BA - Fire Suppression System Malfunction

[LS737]

Saw this on Facebook, apparently happened today, oops!

Source: AeroNews on Facebook

Image: facebook.com/AeronewsGlobal/photos/pcb.2930760220333392/2930759787000102/?type=3&theater

[DaveReidUK]

That won't be the first time a foam party has got out of hand.

[Airbubba]

Presumably an accident. Pictures from the Facebook post linked above.

Today’s incident from Heathrow airport: a fire suppression system apparently malfunctioned at TBJ or Tech 6, in the hangar where a Boeing 777-200ER (G-YMMB) BA was parked.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1920x1080/95663802_2930759657000115_5819285557678702592_n_large__7b722 cc704264fd70039dbf29427ee3138d65816.jpg
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[Capn Bloggs]

As we say in Australia... "Mr Hart, What a mess!".

[Jwscud]

Is the new “bio friendly” blood based foam any better/worse for airframes than AFFF?

[esscee]

Functional check carried out - "Satis".

[create_it83]

I see no fire. Worked well.

[M.Mouse]

Interesting that the system just spreads a blanket of foam at low level when a fire could start at any height.

In 1993 I was one of the two pilots who took a BA B747-400 down to the new maintenance facility at Cardiff. Everybody there was very proud of the place and we were given a guided tour. We were also shown some pictures of the fire suppression system test during commissioning of the building. This is also a foam system. What was quite amazing was that the hangar in the photograph we were shown had foam that was probably 30' or 40' deep! That would be effective.

[admiral ackbar]

Interesting that the system just spreads a blanket of foam at low level when a fire could start at any height.

In 1993 I was one of the two pilots who took a BA B747-400 down to the new maintenance facility at Cardiff. Everybody there was very proud of the place and we were given a guided tour. We were also shown some pictures of the fire suppression system test during commissioning of the building. This is also a foam system. What was quite amazing was that the hangar in the photograph we were shown had foam that was probably 30' or 40' deep! That would be effective.

Something like this? Remember a foam mishap in a USAF hangar around 2012 as well.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1600x1200/0729ab7c180e1bc81c295ebf90e4a422_1225a383af963ffeba521987a43 b6786aeeba409.jpg

[M.Mouse]

That is exactly the sort of image I was shown!

[Locked door]

What happens to any injured or immobilised personnel under that foam?

[M.Mouse]

What happens to any injured or immobilised personnel under that foam?

They are far cheaper to replace than the aircraft.

[cashash]

What happens to any injured or immobilised personnel under that foam? They escape Alex Cruz's cull of BA staff. :uhoh:

[bnt]

According to some folks on Reddit (https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/gd9b11/fire_suppression_system_triggered_by_a_boeing_777/), where they posted video, the foam system was triggered by someone starting the plane's APU in the hangar.

[Airbubba]

Delta had one of these foam mishaps at LAX five weeks ago.

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1024x541/933ee8df_582a_4e01_a1b3_4fe9cc27ac25_8f9134fa5fd279edaf29702 f17e65e386921748f.jpg
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1024x768/49692294517_06ec9bac85_b_6efb32f95ccc6f7d3c739ffbd012918f88b 7daf0.jpg
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[Arfur Dent]

Isn't this an example of the system designed to deal with a problem causing more trouble than the problem itself?

[G-ARZG]

Isn't this an example of the system designed to deal with a problem causing more trouble than the problem itself?

(until you see a hangar on fire...)

[Intruder]

Is the new “bio friendly” blood based foam any better/worse for airframes than AFFF?
Dunno 'bout "new"... The blood-based stuff is what the US Navy used before AFFF was invented!

[tdracer]

Isn't this an example of the system designed to deal with a problem causing more trouble than the problem itself?
I think an aircraft on fire inside a hanger (without proper fire suppression) could case quite a bit of trouble.
I have a vague memory of Air France loosing a nearly new 747 when there was a hanger fire back in the 1980s.

[neilki]

I think an aircraft on fire inside a hanger (without proper fire suppression) could case quite a bit of trouble.
I have a vague memory of Air France loosing a nearly new 747 when there was a hanger fire back in the 1980s.
MX was telling me the other day that LED Beacons can kick off the foam, and the strobes are guaranteed to. Job 1 in the hangar is to pull breakers for every external light..

