Here's something to keep you at the edge of your seat

[Check Airman]

Report: Bulgarian Charter MD82 at Lourdes on Jul 16th 2018, go around without thrust change (http://avherald.com/h?article=4d7fb6f3&opt=0)

Bulgarian Charter MD82 at Lourdes

[atakacs]

Wow wow wow

They where lucky to be in Lourdes by all means 😱

[Right Way Up]

Probably lucky they were not underslung engines or the actual go-around might have been very interesting.

[Bravo Zulu]

Wow.....

Made me think.. In this modern era of tech and surveillance etc. Is it routine at Airports now to record AC movements? I.e CCTV of the runway from the tower??

[atakacs]

Regardless of fatigue, tunnel vision, imperfect CRM or whatever...

If you see and feel that your aircraft is clearly not performing as expected isn't any airman first thought to check the thrust levelers ?

[DaveReidUK]

Taking into account the causes of the serious incident and the deficiencies found in the investigation, the Commission recommends that the following measures should be taken to ensure the flight safety:

BG.SIA-2018/08/01: AO "Bulgarian Air Charter" must organize and carry out additional theoretical CRM training course, and the A/C crewmembers, who have caused the serious incident, must undergo a flight simulator check.

BG.SIA-2018/08/02: During the next flight simulator training session, all MD-82 pilots of AO "Bulgarian Air Charter" to include an exercise with similar conditions for flight performance as in the case of the serious incident.

[parkfell]

Scary stuff indeed.
Even from day 1 when auto throttle is introduced for the first time on a B737-800 MCC/APS course, it can be highly addictive, similar I am told to ‘crack cocaine’....?
So from day 1 the trainees are taught to follow the thrust levers forward as TOGA button is pressed, and during any scheduled thrust changes.

From time to time they will forgot on the G/A, so A/T fail is smartly selected on the IOS panel and nature is allowed to take its course. They tend to remember in future......at least during the course.

[Cornish Jack]

Swiss cheese event again and the comments are valid. What I find surprising is the absence of any comment on the flying experience of the Captain! In so many threads the amassed hours total of the individual is touted as a mark of competence - maybe not?

[NumptyAussie]

Swiss cheese event again

May I please ask why you think this can be explained by the Swiss Cheese Model? (a serious question regarding the effectiveness of different types/styles/methods of incident investigation)

I would have thought that most incidences would be better explained by conducting a root cause analysis rather than a investigation into what barriers failed?

[lomapaseo]

One of the limits of root cause analysis is that "you can't fix stupid". OK a little strong when applied to this event, but one must be willing to look at any future actions at the machine level to lessen the result.

[Webby737]

May I please ask why you think this can be explained by the Swiss Cheese Model? (a serious question regarding the effectiveness of different types/styles/methods of incident investigation)

I would have thought that most incidences would be better explained by conducting a root cause analysis rather than a investigation into what barriers failed?

I don't think this is a case for the Swiss Cheese Model, there's not too many holes in the cheese that have lined up here.
The root cause analysis works better in this case and looking at the recommendations from the Bulgarian AAIB that appears to be what the investigators have done.

[NumptyAussie]

True.
I was taught that there must be a single causation event in order to bring the barriers into effect.

[Webby737]

True.
I was taught that there must be a single causation event in order to bring the barriers into effect.

Exactly, in this case it appears to be lack of or poor training / CRM.

[Judd]

Yet another classic example of automation dependency and blind addiction to flight director commands. Extract from the official report:

" After about 5 seconds and a 350m flight into the runway, the captain commanded “GO AROUND”, pressed the “TO/GA” button and started following the flight director arrows, further increasing the airplane's pitch, but not noticing that the thrust control unit (Autothrottle) was still OFF and did not put manually the throttle control in the required take-off position for a“Go Around”.

[eckhard]

Maybe the crew were used to not hearing the engines, (which are a long way aft of the flight-deck) and therefore this audible cue was not available to them? In other words, it sounded normal, even though it can’t have felt normal?

[highwideandugly]

It’s truly a miracle they survived 😁

[parkfell]

Exactly, in this case it appears to be lack of or poor training / CRM.

I believe that you have firmly “hit the nail on the head“

[misd-agin]

The value of having your hand on the throttles even when the A/T's are engaged. The BASIC crosscheck that we learned in Flying 101 still applies - aimpoint, airspeed, power. Repeat, repeat, repeat, repeat....idle, flare, land.

[atakacs]

In other words, it sounded normal, even though it can’t have felt normal?

Ok I can understand the mistake(s) but at some point they muss have felt it through their ass pants. This aircraft was clearly not getting the expected thrust - any pilot will check the thrust setting as a reflex.

At 07:35:27 (inferred value, not quoted explicitly) - After about 5 seconds and a 350m flight into the runway, the captain commanded “GO AROUND”,

At 07:35:36 AM, ALTradC1/// 66.328ft, speed CAS 124.00kts, the co-pilot retracted the flaps on the captain’s command from 40° directly to 11° (retracting time 17 seconds), and 3 seconds after the beginning of this process started the retraction of the landing gear ALTradC1/// 88.594ft, CAS 118.75kts, (retracting time 6 seconds),

At 07:35:47 AM, ALTradC1/// 71.797, CAS 119.5kts, the throttle controls were pushed aggressively forward from EPR 1.3 to EPR 1.9/20. Later on, he additionally move them forward to the maximum.

I don't know what would be typical in an MD82 but I'd expect would feel the TOGA thrust with 3-5 s of commanding it. There is no missing it - I find it unbelievable that the remained spectators for about 20s...

[Uplinker]

This illustrates why the Airbus FBW designers fitted TOGA switches that can only be manually activated by pushing the thrust levers fully forward.

The problem with having TOGA switches on the thrust lever handles is that you can press for TOGA without pushing the levers forward, and believe TOGA will result. You should also push the levers forward, but as we have seen too many times; when things start going wrong, the human brain can shut down when it cannot understand what is going on, and things get missed. I suspect that having pressed the TOGA switches, the PF believed the engines would spool up and his brain capacity was full while fighting to understand the situation and control the aircraft, so he did not check the thrust.

I believe Airbus designed their thrust control system to avoid this problem. Also, by not having the levers back driven, Airbus pilots are required to look at the N1/EPR gauges to confirm thrust changes and not rely on the proxy of moving levers: So they keep in practise of looking at the gauges, which of course is good practice anyway.

