Accident Near Mangalore Airport - Possibly 2 Aircraft down [Archive] - Page 3

OCTA Aus

14th Mar 2020, 12:48

I will ask again.

What is the lowest level of Airservices surveillance coverage at Mangalore ?

Surely pilots who fly there regularly must have an idea.

Probably not an accurate idea. ATC generally won’t let the aircraft know they are identified until after the departure call is given, as we try to not interfere too much during critical phases of flight. Imagine how it would look if someone missed a crucial CTAF call just because we told them they were identified...

As for what would have most likely prevented this, well Hoosten is correct. E at 1200ft AGL would have done the job and is probably achievable. I’m assuming the inbound aircraft was inbound for air work, so probably what would have happened for the separation would be clear the inbound to a level 1000ft above the outbound aircraft LSALT, and then procedurally clear the outbound aircraft. They would have been separated while in IMC. I’m not totally certain, but I believe that is something like what Hoosten is suggesting. Nobody would have been unduly delayed, it isn’t particularly difficult, and the separation is done by the professional paid $200k per year to do it.

As for Unicom, they are very rare over here. I am slightly surprised MNG doesn’t have an AFRU though.

Dick Smith

14th Mar 2020, 14:14

Hoosten

14th Mar 2020, 14:54

Dick, from my recollection the surveillance went down to around 2500-ish. That was before ADSB became more widespread. I don't think it has improved significantly since the introduction.

I'll give you another act of stupidity in CTAF's and whomever has propogated and perpetuated it, the 'downwind' 'base' & 'final' calls. For Godsakes. It is ridiculous.

OCTA Aus

14th Mar 2020, 15:05

Unicoms of the proven US style don’t exist in Australia due to CASA concrete minds.

Without an AFRU how do the pilots know they are on the correct frequency when calling in the blind.? Do they just presume that no reply means no traffic present?

A fail dangerous system.

Even my farm strip at Gundaroo has an AFRU.
They don’t cost much!

Not much compared with the cost of four human lives

A lot of these airports are owned/operated by the local councils. I don’t think that’s the case with MNG, however in a lot of places they are. And most of them know very little about aviation operations. They possibly don’t know what an AFRU is, and why it’s important. Then no matter what the price is they aren’t going to pay it if they don’t see it as necessary.

Hoosten

14th Mar 2020, 15:10

As for what would have most likely prevented this, well Hoosten is correct. E at 1200ft AGL would have done the job and is probably achievable.

I'll guarantee you, it would not have happened, simply wouldn't have. Australian ATC haven't put two together. Worldwide it is an incredibly low occurrence of ATC caused collision whether inside or out of controlled airspace.

I’m assuming the inbound aircraft was inbound for air work, so probably what would have happened for the separation would be clear the inbound to a level 1000ft above the outbound aircraft LSALT, and then procedurally clear the outbound aircraft. They would have been separated while in IMC. I’m not totally certain, but I believe that is something like what Hoosten is suggesting. Nobody would have been unduly delayed, it isn’t particularly difficult, and the separation is done by the professional paid $200k per year to do it.

Procedural radial separation is one way of doing it, another way is to delay the aircraft on the ground. Yet another way is to improve the surveillance to lower levels, less delay. If anyone wants to bang on about costs, yes, putting radar surveillance out there would be prohibitive. But guess what's come along and is being used more and more in GA cockpits, all while your ANSP is feeding the trough in Canberra.

OCTA Aus

14th Mar 2020, 15:24

I'll guarantee you, it would not have happened, simply wouldn't have. Australian ATC haven't put two together. Worldwide it is an incredibly low occurrence of ATC caused collision whether inside or out of controlled airspace.

Procedural radial separation is one way of doing it, another way is to delay the aircraft on the ground. Yet another way is to improve the surveillance to lower levels, less delay. If anyone wants to bang on about costs, yes, putting radar surveillance out there would be prohibitive. But guess what's come along and is being used more and more in GA cockpits, all while your ANSP is feeding the trough in Canberra.

ADSB would do the job just fine. Put an ADSB groundstation at all the aerodromes where the class E ceiling is lowered to 1200ft, and change the rules so we can assume radar separation when issuing the clearance to the aircraft on the ground. I’m not sure exactly what an ADSB ground station costs, but if the NBN had been done properly instead of the half effort job they did then it would have been pretty easy.

Sunfish

14th Mar 2020, 20:32

There was ADSB coverage at Mangalore only it wasn’t provided by Airservices.

Squawk7700

14th Mar 2020, 22:03

There was ADSB coverage at Mangalore only it wasn’t provided by Airservices.

That is a little misleading.

You would be referring to someone installing a non-certified ADSB raspberry-pi box at their house, connected to the internet and uploading to fligtradar24, wouldn’t you?

Which I might add that ATC do not have visibility over, for obvious reasons. I understand the FR24 even has full coverage at water level on Eildon.

Sunfish

14th Mar 2020, 22:25

You are right Squawk. That is what I was referring to. I know Airservices require bulletproof reliability, etc. but I suspect that low cost hardware is eventually going to utterly disrupt their business and technology model.

That technology is a linux based computer - bulletproof reliability again, an internet connection and software defined radio.

That is available for less than $500 I think.

You program the radio to capture ADSB transmissions as well as CTAF calls.

That could give you 1) “intelligent” AFRU capability - last transmission, aircraft inbound and outbound from ADSB, and suchlike. I haven’t scoped how or what to transmit.

2) Pump the Adsb data to a website and app that give you “software surveillance radar”.

3) use the data for landing fees etc.

You could then mandate mandatory adsb out for vfr aircraft where they may encounter ifr traffic.

Mr Approach

15th Mar 2020, 02:27

ADS-B receivers are normally installed by Airservices on their radio towers. According to ERSA 122.4 can be received on the ground at MNG and the 5000 foot ADS-B coverage diagram includes the MNG area; I do not, however, know what ADS-B coverage is available on the ground or below 5000 feet.
If the 122.4 mast does not have an ADS-B receiver them it would be very cheap and straightforward to install one.
Alternatively Aireon offers a space-based ADS-B service via Iridium satellites that is compatible with current ATC systems and can provide a 5NM separation standard. This means that with some engineering and signing a contract Airservices can offer IFR separation services over the whole continent.
That would however require an expansion in the number of ATC positions in the two ATC Centres, something that, under our system, somebody has to pay for.

Given the very explicit rules about training flights in the MNG area listed in ERSA I am surprised that there is no CTAF. Radio instructions contrary to the legislated requirements in CAR166 are below and it all seems to take place on the area frequency!

The MNM radio broadcasts are taxiing, entering, departing: Inbound, Joining, Base and Final with position, altitude and intentions.Note:
Pilots must respond to radio requests from other TFC for their intentions, position or altitude.
Base/Final broadcast is to include a nominated ACFT landing sequence number, determined by your position behind preceding airborne ACFT (e.g. Warrior ABC final 23 touch and go number 2

If there was an MBZ or CTAF then there would be nothing to stop anyone, Mangalore airport, the local flying school or a bored retired pilot/ATC setting up a UNICOM. The radio has to be licensed by ACMA and the operator needs a flight radio operators certificate unless they hold a pilot's licence. They can also obtaina weather observers certificate from the BoM and make observations for pilots. There are also no regulations prohibiting the use of Flight Radar 24 by a UNICOM operator, the AIP even allows limited traffic information. Perhaps industry should determine it's own safety instead of waiting for the Government?

On eyre

15th Mar 2020, 02:55

Piston_Broke

15th Mar 2020, 04:04

What am I missing here ?
i thought Mangalore had a CTAF 121.1 😳
It does, and has had since they were introduced.

These APP people - the world doesn't exist outside 30NM :)

Mr Approach

16th Mar 2020, 00:34

Piston/Eyre,
So sorry, you are correct, I missed it when I read the ERSA entry, so read my post to say - There is nothing to stop anyone.....
Seriously a UNICOM service could make all the difference, for a number of reasons. Don't wait for the Government - we should do it ourselves.

Piston_Broke

16th Mar 2020, 05:40

Seriously a UNICOM service could make all the difference, for a number of reasons.
I'm not sure it would have.

A UNICOM would not know about the inbound aircraft until it called, and when that happened hopefully the operator would have stepped back and let the two aircraft talk to each other and arrange self-separation, both having been given traffic by ML CEN.

One of the issues reported by the industry after UNICOM trials a few years back was that on occasions they contributed to frequency congestion.

As to why there are not many here, comments made on this forum in the past were who would pay their salaries and indemnity insurance in the event of something going wrong.

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

16th Mar 2020, 07:14

To my knowledge there has never been a mid air collision in controlled airspace in this country.

