched down near the center of the runway- at any phase of the final approach, the aircraft should have not been calibrated with the glideslope parameter. It should have flown way too high. Then it is obvious that the pilot must have attempted to increase the descent rate. But here the transponder data from various sources indicate that the descent rate of the aircraft was within normal limit! The last known position of the aircraft was at 945 ft Calibrated altitude, 175 kts Groundspeed, and descending at a rate of 896 ft/mint. Normal except the ground speed. (It seems way too a high speed at that point even if the 12 kts tailwind is considered) .... Then the Pictures of the broken cockpit shows a fully advanced thrust liver, a disengaged reverse thrust, a completely up Spoilers Arm, and a flap setting of 40... !! Strange and Extremely confusing.

C310driver

11th Aug 2020, 08:36

Strange and Extremely confusing.

I have to wonder who was the PF on this flight. If it was the FO, why didn’t the PIC assume control or call for a go around earlier? If it was the PIC, I’m curious to know if the FO spoke up (was assertive enough) to call for a go around earlier? Surely he couldn’t have just sat there & done nothing, watching his PIC mishandle the aircraft.

B737Capt

11th Aug 2020, 09:16

FlyingStone

11th Aug 2020, 09:39

Vref F40 is 141kias at 65ton, min add +5 (if gusty wind maybe they used +15??

There is no wind correction apart from the standard +5 for tailwinds, even with gusts. That would be just pouring petrol on an already large fire.

Quote from FCTM:
Note: Do not apply wind additives for steady tailwinds or tailwind gusts. Set command speed at VREF + 5 knots (autothrottle connected or disconnected).

TopGunMaverick

11th Aug 2020, 09:45

The subject run way has a hump in the middle and sloping to both ends. Elevation is 343m right in the middle, sloping to 315m at start of RWY10 and 326m at start of RWY28. So if the runway is contaminated with water and rubber, plane landing deep and moving down the slope, where even flow of water is likely, disaster is imminent.... RWY10/28 presumably does not have Centre light but only Edge lights. Add to that Heavy downpour and failing natural light....

DaveReidUK

11th Aug 2020, 12:10

The subject run way has a hump in the middle and sloping to both ends. Elevation is 343m right in the middle, sloping to 315m at start of RWY10 and 326m at start of RWY28.

No, wrong units.

The 10 THR elevation is 314 feet, and the TDZ elevation 338 feet.

parkfell

11th Aug 2020, 12:33

C310driver

Think Command Gradient. Think “Culture”. That will answer your questions.

PJ2

11th Aug 2020, 13:28

Thanks, tdracer...of course! ;)

vilas, good demonstration; the A340 & A330 main gear are similar - slight extension on rotation for tail clearance. The oleo is shortened slightly on retraction and lengthened as part of the extension cycle.

Lord Farringdon

11th Aug 2020, 13:32

Can anyone familiar with the airfield recall if there are distance to go markers on the runway?

Approach to RWY10

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1112x558/picture_1_2798afbd991c85ca090318001a48c6dc6f1f2342.png

Landing spot approx 1300 metes in from RWY10 threshhold.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1027x407/picture_2_7f75ef97926cf1f4785f59a0ba01ff5c2dbb4ebe.png

C310driver

11th Aug 2020, 13:46

I have absolutely no doubt that the cultural aspect will be massive in this accident. The accident cockpit dynamic has all the ingredients for a typical steep cockpit gradient. Highly decorated ex Air Force commander, instructor (?), ex test pilot vs plain jane line FO. I’m curious to learn about the decision making in the final minute of the accident flight.

King on a Wing

11th Aug 2020, 15:08

Here’s something very interesting. Upholds my theory that he PF tried to take off again after realizing that he couldn’t stop before the end … 😳
An extremely poor decision at the very least …

https://indianexpress.com/article/india/kerala-plane-crash-air-india-express-kozhikode-last-minutes-cisf-officer-6549840/

redpill

11th Aug 2020, 15:37

Have you experienced the cockpit culture in India first hand?

TopGunMaverick

11th Aug 2020, 15:44

No, wrong units.

The 10 THR elevation is 314 feet, and the TDZ elevation 338 feet.

Thank you for correcting. Sorry, my mistake.

Teddy Robinson

11th Aug 2020, 16:35

King on a Wing

“There was no sound before the crash. The endpoint of the runway is parallel to the entrance of the perimeter gate from where we could see any flight take off or land,” Singh told indianexpress.com (https://indianexpress.com/).

C310driver

11th Aug 2020, 17:07

Have you experienced the cockpit culture in India first hand?

If this is directed towards me then no, I haven’t.

Please enlighten me, I’m eager to know.

C310driver

11th Aug 2020, 17:14

King on a Wing

“There was no sound before the crash.

The impression I got from that useful eyewitness testimony is that the no sound comment was referring to unusual noises/explosions/bangs and not necessarily the engine noise at a high thrust setting. Having experienced aircraft movements for the last 5yrs, he may consider the sound of aircraft engines at takeoff as normal.

White Knight

11th Aug 2020, 17:41

So they may have slowed to ~ 100kts before realising that they were running out of runway. Again, these are just my 2 cents.

I would think that landing almost halfway down the runway would have helped them realise that they were running out of runway!

Airbubba

11th Aug 2020, 17:43

According to news reports Captain Sathe was given a state funeral today for his heroism.