Another point is that if the approach conditions are blustery with significant crosswind and turbulence, it is useful to take manual control much earlier than 470' agl. 7 miles gives one time to "get in the groove" of blustery weather conditions and get your responses up to speed before getting to short finals and the flare :ok:

[PilotLZ]

Another point is that if the approach conditions are blustery with significant crosswind and turbulence, it is useful to take manual control much earlier than 470' agl. 7 miles gives one time to "get in the groove" of blustery weather conditions and get your responses up to speed before getting to short finals and the flare :ok:
Agreed on this one. However, many operators behind what used to be the Iron Curtain have an interesting attitude towards FDM parameter deviations, as well as towards the difference between an honest mistake and a violation. Which, in turn, often translates into reluctance to fly manually on part of many crews. It gets to the point where even some instructors frown upon pilots flying manually above 1000 feet AAL. While I'm in no way affiliated with the operator from the case study and have no idea whether that's the case with them, I wouldn't rule it out completely as I've heard of numerous such examples from other outfits in broadly the same part of the world.

[PPRuNeUser0184]

The level of incompetency in the LHS out there never ceases to amaze me

[EPHD75]

A good friend of mine who flew the type once told me ".....they do like to fly..." meaning they often land long...not good in the winter...

[sheppey]

as well as towards the difference between an honest mistake and a violation. Which, in turn, often translates into reluctance to fly manually on part of many crews. It gets to the point where even some instructors frown upon pilots flying manually above 1000 feet AAL
So true. Some pilots are lost without the automatics as their crutch. In this incident the captain hastily re-engaged the automatic pilot about three minutes after starting the badly executed manually flown go-around.

And who can forget the tragic crash into the sea of the Flash Air Boeing 737-300 following a night departure from Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. The aircraft slowly rolled to 111 degrees and 43 degrees nose down after the autopilot was disconnected within a few minutes after takeoff.
The CVR recorded the voice of the captain repeatedly shouting to the copilot to engage the autopilot even though the 737 was rolling past the vertical. Automation dependency at its worst.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_Airlines_Flight_604#History_of_the_flight

[Centaurus]

So from day 1 the trainees are taught to follow the thrust levers forward as TOGA button is pressed, and during any scheduled thrust changes.

Better to push the throttles to high power first, which ensures you have achieved power. Then press TOGA. This avoids the inevitable delay in obtaining high power if, after pressing TOGA, for some reason the throttles fail to advance.

[Global Aviator]

Similarities?

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20070916-0

1 2 Go, Phuket.

[Check Airman]

Better to push the throttles to high power first, which ensures you have achieved power. Then press TOGA. This avoids the inevitable delay in obtaining high power if, after pressing TOGA, for some reason the throttles fail to advance.

Agreed 100%

[parabellum]

I believe Airbus designed their thrust control system to avoid this problem. Also, by not having the levers back driven, Airbus pilots are required to look at the N1/EPR gauges to confirm thrust changes and not rely on the proxy of moving levers: So they keep in practise of looking at the gauges, which of course is good practice anyway.

Would this system have been fitted at the time the Air France A320 went into the trees at a French Airshow?

[Uplinker]

As I understand it, yes.

The accident you refer to was caused, I believe, by the pilots trying to be clever, ignoring the SOP and f*****g it up. They decided it would look impressive to rely on the Alpha floor protection system to automatically apply TOGA and lift them off the runway, giving them a touch-and-go without them touching the thrust levers. However, they hadn't read their manuals properly or they would have noticed that Alpha floor protection is inhibited below 100' RA on approach. So the system didn't apply TOGA for them and they crashed.


The only way to manually apply TOGA in the FBW Airbus is to move the thrust levers fully forward. This is a natural instinctive response and there are no other manual TOGA switches to confuse pilots - the levers must be moved fully forward to engage TOGA thrust, (and in this position, the FADECs will not over-thrust or over-heat the engines).


I don't know about the MD82 but in the 737-300/400 (tel:737-300/400) go-around the pilot has to: Press a TOGA switch, Push the levers to arm's length, (overriding the back-drive clutches), and then ask PM to set TOGA thrust. More to do in the heat of the moment compared to the Airbus system of simply moving the levers fully forward.

[Uplinker]

You are misrepresenting what I said.

I was merely pointing out how I believe Airbus have improved the thrust selection system by design.

[macdo]

Unfortunately, as I'm sure some trainers on here will agree, the Go-Around is one of the most cocked up items in recurrent sims, and judging by my old internal incident reports, often cocked up on the line.

[Flocks]

In the Airbus you have report of almost accident because of this system, an airfrance plane almost crash (easy to find the report on the BEA website)

When you are light, even more of Go around altitude is low, if you go with 2 engine on TOGA you rocket yourself to the sky, so what some Airbus pilot do is to go all the way to activate TOGA FD, then reduce the trust to climb gate
the PF didn't go all the way to TOGA gate

In the air France, the PF didn't go all the way, so didn't activate FD TOGA, trust went to CLB but FD stay on ILS and same, pilot didn't pay attention of what they were doing and followed the FD until 50ft with overspeed of the flaps ...and finally do the right thing ...

In the Boeing, if you press TOGA switch once with autotrust ON, plane will give you power for your weight for a climb rate of 1000ft/MN if you press a second time TOGA, max trust is set.

No system if perfect and all go advantage in some situation and flaw in other ...

In that case of the incident with the MD, problems for me and people relying too much on automatic and not checking what they do, when I go around (or my FO), I want nose up and trust, once I m sure I m climbing, I can do other stuff ... Because of all those case of accident / incident, I really pay attention of my action or my First officer in case of go around.

[sheppey]

Actually in the 737-100,200,300,400,500 and 800s
Interesting history. Are you certain the 737-100 had autothrottle? The 737-200 A/T was an optional extra with most -200 not having A/T

[misd-agin]

Better to push the throttles to high power first, which ensures you have achieved power. Then press TOGA. This avoids the inevitable delay in obtaining high power if, after pressing TOGA, for some reason the throttles fail to advance.
I'd add "and KEEP your hand on the throttles." WIndshear directed go-around. I advanced the throttles and hit the TOGA buttons. I eased the pressure on the throttles and felt them trying to move backwards. At that point I turned the A/T's off and continued with manual thrust. It was probably weeks before I realized why the throttles tried to retard - I'd pushed the 757/767 TOGA buttons on the back of the throttle levers with my thumb...but I had recently transitioned to the 737NG that had the TOGA buttons that you pushed with your index and middle fingertips.

