T-38 Talon crash during formation landing

[Judd]

Pilot Error, Instructor Delay Caused Deadly T-38 Crash at Vance, Report Finds

A T-38 Talon instructor pilot failed to take control of the aircraft when his student prematurely used a braking maneuver after touching down, causing the jet to collide with another aircraft, roll over and skid to a halt, killing both pilots, according to an Accident Investigation Board report.

The crash, which occurred during a routine training flight Nov. 21, 2019, at Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma, killed Lt. Col. John "Matt" Kincade, 47, an instructor pilot assigned to the 5th Flying Training Squadron, and 2nd Lt. Travis B. Wilkie, 23, a student pilot assigned to the 71st Student Squadron.

The two men had just completed a training flight with another T-38 Talon instructor-student pilot team; then, both aircraft headed back to base for a formation landing. Kincade and Wilkie flew the left wing position, while the second T-38 flew on the right.

Officials noted that the early morning low cloud cover steadily lifted, and the operation's supervisor allowed the T-38s to alter their flight status "from instrument recoveries-only to a visual recovery-permissible status of 'Restricted Pattern -- Straight-In Only'" when coming in for the landing, according to the report.

Shortly after 9 a.m. local time, Kincade and Wilkie, flying tail number 65-0395, briefly became airborne again after the initial touchdown. In the front seat, Wilkie "prematurely initiated an aerobrake, causing [mishap aircraft 1] to lift back into the air after landing," the report states.

Once an aircraft slows below flying airspeed after touching down, the pilot "will raise the nose to enter an aerodynamic braking maneuver" to block airflow and create drag, which slows the plane "to a speed at which the pilot can safely employ mechanical brakes," the Air Force said. In this case, Wilkie's early use of the aerobraking maneuver caused the T-38 to bounce back up and lose contact with the runway surface, officials said. It was Wilkie's 56th training sortie.

"At the same time, [Wilkie] applied the right rudder to steer the aircraft away from the left edge of the runway," the report states. "The student's use of the rudder under these conditions -- airborne, configured for landing and at an increased angle of attack -- caused the aircraft to roll and yaw to the right and placed it on a collision course with the second T-38."

Because of the delay between rudder application and noticeable aircraft response to the maneuver, the board report, headed by Brig. Gen. Evan Pettus, found that "[Kincade] was unaware of [Wilkie's] rudder input until after the onset of the rapid right roll."

As the T-38 lifted off the runway and crossed into the other T-38's path, it struck the second jet with its right main landing gear, followed by its right wing. The pilots in the second aircraft were not injured in the accident. "After their aircraft collided with [mishap aircraft 2], [mishap aircraft 1] rolled right over the top of [aircraft 2] then impacted the ground upside down with engines in full military power," the report states.

However, Pettus found that a collision with the second T-38 "was inevitable." "By a preponderance of the evidence, the causes of the mishap were [Kincade] failing to take control of [the aircraft] as a precarious situation developed and [Wilkie] subsequently making an inappropriate flight control input," he said.

Pettus added that Wilkie "lacked an effective visual scan during the formation approach," substantially contributing to the accident.

"Due to his focus on [mishap aircraft 2], [Wilkie] did not adequately cross-check his runway alignment prior to touchdown. Instead, he used rudder in an attempt to steer [his aircraft] as his premature aerobrake lifted the weight from [mishap aircraft 1's] wheels after [it] initially touched down," Pettus said.

In a statement to Air Force Magazine, Wilkie's family said more research into the accident should have been conducted, finding the report "grossly and unjustly incomplete." The family added that tandem landings in a 1960s-era trainer are unnecessary and dangerous. The formation landing has "no continuing practical benefit to combat pilot proficiency or survivability," they said, according to the magazine.

"Although it is the instructor's mandate to keep a student pilot safe, it should not be his or her job to ensure preservation of life during an exceedingly unsafe maneuver in an exceedingly tired old plane in which minor student errors occurring in hundredths of a second cannot be corrected quickly enough by the instructor," they said. "We don't think the Air Force is doing right by our Airmen and Airwomen by mandating student pilots land in formation in a plane so old that it doesn't perform as responsively as needed to prevent loss of life."

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/05/04/pilot-error-instructor-delay-caused-deadly-t-38-crash-vance-report-finds.html

[sandiego89]

From the last 2 paragraphs sounds like a lawyer has been advising the family....lawsuit pending I'm sure.....