Reports reveal that according to aviation experts, the decision by Sathe and Kumar to shut off the engines after touch down was very important since it ensured that the plane did not catch fire.

This eventually ended up saving the lives of many passengers who [would] have died if the engines had caught fire and resulted in a bigger death rate.

Late Air India Pilot, Captain Deepak Sathe’s Traits Which Made Him A Real Hero By
Chirali Sharma (https://edtimes.in/author/chirali-sharma/)

August 11, 2020
https://edtimes.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Wing-Commander-Deepak-Vasant-Sathe-1.pngOn 7th August a tragic accident took place where an Air India Express flight crashed at the Karipur Airport in Kozhikode, Kerala taking the lives of both its pilot and co-pilot along.

In total, 18 people had died that unfortunate day when the plane crashed due to bad weather that had made the runway slippery and led to the plane being unable to make a safe landing.

The flight coming from Dubai had 190 passengers onboard and it overshot the table-top runway at the airport due to heavy rains. This led to the plane crashing and breaking into two pieces with one falling in a valley almost 35-feet below.

News reported that pilot-in-command Captain Deepak Sathe had passed away instantly, while co-pilot Captain Abhishek Kumar succumbing to injuries later on.

Today the captain’s body was laid to rest in Mumbai with him getting full state honours and representatives from army, navy, coastguard, Mumbai police and city mayor along with his family members and some politicians too paying their respects to him.

Union civil aviation minister Hardeep Puri also stated that Pilot Sathe was one of the “most experienced and distinguished commanders – Deepak Sathe. He had landed on this airfield as many as 27 times, including this year. He was a very accomplished, experienced, decorated person in command of the aircraft. There is absolutely no doubt over their competence.”

So here we take a look at some things that truly made him into an inspiration and not someone we should forget easily:Sathe Probably Saved Many LivesMany people often get confused at the low number of death rate in the crash considering how much damage to the aircraft there was.

However, it seems that might be because of the quick thinking of the pilots themselves more than anything.

Reports reveal that according to aviation experts, the decision by Sathe and Kumar to shut off the engines after touch down was very important since it ensured that the plane did not catch fire.

This eventually ended up saving the lives of many passengers who have died if the engines had caught fire and resulted in a bigger death rate.

https://edtimes.in/late-air-india-pilot-captain-deepak-sathes-traits-which-made-him-a-real-hero/

parkfell

11th Aug 2020, 17:49

If this is directed towards me then no, I haven’t.

Please enlighten me, I’m eager to know.

Re read #142 & # 155.
Might give you a ‘favour’ of Indian aviation.

fox niner

11th Aug 2020, 20:00

Reports reveal that according to aviation experts, the decision by Sathe and Kumar to shut off the engines after touch down was very important since it ensured that the plane did not catch fire.

well...Take a look:
Certainly not the case.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1242x1175/b30363c2_84db_468b_80ec_fda476e9add1_94fc1a948a1548b878837e1 fb189e60c5a9957e6.jpeg

RetiredBA/BY

11th Aug 2020, 20:01

Vref F40 is 141kias at 65ton, min add +5 (if gusty wind maybe they used +15??) gives 157kias on the MCP, correct for pressure/temp results in 162ktas and with 14kts tailwing gives the 176kts groundspeed
.....and landed half way down the very wet runway and expected to stop !!!!!! Seriously ?

Look no further gentlemen, it was a b awful decision and landing.

gearlever

11th Aug 2020, 20:06

Where is that photo coming from?

JumpJumpJump

11th Aug 2020, 22:41

I have to wonder who was the PF on this flight. If it was the FO, why didn’t the PIC assume control or call for a go around earlier? If it was the PIC, I’m curious to know if the FO spoke up (was assertive enough) to call for a go around earlier? Surely he couldn’t have just sat there & done nothing, watching his PIC mishandle the aircraft.

And if both seats were occupied by captains.....Maybe the cockpit gradient was too shallow....

.... I speculate

Airbubba

11th Aug 2020, 23:03

But both seats weren't occupied by captains. The FO had 1073 hours total flight time according to the Minister of Civil Aviation.

C310driver

12th Aug 2020, 00:05

Re read #142 & # 155.
Might give you a ‘favour’ of Indian aviation.

Thank you. So clearly not the epitome of excellent CRM & human factors.

parkfell

12th Aug 2020, 06:38

You may wish to cross reference this event with the Karachi A.320 fatality in May ~ PIA 8303
The interim report was published in June.

stoneangel

12th Aug 2020, 07:15

well...that's air india.....a accident nearly every 5 years...

pineteam

12th Aug 2020, 08:05

According to news reports Captain Sathe was given a state funeral today for his heroism.

https://edtimes.in/late-air-india-pilot-captain-deepak-sathes-traits-which-made-him-a-real-hero/

Are those people serious?! smh

Wannabe Flyer

12th Aug 2020, 08:10

I don't think state funeral is the correct analogy. Since he is ex armed forces he is entitled to a funeral as per military protocol at the armed forces crematorium along with the gun salute. Read as much into the state funeral as you will about switching off the engines. Over eager narrative that is searching for heroes where there are none.