A hyper focus on the pitch attitude or speed, which is common to see, drops the power cross check. It's seen approach, landing, go-around, windshear, terrain avoidance training, etc. It's present in a lot of the accident reports - a lack of awareness of the thrust levels of the engines.

[misd-agin]

Flocks - AB technique is the 'soft' G/A. Advance to TOGA, verify TOGA guidance and power, then reduce to CLB power. Very similar to the Boeing's first TOGA push (2000 FPM???).

Full power TOGA at landing weight, or lighter, is a great introduction to vertigo refresher training. It's also a great re-introduction into 'low altitude level off from a high thrust/rate of climb". Slowing down the drama helps. Vertical speed intervention, or horrors of all horrors, reducing thrust during a manually flown go-around reduces the vertigo threat and the rapid acceleration and closure with the, often low, go-around altitude.

[beachbumflyer]

Thank god they were flying a Douglas. I think it is safer to fly all go-arounds manually, messing up with automatics so close to ground is looking for trouble.
A lot of pilots screw up with the automatics so close to ground in such a short amount of time.
All you have to do is advance the throttles to full power and pitch up to a go-around attitude. Then you worry about the rest.
Power + Attitude = Performance

[FlyingStone]

All you have to do is advance the throttles to full power and pitch up to a go-around attitude. Then you worry about the rest.
Power + Attitude = Performance

This works for all aircraft, even the most automated ones.

[Bus Driver Man]

Over-reliance on automation which is not fully understood seems to be the case in way too many incidents and accidents.

Has training become the bare minimum these days to minimise the costs as much as possible?
Have airlines created this themselves by prohibiting pilots to manually fly the aircraft and creating a fear culture by punishing mistakes resulting in lack of flying skills and airmanship?

I believe the answer is yes.

From all the companies I have worked for, the one that allowed us to switch off all the automation and where pilots weren’t actually afraid of doing so, had the best pilots and was the safest airline in my opinion.
With all the others, I was never 100% relaxed when flying with them as a passenger, because I knew there were some pilots with sub-standard flying skills and airmanship.


As for Airbus design discussion: I like the AB design, but that’s probably because I’m very familiar with it.
It’s (usually) not the design that kills you, it’s improper usage of it. AB, Boeing, MD, ... They all have their own design with pros and cons. If you are properly trained and you follow the manufacturer’s SOPs, it shouldn’t matter.

[PilotLZ]

I could say a lot on the subject of training. Even the bare minimum (which most carriers sadly rely upon to cull costs) can be implemented in a way that will make it a bit more challenging and educational. Less rigidity in the sim sessions would be a good idea, I think. Most of the time, the scenarios repeat themselves to the point where each failure starts being mentally linked to one very specific set of circumstances. Engine failure after V1 always occurs right after V1 - and it's all well and good with most pilots because they've done it enough times to feel comfortable with everything happening in the same way every time. However, if you try introducing the very same failure at 800 feet AAL, many will make a mess out of it. The same goes for loss of braking during taxiing as opposed to right after touchdown. The same goes for pretty much any failure if you introduce it at a time different from the one when it happened in the last 20 sessions of the crew members concerned. And that's actually quite worrying because real-world failures almost never follow an exact scenario. Hence, developing competencies to deal with a situation, no matter when and how it occurs, shall be prioritized over rote learning of rigid scenarios.

As for manual flying skills, lots of pitiful examples can be seen. Things go as far as some people classifying it as unprofessional, irresponsible and whatnot else. And never asking themselves what will happen on the day when George goes belly-up and you will have to fly the plane manually all the way from FL350, fly a non-precision approach and land - and the skills required for that are simply not there. The safety and quality departments of many outfits will hang you if the snapshot at 1000 feet AAL on final is not quite right, so many prefer to keep the autopilot engaged through 1000 feet AAL just to make sure that they're off the hook. And the FDM watchers are all happy and not at the slightest concerned that said pilot would not have been able to achieve the same snapshot if it hadn't been for the autopilot. Which gives some food for very disturbing thoughts. The entire culture and attitude towards automation needs to change as the individuals, with all their weaknesses, are just a product of the system.

[Check Airman]

I could say a lot on the subject of training. Even the bare minimum (which most carriers sadly rely upon to cull costs) can be implemented in a way that will make it a bit more challenging and educational. Less rigidity in the sim sessions would be a good idea, I think. Most of the time, the scenarios repeat themselves to the point where each failure starts being mentally linked to one very specific set of circumstances. Engine failure after V1 always occurs right after V1 - and it's all well and good with most pilots because they've done it enough times to feel comfortable with everything happening in the same way every time. However, if you try introducing the very same failure at 800 feet AAL, many will make a mess out of it. The same goes for loss of braking during taxiing as opposed to right after touchdown. The same goes for pretty much any failure if you introduce it at a time different from the one when it happened in the last 20 sessions of the crew members concerned. And that's actually quite worrying because real-world failures almost never follow an exact scenario. Hence, developing competencies to deal with a situation, no matter when and how it occurs, shall be prioritized over rote learning of rigid scenarios.

As for manual flying skills, lots of pitiful examples can be seen. Things go as far as some people classifying it as unprofessional, irresponsible and whatnot else. And never asking themselves what will happen on the day when George goes belly-up and you will have to fly the plane manually all the way from FL350, fly a non-precision approach and land - and the skills required for that are simply not there. The safety and quality departments of many outfits will hang you if the snapshot at 1000 feet AAL on final is not quite right, so many prefer to keep the autopilot engaged through 1000 feet AAL just to make sure that they're off the hook. And the FDM watchers are all happy and not at the slightest concerned that said pilot would not have been able to achieve the same snapshot if it hadn't been for the autopilot. Which gives some food for very disturbing thoughts. The entire culture and attitude towards automation needs to change as the individuals, with all their weaknesses, are just a product of the system.

Can you come run our training department please?

[Uplinker]

One of the most useful pieces of advice I was given was to brief a go-around just before you actually do it.

So say to PM "It looks like we might have to go-around. If so, I will simultaneously call 'Go-around....Flap' and pitch up to xx° and push the thrust levers fully forward to set TOGA thrust. I will then read out the FMA. You will check my actions and thrust and monitor our climb and call when it is positive. I will call gear up. Our missed approach altitude is xxx and set. etc. OK, ready?"

(Of course sometimes a go-around must be done immediately but usually there will be a few moments to pre-brief it).

