Is it really that hard...

[gearlever]

to land a modern airliner with CAVOK ?

Incident: Emirates A388 at Moscow on Sep 10th 2017, go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway (http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0)

[tdracer]

to land a modern airliner with CAVOK ?


Well, Asiana at SFO proved it's not trivial for some flight crews...

[Airbubba]

Some earlier discussion of the incident in this thread:

https://www.pprune.org/middle-east/599552-dxb-dme-info.html

Another EK A380 early descent on the Canarsie at JFK:

https://www.pprune.org/middle-east/602933-ek207-jfk.html

[gearlever]

Some earlier discussion of the incident in this thread:

https://www.pprune.org/middle-east/599552-dxb-dme-info.html

Another EK A380 early descent on the Canarsie at JFK:

https://www.pprune.org/middle-east/602933-ek207-jfk.html
YEP.

But now final report released.

[Airbubba]

Is it really that hard... to land a modern airliner with CAVOK ?


In the JFK incident it was suggested that EK get special consideration since they fly internationally and JFK ATC was non-standard when they told the crew that they were too low:

To all you guys that shouts at us ( Emirates), I want JFK ATC to take note of this as well as airbubba we fly 141 destinations everyday. It is very hard to comform and abide by all your rules and non standard ICAO that you guys throw at us.. I have flow into the guts of earth, and never experience what I experience with you guys. Personal experience is, I fly into JFK twice a year. And with all due respect JFK is the worst atc I ever had to deal with in my 22years of long haul flying because of your non standard RT. A note to your managers.
As an Emirates pilot, you are required to be ready to fly at any one of our destinations within 30 min. You as atc is sitting in your tower, so may I please ask that you take this into consideration . So please treat us accordingly.

[gearlever]

In the JFK incident it was suggested that EK get special consideration since they fly internationally and JFK ATC was non-standard when they told the crew that they were too low:

ATC?

Wait a minute.
Am I too high, too low to make it....?

[Pugilistic Animus]

This is the third messup on the A380 that I've seen from EK so far... I don't know how they're training those pilots!?

[Airbubba]

Here's the Synopsis from the GCAA Final Report on the DME incident:

Synopsis

On 10 September 2017, an Emirates Airbus A380-861 Aircraft, registration mark A6-EEZ, operated a scheduled passenger flight EK131, from Dubai International Airport to Domodedovo International Airport, Moscow. There were a total of 448 persons onboard, comprising 422 passengers, two flight crewmembers, and 24 cabin crewmembers.

During approach into Domodedovo International Airport, the Aircraft was cleared for the runway 14R ILS approach when it was on the base leg. The Aircraft descended below its cleared altitude of 500 meters QFE prior to establishing on the localizer. The Radar Controller alerted EK131 to stop the descent. The flight crew then performed a go-around and requested vectors for a second approach. During the go-around, the minimum radio altitude reached was 395 feet above ground level, and EGPWS “Glideslope” and “Terrain Ahead - Pull Up” alerts were activated.

During the second approach as the Aircraft was on the final leg, the flight plan disappeared from the FMS leaving a blank screen. The Commander selected the UUDD14R waypoint using the DIR TO function in the FMS, which resulted in the Aircraft levelling off at 2,600 feet QNH. The flight crew performed a discontinued approach. A third approach to runway 14R was subsequently completed successfully.

The Air Accident Investigation Sector determines that:

(a) The descent below the cleared altitude during the first approach can be explained by an erroneous flight crew perception that the Aircraft would capture the 3° glideslope from above, and by insufficient coordination between the flight crewmembers. After the Co-pilot carried out the glide interception from above procedure, he focused on the horizontal position of the aircraft to establish on the localizer and neither of the two pilots maintained a correct awareness of the Aircraft vertical position.

(b) The cause of the discontinued approach on the second approach was the selection by the flight crew of a waypoint using the DIR TO function and after a relatively long discussion between them due to:

- the unavailability of the flight plan on the ND, as the FMS1, reset after the go-around, was not reconfigured by re-sequencing the flight plan as per the SOP; and.

- the Aircraft oscillation around the localizer course.