Of the 37 mid-airs between 1968 and 2003:
Fifteen of the collisions in or near the circuit area occurred at one of the five major general aviation airports; that is, Archerfield, Bankstown, Jandakot, Parafield or Moorabbin. Thirteen of these collisions occurred during tower operating hours.
And of course, Coolangatta 1998

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

16th Mar 2020, 07:58

the AIP even allows limited traffic information
But the MOS139, which aerodrome operators abide by, does not.

Dick Smith

16th Mar 2020, 09:05

The US has unicoms everywhere and there is no problems with salaries and insurance.

Keep putting up these myths and we will keep going with the higher risk by not having US style non prescriptive unicoms!

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

16th Mar 2020, 09:32

There's no myth. Who pays the salary, the installation, the licence fee? You keep saying it's free. It's not. There is obviously a cost, and it is one our industry is quite clearly not prepared to pay.

Sunfish

16th Mar 2020, 10:13

Traffic: There's no myth. Who pays the salary, the installation, the licence fee? You keep saying it's free. It's not. There is obviously a cost, and it is one our industry is quite clearly not prepared to pay.

Oh but you will pay. Whether you are prepared to or not.

You will pay in landing fees and insurance premiums whether you like it or not. If you can’t pay, you will disappear.

If a 100+ pax jet goes in, that will cost your insurers maybe $140 million. Add hull cost and casualties and damage on the ground. Say $200 million. Now do the probabilities and discounted cash flow. Only then can you talk about affording it. The stupidity extends further to requiring an annual government dividend.

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

16th Mar 2020, 11:29

We are talking about Unicoms, right?

Sunfish

16th Mar 2020, 12:05

sunnySA

16th Mar 2020, 12:15

TThe stupidity extends further to requiring an annual government dividend.

I doubt they'll be any dividend this FY nor the next. In fact, the government may be forced to chip in this FY.

ftrplt

16th Mar 2020, 12:53

Occasional flights into Ballina (and Lismore); I find the Unicom is more of a hindrance than a help, too much repetition of previously made (and already heard) calls tying up the radio.

Unicom operators definitely need training in how to value add if Unicoms are to work.

Doesn't help that Lismore is on the same frequency.

Hoosten

16th Mar 2020, 18:15

To my knowledge there has never been a mid air collision in controlled airspace in this country.

I know it's not helpful to come back and say 'but I meant'

But I mean controlled airspace, not a GAAP/Class D Metro, where you aren't subject to a separation service (unless IFR in IMC)

Of the 37 mid-airs between 1968 and 2003:

Fifteen of the collisions in or near the circuit area occurred at one of the five major general aviation airports; that is, Archerfield, Bankstown, Jandakot, Parafield or Moorabbin. Thirteen of these collisions occurred during tower operating hours.

Which would muddy the stats a little.

And of course, Coolangatta 1998

I will have to find this and read it.

Hoosten

16th Mar 2020, 18:23

Seriously a UNICOM service could make all the difference, for a number of reasons. Don't wait for the Government - we should do it ourselves.

The nature of the rapid frequency transfers from Terminal to Centre, to receive traffic, then to CTAF to arrange segregation with aircraft then to Unicom would further complicate the process. Arriving into MNG from the South is extremely high workload when MNG is busy.

Squawk7700

16th Mar 2020, 19:53

I know it's not helpful to come back and say 'but I meant'

But I mean controlled airspace, not a GAAP/Class D Metro, where you aren't subject to a separation service (unless IFR in IMC)

Which would muddy the stats a little.

I will have to find this and read it.

Jandakot and Hoxton part has had some collisions. At least one of those was just after the tower closed from memory. Moorabbin has the shocker fireball at night after tower closed.

Piston_Broke

16th Mar 2020, 21:47

Occasional flights into Ballina (and Lismore); I find the Unicom is more of a hindrance than a help, too much repetition of previously made (and already heard) calls tying up the radio.

Unicom operators definitely need training in how to value add if Unicoms are to work.

BNA isn't a UNICOM - its a CAGRS, and they are all ex-ATCs .....

Hoosten

16th Mar 2020, 23:03

Jandakot and Hoxton part has had some collisions. At least one of those was just after the tower closed from memory. Moorabbin has the shocker fireball at night after tower closed.

Jandakot is a Class D Metro, i.e no separation service to traffic unless you're IFR in IMC.

Hoxton, Non-Towered Aerodrome.

Mr Approach

17th Mar 2020, 01:12

Hoosten - in every comment you make you expose the ridiculousness of our current system.
When I watch the videos of the US system, I recommended, I do not see pilots doing "rapid frequency transfers from Terminal to Centre, to receive traffic, then to CTAF to arrange segregation with aircraft then to Unicom".
First there is no mandatory traffic information in Class G airspace in the US, if IFR you would be separated from other IFR down to 1200 or 700 feet AGL; that is the Centre (I am not sure what Terminal is in your email) The CTAF is the other frequency you guard and if there is a UNICOM the operator would be on the same frequency, as per our legislation.

So two frequencies, on one you are being vectored to an instrument approach, and if you say you are visual you will be assigned a visual approach. (If you do not want a visual approach do not report visual). The CTAF is where you will hear the VFR traffic, but if the Centre controller can see any VFR traffic he/she thinks might affect your flight, it will be passed. (In Australia this is also a duty of care issue for the ATC)
If it is not hard in the US why is it so hard in Australia? My answer is because of the Class G, IFR pilots are having to separate themselves with other IFR pilots, conducting practice instrument approaches. Centre is passing traffic, but pilot has to self-separate while also keeping eyes and ears open for VFR traffic. It's no wonder that "Arriving into MNG from the South is extremely high workload when MNG is busy"

Last comment "Jandakot is a Class D Metro, i.e no separation service to traffic unless you're IFR in IMC" Strictly correct however Class D airspace was identified and codified by ICAO by observing what control towers do with traffic in the air traffic zone (ATZ), a term not used in Australia. Class D should be circuit area size (5NM if surrounded by Class E but once again Australia is different) Basically pilots either enter as approved by ATC (Non-Metro Class D) or in accordance with a published procedure (Metro Class D). Both are designed to allow pilots to self-separate while positioning for circuit entry watched over by Tower ATC, who also regulates runway movements in accordance with ICAO or National regulations. In the US these are commonly referred to as VFR Towers because IFR aircraft are separated from other IFR aircraft by Centre onto instrument approaches, sequence information is given to the VFR tower, and the Tower then segregates the VFR traffic using circuit area instructions,from the aircraft on the instrument approach who call the Tower around ten miles. In other parts of the world this is ATC 101, but for some reason Australia went a different way.

We are far too heavily biased towards "revenue generating" airspace such as above FL180, the Oceanic areas and major terminal maneuvering areas (TMAs). Low level airspace around our smaller airports where statistically the accidents happen get no interest unless there is something that might embarrass the MInister, such as Jetstar complaining about Ballina.

Hoosten

17th Mar 2020, 02:02

Hoosten - in every comment you make you expose the ridiculousness of our current system.

Mr Approach, I wish I was as eloquent and well spoken in trying to get my points across.

When I watch the videos of the US system, I recommended, I do not see pilots doing "rapid frequency transfers from Terminal to Centre, to receive traffic, then to CTAF to arrange segregation with aircraft then to Unicom".

I don't think there is another location in Australia that exposes just how serious the flaws are in how IFR OCTA is handled in Australia, to their credit, a lot of the Terminal Controllers get you across to Centre as soon as possible, but it is still extremely busy (at times)

First there is no mandatory traffic information in Class G airspace in the US, if IFR you would be separated from other IFR down to 1200 or 700 feet AGL; that is the Centre (I am not sure what Terminal is in your email) The CTAF is the other frequency you guard and if there is a UNICOM the operator would be on the same frequency, as per our legislation.

When I say Terminal I mean APP/DEP.

So two frequencies, on one you are being vectored to an instrument approach, and if you say you are visual you will be assigned a visual approach. (If you do not want a visual approach do not report visual). The CTAF is where you will hear the VFR traffic, but if the Centre controller can see any VFR traffic he/she thinks might affect your flight, it will be passed. (In Australia this is also a duty of care issue for the ATC)

Simple huh?

If it is not hard in the US why is it so hard in Australia? My answer is because of the Class G, IFR pilots are having to separate themselves with other IFR pilots, conducting practice instrument approaches. Centre is passing traffic, but pilot has to self-separate while also keeping eyes and ears open for VFR traffic. It's no wonder that "Arriving into MNG from the South is extremely high workload when MNG is busy"

Whether people will admit it or not, people cannot handle that Dick knows what he is talking about, granted he is not a technical guru, but should he be? There was massive resistance to Dick inside certain quarters of ATC. Another problem being the minister for transport has always been a useful idiot. 8 National Party ministers for transport would be worth what? A 3rd year apprentice plasterer?

