Does Australia need Long Range Firepower

[nomorecatering]

We just bough some new wizz bang long range area denial missiles. But do we need a great reach with our airforce than the limp wristed F35 or F18E can provide. Failing a new version of the B1, do we need something like the F15EX.

It seems like nuclear subs are also quetly comming on the agenda.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=msx-b6pI3pU

[TWT]

It seems like nuclear subs are also quetly comming on the agenda

Do you have a source for that info ? I very much doubt Australia has any intention of acquiring either nuclear powered or nuclear armed subs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack-class_submarine

[currawong]

“Australia needs to seriously consider moving to a nuclear-powered submarine force because, in the rapidly changing circumstances of the region, it is the best solution to meet the Royal Australian Navy’s demanding strategic and operational requirements.

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/maritime-antisub/5606-nuclear-sub-debate-continues-to-gain-traction-in-strategic-policy-community

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-needs-to-consider-the-nuclear-option-for-its-new-submarines/

[TWT]

Interesting, but despite advice from any number of well informed sources, I'd be very surprised if the politicians give nuclear powered subs the green light.

[cattletruck]

I read about these underwater drones (battery powered) that have a range of thousands of kilometers - they mostly glide underwater, downwards when the ballast tanks are full and glide upwards when empty, they even have solar panels to take up a charge when resting on the surface. Too small and too quiet for detection as they go about gathering their intel.

[currawong]

Interesting, but despite advice from any number of well informed sources, I'd be very surprised if the politicians give nuclear powered subs the green light.

So would I.

Point is, not that long ago nobody would waste their time even bringing it up.

[Lonewolf_50]

Interesting, but despite advice from any number of well informed sources, I'd be very surprised if the politicians give nuclear powered subs the green light. I saw what you did there - nice play on words. :D

FWIW a cheaper way to go for longer endurance is AIP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air-independent_propulsion) on a diesel submarine.
That tech is a few decades old, and is affordable. (Swedish, German, and Russian subs have all successfully demonstrated that kit)
Put a nuke tip on a Tomahawk, or similar submarine munition, and Bob's your uncle if what your Navy wants is a sub carried means to deliver a bucket of sunshine somewhere.

[Pontius Navigator]

Lonewolf, as you know, the nuclear has the advantage when it comes to mobility ie high speed transit.

[tartare]

Here's one of the two documents that form the latest Defence White paper update:
https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/2020_Force_Structure_Plan.pdf
The plans are ambitious, but my personal view is China will move faster than Australia will be able to develop the sort of capabilities that it needs.
I think any future engagement with China would largely be a skirmish based air-sea battle beyond visual range.
I absolutely agree the ADF needs long range force projection far in excess of what it has now.
The AGM-158 is a good start.
Some kind of diesel-electric boat - ideally unmanned is needed for the shallow waters of the South China sea - nuclear boats are too big to get close.
But the RAN does need nuclear boats with at least long range conventionally tipped cruise missiles to hold China at threat - US leased or procured.
By the time it arrives, the Collins successor will be a big lumbering out of date target.
I personally think Australia needs a full nuclear deterrent, but it'll never fly with the public or politicians.
And the idea that they'll be able to develop or even procure a domestic anti-ballistic missile system or hypersonic glide vehicles in a decade is laughable.
If you think US or UK defence procurement is a clvster**** - I'd argue Australia's is exponentially worse.
They'll still be fighting over the agenda for the committee meeting or trying to sort out problems with Zoom as the first Chinese landing craft hit the beaches.
The next 10 years are going to be a continuation of muddling through, and hoping like hell the US will step up if the CCP get too aggressive...

[Manwell]

Does Australia need?? Apparently Donald thinks so.

Donald wouldn't call the shots at this level WingNut. Way above his pay grade. Just because he's got the title of President doesn't mean he has supreme control.

[TWT]

Our US friends can confirm (or not) but my understanding is that the President of the USA is also Commander in Chief of the US Armed Forces.

https://www.justice.gov/file/20626/download

[Not_a_boffin]

I read about these underwater drones (battery powered) that have a range of thousands of kilometers - they mostly glide underwater, downwards when the ballast tanks are full and glide upwards when empty, they even have solar panels to take up a charge when resting on the surface. Too small and too quiet for detection as they go about gathering their intel.