The Air Accident Investigation Sector identifies the following contributing factors to the Incident:

(a) The expectation of the Co-pilot that Radar Control might not provide the flight crew with vectors to intercept the localizer at an angle of 45 degrees or less when the Aircraft was on the base leg (90-degrees to the final approach track). The provided radar vectors inside the final approach point (FAP) together with the instruction to maintain relatively high speeds until the Aircraft was almost abeam of the initial approach fix (IAF), and the Co-pilot expectation, resulted in an unusually high workload in a dynamic approach phase.

(b) The glide interception from above procedure was performed when the Aircraft had not yet established on the ILS localizer for runway 14R. This was not in accordance with the SOP.

(c) During the period of when the glide interception from above procedure was performed and the go-around, the Aircraft position was initially outside the azimuthal coverage of the ILS glideslope signal, and when the Aircraft came within azimuthal coverage, it was outside the elevation coverage of the glideslope signal. Consequently, invalid glideslope deviation indications were displayed to the flight crew.

(d) Before performing the glide interception from above procedure, the erroneous flight crew representation of the Aircraft position gave them the perception that they were being vectored to a tight approach and that the Aircraft would capture the glideslope from above, led the pilot flying:

- to refer only to the glideslope deviation indication to determine the Aircraft vertical position instead of considering and crosschecking any other available indications (pressure altitude, vertical and navigation displays, and the DME distance table in the approach chart) which would have enabled him to reconsider and validate the Aircraft position; and

- to descend below the cleared altitude and to modify the heading vectors issued by the Air Traffic Controller.

(e) As the Aircraft was descending below 500 meters QFE, the duration of the Radar Controller’s instruction to the flight crew “not to descend further” was lengthy and the phraseology used was non-standard for an urgent instruction.

(f) As the flight crew prepared for the second approach, a multi-waypoint sequencing in a row of the flight plan occurred when the crew performed a lateral revision of the flight plan using the DIR TO CRS IN pushbutton as per the SOP at a location where several waypoints satisfied the FMS geometrical waypoint sequencing rules. A real time computation issue caused an automatic reset of FMS1.

(g) After the multi-waypoint sequencing of the flight plan and the FMS1 auto-reset during the second attempted approach, the flight crewmembers omitted to reconfigure the FMS by inserting (adjusting the sequencing of the flight plan) the runway 14R ILS approach. The flight crew did not anticipate that omitting this action, aiming at providing the missed approach route should a go-around need to be performed, would jeopardize the capture of the localizer by the AFS system.

The AAIS issued six recommendations: two to the Operator, two to Air Traffic Control, and two to the Aircraft Manufacturer.

[mattyj]

How surprising..American controllers radar vectoring you to a hot and high condition..I thought they did that on purpose..you know, for sport

[Pugilistic Animus]

How surprising..American controllers radar vectoring you to a hot and high condition..I thought they did that on purpose..you know, for sport
Yes, here in the US you gotta deal with glideslope capture from above and they do tend to make it high and fast for the poor jets...not always tho

[Airbubba]

How surprising..American controllers radar vectoring you to a hot and high condition..I thought they did that on purpose..you know, for sport

Yes, here in the US you gotta deal with glideslope capture from above and they do tend to make it high and fast for the poor jets...not always tho

Just to clarify, the incident with the glide slope capture from above was at DME, hard to blame that one on American controllers. ;)

[Mach E Avelli]

Take a tip from Trump. Blame everyone else for your own c0ckups.

[White Knight]

This is the third messup on the A380 that I've seen from EK so far... I don't know how they're training those pilots!?

Please don't tar all of us EK 380 pilots...........

And tbh I've never found ATC in the good 'ole US of A to be a problem:ok:

[Pugilistic Animus]

White Knight I do not believe that all EK pilots fly that way but seeing 2 incidents of poor crosswind landings and now this; it points to something systemic, most likely the training and perhaps over reliance on automation. The main bone that I would pick with the pilots is, in two instances, they didn't do a GA which is disturbing.

[pineteam]

Emirates and many other airlines forbid their pilots to fly raw data in line and push for the max use of Automation.

Airbus: Strongly recommends to fly raw data in line operations and the maximum use of automation is discouraged by Airbus.

