N72EX (Kobe Bryant) Crash Reconstruction with new ATC Audio

[airplanecrazy]

Hi. This is my first post to PPRuNe. I created an amateur reconstruction of the crash of N72EX and it includes new (previously unheard) ATC audio that I obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request to the FAA. I am not a pilot, and I am hoping that some experienced pilots can take a look and give me feedback. Because I am a new member I do not have privileges to embed URLs yet, so if someone could repost with a live link I would really appreciate it. "https ://youtu.be/M_Dpm144KXo" . I am aware of two audio transcription typos where I misspelled VFR.

https://youtu.be/M_Dpm144KXo

[havick]

That’s a pretty good effort on your part stringing what you could together.

[[email protected]]

Yes, very good job, perhaps you should be working for the FAA:ok:

It certainly seems to confirm that disorientation was a key factor - if he entered cloud in a turn, that is likely to produce the leans very quickly and the uncorrected left bank (apart from one brief attempt at wings level) is a good indicator of that. I have seen a number of students enter IMC like that and perform a similar manoeuvre - a turn with the climb dropping off eventually turning into a descent with them getting more and more confused by the indications because they are not focused on the AI.

Just one small point - the graphics say VRF while the audio correctly says VFR.

[aa777888]

Another minor point: I've never heard any aviation professional pronounce ADS-B as "addsbee". It is always spelled out: "A D S B".

[airplanecrazy]

Yes, very good job, perhaps you should be working for the FAA:ok:

It certainly seems to confirm that disorientation was a key factor - if he entered cloud in a turn, that is likely to produce the leans very quickly and the uncorrected left bank (apart from one brief attempt at wings level) is a good indicator of that. I have seen a number of students enter IMC like that and perform a similar manoeuvre - a turn with the climb dropping off eventually turning into a descent with them getting more and more confused by the indications because they are not focused on the AI.

Just one small point - the graphics say VRF while the audio correctly says VFR.

Thanks for you comment. BTW, I mentioned the VFR typos in the original post I am aware of two audio transcription typos where I misspelled VFR.

I wish YouTube would let me fix it, but I decided to let it go once someone first pointed it out because I didn't want a "new" video with just that fix to show up in my subscriber feeds. I still wonder if I made the right decision :)

[airplanecrazy]

Another minor point: I've never heard any aviation professional pronounce ADS-B as "addsbee". It is always spelled out: "A D S B".

I have been saying "addsbee" so long in my brain it never occurred to me that I was mispronouncing it. Thanks for pointing that out!

[Sir HC]

Fantastic job airplanecrazy. The last two transmissions from 2EX I hadn't heard before, quite chilling.

I wonder if he had issues engaging the autopilot, any S-76 guys care to comment on how easy it is to engage PIT/ROL mode on the fly? It's almost as though he engaged the AP (or at least thought he did) and then got distracted in the cockpit by a dropped iPad, passenger interruption etc. I just can't fathom that an ATPL certificated pilot, albeit not current, sitting in an IFR certified helicopter, could not conduct a simple climb on instruments, in my opinion there had to be an external influence.

[airplanecrazy]

Fantastic job airplanecrazy. The last two transmissions from 2EX I hadn't heard before, quite chilling.

I wonder if he had issues engaging the autopilot, any S-76 guys care to comment on how easy it is to engage PIT/ROL mode on the fly? It's almost as though he engaged the AP (or at least thought he did) and then got distracted in the cockpit by a dropped iPad, passenger interruption etc. I just can't fathom that an ATPL certificated pilot, albeit not current, sitting in an IFR certified helicopter, could not conduct a simple climb on instruments, in my opinion there had to be an external influence.

Thanks for the kind words. For anyone answering Sir HC's first question, I believe that the helicopter had an SPZ-7000 Flight Control System installed (at least it did when sold by the State of Illinois, and I find no record of it being removed in the Airworthiness documentation.).

[ApolloHeli]

I just can't fathom that an ATPL certificated pilot, albeit not current, sitting in an IFR certified helicopter, could not conduct a simple climb on instruments, in my opinion there had to be an external influence.

I think you underestimate the potential for over-saturation when things suddenly go all white outside if you haven't been in those conditions and practiced IMC flying very recently. It's certainly a perishable skill. Here's a good example of an EC135 (https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20170525X33813&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA) IFR-rated pilot who wanted to practice an ILS approach to keep proficiency (responsible decision in my opinion), however, unfortunately he was sans instructor and very quickly became over-saturated and lost it while on the way in.

[[email protected]]

I think you underestimate the potential for over-saturation when things suddenly go all white outside if you haven't been in those conditions and practiced IMC flying very recently. It's certainly a perishable skill. Here's a good example of an EC135 (https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20170525X33813&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA) IFR-rated pilot who wanted to practice an ILS approach to keep proficiency (responsible decision in my opinion), however, unfortunately he was sans instructor and very quickly became over-saturated and lost it while on the way in.
Yes, that report is classic saturation trying to deal with real IMC as a single pilot.

What can make it worse is engaging an autopilot that has its own limitations and tends to meander about whatever datum was set - this is especially true of 3 axis APs that have to use cyclic pitch to do things like hold ALT or VSI - they are slow, lagged to reduce control inputs and don't deal with turbulence well.

Unless you have experienced it to the point you were scared, it is difficult to explain how powerful the spatial disorientation illusions can be, convincing you that you are in a turn to the right (for example) when you are actually close to wings level and causing you to push left bank because it 'feels right'.

Constant practice in actual IMC conditions is the only way to prepare you for IIMC - or perhaps try teaching students to fly IMC, that sorts you out when they screw it up:ok:

[airplanecrazy]

Please forgive my naïve question (as a non-pilot). Should the pilot have declared an emergency to ATC when he decided to "climb above the layers" at 17:44:34? I can't imagine that it would have significantly changed the outcome, but I am curious. Thanks.

[Sir HC]

I sure appreciate task saturation, having done my fair share of both two crew and SPIFR. The NTSB report you referenced looks like he forgot to activate the approach and follow the glide slope and then failed to properly sequence to GA mode when he realized that he was full scale deflection.

In my opinion, the two accidents are vastly different, with the Delaware one, the pilot having to fulfill a clearance, a busy cockpit with a FD not giving useful information, reading back clearances etc etc.

Kobe's accident, all the guy had to do was pull pitch and climb, no airspace to contend with, no clearance to get/maintain, no icing to deal with, he didn't even need to talk to SoCal. I think the decision to continue IMC in a VFR only helicopter would be weighing on him, but he sounded pretty calm on that radio call. As I first said, I just find it unfathomable that an ATPL with even the bare instrument rating couldn't maintain a heading and airspeed, I believe there had to be something else that added to his workload.

[gulliBell]

..Should the pilot have declared an emergency to ATC when he decided to "climb above the layers" at 17:44:34?..

At the very least he should have told ATC he was no longer VMC and was climbing to regain visual reference.

[gulliBell]

... just find it unfathomable that an ATPL with even the bare instrument rating couldn't maintain a heading and airspeed, I believe there had to be something else that added to his workload.

Nope. Despite holding an ATPL and being a CFII, ending up in cloud for the first time, of itself, could easily have been enough for the whole show to turn to worms.

[gulliBell]

...What can make it worse is engaging an autopilot that has its own limitations and tends to meander about whatever datum was set - this is especially true of 3 axis APs that have to use cyclic pitch to do things like hold ALT or VSI - they are slow, lagged to reduce control inputs and don't deal with turbulence well...

I'm not familiar with the SPZ-7000 installation in the S76, but in any event the pilot didn't need to engage any pitch mode to save the day. All it needed was to center the heading bug, push the HDG button on George, increase power and confirm climbing. Single cue mode, that's all. It takes five seconds to do that. George takes care of keeping the wings level, your left hand controls the rate of climb, your eyes confirm climbing wings level, and you tell ATC what happened.

[Torquetalk]

I'm not familiar with the SPZ-7000 installation in the S76, but in any event the pilot didn't need to engage any pitch mode to save the day. All it needed was to center the heading bug, push the HDG button on George, increase power and confirm climbing. Single cue mode, that's all. It takes five seconds to do that. George takes care of keeping the wings level, your left hand controls the rate of climb, your eyes confirm climbing wings level, and you tell ATC what happened.

The safest thing to do if committing to the climb in that type is to press the GA button and then figure out the next few steps (in this case recognizing that he needed ATCs help). If selecting one mode in a S76B, I’d made it IAS then add power. Pressing HDG and adding power will give an initial climb, but the PBA will quietly convert that to airspeed while you are not looking. Best fly 3 cue IMC and at night if you want to avoid nasty surprises.

[airplanecrazy]

The safest thing to do if committing to the climb in that type is to press the GA button and then figure out the next few steps (in this case recognizing that he needed ATCs help). If selecting one mode in a S76B, I’d made it IAS then add power. Pressing HDG and adding power will give an initial climb, but the PBA will quietly convert that to airspeed while you are not looking. Best fly 3 cue IMC and at night if you want to avoid nasty surprises.

I have the pilot's manual for the SPZ-7000 and I see this "The go-around mode may be engaged by pressing the button on the mode selector or by depressing the go-around switch on the collective. When engaged, this mode will cancel all other modes that are engaged. Upon engagement the collective will be commanded to obtain 75 knots or more while the roll axis will return the aircraft to a level roll attitude and will maintain the current aircraft magnetic heading. The pitch axis will be commanded to a positive rate-of-climb of 750 fpm " Does pressing the GA button activate the autopilot if the autopilot is currently off, or would the autopilot also have to be turned on to actually command the aircraft?

[[email protected]]

The problem comes if you are not used to using the AP upper modes and if you spend all your time VFR without needing them. What might take an experienced user 2 button presses to achieve a predictable outcome (ie wings level climb) can take far longer and if you press the wrong button or have the HDG bug in the wrong place you can easily end up disorientated.

[gulliBell]

The safest thing to do ....

I don't entirely agree. In an aircraft that hasn't been maintained to the IFR standards, probably for years, there is too much stuff that needs to be working properly for 3-cue to work as advertised. And if it doesn't work as advertised you end up with utter confusion. Trust me on that. The safest thing to do, and this is what we teach in the simulator, is to boil it down to the minimum which is HDG hold (single cue), increase power manually, check wings level and climbing, and then adjust pitch trim to get 70 knots-ish. If a pilot who is already confused about his situation is then loaded up with deciphering what 3-cue is or isn't doing it 'aint gonna be pretty. But in the off-chance everything does work, then yeah, pushing the GA button should save the day. But I wouldn't trust it in a critical situation in an aircraft only maintained to VFR.

And having refreshed my memory, this is what GA mode does in the SPZ-7000 ...

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1133x381/screen_shot_2020_05_30_at_14_10_28_4df04169e72f322c2b2eaf76b f37038dbbdfbd96.png

[[email protected]]

Gullibell - I presume there is a minimum speed for engagement?

[TIMTS]

How accurate is the airspeed readout in the video?
If he was coupled up in the climb and allowed the airspeed to bleed below 60kias, the autopilot heading reference would switch from roll to yaw. Could explain the sudden left turn and disorientation.

[gulliBell]

Yep, for SPZ-7000 it's 60 KIAS.

[gulliBell]

...Could explain the sudden left turn and disorientation.

I don't believe that theory. If HDG mode was engaged the bank angle won't exceed 20 degrees by system design. I think he had quite a bit more than 20 degrees left bank towards the end. I would be very surprised if the pilot had made any use of the autopilot. Regrettably.

[airplanecrazy]

How accurate is the airspeed readout in the video?


The speeds shown in the video are what I would call kinematic speeds (combination of ground speed and vertical velocity from GPS/ADS-B) The speeds shown do not reflect any wind (which I assumed were calm the entire time based upon the METAR at VNY). They also do not reflect effects of air density on indicated air speed. Given those caveats, I think the speeds are pretty close to both TAS and IAS. As a sanity check, the lowest ground speed reported in the flightradar24 ADS-B data for the duration of the video is 109 knots (I would give a link to the data, but I don't yet have that privilege "www.flightradar24.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/N72EX-Granular-Data.csv"). I think the aircraft was well above 60 knots the entire time.

I also note from that ADS-B data the altitude, ground speed, rate of climb, bearing, or turn rate are never constant for the duration of the video. Would one of those be mostly constant, for at least a little while, if the autopilot was engaged?

[JimEli]

ATP and CFII aside, from the information I’ve seen this pilot flew VFR in a predominately VMC environment. It appears recurrent training/checking was accomplished in the actual aircraft using a view-limiting device and not in a simulator. I suspect he maintained basic instrument currency by performing the minimum requirements every 6 months during his 135 checks. Given these supposed circumstances, an IIMC recovery would be at best, an accident waiting to happen.

Also, consider how he achieved the initial rate of climb.

[gulliBell]

...Does pressing the GA button activate the autopilot if the autopilot is currently off, or would the autopilot also have to be turned on to actually command the aircraft?
The S76 is always flown with both AP's on. The AP's can be in stability augmentation mode or attitude retention mode. For the flight director to control the aircraft the AP's must be in attitude retention mode with the force trim ON. The S76 should be flown in attitude retention mode, and I would be very surprised if this aircraft was being flown in stability augmentation mode. Therefore, one button press on the flight director would have given safe control of the aircraft to George (assuming FD2 was the active flight director).

[JimEli]

Yes, that report is classic saturation trying to deal with real IMC as a single pilot.

What can make it worse is engaging an autopilot that has its own limitations and tends to meander about whatever datum was set - this is especially true of 3 axis APs that have to use cyclic pitch to do things like hold ALT or VSI - they are slow, lagged to reduce control inputs and don't deal with turbulence well.

Unless you have experienced it to the point you were scared, it is difficult to explain how powerful the spatial disorientation illusions can be, convincing you that you are in a turn to the right (for example) when you are actually close to wings level and causing you to push left bank because it 'feels right'.

Constant practice in actual IMC conditions is the only way to prepare you for IIMC - or perhaps try teaching students to fly IMC, that sorts you out when they screw it up:ok:

Having SPIFR experience in the 135, and many a hour in the 135 simulator (flying and observing), I surmise the pilot lost control of the aircraft during his reconfiguration for the missed approach.

First, it appears the controller violated ATC procedures by vectoring the aircraft in violation of the recommended distance/angle from the approach gate. This is what precipitated the accident. At his point, I guess the pilot failed to arm the GS, or armed the GS after passing through it. This would explain why the aircraft never descended.