And too slow and too comms limited to provide anything tactically useful beyond good environmental data

[Lonewolf_50]

Lonewolf, as you know, the nuclear has the advantage when it comes to mobility ie high speed transit. To be sure, but that speed comes at a significant cost premium and isn't as necessary if you are assessing a regional security situation rather than a global one. The problem (force structure wise) then becomes one of numbers.
When your strategic situation is primarily local regional defense and small expeditionary operations within a region, the dash capacity isn't as critical "to get there" but one still does run into the patrol length problem in any event when using non nukes. Nukes can stay out a lot longer.
Depending on your regional coverage requirements, and your need to have an asset 'positioned within X nm of operations zone Y' (since we are not talking an ICBM style of capability in my suggestion) you will eventually discover a rotation scheme that will probably increase the number of boats, total, and manpower, total, one would need to establish at least a credible deterrent of the kind I mentioned.
Still cheaper than running nukes, though.

Establishing the infrastructure and industrial plant for a nuclear powered sub fleet is bloody expensive. That is one of the factors that led the Government of India to eventually return the Charlies to the Soviets that had been lent/tried out in the 80's. (There was some question at the time of them choosing to establish an autonomous capability ... but it's been a few years, I think I need to follow up on that ...)

More than one way to peel the onion; most national ecnomies can't or won't afford that nuclear capability. The up front costs are non trivial.
I'd expect to see the Japanese do it long before the Aussies.

[West Coast]

Lonewolf, as you know, the nuclear has the advantage when it comes to mobility ie high speed transit.

The flip side being a nuke is louder, more expensive to purchase, maintain and then dispose of.

Not to mention the hoopla and hurdles on civilian buy off.

[keesje]

The F15E has great performance, it is very proven, can carry a good load over longer distances, and it is a flying radar reflector

It can easily can be spotted & tracked from far, by so-so radar systems.

[Asturias56]

The flip side being a nuke is louder, more expensive to purchase, maintain and then dispose of.

Not to mention the hoopla and hurdles on civilian buy off.

The RN just park theirs near major towns when they're out of service

[finestkind]

I believe Lang Hancock had something to say about nuclear missile defence of Australia.

[swh]

The F15E has great performance, it is very proven, can carry a good load over longer distances, and it is a flying radar reflector

It can easily can be spotted & tracked from far, by so-so radar systems.

A manned aircraft is not the answer, a variant of the Loyal Wingman is.

[Asturias56]

I guess the question is where are you going to fight and who are you fighting?

It's hard to see the Red Army ploughing through Indonesia so you're thinking of fighting the Chinese Navy and Air Force somewhere north of Indonesia & PNG. You have to ask if that is likely or effective unless you are fighting alongside the USA - in which case Australia is going to be a bit of a side-show to the main action which will take place much further north - Taiwan and the N Pacific

[Gnadenburg]

I guess the question is where are you going to fight and who are you fighting?

It's hard to see the Red Army ploughing through Indonesia so you're thinking of fighting the Chinese Navy and Air Force somewhere north of Indonesia & PNG. You have to ask if that is likely or effective unless you are fighting alongside the USA - in which case Australia is going to be a bit of a side-show to the main action which will take place much further north - Taiwan and the N Pacific

Yes. This is true. Policy seems pretty clear we won't be operating on our own. We will be operating with traditional and emerging allies.

Though no matter what the scenario, the RAAF will need to be mobile, potentially dispersed and expeditionary. Otherwise, the F35's are an airborne Maginot Line if solely Australian based. Operating from Indonesian or New Guinea bases, or from Malaysia and Singapore, the RAAF can patrol or interdict primary and secondary shipping lanes ( as was done in WW2 ) which are critical to China. I've attached a wayward article from Forbes has a nice map showing the huge distances involved.


There's considerable logic in a big, heavy fighter bomber like the new F15 if we are planning to fight a second rate power in the Indonesian archipelago. But China is all but named as the threat. And the F15's role was to work with the range limited F35's and Growlers anyways.