[Saintsman]

Simple question. Why are formation landings required. Is there an operational need that overtakes individual landings?

[Airbubba]

Here's an earlier thread on the mishap:

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/627415-t-38-fatal-mishap-vance-afb-oklahoma.html

[ACW418]

Formation landings are needed if an an aircraft loses its ASI and a shepherd aircraft leads it to a landing.

ACW

[WIDN62]

Loss of an ASI is a reason for a formation approach and not necessarily a formation landing.

[sandiego89]

Simple question. Why are formation landings required. Is there an operational need that overtakes individual landings?

They can also be useful for high sortie operations, especially combat operations when recovering multiple aircraft on a single runway.

[flighthappens]

They can also be useful for high sortie operations, especially combat operations when recovering multiple aircraft on a single runway.

Id love to see the numbers on this vs a run in and break.

[Duchess_Driver]

Id love to see the numbers on this vs a run in and break.



RIAB will get more aircraft into the pattern - formation landings will obviously increase runway usage but it would depend on trail distance as to which method would recover “two pair” quicker. But you all knew that....

[ASRAAMTOO]

If visability is poor or cloudbase is low then a pairs GCA or ILS can get formations on the ground quickly. Generally speaking VFR conditions are required for a RIAB.

[wiggy]

Simple question. Why are formation landings required. Is there an operational need that overtakes individual landings?

Well "back in the day" we used to do them:

1. Because of the aforementioned ASI failure case...( FWIW we lost an F-4, albeit at night, fortunately non-fatal, off a pairs approach with one going around at low level, so that isn't always the safe option)

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/82599

2. If the weather was bad and GCAs ("talk downs") were needed pairs approaches meant ATC could get more aircraft back on the ground quicker vs. everybody doing singleton GCAs..

3. And shock horror, and I know it sounds somewhat old fashioned in the days of safety cases, they were regarded as worth doing because they were a bit of a challenge, but no more inherently dangerous than lots of other aspects of aviating.

[bounce'em all]

Tough break for all parties involved, my heart is with both families, but: formation takeoffs, approaches and landings have been a worldwide routine practice, in all services, for over 90 years.
Also, you all know the reason why the services started to opt for the faster “run-in and break” procedure. Different times and environments call for different measures.
We’ve done it a myriad of times, not without risk: at times it saved our hides.

How about all the “riskier” ops besides this ROUTINE practice? Abolish military aerial operations altogether?


Nothing to see here.
RIP, boys.

[Mach the Knife]

Loss of an ASI is a reason for a formation approach and not necessarily a formation landing.

Wrong. I had to do this 2 months ago. A formation landing is a key military pilot skill and needs to be practiced.

[Bob Viking]

The truth is that you may only need to do a formation landing in anger a few times in a twenty year career.

The problem with that is it is a difficult skill. The time to find out just how difficult is not when you need it in anger. That would be dangerous.

This may of course be similar to the PFL issue. How many aircraft have been lost practicing formation take offs and landings versus how many would have been lost if it were not a capability?

My take on it is that it appears to be an issue of instructor skill. The USAF typically trains IPs rather than QFIs and the T-38 has awful rear seat visibility.

These two things combined mean that even a pilot with many hours may not have actually had a very lengthy instructor work up and in a seat with poor visibility may not have been aware of the impending danger.

Knowing when to take control is a key tenet of instruction. In fact very recently I had to take control from a senior officer on landing. It can happen any time with anyone.

For the record, I agree with teaching formation take offs and landings to students.

I don’t mean this to be controversial just saying it as I see it.

BV

[Ascend Charlie]

When we did these, at the point of the flare and before the power reduction, the No.2 would reduce power first and touch down, and thus produce some longitudinal separation. The leader would touch down a bit further down the runway. He didn't stand on the brakes until he hear 2 say "clear" - not clear of the runway, obviously, but under control on his side of the runway.

[Two's in]

Pettus added that Wilkie "lacked an effective visual scan during the formation approach," substantially contributing to the accident.

I would be very interested to know how the inquiry team were able to deduce that particular "fact" from the available evidence, short of a pre-mortem Vulcan mind-meld.

[trim it out]

I would be very interested to know how the inquiry team were able to deduce that particular "fact" from the available evidence, short of a pre-mortem Vulcan mind-meld.
Not familiar with the type, CVR and/or cockpit camera perhaps?

[gums]

Salute!