Last comment "Jandakot is a Class D Metro, i.e no separation service to traffic unless you're IFR in IMC" Strictly correct however Class D airspace was identified and codified by ICAO by observing what control towers do with traffic in the air traffic zone (ATZ), a term not used in Australia. Class D should be circuit area size (5NM if surrounded by Class E but once again Australia is different) Basically pilots either enter as approved by ATC (Non-Metro Class D) or in accordance with a published procedure (Metro Class D). Both are designed to allow pilots to self-separate while positioning for circuit entry watched over by Tower ATC, who also regulates runway movements in accordance with ICAO or National regulations. In the US these are commonly referred to as VFR Towers because IFR aircraft are separated from other IFR aircraft by Centre onto instrument approaches, sequence information is given to the VFR tower, and the Tower then segregates the VFR traffic using circuit area instructions from the aircraft on the instrument approach who call the Tower around ten miles. In other parts of the world this is ATC 101, but for some reason Australia went a different way.

Australia knows best, they do it with most things, bastardise, butcher and end up spending twice as much to rectify. MYKI Vs METRO (Houston). They simply refuse to buy proven off the shelf.

We are far too heavily biased towards "revenue generating" airspace such as above FL180, the Oceanic areas and major terminal maneuvering areas (TMAs). Low level airspace around our smaller airports where statistically the accidents happen get no interest unless there is something that might embarrass the MInister, such as Jetstar complaining about Ballina.

Greed knows no bounds, government greed, corporate greed (bonuses). And good ole user pays.

ftrplt

17th Mar 2020, 03:43

question I have always wondered with E - what is the reasoning/advantage for E down to 1200 / 700 ? i.e why 1200'/700' - not something else?

Lead Balloon

17th Mar 2020, 04:03

8 National Party ministers for transport would be worth what? A 3rd year apprentice plasterer?My apologies for the thread drift, but that right there is funny!

George Glass

17th Mar 2020, 04:17

That’s being unfair to apprentice plasterers.

Dick Smith

17th Mar 2020, 04:56

I thought others may be interested in this article (http://rosiereunion.com/file/1.4.16%20Article%20by%20Dick%20Smith%20in%20The%20Australian %20-%20Controlled%20airspace%20still%20under%20a%20cloud%2025%20 years%20on.pdf) I wrote for The Australian on 1 April, 2016.

Particularly note my last words:

“Calling in the blind do it yourself airspace” will remain until a major accident with fatalities brings in the change. I despair!

It looks as if what I said was so true when it comes to Mangalore.

George Glass

17th Mar 2020, 05:11

Nah........I’m not going to bite.

Dick Smith

17th Mar 2020, 05:12

thorn bird

17th Mar 2020, 05:55

Any fatality is a worry Dick.
Unfortunately if people persist in committing aviation despite CAsA's best endeavours to stamp it out, there will be more.
Our safety record is way behind the USA statistically, that should tell us something, they have a GA industry, we have the ragged dregs
of what's left of one, but we still persist with the myth that ever increasing regulation will make us safer.

There is a rumour around that McBank affiliates have been telephoning airport leaseholders to ask if they are solvent with the current crisis.
Could it be that the major airports are a tad worried about their cash flow? or is McBank worried about their "Management Fees" and directors bonuses?
Passing strange.
At this time with the whole aviation industry rapidly arriving with their backs to the wall, is it time to suspend all Curfews and other restrictions that impinge on the whole industry? The rule book got thrown out with the 89 dispute to keep the country moving, are we at that time again?

Desperate times call for desperate measures, I tried to buy some black underwear at Target today, my white ones have printers ink stains all over them, out of stock dam it, this really is getting serious.

Hoosten

17th Mar 2020, 05:57

That’s being unfair to apprentice plasterers.

I know, but I'm an ex-tradie myself (that's where I learn't my conversational skills) I had to pick a trade that wouldn't bust the bruthahood.

aroa

17th Mar 2020, 07:13

Dont worry Dick. This fatality rate is an anomaly.
Meanwhile refer to Dr (Smart) Aleck gobsmaking comment "that CASA is being prospective and etc" and you can see clearly what the regulator thinks about all this.
Using the Angel Flight "fix"... Charter operators , Flying Schools etc will have to have their aircraft 'annualed' every 50 hours. That should stop it

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

17th Mar 2020, 07:15

traffic, in your way of thinking, you only work out the costs AFTER THE ACCIDENT. Then you say to yourself “jeez, if we had spent $100,000 per year to prevent the accident it would have been money well spent.”.

Risk management calculations allow allow you to make the costs decision without waiting for the accident.

To put that another way. You can calculate what it’s worth to stop the accident and I assure you, you will think it’s a good deal.
Unicoms can't, by law, give traffic. Everything else they can provide is just a nice to have. Who pays the $100k per year for nice to haves? Pretty much no one in aviation. CA/GRO's provide a directed traffic service only, not separation, and they cost a sh*t load more than $100k a year. You want ATC? Put your hand in your pocket, and they better be deep.

Hoosten

17th Mar 2020, 07:23

You want ATC? Put your hand in your pocket.

Na, Na, Na, Na, You want ATC? Treat the the airways as the national infrastructure it is. Enough tax is paid, enough revenue is made. There's a very good reason all the government departments associated with this are VERY quiet, cos they're getting away with murder.

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

17th Mar 2020, 07:23

I have just been told that with 19 fatalities over 3 months, if this keeps up we will end up with 76 fatalities per year. Let’s hope this is not going to happen. The normal fatality rate is about 21 per year.
Sorry Dick, but you had to be told that 4 x 19 is 76?

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

17th Mar 2020, 07:42

Treat the the airways as the national infrastructure it is.
You mean the way the Federal Government treats other national infratructure such as rail, road etc, all of which are substantially underfunded, under resourced, and exist in a state of constant catfight with the various State governments over who pays for what? The Federal government may "own" things on paper, but it operates practically nothing (civil) in Australia. It pretty much just provides funding to the States, and they have passion fingers with the money when they get it.

Lead Balloon

17th Mar 2020, 09:26

So TIER....

Having articulated one of the structural problems, at least more people are likely to know what that problem is. The problem is actually curable. It just needs more people to understand that it’s curable.

Sunfish

17th Mar 2020, 09:40

Some states ceded control of aviation to the Feds. The Feds trump state law in those jurisdictions.

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

17th Mar 2020, 11:11

I think the Feds have always controlled aviation. Even the larger airports are still federal land, just leased off. The Govt still has a say in aerodromes passed to councils under the ALOP. CASA is Federal. AsA is Govt owned. They've just gotten out of "doing" aviation.

Lead Balloon

17th Mar 2020, 22:15

CASA and Airservices and ATSB can be fixed. Problem is: It requires political wisdom and what my dearly-departed granny used to call “gumption” to do it.

(I was told the other day that a manager in Airservices was paid a $100,000 bonus because an external contractor managed to achieve a contractual milestone. If true, that is in my opinion a manifestation of a completely munted management culture.)

Squawk7700

17th Mar 2020, 22:44

Lead Balloon

17th Mar 2020, 23:21

Airservices has “directors”? I know it has a CEO and a bunch of General Managers. Haven’t heard about directors. Maybe just a difference in terminology rather than substance.

Squawk7700

18th Mar 2020, 01:02

Airservices has “directors”? I know it has a CEO and a bunch of General Managers. Haven’t heard about directors. Maybe just a difference in terminology rather than substance.

General Manager perhaps yes. Bonuses are normally at executive level.

Mr Approach

18th Mar 2020, 03:08

Lead Balloon,
Airservices has a Board, see here for details <https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/about/our-governance/our-board/>
Boards do not get bonuses, contracted managers do, supposedly tied to "performance".
Targets are set each year (I think though it should be longer) and if you meet the target the CEO decides how much of the bonus you get.
It is however a flawed concept, particularly in the Public Service where performance is not very important, because the manager then concentrates on whatever generates the bonus instead of other "non-bonus attracting" activities.
From an online document <https://hbr.org/2016/02/stop-paying-executives-for-performance>
"As the incoming Chief Executive of Deutsche Bank, John Cryan, recently said (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/24/bankers-still-overpaid-says-top-banker-john-cryan-bonuses-deutsche-bank) in an interview: “I have no idea why I was offered a contract with a bonus in it because I promise you I will not work any harder or any less hard in any year, in any day because someone is going to pay me more or less."

George Glass

18th Mar 2020, 06:31

“It is however a flawed concept, particularly in the Public Service where performance is not very important, because the manager then concentrates on whatever generates the bonus instead of other "non-bonus attracting" activities.”