Source: WIN by Airbus: Operationnal Philosophy/ Use of Automation/ Manual Flying Policy. They released for the second time in December 2019 a video warning us about the paramount importance of hand flying raw data in daily operations but oh well some airlines still think it’s ok to ignore the manufacturer recommendations...

[Pugilistic Animus]

Just to clarify, the incident with the glide slope capture from above was at DME, hard to blame that one on American controllers. ;)
I just blame US ATCOS for everything even if my electric bill is high and fast :}

[Tommy Gavin]

1000' unstable = GA right?
Nevertheless, ATC in USA is a mixed bag. Some airports are very good and some are piss poor. JFK is the worst. They should send some guys over to LHR or FRA and see how it could be done.

[Pugilistic Animus]

1000' unstable = GA right?
Nevertheless, ATC in USA is a mixed bag. Some airports are very good and some are piss poor. JFK is the worst. They should send some guys over to LHR or FRA and see how it could be done.

Ours was 1000' in IMC 500' VMC...

[glofish]

​​​​​​I wouldn’t blame it solely on Emirates, just as the US controllers shouldn’t be singled out here.

Emirates is a huge airline, with most probably the biggest network, therefore exposing the industry wide flaws more rapidly.

1. Pilot quality: With the increased demand for pilots in an ever shorter period and the reducing of funds for training and renumeration for them, due to the erosion of ticket prices, it was only a matter of time until the problem of quality arises. The industry tried to mitigate this with increasing automation and a huge array of sops and technical by heart items to replace the good old thorough common sense, training and experience. The latter was always a base to deal with all kinds of situations, even with new ones, as extrapolation and improvisation were possible drawing from it. This is no longer possible with the earlier, as the stereotypical application of Pavlovs dog/sop behaviour needs a recognised condition. The startle effect is a well known fact in aviation that leads to temporary loss of situational awareness. In such a state there is no recognised condition and thus no trained reaction or applicable sop can be triggered.

2. Automation quality: There is no question about the benefits of automation. The autopilot, flight management systems, ground proximity warnings and other protections are great achievements. As with a lot of good things, humans tend to go too far, especially when profits can be increased. The manufacturers lured the airlines into buying their supermodels by promising to save on pilot training through automated protections. But such protections are only as good as their programming and you can hardly program every eventuality. Plus, would you believe it: Even engineers are fallible!!

3. At this point the ugly hypocrisy of today’s industry, and as an accomplice the regulator, arises: Our books recognise that such failures can happen and simply states, that in such situations the pilot (from point 1!) shall take over. A classic catch 22 situation. (look at the MAX disaster)

4. I would like to add another contributing effect: The differences between manufacturer philosophies. Due to rapidly changing numbers of different models in many fleets, pilots get quickly shifted from one model to another at many airlines, incl. EK. Considering points 1 and 2, one can imagine that too big a difference of operations and sops can greatly enhance the problems. Two accidents (B777 in DXB and SFO) reflects this: Pilots trained and long working on Airbus, transitioned to Boeing and in their early line phase screwed up due to huge differences in autothrust/throttle systems.



The remedy to this situation is as obvious as the reluctance to acknowledge it. We will have to live with the regular incident reports that point bluntly to the above.

[atr-drivr]

1000' unstable = GA right?
Nevertheless, ATC in USA is a mixed bag. Some airports are very good and some are piss poor. JFK is the worst. They should send some guys over to LHR or FRA and see how it could be done.

And watch the EDCT’s crank up due to their ‘experience’....

[Airbubba]

Ours was 1000' in IMC 500' VMC...

Most U.S. carriers have gone to 1000 feet stable over the last decade it seems. Of course, if you don't realize that you are 400 feet RA eight miles out until the controller tells you and you hear the EGWPS stable approach criteria may not save you.

Also, the go around policy itself affects the decision to proceed with less than optimum safety margins. Some overseas carriers apparently still have you fill out paperwork if you go around. The trend in recent years has been for the safety folks to complain that we aren't doing enough go arounds off of unstable approaches.