DaveReidUK

12th Aug 2020, 08:17

Are those people serious?! smh

The ED Times article contains other gems, including the following from the Captain's cousin:

Landing gears didn’t work.
Ex IAF pilot made three rounds of airport to empty the fuel which saved plane from catching fire. That’s why there was no smoke seen coming from the crashed aircraft.
He turned off the engine right before the crash.
He belly landed after the 3rd iteration.
The right wing was ruptured.
The Pilot martyred but saved life of 180 co-passengers.

As well as the editorial comment:

... the plane crashed due to bad weather that had made the runway slippery and led to the plane being unable to make a safe landing.

The flight ... overshot the table-top runway at the airport due to heavy rains.

So no need for an investigation report.

pineteam

12th Aug 2020, 08:29

Gizm0

12th Aug 2020, 08:30

Before everyone gets too upset / indignant / outraged about how the Indian press & general public have reacted to this extraordinary accident then perhaps they should reflect upon the way the initial press reports of the Kegworth 737 accident at East Midlands were written. In particular the captain (small c here!) was hailed as a hero for saving so many lives..........

Maninthebar

12th Aug 2020, 08:31

They crashed cause they landed half the runway and apparently tried to go around on top of that. Sure let's wait for for the investigation report but calling him a hero is an insult to all the innocent people who lost their life.

I may have missed it but is there evidence, as opposed to conjecture, that either of the above happened?

pineteam

12th Aug 2020, 08:43

Arun Kumar, Director-General for Civil Aviation, told CNN News-18 on Saturday that the plane landed about 3,000 feet into a 9,000 feet-long runway, causing it to breach a further 240-meter (787 feet) safety area at high speed and crash into a valley beyond.
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/dgca-chief-suggests-pilot-error-in-ai-crash/article32313766.ece

Maninthebar

12th Aug 2020, 08:46

Thank you, so a third of the way along (not half). Look I am not saying that crew actons were faultless but there seems to be a lot of jumping to conclusions.

pineteam

12th Aug 2020, 09:00

You are welcome. Yes sorry I have exaggerated a bit. But it drives me crazy that so many people think he is a hero when clearly he is not.

parkfell

12th Aug 2020, 10:40

Start at #178 and add to it with credible information and pictures from the crash site. Look at AVHerald.com for additional information.
A matter for conjecture ~ why didn’t they divert......

parkfell

12th Aug 2020, 11:20

....... perhaps they should reflect upon the way the initial press reports of the Kegworth 737 accident at East Midlands were written. In particular the captain (small c here!) was hailed as a hero for saving so many lives..........

They were unfortunate to encounter the M1 motorway and the westerly embankment.
Just that bit higher gliding past it might have been a whole different story?
The popular press do tend to create a story.

The AAIB of course eventually painted a somewhat different picture from that of hero.
Let us hope the Indian authorities are as punctilious as their UK AAIB counterparts.

Rigid Rotor

12th Aug 2020, 14:09

Hey, "Airbubba" Dude, I presume you too are a "Pilot" ???
I knew this Officer - as a fellow Test Pilot.
Let's cut some slack here, may we please?
I agree that that putting the Captain on a pedestal ( mostly initiated by a retired Air Marshal of the IAF, who must have been his immediate superior in some capacity a long time ago and perhaps in good faith) - was definitely premature.
It also may be appearing increasingly evident that the landing may have been botched.
But does that excuse you for using the sarcasm here ??? Against a chap who really cannot defend himself now?
Take a break fella, will you please?

Airbubba

12th Aug 2020, 15:25

It also may be appearing increasingly evident that the landing may have been botched.
But does that excuse you for using the sarcasm here ??? Against a chap who really cannot defend himself now?

Not sure what sarcasm you think I'm using. I put 'pilot' in quotes since the early news stories said the 'pilot' turned off the 'engine'. Obviously there were two pilots and two engines. Similar stories of 737's circling to dump fuel appear in American media as well. However, like the A320's with dual bogies, Boeing probably built a 737 with fuel dump for some customer that I don't know about (yet).

Are you familiar with Captain Sathe's earlier crash? Was it a Hindustan MiG-21? The inspiring story of his recovery after being told that he would never fly again is reminiscent of the medical saga of SR-71 pilot Brian Shul.

alf5071h

12th Aug 2020, 15:55

Airbubba,
Human actions, statements, are influenced by their point of view.
Thus perhaps with a more worldly view, your comments, seen by some to be offensive or misjudged, could be reconsidered to reflect cultures other than yours - US ?

This issue also relates to other posts in this thread which are blinked by a single point of view, personal experiences, 'home' culture - national, organisational, or professional.

Accidents can be generalised as involving the situation and context.

Situation - factual; evidence of the situation at the time the event occurred. This cannot be easily judged by others without the facts from recordings nor specialist interpretation.

Context - subjective; beliefs, motivations, perceptions and values of the individuals involved. Any judgement of these will be subjective, according to viewpoint, and cannot be stated with any certainty.

More fruitful discussion might start with what is not known, opposed to what is attributed to 'fact'.

42go

12th Aug 2020, 16:07

"More fruitful discussion might start with what is not known"

OK, then, alf, for you:
Why touch down 1/3 of the way along a wet runway with a tailwind and marginal LDA?
Why not then go-round?

Fruitful discussion?

swh

12th Aug 2020, 16:31

Captain Hindsight,

Their first approach was in the other direction and they were unable to get in, they went around and tried RW28.

parkfell

12th Aug 2020, 16:50

alf...