You’re not a public servant are you ? Because that observation demonstrates profound insight. Cracked me up . Priceless........

Lead Balloon

18th Mar 2020, 08:59

Do you have a dog called “Toto” and a feeling you’re not in Kansas anymore, Mr Approach? If not, please activate your beacon so we can find and save you.

The technical/operational stuff you post is important.

Mr Approach

19th Mar 2020, 00:40

Thank you for your kind words, Mr Balloon, however what makes you think I need to be saved?
You must be a nom-de-plume for the AFP or CASA :=

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

25th Mar 2020, 12:57

I have just been told that with 19 fatalities over 3 months, if this keeps up we will end up with 76 fatalities per year. Let’s hope this is not going to happen. The normal fatality rate is about 21 per year.
According to this https://www.wingswatch.net/accidents the US is running about 27 a month.

Lead Balloon

26th Mar 2020, 06:15

Gosh, aviation in the USA must be more than 4 times as dangerous as aviation in Australia. Or is it more than 12 times more dangerous?

Traffic_Is_Er_Was

26th Mar 2020, 12:35

Lots of E and lots of ATC doesn't stop you getting killed. They just start the search earlier.

Lead Balloon

26th Mar 2020, 21:57

Spoken like a true Austronaut!

KRviator

23rd Apr 2020, 03:40

Preliminary report is out now (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2020/aair/ao-2020-012/).

It doesn't really say much that we didn't already know, except that Mangalore CTAF calls were not recorded, and the ATCO passed traffic info to both aircraft about the other.

Nomde plume

23rd Apr 2020, 05:10

JQF only got 2 minutes (if that) heads up before they collided. The report lacks a lot of detail about what was said to AEM too considering JQF hadn’t yet called departure...

Advance

23rd Apr 2020, 06:17

In the USA ALL IFR aircraft are separated by ATC.
Dick Smith has been trying to bring Australian safety standards up for at least 30 years by insisting on the same ATC separation here.
The ATSB report confirms what this forum has known for some time => both aircraft were visible to ATC via ADS-B tracking.
Airservices have a flow chart that demonstrates the workload of providing separation is LESS than the workload of only providing traffic.
WHY?
Each task requires ATC considering the trajectory of every aircraft in the sector.
To separate aircraft, the ATC makes a decision and issues an instruction.
If the ATC passes traffic then the pilot may respond with his decision to change altitude or track or otherwise avoid the conflict
BUT then the ATC has to assess this change to determine if a different conflict will occur and perhaps pass further traffic.
So let us stop accepting the nonsense argument that it costs more to provide separation compared to traffic information - it does not.
What is the total cost of this accident going to be?

Almost two decades ago Dick organised a trip by both Airservices and CASA staff to the United States with flights arranged to demonstrate the ease of use and safety of Class E airspace.
A very experienced US ATC from the Southern California Terminal Radar Control Unit addressed the team and pointed out how easy it was to provide separation and how safe the result.
John and Martha King of King schools tried very hard to educate the team on why US airspace is as safe as Australian airspace in terms of collisions per flight hour but has so much greater traffic density and thus greater actual safety.

A lot of very experienced pilots and controllers in this country know Dick was right back then and he is proven right again by this accident.

CAN WE LEARN FROM IT THIS TIME???

Hoosten

23rd Apr 2020, 08:12

The timing of the traffic being issued to AEM needs to be put in context. The En-Route ATC has very little time to issue the traffic statement from when it's transferred from Departures. The aircraft is transitioning from CTA, obtaining weather information whilst still in CTA, briefing the approach whilst in CTA etc, etc. It then changes frequency to Centre, then changes to the CTAF. It's a very high workload, let alone it being a training flight.

Nomde plume

23rd Apr 2020, 08:58

Hoosten

23rd Apr 2020, 12:35

They were given traffic, under the limitations of the airspace setup. Don't blame the ATC, if you want to blame, blame the airspace setup, both the Class and the boundaries.

WhisprSYD

23rd Apr 2020, 22:13

Why wouldn’t ATS give conflicting traffic at 6000’ when JQF called taxi for departure at 7000’?

AIP GEN 3.3
2.16.1.1 An IFR flight reporting taxiing or airborne at a non-controlled aerodrome will be advised of conflicting IFR traffic which is not on the CTAF.

JQF gave a taxi call at 1111 - I’m assuming that with the location of the collision at 1124 that would have given AEM an ETA of around 1126?

MATS Criteria for traffic at taxi call is anyone within 10mins.

Report doesn’t mention whether or not additional attempts were made to contact JQF for a traffic update prior to departure or whether AEM reported changing to the CTAF and had established 2 way comms? Would be good to know if either occured.

What can often happen is outbound aircraft taxies, gets told no ifr traffic as next inbound is 15 odd mins away, takes longer than expected to depart (10 mins after taxi call is when sar alerting process begins) inbound aircraft gets given traffic on pending departure, told they are on the CTAF and not aware of you inbound.. then outbound aircraft gives departure call and says we copied inbound aircraft on the CTAF..

Nomde plume

23rd Apr 2020, 22:45

WhisprSYD, 10 mins isn’t based on when the call was made, it’s based on estimated departure and arrival times. Which obviously were coincident. Per AIP:

2.16.4 Traffic information will be provided in accordance with the preceding paragraphs whenever there is a possibility of confliction between aircraft in the following situations:

a. aircraft that climb, descend or operate with less than 1,000FT vertical spacing and less than 15NM lateral or longitudinal spacing;

b. overtaking or opposite direction aircraft on the same or reciprocal tracks with less than 1,000FT vertical spacing and less than 10 minutes longitudinal spacing based on pilot estimates;

c. more than one aircraft arriving at, or departing from, the same aerodrome with less than 10 minutes between arrival and/or departure and falling within these guidelines.

Vref+5

23rd Apr 2020, 23:14

Great to see Australia has again failed to learn from overseas. Here is proof that the ADS-B mandate was a complete waste of everyone’s money because the airspace structure wasn’t updated to reflect the improvements in the surveillance.

I was part of the NAS team all those years ago. The arguments thrown at us back then as to why the US NAS wouldn’t work here, specifically low level E and the US CTAF, was because of their better radar coverage at low level. Well now we have the improved surveillance without any other upgrades and what’s the result?? No change. What a surprise.

WhisprSYD

23rd Apr 2020, 23:24

WhisprSYD, 10 mins isn’t based on when the call was made, it’s based on estimated departure and arrival times. Which obviously were coincident. Per AIP:

What’s the ETD for someone who taxies at 1111?

1114? 1117? 1119? 1130?

or do you want traffic information based on Flight plan etd?

see the issue - only reliable times the controller has for basing the assessment are time at taxi, inbound pilot estimate or radar verified system estimate, and ATD when it’s given.

Usual procedure is give traffic to anyone within 10 mins at time of taxi (plus a minute or two for mum) - then update if necessary on departure which is what appears to have happened here..
At 14 mins prior to the collision the inbound aircraft may still have been air working at another aerodrome with a 30 minute delay set.. we don’t know any of that

The important thing is that the inbound aircraft is aware of the pending departure, which it was here.

Nomde plume

23rd Apr 2020, 23:52

At 14 mins prior to the collision the inbound aircraft may still have been air working at another aerodrome with a 30 minute delay set.. we don’t know any of that

Yes we do, we know that it departed Tyabb at 1055, climbed to 6000’ and tracked through the Melbourne TMA on a more or less direct track to Mangalore.

We know AEM gave their intentions to conduct airwork at Mangalore to the surface yet they weren’t given JQF until 2 minutes after they had left 6000’.

If AEM had passed 5000’ at this point (likely), JQFs ability to separate at 4000’, the lowest possible level was gone. Both aircraft potentially in IMC.

It was too late, the traffic had to be passed on earlier. The traffic was known at taxi, why wasn’t it passed on to either aircraft until it got this far?

Mr Approach

24th Apr 2020, 02:22

From the interim Report (my underlining):

The investigation is continuing and will include further examination and analysis of:

weather conditions at the time of the accident
recovered radios from the aircraft
recorded radar data, as well as recorded area frequency calls and recollections of CTAF radio broadcasts.
pilot qualifications, experience and medical histories
aircraft maintenance and operational records
air traffic services actions, procedures and practices
traffic density in and around Mangalore Airport
classification of the airspace around Mangalore Airport
Class G and CTAF operational and communication processes and procedures around Mangalore Airport
visibility from both aircraft.

Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant parties so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken.