Second, when the pilot realized the AP didn’t capture the GS, he requested a missed approach. However, I believe he may have been in a slightly confused state of mind (unusual position and circumstances). He was then instructed to perform the published missed, which suddenly increased his workload. I would guess he hadn’t familiarized himself with the missed approach instructions, and therefore needed to quickly find/read them. This also helps to explain the unwarranted climb at this time. Most pilots would (eventually) place the FMS into NMS/GPS mode in order to fly this missed procedure, which requires a reconfiguration. I suspect the pilot may have inadvertently disconnected the AP at this point. Disconnecting is an easy mistake, especially if one doesn’t perform the reconfiguration in an orderly fashion. With the sudden, unexpected AP decoupling, and a slightly confused state, I expect the aircraft quickly lost airspeed, stability and the pilot lost control.

An ATC procedural error combined with pilot task saturation and FMS/AP misconfiguration followed by the pilot’s inability to perform an unusual attitude recovery resulted in this crash.

As always, I could be completely wrong.

[gulliBell]

..As always, I could be completely wrong.

Yes you are. The pilot was not on a PROC so there was no GS to capture. He was not being vectored by ATC, he was flying VFR OCTA following a major highway.

[gulliBell]

..I expect the aircraft quickly lost airspeed, stability and the pilot lost control..
Nope, the aircraft was at high speed immediately prior to the accident sequence. The pilot was in control, he just lost situational awareness.

[212man]

Yes you are. The pilot was not on a PROC so there was no GS to capture. He was not being vectored by ATC, he was flying VFR OCTA following a major highway.
he was talking about the EC135 accident report quoted earlier

[havick]

I wonder what position the NTSB found the force trim release switch?

[JimEli]

Yes you are. The pilot was not on a PROC so there was no GS to capture. He was not being vectored by ATC, he was flying VFR OCTA following a major highway.

Take your finger off the trigger, you're scaring everybody.

[airplanecrazy]

I have started a g-force analysis of the flight using a program called "Tacview" and what I currently see in my model is that from 17:45:12 (after the sharp turn is established) to 17:45:22 (about when the pilot finishes saying he intends to climb to 4000), the combination of turn and acceleration downward appear to give about 0.9 - 1.1g down in the seat with very little lateral (side to side) or longitudinal (backward and forwards) g's. This is very preliminary, but I would like like to know if that even sounds possible to you all? I can reproduce a similar effect flying the X-Plane S76 simulator, but 1) It is a not a full fidelity simulator, 2) It doesn't really tell me how it would feel in the cockpit; and 3) I don't know if a pilot would notice himself/herself making the control inputs necessary to preserve a 1G in the seat as they are descending/turning (assuming the pilot is not getting attitude information from the AI and is flying by feel). I still have a lot of work to do to be confident in these preliminary results because I am still working on my pitch/roll model, working on my filtering software to deal with GPS position gaussian error, and working on my algorithm to deal with the 25 foot quantization of altitude in the ADS-B data, but it looked interesting...

[ApolloHeli]

(assuming the pilot is not getting attitude information from the AI and is flying by feel).

A fundamental concept of successful IMC flying is understanding the fact that you cannot fly by feel. If there's no AH, then flying off the remaining instruments is possible, however if a pilot's just looking out the window trying to regain references (or ignoring the instruments in some other way), they won't be flying for much longer.

[Hot and Hi]

... the combination of turn and acceleration downward appear to give about 0.9 - 1.1g down in the seat with very little lateral (side to side) or longitudinal (backward and forwards) g's. This is very preliminary, but I would like like to know if that even sounds possible to you all?
What would you like to know whether it is possible?

To fly wth 0.9g to 1.1g, and little lateral or longitudinal acceleration? I would say that is the aim. The lateral and logitudinal g's normal only come in at the moment of contacting terra firma (i.e., hard landing or crash).

[airplanecrazy]

A fundamental concept of successful IMC flying is understanding the fact that you cannot fly by feel. If there's no AH, then flying off the remaining instruments is possible, however if a pilot's just looking out the window trying to regain references (or ignoring the instruments in some other way), they won't be flying for much longer.

What would you like to know whether it is possible?

To fly wth 0.9g to 1.1g, and little lateral or longitudinal acceleration? I would say that is the aim. The lateral and logitudinal g's normal only come in at the moment of contacting terra firma (i.e., hard landing or crash).

I see that I did not phrase my question well, so I will try again :) The hypothesis I am exploring is that the pilot's attention could have been diverted away from the attitude indicator from 17:45:12 - 22 and that he "subconsciously" applied control inputs while distracted to maintain a 1g trajectory for those 10 seconds, even though the helicopter was banking and descending at the end of that period. My question is does the hypothesis seems possible to actual pilots? I have no experience to judge whether it would have required more than "subconscious" concentration from the pilot to achieve that trajectory, or to know if the pilot would have noticed making those control inputs (e.g. it would require the cyclic to be in an unexpected position).

[jimjim1]

Edit:- Ha! Our posts crossed:-)

Airplanecrazy, who did the AMAZING video reconstruction says:-

the combination of turn and acceleration downward appear to give about 0.9 - 1.1g down in the seat with very little lateral (side to side) or longitudinal (backward and forwards) g's. This is very preliminary, but I would like like to know if that even sounds possible to you all?


I don't know if a pilot would notice himself/herself making the control inputs necessary to preserve a 1G in the seat as they are descending/turning (assuming the pilot is not getting attitude information from the AI and is flying by feel).

Since no one competent appears to have answered I will give it my best!?

I have done zero instrument flying, some other flying and I even had a helicopter lesson:-)

Your statements above seem reasonable to me. As the g tended to increase due to the turn the pilot could well have compensated automatically with a bit of forward cyclic.

In fact, thinking further, without some aft cyclic the aircraft may well have maintained 1g all by itself. To get more than 1g, up collective (+power) would be required and also aft cyclic to maintain the flight path as a level turn.

Perhaps all that was required was a little bit of roll input or perhaps the helicopter's natural instability would have been sufficient?

Maybe someone who understands this properly can respond to airplanecrazy? I have no knowledge of any autopilot or stability systems.

The reconstruction is very powerful and the scenario presented suggests that the pilot became distracted or maybe had a medical issue.

In addition to the amateur ADS-B collections there are I believe official ones. They may add to the available data and are likely to have proper timestamps. There are new satellite ADS-B data gathering systems too. I believe at least one is in pre-production testing and that they provided the data that persuaded Boeing to ground the 737 MAX. Boeing seemed to feel it safe (for them) to discard as irrelevant the amateur-collected material that showed a flight path eerily similar to the LyonAir crash.

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/satellite-based-ads-b-data-now-available-to-all-flightradar24-users/

[[email protected]]

In straight and level constant speed flight you experience 1G, just as if you were standing on the ground not moving - all forces are in balance.

If you roll into and maintain a steady state turn while maintaining height you will experience an increase in steady state G - 1.4 G at 45 deg AoB and 2 G at 60 deg AoB because the you are accelerating towards the centre of the turn.

As Apolloheli pointed out, you can't fly IMC by feel because of the lack of the visual cues your brain needs to orientate itself and the fact that acceleration in all axes affects the vestibular organs of your inner ear causing powerful sensations of pitching, rolling or yawing.

Whilst it is possible to fly instruments without an AH/AI it takes practice and is far more likely to end in tears than when using an AH/AI.

In the thread accident, all we know is that what he wanted to do with the helicopter isn't what the helicopter was actually doing - typical symptoms of disorientation.

If you end up IMC when you weren't expecting to and don't lock straight into an instrument scan, things are going to go wrong quite quickly - if you have the aircraft trimmed straight and level and don't move the controls apart from raising the lever a little to initiate the climb then you might survive to VMC on top.

If you go into cloud already in a turn you are halfway to the crash if you don't lock onto instruments and if this happens while you are moving your head around looking for external references you have a bullet in the chamber and your finger on the trigger.

For those that haven't experienced it, I cannot explain how powerful the illusions of bank can be - the leans - and how easy it is to end up in a spiral descent. If you have the height and awareness to recognise the situation you can recover it with good instrument flying skills and I have had to take control from disorientated students in this configuration many times in cloud. If you don't have the height and awareness you are doomed.

[airplanecrazy]

Edit:- Ha! Our posts crossed:-)
Airplanecrazy, who did the AMAZING video reconstruction says:-


Thanks for the kind words!

In addition to the amateur ADS-B collections there are I believe official ones. They may add to the available data and are likely to have proper timestamps.

I sent a FOIA request to the FAA for the ADS-B data they have. In discussions with the FOIA officers, I think there is a good chance I will get it. :)

[212man]

For those that haven't experienced it, I cannot explain how powerful the illusions of bank can be - the leans - and how easy it is to end up in a spiral descent.

i agree - like a lot of things it’s hard to understand without experiencing it. I’ve had full blown leans three times - once in IMC and twice in VMC. The IMC encounter was after a 270 degree turn from ATC vectors, and when I rolled level it felt like I was banking the opposite direction. It required complete fixation on my scan until the felling began to dissipate. The VMC encounters were once in clear visibility above a smooth full cloud layer that had a slope to it, giving a false horizon (I assume a temperature gradient?). Secondly in hazy conditions with no visible horizon, approaching the coast, that was straight but not perpendicular to our approach, giving a false horizon. I had to revert to instruments to overcome the sensation of banking which was almost overwhelming in both cases.

[gator2]

I've been thinking there should be a rich guy pilot qualification checklist: Is this machine IFR certified? Are you Mr. Pilot IFR rated? How much IFR time have you flown in an actual cloud? When was the last time you flew IFR in a cloud? Show me how you engage the autopilot.

Ok, all answers to that the right ones, I'll fly with you.

[evil7]

Yeah - and if Mr Rich guy then is not too tight to pay (I doubt) for all the satisfying answers Mr. pilot will be happy to drive him

[nomorehelosforme]

Firstly, AIRPLANECRAZY,

I am often an outsider looking in but what you have put together is impressive and am glad to see the real pro’s have embraced your tread.

As posted by gator2

I've been thinking there should be a rich guy pilot qualification checklist: Is this machine IFR certified? Are you Mr. Pilot IFR rated? How much IFR time have you flown in an actual cloud? When was the last time you flew IFR in a cloud? Show me how you engage the autopilot.
Ok, all answers to that the right ones, I'll fly with you.

The rich guy qualification checklist you suggest has often met the client’s requirements (or more by requesting 2 pilots) From my experience in the UK many VIP pilots are ex mil and have thousands of hours on various types in many different weathers and terrain. But sadly these high profile accidents keep happening and the ugly question keeps arising in VIP flights.... peer pressure and then from a pilots prospective do I or don’t I...

[Evil Twin]

Firstly, AIRPLANECRAZY,

I am often an outsider looking in but what you have put together is impressive and am glad to see the real pro’s have embraced your tread.

As posted by gator2

I've been thinking there should be a rich guy pilot qualification checklist: Is this machine IFR certified? Are you Mr. Pilot IFR rated? How much IFR time have you flown in an actual cloud? When was the last time you flew IFR in a cloud? Show me how you engage the autopilot.
Ok, all answers to that the right ones, I'll fly with you.

The rich guy qualification checklist you suggest has often met the client’s requirements (or more by requesting 2 pilots) From my experience in the UK many VIP pilots are ex mil and have thousands of hours on various types in many different weathers and terrain. But sadly these high profile accidents keep happening and the ugly question keeps arising in VIP flights.... peer pressure and then from a pilots prospective do I or don’t I...

There should probably be a rich guy checklist going in the opposite direction also...

Will you pressure the pilot to fly when weather is below minima
Will you arrive with sufficient time for the scheduled departure
Will you treat the pilot with respect
etc.

[John R81]

You don't need any of these "rich Guy checklist" as you already have adequate training - as a pilot.

You are responsible for the safety of the passengers, the aircraft and people on the ground
You cannot escape that responsibility, or blame someone else

If you don't have the strength of character to stand up to the nasty rich guy "wanting it all" then take off the pilot uniform and go do something else. Wearing fancy dress and failing to take responsibility means people are at risk of dying, and it will be solely your fault.

Be professional!

[601]

You are responsible for the safety of the passengers, the aircraft and people on the ground

I always flew on the basis that I was the VIP on the flight.

[212man]

I always flew on the basis that I was the VIP on the flight.
Yes - I worked on the basis that generally speaking the pilots are the first at the scene of the accident!

[gator2]

Evil twin: Good point. Put those on the rich guy checklist. "if I pressure you to fly when it is not safe in your judgement as my pilot will you tell me no?" "If I show up late will you refuse to compromise your flight planning and prep to make up for my irresponsibility?" "If my kids get drunk and want their stomach pumped will you refuse to take off until it is safe?"

[Evil Twin]

Evil twin: Good point. Put those on the rich guy checklist. "if I pressure you to fly when it is not safe in your judgement as my pilot will you tell me no?" "If I show up late will you refuse to compromise your flight planning and prep to make up for my irresponsibility?" "If my kids get drunk and want their stomach pumped will you refuse to take off until it is safe?"

Yes I would still say no in all of those scenario.

[B2N2]

I've been thinking there should be a rich guy pilot qualification checklist: Is this machine IFR certified? Are you Mr. Pilot IFR rated? How much IFR time have you flown in an actual cloud? When was the last time you flew IFR in a cloud? Show me how you engage the autopilot.

Ok, all answers to that the right ones, I'll fly with you.

There are several compagnies that provide a rating system for charter operators.
ARGUS being one of them.
https://www.sherpareport.com/aircraft/aircraft-overview/argus-ratings-jets.html

[Gordy]

And so it continues (https://www.dailynews.com/2020/06/11/in-wake-of-kobe-bryants-death-house-and-senate-introduce-helicopter-safety-bill/?fbclid=IwAR21O53XcyRzRXOk58igDBbm6XWVrngtxtMTMa7Ln3X1JJoxII RwMMka6zw)

[LRP]

And so it continues (https://www.dailynews.com/2020/06/11/in-wake-of-kobe-bryants-death-house-and-senate-introduce-helicopter-safety-bill/?fbclid=IwAR21O53XcyRzRXOk58igDBbm6XWVrngtxtMTMa7Ln3X1JJoxII RwMMka6zw)
Exactly. If the FAA had listened to the NTSB we would now have a digital record of the flight controls, engines, and instrument indications along with an audio recording of the aircraft hitting the ground with a voice in the background saying "Terrain, Terrain".

[[email protected]]

All they need is to change the VFR minima upwards so people don't end up trying to scud run in crap weather rather than go IFR.

EGPWS is impractical at low level in a helicopter as the amount of alerts just lead you to disable it.

Definitely need CVFDR and the best additional equipment would be a rad alt with an audio warning - that, however, requires the pilot to set the bug religiously and react to the warning appropriately.