Have you ever thought about posting your thoughts on a philosophy website where aspects of knowledge, existence and reality of CRM / accidents can be discussed from an academic point of view?

A UK cultural point of view...

Airbubba

12th Aug 2020, 17:08

Context - subjective; beliefs, motivations, perceptions and values of the individuals involved. Any judgement of these will be subjective, according to viewpoint, and cannot be stated with any certainty.

We must not be judgmental, several planes run off the runway in India every year in the monsoon season, it's a cultural thing can't be helped. The pilots didn't have the correct shared mental model, the stable approach criteria were not correctly applied in this case, there was a command gradient etc...

'Well, I admit the human element seems to have failed us here.' - General Buck Turgidson

DaveReidUK

12th Aug 2020, 17:41

Not sure what sarcasm you think I'm using. I put 'pilot' in quotes since the early news stories said the 'pilot' turned off the 'engine'. Obviously there were two pilots and two engines.

I made a similar point earlier on the thread:

BBC News reporting 15 fatalities, including "the pilot".

Like your post, it was intended as a criticism of the media coverage, certainly not as sarcasm at the expense of the deceased crew.

alf5071h

12th Aug 2020, 18:01

42go,
As yet, there is no factual evidence (for accident investigation purposes opposed to a legal view) stating the touchdown position. Similarly, the tailwind value is unknown; forecast, reported (when), accuracy of recording, unknown, … some of the uncertainties which pilots have to manage every flight.

'Marginal landing distance' is subjective - it implies that the margins of performance were known beforehand, not as assumed with hindsight.
What was the landing distance required as defined by national / operator requirements - not referenced so far; nor the basis of aircraft performance (repeated questioned in previous posts), then what procedure or guidance as to how this is used; e.g. additional factors, considering next worst case runway condition (no facts as to what the crew were told nor the actual runway conditions - including grooved or not, rubber contamination, …)

We need to reflect on our own experiences. How often do we judge the actual point of touchdown - how precise, what was the achieved landing distance opposed to what was expected, again how would we know, runway braking action, tyre tread wear.

For those who have flown a go around in similar circumstances - what was the trigger factor which changed the original plan, why.
"Why', how did this situation differ from similar marginal approaches with a satisfactory landing.
If we can answer why, then this is a basis for questioning the crews action, always subjective, even if we have assumed certainty.

parkfell

12th Aug 2020, 19:25

......
"Why', how did this situation differ from similar marginal approaches with a satisfactory landing.
......
I doubt from the information available that this was a ‘marginal approach’. In other words the approach was not stable under generally accepted criteria and merited a go around and diversion.
As things are never black and white, a marginal approach might be regarded as in the ‘grey area’ where on a good day ‘your get away with it’ given the built in safety margin into performance criteria. Regrettably that was clearly not the case here.
The holes in the “Swiss Cheese” unfortunately aligned.

I am not entirely convinced that a ‘satisfactory landing‘ always occurs from a marginal landing.
Satisfactory would infer that the outcome (from a marginal approach) was never in doubt.
Again not the case here.

alf5071h

12th Aug 2020, 21:23

parkfell, #223, CRM.
If you are able to identify which aspects of CRM were poor, or even what CRM consists, and how applied (not the oft quoted academic definition), then we might consider the 'reality' of CRM

The occurrence - reality, of 'CRM accidents' is that we, the industry, assume that CRM, monitoring, intervention, etc, will aways work; it doesn't.
In order to understand this we need answer how CRM factors - HF coincide with other aspects of the situation result in an accident. Only then might we discuss the practicalities in operation and why these differ from the academic concepts.

#227, the question 'why' was asked of you, not the accident crew.
If we are able to first understand ourselves, then we might ask similar questions about this accident, but don't expect anything other than subjective opinion.

Satisfactory outcome is judgement after the fact; we can never ensure a satisfactory outcome, only mitigate the risk which we perceive.

C310driver

12th Aug 2020, 23:24

I want to know what you’re smoking, it must be the good stuff.

The Boeing FCTM guidance leaves no doubt that if an approach is unstabilised, the flight crew MUST go-around. That is not up for debate. I suggest you look up Recommended elements of stabilised approach.

Yes absolutely, not all unstabilised approaches result in accidents BUT most ALAR are the result of an unstabilised approach. Look this up if you think I’m making stuff up.

Operating an airworthy aircraft isn’t mystical. There are systems in place. However when there are multiple inflight failures, then of course, all bets are off.

CRM wasn’t effective in this case because - the investigation report will have the cause for that. They will answer the WHY did it happen question. This forum is to get a clue of the WHAT happened. If you get what I mean?

C310driver

12th Aug 2020, 23:45

For those who have flown a go around in similar circumstances - what was the trigger factor which changed the original plan, why.
"Why', how did this situation differ from similar marginal approaches with a satisfactory landing.
If we can answer why, then this is a basis for questioning the crews action, always subjective, even if we have assumed certainty.

If a VERY highly experienced ex Air Force ‘Wing Commander‘, ex test pilot, training captain cannot judge ‘why’ the need for a timely go-around, then sorry, he has no place in command of an airliner, full of passengers.

How did this situation differ? Are you serious? Have you not been reading other posts in this thread? Long landing? Wet runway? Tailwind? Marginal weather? This is basic Threat & Error Management.