Some discussion of the no fault go around policy in this 2008 thread:

https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/319370-no-fault-go-around-policy.html

At some third world expat jobs you'd be fired on the spot for an incident like the one in the GCAA DME report. I'm sure EK is not like that. At least the pilots were deadheaded back to base before they were fired I presume. Actually, I'd like to think that they were retrained and put back on the line but somehow I doubt it. Anybody know?

Will the GCAA issue a report soon on the JFK incident?

[White Knight]

Actually, I'd like to think that they were retrained and put back on the line but somehow I doubt it. Anybody know?


They weren't...

[uplock]

Originally Posted by Airbubba Will the GCAA issue a report soon on the JFK incident?
Not going to happen
Why was there no investigation from any US authority concerning the A380 JFK event ?
No FAA investigation nothing from the NTSB and nothing from the GCAA
AVHERALD has a link to the JFK incident / near accident on the 4th Dec 2017 here (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b21e320&opt=0)
Shameful how it was handled by the company
Even more Shameful how GCAA chose not to investigate
GCAA seems to suffer from dementia or maybe Alzheimer’s as 2019 events never saw the light of day from both fleets

[Airbubba]

Not going to happen
Why was there no investigation from any US authority concerning the A380 JFK event ?
No FAA investigation nothing from the NTSB and nothing from the GCAA
AVHERALD has a link to the JFK incident / near accident on the 4th Dec 2017 here (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b21e320&opt=0)

From your AvHerald link above:

On Dec 12th 2017 the FAA told The Aviation Herald in response to the inquiry of Dec 9th 2017 (and an initial reply the same day that the FAA needed to check): "Emirates Airline EK-207, an Airbus A380, landed safely on Runway 13L [sic - they actually landed on 22L after the go around - Airbubba] at John F Kennedy International Airport, December 4, 2017 at 8:26 pm after initiating a go around due to a low altitude alert. The FAA is investigating."

Surely you would think another serious A380 approach incident at JFK three months after the DME incident would also merit a full GCAA investigation and report. Or, would it? :confused:

[Emma Royds]

Correct me if I am wrong but doesn't the location of where an incident or accident occurs, eventually determines which investigative authority has the responsibility to investigate, which can be delegated to another state if required?

I understand the IAC in Russia will publish the DME report and the NTSB would have the duty of investigating what happened at JFK. Given that both entities have far more experience in incident and accident investigation, the GCAA would merely play a supporting role.

[Airbubba]

Correct me if I am wrong but doesn't the location of where an incident or accident occurs, eventually determines which investigative authority has the responsibility to investigate, which can be delegated to another state if required?

I understand the IAC in Russia will publish the DME report and the NTSB would have the duty of investigating what happened at JFK. Given that both entities have far more experience in incident and accident investigation, the GCAA would merely play a supporting role.

Apparently the Russians delegated the investigative authority to the AAIS which is part of the GCAA in the DME incident.

From the GCAA final report:

This Investigation was conducted by the Air Accident Investigation Sector of the United Arab Emirates pursuant to Civil Aviation Law No. 20 of 1991, in compliance with Air Accident and Incident Investigation Regulations, and in conformance with the requirements of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

This Investigation was conducted independently and without prejudice. The sole objective of the investigation is to prevent future aircraft accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

The Air Accident Investigation Sector of the United Arab Emirates issued this Final Report in accordance with National and International Standards and best practice. Consultation with applicable stakeholders, and consideration of their comments, took place prior to the publication of this Report.

Occurrence Brief

AAIS Case No: AIFN/0010/2017
Operator/owner: Emirates
Aircraft make and model: Airbus A380-861
Registration mark: A6-EEZ
MSN: 0158
Number and type of engines: Four, Alliance (EA) GP7270
Date and time (UTC): 10 September 2017, 1753 UTC
Place: Domodedovo International Airport, Moscow
Category: Transport (Passenger)
Persons on board: 448
Injuries: Nil

Investigation Process

This occurrence was notified by the Operator to the AAIS by phone call to the Duty Investigator (DI) Hotline Number +971 50 641 4667.

The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (FATA) as the representation of the State of Occurrence delegated the Investigation to the AAIS being the State of Registry and of the Operator.