PilotLZ's post sums things up very well and prompts me to roll out again my call for Chief pilots to consider mandating 3 fully manual approaches to land every 6 months, (in appropriate conditions). We used to have to log practice auto-lands like that, and the same protocol could now be transferred to manual flying practice.

This small step should be easy to implement and might begin to address and stop the rusting of our pilot skills.

[Herod]

One of the most useful pieces of advice I was given was to brief a go-around just before you actually do it.

So say to PM "It looks like we might have to go-around. If so, I will simultaneously call 'Go-around....Flap' and pitch up to xx° and push the thrust levers fully forward to set TOGA thrust. I will then read out the FMA. You will check my actions and thrust and monitor our climb and call when it is positive. I will call gear up. Our missed approach altitude is xxx and set. etc. OK, ready?"

In the days when this old fart was flying, this was part of something called the "Approach Brief". Apart obviously of setting the missed approach altitude, since the brief was done prior to TOD

[172_driver]

PilotLZ's post sums things up very well and prompts me to roll out again my call for Chief pilots to consider mandating 3 fully manual approaches to land every 6 months, (in appropriate conditions)

Do you need to have it written down? Just do it. (unless prohibited by the company)

[turbidus]

In the Boeing, if you press TOGA switch once with autotrust ON, plane will give you power for your weight for a climb rate of 1000ft/MN if you press a second time TOGA, max trust is set.

This only works if the aircraft has not touched down.

Once WOW is sensed, the ac is in land mode....pressing TOGA has no effect and AT is disengaged.

[Check Airman]

Do you need to have it written down? Just do it. (unless prohibited by the company)

I think that last statement is a big part of the problem that PilotLZ was taking about.

[FlightDetent]

[...], I will simultaneously call 'Go-around....Flap' and firewall the throttles. Then pitch up to xx° while you check GA thrust is set. Afterwards, I will read FMA loud, we verify the NAV guidance, and you advise positive climb lest we forget to raise the gear. Until that moment, no calls to ATC or resposes, except "MediumJet123, going around" or "standby". Mini-rehearsal works like magic, and after 5 or more years on the job actually see the situation developing bit in advance.

[Check Airman]

Mini-rehearsal works like magic, and after 5 or more years on the job actually see the situation developing bit in advance.

I agree with this. Especially at my company where there are six callouts to be made (excluding the FMA) before the PM announces “positive rate”.

[safetypee]

Herod - "Approach Brief"
The briefing is the flight-plan for the mind. :ok:

System operation;
So TOGA buttons change AT mode in the air, but not on the ground.
TOGA buttons change FD mode in the air, on the ground … ?

Avoid confusion; simplify procedures:
Always advance thrust lever manually; press TOGA button for FD guidance, … speed profile ?
Select flaps as per manufacturers procedure; check power set.
Gear up as per takeoff procedure, the aircraft is in the air, flying.
Fly the aircraft, not the mode annunciations.
Special briefing, alternative procedure if missed approach is terrain limited.

A GA is a takeoff without landing.

A landing is an approach without GA.

[Flocks]

I agree with this. Especially at my company where there are six callouts to be made (excluding the FMA) before the PM announces “positive rate”.

Serious ??
What so he need to say ?
In my airline the call from PF is "go around, flaps 15", PM move Flaps, check vertical speeds and trust moving forward and say "positive rate" when it is good then PF call for gear up then PM check FMA mode and levers position and that it until 500ft from go around altitude...I think it is enough. No need to have big speech when go around ...

[Check Airman]

My last airline found the Airbus SOP quite sufficient "GA - FLAPS". My current airline would rather have us talk ourselves to death than just get on with flying the plane. It's hard enough to get right when you're in the sim, and from what I've observed on the line, it's always a mess. Of course, the instructors who hardly ever leave the sim can't understand why it's often fumbled.

[Lord Farringdon]

We talk about pilot skills, and CRM training but this captain had over 24000 hours under his belt of which 6100 were on type. He managed that without killing himself and everybody else with him. I think he knows how to fly the aeroplane. CRM certainly seemed to be lacking but there also seemed to be no immediate understanding of the peril they were actually in and perhaps they needed a bit of fear for the CRM training to kick in. We can blame automation and boy that does have a lot to answer for but it has also saved countless lives. But there are two things can easily negate things like piloting skills and experience, CRM, automation, checklist procedure, pre flight ground inspections, flight planning, sim training, techniques, procedures and knowlege of aviation rules of proecudre and navigation. Playing host to complacency and a exhibiting a lack of sound airmanship. It's just the umpteenth approach to this airfield right? It 's just a GA. We do this all the time in the sim. Touch this, flick that and Bobs your uncle, right? Oh yeah we deselected auto thrust this time...that was a bit different eh!! But you know, under everyday circumstance a GA would have had us climbing like a home sick angel so I never need to look at the EPR's'to confirm the engines are are actually doing what I asked them to do (or that I thought I asked them to do).

From a military transport (non pilot) flying perspective I remember one of my captains emphasising in a pre- takeoff briefing on another national assistance task that involved days of short ferry flights between two main islands, " This is just another routine flight guys, so let's be extra vigilant!" Hidden in those words were the need for airmanship and to be on the look out for that silent killer, complacency.

If PPrune is anything to go by, I get the impression complacency is a close flying companion of many commercial crew today, along with boredom. Rather natural in light of the repetitive nature of the task and the routine of it all. Remember when the flight engineer would have hollered obscenities at you if you touched the throttles when you shouldn't or didn't touch the throttles when you should have? Perhaps there is a ghost seat now in many flight decks where the flight engineers once sat and this is where Mr Complacency now sits waiting for you...... to do nothing. With his calming and reassuring silky voice, "your doing fine, keep doing this and everything will be good....!

Airmanship on the other hand sits with the pilots. If they have it, complacency doesn't stand a chance. If they don't then the silent ''killer'' waits to spring the trap.

Full marks to Mr Douglas who despite been given every opportunity to give up the complacency ghost as it were, kept flying long enough for the pilots to realise their folly and to finally react.

In a bid to to reduce the number lives lost in motorcycle accidents in my country, the Police are running a road safety campaign that includes signage with the words ""Respect Every Ride". Perhaps "Respect Every Flight" should be the mantra for commercial aviation.

[Uplinker]

Do you need to have it written down? Just do it. (unless prohibited by the company)

Yes, written down, logged and checked, that is my whole point !

Then pilots will have to do it and prove they did it. That way we mandate manual flying. A small start, agreed, but it would foster an atmosphere of encouragement to keep one's skills sharp.