Stop pilots scud running and we will see a reduction in CFIT and IIMC.

[JimEli]

All they need is to change the VFR minima upwards so people don't end up trying to scud run in crap weather rather than go IFR.
...
Stop pilots scud running and we will see a reduction in CFIT and IIMC.


Do you really think this would make a difference? All indications are he violated the existing VFR minimums. This operator did not have the option of IFR.
Is it the regulations, or the mindset?
And the FAA recently increased the helicopter Class G visibility minimums in 2014.

[megan]

All they need is to change the VFR minima upwards so people don't end up trying to scud run in crap weather rather than go IFRNot all operations are conducive to IMR, they have to be conducted VFR or not at all. Raising the VFR limits is not going to do anything either, the current limits are adequate, the failure is to comply. Be there a pilot out there who has not had issues with weather and had a learning moment, as in, I won't do that again?

[[email protected]]

Well that pilot certainly won't be doing it again will he?

My point is that some pilots will push marginal conditions with a set of rose tinted glasses on when the weather is on the limits. Move the limits up so it is a more clear-cut out of limits decision and any pushing of those limits becomes slightly safer.

I know this doesn't account for the ones who will launch in below limits conditions and press on once airborne as it gets worse but it might save a few lives.

Other options include mandatory IFR capability for passenger flights, mandatory real IMC experience and recency, reporting of operators launching in marginal or below limits conditions by ATC - none of which are likely to be acceptable.

Or we can sit and do nothing except whinge about stupid pilots and poor decision making - years of highlighting the problems and trying to educate pilots clearly hasn't worked so what is the solution?

Unless you can find some way of decoupling the commercial pressure from the go/no-go/land decision it's just going to keep on happening.

[Gordy]

Years of highlighting the problems and trying to educate pilots clearly hasn't worked so what is the solution?

We do not know that. I suspect that many pilots have declined flights due to weather, and many have changed their attitude over the years, they just never make the news and are therefore not a measurable statistic.

I will continue to attempt to educate and mentor.

[[email protected]]

I will continue to attempt to educate and mentor. As will I. When I was instructing on SAR, one of the most difficult things to teach pilots was when to say no since the pressure of lifesaving (potentially) and the will-do culture was at least as much of a driving force to get airborne and give it a go as any commercial pressure.

But we also don't know how many close calls caused by pilots pushing on there continue to be, no-one is going to report that they screwed up and scared themselves but didn't actually crash or break the aircraft.

[JimEli]

We do not know that. I suspect that many pilots have declined flights due to weather, and many have changed their attitude over the years, they just never make the news and are therefore not a measurable statistic.
...



...
But we also don't know how many close calls caused by pilots pushing on there continue to be, no-one is going to report that they screwed up and scared themselves but didn't actually crash or break the aircraft.

But we do know UIMC continues to be in the top 3 causes of helicopter accidents.

[megan]

Move the limits up so it is a more clear-cut out of limits decision and any pushing of those limits becomes slightly saferNo matter where you set a limit there will be folk, for whatever reason, who will take it the extra yard. People bust the approach minima in an effort to get in, and they can be just plain caught out in their rolling of the dice. Some operators do raise the legal limits for various reasons, often based on the pilots experience level eg military green/white instrument ratings.

Going IFR is no panacea, local A320 airline crew had been planned to a VMC airport, on arrival it had been hit by unforecast fog, with no fuel to go elsewhere they carried out an autoland, a procedure for which they had no training and the aid didn't have the requisite approval. Back when our country had a government run aviation operational control a Puma crew on a VFR ferry flight were advised their destination airport had been closed due unforecast thunderstorms and were asked to nominate an alternate. No alternate available and the crew insisted they would proceed to planned destination, which upset operational control no end for their order was sacrosanct, you have to proceed to an alternate. The only alternate available would have been to find a clear spot and land in the scrub, they made it to destination without confronting any weather issues. Weather forecast are horoscopes with numbers it is said.one of the most difficult things to teach pilots was when to say noNicely summed up Crab, but as you try to fill that bag of experience when to say no is itself a variable, and you hopefully don't have to dip into the bag of luck in the process.

Our EMS industry has an enviable record, often lay in bed at night and hear the local 412 going over in absolutely foul weather and think better you than me, has to be said the crews were very experience IMC folk. The dreadful US EMS experience is commentary I think on the competitive nature of the industry and the lack of standards, witness the recent report where the crews were subject to disciplinary action for refusing trips.

[airplanecrazy]

It looks like my crash reconstruction is consistent with the NTSB report today: “Calculated apparent angles at this time show that the pilot could have misperceived both pitch and roll angles,” one report stated. "During the final descent the pilot, responding to (air traffic control), stated that they were ‘climbing to four thousand.’”

[TWT]

https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=63911&CFID=394601&CFTOKEN=b50d65922c2b2b26-A294BC54-5056-942C-92BEA33CC33B0675

[LRP]

https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=63911&CFID=394601&CFTOKEN=b50d65922c2b2b26-A294BC54-5056-942C-92BEA33CC33B0675

Amazing how quickly the NTSB can investigate an accident which kills someone important. The average time for a regular fatality is 18 - 24 months for a factual.

[UNpeople]

But we also don't know how many close calls caused by pilots pushing on there continue to be, no-one is going to report that they screwed up and scared themselves but didn't actually crash or break the aircraft.
Very pertinent. Close calls teach you lessons that you hardly get from instructors and will never forget.

[UNpeople]

It looks like my crash reconstruction is consistent with the NTSB report today
Bravo to your reconstruction attempt.

[212man]

Amazing how quickly the NTSB can investigate an accident which kills someone important. The average time for a regular fatality is 18 - 24 months for a factual.
That's not a report - it's the link to the public docket. The press are reporting on what's contained within.

[wrench1]

Amazing how quickly the NTSB can investigate an accident which kills someone important. The average time for a regular fatality is 18 - 24 months for a factual.
FYI: the 18-24 month time frame is usually for a Probable Cause report. A Factual report, which has not been released for this accident, is usually released a week to 6 months after the Docket is opened to the public depending on the amount and complexity of the investigative results. Once a Factual is released you can then monitor the "completion" database below for possible Probable Cause report release date:
https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/InvestRel.aspx

[LRP]

FYI: the 18-24 month time frame is usually for a Probable Cause report. A Factual report, which has not been released for this accident, is usually released a week to 6 months after the Docket is opened to the public depending on the amount and complexity of the investigative results. Once a Factual is released you can then monitor the "completion" database below for possible Probable Cause report release date:
https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/InvestRel.aspx
Not even close my friend. A quick inquiry for the last 18 months in the U.S. shows 32 fatal RW accidents. Among those there are 30 preliminaries, 1 factual (issued 14 months after the accident), and one final (issued 15 months after the accident).

[Hot and Hi]

If you end up IMC when you weren't expecting to and don't lock straight into an instrument scan, things are going to go wrong quite quickly - if you have the aircraft trimmed straight and level and don't move the controls apart from raising the lever a little to initiate the climb then you might survive to VMC on top.

If you go into cloud already in a turn you are halfway to the crash if you don't lock onto instruments and if this happens while you are moving your head around looking for external references you have a bullet in the chamber and your finger on the trigger.

For those that haven't experienced it, I cannot explain how powerful the illusions of bank can be - the leans - and how easy it is to end up in a spiral descent. If you have the height and awareness to recognise the situation you can recover it with good instrument flying skills and I have had to take control from disorientated students in this configuration many times in cloud. If you don't have the height and awareness you are doomed.

i agree - like a lot of things it’s hard to understand without experiencing it. I’ve had full blown leans three times - once in IMC and twice in VMC. The IMC encounter was after a 270 degree turn from ATC vectors, and when I rolled level it felt like I was banking the opposite direction. It required complete fixation on my scan until the felling began to dissipate. The VMC encounters were once in clear visibility above a smooth full cloud layer that had a slope to it, giving a false horizon (I assume a temperature gradient?). Secondly in hazy conditions with no visible horizon, approaching the coast, that was straight but not perpendicular to our approach, giving a false horizon. I had to revert to instruments to overcome the sensation of banking which was almost overwhelming in both cases.

Thank you Crab and 212man, for your vivid accounts of the illusion of banks (the “leans”). From your accounts it sounds as if even recent IMC skills don’t do away with this illusion, but rather give you the ability to ignore/suppress the illusion. Further that recent IMC skills mean that your skills to fly by instruments are not rusty.

At the risk of stating the obvious, let us be reminded that a pilot flying in VMC doesn’t experience the leans. This is important as the standard explanation of the leans is that the illusion is caused by “the stabilisation of the fluid in the semi-circular canals when in actuality the aircraft still is in a banked turn”. Obviously, the same stabilisation of fluid in the semi-circular canals would also happen when the pilot has a clear view of the horizon.

Nonetheless, despite the vestibular system disagreeing with what the eyes see, the brain apparently completely mutes the conflicting information from the vestibular system. Further, any halfway proficient pilot effortlessly manages to fly by visual cues (real horizon, angle of bank = the angle at which the ‘window’ intersects the real horizon, rate of turn = angular velocity of faraway landmarks). All the while, if I may add, we all believe that in VMC we all fly by the seat of our pants, meaning that in all generality we make use of the smallest sensation of acceleration or turn around any axis, and accept such non-visual sensory input in assisting us with smooth VMC flying.

Now, this begs the question: Where does the problem start? When are insufficient visual cues sufficient to make the brain accept the input from the vestibular system with such high associated confidence that – as reported – it is very difficult to ignore or consciously override?

Obviously:

A pilot flies well by visual clues in VMC.
After some training, pilots don’t struggle (in IFR training under ‘foggles’) to fly by the traditional 6-pack. Arguably, the remaining visual cues that a student pilot gets in the peripheral vision at the corners of the ‘foggles’ are sufficient to convey things such as a constant (or changing) angle of bank and the presence (or absence) of a rate of turn. Student pilots under ‘foggles’ may start feeling nauseous after some time, but in all generality they do not suffers the “leans”.
Flight sim pilots fly very well, using ‘synthetic vision’ (i.e., the flight sim view out of the cockpit) and maybe an occasional scan for IAS, ALT and VSI.
After some instrument training, most pilots won’t struggle to fly a sim based input from the traditional 6-pack only. Again, not heard of any IMC simmer who suffered the “leans” – of course not, as no real motion involved, hence no fluid in the semi-circular canals are affected.

So where ‘do we lose the plot’? Would a proper EFIS (combining AH, DI, airspeed, VSI and ALT onto one display) make all the difference (in other words: Is the mental work of scanning the 6-pack and mentally putting together the information overpowering us)?

Does screen size matter? Would displaying the AH on a 10-inch display make all the difference in the world, compared to a standard 3.5 inch round gauge? (All questions here asked with regards to avoiding to suffer the “leans” or other overpowering illusions). Would adding highly realistic terrain (i.e., making it “synthetic vision”) help to make the poor brain accept the visual cues provided as ‘real’, and suppress the contradicting information received from the vestibular system?

-> I guess the question is: How does instrument-derived data need to be presented, in order to appear to the brain at least as real as the (very limited) visual cues that a student pilot still gets when under ‘foggles’?

[JimEli]

I found the NTSB interviews very telling and at times difficult to read.

Oh, and the Company's Training Manual changes dated 03-06-20 are very curious.

[wrench1]

Not even close my friend. A quick inquiry for the last 18 months in the U.S. shows 32 fatal RW accidents. Among those there are 30 preliminaries, 1 factual (issued 14 months after the accident), and one final (issued 15 months after the accident).
I guess I missed your point then. We're at 5 months with this one and still only have a Preliminary report. No Factual report has been released as you noted in your previous post. I've seen dockets opened to the public in as little as a month or two after the accident. So I guess I don't see any difference in this investigation as compared to others I've been around at this point except for the media coverage.

[HissingSyd]

At the risk of stating the obvious, let us be reminded that a pilot flying in VMC doesn’t experience the leans?

Oh yes they do. But as you observe, the visual system usually makes it natural to ignore the phenomenon. When visual clues are reduced, say in hazy weather or at night, it becomes more obvious.

[Edited] Although the leans can be a powerful illusion, it applies only to a single axis. Further up [the previous] thread you will find my, and others', descriptions of the coriolis illusion, which is in three axes. This is not caused by a sustained turn, but by rotating the head while in a turn. The rotation is most likely looking up or down or looking left or right quite quickly. As crab suggests above, getting into a position where this might happen is like putting a loaded pistol to your head.

[Joejosh999]

Really well done on the sim, 4 stars.

... maybe just me (and my own tension!) but I sensed tension in the pilot’s last transmission. A pause, a breath. Dunno.

[JimEli]

...
-> I guess the question is: How does instrument-derived data need to be presented, in order to appear to the brain at least as real as the (very limited) visual cues that a student pilot still gets when under ‘foggles’?I believe you are missing the point. The vestibular illusions are so overpowering, the pilot disregards the visual clues. The contradictions between the senses leads to additional confusion. Obviously, some types of presentations may be better than others, and what is digitally capable today may be an improvement on previous methods. But in the end, they are all just representations of the real world, and therefore fall short. The breadth of study and experiment in this field is very expansive.

[jimjim1]

a pilot flying in VMC doesn’t experience the leans.

I have experienced "the leans" lying in bed asleep.

I opened my eyes and the room was oscillating about 45 degrees each way at say 0.5 - 0.25Hz.

I had to crawl along the floor to go to the bathroom for about 24h.

The systems that tell us which way is up are not simple and straightforward. It appears to me that the brain combines available cues to create an impression of which way is up. It is easily fooled.

[Gordy]

I have experienced "the leans" lying in bed asleep.

I opened my eyes and the room was oscillating about 45 degrees each way at say 0.5 - 0.25Hz.

I had to crawl along the floor to go to the bathroom.

Me too once, but I sobered up in the morning....;) Sorry....it had to be done, after all we do have a reputation to uphold.....

Back to serious discussion.

[megan]

A local 737 captain was inbound when he had the sensory perception of doing back flips while sat in his seat (his description). Co-pilot completed the trip and captain commented on the passengers take when they saw him with four stripes and hat being wheeled off the aircraft in a wheel chair. NASA invited him to travel to the US for study of what prompted the issue, but he declined. Lost his medical, a pity (always is), because he was one of the best you could meet, took up ground instructor duties so his inestimable gifts were not completely lost. Vestibular disorders are many and not necessarily a case of what we call the "leans".

https://vestibular.org/understanding-vestibular-disorder/types-vestibular-disorders

[krypton_john]

I have experienced "the leans" lying in bed asleep.