Great point/technique Ascend

This one sounds like the wingie landed a bit hot and was in a hurry to aero brake to get behind lead. And as we know, low aspect ratio wing at high AoA means roll due to yaw. Maybe both in the 38 with flaps down. Need a 38 IP here to comment from actual experience in these matters. The student pilot had many flights and would not have been in the T-38 if he had been tracked to fly buffs or cargo types.

I briefed and executed what Ascend described, but I could normally see if #2 was under control behind me and start slowing down before he called "clear".

Let the nannies whine and carp, but there are operational and emergency requirements to land two by two.

Gums sends...
P.S. Anyone else pick up on the engines being at full mil power? Think maybe the IP tried a go-around once the yaw and roll got scary?

[capngrog]

Military flying is different from civil commercial flying. Military aviators are trained, whether transport or fighter, to routinely get the maximum performance from their aircraft, sometimes to the detriment of safety. Commercial aviators are trained to operate with a maximum of safety, rarely pushing the limits of their aircraft. I know that is a rather simplistic explanation of the difference in philosophies between military and civil aviation, and that there are exceptions to every rule; however, military aviators are trained to operate "on the edge" and sometimes a bit beyond. Military flight training reflects this philosophy. I haven't seen the statistics lately, but as I recall, the accident rate for military aviation far exceeds that of commercial civil aviation by several orders of magnitude. General Aviation is another matter.

Cheers,
Grog

[BEagle]

With you on this, Ascend Charlie and gums!

I once had unreliable airspeed in an F-4, called knock it off and requested RTB on the wing. My alleged leader took us down, levelled off in cloud even though we could see gaps beneath us, then flew the approach but decided to fly a go-around and a pairs visual circuit as it would be 'good training'...ar$e! My nav lost his cool and reminded the idiot that we had a REAL failure and that this practice bleeding wasn't a good idea! Cause of the failure was the static connection on my nav's ASI coming adrift, admitting cabin pressure into the static system.

Got my own back a little later though - this time the same person lost HIS instruments and I led him down for a night pairs approach. This time landing off the first approach!

[ozbiggles]

I Think that accident report précis was looking for an ideal outcome in an imperfect world. Split second decisions that have could have gone anyway decided on by people who had months to sit down and pick an event apart. Blaming the instructor or the student in that environment with the benefit of hindsight....Is there a link to the entire report or will I have to stop being lazy and look for it myself?

[Jhieminga]

https://www.afjag.af.mil/Portals/77/AIB-Reports/2019/T-38%20AIB%20Report_11March.pdf

[Dan Winterland]

Standard US military report blaming the operator. It will have little impact of future safety. The question that should be asked is whether a 60 year old design still adequate for modern training.

[Video Mixdown]

Very similar circumstances are well illustrated in the TV series ‘Jetstream’. During a pairs landing a student suddenly veers off towards lead - fortunately the instructor is able to take control and prevent a collision.

[ozbiggles]

Thanks jhieminga, that is actually a tough read having the HUD photos there as it unfolds. I stick with my original comments, spending months on a report to dissect something that happened in split seconds and find ‘blame’. I think it is just one of those things that happens instructing where 99.9% of the time you walk away from it with nothing but a learning point. A tragedy that shows how unforgiving it can be.
I will add in this edit as with gums below, I believe it is a very good, well researched report and I guess in the world we live in there is not a lot of room in accident reports for sentimental thoughts. I feel for the families and hope someone has the chance to explain to them no one thinks any less of the guys involved, we have all been there.

[gums]

Salute!

Agreed withya Oz from Oz. Very tough read.

No audio transcript, but I assume it was in one of the annex portions. I say this, as the report implies that the IP took control someplace in there, but I am not sure exactly when. It explains my note that motors were at mil power.

The sequence and the excrutiating details of this sad story should bring home some reality to those that sit in their chairs, flying PC simulators, but never pulling 6 or 7 gees or flying into a cloud while looking over their shoulder at the bandit and becoming fubar. The sh!t happens quickly, and you must anticipate, then react using hand-eye-foot-brain coordination patterns developed and burned into your body-brain connections from previous encounters and/or plenty of practice.

Gums sends....

P.S. My opinions about this sad event shall be reserved for private PM, but I applaud the board for trying to recreate the profile and working with test pilot folks to determine when the final results became inevitable.

[Dominator2]

To throw in my credentials, 41 years flying single and twin engine jets and only the last was not cleared for formation landings. A basic flying skill taught to, and practiced by, all fighter pilots world wide.