You might be one who does a fully manual approach every day, but trust me there are many who keep all the automatics in until past 1000' agl and then they wonder why their skills are rusty when they screw up even an ILS when they attempt it manually.

[Uplinker]

In the days when this old fart was flying, this was part of something called the "Approach Brief". Apart obviously of setting the missed approach altitude, since the brief was done prior to TOD

Again, maybe I didn't explain my point very well.

What I meant was a pre- go-around brief immediately before actually doing it, (not 30 minutes before). So you are at 6 miles and despite your best efforts you are still closing on the one ahead, or the one on the runway missed their exit so you are 90% sure you will be going around. Then is the time to say to PM 'OK in a moment we will probably have to go-around. I will call go-around flap..........etc, OK ready?'

[Uplinker]

Originally Posted by Fixed this with bold lettering
[...], I will simultaneously call 'Go-around....Flap' and firewall the throttles. Then pitch up to xx° while you check GA thrust is set. Afterwards, I will read FMA loud, we verify the NAV guidance, and you advise positive climb lest we forget to raise the gear. Until that moment, no calls to ATC or resposes, except "MediumJet123, going around" or "standby".

See, your version seems nervous to me - it makes me feel that something bad is about to happen: "Firewalling the throttles..." "read the FMA loud", sounds like you think you are moments from disaster and you must do something physical and wrestle the aircraft.

But, it need not be like that. It should be calm, but positive and a controlled process. It often isn't, and this could be why. A pre-brief immediately before doing it - even simply saying "I am going to go-around around, are you ready?" might help enormously.

[kontrolor]

the captain ordered "Go Around" and pressed the TOGA button

that sums it more or less....not a pilot, but a button manipulator. He should be stripped of his rank and sent back to primary training on gliders.

[Herod]

Lord Farringdon:

Remember when the flight engineer would have hollered obscenities at you if you touched the throttles when you shouldn't or didn't touch the throttles when you should have? Perhaps there is a ghost seat now in many flight decks where the flight engineers once sat and this is where Mr Complacency now sits waiting for you...... to do nothing. With his calming and reassuring silky voice, "your doing fine, keep doing this and everything will be good....!

In a nutshell.

[FlyingStone]

the captain ordered "Go Around" and pressed the TOGA buttonthat sums it more or less....not a pilot, but a button manipulator. He should be stripped of his rank and sent back to primary training on gliders.

Well this is how you initiate go-around on most aircraft. It's what happened afterwards that's the issue here.

[FlightDetent]

But, it need not be like that. It should be calm, but positive and a controlled process. It often isn't, and this could be why. A pre-brief immediately before doing it - even simply saying "I am going to go-around around, are you ready?" might help enormously. Fair call on the choice of words, any manoeuvre on this job should be as mundane as possible. Perfectly in agreement with the second point too, look across seeking eye contact, wink, and let's go not get famous.

My vocabulary is limited and tailored to non-english speaking environment firewall was a shorthand screen language here, to avoid getting type specific. On the A/C we both are familiar with, this works for me: "Three clicks all the way, close the flaps and I read FMA. We check together, adjust NAV, with positive climb - gear up. No talking to ATC before this is finished." (the desire to avoid R/T is region specific, not a rule I consider universally relevant).

You surely noticed, the actual reason for the bolding was the sequence. Leading with thrust, foremost. :O Especially in the context of this thread.

[safetypee]

Your lordship - Lord Farringdon. :ok:
The concepts of safety range CRM to Mantra; neither perfect, nor static. Change according to the last accident or academic concept, often a long time after the event with fading memories.

As much as current safety initiatives, operations, and training are ridiculed, remember that they have achieved the current high levels of safety - whatever the measure. However, the industry must not continue to expect the same methods to improve safety beyond what has been achieved - we keep on doing the same, but expect a different result.
Thats complacent.

Yes keep what we have, do not try to move the clocks back; look forward seeking small changes which might influence the future, change, check, be prepared to change again - if only we knew where to start.

[beachbumflyer]

Well this is how you initiate go-around on most aircraft. It's what happened afterwards that's the issue here.
But the A/T was off

[hans brinker]

that sums it more or less....not a pilot, but a button manipulator. He should be stripped of his rank and sent back to primary training on gliders.

I don't think training on gliders is going to teach him how to do go-arounds.... ;)

[172_driver]

Yes, written down, logged and checked, that is my whole point !

Then pilots will have to do it and prove they did it. That way we mandate manual flying. A small start, agreed, but it would foster an atmosphere of encouragement to keep one's skills sharp.

You might be one who does a fully manual approach every day, but trust me there are many who keep all the automatics in until past 1000' agl and then they wonder why their skills are rusty when they screw up even an ILS when they attempt it manually.

OK, I see where you're coming from now. It is a small step alright.

"Alright Bloggs, my controls. Time to put the hood on" ;)

[Centaurus]

even simply saying "I am going to go-around around, are you ready?" might help enormously.

And what if the 250 hour cadet second in command pipes up and replies he is not ready because you haven't briefed him on your step by step sequence of actions to conduct a go-around and exactly why you have decided to go-around in the first place.

Tongue-in-cheek of course. But seriously, where does this warm and fuzzy pat the doggy attitude, stop?

[tartare]

Forgive my light plane flying ignorance.
If, in any large passenger jet, the power levers are manually advanced to full power - i.e. firewalled, you will get full power regardless of auto-throttle or autopilot settings, right?
In other words, manual advance of the power levers will over-ride all automatics?

[OldLurker]

On the subject of briefing: back in the day, I was taught that a go-around is always an option and is always briefed for. More than that, I was taught that you don't approach to land with the option to go around if the approach goes pear-shaped: instead, you approach to a go-around with the option to land if the ducks are in a row. It sounds like the same thing but it fosters a different attitude. But I've read elsewhere in this forum that nowadays some airlines' desk-flyers will hang you if, with 20-20-hindsight, they can find a reason why you shouldn't have gone around, as well as (as PilotLZ said up there) if the snapshot at 1000 feet AAL on final is not quite right.

[172_driver]

In other words, manual advance of the power levers will over-ride all automatics?


Can only speak for B737. The answer is Yes... but it's not that clear cut.
The autothrottle servo motors can easily ge over ridden but if you don't fly the automatics as intended the same servo will bring back the thrust levers as soon as you let go of them. In a go-around scenario you either have to press TOGA switches or disconnect the autothrottle and manually advance.