I opened my eyes and the room was oscillating about 45 degrees each way at say 0.5 - 0.25Hz.

I had to crawl along the floor to go to the bathroom for about 24h.

The systems that tell us which way is up are not simple and straightforward. It appears to me that the brain combines available cues to create an impression of which way is up. It is easily fooled.

So, about those unusual mushrooms you ate with dinner....

[[email protected]]

The leans can happen to anyone and by that I mean those without underlying vestibular conditions.

It can happen in VMC when your visual reference of the horizon is removed or altered. An example of this is a cloud layer that isn't horizontal but obscures the actual horizon and can cause the pilot to adopt a 'wing down' attitude.

In mountains, where you have high ground all around and rock strata lying at odd angles, the illusion can be powerful enough that when you see something that is actually horizontal, the brain struggles to compute - there is a lake in Snowdonia known as the sloping lake for this reason, you fly up a valley with several turns in it and then come round the corner to see what you thought was level actually isn't. We always taught that mountain flying is a visual/instrument balance to try to keep orientation.

In the Bryant crash you have two of the possible illusions that I have described - low lying cloud, probably in layers, and hilly terrain - the combination is dangerous to start with but if you then enter cloud and are not practised on instruments, it is no surprise that disorientation occurs.

If you remove the brain's horizon reference (or alter it ) and don't replace it with a learned procedure - transferring to instruments and believing them - then things are going to get tricky very quickly.

[Hot and Hi]

The leans can happen to anyone and by that I mean those without underlying vestibular conditions.

It can happen in VMC when your visual reference of the horizon is removed or altered. An example of this is a cloud layer that isn't horizontal but obscures the actual horizon and can cause the pilot to adopt a 'wing down' attitude.

In mountains, where you have high ground all around and rock strata lying at odd angles, the illusion can be powerful enough that when you see something that is actually horizontal, the brain struggles to compute - there is a lake in Snowdonia known as the sloping lake for this reason, you fly up a valley with several turns in it and then come round the corner to see what you thought was level actually isn't. We always taught that mountain flying is a visual/instrument balance to try to keep orientation.

In the Bryant crash you have two of the possible illusions that I have described - low lying cloud, probably in layers, and hilly terrain - the combination is dangerous to start with but if you then enter cloud and are not practised on instruments, it is no surprise that disorientation occurs.

If you remove the brain's horizon reference (or alter it ) and don't replace it with a learned procedure - transferring to instruments and believing them - then things are going to get tricky very quickly.

Crab, Hissing and JiimEli, all very well noted. So what instrument support would *you* deem sufficient to push back the various overpowering illusions? Clearly the standard 6-pack isn't: The illusions remain strong and convincing, and only "being practised on [those 6-pack] instruments" help you to avoid disorientation.

On the other hand, equally clearly, replacing all windscreens with computer screens that display exactly what you'd see in fine weather conditions through the windscreen, would be perfectly alright. (We'd call this an immersive flight sim.) To say that there would be a (principal) difference between the so-called "reality" perceived through our senses on one side, and any representation of reality perceived by our senses on the other side, is of course humbug.

Would you therefore argue that - if not the classic 6-pack - maybe a 12-inch highly realistic synthetic vision screen on the dash would be sufficient to push back the evil spirit of illusions? OK, 12 inch is not the same as the entire windscreen around you. But given that we seem to agree that already the limited visual cues a student pilot gets while flying with 'foggles' are enough to push back those illusions, a nice TV screen infront of the pilot might just do the trick...

[Helicopter ASI]

Amazing how quickly the NTSB can investigate an accident which kills someone important. The average time for a regular fatality is 18 - 24 months for a factual.
My thoughts exactly after waiting over two years for the report on an accident that claimed two lives, one of which was my fiance. The final report consisted of a single sentence...the same one that appeared in the NTSB Prelim issued over two years earlier! Of course, there was no investigation because there was "no one of importance" on board.

[meleagertoo]

no-one is going to report that they screwed up and scared themselves but didn't actually crash or break the aircraft.

Jesus! What an unprofessional and undisciplined world you inhabit, crab.

"no one"? No one!!!! Where Professionals come from reports like that are the norm...

Hadn't you noticed aviation safety (leave alone Professionalism) has progressed somewhat since the gung-ho days of 1950s RAF fast-jet hooliganism?

[Georg1na]

meleagertoo - Crab has said it and and he is so right. Your little silly rant adds nothing. Disorientation is a quick killer and only complete trust in your instruments and a competent scan will save you.We have all frightened ourselves fartless on many occasions and only talked about it to our closest.

[roscoe1]

I remember stories from my father who was a B17 IP before he went to war. Needle, ball and airspeed. All you need to stay upright and fly around a bit until you can get either better conditions or climb out of it. I got my instrument ticket in a Cessna 182 with a guy who was an F111B simulator instructor and he would never have signed me off for a check ride if my partial panel skills were below his standards. That was an expensive rating even in 1982, it took me a long time to make par with him. He was an SOB but the words " Don't fu@k with the raidios.....fly the damn airplane" have helped me out more than once. All the new stuff is great and I think all 135 helicopters should have all the bells and whistles, plus fdr and cvr if flying passengers for hire. That being said, you shouldn't need it to stay alive. Clear and simple, training and currency on basic flying skills might have prevented this whole thing. Now the lawsuits and congressional hearings will be the "solution". We'll see I guess.

[W u W]

Really well done on the sim, 4 stars.

... maybe just me (and my own tension!) but I sensed tension in the pilot’s last transmission. A pause, a breath. Dunno.

​​​​​ Thought the same and when comparing his tone from the the first transmissions in my opinion you can clearly here it....but maybe it's just me too.

So very sad.

WuW

[[email protected]]

Roscoe1 - have you flown instruments in a helicopter? FW is soooo much easier since the platform is inherently unstable. Rely on needle ball and airspeed (most helos don't have a turn needle anyway) and you are dead in an unstabilised helicopter in cloud.

Meleagertoo - UK Mil flying is pretty professional and very discplined but Georgina gets the reality of life as a pilot, you seem to have some fantasy about pilots and admitting mistakes..

[roscoe1]

Yes, I've flown helicopter IFR and of course it pushes the flying skills of most folks to go iimc in a helicopter with no SAS or autopilot. If you think going inadvertant in an unstabilized machine has to have a bad outcome beyond needing a change of underware then that is your opinion. Not saying aany particular person including me would survive but with all the attitude info available in an IFR certified helicopter it should not matter if there is not a turn and bank gyro. Unstabilized? SAS, autopilot, even force trim...this was not an unstabilized ship and my point was that he should have seen it coming, flipped some switches, made a stabilized climb and confessed. You don't need that much to survive unless bad calls have already piled up.

[[email protected]]

I had to ask because you made the idea of instrument flying in a helicopter seems very straightforward, even without a decent instrument fit - I wouldn't want less experienced pilots to think it is easy and chance their arm in marginal conditions.

I have flown IFR in a completely unstabilised single (military) and a number of full IFR twins - as much as the automatics will help you, they will only do so if you press the right buttons at the right time and know what to expect from the aircraft when you do press those buttons.

There is no substitute for a good IF scan and that has to be learned and practised regularly.

[Hot and Hi]

There is no substitute for a good IF scan and that has to be learned and practised regularly.

Is a 'big screen' of synthetic vision a substitute for a good IF scan (which will only save your bacon if it was learned and practised regularly)?

I know I have asked this question here twice already, and nobody is biting. Can it be that the factually correct answer would be seen as 'politiically' incorrect? It seems obvious on the other hand that none of the measures that media and populistic politicians (is that a a tautology?) are demanding would have prevented this accident:

- Stricter legal limits (while the problem is the non-observance of existing limits)
- TAWS: Terrain Awareness (while the pilot knows they are close to terrain, as they are dodging clouds and can't go any higher without losing visual reference to the ground), and
- TAWS: Traffic Warning (which screams "PULL UP, PULL UP" while the pilot is already spatially disoriented and doesn't know anymore where "up" is)
- CVFDR (that in the best case could help with the accident investigation in explaining the mishap but not in preventing it)

By definition, there is almost no overlap between the group of pilots who are at risk of inadvertently entering IMC, and those pilots who do not only have and maintain an IF rating (like our mishap pilot) but also regulary practise IF in their daily operations, in real IMC conditions.

So what is the solution? Good advice not to get into trouble won't crack it, as we know that there will be situations where people find themselves in trouble.

[roscoe1]

The really sad part of this discussion has been left in the dust. All the experts, all the opinions, all the legislation to come and the NTSB throwing up their hands when the FAA doesn't take their advice (again) fails to mention that this all happened in order to get a teenager to a basketball game. Granted, business is business and if people are willing to pay, there is not too much I can say that makes it wrong to conduct that business in this case. However, there was zero, or if possible less than zero, risk/benefit analysis going on here. Bear in mind I'm talking about passenger 135 operations, not all types of helicopter operations. I cut a lot more slack if prople want to risk their lives and machines by themselves or with others who understand what they are doing. That process should have started long before this flight. The primary question should have been, how important is it to complete this mission? It was a convenience, not very important at all, but it was treated as if it were a mission of mercy or disaster response. I am not at all saying helicopters shouldn't be used like this. I'm just saying that perhaps it should have been given serious consideration by the pilot before he pulled pitch, and certainly as things got dicey with ATC and the weather.

[RVDT]

Good advice not to get into trouble won't crack it

Maybe that is where the shortfall is - considering as you say all the other options listed probably would not have made a difference.

People need to be damn sure they understand that IIMC more often than not is equivalent to flying into the ground if you are not qualified to do it.

"Training" should be limited to showing just how "unsuccessful" you will be.

Giving pilots a few hours on "foggles" to teach them how to save them from their own shortcomings is actually misguided and has never made sense to me.

I think the basic problem could be just ego. Back in the days of training guys to line you had to make them aware of it and batter it out of them.

Ego makes you overestimate your abilities and is known as a "hazardous attitude" - pun intended. The trick is knowing it exists and how to handle it.

[JohnDixson]

H&H wrote: “Good advise not to get into trouble won't crack it, as we know that there will be situations where people find themselves in trouble.”

Concur. It is then up to the leader of the operation to ensure that when the inevitable occurs, his folks are ready and able, and the equipment is the same. From what I’ve read from some experienced posters here, there seems to be agreement that meeting the bare minimum legal requirements does not insure the status extant in that first sentence. So, really two issues: 1) denier population that think you can always get away with VFR only; 2) leadership and funding to provide the needed skills/currency thereof.
This basic issue once existed at SA. Military rules required IFR currency but allowed it to be done in FW aircraft and thats what we did. Cheaper by far of course. It took some hard work by one of my predecessors to change that situation. Translate “hard work” into leadership.

[Gordy]

- Stricter legal limits (while the problem is the non-observance of existing limits)
- TAWS: Terrain Awareness (while the pilot knows they are close to terrain, as they are dodging clouds and can't go any higher without losing visual reference to the ground), and
- TAWS: Traffic Warning (which screams "PULL UP, PULL UP" while the pilot is already spatially disoriented and doesn't know anymore where "up" is)
- CVFDR (that in the best case could help with the accident investigation in explaining the mishap but not in preventing it)

So what is the solution? Good advise not to get into trouble won't crack it, as we know that there will be situations where people find themselves in trouble.

How do you stop a Mormon from drinking your beer when you invite him fishing with you?......Invite two of them.....checks and balances.

Two Pilots.

[[email protected]]

Is a 'big screen' of synthetic vision a substitute for a good IF scan (which will only save your bacon if it was learned and practised regularly)? Nope - it is just an invitation to push on into conditions that are not suitable for VFR flight.

[Hot and Hi]

Nope - it is just an invitation to push on into conditions that are not suitable for VFR flight.
Well, Mr Bryant's pilot didn't need synthetic vision as an invitation to push on. He pushed on without it, maybe assuming that his [6-pack] instrument flying skills would pull him through.

It is unfortunate that the urge to give a politically correct answer defocusses the discussion. With your logic one should also disallow the attitude indicator in VFR-only aircraft, as indeed it is an invitation to push on into conditions that can become sketchy.

My question to the forum of experts was however a technical one:

- We all agree that good real visibility (=VMC) allows any reasonably proficient pilot (even if trained VFR-only) to successfully reject the illusions that cause spatial disorientation.
- We know that with degrading visibility, the illusions can become overpowering.
- We however also know that under 'foggles' the little remaining peripheral vision still allows the student pilot quite well to cope with the illusions (in all generality, peripheral vision would still give accurate perception of bank and of rate of turn).

The question therefore is: What properties and qualities does synthetic reality need to have in order to be sufficiently trusted by the pilot's brain to then reject the wrong illusions?

As stated before: From experience of less than proficient IF pilots (like in this mishap), we know the 6-pack isn't suitable. And it is self-evident that replacing all cockpit windows with HD TV screens showing what the pilot could see in VMC through the windscreen would do the trick. But where is the tipping point? What is the minimum 'instrumentation' needed that would give the pilot's brains sufficient visual clues to be able to reject the illusions even without owning proficient IF scan skills?

I myself haven't made up my mind in this question yet. I am not yet convinced that embedding synthetic vision into the EFIS glass panel is the solution. I fear that solely increasing the AI presentation from a 3.5 inch round instrument to a 7 or 10 inch screen, and maybe adding some synthetic terrain, might not be sufficient to trick the brain into not succumbing to the other illusions. My hunch is that the 'balance' information is gleaned by the brain from peripheral vision, not from the central, in-focus view. The 'foggle' experience that we spoke about several times in this discussion, is a good support for this theory.

What do you experts think?

[[email protected]]

It wasn't a politically correct answer - just the truth based on years of experience. When NVG were introduced we saw them used by some to push on in worse weather at night than they might have done in non-NVG flight - if you can see more you will go further.

As much information as you present to the pilot in the cockpit, if they are not trained to use it properly and believe in it then it won't prevent somatogravic or visual illusions fooling their brain.

I would always have an AI in a VFR aircraft for that just in case moment - better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.

A standard instrument fit is more than enough to prevent or overcome the leans but you have to believe the presentation - that comes down to training, exposure to real IMC and practice.

If you push the limits and go scud running, and you don't have the skills or knowledge to execute a plan B when it goes wrong then WTF are you doing in a cockpit in the first place?

[JimEli]

...
What do you experts think?


Aircraft state is more complicated than a pretty picture. Attitude alone is not sufficient especially in a helicopter. The full picture requires airspeed, trim, yaw rate, power, altitude, etc. What does the SV picture look like for a helicopter flying straight and level, but backwards?