[Jwscud]

I grew up with AFFF, the blood stuff came in late in my firefighting experience. Didn’t realise it was the original!

[Airbubba]

American had a foam party at the hangar in GRU in January. The APU was the alleged culprit once again.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/600x800/dy_qf_nv_ex0_aax_pz8_80de27cdb58afa28325e9c41a2b5211aea81192 0.jpg
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[capngrog]

I grew up with AFFF, the blood stuff came in late in my firefighting experience. Didn’t realise it was the original!

I agree with Intruder that protein ("blood stuff") fire fighting foams pre-dated the more modern AFFF foams; however, since protein foams are biodegradable and AFFF foams are not, there may be a recent push to return to the protein foams. During my days in the USAF, protein foams were in use, and these reportedly were based on cattle blood. The stuff smelled bloody awful (pun intended) and seemed to hang about on the ramp for days. The U.S. Navy developed AFFF foams in the late 1960s, and this, to my knowledge, has been the preferred fire fighting foam since. As a fire protection engineer, I was involved in aircraft hangar fire protection design for a number of years (1970 - 2010), and the foams in use then were AFFF. I've been out of the game for some 10 years now, and there may be a push to go back to protein foams due to environmental concerns.

By the way, there are two basic types of AFFF foams: low expansion as depicted in the photographs of foam covering the hangar floor, and high expansion as depicted in the photo of the F-16 getting a bubble bath.

Cheers,
Grog

[capngrog]

As an aside here, I noticed that the low expansion foam shown in Air Bubba's Post #3 has a brownish tint. In my long ago experience, this was a characteristic of protein foams whereas AFFF foams are all bright white in color. Of course the brownish tint could be due to some sort of contaminant.

Just a thought.

Cheers,
Grog

[Airbubba]

Oy, these things happen... :eek:

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1920x1079/157a9e4e_d7fd_42fd_a67e_1069ca2da229_large16x9_foamblobairpo rt_leak_large__a0d6ce22e25498ee3842f3926232a153f32700f7.jpg
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[Airbubba]

What happens to any injured or immobilised personnel under that foam?

They are far cheaper to replace than the aircraft.

They escape Alex Cruz's cull of BA staff. :uhoh:

Here's a report of a hangar foam fatality after reentering the hangar to take pictures.

REPORT: Deceased contractor warned not to enter foam-filled hangar
By LAUREN SAGE REINLIE / Daily News
Posted Feb 18, 2014 at 12:01 AM
Updated Feb 18, 2014 at 2:57 PMEglin Air Force Base officials announced Tuesday afternoon that the contractor killed in the Jan. 8 foam accident entered the hangar against emergency responders advice.


EGLIN AFB -- J.D. Lord, the contractor who died in an accident on base last month, entered the foam-filled airplane hangar against the advice of emergency personnel, according to an Air Force report released Tuesday.

The 31-year-old and three co-workers were “curious” to see the foam that filled the massive King Hangar during an accidental activation of the fire-suppression system, the report said.

None had received formal safety training on the dangers of the foam, according to the report.

“I offer my deepest condolences to the family of J.D. Lord. This is a tragic loss,” Maj. Gen. Arnold Bunch, commander of the Air Force Test Wing, said Tuesday as he stood in the hangar where the incident took place. “We lost a valued team member of our team who had worked with us for about six years.”

After the incident, Air Force officials immediately began investigating what happened and what measures could be taken to prevent a similar accident in the future, Bunch said. Other contributing factors included faulty parts that failed during record-cold weather and a lack of understanding of the system’s abort function.

“There are many findings and recommendations that we will undertake ... to conduct safer operations,” Bunch said. “Safety is our No. 1 priority.”

On Jan. 8, after a record cold snap brought frigid temperatures to Northwest Florida, a water line burst, flooding sensors in the hangar’s fire-suppression system and accidentally triggering the release of the high-expansion foam, according to the report.

An alarm sounded for 30 seconds before tons of foam began pouring into the 90,600-square-foot hangar, Eglin’s largest.

