Typhoon near miss SE of Elgin

[Distant Voice]

The threat to aircrew and the general public continues due the lack of a Collision Warning System for Typhoon. Below is an extract from the latest Airprox report (No 2019238)

"An Airprox was reported when 2 Typhoon aircraft flew into proximity around 12nm SE of Elgin at 1345hrs on Monday 12th August 2019. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and both were in receipt of a reduced Traffic Service from Lossiemouth Approach.

Of note, CWS on Typhoon remains a high priority as a mitigation to the risk of MAC. Recent trials of Enhanced Collision Awareness System (ECAS) have been unsuccessful, delaying the installation onto the front-line aircraft. The trial produced recommendations for a comprehensive review of the system concept and highlighted areas that needed improvement if ECAS was to be integrated effectively onto the Typhoon. Once a workable solution is available, further trials will take place"

I know that Douglas Ross MP has raised several questions in parliament about the lack of CWS in the Typhoon aircraft and the inadequacy of ECAS. Typhoon needs a CWS similar to the one that was fitted to Tornado, not a quick fix 'bodge up' that fails to meet the recommendations set out in the MAA Def Stan to mitigate the Mid-Air Collision risk. We need collision AVOIDANCE (TCAS), as promised, not collision AWARENESS.

In 2014 Air Marshal Garwood, the then DG MAA, stated in his annual report "Given the MAC [Mid Air Collision] risk and the existence of a credible mitigation in the form of TCAS, until the point at which a firm commitment is made to fit such a system to each of our fast-jet platforms, their respective ALARP statuses will remain open to challenge" The MAC risk for Typhoon, Hawk T1 and Lightening II is not ALARP and as such routine operations should cease in order to be compliant with MAA regulations. Of course this was ignored in 2012 and resulted in a collision of two Tornado aircraft over the Moray Firth.

In 2008 Andrew Walker, coroner for the XV230 inquest, accused the MoD of adopting a cavalier approach to flight safety, nothing has changed. Furthermore, the Lord Advocate should be advised that these issues continue as a result of 'the ongoing 'systemic defect in a system of working' namely the ‘flawed’ interpretation by Duty Holders of the ALARP standard, which is a continued threat to aircrew and the general public (Public interest). This 'systemic defect' could have been identified at an FAI for the Tornado collision.

DV

[flighthappens]

Having just read the airprox, it appears this incident could have been stopped on a number of levels without a CWS. There were a number of assumptions made from Typhoon A, Typhoon B and ATC. Deficient planning [lack of backup deconfliction plan for Typhoon B] Any number of those areas, if challenged, would have nipped it in the bud.

Further to that there should be question on the suitability of Typhoon A's aircraft without L-16, a radio defect, and a display issue.

I'd challenge the RAF to sort these areas first.

I admire the fight to get a CWS, however I myself don't see it as a panacea. To me, it doesn't necessarily matter how the SA is gained; for example robust planning and authorisation, as well as working L-16 in both aircraft would have prevented this case, as well as Moray Firth. (yes, I know this wouldn't help with civ aircraft).

[alfred_the_great]

Genuine question - if all 3 pilots were near or at task saturation, and had been warned about the presence of nearby aircraft, what would another electronic alarm have changed?

It seems the underpinning problem was that each individual was working to an incorrect mental model, and was disregarding any information that didn't fit. Why and how would your suggested system change that?

[SOX80]

I have flown a number of aircraft with TCAS fitted, it is without doubt a great SA builder. Tornado spent a fairly large part of its time floating around VFR at LL where TCAS was a help (though it had limitations at LL and wont stop you hitting a glider or microlight), we also didn't have a radar that could reliably see other aircraft . Typhoon is a different beast all together, most sorties consist of transiting under an ATC service to an area of segregated airspace where you then conduct high energy manoeuvres (TCAS doesn't work when manoeuvring hard in close proximity to other aircraft and has to be turned off in these situations). Don't get me wrong I would love to have TCAS in Typhoon, especially for OPS when ATC is often somewhat looser, but it is just another sensor, Typhoon has numerous other sensors which can build SA, in addition to the measures that have been mentioned above: planning, deconfliction, CADS, an ATC service, not to forget the rev backup of looking out the window and doing a proper scan! The bottom line is that there is a reason most FJs around the world don't have TCAS fitted, part of it is cost of course but also it is seen as redundant in many of the scenarios where we operate. Maybe that will change as we all get more litigious and safety focused and that will be fine, just be clear it is not a panacea for avoiding MAC, especially in a high performance FJ.