[safetypee]

'Manually advance thrust levers.'
As in https://www.pprune.org/10799380-post51.html #51

And for those who depend on the FD, what do the TOGA buttons do with the AT Off, FGS mode; either in the air or on the ground during GA ?

[kontrolor]

I don't think training on gliders is going to teach him how to do go-arounds.... ;)
they would teach him flying techinque and proper decision making, which he clearly lacks.

[kontrolor]

Well this is how you initiate go-around on most aircraft. It's what happened afterwards that's the issue here.
its not the fact that he pressed the button, it was all what preceeded that, stream of bad airmanship and lack of command of situation, let alone no CRM.

[safetypee]

kontroler,

What is 'proper decision making' ?
and if a person lacks this ability, how might we know ?

Similarly for 'stream of bad airmanship and lack of command of situation, let alone no CRM.'

Not with biased hindsight.

[Uplinker]

And what if the 250 hour cadet second in command pipes up and replies he is not ready because you haven't briefed him on your step by step sequence of actions to conduct a go-around and exactly why you have decided to go-around in the first place.

Tongue-in-cheek of course. But seriously, where does this warm and fuzzy pat the doggy attitude, stop?

Well, in your situation, firstly you would know that a pre-brief would be a very good idea to prepare the F/O and to review all the important actions. A 250hr F/O will not necessarily be able to perform perfectly in the real airplane when something unusual is thrown at them even though they will have passed all the tests in the SIM. You need to nurture your inexperienced crew. They are the equivalent of learner drivers.

I never said you needed to explain your reasons for going around, nor did I say that a pre-brief needed to be a long drawn out process :=

A go-around is an unusual procedure which we rarely do. In theory, we should all be expecting it on every approach, and would all perform it faultlessly it was required. But we also know this doesn't always happen. A very senior training Captain and his F/O at a previous airline both forgot the gear and left it down during a go-around in a 757. Had he taken 5 seconds to run through the important actions before actually calling the go-around, it might have made it run more smoothly.

.....in any large passenger jet, the power levers are manually advanced to full power - i.e. firewalled, you will get full power regardless of auto-throttle or autopilot settings, right?
In other words, manual advance of the power levers will over-ride all automatics?

172_driver explains this: in some types having pushed the levers forward you will get maximum thrust, but if you then let go, (to put both hands on the yoke for example), the levers will be motored back towards idle unless you also press a separate TOGA button.

The point I was making earlier is that Airbus have designed-out this conundrum by engineering the manual TOGA switches so they do not need to be separately found and pressed and can ONLY be selected by pushing the thrust levers fully forward - which is obviously where the levers need to be !

Airbus FBW thrust levers fully forward = TOGA, no ifs or buts :ok:

[FlyingStone]

they would teach him flying techinque and proper decision making, which he clearly lacks.

Yeah, gliders don't have much to do with stabilized approaches in a jet transport, go-arounds or balked landings. It's a completely different ball of fish.

Also, you will find that skill deficiency of an airline pilot is rarely, if ever, solved by sending said pilot to glider school. Finding root cause and creating a bespoke training training plan with simulator and line training is a much better tool.

its not the fact that he pressed the button, it was all what preceeded that, stream of bad airmanship and lack of command of situation, let alone no CRM.

Anybody can get themselves to a point where approach becomes unstabilized and I believe most of us have been in that situation at least once. It's quite natural to try and "salvage it" but once you give up, it's the correct execution of the go-around/balked landing which counts, and was not done properly here.

[ManaAdaSystem]

The TOGA switches on the MD are palm switches. You are supposed to push the throttles forward and with your palm press the switches. Unlike the 737, you will get full thrust on the MD, and even if you can’t hear the engines, you will feel the push when thrust is set.
No matter what way they design the TOGA switches, thumb, index finger, palm or just throttles forward, we pilots will find a way to make it not work.

[tdracer]

Forgive my light plane flying ignorance.
If, in any large passenger jet, the power levers are manually advanced to full power - i.e. firewalled, you will get full power regardless of auto-throttle or autopilot settings, right?
In other words, manual advance of the power levers will over-ride all automatics?
To add a bit to 172's answer, on any Boeing or MacDac, commanded thrust is dependent on the thrust lever position. Period. So if you push the throttles forward, you'll get more thrust.
However things are not always that simple - as 172 points out, if the autothrottle is active it may start pulling the throttles back (although on some installations a large manual override of the A/T will cause it to disconnect). Further, with wing mounted engines you're going to get a significant pitch-up moment from the increasing engine thrust (FBW will largely hide that, although it's still there - and if FBW is in a degraded mode for some reason you can get a big surprise)(not an issue with the MD-80 series tall mounted engines).
From an engine guy's perspective, simply firewalling the the levers can create another issue - pre-FADEC (or FADEC operating in degraded mode) - you can get a big engine overboost. Not only is this really hard on the engines (and has been known to cause engine failure), the pitch-up moment with wing mounted engines will be much larger - potentially enough to make aircraft control difficult.
If memory serves, the MD-80 engines are pre-FADEC, which may have influenced the crew's actions with regard to manually advancing the throttles.

[Check Airman]

And what if the 250 hour cadet second in command pipes up and replies he is not ready because you haven't briefed him on your step by step sequence of actions to conduct a go-around and exactly why you have decided to go-around in the first place.

Tongue-in-cheek of course. But seriously, where does this warm and fuzzy pat the doggy attitude, stop?

I don't think it necessarily have to do with warm and fuzzy feelings. Once you select TOGA, things happen fast, as I'm sure you're well aware. Giving a heads up allows the PM a second or two to catch up, if necessary.

[Centaurus]

A 250hr F/O will not necessarily be able to perform perfectly in the real airplane when something unusual is thrown at them even though they will have passed all the tests in the SIM. You need to nurture your inexperienced crew. They are the equivalent of learner drivers.

Presumably the F/O has a command type rating before being qualified to act as second in command of a jet transport. Thank goodness the passengers are not aware the first officer is considered to be the equivalent of a learner driver and needs to be "nurtured.".

Just ask yourself honestly if the situation occurred where the captain becomes incapacitated in the cruise at 37,000 ft would the 250 hour first officer be able to safely fly that aircraft solo IMC all the way from cruise to the landing while making all the radio calls to ATC etc. Especially as his company limits him to a max crosswind component of 15 knots.
The uncomfortable truth is the airlines count on the statistical probability that this combination of circumstances will never happen in our lifetime. Next question please..