In spatial disorientation, the vestibular system rules. The pilot believes they are turning when they’re not and vice versa. The vestibular has overpowered the visual. A pilot makes inappropriate control inputs based upon these false sensations. It’s worth repeating that inappropriate control inputs during an upset recovery can lead to a completely different upset situation. Game over.

The contradiction between sensed orientation and visual in the pilot’s mind creates confusion, and it’s only through training and experience (and dare I say proficiency) that a pilot is able to resolve this. As straightforward as it seems, just making the attitude indicator bigger doesn’t solve the underlying problem.

A similar issue is experienced by many in a simulator, but manifested differently. Even high-end simulators have an infidelity between the motion and the visual. However, when flying a simulator, the disconnect between the senses doesn’t create full blown SD, but rather causes many to become ill. Some even violently.

While there is belief that synthetic vision technology may provide improvements in SD recovery, the real benefit from SV is improving situational awareness, workload reduction (i.e. terrain and path-in-the-sky) AND UPSET PREVENTION.

But why keep asking for meaningless opinions?

MITIGATING PILOT DISORIENTATION WITH SYNTHETIC VISION DISPLAYS (https://dataworks2018.testscience.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2018/03/DATAworksBallard030518.pdf)

SYNTHETIC VISION SYSTEM COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT DECK DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES FOR UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERY (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170005467.pdf)

Evaluation of Synthetic Vision Display Concepts for Improved Awareness in Unusual Attitude Recovery Scenarios. (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160009271.pdf)

Airplane State Awareness - Virtual Day- VMC Displays. (https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SE200:_Airplane_State_Awareness_-_Virtual_Day-VMC_Displays)

Airplane Upset Recovery. Industry Solutions for Large SweptWing Turbofan Airplanes Typically Seating More than 100 Passengers.

Prevent Loss of Control in General Aviation. NTSB. (https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Pages/mwl5-2017-18.aspx)

[JimEli]

How much would SV have helped this pilot?
How much would have SV have helped this pilot?

[aa777888]

MITIGATING PILOT DISORIENTATION WITH SYNTHETIC VISION DISPLAYS (http://Aircraft%20state%20is%20more%20complicated%20than%20a%20simp le%20picture.%20Attitude%20alone%20is%20not%20sufficient%20e specially%20in%20a%20helicopter.%20The%20full%20picture%20re quires%20airspeed,%20trim,%20power,%20altitude,%20yaw%20rate ,%20etc.%20%20%20In%20spatial%20disorientation,%20the%20vest ibular%20system%20rules.%20The%20pilot%20believes%20they%20a re%20turning%20when%20they’re%20not.%20The%20vestibular%20ov erpowers%20the%20visual.%20They%20make%20inappropriate%20con trol%20inputs%20based%20upon%20these%20false%20sensations.%2 0It’s%20worth%20repeating%20that%20inappropriate%20control%2 0inputs%20during%20an%20upset%20recovery%20can%20lead%20to%2 0a%20completely%20different%20upset%20situation.%20%20The%20 contradiction%20between%20sensed%20orientation%20and%20visua l%20in%20the%20pilot’s%20mind%20creates%20confusion,%20and%2 0it’s%20only%20through%20training%20and%20experience%20that% 20a%20pilot%20is%20able%20to%20resolve%20this.%20As%20straig htforward%20as%20it%20seems,%20just%20making%20the%20attitud e%20indicator%20bigger%20doesn’t%20solve%20the%20underlying% 20problem.%20%20A%20similar%20issue%20is%20experienced%20by% 20many%20in%20a%20simulator,%20but%20manifested%20differentl y.%20Even%20high-end%20simulators%20have%20an%20infidelity%20between%20the%20 motion%20and%20the%20visual.%20However,%20when%20flying%20a% 20simulator,%20the%20disconnect%20between%20the%20senses%20d oesn’t%20create%20full%20blown%20SD,%20but%20rather%20causes %20many%20to%20become%20ill.%20%20While%20there%20is%20belie f%20that%20synthetic%20vision%20technology%20may%20provide%2 0improvements%20in%20SD%20recovery,%20the%20real%20benefit%2 0from%20SV%20is%20improving%20situational%20awareness,%20wor kload%20reduction%20(i.e.%20terrain%20and%20path-in-the-sky)%20AND%20UPSET%20PREVENTION.%20%20But%20why%20keep%20ask ing%20for%20meaningless%20opinions?%20%20MITIGATING%20PILOT% 20DISORIENTATION%20WITH%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20DISPLAYS%20ht tps:/dataworks2018.testscience.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2018/03/DATAworksBallard030518.pdf%20%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20SYSTEM% 20COMMERCIAL%20AIRCRAFT%20FLIGHT%20DECK%20DISPLAY%20TECHNOLO GIES%20FOR%20UNUSUAL%20ATTITUDE%20RECOVERY%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170005467.pdf%20%20Evaluation%20of%20Synthetic%20Vision%20 Display%20Concepts%20for%20Improved%20Awareness%20in%20Unusu al%20Attitude%20Recovery%20Scenarios.%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160009271.pdf%20%20Airplane%20State%20Awareness%20-%20Virtual%20Day-%20VMC%20Displays.%20%20http:/www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SE200:_Airplane_State_Awareness_-_Virtual)

SYNTHETIC VISION SYSTEM COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT DECK DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES FOR UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERY (http://Aircraft%20state%20is%20more%20complicated%20than%20a%20simp le%20picture.%20Attitude%20alone%20is%20not%20sufficient%20e specially%20in%20a%20helicopter.%20The%20full%20picture%20re quires%20airspeed,%20trim,%20power,%20altitude,%20yaw%20rate ,%20etc.%20%20%20In%20spatial%20disorientation,%20the%20vest ibular%20system%20rules.%20The%20pilot%20believes%20they%20a re%20turning%20when%20they’re%20not.%20The%20vestibular%20ov erpowers%20the%20visual.%20They%20make%20inappropriate%20con trol%20inputs%20based%20upon%20these%20false%20sensations.%2 0It’s%20worth%20repeating%20that%20inappropriate%20control%2 0inputs%20during%20an%20upset%20recovery%20can%20lead%20to%2 0a%20completely%20different%20upset%20situation.%20%20The%20 contradiction%20between%20sensed%20orientation%20and%20visua l%20in%20the%20pilot’s%20mind%20creates%20confusion,%20and%2 0it’s%20only%20through%20training%20and%20experience%20that% 20a%20pilot%20is%20able%20to%20resolve%20this.%20As%20straig htforward%20as%20it%20seems,%20just%20making%20the%20attitud e%20indicator%20bigger%20doesn’t%20solve%20the%20underlying% 20problem.%20%20A%20similar%20issue%20is%20experienced%20by% 20many%20in%20a%20simulator,%20but%20manifested%20differentl y.%20Even%20high-end%20simulators%20have%20an%20infidelity%20between%20the%20 motion%20and%20the%20visual.%20However,%20when%20flying%20a% 20simulator,%20the%20disconnect%20between%20the%20senses%20d oesn’t%20create%20full%20blown%20SD,%20but%20rather%20causes %20many%20to%20become%20ill.%20%20While%20there%20is%20belie f%20that%20synthetic%20vision%20technology%20may%20provide%2 0improvements%20in%20SD%20recovery,%20the%20real%20benefit%2 0from%20SV%20is%20improving%20situational%20awareness,%20wor kload%20reduction%20(i.e.%20terrain%20and%20path-in-the-sky)%20AND%20UPSET%20PREVENTION.%20%20But%20why%20keep%20ask ing%20for%20meaningless%20opinions?%20%20MITIGATING%20PILOT% 20DISORIENTATION%20WITH%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20DISPLAYS%20ht tps:/dataworks2018.testscience.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2018/03/DATAworksBallard030518.pdf%20%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20SYSTEM% 20COMMERCIAL%20AIRCRAFT%20FLIGHT%20DECK%20DISPLAY%20TECHNOLO GIES%20FOR%20UNUSUAL%20ATTITUDE%20RECOVERY%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170005467.pdf%20%20Evaluation%20of%20Synthetic%20Vision%20 Display%20Concepts%20for%20Improved%20Awareness%20in%20Unusu al%20Attitude%20Recovery%20Scenarios.%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160009271.pdf%20%20Airplane%20State%20Awareness%20-%20Virtual%20Day-%20VMC%20Displays.%20%20http:/www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SE200:_Airplane_State_Awareness_-_Virtual)

Evaluation of Synthetic Vision Display Concepts for Improved Awareness in Unusual Attitude Recovery Scenarios. (http://Aircraft%20state%20is%20more%20complicated%20than%20a%20simp le%20picture.%20Attitude%20alone%20is%20not%20sufficient%20e specially%20in%20a%20helicopter.%20The%20full%20picture%20re quires%20airspeed,%20trim,%20power,%20altitude,%20yaw%20rate ,%20etc.%20%20%20In%20spatial%20disorientation,%20the%20vest ibular%20system%20rules.%20The%20pilot%20believes%20they%20a re%20turning%20when%20they’re%20not.%20The%20vestibular%20ov erpowers%20the%20visual.%20They%20make%20inappropriate%20con trol%20inputs%20based%20upon%20these%20false%20sensations.%2 0It’s%20worth%20repeating%20that%20inappropriate%20control%2 0inputs%20during%20an%20upset%20recovery%20can%20lead%20to%2 0a%20completely%20different%20upset%20situation.%20%20The%20 contradiction%20between%20sensed%20orientation%20and%20visua l%20in%20the%20pilot’s%20mind%20creates%20confusion,%20and%2 0it’s%20only%20through%20training%20and%20experience%20that% 20a%20pilot%20is%20able%20to%20resolve%20this.%20As%20straig htforward%20as%20it%20seems,%20just%20making%20the%20attitud e%20indicator%20bigger%20doesn’t%20solve%20the%20underlying% 20problem.%20%20A%20similar%20issue%20is%20experienced%20by% 20many%20in%20a%20simulator,%20but%20manifested%20differentl y.%20Even%20high-end%20simulators%20have%20an%20infidelity%20between%20the%20 motion%20and%20the%20visual.%20However,%20when%20flying%20a% 20simulator,%20the%20disconnect%20between%20the%20senses%20d oesn’t%20create%20full%20blown%20SD,%20but%20rather%20causes %20many%20to%20become%20ill.%20%20While%20there%20is%20belie f%20that%20synthetic%20vision%20technology%20may%20provide%2 0improvements%20in%20SD%20recovery,%20the%20real%20benefit%2 0from%20SV%20is%20improving%20situational%20awareness,%20wor kload%20reduction%20(i.e.%20terrain%20and%20path-in-the-sky)%20AND%20UPSET%20PREVENTION.%20%20But%20why%20keep%20ask ing%20for%20meaningless%20opinions?%20%20MITIGATING%20PILOT% 20DISORIENTATION%20WITH%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20DISPLAYS%20ht tps:/dataworks2018.testscience.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2018/03/DATAworksBallard030518.pdf%20%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20SYSTEM% 20COMMERCIAL%20AIRCRAFT%20FLIGHT%20DECK%20DISPLAY%20TECHNOLO GIES%20FOR%20UNUSUAL%20ATTITUDE%20RECOVERY%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170005467.pdf%20%20Evaluation%20of%20Synthetic%20Vision%20 Display%20Concepts%20for%20Improved%20Awareness%20in%20Unusu al%20Attitude%20Recovery%20Scenarios.%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160009271.pdf%20%20Airplane%20State%20Awareness%20-%20Virtual%20Day-%20VMC%20Displays.%20%20http:/www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SE200:_Airplane_State_Awareness_-_Virtual)

Airplane State Awareness - Virtual Day- VMC Displays. (http://Aircraft%20state%20is%20more%20complicated%20than%20a%20simp le%20picture.%20Attitude%20alone%20is%20not%20sufficient%20e specially%20in%20a%20helicopter.%20The%20full%20picture%20re quires%20airspeed,%20trim,%20power,%20altitude,%20yaw%20rate ,%20etc.%20%20%20In%20spatial%20disorientation,%20the%20vest ibular%20system%20rules.%20The%20pilot%20believes%20they%20a re%20turning%20when%20they’re%20not.%20The%20vestibular%20ov erpowers%20the%20visual.%20They%20make%20inappropriate%20con trol%20inputs%20based%20upon%20these%20false%20sensations.%2 0It’s%20worth%20repeating%20that%20inappropriate%20control%2 0inputs%20during%20an%20upset%20recovery%20can%20lead%20to%2 0a%20completely%20different%20upset%20situation.%20%20The%20 contradiction%20between%20sensed%20orientation%20and%20visua l%20in%20the%20pilot’s%20mind%20creates%20confusion,%20and%2 0it’s%20only%20through%20training%20and%20experience%20that% 20a%20pilot%20is%20able%20to%20resolve%20this.%20As%20straig htforward%20as%20it%20seems,%20just%20making%20the%20attitud e%20indicator%20bigger%20doesn’t%20solve%20the%20underlying% 20problem.%20%20A%20similar%20issue%20is%20experienced%20by% 20many%20in%20a%20simulator,%20but%20manifested%20differentl y.%20Even%20high-end%20simulators%20have%20an%20infidelity%20between%20the%20 motion%20and%20the%20visual.%20However,%20when%20flying%20a% 20simulator,%20the%20disconnect%20between%20the%20senses%20d oesn’t%20create%20full%20blown%20SD,%20but%20rather%20causes %20many%20to%20become%20ill.%20%20While%20there%20is%20belie f%20that%20synthetic%20vision%20technology%20may%20provide%2 0improvements%20in%20SD%20recovery,%20the%20real%20benefit%2 0from%20SV%20is%20improving%20situational%20awareness,%20wor kload%20reduction%20(i.e.%20terrain%20and%20path-in-the-sky)%20AND%20UPSET%20PREVENTION.%20%20But%20why%20keep%20ask ing%20for%20meaningless%20opinions?%20%20MITIGATING%20PILOT% 20DISORIENTATION%20WITH%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20DISPLAYS%20ht tps:/dataworks2018.testscience.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2018/03/DATAworksBallard030518.pdf%20%20SYNTHETIC%20VISION%20SYSTEM% 20COMMERCIAL%20AIRCRAFT%20FLIGHT%20DECK%20DISPLAY%20TECHNOLO GIES%20FOR%20UNUSUAL%20ATTITUDE%20RECOVERY%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170005467.pdf%20%20Evaluation%20of%20Synthetic%20Vision%20 Display%20Concepts%20for%20Improved%20Awareness%20in%20Unusu al%20Attitude%20Recovery%20Scenarios.%20https:/ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20160009271.pdf%20%20Airplane%20State%20Awareness%20-%20Virtual%20Day-%20VMC%20Displays.%20%20http:/www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SE200:_Airplane_State_Awareness_-_Virtual)

Airplane Upset Recovery. Industry Solutions for Large SweptWing Turbofan Airplanes Typically Seating More than 100 Passengers.