Personnel were evacuated from the hangar and the adjacent building where Lord and the three contractors with Defense Support Services (DS2) worked, according to the report.After all personnel were accounted for and it was determined there was no fire, firefighters worked to make sure none of the foam was escaping from the hangar. Lord helped, the report said.

Firefighters told investigators they made it clear to him that the hangar was off limits.

Unbeknownst to firefighters, Lord, the three contractors and about six to eight other employees entered the hangar using a third-floor catwalk between the two buildings, the report said.

No barriers were in place to prevent them from entering, Bunch said.

The employees told investigators they wanted to observe and take photographs of the foam that had filled the hangar below them, according to the report.

After checking out the foam, Lord and the three contractors decided to use the elevator to leave the hangar for reasons not specified in the report.

At some point they lost situational awareness, Bunch said.

The elevator opened on the ground floor and the four contractors were immediately engulfed. With no immediate escape available, they tried to make their way to an exit through the foam, holding hands to stay together.

That plan quickly fell apart when they let go of each other to try to clear the foam from their mouths and eyes, the report said.

The contractors could not see anything except what was immediately in front of them. The report described conditions as a “white out.” They also could not communicate with each other.

The conditions were described as “frightening,” even for personnel trained to respond to emergency situations, the report said.

One of the contractors, using a hood to cover his face, was able to make it out. Another broke a window to escape.

Rescue crews were called in. Two-man teams, tethered to ropes and using breathing masks, entered the foam.

One of the contractors had sat down and, turning his head to the ground, was able to make an air bubble for himself by constantly waving his arm in front of his face, Bunch said.

He was found 5 minutes after the first rescue crew entered.

It was the fifth rescue crew that found Lord, 1 hour and 19 minutes after he had entered the foam, Bunch said.

He was in cardiac arrest and was unable to be resuscitated.

Although final autopsy reports had not been released Tuesday, it is likely that Lord was rendered unconscious, either from a blow to the back of the head or as a result of panic or asphyxiation, the report said. The likely cause of death was suffocation.

High-expansion foam is used in about 146 hangars at 46 bases Air Force-wide, according to Eglin public affairs. In the past five years, there have been 25 accidental releases of the foam, including one at King Hangar in 2012.

This is the first reported fatality, Bunch said.

There is no Air Force instruction requirement about the fire-suppression system or the foam that is released, he said.

One comment that was repeated often during the investigation was the lack of understanding about the life-threatening potential of the foam, according to the report.

“There is something inherently benign about soap bubbles and foam,” the report said. Test and accidental releases of the foam often have an “air of excitement.”

The surviving contractors were “stunned when the foam became a life-threatening and panic-inducing substance,” the report said.

[admiral ackbar]

Oy, these things happen... :eek:


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1466x1080/article_0_132850e6000005dc_69_634x467_large__038ee36edb8d253 231177fc7d03209c451e130e4.jpg



This was the incident I was refering to in my post. A-10 can probably taxi, take-off and fly!

[Airbubba]

This was the incident I was refering to in my post. A-10 can probably taxi, take-off and fly!

Yep, these events are a lot more common than I had realized. :eek:

From the article above, for the Air Force alone:

High-expansion foam is used in about 146 hangars at 46 bases Air Force-wide, according to Eglin public affairs. In the past five years, there have been 25 accidental releases of the foam, including one at King Hangar in 2012.

[KRviator]

Jetstar did the same in Newcastle a few years ago as well...

https://nnimgt-a.akamaihd.net/transform/v1/crop/frm/storypad-36mDshx2U2dAuMR3XyjpW6R/151180e0-4c3d-455c-a6aa-efec11ec73fe.jpg/r0_3_1200_678_w1200_h678_fmax.jpg

https://nnimgt-a.akamaihd.net/transform/v1/crop/frm/storypad-36mDshx2U2dAuMR3XyjpW6R/42da4901-53e6-4312-99a3-efead2e99c5b.jpg/r0_3_1200_678_w1200_h678_fmax.jpg

https://nnimgt-a.akamaihd.net/transform/v1/crop/frm/storypad-36mDshx2U2dAuMR3XyjpW6R/064a401e-14f8-41e1-baec-8bd640322e9d.jpg/r0_3_1200_678_w1200_h678_fmax.jpg

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CD5GdyzUkAAHYly.jpg

[oldpax]

That liquid blood was good for tomatoes!!