The Australian Air Force Can Send Just Two Fighters Into Battle With China (https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/07/05/the-australian-air-force-can-send-just-two-fighters-into-battle-with-china/#732d72bb17c3)

[Asturias56]

It would seem logical to start serious co-operation with the Indonesian's and the Philippines I'd say - the TNI has a big army , a small air force and a "coastal/brown water" navy. Working together with the RAN and the RAAF would give the high end high tech a big boost while leveraging a substantial ground force. If you HAVE to fight better to do it N of Sulawesi than outside Broome

[Gnadenburg]

Australia’s Strategic Update: What it means for Indonesia (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-defence-strategic-update-what-it-means-indonesia)


The Indonesian archipelago would play a critical strategic role in any confrontation with China- including further afield in north east Asia or Taiwan . China's vulnerability to energy and trade through the shipping routes is significant and it would not be difficult to blockade with regional cooperation. China is well aware of this which is why I find their current spread of aggression odd.

The article above provided an excellent overview of the complexities of dealing with Indonesia from an Australian perspective.

[TBM-Legend]

My Indonesian colleague who runs an airline there and has lived there for the past 30 years tells me that the weak point is West Papua and China has been pumping huge money into PNG and supporting the West Papua Movement through the "back door".

[tartare]

I guess the question is where are you going to fight and who are you fighting?

It's hard to see the Red Army ploughing through Indonesia so you're thinking of fighting the Chinese Navy and Air Force somewhere north of Indonesia & PNG. You have to ask if that is likely or effective unless you are fighting alongside the USA - in which case Australia is going to be a bit of a side-show to the main action which will take place much further north - Taiwan and the N Pacific

What makes you think they'd stay North of Indonesia?
They've had absolutely no problems coming right down to the Coral Sea!
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-14/chinese-war-ship-war-games-queensland-first-pictures/11308072#:~:text=The%20Chinese%20spy%20ship%20is,the%20month %2Dlong%20war%20games.
Have a look at a map to see how close that is.

[TBM-Legend]

China has a port and big airfield in Solomons, Vanuatu and has done a deal with Bougainville plus big bucks in PNG and a new arrangement in Kiribati. Check the map and approaches to Australia. Almost a copy of the Japanese blueprint in WW2...

[Asturias56]

"What makes you think they'd stay North of Indonesia?"

I don't see them trying to invade 273 million Indonesians - most of whom seem to have quite determined views on the Chinese.

[tartare]

With no disrespect intended - I think you're missing the point.
If we're talking hot war - they don't need to invade Indonesia - you're thinking land or land air campaign.
The PLA Navy are quite capable of denying Australian sea-lanes, interdicting or simply harassing shipping.
In fact they're transitioning right now from being a green water navy, to a blue water navy.
They have a nascent carrier capability to project air-power at distance and in addition, operate nearly 70 diesel electric and nuclear boats.

China could effectively sail right around Indonesia and any other country in the way and make things very, very difficult for Australia if it really needed to.
They don't need to put a single PLA boot on Australian soil, or anywhere else in South East Asia to do so.
In my view, that's the most likely scenario for a shooting war - a drawn out air-sea campaign at long distance, with isolated vessels sunk - jets shot down BVR - and if they got really irritated - drop a cruise missile or two with a conventional warhead on one or two Australian bases.
Not all out total war.

The yellow hordes aren't going to come sweeping over the Timor Sea in landing craft after they've blitzkrieged their way through every country between us and them.
What have we got that they want - some food producing land, a lot of mineral resources, and a few irritating US bases?
That would be a similar scenario to the one facing Japan during WW2, and why the Japanese were never seriously going to invade Oz.
The Japanese Naval high command was gung ho - but the Army said `don't be crazy, think of how long the supply lines would be.'
I think the Chinese are far more likely to get so cocksure that they'll feel they can reach out at long range and punch us a couple of times to remind us who's boss in the neighbourhood.

I agree with Hugh White's assessment.
We need nuclear powered boats with conventional cruise missiles, plus small diesel electrics for the work that's currently being done in the South China Sea littoral waters, and as many underwater UAVs as we can afford.
Not more surface ships and certainly not the Collins successor.
In addition to ABM defence interceptors, we need more F-35s and LRASMs.
And given the lead time we need to start thinking right now about a domestically developed nuclear deterrent.