Come on ATSB, should a critical safety issue be identified - FOUR PEOPLE DIED!
Why is this not a safety problem when it could have been prevented with an airspace model and ATC services that were accepted by CASA back in the '90s?
Why was the Federal Government provider of ATS allowed to then argue with the regulator and have the plan overturned? (At a time when it was managing the FAA Pacific Towers that used exactly the separation services they were rejecting for Australia!)
Even the State Safety Programme starts off with complacency:
"Australia has an enviable record in aviation safety, among the best in the world, which has been built on a strong safety governance system, forged over many years."
That's OK then we don't really have to try any harder, do we?
I believe I could guarantee that if the two aircraft at Mangalore had been airliners, with or without passengers, then action would have been taken.
There is a better way, Minister! For the sake of a few dollars and a few more controllers, those four men need not have died.

Advance

24th Apr 2020, 06:39

Let me prefix these remarks by saying I lay no blame at the foot of the unfortunate ATC who had to sit and watch two blips merge and vanish.
That person was doing precisely what they were paid to do and acting in accordance with both training and written instructions.

On 5th October 1999, a train went through a red light at Ladbroke Grove near Paddington London.
31 dead, 417 injured. This signal was known to be problematic - it had been passed eight times in six years though the driver had not been told of this.
This particular signal was almost impossible to see with the sun behind it, and on curved lines, it was not immediately obvious which of a myriad of signals related to the particular line this train was on.
All of this was known to management but nothing was done to rectify the safety deficiencies.
Other known but not corrected safety issues came out at the inquiry.
This is one of the major contributing factors to the UK enacting the offence of Corporate Manslaughter.“Section1. The offence

An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or organised—

causes a person's death, and
amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased............................

So far as I know we do not have an equivalent offence in Australia - yet - but let me tiptoe very gently here.

Airservices is an organisation that provides a service known as Air Traffic Control whose function is to prevent collisions between aircraft...............
CASA has an Office of Airspace Regulation which is required to operate in accordance with a policy statement issued by Michael McCormack and Para 47 reads:

The Government expects CASA to adopt international best practice in airspace administration. This includes adopting proven international systems that meet our airspace requirements. The Government’s airspace strategy recognises that international airspace systems include a range of characteristics to be considered, and implemented as appropriate.

Aviation has two sets of rules; VISUAL for those who can see other aircraft and visually separate themselves from others, and INSTRUMENT for those who may not be able to see other aircraft as they are permitted to operate in cloud and conditions where visual separation is not possible.

VERY PLAINLY any system of airspace administration that is able to separate IFR aircaft but does not do so, in the full knowledge that those aircraft may be operating in conditions where they can not visually separate themselves is NOT applying any form of international best practice nor proven international systems.

The CEO of Airservices and the Manager of the OAR are both controllers and should both be thinking very carefully about their responsibility as individuals, let alone as the persons responsible for their respective organisational functions.

May I also most respectfully commend the Chief Commissioner of ATSB, himself an ex-controller and ex Safety Manager of Melbourne Center to consider whether this ongoing unsafe mode of airways operation be permitted to continue or is deserving of an immediate safety recommendation to both CASA and AA.

40years

24th Apr 2020, 07:59

The ATSB Commissioner was not Safety Manager of Melbourne Centre, he was Centre Manager. And a good one too.

ACMS

24th Apr 2020, 09:24

You guys can argue about the rules for when ATC are supposed to advise traffic all you want...

BUT, why did ATC wait soooo long to tell AEM about JQF and also to tell JQF about AEM when they should have realized it could be a separation issue quite a while earlier?

JQF taxied at 1111 but AEM wasn’t advised at all until 1119......8 minutes later
JQF taxied at 1111 while AEM was inbound but they weren’t advised of AEM until they became airborne at 1122 .....2 minutes before impact.....why did ATC wait 11 minutes to advice them of AEM descending inbound across their departure track...

So experts can quote required times all you want but to me THEY WERE BOTH ADVISED WAY TOO LATE.....

AEM had a whopping 5 minutes notice of JQF before the impact
JQF had a whopping 2 minutes notice before the impact.

That’s supposed to be the whole idea of calling on the ground, you get given traffic so you can plan BEFORE getting airborne.....otherwise why bother...

Lead Balloon

24th Apr 2020, 10:04

Yep, they were advised way too late.

But we’ll now have to sit through a few years of the unedifying and expensive pantomime of the conflicted ATSB coming up with a report as to why the tragedy was not a consequence of anything other than pilot error. So very ... Australian.

Hoosten

24th Apr 2020, 11:05

BUT, why did ATC wait soooo long to tell AEM about JQF and also to tell JQF about AEM when they should have realized it could be a separation issue quite a while earlier?

I really don't know how many times it needs to be explained to you? And the others posting similar.

The sector boundaries do not allow traffic to be passed any earlier to AEM than it was. This accident is a combination of airspace classification and airspace (sectorisation) boundary issues.

- The Departures North Controller would have handed the aircraft off to Dookie Sector as soon as Dep North had no separation issues, AEM would have been in controlled airspace when this hand off had taken place. The rules of a handover of aircraft are many. You can't just hand an aircraft off to another controller on a whim. Nine times out of ten the Dookie Controller will launch straight into the traffic statement. 9 times out of 10 the aircraft will acknowledge the traffic and advise the airwork details then switch straight to the CTAF.

- When it is busy at MNG it is virtually impossible to monitor both fequencies when you are conducting an IFR training flight.

- It doesn't matter how many times you say 'they should have had traffic earlier' it CANNOT change unless there is a sector boundary change (virtually impossible given that the terminal needs the boundary where it is to process traffic into ML, AV & EN). Stomping your feet and demanding that traffic be given earlier is analogous to a 6 year old child asking her mother why she can't go to the pub.

OR

- There is an airspace classification change that would have seen these two aircraft positively separated.

Advance

24th Apr 2020, 11:29

Hoosten we have a problem exactly as your last line identifies.
Thanks

Nomde plume

24th Apr 2020, 12:28

Stomping your feet and demanding that traffic be given earlier is analogous to a 6 year old child asking her mother why she can't go to the pub.

4 people aren’t dead because a 6 year old couldn’t go to the pub.
JQF needed that traffic info at taxi because that’s when they had an opportunity to do something about it.

The moment you take off and enter IMC you can do nothing other than climb to LSALT/MSA at an absolute minimum. That’s exactly all they did.

The only thing (sans TCAS) that stops an IFR-IFR collision in IMC in class G airspace is accurate, clear and timely traffic information. The report offers nothing to the first two parameters but is damning of the third.

People are rightfully upset about this. Many pilots on here have lost friends and mentors in this accident.

Go and jump in the driver’s seat of your car on a rainy night with a blindfold on and think about who you’re going to ask to sit in the passengers seat giving you directions.

Don’t try and play down the seriousness of this accident and say all pilots here are 6 year olds. We place an incredible amount of trust in ATC. I have no problem placing my trust in the guys and girls on the other end of the radio. I will continue to place my trust in them.

But something happened here that let them down. It’s not going to be put down to the fact that a CTA boundary 20nm away meant it was all too hard.

Hoosten

24th Apr 2020, 15:10

Nomde plume, I think you need to go back to the start of this thread, read it all the way through. I was accused of being too emotional as I lost a friend and acquaintances as well.

The only thing (sans TCAS) that stops an IFR-IFR collision in IMC in class G airspace is accurate, clear and timely traffic information. The report offers nothing to the first two parameters but is damning of the third.

You know what would have prevented this accident? The appropriate class of airspace for the level of traffic in a supposedly first world country.

You are blaming the controllers when you should be blaming a third world airspace system. You are blaming the controllers when you should be blaming the inability of aviators and public servants in this country to see past their egos and jingoistic belief that we have 'one of the best safety records in the world' so let's just leave things the way they are, the way things were done 20 years ago. Cos nothing has changed right? Oh, except the traffic levels right?

You don't know how a traffic assessment is done by an ATC, you don't know how and when that information is displayed and just when it becomes available. And you most certainly won't get all of that information in the accident report in 2023 sometime.

Yes, we do trust the ATC's. I do too, any time I head up that way. But I also know what goes on on the other side of the mike. So I can give you a heads-up, you are focusing on one part, a small part in the great scheme of things here.

CAVOK92

24th Apr 2020, 20:38

Traffic information couldn’t be given any earlier is complete nonsense. Yes AEM at the time could have been with different controller to JFQ. However the controllers are very capable of communicating with each other. Everywhere else in the country you can and will be given conflicting traffic information even if one of the other aircraft is on a seperate approach/area frequency. To be given traffic well after your descent and only 1000fr above the MSA is just ridiculous.
Hopefully some serious procedure and airspace changes come from this.

Hoosten

24th Apr 2020, 23:49

Traffic information couldn’t be given any earlier is complete nonsense.