After the Initial Investigation phase, the occurrence was classified as a 'Serious Incident', and the AAIS assigned an investigation file number, AIFN/0010/2017, to the case.

The AAIS formed an Investigation team led by an investigator-in-charge (IIC). The Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) of French, being the State of Manufacture and Design of the Aircraft, the Federal Air Transport Agency (FATA) of the Russian Federation, being the State of Occurrence, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States, being the State of Manufacture of the flight management system (FMS) installed in the Aircraft, were notified of the Incident. The BEA assigned an Accredited Representative who was assisted by Advisers from the Airbus. The FATA provided all required information to the AAIS for the purpose of the Investigation. The NTSB assisted by Advisors from Honeywell (FMS Manufacturer) provided the FMS analysis for the purpose of the Investigation.

[Phantom Driver]

Emirates and many other airlines forbid their pilots to fly raw data in line and push for the max use of Automation.


Good idea .

Airbus: Strongly recommends to fly raw data in line operations and the maximum use of automation is discouraged by Airbus.

Really ? I have my doubts this is what Airbus " recommends " in daily ops...

Source: WIN by Airbus: Operationnal Philosophy/ Use of Automation/ Manual Flying Policy. They released for the second time in December 2019 a video warning us about the paramount importance of hand flying raw data in daily operations but oh well some airlines still think it’s ok to ignore the manufacturer recommendations...

This has been argued ad infinitum on this forum over the years ; however , not many places these days that you could, or even want to , hand fly raw data approaches . Airspace just ain't what it used to be , and nor are modern automated aircraft ( better be on top of your systems knowledge ) .

Not going to start this debate again , but my personal opinion has always been--spend more sim time hand flying raw data approaches rather than those time wasting LOFT exercises . Fixed base trainer and line checks should sort you out . Hopefully that's what happens these days ( I've been out of the game for a while...)
(p.s do they still wear uniforms in the ME sims ? My Far East outfit had a more enlightened approach to this ; dealing with problems in the jumbo always seemed easier in civvies ( for some reason).

[Gordomac]

The thread opener asked the simple question "It's not that difficult, is it ? - or something like it. No, it is dead easy ,actually. Not going to enter the debate again but we are stuck with the industry forcing us into procedures dictated by the Bean Counters. We have gone from being pilots and airmen to button pushers. All heads under the coming, furiously resolving problems through the FMC with no-one looking out of the window has led to incident after incident . Those who support this brush off with the annoying comment ; "Yeah, well, that's how we dot it ".

I received fantastic pilot training at Oxford Air Training School in 1971. Many much cleverer bods than me taught me the 3 degree principle which could put you in the "frame" wherever you were. Range to touch times three puts you in the picture wherever you are whatever your in . Worked for me from Cherokees to A340 with lots in between.

The guys in question at 8 miles out should be around..........er........2400ft. What the F were they doing at 400ft ? Oooooops, heads down, resolve through the FMC. Yeah, right.

No chaps, it is not difficult . But keep the focus on button pushing, systems knowledge (what is it doing now, (?)- systems) , and we will have a lot more of this .

[White Knight]

The guys in question at 8 miles out should be around..........er........2400ft. What the F were they doing at 400ft ? Oooooops, heads down, resolve through the FMC. Yeah, right.

No chaps, it is not difficult . But keep the focus on button pushing, systems knowledge (what is it doing now, (?)- systems) , and we will have a lot more of this .



Could not agree more:ok:

[gearlever]

The thread opener asked the simple question "It's not that difficult, is it ? - or something like it. No, it is dead easy ,actually. Not going to enter the debate again but we are stuck with the industry forcing us into procedures dictated by the Bean Counters. We have gone from being pilots and airmen to button pushers. All heads under the coming, furiously resolving problems through the FMC with no-one looking out of the window has led to incident after incident . Those who support this brush off with the annoying comment ; "Yeah, well, that's how we dot it ".

I received fantastic pilot training at Oxford Air Training School in 1971. Many much cleverer bods than me taught me the 3 degree principle which could put you in the "frame" wherever you were. Range to touch times three puts you in the picture wherever you are whatever your in . Worked for me from Cherokees to A340 with lots in between.