[Lord Farringdon]

Presumably the F/O has a command type rating before being qualified to act as second in command of a jet transport. Thank goodness the passengers are not aware the first officer is considered to be the equivalent of a learner driver and needs to be "nurtured.".

Just ask yourself honestly if the situation occurred where the captain becomes incapacitated in the cruise at 37,000 ft would the 250 hour first officer be able to safely fly that aircraft solo IMC all the way from cruise to the landing while making all the radio calls to ATC etc. Especially as his company limits him to a max crosswind component of 15 knots.
The uncomfortable truth is the airlines count on the statistical probability that this combination of circumstances will never happen in our lifetime. Next question please..

Unfortunately a rather more experienced FO was on the wrong side of that statistical probability on UPS 6. While that was tragic set of circumstances with the odds severely stacked against the FO, it simple says that the hours, experience and competence of the guy or gal in the RH seat has no bearing on the nature of the emergency they may face when the Captain becomes incapacitated. But the outcome most certainly will.

[FlightDetent]

Just ask yourself honestly if the situation occurred where the captain becomes incapacitated in the cruise at 37,000 ft would the 250 hour first officer be able to safely fly that aircraft solo IMC all the way from cruise to the landing while making all the radio calls to ATC etc. Especially as his company limits him to a max crosswind component of 15 knots.Perfectly capable. At 250 hrs, completely every single one of them. And all done by the book too.

It depends who trains them, and to what standard are they made to perform.

I am not disputing a narrow field of vision, non-existent experience, nor being just inches ahead of aircraft. But a single handed return to land with a malfunction is a piece of cake. They're young, sharp and motivated..

​​​​​

[parkfell]

Perfectly capable. At 250 hrs, completely every single one of them. And all done by the book too.
It depends who trains them, and to what standard are they made to perform.
I am not disputing a narrow field of vision, non-existent experience, nor being just inches ahead of aircraft. But a single handed return to land with a malfunction is a piece of cake. They're young, sharp and motivated..

​​​​​
Some doubting Thomas’ might be surprised that the better trainees (“young, sharp and motivated”) by the end of the MCC/APS course would be perfectly capable of dealing with this situation and cope well with a 20kt crosswind landing.
You would be amazed what a MPL student is capable of achieving at the end of phase 3.
Phase 4 is the type rating.

[Uplinker]

Presumably the F/O has a command type rating before being qualified to act as second in command of a jet transport. Thank goodness the passengers are not aware the first officer is considered to be the equivalent of a learner driver and needs to be "nurtured."...

Wow. Really? Sorry for the thread drift, but you don't believe in nurturing or mentoring junior staff? They know everything there is to know, and how to deal with any situation, the day after they pass their first ever commercial line check?

I am not talking about their ability to control an airplane.

[FlyingStone]

Just ask yourself honestly if the situation occurred where the captain becomes incapacitated in the cruise at 37,000 ft would the 250 hour first officer be able to safely fly that aircraft solo IMC all the way from cruise to the landing while making all the radio calls to ATC etc. Especially as his company limits him to a max crosswind component of 15 knots.
The uncomfortable truth is the airlines count on the statistical probability that this combination of circumstances will never happen in our lifetime. Next question please.

If they wouldn't, they would still have the safety pilot on the jumpseat, it's as simple as that.

With 2 autopilots, 2 FMCs, maximum assistance from ATC (mayday call), autoland available, it should be no biggie.

Will they make a mistake or two? Sure. Will the profile not be idle all the way with spool up just prior to landing gate? Not even close to that. But I have no doubts they would land the aircraft safely.

[vilas]

It's ironical that most accidents that we hear are caused by experienced pilots and someone inevitably drags the issue to 250hrs copilot. The latest PIA accident pilot had 17000hrs. It's not the number of hours or years but the quality of flying that one does that matters. The pilot has to know the design philosophy, it's systems including automation. Insufficient knowledge of automation is not over dependence but ignorance.
Under similar situation EK521 on 3rd Aug2016 B777 crashed in Dubai during go around. The aircraft touchdown before GA was initiated. According to the design philosophy of Boeing in this situation pilot needs to manually set thrust and attitude. The inquiry says they simply didn't know this. If these pilots had encountered this situation even after 10000hrs result would have been same. Accidents rarely happen with single ommission or commission. It usually requires a confirmatory action to crash which was provided by not monitoring the parameters, FMA etc. and the copilot retracting the gear as if that was the most important thing. It may be a design flaw but till the time it is changed pilot has to know it. Since there are virtually two different procedures and this one after touchdown one may not experience it in a life time will always be the black swan unless briefed before. When I suggested this few years ago some thought it's too much to brief everything. So be it.

[PilotLZ]

Perfectly capable. At 250 hrs, completely every single one of them. And all done by the book too.

It depends who trains them, and to what standard are they made to perform.

I am not disputing a narrow field of vision, non-existent experience, nor being just inches ahead of aircraft. But a single handed return to land with a malfunction is a piece of cake. They're young, sharp and motivated..

​​​​​
While a 250-hour FO is still about as far from proficiency as a man can be, performing a diversion to a major and well-equipped airfield with an autoland under MAYDAY and all ensuing assistance from ATC should not be completely beyond them. Descent on a conservative profile, ILS to autoland, stop on the runway. That's enough. After all, how come that the instructor releases their safety pilot if they are not confident that there will be someone capable of saving the day in case they're left alone at the flight deck?

[Judd]

Some doubting Thomas’ might be surprised that the better trainees (“young, sharp and motivated”) by the end of the MCC/APS course would be perfectly capable of dealing with this situation and cope well with a 20kt crosswind landing.
You would be amazed what a MPL student is capable of achieving at the end of phase 3.
Phase 4 is the type rating.

From the replies so far it is comforting to know Cadet/MPL first officers graduate on type with command skills notwithstanding basic CPL hours. On completion of the type rating in the simulator it would be a great confidence builder for all pilots regardless of experience levels but particularly MPL or equivalent graduates, to be given the opportunity to fly the aircraft solo from IMC cruise to landing assuming the other pilot is incapacitated.

Because of time limitations of simulator bookings, the practice could start at (say) 20,000 ft and 80 miles from the destination. Radar vectors available but the flight must culminate with an ILS and landing.

[Judd]

Remember when the flight engineer would have hollered obscenities at you if you touched the throttles when you shouldn't or didn't touch the throttles when you should have

Flight engineers hollering obscenities and today's principles of CRM are not exactly compatible in terms of flight safety principles. In my day I frequently had the misfortune to be crewed with some real dinosaurs among the ranks of that trade. I recall talking to one RAF F/E on the Handley Page Hastings. He was proud of the fact he could call an abort (whether it was technically justified or not) and by RAF rules the captain had to abort whether it was justified or not.