[tucumseh]

The other things being mentioned are just some of the required 'defences in depth', and it is right to ask why they failed. The fact they did fail emphasises the need for depth.

What they comprise is up to MoD; DV merely points out that AM Garwood himself mentioned TCAS. Having been so firm and specific in a 6-year old annual report (which simply regurgitated what was said in the 80s and probably before), the key question is why the chosen solution has taken so long and failed, when another system was successfully trialled and recommended 30 years ago.

It seems that systems integration is the now problem. That's actually a huge leap forward, given previous losses due to flat refusal to integrate safety critical systems. For example, Tornado ZG710 (2003). The trouble is, this practice was by then policy, approved by Garwood's predecessors. His 2014 statement was very brave (in a Yes Minister sense).

[Distant Voice]

It seems the underpinning problem was that each individual was working to an incorrect mental model, and was disregarding any information that didn't fit. Why and how would your suggested system change that?

It is reported that TCAS greatly increases SA and reduces workoad.

Typhoon has numerous other sensors which can build SA, in addition to the measures that have been mentioned above: planning, deconfliction, CADS, an ATC service, not to forget the rev backup of looking out the window and doing a proper scan!

In AVM Atha's Tornado safety statement of Oct 2013 he points out;

"Current technical mitigations are based on systems used primarily for alternative purposes other than for bespoke aircraft-aircraft spatial positioning and avoidance"

This statement carries the following footnote,

"It is worth noting that equipment mitigations are rarely mandatory items for a flight to proceed. As such, these can at best be considered as aids to deconfliction"

In other words unless you have a bespoke system you could end up with parts of your CWS unserviceable. Of course ECAS will not be a bespoke system, even when they get it working. A bespoke CWS would be a 'No Go' item.

DV

[SOX80]

One of the main problems with TCAS is that it is designed for the civil sector, for aircraft in benign flight regimes that maintain profiles designed to keep them away from each other. Trust me, if you have 3 aircraft 1000ft separated in the same CAS stack you will get so many nuisance warnings from the TCAS that it will be turned off, or worse ignored in a jet which is constantly giving you other audio warnings 90% of which are nugatory.

This was predicted and realised with ECAS which is turned off before take off as it generates so many nuisance warnings. TCAS is really only useful in a FJ in the transit (when you are behaving like an airliner) or for finding the tanker on a dark night.

Again, TCAS is great and IMHO should be fitted to all military aircraft but it would not have prevented the vast majority of FJ vs FJ close a-boards in the last few years, because it would have been turned off (the exception to this is the Moray Firth Tornado crash where it almost certainly would have saved lives, hence I still think it should be fitted and used where appropriate)

[matelo99]

The issue I have with the likes of TCAS (and TAS and CADS along with all the rest) are that in times of war these will be turned off, all the lessons we learn and all the reliance we place on them in peace time will be lost in war. This will place a massive learning curve on today’s pilots at a time when they should have already learnt the lessons of SA building (ie day one of a conflict is not the place to learn simple lessons like this).

Too many commanders are thinking of solutions to save their skin now rather than seeking something that will work in both an operational theatre, where aircraft are manoeuvring aggressively, and the Friendly skies of the UK which are filled with civvies.

[tucumseh]

matelo99

Correct, hence 'defences in depth' whereby you can disable or lose one defence and the risks remain acceptable.

Add, the ground is also full of civvies (and other forms of life), which the MoD decision makers are required to consider. Shoreham should have brought this home, especially given the aircraft was neither serviceable nor airworthy, with MoD (according to the CAA) having THE major part to play.

[Distant Voice]

The issue I have with the likes of TCAS (and TAS and CADS along with all the rest) are that in times of war these will be turned off, all the lessons we learn and all the reliance we place on them in peace time will be lost in war.

The DSA Annual Assurance Report for the period April 2015 to March 2016 states the following,

"While military employment of these systems [TCAS] on fast jet aircraft was originally envisaged to mitigate risks during training and non-operational flying, recent reporting has also recognised their positive effect in current operations. In the congested multinational airspace where current operations are underway, coalition aircraft fitted with the system have been able to take action to avoid collisions on several occasions."

DV