If anything, he should have been go-around minded right from the start of the approach. In fact he was during the first approach to Runway 28. Why didn’t he go around again on the subsequent approach to Runway 10? The officials say he still had plenty of fuel onboard.

Lookleft

13th Aug 2020, 01:04

Airbubba

13th Aug 2020, 01:48

Some pilot views on the mishap from the Hindustan Times and the Press Trust of India.

‘Kozhikode plane crash not an accident but murder’: Air safety expert Capt Mohan RanganathanRanganathan explained how table-top runways, the one in the case of the Kozhikode airport, have very little space and therefore require more safety features. “There’s no escape for an aircraft if it overruns,” Ranganathan told HT.INDIA Updated: Aug 08, 2020 16:01 IST
Aditi Prasad | Edited by Spar****a Saxena

Hindustan Times, New Delhi - If appropriate steps are not taken, accident similar to Friday’s airplane crash in Kozhikode could occur next at Patna, Jammu airports, air safety expert Captain Mohan Ranganathan said in a conversation with Hindustan Times. During the interview, Ranganathan, who is a member of a safety advisory committee constituted by the civil aviation ministry, said he had submitted a report around nine years ago, warning that the Calicut (now Kozhikode) airport was not safe for landings.

“The warnings were ignored... in my opinion, it is not an accident but a murder. Their own audits have had flagged safety issues” Ranganathan said, adding that the crash could have been well avoided.

Ranganathan explained how table-top runways, the one in the case of the Kozhikode airport, have very little space and therefore require more safety features.

“There’s a drop of around 70 metres at the end of the runway at the Kozhikode airport, in the case of Mangalore it is about a 100 metres. There’s no escape for an aircraft if it overruns,” he explained.

“You will find another major accident either in Patna or Jammu airport. Both of them are dangerous airfields and don’t have safety features” he said.

“I understand that Runway 10 ILS is being used on a trial basis at Calicut. Some of the crew are accepting even VOR approach on Runway 10. The reason is the lower minima than Runway 28. However, all the flights that land on Runway 10 in tailwind conditions in rain, are endangering the lives of all on board,” he had said.

He also said that the airport does not have the minimum Runway End Safety Area (RESA).

“The runway strip is just half the minimum width laid down in ICAO Annex 14. This fact was known to the DGCA team that has been conducting inspections and safety assessments during the past several years. Have they considered the danger involved? Has the DGCA or the airlines laid down any operational restrictions or special procedures?” he had written.

At least 18 people, including the pilot and the co-pilot, have been killed as Air India Express flight IX 1344 overshot the runway at Kerala’s Kozhikode airport and fell into a valley, breaking into two on Friday evening. The flight was bringing Indians stranded in Dubai amid Covid-19 pandemic under the government’s Vande Bharat Mission.

Video interview of Captain Ranganathan in the article linked below.

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kozhikode-plane-crash-not-an-accident-but-murder-air-safety-expert-capt-mohan-ranganathan/story-FmzwXnfwCFbUYgFQm7ySwJ.html

Wrong Call By Pilots Among Many Likely Reasons For Kerala Crash: ExpertsThe dominant reason cited by the experts was the decision by the pilots to not divert the plane to another airport after the first attempt to land at the designated strip failed amid rain. All India (https://www.ndtv.com/india) Press Trust of India (https://www.ndtv.com/topic/press-trust-of-india)

Updated: August 11, 2020 11:03 pm IST

New Delhi: A gust of wind, wrong decision by the pilots, the condition of the air strip and even faulty indication by the instrument landing system could be possible reasons for the crash of the Air India Express on Friday in Kerala's Kozhikode, according to aviation experts.

The dominant reason cited by the experts was the decision by the pilots to not divert the plane to another airport after the first attempt to land at the designated strip failed amid rain.

The Boeing 737, bringing back 190 stranded Indians from Dubai, broke into pieces after it overshot the table-top runway 10 and fell into a valley 35 feet below, leaving 18 people including both the pilots dead.

"It is foolish to land with a tailwind on a wet runway...This is what I have been pointing out for years. I said in 2011 that landing with a tailwind in rain on runway 10 will result in an accident one day," leading expert Captain Mohan Ranganathan told PTI.

Mr Ranganathan was a member of the operations group of the Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Committee (CASAC) in 2011. He has been a part of various other safety committees of aviation regulator DGCA.

As the investigators begin probe into the accident, another aviation expert referred to the "widely recognised Swiss Cheese" model while talking about possible reasons for the crash that included breaking apart of the plane's fuselage.

"Any aeroplane accident that happens is never dependent on a single factor. Top air accident investigation teams across the world believe in the Swiss Cheese model. It says that only when the holes of all the slices of Swiss cheese get aligned, then only an accident happens," the expert said on condition of anonymity.

"It is just a metaphor. The Swiss cheese has lot of holes. If you put slices of Swiss cheese in a string and spin them, there will be one in a million times that all the holes would be aligned. That will be a precursor to an accident," he explained.

The expert said the reasons for the crash could include environmental factor, human factor, technical factor, health of the plane, administrative factor and external factor like what the air traffic controller is telling the pilots.

He said a sudden gust of wind leading to a wrong decision by the pilots, condition of the aircraft, wrong signalling by the instrument landing system or pure human error could be some of the reasons for the crash.