Prevent Loss of Control in General Aviation. NTSB. (http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Pages/mwl7_2015.aspx)Most of those links did not work, but I was able to search them out using the titles.

That's a great body of work. For the TLDR crowd it basically says synthetic vision is of little to no value compared to normal EFIS type attitude information.

[JimEli]

Most of those links did not work, but I was able to search them out using the titles.

That's a great body of work. For the TLDR crowd it basically says synthetic vision is of little to no value compared to normal EFIS type attitude information.


Sorry, the forum software routinely scrambles my links, requiring successive edits to fix. I'm not sure why. I think I have fixed them now...

[Hot and Hi]

Vertical Magazine "Rotor Radio" podcast with Elan Head where she makes some pertinent statements about how difficult it is even for IF inctructor rated pilots to fight those illusions:

https://www.verticalmag.com/news/rotor-radio-spatial-disorientation-elan-head/?utm_source=vertical-daily-news-todays-news&utm_campaign=vertical-daily-news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=todays-news&utm_content=V1

[jimjim1]

Sorry, the forum software routinely scrambles my links, requiring successive edits to fix. I'm not sure why. I think I have fixed them now...

I have sometimes noticed that too. A fix seemed to be to quote the links. I mean after the fact. I always check links and if they are broken I "reply" quoting the entire post and post that with a short explanatory note.
As I recall 100% success rate.

I have not observed this for a while though ... ? Maybe you are seeing a different issue.

I did write a detailed Tech Support note to the Pprune support forum. Here it is: (if the link is OK:-)

https://www.pprune.org/pprune-problems-queries/626127-links-pprune-posts-sometimes-broken.html#post10588320

Edit:- I don't mean to moan at Pprune - just providing info for anyone who wants it. It's I assume a small site with limited resources.

[Ascend Charlie]

I have experienced the cross-coupling of the balance canals on a NVFR flight near the coast. A nav over dark land, to a turning point over a lighthouse. The sea mist was just rolling in below us.

We got to the turning point, we rolled the aircraft to start the turn (1 canal) and pitched the aircraft through the turn (2 canals) and then I turned my head to look at the lighthouse below - its beams of light, like fingers rotating in the mist, totally stuffed me up - eyes telling me one thing and 2 confused balance canals, I felt like I was rotating backwards out of my seat, a very powerful feeling. Lucky I wasn't on the controls at the time.

Maybe something similar happened here, he starts a turn, introduces a climb, turns his head to look for a visual feature, feels he is falling backwards and pokes the nose down...

[[email protected]]

Hot and Hi - good link to rotor radio, Elan Head (cool name) talks a lot of sense. It comes down to training and practice in the end - as we all knew:ok:.

I have experienced the leans 'under the hood' but being in cloud is very different - you don't have the psychological safety blanket of being able to peek or just look up, you have to use the instruments and that can make it much more scary.

So add the fear factor to the vestibular illusions and you find yourself in a place that you need good, current skills to recover from.

Taking pilots who have only ever flown 'simulated' IF (under the hood or with foggles) into cloud is something I have done and still do on a regular basis - it often scares them fartless (no-one tells you it is bumpy inside the fluffy stuff) and taking control is another regular occurrence. However, once the fear dissipates and they gain the confidence of trusting the instruments and using the correct techniques, it is amazing the progress the students make.

If you want a challenge as an Instrument Flying instructor, try recovering from a student's 'leans-induced' unusual attitude where height, heading and speed (not to mention glideslope and centreline) have gone badly awry at 3 miles on the ILS, IMC with a 300' cloudbase. :)

[HissingSyd]

I felt like I was rotating backwards out of my seat, a very powerful feeling. Lucky I wasn't on the controls at the time.
Maybe something similar happened here, he starts a turn, introduces a climb, turns his head to look for a visual feature, feels he is falling backwards and pokes the nose down...

I came to that conclusion from my personal experience early in the previous topic.

It comes down to training and practice in the end - as we all knew.

It is impossible to describe the sensation or to train for it, but good, current IF experience must help, and IF in cloud.

In initial flying training we had a week for aero-medicine. This included a session using a rotating chair, first to demonstrate the leans. Then, eyes closed and chin on chest we were spun again, quite slowly, and after a few seconds told to look up. Many of us flung ourselves from the chair trying to find where up and down were. This experience is rather like doing the dunker - it lets you deal with the real situation because you already know how terrifying it might be. Yes, I have escaped from a ditched helicopter, too. ;-)

I have experienced the leans 'under the hood'

With reference to what was said the blog, I think it is worth emphasising that these coriolis effects are quite different from the leans, which is itself dangerous enough.

If you want a challenge as an Instrument Flying instructor, try recovering from a student's 'leans-induced' unusual attitude where height, heading and speed (not to mention glideslope and centreline) have gone badly awry at 3 miles on the ILS, IMC with a 300' cloudbase.

I recollect being given unusual attitudes to recover from during IF training,

[[email protected]]

I recollect being given unusual attitudes to recover from during IF training, very unlikely to have done that in cloud - the requirement for UP/UA training is normally clear of cloud with a visual horizon just so the instructor can let the UP/UA develop further and recover it safely. The situation I was describing has happened to myself and colleagues when the students were trying to fly an ILS but not coping with real IMC very well.

It is one thing to recover when someone else puts you in a UP for training since you know it is coming - quite another to put yourself into one accidentally or have someone else do it because their scan has broken down.

With reference to what was said the blog, I think it is worth emphasising that these coriolis effects are quite different from the leans, which is itself dangerous enough. fair comment but both produce powerful illusions and disorientation in a DVE so should still be considered in the same breath when talking about IIMC.

It is impossible to describe the sensation or to train for it, but good, current IF experience must help, and IF in cloud. yup, exactly what many of us have been saying all along:ok:

[HissingSyd]

very unlikely to have done that in cloud - the requirement for UP/UA training is normally clear of cloud with a visual horizon just so the instructor can let the UP/UA develop further and recover it safely.

Of course. Exactly as you describe. Nevertheless, pretty useful as a student. ;-)

[[email protected]]

Yes, probably the two standard ones - a low speed autorotative turn and a high speed, high power descending turn.:ok:

For experienced Sqn pilots I would get them to try and come to the hover on instruments and the resulting UP was more difficult to recover from as they had put themselves into it. It is quite representative of an IIMC encounter at low speed and low level and the larger yaw inputs and larger power changes of trying to come to a free air hover means that good recovery skills are required and it can be quite a confidence builder.

[Georg1na]

Crab - did you ever do this one which was quite fun. Come to the hover as you say with the ASE engaged - get the aircraft moving backwards quite fast and then hand over control. The student then puts his feet on the pedals, that disengages the yaw channel and the aircraft does a snap 180 degree turn and the nose drops dramatically!! You need to keep your hands near the controls as said student can start thrashing about a bit. Happy days.........................:eek:

[[email protected]]

No but I did reach out from the RHS of a Wessex and put my finger over the pitot tube as I gave control to my colleague in a UP on SCT IF. He pushed the nose forward assuming we were at zero IAS and then a bit more - we both got a surprise as I removed my finger from the pitot and suddenly had 115 Kts and rising quickly! Learned about messing around on UPs from that one:)

[212man]

No but I did reach out from the RHS of a Wessex and put my finger over the pitot tube as I gave control to my colleague in a UP on SCT IF. He pushed the nose forward assuming we were at zero IAS and then a bit more - we both got a surprise as I removed my finger from the pitot and suddenly had 115 Kts and rising quickly! Learned about messing around on UPs from that one:)
lucky the heater wasn’t on!

[[email protected]]

lucky the heater wasn’t on!:):):ok:yes, that would have been painful and even more embarrassing .

[Georg1na]

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/500x542/wessex_mountains_3__deacf4d5e8018cd959cb43276b729919bf3f7e8c .jpg
Crab - you have bloody long arms to do that!!:sad:

[[email protected]]

Not really - just look at where the pilot's hand is on the cyclic - not a big reach at all.

[MightyGem]

As a QHI I was teaching pilots to become Aircraft Commanders. They were in the LHS "commanding" and I was in the RHS being a "pilot". As we approached the airfield, I purposely went inadvertent IMC to see how the student would cope. He coped well. I, however, got an immediate case of the leans.

So, we're flying round the radar circuit in a Gazelle(so no aids) me fighting the leans, him grinning at me, knowing full well what's happening and asking: "Do you want me to take over?" Me, through gritted teeth: "No, I'm fine".

Joking apart, it was hard work.

[Georg1na]

"just look at where the pilot's hand is on the cyclic "

Cyclic? Woss that then.............I bet you were a great lover - at arms length.................:D

[[email protected]]

Not a reacharound though:ok:

[Cyclic Hotline]

The Headline is deceiving as it has nothing to do with Vanessa Bryant, but it is actually Island Express now claiming that the Air Traffic Controllers caused this crash!

https://www.tmz.com/2020/08/25/vanessa-bryant-sues-air-traffic-controllers-over-kobe-helicopter-crash/KOBE BRYANT HELICOPTER CRASH - ISLAND EXPRESS SUES AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS 8/25/2020 7:04 AM PThttps://imagez.tmz.com/image/aa/4by3/2020/08/25/aaf1e2474b6847828ad139296b367a1d_md.jpg
EXCLUSIVEIsland Express, the company that operated the helicopter that killed Kobe Bryant (https://www.tmz.com/people/kobe-bryant/) and 8 others, is suing the 2 air traffic controllers who they claim caused the crash.
The helicopter company claims the 2 air traffic controllers who were guiding the pilot to the Mamba Academy, Kyle Larsen and Matthew Conley, were asked by the pilot for radar guidance, presumably because of the heavy fog. According to the lawsuit, Larsen responded by saying, "I'm going to lose radar and comms [communications] probably pretty shortly so you can just squawk V-F-R [visual flight rules] and when you get closer go to Camarillo tower."
The company claims the controller denied the pilot the use of what it believes is life-saving radar, despite the fact that radar guidance had not yet been lost.
Conley then relieved Larsen and according to the suit, less than 2 minutes later the pilot radioed in, but Conley was unhelpful and uninformed.
https://imagez.tmz.com/image/32/4by3/2020/01/28/32b4809d834046a0ac1511789552be4a_md.jpg (https://www.tmz.com/photos/2020/01/28/kobe-bryant-helicopter-fire-crash-photos/)MOMENTS AFTER THE CRASHLAUNCH GALLERY (https://www.tmz.com/photos/2020/01/28/kobe-bryant-helicopter-fire-crash-photos/)SWNS (https://www.tmz.com/photos/2020/01/28/kobe-bryant-helicopter-fire-crash-photos/)According to the suit, the pilot believed he was still operating on radar because the tower operators did not clearly say it was being terminated. Nevertheless, the company claims the helicopter did suddenly lose radio and radar contact in the fog.
https://imagez.tmz.com/image/e8/4by3/2020/06/17/e8aa0e6bdfdd424b9926d1a508825697_md.jpg
NTSBThe suit claims at some point -- presumably when the pilot was in the fog -- radio contact came back, and Conley tried reaching the pilot repeatedly, and that caused the pilot additional stress. What's unclear ... it would seem Conley was calling to guide the pilot.
Short story ... the helicopter company says the tower operators caused the pilot stress and distraction which ultimately caused the crash.

[fitliker]

Failure by the pilot to maintain VMC was the very simple cause of the crash .
If the pilot had of stayed out of the ground based obscuration , his passengers would not have died in the aircraft under his control .
Sophiests playing word games . The decision of the Pilot to continue into cloud while "VFR" was the cause of the crash . Simple.
The Ambulance chasers always go after the deepest pockets in a shotgun lawsuit. Hence the ATC getting accused .
I have lots of experience scud running and would never enter cloud that close to ground , I have turned around and tried different routes when I have been stopped by a wall of weather while flying low level .
The Pilot did not take advantage of the aircraft ability to hover . He made many errors but the one that killed him was going into cloud below MSA.

[[email protected]]

There should be a minimum radar vectoring height chart for the area - a controller isn't allowed to give a radar service below that.

ot much doubt the aircraft would have been below the minimum level.

[Hughes500]

Er, the Captain of the aircraft's primary responsibility is its safety. So he is not obliged to obey ATC if it puts the aircraft in an unsafe place. Well that is what I was told at the start of my flying at Middle Wallop in teh 1980's

[212pete]

Hmm, let me see; VMC into IMC, fully IFR capable aircraft; how about a Pan Pan call and climb IMC back to VMC. Sort it out later with the feds.
In reference to the law suit, attorneys always will find a way to encourage a client to a law suit.

[Fareastdriver]

Island Express going to go bankrupt?

[OvertHawk]

Island Express going to go bankrupt?

They're just trying to throw enough mud around in the hope that some of it sticks to someone else rather than themselves.

[airplanecrazy]

"The suit claims at some point -- presumably when the pilot was in the fog -- radio contact came back, and Conley tried reaching the pilot repeatedly, and that caused the pilot additional stress."

A couple of months ago I created a crash reconstruction with the full ATC audio I obtained from the FAA. I am not a pilot or an air traffic controller, but I don't believe the controllers had any responsibility for the crash. https://youtu.be/M_Dpm144KXo Here is a statement that the last controller (CO) said in his NTSB interview that really struck me;

Group: Hindsight being 20/20, when you look back is there anything you would have done differently, or anything you think could have been done differently?
CO: I think the circumstances were beyond control of anyone in this building.:

T (https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/63500-63999/63911/636398.pdf)he full transcript is in the docket.

[Twist & Shout]

Airplanecrazy
Group: Hindsight being 20/20, when you look back is there anything you would have done differently, or anything you think could have been done differently?
CO: I think the circumstances were beyond control of anyone in this building.:

This ^
The end.

[FWRWATPLX2]

Is it fair to say we still do not know definitively the cause of the accident?

It has been speculated that conditions reported as foggy or misty at the time of the crash with visibility of 2.5 miles and ceilings of about 1,100 feet contributed to the accident.

The fact was the Pilot-in-Command was instructed, “maintain Special VFR condition at or below 2,500 feet", which confirms the less-than-VFR weather.