EDIT: Noting that it is Wikipedia:

The PLAN's ambitions include operating out to the first and second island chains, as far as the South Pacific near Australia, and spanning to the Aleutian islands (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleutian_islands), and operations extending to the Straits of Malacca (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straits_of_Malacca) near the Indian Ocean.[127] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Navy#cite_note-AR2008-127) The future PLAN fleet will be composed of a balance of combatant assets aimed at maximising the PLAN's fighting effectiveness. On the high end, there would be modern destroyers equipped with long-range air defense missiles (Type 052B (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_052B_destroyer), Type 052C (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_052C_destroyer), Type 052D (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_052D_destroyer), Type 051C (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_051C_destroyer) and Type 055 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_055_destroyer)); destroyers armed with supersonic anti-ship missiles (Sovremenny class (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovremenny_class_destroyer)); advanced nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines (Type 093 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_093_submarine), Type 095 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_095_submarine), Type 094 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_094_submarine), Type 096 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_096_submarine)); advanced conventional attack submarines (Kilo (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilo_class_submarine) and Yuan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_041_submarine) classes); aircraft carriers (Type 001A (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_001A_aircraft_carrier), Type 002 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_002_aircraft_carrier) and Type 003 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_003_aircraft_carrier)) and large amphibious warfare vessels (Type 071 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_071_amphibious_transport_dock) and Type 075 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_075_landing_helicopter_dock)) capable of mobilizing troops at long distances.

[keesje]

What have we got that they want - some food producing land, a lot of mineral resources, and a few irritating US bases?

Is this for real. Some weapon industryvlobbyist can learn something here.

[Asturias56]

"As the strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific deteriorates, Australia’s relationship with Indonesia will assume even greater importance. Canberra must be ready to accept, however, that despite growing strategic convergence, its views will not always align with those in Jakarta, and there are relationship risks ahead that require policy consideration now" -thanks gnadenburg - it's clearly an issue - not everything each country values is the same in the other - but it may be a case of my enemies enemy is my friend I suspect in this case.

[Asturias56]

tatare - I think you need to remember the distances - from the northern most point of Iran Jaya to Darwin is 1400 kms - as post 20 points out that really restricts how many RAAF fighters can go north (2) and that applies in spades to anyone coming the other way. It's easy to say " the Chinese can just sail around Indonesia" but from the N end of the Philippines to New Caledonia by sea is 6700 kms - roughly the same as from Murmansk to Boston Harbor

[tartare]

...and do those sorts of distances prove any obstacle at all to a fully embarked Chinese nuclear powered carrier?
China is rapidly developing that capability - the Type 004.
Or to a nuclear powered submarine?
Their boats might be noisy now... how about in a decade?
Or to a large unmanned, underwater vehicle?
Cheaper and quicker to develop than anything manned.
Following the logic of your argument, absent ICBMs, Australia shouldn't need to worry about a military threat from China because we're simply too far away, and the Indonesians and others are an obstacle?
In the medium to long term, the threat clearly is not just focused north of Indonesia, or PNG for that matter, or predicated on the Chinese having large, well developed bases in Thailand or the South West Pacific to operate from.
Anyone who believes Chinese assertions that they are simply defending to the Nine Dash Line or their immediate neighbours is naive in my view.
Every sign points towards them wanting long term to hold at threat a huge arc from the Bay of Bengal, down as far as the Coral Sea, and possibly even out as far as the mid Pacific.

[Lookleft]

For me the issue is not how many carriers and subs the Chinese military has but its the way they are controlled and commanded. Central command such as the CCP has over the military does not lend itself to the flexibility and swiftness of decision making that would be required in a major conflict. It was only after Stalin took away the political control of its military that it started to perform well. The Japanese also seriously uinderestimated US industrial capacity when they thought they could knock the US out of the Pacific. I can see the CCP making the same mistake as they view their system of government to be morally and culturally superior. The hope is that the current defense policy is sufficient to warn the CCP that Australia is not asleep at the wheel and that our current diplomatic position indicates that we are not easily intimidated (unless you're a Labor politician).

[tartare]

... The hope is that the current defense policy is sufficient to warn the CCP that Australia is not asleep at the wheel and that our current diplomatic position indicates that we are not easily intimidated (unless you're a Labor politician).