Yes a formation landing may be dangerous if the "Swiss Cheese" holes are aligned. Being taught and adhering to the correct techniques will always reduce the risks. There are many reasons why for nearly 100 years we have flown formation landings.
Like many aspects in aviation, it is often more than one factor that will lead to an accident. Example, a flight lead who flies the approach too fast "to help the wing man". The flight lead who lands long and flares very slowly "to help the wingman". The instructor teaches the wrong technique because "he knows better", all may contribute. There is no doubt that an inexperienced wing man using the correct techniques can be led by a good flight lead to a successful formation landing under most conditions, but always something MAY go wrong.

If things go wrong it is as much down to luck as good skills to walk away without incident. Any BOI that dissects the information AFTER the event and concentrates on minutiae is wrong.

BV, yes your correct that the USAF employs IPs to instruct their student pilots. Don't, however, imply that QFIs are necessarily any more capable that IPs. I have flown with some very talented IPs and some cr*p QFIs. There were a few techniques that I learnt from the USAF whilst flying the F4 that were never taught on our RAF OCU. Equally, I would like to think that we (the RAF) taught our USAF counterparts a few things that they had not seen previously. The only problem being that the USAF is too large an organisation to effect change easily.

[Homelover]

Second what Dominator says about USAF IPs. I trained as a Brit stude at Sheppard AFB as part of the ENJJPT program and I thought the USAF instructors were, in the main, great. I came ‘home’ to Valley and the QFIs certainly weren’t any better. The trg system was just ‘different’.

[SOX80]

Formation T/Os and landings, as has been suggested, need to be taught and practised regularly to keep current and safe. They are also inherently risky procedures, so that risk needs to be justified. In aircraft with decent A-A radars, radar trail is the way to go. I cannot really see when a formation T/O is justified in a modern FJ (if many years of recent OPS I have not seen a single formation T/O or landing, usually the jets are too heavy) and there are limited occasions when a failure may drive you to a formation landing (although in the vast majority all you need is a formation approach with the lead going round and leaving the runway for the #2). Not saying that we should definitely stop doing them but we do need to have a good reason, and not just because we used to do them. I know the Tornado DDH stopped form T/Os in the last few years of the jet, with good reason.

[Bob Viking]

You make fair points. And I don’t think I articulated my point very well.

Individually it is of course possible to get a great instructor who isn’t a QFI and conversely you can get a QFI who isn’t a very good instructor.

My point was that it appears the instructor in this case let things run foo far. A causal factor may have been the poor visibility in the back of the T-38. Good instructor training (of any variety) may have prevented this from happening.

The more I think about it the more ambivalent I become on the issue.

I still fly and teach formation take offs and landings regularly. If we stopped them it wouldn’t be the end of the world. But I think it would be a shame.

Heavy, older jets have always made them more risky. I would wager that flying them in a Typhoon, for example, (if in fact that ever happens) would be far easier and safer.

The fact of the matter is that they are safe if practiced and taught correctly but we could probably cope just fine if they were outlawed.

Doing them just because we always did is not an excuse. We used to do night, conventional pairs take offs in the Jag. That doesn’t mean I think we should still practice them.

If I were a duty holder I would need an awful lot of convincing that pairs take offs were still necessary though. Especially now that all of our frontline jets (and even our main training jet - in a synthetic but very reliable fashion) are radar and datalink equipped.

This accident is obviously tragic and I don’t like the victim blaming but we all accept risks in our job so a lawsuit is unnecessary in my opinion.

BV

[tartare]

How many seconds is spool up from idle to full military power on the T-38?

[Duchess_Driver]

This accident is obviously tragic and I don’t like the victim blaming but we all accept risks in our job so a lawsuit is unnecessary in my opinion.

Quite.

But what we as aircrew accept/understand as “the job” often differs from the perception of loved ones and those others “left behind.” In times of high emotion it’s all too easy for a law suit to develop not necessarily because its what those close to the situation want but because of “pressure” applied by profiteers.

[pr00ne]

BV, SOX80 and Dominator2,

I think that formation take offs (and landings) were just the way we did it in my day, and they were a tactical solution to a Cold War problem, that of getting missions off the ground as quickly as damm possible and away into a tactical 2 ship, 4 ship, 6 ship or 8 ship formation heading for a pre destined tactical attack target on Day 1 hour 1. Strike was rather different and at least the QRA would have gone off solo and continued that way all the way to the target.