Yeah, sure thing. I'm tipping you've worked both theses airspaces?

Hopefully some serious procedure and airspace changes come from this.

Doubt it.

CAVOK92

25th Apr 2020, 00:24

Love the attitude Hooters. Iv flown around the area enough to know that it is possible and the limiting issue is Airservices internal procedures in for Melbourne airspace. Everywhere else in the country traffic statements form a controller down stream is never an issue. On a daily basis I get traffic statements issued by approach for the next area, Center issuing a tragic statement from Moresby FIR, centre for an approach area. Controllers are capable of talking to each other and do it thousands of times a day.

It was made even more obvious that’s this is the case as the day after the accident traffic statements and alerts started to be issues in a much more timely manner.

Hoosten

25th Apr 2020, 07:36

CAVOK92, you don't know what you're talking about. Simple. If that is attitude, so be it.

So, you get traffic on a daily basis from Approach for the next area? That is the single greatest load of bull**** I think I've read on this site.

Another effing Australian airspace expert.

CAVOK92

25th Apr 2020, 08:03

Hooters. Thanks for the bout of confidence.
Every time I have been dropped out of CTA laterally or vertically I have been given a traffic statement even when the airspace is on seperate controller to who is underneath or next to.

Hoosten

25th Apr 2020, 09:18

CAVOK92, I call bull**** on you being given traffic by an approach controller for the next sector you're dropping into 'on a daily basis'

Does not happen, if an approach controller wanted to give traffic, they would have stayed on sectors. I worked the MNG sector as an ATC for 18 years, I'm now teaching (and have done for years) IFR as an instructor into that airspace.

You don't know what you are talking about in this accident scenario.

CAVOK92

25th Apr 2020, 09:54

Every time It has been warranted anywhere else I the country the traffic has been given to me. Your right, defiantly wouldn’t be daily as I would be working way to hard.

looking at this scenario also with significant IFR examining experience and significant experience in the area. The traffic information was not adequate. If I was in JQF and lived to tell the tale I would be ropable.

Now we have established some inside knowledge. Could you please enlighten the rest of us as to why the traffic information was so poorly handled? Why Melbourne ATC’s procedures can’t be changed to provide traffic information at an appropriate time to inbound aircraft (at TOD)?

ACMS

25th Apr 2020, 13:52

HOOSTEN......Argue all you want and make excuses.....THE SYSTEM FAILED MISERABLY AND 4 PEOPLE ARE DEAD......

This should have been preventable, they weren’t doing 400 kts either and the system should have advised them in plenty of time to take appropriate action to avoid each other.

Remember we had 3 very experienced Pilots ( no offense to the Thai trainee ) in those two Aircraft operating in a known environment with probably excess capacity available and they were still let down.....

Now stop making excuses.....

Advance

25th Apr 2020, 21:28

Hang about ACMS
I do not know Hooters but he is advocating change to the airspace classification, just as I am.
The system is broken - but not at the workface level.
It is broken at the management level in both OAR and Airservices.

By definition, IFR aircraft can not separate themselves visually and giving them traffic does NOT solve the problem.
IFR aircraft are frequently constrained to fly one flight path and one only - they have no choice; consider an instrument approach for example.

Your are right to this extent: FOUR PEOPLE ARE DEAD because the SYSTEM IS A FAILURE.

Fix the system not blame the worker who is only permitted to dish out traffic information.

Hoosten

26th Apr 2020, 07:35

CAVOK92 & ACMS,

I have pointed out several times that the airspace set up, both boundaries and classification are deficient, I have gone into a bit of detail regarding the workload required from both sides of the fence in this scenario.

You are both banging on about 'why wasn't traffic given sooner' I've pointed it out to you. To continue on about the timeliness of the delivery is to overlook the cause, it's a contributory factor yes, but it not the cause. Having an extra 5 minutes to consider the traffic may not have prevented this accident. Class E Airspace would have given these aircraft a much greater safety factor with positive separation. IFR traffic in high density Class G Australian airspace is archaic.

I can have a conversation with either of you or anybody else about just what happens in this scenario, it is just too lengthy to 'back and forth' on a bulletin board. But to target an ATC in this instance is stupidly misguided and wrong.

ACMS

26th Apr 2020, 08:17

I’m not actually blaming the ATCO either......As a dumb Pilot I expect better of the system to protect us, is that too much to ask?.
and yes 5 minutes more would have made a big difference......Especially to the crew of JQF.....

Hoosten

26th Apr 2020, 09:13

You won't be getting any better while there's a reliance on DTI in high density Class G.

You won't be getting any better when ADSB surveillance is 'there' and it's not used for CTA service.

Better requires a fundamental shift from those that have the 'power' to mandate airspace change.

Old Akro

26th Apr 2020, 23:52

Another weak report from the ATSB. It is dramatically late and despite the fact that they have (Area) had radio transcripts for weeks, there is scant reference to them in the preliminary report.

The report does however confirm that both aircraft had ADS-B which was being received by ATC. The preliminary report also confirms that neither aircraft was in in VFR conditions. The system that we have all had to invest large amounts in equipment upgrades in our aircraft and it would appear to have not given the safety improvement we were promised.

Hootsen suggests that both boundaries and classification are deficient

Cavok suggests that " Airservices internal procedures in for Melbourne airspace" are to blame.

Advance says "The system is broken - but not at the workface level.
It is broken at the management level in both OAR and Airservices.
By definition, IFR aircraft can not separate themselves visually and giving them traffic does NOT solve the problem.
IFR aircraft are frequently constrained to fly one flight path and one only - they have no choice; consider an instrument approach for example."

Either way, the cause of this accident lies at the feet of AsA and / or OAR. And I think if previous submissions were reviewed, it would be found that they had warnings. There is not the faintest hint in the preliminary report that either aircraft crew has contributed as was speculated by many on this forum immediately after the accident.

4 people are dead because they put their trust in a deficient system that failed them. Compare the attention that 4 police officers who died on the Eastern freeway is getting. It would appear that at least 1 person will go to jail for a long time for the Eastern Freeway incident. This is an event of greater significance and should get the same attention.

Advance

27th Apr 2020, 00:12

ACMS and CAVOK92,
If you are happy that four people died because of a broken system and are content to just whinge on a bulletin board then that is your right.
BUT if you want to change the system then recognise what serious experts are telling you is true.
Get on to Worksafe, the Victorian Police, the AFP, your local MPs and point out that the Airservices organisation responsible for separating aircraft had the means to do so but did not; that the CASA OAR organisation charged with implementing international best practice in airspace administration has failed to do so.
If you simply criticise how the ATC did the job you will find he/she did exactly what they are paid to do - nothing will change.
A Ministerial question in Parliament is just a tiny annoyance to a public servant but imagine if a homicide detective or coronial investigator walks in to their office.......... that might get their attention!

Get AOPA or AFAP or any organisation you are a member of behind you.
And it would be really great if Civil Air (the ATC union) started telling their employer that change must happen to protect their members against possible criminal charges.

thorn bird

19th May 2020, 04:46

From sky news for anyone interested.

https://www.skynews.com.au/details/_6157302934001

Lead Balloon

19th May 2020, 09:48

From sky news for anyone interested.

https://www.skynews.com.au/details/_6157302934001
It’s frustrating when a valid point is lost in tabloid twaddle.

Mr Approach

20th May 2020, 04:43

Capn Bloggs

20th May 2020, 05:05

It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade
Such as? :confused:

Lead Balloon

20th May 2020, 06:35

Folks - It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade, so please read the Minister's Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) and reflect on the fact that, regardless of his words, we do not provide Class E airspace for any uncontrolled airports with RPT services, never mind those that do not have RPT:

Para 34 - The Government considers the safety of passenger transport services as the first priority in airspace administration and CASA should respond quickly to emerging changes in risk levels for passenger transport operations. Airspace administration should also seek to deliver good safety outcomes to all aviation participants.
Para 35 - The Government expects that CASA will continue to review Australia’s airspace as required and continue to move towards closer alignment with the ICAO system and adoption of proven international best practice

No point in blaming Airservices or CASA, they are both overseen by the DIRD's general manager Air Traffic Policy, on behalf of the Minister Michael McCormack. The GM's name and address are:
Mr Jim Wolfe
General Manager
Air Traffic Policy
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
GPO Box 594
CANBERRA CITY 2601
Phone: (02) 6274 7611 (tel:(02) 6274 7611)
Fax: (02) 6274 7804From the Airspace Act https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00178: Part 2—Australian Airspace Policy Statement

8 Minister must make Australian Airspace Policy Statement

(1) The Minister must make a statement (the Australian Airspace Policy Statement).