The guys in question at 8 miles out should be around..........er........2400ft. What the F were they doing at 400ft ? Oooooops, heads down, resolve through the FMC. Yeah, right.

No chaps, it is not difficult . But keep the focus on button pushing, systems knowledge (what is it doing now, (?)- systems) , and we will have a lot more of this .

Spot on.
There are so many clues in modern cockpits which show you distance to run, but **** happens.
Captain Warren Vanderburgh's vid "Children of the Magenta" is a must IMHO training commercial pilots.

Here is a similar event (CAVOK, darkness):

Incident: Thai A359 at Frankfurt on Jan 1st 2020, about 800 feet AGL about 7nm from touch down (http://avherald.com/h?article=4d1e782d&opt=0)

[Pugilistic Animus]

It makes a huge difference when a company has a safety culture rather than a blame and punitive culture.... pilots should be safe from persecution for a GA etc and anonymous reporting also help I'm not singling any particular company here. Just something I think is important to bring up this topic.
I do believe for most part the safety culture is out there and it is working.

[Emma Royds]

Apparently the Russians delegated the investigative authority to the AAIS which is part of the GCAA in the DME incident.

Thanks for the clarification. I was not aware! :ok:

[pineteam]

Good idea .


Phantom I hope you are joking there cause that's the exact opposite of what is recommended... xD
Please check out the Airbus videos: https://www.airbus-win.com/ All I said above is from there. There is no debate to have. This is a real issue.
According to Airbus, one third of the accidents, the main cause are the lack of flying skills.
I do agree with you that the simulator sessions should be reviewed to emphasize more on hand flying.
In my outfit, we do it every 6 months. Is that enough to be safe? Definitely not. Hand flying should be done regularly in the real plane. Against, that's not coming from me but from Airbus itself. I personally can feel degradation in my scan and accuracy just within just few weeks when I don't do raw data for a while.
For the 6 years I have been flying Airbus, I have been to the sim with many different cpts and fos and it's always the skippers who are reluctant to fly raw data in line operations who have serious issue in the simulator. That's not a coincidence...

[Phantom Driver]

pineteam;

I agree with your sentiments entirely . I recall a DC10 accident from many years ago ; this particular aircraft had a known autothrottle defect ; it would not hold the commanded speed . On a night approach to a short(ish) contaminated runway , it maintained VRef +20 all the way down finals . The Captain did not disconnect A/T , the jet landed hot and inevitably aquaplaned off the end of the runway into the river at the end and broke in two ... Fortunately all survived ( as i recall ) .

The accident report stated that the Captain was simply too afraid to take manual control of the thrust because he hadn't done it for a very long time . No excuse for that ; but a rare anomaly . In those days , the Atlantic Baron types were pretty good at handling their classic aircraft ..

Unfortunately , in these days of RVSM/RNP/ANP/TCAS etc etc and a crowded airspace at most international destinations , the situation does not lend itself easily to manual flying as we used to know it . Modern aircraft are designed to be flown by the automatics . Doing anything else seriously overloads the monitoring capabilities of the PM --trying to watch your flying like a hawk , making mode selections , handling ATC stuff / frequency changes while also looking out for other traffic . He's a busy boy / girl ..In addition , the flight data Big Brother is also busy reporting your every move back to base--in real time .The result ? Too many people have forgotten how to FLY .

My suggestion years ago was for the company to buy a Pitts special or something similar and roster everyone to go and have some hands on fun once a month . Of course , that idea got nowhere .

[tttoon]

Unfortunately , in these days of RVSM/RNP/ANP/TCAS etc etc and a crowded airspace at most international destinations , the situation does not lend itself easily to manual flying as we used to know it . Modern aircraft are designed to be flown by the automatics . Doing anything else seriously overloads the monitoring capabilities of the PM --trying to watch your flying like a hawk , making mode selections , handling ATC stuff / frequency changes while also looking out for other traffic . He's a busy boy / girl ..In addition , the flight data Big Brother is also busy reporting your every move back to base--in real time .The result ? Too many people have forgotten how to FLY .