"It can be a multiple reasons. We cannot speculate. Wind speed could be a reason. When you are at low speed, you are susceptible to impact of the wind. One gust of wind can play havoc," he explained.

The runway 10 at the Kozhikode airport is approximately 2,700 metres long. The aircraft touched down approximately 1,000 metres from the beginning of runway 10 while landing, according to the AAI.

Captain S S Panesar, former director of flight safety and training at the Indian Airlines said the pilot should have diverted immediately to one of the nearby airports like Trivandrum or Bengaluru after he did not succeed in its first attempt to land on runway 10 in bad weather condition, using the instrument landing system (ILS).

The ILS uses radio beams to give pilots vertical and horizontal guidance while landing the plane.

"The authorities have found the DFDR (digital flight data recorder) and CVR (cockpit voice recorder), but one thing will remain unanswered, that why didn't he divert?" Mr Panesar asked.

The experts said the flight data recorder would give the investigators condition of the health of the aircraft, while the cockpit voice recorder will provide details of what the pilots were thinking and what they were going through before the crash.

Captain Deepak Sathe was the pilot-in-command and Captain Akhilesh Kumar was the first officer of the flight AIX1344.

According to the AAI, the visibility at Kozhikode airport when the flight landed was 2,000 metres.

The Kozhikode airport is a CAT-1 airport where flights can land with visibility of 801110 [sic] metres or more. At a CAT-IIIB airport, the runway visual range can be as low as 50 metres.

B737 is one of the most popular aircraft models of Boeing. According to the aircraft manufacturers' operations manual, a B737 plane can satisfactorily land or take off when the tailwinds are not more than 15 knots.

A former DGCA official told PTI that the accident could have been averted had the runway been extended some more during the last few years.

In 2017, the AAI had attempted to procure land to extend the runway, but it was not able to do so as the land acquisition was proving to be expensive and there was stiff resistance from locals, said the official.

Addressing the questions on runway 10, Civil Aviation Minister Hardeep Singh Puri said on Monday the airport is equipped with Runway End Safety Area (RESA) as per International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

Ten years back, an Air India Express aircraft overshot the table top runway at Mangalore airport, fell into a gorge and caught fire, resulting in loss of 158 lives.

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/air-india-express-plane-crash-experts-cite-pilots-wrong-decision-as-major-reason-for-kozhikode-crash-2277999

C310driver

13th Aug 2020, 03:04

One for the HF people.At what point in the human thought process does logic, training, experience and sound judgement get trumped by presonitis and wishful thinking? In both of the recent accidents professional pilots shake their head at why an approach was continued but I have no doubt that the PIC of both aircraft would have been also shaking their heads in disbelief if they were reviewing the sequence of events.

This is a great question, thank you!

I would guess when the loss of situational awareness, target fixation and/or overconfidence sets it, they create for a very slippery situation in the cockpit. Add to that a steep cockpit gradient, an FO who is unwilling to speak up to a very senior Captain and the situation can go from a boring flight to a very very sudden life or death situation.

I have flown with some captains who’s SA was so bad, that they had no idea what they were bringing upon themselves had I not been assertive (think 4 whites on short final and not self-correcting). Then again, nobody is perfect, but that’s the reason there’s another pilot upfront, to prevent one guy from killing everybody else on the aeroplane, due to losing situational awareness & overconfidence.

What do the other senior pilots/captains think?

Roj approved

13th Aug 2020, 04:10

These "AIR SAFETY EXPERTS" are making some of the right noises, but, how about focussing on a few of these areas:
Stabilised Approaches, Long Landings, Tail Wind Limitations, woeful CRM, lack of Runway Grooving, Poor ATC equipment and standards, Approach Aids U/S, FLT limitation breaches, Fake Licenses, Recurrent Training Scams, Company Pressure, the list goes on.

I flew in India over 10 years ago, mainly in the South, and the ATC standard was woeful back then, and I doubt it has improved much. Being able to argue with the controller to get yourself a better position in the sequence, getting "Vectored" toward terrain in a Non Radar Procedural TMA below MSA, disregarding procedure entries onto approaches that take you below MSA so you can save a few minutes, it was mind boggling.

Like all countries, there where some great pilots, but there where also some very average ones. I can assure you, I am no Ace of the Base, but I understand the importance of the SOP and the responsibility I have to the passengers and crew.

Back then, F/O's were NOT allowed to land during the "Monsoon Season", July to October. ie: no PF sectors at all for those months. (I don't know if this is still the case?) It could be a CAVOK day on the East Coast, eg VOMM, but the F/O's were prohibited from acting as PF?? Their skills were eroded quickly during these months. Remembering, a lot of these F/O's were straight from flying school into the RH seat of a Jet.

So when you are doing 6 sector days, in this sort of weather, it was very taxing. The good guys and girls were an asset during the bad weather approaches, the others would be varying degrees of useless to you, as they had no idea of why it was so hard, and what support to provide.

The resistance to Go Arounds and to a greater extent diverting was phenomenal. The questions of my manhood that were expressed on the radio when I went around once was unbelievable. Leading into these sort of comments about the runway being dangerous because WHEN you over run it, the terrain is dangerous, HOW ABOUT NOT OVER RUNNING THE RUNWAY?

Calicut, VOCL, is 64nm from Cochin, VOCI, which has an ILS ON RWY 27, into the prevailing wind. In fact, there are 5 ILS equiped Runways within 150nm.