[Jwscud]

As an aside here, I noticed that the low expansion foam shown in Air Bubba's Post #3 has a brownish tint. In my long ago experience, this was a characteristic of protein foams whereas AFFF foams are all bright white in color. Of course the brownish tint could be due to some sort of contaminant.

Just a thought.

Cheers,
Grog

it was the brown colour that made me think it was the bio-friendly stuff. I don’t have any technical knowledge beyond being trained to use it in shipboard days, but I understand AFFF is very environmentally unfriendly when it washes off.

The smell of the bio stuff drying on your clothes in hot weather is definitely unforgettable :eek:

[A320LGW]

No mention of this not being an accident :hmm:

[Airbubba]

No mention of this not being an accident :hmm:

Are you implying that it was possibly one of those cases of industrial sabotage that sometimes occur in times of militant labor activism?

[A320LGW]

Are you implying that it was possibly one of those cases of industrial sabotage that sometimes occur in times of militant labor activism?

That is what the word on the street is

[Airbubba]

Are you implying that it was possibly one of those cases of industrial sabotage that sometimes occur in times of militant labor activism?

That is what the word on the street is

Wow. :eek:

The worse case I recall of this form of 'activism' was the arson of the Dupont Plaza Hotel in SJU during a Teamsters strike in 1986. Nearly 100 fatalities as I recall.

In the unrest leading up to the 1989 Eastern Airlines strike Charlie Bryan's Machinists would find wires cut on aircraft. Door slides would mysteriously pop on planes in the hangar for maintenance.

When the strike was finally called to go down at the traditional 12:01 am the evening maintenance shift was locked out preemptively to avoid further celebratory sabatoge.

During the EAL strike an observation station was set up on the top floor of the Viscount hotel in MIA with binoculars and radio scanners to monitor the operations of the replacement pilots. Possibly not related but unauthorized transmissions on tower frequency would sometimes give bogus instructions to the pilots who crossed the picket line to fly the passengers.

Three decades later I would think that hangar surveillance cameras would catch someone intentionally messing with the fire detection system. Or would they?

[DaveReidUK]

I'd want to see more evidence than "word on the street" before believing a conspiracy rather than a simple c*ck-up.

[Local Variation]

I'd want to see more evidence than "word on the street" before believing a conspiracy rather than a simple c*ck-up.

The suppression system requires double knock detection from 2 separate detection points of differing types. A manual override whilst possible is fitted. Given the value in the hanger, there maybe some form of lockout on the override.

BA will quickly find the root cause, probably already have.

[Airbubba]

The suppression system requires double knock detection from 2 separate detection points of differing types. A manual override whilst possible is fitted. Given the value in the hanger, there maybe some form of lockout on the override.

I've made a career of breaking planes, not fixing them, so I'm not too familiar with these maintenance hangar fire suppression systems. It seems from the news accounts I've found online there is usually a 30-second warning period for folks to evacuate before the foam starts to flow. Is there no cancellation available? Or does the override stop the foam rather than start it without detection?

I remember doing a sim somewhere with the briefing that a halon or something similar cloud would fill the bay in event of a fire detection. I was told that if I didn't get out I would suffocate (but be pay protected for the remainder of the training session under the CBA ;)).

[Lord Farringdon]

So how do they clean this mess up and what damage if any, is done to the aircraft that this system protects?

[Local Variation]

I've made a career of breaking planes, not fixing them, so I'm not too familiar with these maintenance hangar fire suppression systems. It seems from the news accounts I've found online there is usually a 30-second warning period for folks to evacuate before the foam starts to flow. Is there no cancellation available? Or does the override stop the foam rather than start it without detection?

I remember doing a sim somewhere with the briefing that a halon or something similar cloud would fill the bay in event of a fire detection. I was told that if I didn't get out I would suffocate (but be pay protected for the remainder of the training session under the CBA ;)).

Airbubba,

The manual override will be to release the extinguishment. Due to the potential for the 2nd detector to not activate (for whatever reason, aka citing), you need the ability to enable if you can clearly see a fire event. The eyes and nose remain the best forms of detection regardless of technology development.