According to NTSB: “Examination of the main and tail rotor assemblies found damage consistent with powered rotation at the time of impact." and "Viewable sections of the engines showed no evidence of an uncontained or catastrophic internal failure"

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20200126X41436&AKey=1&RType=Prelim&IType=MA
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA20MA059.aspx
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/nr20200207.aspx

P-I-C: ARA G. ZOBAYAN 50 years old, had 1,200 Hours S-76 and was the Chief Pilot for Island Express, with 8,200 Hours (approximately) Total and had flown about 270 hours the previous 6 months, which is about average . . . Typically, one can expect to fly 500 hours/year, unless flying "long haul". How much Actual Weather Flying had he logged? Flight Simulator experience logged? How much had he logged wearing a View Limiting Device or Hood? Again, would need to see his Pilot Logbook. That might give a clue to his competency and level of self-confidence to climb, with sole reference to Instruments, into VFR conditions, above the clouds. For example, pick a westerly heading over the highway, keeping within +/- 10 degrees, pull up on the Collective, watching the Altimeter and VSI increase, maintain airspeed or maybe slow a bit to increase Rate of Climb, keep the Needle and Ball centered . . . And, that would work just fine without a Gyro Horizon or Attitude Indicator. A true bonus if the aircraft had one of those that functioned.

Zobayan went to Group 3 Aviation in 1998 for flying lessons. Were all of his flying and ground school lessons received, there? Would be interesting to see all of the sign-offs by his Instructors and lesson syllabuses/syllabai to know exactly what he was taught.

FAA notes: "violated federal flight rules in 2015, when he flew into busy airspace near Los Angeles International Airport despite being ordered not to by air traffic control" He was criticized by the FAA, “Had Mr. Zobayan properly planned and reviewed current weather at LAX, he would have been able to anticipate the required action to transit … resulting in proper coordination”.

Trend?

CFI/FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR - INSTRUMENT HELICOPTER (2020-08-31)
CFI/FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR - ROTORCRAFT-HELICOPTER (2020-08-31)
GI/GROUND INSTRUCTOR - INSTRUMENT
PILOT/COMMERCIAL - INSTRUMENT HELICOPTER
PILOT/COMMERCIAL - ROTORCRAFT-HELICOPTER
PILOT/PRIVATE - INSTRUMENT HELICOPTER
PILOT/PRIVATE - ROTORCRAFT-HELICOPTER

The The Sikorsky S-76B is capable of single-pilot instrument flying certified or not and regardless the company was restricted to VFR operations, or not, in an Abnormal or Emergency situation, the Pilot-in-Command can do what the heck he wants to save the day. Apologize and explain later, but best to fess-up and submit a NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Report.

I first earned a Commercial Pilot License Rotorcraft-Helicopter with an Instrument Rating March 1979, after graduating US Army flight training, at Mother Rucker. Earned Airline Transport Pilot License with Instrument Rating Rotorcraft-Helicopter October 1983 . . . Then offered a Corporate Pilot job flying both multi-engine turboprops and multi-engine IFR helicopters based at LAX, July 1987. By September 1987, I earned a Certificated Flight Instructor-Instruments Rating Rotorcraft-Helicopter and became a Helicopter Instrument Examiner for the Corporate Flight Department. After five years there, before the Defense industry wind down and half the Flight Department was let go, I went on to fly a BK-17A3/A4 in the same area . . . All the while, I had been flying the Bell Huey out of Los Alamitos Army Air Field. So, I had quite a bit of experience flying in the same operational area and terrain. Up to the Santa Susana rocket facility in the Simi Hills, out to Thousand Oaks, over to Palmdale Air Force Plant, out to Vandenberg Air Force Base, Van Nuys, Burbank, Santa Monica, you get the idea . . . I know the area like the back of my hand, including the canyons, the canyons with wires, and particularly the scuddy weather.

During my career spanning 36 years, have had lapses in Instrument currency? Of course. I could still keep shiny side up and might have been a bit rough during recurrent training. Let's see a show of hands how many have flown Instruments on Partial Panel, either during training or out of necessity, when something failed? Compass Card not working, no problem, that's what the Standby Compass is for. Don't need a Gyro Horizon, just makes it a whole lot smoother and easier. Right?

So, with 1,200 hours in the S-76, being an Instrument Rated Commercial Pilot and an Instrument Instructor and the Chief Pilot (that is the one who sets the example for all the Pilots he employed), it seems hard to understand Spatial Disorientation or Vertigo.

How many Instrument Rated Pilots have heard the axiom, "Believe Your Instruments"? That is, ignore what your body, nerves in your musculoskeletal system, and inner ear are directing you to do, just use the Instruments and do not fixate on any one. When you do, force yourself to increase your scan. This is just basic Human Factors stuff. Most importantly, don't put yourself in that position, in the first place. If there is any doubt about the weather or how low you will have to go and how slow you will have to fly doing Special VFR, then do not take off. If in rapidly declining weather, #1 slow down. Maintain straight and level. Maintain Visual contact with the ground. Look at the Compass Card, pick a 180 degree heading or a heading that will take you to VFR. Have I ever gone up a canyon parallel to the 405 and the weather would not allow any further progress? Indeed. I simply made a tight course reversal (180 degrees from what I was flying), at the same altitude, using my basic "Six Pack" of Instruments and returned to VFR, and got either IFR Clearance to go On-Top or Over-The-Top or returned to LAX, all coordinated with ATC. If Plan A does work, then have a Plan B. Have I ever said "No" to an Employer or Chief Pilot or passenger? Indeed. I only ever cared about protecting my Pilot License.

I am not blaming Ara Zobayan, because I do not know him, have not worked for him, have not flown the S-76, but I have flown comparable and even more sophisticated and faster aircraft and I have not seen a final Accident Investigation Report from NTSB, but if all the rotating parts were rotating . . . Did he suffer a medical episode or was it simply Spatial Disorientation? If it was the later, then we should want to know why, with all the experience and credentials he had.

[gulliBell]

..That might give a clue to his competency and level of self-confidence to climb, with sole reference to Instruments...


The critical competency was to have the nous to push one button on George, take hands off the flight controls, and monitor the instruments. It's not that difficult when George is available to help.

[airplanecrazy]

The user cazzipropri on Reddit posted a name anonymized version of the claims against the controllers. I obviously have a lot to learn about atc responsibilities. https://www.reddit.com/r/ATC/comments/igyycf/island_expresss_lawsuit_against_atc_press_review/

Edit: Changed link to reddit page.

[JimEli]

First and foremost, the views and opinions expressed here are those of the author. The content is not intended to malign any individual, group, organization or company, nor imply any illegal act occurred. I’ve authored this simply to raise questions on the appropriateness and efficacy of current policies, procedures and oversight of Part 135 helicopter operations. My opinions are primarily derived from information provided in the NTSB accident investigation docket. Please bear with me, this is lengthy.

Do you think this pilot was prepared to perform an IIMC recovery--because the checked boxes seem to say so?

On June 21, 2019 (218 days prior to the accident), the accident pilot completed a concurrent FAA Part 135.293 and 299 check flight in the S-76. The check was conducted by the FAA POI and lasted only 1.0 hour. During this flight, among other maneuvers, the pilot was evaluated performing both “IIMC MANEUVER” and “ILS DEMO.” No additional instrument approaches were evaluated. During this flight, which was accomplished at Long Beach, the maneuvers “High Altitude Takeoff & Landings,” “Autorotations (Single Engine)” and “Hovering Autorotations (Single Engine)” were also checked.

The previous year’s (2018) concurrent Part 135.293/299 S-76 check flight lasted just 36 minutes and it was noted the pilot was evaluated performing “IIMC MANEUVER” and “ILS OPERATION.” No additional instrument approaches were evaluated. Is 36 minutes, or even 1-hour adequate time to conduct an FAA Part 135.293/299 checkride in a complex helicopter like the S-76?

On May 10, 2019 (260 days prior to the accident), the NTSB docket notes the pilot performed two S-76 training flights with a contract training company. These two flights lasted a total of 3.6 hours. The document notes, among many others, an “IIMC MANEUVER” and “ILS Operation” were graded satisfactorily, with no other instrument approaches noted.

During the NTSB interview of the instructor for the above flight, regards wearing a view limiting device during IIMC training, the instructor stated, “so sometimes yes, sometimes no. Especially if you wear a helmet it's difficult to use a hood on something like that. If you wear a headset that may or may not. It depends on what's available, somebody wants it, somebody doesn't want it. Again, it is more tailored for the check ride.” And specifically, on whether the accident pilot wore a view limiting device, the instructor stated, “I don't remember that part.” How was the time logged? Shouldn’t this be stipulated by policy and regulation?

Furthermore, the FAA POI characterized the training with this company as not part of the operator’s approved training program, stating, “it was never something where, you know, I either approved, accepted, or required it, or, you know, anything to that effect.” And when asked if he would say that it meets the definition of best practices as the FAA uses that term, he added, “I can't answer that. Because I just don't -- you know, I'm not an expert on their training, or their facility, or really you know, I don't have information -- enough information to make that distinction.” This was the only training in the year prior to the accident that was noted in the NTSB docket.

An example of uninhibited check-boxing occurred in 2018, with the accident pilot receiving in-house training. Accordingly, the pilot completed the following maneuvers in two flights (0.8 and 0.5) totaling 1.3 hours: ILS and VOR approach, company heliport, oil-rig, confined area, pinnacle and slope landings, rapid deceleration, unusual attitude, IIMC, landing gear failure, T/R control failure, generator failure, engine fire, loss of engine in cruise, loss of engine during takeoff, loss of engine hovering OGE (both landing and fly-away), loss of engine IGE and loss of engine hover taxi, engine trim failures, cyclic trim failure, SAS failure, steep approach, Vy climb, steep turns, max-endurance and MCP flight, shallow approach and run-on landing. Further compounding incredulity, all of the above maneuvers with the exception of the VOR approach are checked on both flights. Is this just an example of sloppy bookkeeping?

Given all of the above, what exactly was being checked? According to the FAA, the “IIMC Maneuver” is a recovery from IIMC, and must include attitude instrument flying, recovery from unusual attitudes, navigation, ATC communications, and at least one instrument approach. Further complicating matters, the demonstration should be scenario-based. The instrument approach is apparently the “ILS DEMO.” Which begs the question, can a pilot fail a demonstration?

Indications from the docket are not completely clear on whether the operator even had procedures for unusual attitude recovery and IIMC. These procedures may have been absent from the operator’s S-76 maneuvers guide and training manual. Evidence shows that procedures were “added” versus “replaced” in the company’s documents after the accident (3/6/20). However, the docket information is not entirely clear what, if any procedures were in place at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the added material lacks proper indications highlighting what text was altered. During an NTSB interview, an FAA lawyer interjected comments, that if nothing else, displayed a heightened sensitivity towards the topic. In the absence of a specific delineated procedure, maybe the accident pilot was attempting to perform exactly what the operator’s GOM instructed him to do, “pilots will never take an aircraft into IMC…”?

To my knowledge, the Part 135 IIMC training and checking have existed at least since 2014. FAA Inspector guidance states they must ensure that operators have procedures for recovery from IIMC and that these procedures are incorporated into the certificate holder’s initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent training curriculums. In addition to training, the certificate holder should establish a GOM loss of control IIMC avoidance policy that supports the emergency authority of the pilot to divert, make a precautionary landing, or make an emergency transition to IFR. Within 60 days of the FAA’s Part 135 Helicopter Training and Qualification Program Review and Competency Check Requirements notice, POIs should have conducted a “focused review of the helicopter training and qualification programs for their assigned certificate holders to identify whether the programs include the required training and testing on procedures for … training and checking on recovery from IIMC.” Was this overlooked by both the FAA and the operator?

But one must acknowledge that the totality of the FAA requirements is convoluted and confusing. The final rule for IIMC recovery training and checking was published in 2014, compliance required in 2015, POI focused review in late 2017, and then the policy with its invaluable guidance was cancelled in late 2018. What’s an operator to do?

Further, regarding Part 135.293 checking of a pilot’s knowledge of “escaping from severe weather situations, in case of inadvertent encounters,” (assuming IFR is viewed as “severe weather” to a VFR operator) the FAA acknowledges this area relates to general aeronautical knowledge and not aircraft specific, and only requires the areas associated with aircraft operational capabilities to be evaluated on separate check flights. Yet, in an aircraft like the S-76, these related areas would seem manifold (performance, instrumentation, autopilot, approach capability, etc.).

Yet, how effective is the prescribed annual IIMC training and checking? During the NPRM period many operators commented that the IIMC recovery training should be demonstrated semi-annually, while several individual commenters recommended quarterly training for pilots to maintain proficiency. Identical comments from two individuals suggested requiring frequent short training sessions involving unplanned entry into IMC followed by an instrument approach to landing at least quarterly in an approved aircraft or simulator. They suggested a requirement that a table-top PC-based navigation system trainer or similar device be used at least monthly. These were primarily pilots, practically begging for more training.

The Part 135 regulations are equally valid for both Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) and commercial operators. With this in mind, the NTSB agreed with the NPRM requirement for a HAA pilot to hold an instrument rating, and stated that HAA pilots should maintain instrument currency. It commented that instrument currency is generally acknowledged to be a skill that deteriorates rapidly without continued practice and use. Numerous other commenters also suggested that the FAA require HAA pilots to maintain currency or routinely demonstrate the ability to recover from IIMC. Several commenters noted that this requirement should be applied to all commercial pilots.

However, the FAA concluded that an annual check is sufficient because it can be incorporated into a certificate holder's existing competency check schedule. Does that sound like the convenience of the annual implementation overshadowed any concern for effectiveness?

The system seems to be failing us. Have we reached the point where the paperwork has become the exercise and effectual training is secondary? Could the requisites and paperwork be so unclear, complicated and baffling that they have actually become a hinderance? We should all ask ourselves, “what is the purpose of a check box?” Because ultimately, the pilot is the victim of an unmindfully checked box.

---

References

NTSB DCA20MA059 Accident Investigation Docket

14 CFR § 135 Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand Operations and Rules Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft

Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 35, Part II, FAA 14 CFR Parts 91, 120, and 135 Helicopter Air Ambulance, Commercial Helicopter, and Part 91 Helicopter Operations; Final Rule

FAA FSIMS 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 19 Flightcrew Member Training and Qualification Programs

FAA National Policy, 8900.270, Part 135 Check Pilot (Check Airman) Functions

FAANational Policy , 8900.437, Part 135 Helicopter Training and Qualification Program Review and Competency Check Requirements

[Torquetalk]

The user cazzipropri on Reddit posted a name anonymized version of the claims against the controllers. I obviously have a lot to learn about atc responsibilities. https://www.reddit.com/r/ATC/comments/igyycf/island_expresss_lawsuit_against_atc_press_review/

Edit: Changed link to reddit page.