Note: Generally, CASA must exercise its powers and perform its functions in a manner consistent with the statement: see section 11A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988.

Contents of statement

(2) The statement must:

(a) specify and describe the classifications to be used to administer Australian‑administered airspace; and

(b) specify and describe the designations to be used for the purposes of restricting access to, or warning about access to, particular volumes of Australian‑administered airspace; and

(c) describe the processes to be followed for changing the classifications or designations of particular volumes of Australian‑administered airspace; and

(d) outline the Commonwealth Government’s policy objectives for the administration and use of Australian‑administered airspace; and

(e) include a strategy for the administration and use of Australian‑administered airspace in the future.

(3) The statement may also include any other matter the Minister thinks appropriate.

Consistency with Chicago Convention

(4) The statement must be consistent with the Chicago Convention. However, if Australia has notified differences under Article 38 of that Convention, the statement must be consistent with those differences.

Legislation Act 2003

(5) A statement made under subsection (1) is a legislative instrument, but section 42 (disallowance) of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply to the statement.

Note: Part 4 of Chapter 3 (sunsetting) of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply to the statement: see regulations made for the purposes of paragraph 54(2)(b) of that Act.

9 Consultation before making Statement

(1) Before making the Australian Airspace Policy Statement, the Minister must consult:

(a) CASA; and

(b) Airservices Australia.

(2) The Minister may also consult any other person or body the Minister thinks appropriate.

10 Statement must be reviewed every 3 years

The Minister must cause the Australian Airspace Policy Statement to be reviewed at least once in each of the following periods:

(a) the period of 3 years after it is made;

(b) the period of 3 years after the completion of the last review.Summary: Just make **** up.

Dick Smith

26th May 2020, 02:19

As mentioned previously, readers of this thread may be interested in the article I wrote in The Australian (http://rosiereunion.com/file/1.4.16%20Article%20by%20Dick%20Smith%20in%20The%20Australian %20-%20Controlled%20airspace%20still%20under%20a%20cloud%2025%20 years%20on.pdf) newspaper four years ago.

It is interesting that it was ignored by all the CASA people and the people at Airservices.

I suppose the Board members of each organisation will say it is nothing to do with them and the Minister will say he knows nothing about airspace so it isn’t his responsibility.

If I were a relative of one of the four pilots who lost their lives, I would be quite angry.

Capn Bloggs

26th May 2020, 06:28

Having operated in the lowered E over the last few days, and considering various traffic scenarios I was put in by fate, Dick, you will have to show us the money because Class E will NOT be cost-free.

BTW, I am disappointed you appear to be trying to leverage an agenda when you don't even know if the current system failed...

Dick Smith

26th May 2020, 10:13

I do know that the current system failed.
So does CASA , AsA and the ATSB.

It’s all about delaying the truth so no one from these organisations will be held responsible.

Imagine the situation for the poor controller. Seeing the aircraft disappear but knowing that the current regulations do not allow a control service to be provided.

Complete madness.

topdrop

27th May 2020, 08:20

Hoosten,
I worked Approach for 21 years and we would regularly pass traffic info on behalf of adjoining sectors - both on our own initiative and on request of the adjoining sectors.

Capn Bloggs

27th May 2020, 09:19

I do know that the current system failed.
No you don't. You don't know what calls were made on the CTAF or if all the required DTI was provided and acknowledged.

What I do know is that safety dropped markedly when "close-in" CTAFs replaced the bigger MBZs. Having to operate on two radios at the same time can result in comm overload is not good and, I believe, will be a major contributing factor in this accident.

In any case, show us the money.

Styx75

27th May 2020, 09:33

No you don't..

Two aircraft collided mid air. The system failed.

Capn Bloggs

27th May 2020, 10:28

OK then, what "system"?

Styx75

27th May 2020, 10:42

OK then, what "system"?
That's a good topic for a review into airspace in Australia.

On eyre

27th May 2020, 13:09

Two aircraft collided mid air. The system failed.

Or rather someone within the system failed - commonly known as human error which we all realise, that despite the best of intentions, cannot be completely eliminated. Sad but true and not to make light of it.

Styx75

27th May 2020, 13:42

Or rather someone within the system failed - commonly known as human error which we all realise, that despite the best of intentions, cannot be completely eliminated. Sad but true and not to make light of it.

People are part of the system; a failure of a human is a failure of the system.

That's why atsb reports and such examine the human factors at play to try to build more robust procedures.

On eyre

27th May 2020, 13:52

People are part of the system; a failure of a human is a failure of the system.

That's why atsb reports and such examine the human factors at play to try to build more robust procedures.

And as human error can never be eliminated, no matter how hard you try, no system will ever be faultless.
Stay alert everyone.

Styx75

27th May 2020, 14:43

And as human error can never be eliminated, no matter how hard you try, no system will ever be faultless.

But it can be reduced. That's why pilots participate in cyclic check and training, flight reviews etc. It's why we have developed checklists and crosschecking etc. All these came through studies and and research leading to redesigning of systems based around human factors. It's the basis for why T.E.M is now a mandatory competency for pilots.

On eyre

27th May 2020, 18:08

Old Akro

27th May 2020, 21:03

But it can be reduced. That's why pilots participate in cyclic check and training, flight reviews etc. It's why we have developed checklists and crosschecking etc. All these came through studies and and research leading to redesigning of systems based around human factors. It's the basis for why T.E.M is now a mandatory competency for pilots.

Tell that to the Renmark pilots operating a periodic review under supervision of a CASA FOI.

James Reason himself details the limits of process based safety in his books. In many ways Tony Kerns work takes over from James Reason. But personal responsibility doesn't fit well with a regulators mind set.

This forum is good at being unforgiving of pilots. But this accident had 4 very well qualified pilots with very good recency flying well equipped aircraft. Both had active IFR flight plans. Both were flying consistent with their flight plans. Personally, I cannot point to anything that would give me any comfort that the same thing would not have happened to me.

The ATSB report acknowledges that both aircraft were identified via ADS-B returns received by the AsA system (as opposed for F24 etc). The ATSB preliminary report acknowledges that the AsA system had the information that indicated a traffic conflict (note that I say system, not controller. Its unknown what the controller was presented). ATSB have departed from typical practice by not making any comment on the recorded radio transmissions in its preliminary report, nor presenting any transcripts. Which is curious.

This is going to be a complex report and I'll put money on the ATSB not publishing a final report for 3 years after the accident. But I'm pretty sure that airspace design (ie class E, CATAF and control step location), radio frequency boundaries, radio procedures and the concept of aircraft self separating in IMC are all likely to feature in the final report. These are all systems based issues.

Squawk7700

27th May 2020, 22:52

ATSB have departed from typical practice by not making any comment on the recorded radio transmissions in its preliminary report, nor presenting any transcripts. Which is curious.

This says a lot about what might be coming later.

Stickshift3000

27th May 2020, 23:36

I'll put money on the ATSB not publishing a final report for 3 years after the accident.

No takers here, that's a sure thing.

iron_jayeh

29th May 2020, 01:01

I have the solution. Class c sfc -180 then class A above that. Ok let's do it

Advance

31st May 2020, 10:15

The bottom line is this.
Four people are dead because ATC could have separated them but did not.
Why not?
Because the level of service in any airspace is decided by the Office of Airspace Regulation which is required by Ministerial Direction to implement international best practice in airspace management.

VERY PLAINLY any system of airspace administration that is able to separate IFR aircaft but does not do so, in the full knowledge that those aircraft may be operating in conditions where they can not visually separate themselves is NOT applying any form of international best practice nor proven international systems.

No matter who overseas the OAR - it is their responsibility to carry out the Ministerial Direction and they have failed to do so.

Now let us make sure the Coroner and other investigative bodies are aware of the aspects of Aviation Legislation that you can bet nobody in CASA or AA will point them to.

Lead Balloon

31st May 2020, 10:30

the Office of Airspace Regulation ... is required by Ministerial Direction to implement international best practice in airspace management.What law says the OAR must comply with ‘Ministerial Directions’, and where is the Ministerial Direction that says the OAR must implement international best practice in airspace management?

It might be worth having a look at what the Airspace Act actually says (here: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00178 )

iron_jayeh

31st May 2020, 10:57

Stickshift3000

1st Jun 2020, 01:56

Or ... and hear me out. When you're given traffic you could self separate. I think of the traffic at places like caboolture and know there is no way people are going to want to wait while soomeone else is doing an approach.

In a perfect world that can work well.

However I often rent an aircraft fitted with only a single radio; it's not possible to hear all relevant broadcasts when switching between the CTAF, AWIS and Centre (and other) frequencies.

iron_jayeh

1st Jun 2020, 02:30

But if cta then you will need to be on centre not the ctaf otherwise how do they seperate?