[FlightDetent]

Judd Eh, what command skill are we talking about? To land the A/C?

Standard excercise for cadets on the last SIM before the check-ride: At positive climb call the PIC goes u/s. After thrust reduction an engine stalls (the wrong one wind-wise) and fails with damage. 2/3 of max demonstrated crosswind and cloudbase at 220 ft. Reasonable cabin co-op and clear ATC liaison both required to pass.

And they make it look easy. Robotic, rota-learned? Perhaps, safe and organised nevertheless.

[PilotLZ]

The incapacitation exercise in the sim implies wearing headsets as the instructor uses the intercom to ask one of the pilots to go silent without the other one hearing it. Which was all well and good before the age of Miss Rona, when many training centres started discouraging sim users from wearing the headsets or donning the oxygen masks in the sim, citing hygiene. :rolleyes:

In real operations, what is ever so slightly concerning is that some outfits only do the bare minimum of 8 legs of line training with a safety pilot - and that safety pilot will be released afterwards unless the performance of the trainee is absolutely dire. And, in many cases, that's a bit premature as a newbie is highly unlikely to get reasonably confident with only 8 legs and 4 to 5 landings as PF at best. Hence, they will be under far greater stress and far more likely to run into trouble, should the Captain go silent on leg number 9. I would say that raising the minimum requirements for safety pilot release to something like 20 legs, at least 10 of which as PF, and no input on the controls from the instructor on the last 3 consecutive landings would make sense. But here comes the main issue, namely that many bean counters consider any training surplus to the legal minimum a waste of productivity...

[Check Airman]

Judd Eh, what command skill are we talking about? To land the A/C?

Standard excercise for cadets on the last SIM before the check-ride: At positive climb call the PIC goes u/s. After thrust reduction an engine stalls (the wrong one wind-wise) and fails with damage. 2/3 of max demonstrated crosswind and cloudbase at 220 ft. Reasonable cabin co-op and clear ATC liaison both required to pass.

And they make it look easy. Robotic, rota-learned? Perhaps, safe and organised nevertheless.
One wonders how they'd do when the situation is unscripted. Not to say that a 25,000hr pilot can't be caught off guard, but I'd still feel more comfortable with a more experienced newbie in the seat.

[misd-agin]

Oh, the dreaded engine out in the sim. Or the crosswind landing Terrifying. Except...it's not for real. Any of the sim racers crashing get hospitalized in any of their wrecks? Screw it up in the sim? Put the sim on freeze, and some coaching from the instructor, and let's try again. "Ok, let's freeze right here. Did you see what just happened? Did you see what you just did? Don't to that because XYZ happens? Ok? I'll put you back on a five mile final and we'll do it again." That doesn't happen in real life. Real life is moderate turbulence, gusting winds, right at the max crosswind limit, and your brain going "unstable? Go-around? Nah, hang in there. Go-around? Nah, it's barely acceptable." While you're working hard and the pucker factor is real, even with 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, or 25,000 hrs. Turn off the runway and the legs start shaking from the adrenaline release as the other pilots congratulate you on winning, or at least tying, the fight. Yeah, I remember those days in the sim....except it doesn't happen in the sim.

[sheppey]

Standard excercise for cadets on the last SIM before the check-ride: At positive climb call the PIC goes u/s. After thrust reduction an engine stalls (the wrong one wind-wise) and fails with damage. 2/3 of max demonstrated crosswind and cloudbase at 220 ft. Reasonable cabin co-op and clear ATC liaison both required to pass.

And they make it look easy. Robotic, rota-learned? Perhaps, safe and organised nevertheless.
What a murderous use of a simulator and the classic reason why they are called the Horror Box. Just count the number of separate "events" foisted upon the student. PIC loses his marbles seconds after VR (a major non-normal) Seconds later an engine problem and engine failure with strong crosswind (another major non-normal totally unrelated to the captain snuffing it temporarily).

Although the writer doesn't say so, the mention of a strong crosswind coupled with 220 ft cloud base suggests the student is now required to land under these conditions (One engine out, one captain out, and weather bad. .

The word for that set of events all rolled into one session is commonly known as "Brutalising" and is a total waste of simulator time and money. I am astonished that any operator of good repute would sanction such a nonsensical approach and have the temerity to call it "training.".



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[kontrolor]

Yeah, gliders don't have much to do with stabilized approaches in a jet transport, go-arounds or balked landings. It's a completely different ball of fish.

Also, you will find that skill deficiency of an airline pilot is rarely, if ever, solved by sending said pilot to glider school. Finding root cause and creating a bespoke training training plan with simulator and line training is a much better tool.



Anybody can get themselves to a point where approach becomes unstabilized and I believe most of us have been in that situation at least once. It's quite natural to try and "salvage it" but once you give up, it's the correct execution of the go-around/balked landing which counts, and was not done properly here.

The answer was below your oriignal post. My point was, that this was one hell of a piece of bad airmanship, bad preparation, bad decision making proces, and lack of basic pilot skils - you don't just press buttons, you MAKE SURE the airplane is moving in right direction with right engine settings. Yes, unstabilized approaches happen, but this one was exemplary. It is NOT natural to salvage it. I was taught in my military days, that you don't salvage failed approach or anything you do. You do it again PROPERLY. Salvaging is exactly the second cause of this incident. This captain should be retrained to the bone.

The TOGA switches on the MD are palm switches. You are supposed to push the throttles forward and with your palm press the switches. Unlike the 737, you will get full thrust on the MD, and even if you can’t hear the engines, you will feel the push when thrust is set.
No matter what way they design the TOGA switches, thumb, index finger, palm or just throttles forward, we pilots will find a way to make it not work.

[Pilot DAR]

if the situation occurred where the captain becomes incapacitated in the cruise at 37,000 ft would the 250 hour first officer be able to safely fly that aircraft solo IMC all the way from cruise to the landing while making all the radio calls to ATC etc

This happened to me at about that phase of my flying. My Captain suffered food poisoning (airport cafeteria), and took a few hour "nap" while I flew to our intended destination (where medical treatment would be much more available if needed - it was not). The passengers were entirely unaware. Sure, multiple "events" could have saturated me, but the single event that passed all the workload to me was not a problem. I would hope that a pilot is not being allowed in the right seat without having been assessed for these minimum skills.