I would say the number one problem is not airspace, congestion or whatever. It's company culture. In the right circumstances, hand flying in accordance with FDM etc. is possible. Not all flights are JFK - DBX. If flying by hand "seriously overloads" the PM, that points to a lack in performance from that PM and a lack in confidence in the skills of the PF. Why? Because neither of them regularly do it, and lack awareness. If a current commercial pilot can not fly a raw data approach in a working airplane, I'd say we have a serious problem. What will happen when the **** hits the fan and the A/P packs in? Modern aircraft are designed to be used at any appropriate automation level.

I'm lucky enough to work for a company where F/D and A/T off flying below RVSM is permitted and performed regularly, and just doing it every now and then makes a world of difference in your TLAR skills. And just to be clear, that doesn't make us cowboys, automation is used where appropriate.

As a final note, feel free to compile lists of incidents and accidents where under-reliance on automation was a factor, and those where over-reliance was a factor. I think everybody knows which one will be longer.

[Phantom Driver]

tttoon

Because neither of them regularly do it, and lack awareness. If a current commercial pilot can not fly a raw data approach in a working airplane, I'd say we have a serious problem.

Correct. . However , I believe the pertinent word is " regularly" . Congratulations on flying with an enlightened operator that permits you to indulge and hone your skills . However , not all operators can permit that luxury when most flights are in the longer haul category with a pax load of 300 plus , you are part of a heavy crew and there is a battle for sectors to maintain landing currency. Those folks at the back want a smooth ride which the automation delivers .

With all due respect , I don't think all pilots can guarantee to keep the needles centred perfectly on every departure/arrival (mostly RNAV these days) using raw data alone . With FD it is another matter and I believe most operators do encourage hand flying whenever practical . But RAW data on the line in a heavy jet ? I don't think so .

The simulator is the place to do LOTS of this raw data stuff . If you are not up to standard , then that is a fail . Having retired , I am not sure if this is common practice in training departments these days . It was moving in that direction when I left my last outfit .

[misd-agin]

If turning the a/p off makes for a rough flight something's not right. The autopilots do an excellent job but sometimes they're not the answer. Turning the a/t's off makes for a more enjoyable passenger experience, especially on Airbus', on approach. We have a couple of departures, typically with strict noise abatement procedures, where the a/p is required to be on. Otherwise it's a Big Boy philosophy, use automation as appropriate/desired. Most guys can adjust the level of automation to match the demands of a particular flight. VFR, day, just vectors? IMC, terrain, multiple tough restrictions to make, thunderstorms? Guys increase the level of automation.

Raw data? Few guys do it. It's not that tough to ignore the FD's and fly pitch and power until reaching an energy state where that you're hand flying matches the commands of the FD. The lazy man's raw data.

[pilotguy1222]

This is the third messup on the A380 that I've seen from EK so far... I don't know how they're training those pilots!?

I believe it was a training flight. Overloading a captain with a sub-par FO, I can see how it happened.

[Airbubba]

I believe it was a training flight. Overloading a captain with a sub-par FO, I can see how it happened.

Are you talking about the EK DME event? There is no mention of a training flight or instructor and student in the GCAA report:

The Commander went through and completed CCQ (cross crew qualification) program training from the A330/A340 to the A380 in December 2014, and he underwent Operator required recurrent training and checking thereafter, and most recently, in June 2017.

The Co-pilot held B737-300 and B737-900 type rating as first officer before joining the Operator. After joining Emirates, the Co-pilot completed all required Operator training, and he underwent the Operator required initial training and checking for the A380 in December 2016. His last recurrent training and checking was undergone in April 2017.

Based on the training records, both flight crew had attended the required training, which included glideslope interception from above, as per the Operations Manual-Part D (OMD).

[Check Airman]

tttoon



Correct. . However , I believe the pertinent word is " regularly" . Congratulations on flying with an enlightened operator that permits you to indulge and hone your skills . However , not all operators can permit that luxury when most flights are in the longer haul category with a pax load of 300 plus , you are part of a heavy crew and there is a battle for sectors to maintain landing currency. Those folks at the back want a smooth ride which the automation delivers .