It's good to see these "AIR SAFETY EXPERTS" highlighting some of the infrastructure issues in Indian aviation, but a possible look in the mirror for all the Standards departments of all the Airlines is in order. I am sure there will be findings from this accident similar to the Mangalore accident, and the PIA Karachi accident too.

Things need to change in the way these aircraft are operated, the way pilots are trained, and most importantly, the way the companies support the Crew everyday. Until this change is effected, these accidents will continue to occur.

parkfell

13th Aug 2020, 08:48

The AIR SAFETY EXPERTS and others know exactly what needs to improve, and what investment is required.
I suspect that will only occur when you can convince the Politicians that appropriate action is necessary.
How effective will the democratic process be in encouraging them to do the right thing?

This will occur at best at ‘glacier’ speed as the Cultural aspects will prove to be as solid as bedrock.

Don’t expect change anytime soon, as earthquakes aren’t that predictable.

Dave Gittins

13th Aug 2020, 12:16

Apols if I have missed it but why (is it conjectured) that after an approach to 27 with a wind of 240 (and apparently a GS of 149 kts) were approaches to 10 (with a GS of 176 kts) then attempted. What was the reason ?

Uplinker

13th Aug 2020, 15:30

Better vis and lower minimums at the other end?

But a 10kt tailwind and torrential rain is a very bad combination. If you absolutely must do it, then you need to make a "carrier deck" landing and firmly plant it within the touchdown zone. Continuing a landing as they did when they must have known they had floated far beyond the touchdown zone, seems crazy. I really hope there is a technical reason for this crash, not a human one.

If there was that much rain, then there must presumably have been a cell of convective above the airport- so why attempt to land underneath a cell with the dangers of a microburst?, let alone the torrential rain, and potential turbulence.

Why not hold and wait for 20 mins until the cell has moved off? I have had this conversation with Captains a few times - what about the cell over the airport? - what about it? - well what about microburst? what about the torrential rain? why not wait or go somewhere else? = "No, it'll be fine". :ugh:

This Air India flight might have floated because of the outflow from a microburst at the other end of the runway.....

lomapaseo

13th Aug 2020, 16:39

Uplinker

Do monsoons in India really have cells that move on in an hour

swh

13th Aug 2020, 23:53

Yes they do.

Check Airman

14th Aug 2020, 04:14

Don't they do that in FL as well?

vilas

14th Aug 2020, 06:25

Monsoon rains come with a steady drizzle for the most part interspersed with strong short bursts which badly reduce visibility. Aircraft approaching minimums is forced to go round. It's deceptive because another aircraft may have landed just before or may be able to land after that. How long to hold will depend on fuel situation. But at critical airports the company OM should forbid tailwind landings in wet conditions.

alf5071h

14th Aug 2020, 06:45

C310driver, # 230
Unfortunately the world does not support an idealised 'procedural' approach to safety.

IF … the 'very experienced' 'well qualified' 'captain', cannot judge why: -

THEN … has no place in command of an airliner: -

EXCEPT … we are unable to identify the human weakness before the accident.

CAUTION … this procedure will significantly reduce the pilot population without improving safety.

Lookleft # 231
:ok:
Such questions defy answer; but we can think about them before, during, and after flight.

parkfell

14th Aug 2020, 07:23

vilas

14th Aug 2020, 08:10

Rw28 approach is between the hills and it appears that in rainy conditions has heavier showers. Pilots operating there regularly seem to have developed a work around to land on RW10 which will be in tailwind. It's a critical RW with a drop at the end and with some apprehensions about RW lighting. Whether the company has approved this or done it's math on Landing distance in tailwind with a little degraded friction about the margins is not known. If a pilot briefs for RW28 shouldn't be switching to RW10 in rain with TW without briefing which includes LD. If company OM had forbidden RW10 TW landing in rain this accident wouldn't have happened.

George Glass

14th Aug 2020, 08:56

There is a reason why many Pilots get to the end of a 40 year career without scratching the paint.
These Pilots are the backbone of every legacy carrier with sound safety records.
They are not management Pilots.
They are not ex-military egotists.
They are those that have long , deep experience , understand their operational environment and have an intimate knowledge of the operation and capabilities of their aircraft.
They are the ones that F/Os are happy to see at sign-on and not the ones who make their heads drop.
They have a good working knowledge of Company policy , but have a healthy disregard for Fuel Policy.
And they especially don’t listen to dissertations from policy managers and accountants.
They are comfortable in their aircraft.
Once the doors are closed the stress goes off , not up.
A diversion is a straight forward operational decision.
The Company’s reaction is irrelevant. If it is, start looking elsewhere.
The reason these sort of incidents keep happening with monotonous regularity is because more and more operators have less and less regard for these Pilots that make up the core of any successful airline.
No amount of investigation or analysis of events after the fact will change this reality.

C310driver

14th Aug 2020, 09:08

How about a combination of very successful military pilot, together with ‘Cultural’ as described in this thread.
SKYGODS & ‘Ace of the base’ syndromes are part of the ‘Swiss Cheese’ ingredients ~ the holes.

C310driver..#229..just what is he on?

Obviously, on some of nature’s finest..