Launching for the wars of 1990 onwards has been rather different, there is not (usually) the same desperate need to get aloft in such a split arse manner, but you still see pairs take offs from Cyprus on the news.

[CoodaShooda]

Bob Viking

I was recently shown some cockpit footage from a RAF Hawk that yawed left on take-off and passed just under his leader’s tailpipe in a three ship formation take off.

The jury was out on the cause.

Are you familiar with it and in a position to offer some insight into what the heck happened?

[Bob Viking]

I am familiar with the incident and know plenty but I’m afraid I won’t be discussing any details on here.

The only tidbit I will give you is that it wasn’t me!

BV

[gums]

Salute!

@ Tartare

Spool up on the J-85 is like a piston motor. Figure 2 or 3 seconds from idle to full mil
T-38 folks here might comment, but not many colonists visit or post here.

Gums sends...

[Airbubba]

The only tidbit I will give you is that it wasn’t me!

BV

Maybe 25 years ago one of the USAF F-15 pilots at Kadena was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto with another male. Things were immediately hushed up given the sensitivity of the situation and evolving attitudes toward sexual orientation.

The squadron pilots had nametags made up with the disclaimer 'It wasn't me!' ;)

The sister squadron was known to tease about the incident with manual manipulation of the burner nozzles.

This was before Maestro O'Malley's infamous Gold Bond Powder video at Kunsan.

[tartare]

Salute!

@ Tartare

Spool up on the J-85 is like a piston motor. Figure 2 or 3 seconds from idle to full mil
T-38 folks here might comment, but not many colonists visit or post here.

Gums sends...

Thanks Gums.
I`spose they were screwed once the right roll started, the poor guys.

[CoodaShooda]

Thanks BV

Understood.

[Two's in]

Talking of the pressure and external events, not much seems to have been made of the fact that the student was on a "pre-chop check ride". He could have been chopped on the unsat rides alone, but the training boss decided there may have been external factors and he was given extra time (including this sortie) to improve his performance before his formal chop-ride. That's why he was with the most experienced instructor. That's quite a dynamic in play there, where the system has seemingly coupled the IPs greater experience with a marginally performing student, normally done to avoid the student being overridden too early and gaining another unsat grade. That moves the risk profile up considerably if you consider the student's pressure to perform well with the instructor's reluctance to intervene unless absolutely necessary.

The actions relating to the individual actions are pure speculation, but the factors in play are all in the report, but not really commented on by the Board.

[Lonewolf_50]

For Two's in:
Just on a hunch (and based on a few years answering Congressional Inquiries) given the lawyering up of Wilke's family, I suspect that they'd be the same kind of people who'd have pushed their District Representative in the House for an investigation had Wilke been disenrolled from training after a fail on a chop check.

I have seen this movie before.

A similar accident happened over 30 years ago at Whiting Field, though not due to formation landing.
A student who was on the cusp of being disenrolled was taken up with one of the best IPs in the Wing. Standards IP, NATOPS Instructor, etc. The result of the sortie was two fatalities and a destroyed aircraft. It was years later that I found out (from the dead student's roommate who ended up in my squadron) that one of his documented tendencies during training was to lock up / freeze up on the controls.
Whether or not that was a factor in the accident will never be known.

[gums]

Salute!

Thanks Wolf and Two's... decent points for all of us to consider.

After reading the history of the student over the last few rides, I can easily understand that some emotional pressure was present. I also wonder if there was "outside" pressure, as the student would not have advanced to the stage of his/her training without good hands and such, otherwise would have been on the cargo/buff training track.

One of the lessons pounded into me as a raw nugget in UPT, and later in my first operational squadron was to leave personal problems at home, on the ground. They would still be there if you came back. If you took the problems up with you, you have a less chance of coming back to deal with them. The high performance aviation mistress is very sweet, but also harsh if you do not have your sh!t together and forget your mission is not just to enjoy a clear dark night at 35,000 feet with the Northern Lights beaming down. Or maybe coming home thru the haze when the Hmong were burning their last opium crop for the next season and you had just tried to hit some trucks coming down the Trail.

At all my rejoins with fellow combat pilots, we joke about having a family photo on the instrument panel! That was a certain death sentence! But Hollywood is Hollywood, huh?

Won't talk about this sad accident anymore except on PM.

Gums sends.