With all due respect , I don't think all pilots can guarantee to keep the needles centred perfectly on every departure/arrival (mostly RNAV these days) using raw data alone . With FD it is another matter and I believe most operators do encourage hand flying whenever practical . But RAW data on the line in a heavy jet ? I don't think so .

The simulator is the place to do LOTS of this raw data stuff . If you are not up to standard , then that is a fail . Having retired , I am not sure if this is common practice in training departments these days . It was moving in that direction when I left my last outfit .

I disagree with most of what you’ve written here. I regularly fly raw data on the line. That’s the only way to maintain proficiency. A few minutes in the sim twice a year isn’t enough practice for me.

With reference to keeping the needles centred on a SID, that’s difficult in a Boeing or Airbus, because most SIDs don’t have needles anymore! My last plane had a CDI that could be used in LNAV, and I’d enjoy hand-flying the SIDs in that case. I really wish Boeing and Airbus would put a CDI on the screen.

Granted, I don’t fly long haul, but particularly now, when there’s less flying, I can ill afford to squander the chance to maintain my skills by allowing the AP to fly.

[tttoon]

tttoon



Correct. . However , I believe the pertinent word is " regularly" . Congratulations on flying with an enlightened operator that permits you to indulge and hone your skills . However , not all operators can permit that luxury when most flights are in the longer haul category with a pax load of 300 plus , you are part of a heavy crew and there is a battle for sectors to maintain landing currency. Those folks at the back want a smooth ride which the automation delivers .

With all due respect , I don't think all pilots can guarantee to keep the needles centred perfectly on every departure/arrival (mostly RNAV these days) using raw data alone . With FD it is another matter and I believe most operators do encourage hand flying whenever practical . But RAW data on the line in a heavy jet ? I don't think so .

The simulator is the place to do LOTS of this raw data stuff . If you are not up to standard , then that is a fail . Having retired , I am not sure if this is common practice in training departments these days . It was moving in that direction when I left my last outfit .

I would say especially on heavy jets on long haul the company culture should be to take every opportunity you've got. I've got some experience on a detachment with a different operator flying the same type of widebody as my company, with similar (tropical) destinations, and in general, most people were just happy to chuck in the A/P as soon as they could and take it out fully configured and checklists completed. What makes flying a widebody different from a 737 or a C150? The 300 pax should not figure into this, as risk is not increased. I don't understand the invisible wall that prevents someone flying an approach raw data in appropriate conditions from downwind in a big jet? Flying manual thrust is another one: as a passenger, I would much prefer a pilot who has done this regularly for training after briefing it correctly over a guy who hasn't done it in 5 years and suddenly had his heart rate go up by 30 beats when he opened the ATL and saw the A/T was MEL'd.

[neilki]

Not going to happen
Why was there no investigation from any US authority concerning the A380 JFK event ?
No FAA investigation nothing from the NTSB and nothing from the GCAA
AVHERALD has a link to the JFK incident / near accident on the 4th Dec 2017 here (http://avherald.com/h?article=4b21e320&opt=0)
Shameful how it was handled by the company
Even more Shameful how GCAA chose not to investigate
GCAA seems to suffer from dementia or maybe Alzheimer’s as 2019 events never saw the light of day from both fleets
One thing I can tell you. It caused havoc in the employee parking lot.... I dont think ive ever heard so many car alarms going off!!

[White Knight]

Quote:
Originally Posted by pilotguy1222 View Post (https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10759824#post10759824)
I believe it was a training flight. Overloading a captain with a sub-par FO, I can see how it happened.
Are you talking about the EK DME event? There is no mention of a training flight or instructor and student in the GCAA report:


No. One of the JFK events.

[alleyquit]

Is this the final report, so it's really fine?

[fatbus]

DME - sub par Capt! Leave it at that !

[Phantom Driver]

DME - sub par Capt! Leave it at that !

Basic question--how does a " sub par Capt " get to command a 380 on an airline that spans the globe ;
( re-reading the report , PM ( pilot " monitoring ") skills by said individual appeared to be somewhat lacking...)

[fatbus]

You think there's only one ? Too many squeak through only to deteriorate quickly after they "peaked". Large number of captains requiring additional training post recurrent. Going to be very difficult for some once the flying starts up again.