Absolutely - I concur.
To be clear, the likely scenario under which I see actual armed conflict happening is isolated long-range clashes.
Australia does or does not do something to which a hegemonic and aggressive China objects - and they take physical revenge at distance.
There was a very interesting line or two in the policy that seemed to allude to developing some sort of Australian SOSUS type capability.
Also that the eastern arc of JINDALEE would be expanded.
That spoke volumes in terms of the proximity of the threat to the Australian coast, and new directions it might come from.

EDIT - there's already quite a bit of hardware on the seafloor further north...
https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2020/01/15/sound-surveillance-system-sosus-the-fish-hook-that-catches-chinese-submarines/

[West Coast]

...and do those sorts of distances prove any obstacle at all to a fully embarked Chinese nuclear powered carrier?



A nuclear powered carrier doesn’t sail alone. If their strategy is like that of the US, the Carrier is at the center of a battle group, many of the accompanying ships are conventional and will need underway replenishment. The carrier itself will need replenishment to service the air wing.

The Chinese are not immune to the basic logistic challenges other nations have, nuclear powered or not.

[Gnadenburg]

Although some quarters are suggesting Australia arm itself heavily in area denial capabilities, to "rip the arm off" a potential aggressor in the South West Pacific, I think this is more a firm and reliable commitment to the US alliance.

Australia did not feature in War Plan Orange. Though once the US bloodied, in the opening months of WW2, Australia became important strategically in the Battle of the Pacific. The Japanese addressed this, although did not have the capabilities to interdict US operations over the vast distances required. US submarine operations for instance, based out of Fremantle WA, operated into the no-less significant today ( to the Chinese if the Malacca blockaded ) maritime choke points of Sunda/Lombok/Bali straits. With advancing technologies and the vulnerabilities of US bases further north, Australia is slowly featuring heavily in US planning. Stockpiling of munitions and fuel is a clear indicator. No different to WW2 except that this time around, Australia should be far better equipped for the types of conflicts envisaged. With a Fifth Generation air force and a naval build up underway ( though oddly lagging sub-surface ) the Australian military is being well positioned to integrate with the US in countering China militarily. As well as adding to the efforts of deeper developing alliances with regional countries at varying levels.

[West Coast]

You make a good point. Other than an initial skirmish, I don’t anticipate any one nation will militarily oppose China. If the Chinese carrier sails towards Australia with ill intent, there will be a number of nations involved.

[ozbiggles]

Might need to tool up a little quicker after poking the bear today.

[Asturias56]

I read that Kings Bay cost the US taxpayer over $ 5Bn dollars in 2017 cash terms for the base alone. You'd have to buy the boats from the Americans (doubtful), the Brits (impossible) as they can't build fast enough) or of course the French . Interestingly the Brazilians are building their own SSN with French help but it was laid down in 2017 and isn't expected to be launched until maybe 2030.... notional cost for the vessel alone is $ 7.4 Bn

[tartare]

Ironically, we are already in effect procuring nuclear boats.
The attack class sub or Short-Fin Barracuda, is a diesel-electric modification of the French nuclear Barracuda class boat.
It's European, and a significant modification to an existing design, creating one of the largest diesel-electric boats in existence.
What could possibly go wrong...? :)

[Gnadenburg]

Other than an initial skirmish, I don’t anticipate any one nation will militarily oppose China. If the Chinese carrier sails towards Australia with ill intent, there will be a number of nations involved.

Plenty of scenarios. But let's not forget, Tindal is being developed and hardened for heavy US bomber operations.

The RAAF will be able to deploy many dozens of F35's and Super Hornets in the north ( Darwin-Tindal ). Integrated with all the add-ons of expanded Jindalee, early warning aircraft, tankers and ISR and electronic warfare aircraft. SAM's and ABM's are sort capabilities ( as China will develop longer range missiles ) . Anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities are being modernised- so with battles further north sending surface assets to the Arafura and Timor Sea unlikely and sub-surface will not be without risk too. So the US will have bases in Australia ably defended locally. Long range US aircraft have secure bases with the expected loss of Guam.

The lone-ranger scenarios of the RAAF operating over vast distances fill some scenarios but not all.