Well the plaintiffs will try and tell it to suit them. And maybe they will succeed unless the court clearly understands the reasonableness and legality of the denial of service. But by the plaintiff’s own submission, no service was provided, they were just on frequency hoping to get one. So if no service is being provided, there is no service to be terminated. And if no service was being provided, there is nothing to hand over.

One for the lawyers and insurance companies. Doubt there will be any case law written changing ATC obligations on the basis of this.

But maybe Island Express could levy their customers a few bob in the price to ensure proper IFR competency for their pilots. All that kit just to smash it into the hillside.

[[email protected]]

In the US is there not a requirement for the pilot and controller to both establish a verbal contract on what service is being provided?

[FWRWATPLX2]

Jim, you made excellent points. Blame-shifting does not resolve the Pilot-in-Command is ultimately responsible and is the Final Authority. The Pilot-in-Command is the only one who can and should make the Go - No-Go decision, whether he has a check in the appropriate box or not. At what point does a Pilot's ego relent and acknowledge the risks to "Go", to takeoff, to continue, are too great?

[megan]

The suit that has been filed. Lets destroy the lives of two controllers. Only in America. :sad: One is reminded of the definition of waste - a bus full of lawyers going over a cliff with two empty seats.

https://ca-times.brightspotcdn.com/62/13/e4ec26a24263a3677a804fe8cd6d/countersuit.pdf

[[email protected]]

The lawsuit mentions the poor controller handover and loss of radar service as causes of the accident - the only cause was poor piloting, anything else is just a contributory factor.

The controller handover didn't make the pilot fail to keep the wings level in the climb or make him enter a spiral descent. I hope the defendants team point this out quite clearly.

[Winnie]

ATC Literally stands for Air TRAFFIC Control, and the term VFR Services TERMINATED means just that...

[megan]

crab :ok: And if a controller was to do something silly like give a radar vector into the side of a mountain or massive CB it's still the PIC fault for not having awareness of where he's at, nor is a PIC obliged to follow ATC directions if s/he considers it places them in jeopardy.

[ApolloHeli]

crab :ok: And if a controller was to do something silly like give a radar vector into the side of a mountain or massive CB it's still the PIC fault for not having awareness of where he's at, nor is a PIC obliged to follow ATC directions if s/he considers it places them in jeopardy.

Except that for an aircraft under radar vectors the controller is responsible for ensuring terrain and obstacle clearance. Mistakes may happen and you might be forgotten about so it's still good to be alert after being given a vector, but if a controller uses the standard phraseology "radar vectors", this indicates they take over responsibility for your terrain/obstacle clearance.

It won't be much consolation for you if you fly yourself into a hillside, but it'll make a world of difference for the controller afterwards. In this case, N72EX was not under radar vectors, so the controller is not responsible.

[[email protected]]

And you wouldn't expect radar vectors under VFR anyway - IFR positioning for an approach yes but he definitely wasn't doing that.

[MikeNYC]

And you wouldn't expect radar vectors under VFR anyway - IFR positioning for an approach yes but he definitely wasn't doing that.

Relevant that even IFR approaches are sometimes flawed:

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2012-08-01/fly-plate-and-you-wont-get-hurt

[ApolloHeli]

Relevant that even IFR approaches are sometimes flawed:

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2012-08-01/fly-plate-and-you-wont-get-hurt

Thankfully I believe here in EASA land instrument procedures are flight checked before being published. I'm blown away that the FAA let that approach incident slip, even by their standards.

[megan]

My post which has received comment was merely to point out a PIC's responsibilities, not intimating anything specific to the accident, other than even under positive control the controller is not responsible for the ultimate safety of an aircraft. In some jurisdictions a GCA is not now permitted, other than in an emergency, because it's not a pilot interpreted aid, although it was standard airline fare in the piston days. Except that for an aircraft under radar vectors the controller is responsible for ensuring terrain and obstacle clearance. Mistakes may happen and you might be forgotten about so it's still good to be alert after being given a vector, but if a controller uses the standard phraseology "radar vectors", this indicates they take over responsibility for your terrain/obstacle clearance.Beg to differ, ultimate responsibility rests in the cockpit, always, it behooves the cockpit to understand where the controller is directing them, accidents have happened where aircraft have hit terrain while under radar control. Controllers are human and make mistakes. We've had such systems as TAWS and TCAS introduced to provide protection against the unthinkable.

https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Loss_of_Separation_-_ATCO-induced_Situations

[Torquetalk]

Much discussion about the pilot’s responsibilities when receiving a radar service from ATC. But this pilot was chomping along at low level, and even if identified by radar, it is not likely that they could be under radar control. In fact, it’s not clear that they were receiving any service at all, having been refused flight following due to coverage limitations.

If you can see, separation and obstacle clearance remain an obligation on the pilot, even if IFR and under radar control. In this case, this flight was certainly not IFR and the whole point was that he was supposed to stay clear of cloud by own navigation.

[[email protected]]

I think pretty much every pilot in the 'room' agrees what the cause of this accident was and that the law suit is just lawyers skullduggery to try and deflect the blame.

[ApolloHeli]

I think pretty much every pilot in the 'room' agrees what the cause of this accident was and that the law suit is just lawyers skullduggery to try and deflect the blame.

Agreed. I'm just curious from any Americans familiar with the matter; could the findings of an NTSB report be used as evidence in a legal case?

[JimEli]

Agreed. I'm just curious from any Americans familiar with the matter; could the findings of an NTSB report be used as evidence in a legal case?A jury needs to form its own opinion. No part of an NTSB Final Accident report can be used in civil litigation (by law 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b)). Broadly speaking, this means opinions and the NTSB’s probable cause determination, while evidence and investigative testimony usually is admissible. However, lawyers have sneaky ways of getting as much of the report as possible interjected.

[Hot and Hi]

It wasn't a politically correct answer - just the truth based on years of experience. When NVG were introduced we saw them used by some to push on in worse weather at night than they might have done in non-NVG flight - if you can see more you will go further.

As much information as you present to the pilot in the cockpit, if they are not trained to use it properly and believe in it then it won't prevent somatogravic or visual illusions fooling their brain.

I would always have an AI in a VFR aircraft for that just in case moment - better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.

A standard instrument fit is more than enough to prevent or overcome the leans but you have to believe the presentation - that comes down to training, exposure to real IMC and practice.

If you push the limits and go scud running, and you don't have the skills or knowledge to execute a plan B when it goes wrong then WTF are you doing in a cockpit in the first place?

Here is the thing: Why isn't there spatial disorientation as long as we look at the very big screen called "windscreen", with good visibility outside? We understand that illusion and contradictory (ie wrong) information from the vestibular system is very powerful and is most difficult to overcome, even by IFR trained pilots. Yet, the moment there is a good visual baseline (ie, VMC), no pilot complains about spatial disorientation.
.

Or have you ever seen *any* pilot levelling out - in VMC - after a 180 deg turn say: "Jesus, I can't believe I am wings level, it feels like I am now banking to the opposite side, my windscreen must be wrong, the horizon is not level, let me just spiral down to the ground, because it feels better."?
Have you ever seen a pilot accelerating, with the horizon line clearly in front of them, saying: "Wow, my senses tell me I am zooming up, soon I must be stalling. The windscreen in front of me is obviously wrong. The ASI must be bugged too. Let me just push the stick further forward to avoid the stall."?

Yet in the two above scenarios, obviously the same presumed powerful misleading information is fed by the vestibular system to the brain of the pilot (leans, and somatographic illusion respectively), which in the absence of a good visual picture would be experienced as "overpowering" and - unless very well trained and recent - would be very difficult of fight. (I am referring again to the very good article from Elan Head (https://verticalmag.com/news/rotor-radio-spatial-disorientation-elan-head/))

The obvious answer is that there is a tipping point at which too little vision information (read: degrading visibility) makes the brain remove the checks and balances that it normally subjects the vestibular system to. In the absence of anything else, the brain then takes the vestibular information on face value, and promotes it to "100% reality", with devastating effects (WYSIAYG - "What you see is *all* you get", Daniel Kahnemann, Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow, 2011, if you want to brush up a bit on the cognitive science behind all this).

Conversely, there is a tipping point at which feeding the brain increasing visual information will allow the brain to (effortlessly) put the 'genie back into the bottle', where the brain can demote the vestibular information to the more support function that is meant to occupy.

There is no principal reason why synthetic vision cannot achieve this. The question can only be, how realistic, how trustworthy, and how big this screen must be?

While there is belief that synthetic vision technology may provide improvements in SD recovery, the real benefit from SV is improving situational awareness, workload reduction (i.e. terrain and path-in-the-sky) AND UPSET PREVENTION.

We now have thousands of hours of GA aircraft flown under VFR with some sort of synthetic vision on board. Be it tablet apps like the ones from Helios Avionics, Garmin or Foreflight, getting attitude information from an external AHRS (and in same cases, directly from the sensors built into the tablet), or panel mounted EFDs, be it certified or non-certified.

Observing pilots flying with these tools, as crude as they may still be at this time, there is no doubt in my mind that even a mini tablet-sized synthetic vision screen in front of the pilot can significantly reduce workload. It can give the pilot the confidence to reject wrong vestibular information, to remain calm and avoid the panic that leads to pilot induced upset.

To give an example: It makes a big difference when flying into a big black hole at night, to know whether the space in front of you is empty sky, a mountain, or a cloud obscuring the view on other aircraft, cultural light, terrain or the horizon lying behind it. Knowing the real world outside is still the same, even if momentarily it's all black, or all white, allows pilots to avoid giving in to illusions, such as false horizons or autokinesis, etc.

While in the mishap discussed in this thread many other things could have prevented the accident (seeing that the PIC was instrument rated, very experienced, had auto-pilot in his ship, and the operation benefited from operational oversight and safety management that comes with being a commercial charter operation), I reckon that even a much less experienced pilot could have extracted themselves out of this situation, simply by consistently using synthetic vision even in the cheapest available form.

[aa777888]

Interesting that you posted in this thread, and after so long, H&H. Really a subject worthy of it's own topic. And of course a subject that has been discussed a very great deal in this forum.

Why can't Johnny read instruments? Why can't Johnny trust instruments? Why can't Johnny ignore his vestibular system?

Very much in the "for what it's worth" department, as a VFR only rated pilot with just the tiny bit of FAA mandated hood time, I actually prefer, am more comfortable with, the basic instruments by themselves. Synthetic vision does nothing for me. Perhaps it is the lack of three dimensional information. I love my tablet. I have weather and traffic on it. I use it preferentially for horizontal navigation. But when it comes to keeping the whirly bits on top it does nothing for me that way.

The other week I was flying a long, daytime cross country in very hazy conditions. Legal, but not an easy day for VFR flying. You might have called it a very UK sort of weather day :E. It even had a short water crossing where the angle of the opposite shoreline was perfect for inducing leans. Just exactly the kind of conditions that, had it been night, did kill JFK, Jr. All instruments were ready, AH horizon line adjusted just so, in case a rogue cloud should reach through the haze to engulf me (none did, planned and flew with plenty of margin to the actual ceiling), but I never once thought to bring up the synthetic vision display (and it probably would have been a bad sign if I had!)

I am curious: do any "real" IFR pilots, meaning those who fly in actual IFR in actual IFR capable helicopters, not with some Foggles in training helicopter because I know you all dismiss such flying as not "real", find synthetic vision to have any value? Not just attitude information on the EFIS, which certainly does have value, but a synthetic display of the terrain ahead? Except on approach or departure one should be very far from terrain and obstacles when IFR, correct? Doesn't that make the synthetic details superfluous and distracting?

[gulliBell]

The accident pilot had all the tools he needed and more to keep it upright but couldn't. Giving him even more tools probably wouldn't have changed the outcome.

[JimEli]

Observing pilots flying with these tools, as crude as they may still be at this time, there is no doubt in my mind that even a mini tablet-sized synthetic vision screen in front of the pilot can significantly reduce workload. It can give the pilot the confidence to reject wrong vestibular information, to remain calm and avoid the panic that leads to pilot induced upset.

To give an example: It makes a big difference when flying into a big black hole at night, to know whether the space in front of you is empty sky, a mountain, or a cloud obscuring the view on other aircraft, cultural light, terrain or the horizon lying behind it. Knowing the real world outside is still the same, even if momentarily it's all black, or all white, allows pilots to avoid giving in to illusions, such as false horizons or autokinesis, etc.


Hmm. "reduced workload... gives pilot confidence to reject wrong information... that leads to pilot induced upset... knowing what is in front of you... knowing the real world... allows pilots to avoid illusions..." Many would argue that sounds precisely like increased situational awareness.

[roscoe1]

With regard to thinking that visual contact with the ground/ horizion would over ride vestibular jumbolation, I suggest that anyone who thinks that getting vertigo can be " cured" when that picture is re-established seek out the nearest Barany Chair, often associated with physiology of flight instruction. After a spin in that, a good instructor can make you feel like the world is spinning, in multiple directions, while you are looking right at it. The creepiest thing is looking at the persons eyes as they are trying to regain some semblance of normalcy. They are uncontrollably flicking back and forth like a couple of pinballs. Unusual attitude training with foggles or a paper bag over your head ain't nothing until you've seen how bad spatial disorientation can actually be.

[Hot and Hi]

Hmm. "reduced workload... gives pilot confidence to reject wrong information... that leads to pilot induced upset... knowing what is in front of you... knowing the real world... allows pilots to avoid illusions..." Many would argue that sounds precisely like increased situational awareness.
Yes, Jim, to your point. In full support of your statement earlier in this thread, which I copied in.

[Hot and Hi]

No, roscue, that’s not what anybody thinks. The other way round: Being visually anchored in the world around you *prevents* vertigo.

This is not about upset recovery, but about upset prevention.

[roscoe1]

Understood, or rather misunderstood.😁

[albatross]

Isn’t it about time to put this thread to bed?

[Bravo73]

https://www.necn.com/news/national-international/vanessa-bryant-others-reach-settlement-in-helicopter-crash-that-killed-kobe-bryant-daughter-seven-others/2490716/


“Vanessa Bryant has reached a settlement in her lawsuit against the company that owned and operated the helicopter that crashed in Calabasas last year, killing her husband -- Laker legend Kobe Bryant -- and their 13-year-old daughter, according to court papers filed Tuesday.The settlement with Island Express Helicopters, subsidiary OC Helicopters and the estate of the pilot, Ara George Zobayan, also includes surviving relatives of the other passengers who died in the crash.

Terms of the settlement are being kept confidential, according to the court documents.”

[gulliBell]

That was quick....