It’s quite obvious, from the testimonies of pilots here who have flown in that region, that the sky gods are thriving. So I have no doubt in my mind, that its going to play a major part in this accident. Let’s see what the CVR reveals.

vilas

14th Aug 2020, 13:06

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.b737.org.uk/asrs_throttle_sensitivity.htm&ved=2ahUKEwjbkp6v3ZfrAhVszTgGHcSXAukQFjAAegQIBhAB&usg=AOvVaw3BPoC4_RR9VKfeYyTCVqr5
Can B737 800 guys respond to this please?

Airbubba

14th Aug 2020, 15:35

Here's the text from the article linked above.

5 May 2018 - NASA ASRS report issued into 737NG Throttle Sensitivity5/9/2018 FOR YOUR INFORMATION 2018-77/3-9

ACN: 1531071 (tel:1531071)

From: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Re: B737NG Throttle SensitivityNASA Aviation Safety Reporting SystemWe recently received an ASRS report describing a safety concern that may involve your area of operational responsibility. We do not have sufficient details to assess either the factual accuracy or possible gravity of the report. It is our policy to relay the reported information to the appropriate authority for evaluation and any necessary follow-up. We feel you should be aware of the enclosed deidentified report.SynopsisB737-800 First Officer reported it is very easy to inadvertently nudge the throttles forward, out of idle, during landing causing the spoilers and reversers not to operate normally.Narrative 1Upon touchdown in the B737NG-800, it has been observed on more than one occasion that it is very easy to inadvertently nudge the throttles forward, out of idle, as the Pilot Flying (PF) reaches down to grab the reverse thrust levers. This can, and will cause the speed brake lever to move to the DOWN position, stowing the speed brakes, and locking out the reverse thrust levers from movement given the current aircraft logic sensing that the PF may intend to goaround. However, if the throttle movement out of idle was inadvertent and no go-around is intended, this situation has the combined negative effect of taking weight off the landing gear, reducing drag, and preventing the reverse thrust system from operating, resulting in less effective aircraft braking and increased landing distance.

Additionally, an inadvertent and virtually imperceptible nudge of the throttles out of idle upon landing is now an aircraft condition not detected by either the PF or Pilot Monitoring (PM) until either the speed brake lever moves to the DOWN position, or the reverse thrust levers will not move. The time that passes to recognize this unforeseen aircraft condition can cause several hundred or even a thousand or more feet of runway to be lost as the PF and PM detect the unanticipated aircraft configuration and initiate the corrected response to move the throttles back to idle, redeploy the speed brake lever back to the UP position, and re-acquire the reverse thrust levers and pull them to deploy the reverse thrust system. Several hundred, or even a thousand or more feet of runway landing distance can be critical at many of the airports and in many of the environmental conditions we fly into.

The force needed to inadvertently move the throttles out of idle upon touchdown is so small that it is easily undetectable by the PF. As the PF slides or moves the hand downward on the throttles toward the reverse thrust levers to grab and pull them, an inadvertent and very small force can be applied to the reverse thrust levers themselves or some other part of the throttle quadrant, moving it out of idle. The distance or throw needed to move the throttles out of idle causing this undesirable aircraft condition is very small. I would estimate .5 - 1 inch. This small distance, and the small force needed to cause the movement, is hard to detect contributing to the difficulty of immediately recognizing the aircraft's undesirable state.

In summary, the reason this event occurred on this flight and on other flights (observed by me happening to other crewmembers while I sat in the FO seat and in the jumpseat), is due to an aircraft deficiency. This deficiency can be compensated for by an aware PF, but can also be easily fixed by a modification to the aircraft's go-around logic.

Recommendations: Change the go-around logic in the B737 that moves the speed brake lever to the DOWN position and locks out reverse thrust lever movement, from throttle position "both thrust levers are retarded to IDLE", to 'both thrust levers are more than 33 degrees.' This would eliminate go-around logic activation for small, inadvertent movement of the throttles out of idle, as a greater throw of the throttles would be required for go-around logic to be employed. Add a note or caution in the LANDING section of the B737 Operating Manual to advise pilots of this possibility, and offer prevention techniques to minimize its occurrence. Adopting these recommendations may prevent a runway overshoot in the future.

http://www.b737.org.uk/images/thrustlevers.jpgCallback 1The reporter stated that this happened to him and has seen it several times, the inadvertent throttle movement during landing when reaching for the reverser handle. The reporter stated that during final approach, and just touching down, the go-around logic is that if the throttles are moved out of idle detent. Aircraft thinks the pilot intends to go-around and therefore spoilers will retract, the reversers will be locked out, the air/ground switch is still in air mode, (due to the spoilers retracting), and so the aircraft thinks it's still flying. The reporter stated that it becomes very chaotic until you realize what is actually happening. The reporter also stated that you start running out of runway very quickly.

The reporter stated that if the go-around logic was changed to, instead of just throttle movement, to throttle movement of more than 33 degrees to determine a go-around was intended, this would mitigate this inadvertent throttle movement issue. The reporter also stated that it would be helpful if the Flight Manual had information of the potential inadvertent throttle movement and a procedure to deal with it.SynopsisB737-800 First Officer reported it is very easy to inadvertently nudge the throttles forward, out of idle, during landing causing the spoilers and reversers not to operate normally.

This is an issue on most other Boeings as well where the reversers are locked out when the thrust levers are not at idle to prevent inadvertent deployment.