The manual override has control to prevent tamper, such as key switch enable or similar. But that assumes the key is not always left in the switch.

[Airbubba]

Airbubba,

The manual override will be to release the extinguishment. Due to the potential for the 2nd detector to not activate (for whatever reason, aka citing), you need the ability to enable if you can clearly see a fire event. The eyes and nose remain the best forms of detection regardless of technology development.

Thanks for that explanation. :ok:

So is there no manual cancel during the seconds before the foam flows? Or was inadvertent activation not considered in the design? Or in the regulations?

It seems that there are very few saves and many costly false activations with this system.

As one insurer observes:

These systems can automatically and effectively extinguish a fire by smothering it. However, they are not without risks — risks that can be especially concerning given that hangar foam fire suppression systems are known to discharge inadvertently in many instances. Consequently, the pros and cons of foam fire suppression systems are frequently debated by stakeholders including aircraft owners, hangar operators/owners, fire safety experts, trade associations, FBOs and others.Unintended Consequences of Inadvertent Hangar Foam DischargesWhen a hangar foam fire suppression system inadvertently discharges the results can be damaging or even deadly. For example, in 2014 a civilian worker at Eglin Air Force Base died after being trapped in a foam-filled hangar during an inadvertent system discharge.

Other unintended consequences produced by foam fire suppression system discharge include:

Damage to aircraft. While the foam can prevent the aircraft from being destroyed by fire, it can damage sensitive systems in the process, requiring expensive repairs or replacement of components.
Damage to other equipment. Other assets in the hangar including vehicles, tools and support equipment can be damaged by fire suppression foam.
Loss of business. From missed flights and costs associated with arranging for substitute aircraft in place of damaged aircraft, to harm to an operator’s reputation, an accidental foam discharge can negatively impact operations in many ways.
Environmental risks. If foam escapes containment within the hangar, environmental contamination can occur and the consequences can be far-reaching.

These are just some of the issues resulting from false activations of foam fire suppression systems.National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 409 – Standard on Aircraft HangarsNFPA 409 was defined to be the “standard that helps safeguard life and property through the requirements for the proper construction and fire protection of aircraft hangars used for aircraft storage, maintenance, or related activities.” While no one in aviation would dispute that NFPA 409 is well-intentioned and that adhering to it is critical in many circumstances, some people do question whether perhaps it goes too far and is too burdensome in certain applications.


https://www.global-aero.com/pros-and-cons-of-hangar-foam-fire-suppression-systems/

[Local Variation]

Thanks for that explanation. :ok:

So is there no manual cancel during the seconds before the foam flows? Or was inadvertent activation not considered in the design? Or in the regulations?

It seems that there are very few saves and many costly false activations with this system.

As one insurer observes:



https://www.global-aero.com/pros-and-cons-of-hangar-foam-fire-suppression-systems/

The double knock is there to provide some level of protection against unwanted activation. Double knock being two detection devices needing to trigger. Alternatively, co-incidence detection utilising two specific detection trigger points adds another layer of protection.

Pre-fire, visible count down timers, flashing strobes, sounders, controlled delay blocks, hold off relay timers are permitted, but my limited detailed standards knowledge of fixed extinguishing (FE) systems does not extend to advising on say, a stop or abort button. Certain FE types permit a timed block window for flow.

I would stick my neck out and hazard a guess that abort is a probable optional system add-on based on specification. But that introduces a whole realm of monitoring and control etc (if the applied standard permits). A verified activation being aborted is something the Insurers would pick up on straight away.

As an aside, fire alarm delay blocks in general are limited to a number of minutes, typically up to just under double digit max in the UK for search and validation time. Big sites allow a variation to be applied as it can take more than 10 mins to physically reach the furthest point in the building search area. Airports are very much in scope here.

[cashash]

Thanks for that explanation. :ok:

So is there no manual cancel during the seconds before the foam flows? Or was inadvertent activation not considered in the design? Or in the regulations?

It seems that there are very few saves and many costly false activations with this system.




As someone who speaks from bitter personal experience - no, there is no way you can switch the system off once it is started...:{