Stickshift3000

1st Jun 2020, 02:42

But if cta then you will need to be on centre not the ctaf otherwise how do they seperate?

That's my point; one is not necessarily always on CTR with a single radio.

iron_jayeh

1st Jun 2020, 02:43

Son you don't want cta. You want g airspace.

Lead Balloon

1st Jun 2020, 03:39

Son you don't want cta. You want g airspace.
How is G any more ‘effective’ than controlled airspace in solving the problem of needing to listen for potentially-relevant information on multiple frequencies in a single radio aircraft?

I can’t imagine why any IFR pilot would ‘want’ G airspace in preference to E (or D or C or B or A), but some apparently do.

Stickshift3000

1st Jun 2020, 05:14

With a single radio I have the same problem, if not worse problems, in G.

Squawk7700

1st Jun 2020, 07:08

However I often rent an aircraft fitted with only a single radio; it's not possible to hear all relevant broadcasts when switching between the CTAF, AWIS and Centre (and other) frequencies.

Easy fix, hire an aircraft with two radios!

Oh wait, you can’t, because over 70% of the GA fleet in this country are pre 1975 models!

(well not really, but you get the point)

CaptainMidnight

1st Jun 2020, 08:54

it's not possible to hear all relevant broadcasts when switching between the CTAF, AWIS and Centre (and other) frequencies.
Ah, the Good Ole Days ..

Before CTAFs MTAFs MBZs etc, if you were in Class G (OCTA) it was only the relevant FIA frequency to be monitored and communicated on.

:):)

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 01:24

Nomde plume

2nd Jun 2020, 02:22

I think a fairly big point is being missed here. If it is VMC you don't need to sit on the ground waiting for an approach to terminate. If it was VMC both the IFR aircraft can cancel IFR and continue their airwork while 30 hundred aircraft depart the aerodrome. It happens on CTAF's in VMC every day between IFR training aircraft. 'Are you happy if we separate visually?' 'Yep'

If you are at Caboolture you're not waiting for anyone, there's no approach there. If there's an IFR doing some sort of let down procedure to LSALT and you had to 'wait' then I'd suggest there's a bigger problem, like, maybe your eyes are painted on? It won't be Class E that forces you to 'wait'

How many days a year at these places are you weathered in, forcing you to wait on the ground until an approach becomes visual? Yet again, it shouldn't be Class E that delays your departure. It will be Class E that stops you welding your aircraft to another.

Why would you cancel IFR? Operating visually clear of terrain and traffic is a perfectly acceptable IFR procedure. Hell, you can even request a VFR climb through class E if you have VMC. No need to throw away your surveillance and SARwatch services.

The important thing that’s relevant to this accident and class E is that the Seminole would not have been given a clearance on the ground to depart if there was overlying class E. In class G they should’ve been given traffic but they weren’t.

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 04:03

Why would you cancel IFR? Operating visually clear of terrain and traffic is a perfectly acceptable IFR procedure. Hell, you can even request a VFR climb through class E if you have VMC. No need to throw away your surveillance and SARwatch services.

Don't cancel it, no problem. You can still operate in the way I laid out.

The important thing that’s relevant to this accident and class E is that the Seminole would not have been given a clearance on the ground to depart if there was overlying class E. In class G they should’ve been given traffic but they weren’t.

'would not' not necessarily. Depends if a procedural clearance could have been issued.

'but they weren't' oh yes they were given traffic. It's the timing of the traffic delivery and the airspace limitations that will be subject to a fair amount of scrutiny in the investigation. You'll just have to wait until 2023-ish to find out.

Nomde plume

2nd Jun 2020, 04:38

You can’t depart IFR unless you are cleared to LSALT as a minimum. And you won’t get a clearance if that level is occupied.

Same thing in class G except that they didn’t get the traffic on the ground, they got it on departure. At which point the option to stay on the ground was gone.

you can’t depart in to IMC and then decide to level off below LSALT or MSA because of traffic. Do you see what I’m saying?

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 06:32

You can’t depart IFR unless you are cleared to LSALT as a minimum. And you won’t get a clearance if that level is occupied.

You CAN depart if it's a procedural clearance which includes climb above LSALT.

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 06:37

Same thing in class G except that they didn’t get the traffic on the ground, they got it on departure. At which point the option to stay on the ground was gone.

So now you're saying they did get traffic? Changing your story? Or just refraining from manipulating the facts of what actually happened to suit your agenda?

you can’t depart in to IMC and then decide to level off below LSALT or MSA because of traffic. Do you see what I’m saying?

Yes, as an IFR rated pilot I'm aware of that. Beside the fact none of what I've posted suggests that you do that.

Dick Smith

2nd Jun 2020, 06:48

Bodie. That is outrageous if the final report takes until 2003 to come out.

There could be further deaths in that time.

The ATSB would have enough information now to issue an emergency advice.

sunnySA

2nd Jun 2020, 06:52

'but they weren't' oh yes they were given traffic. It's the timing of the traffic delivery and the airspace limitations that will be subject to a fair amount of scrutiny in the investigation. You'll just have to wait until 2023-ish to find out.
ATSB report will take a considerable time to prepare and release. What about the ASA report, has that been released?

sunnySA

2nd Jun 2020, 06:53

Bodie. That is outrageous if the final report takes until 2003 to come out.

There could be further deaths in that time.

The ATSB would have enough information now to issue an emergency advice.
Dick, what would this advice say?

Nomde plume

2nd Jun 2020, 07:11

Bodie, I said they didn’t get traffic on the ground. I was talking about how if there was CTA they would’ve been denied a clearance on the ground. Read it.

They got traffic on departure. 2 minutes before they collided. and they collided at what was essentially LSALT. So even if they got the traffic right after takeoff, they still had no opportunity to do anything. That’s the issue here. Nothing to do with playing VFR and visually separating as you seemed to think that everyone was missing.

My story is exactly that from the preliminary report, I suggest you read it so that you know what everyone else here is talking about.

My only agenda Is uncovering why so much known information was omitted from the preliminary report.

Dick Smith

2nd Jun 2020, 07:44

Sunny. A recommendation that AsA look at providing a class E service to low level at the airport because of the density of IFR traffic.

If they can do it for every IFR approach in the USA you would think we could do it at least at the busy airports.

This is a warning of what could happen at Ballina.

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 08:01

Nomde plume, no, you specifically said that traffic wasn't given. Not that traffic wasn't given on the ground. If that's what you meant how about you construct the sentence accordingly.

I'll say it again, they may NOT have been denied a clearance in Class E if a procedural clearance could have been issued.

I've read the preliminary report, it means 2 tenths of sweet **** all. It has NO information in it that you can construct a cause from. There's nothing to 'uncover' from a preliminary report. In fact I don't know why they're published, it serves no purpose.

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 08:02

Dick, the Renmark accident accident took 3 years, so has every other major accident report. This won't be any different.

Ballina is not a question of if, it's a question of when.

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 08:06

SunnySA, I don't know anything about ASA or their investigation process. Traffic was given.

Nomde plume

2nd Jun 2020, 08:21

Nomde plume, no, you specifically said that traffic wasn't given. Not that traffic wasn't given on the ground. If that's what you meant how about you construct the sentence accordingly.

The important thing that’s relevant to this accident and class E is that the Seminole would not have been given a clearance on the ground to depart if there was overlying class E. In class G they should’ve been given traffic but they werent.

Paragraphs: for when you have something to say that fits in two or more sentences. Not sure why you’re fighting that battle mate. No one is arguing they never got traffic. Look at my posts earlier in the thread, I said the exact same thing.

I'll say it again, they may NOT have been denied a clearance in Class E if a procedural clearance could have been issued.

So you’re suggesting SIDs and STARs for all of these airports? Great idea. Good luck with that.

I've read the preliminary report, it means 2 tenths of sweet **** all. It has NO information in it that you can construct a cause from. There's nothing to 'uncover' from a preliminary report. In fact I don't know why they're published, it serves no purpose.

You can construct that JQF was first given traffic info no more than 2 minutes before the two aircraft collided. It explicitly states that.

What I want to know is exactly what was said, and where were the two aircraft relative to each other when the calls were made. It would be very easy to construct by comparing the radar data vs ATC tapes.

Bodie1

2nd Jun 2020, 08:53

The important thing that’s relevant to this accident and class E is that the Seminole would not have been given a clearance on the ground to depart if there was overlying class E.

So you’re suggesting SIDs and STARs for all of these airports? Great idea. Good luck with that.

For about the eighth time. If a procedural clearance can be given to the aircraft on the ground they wouldn't have been delayed.

mate, if you are going to make definitive statements about clearances you need to know what you're talking about, it's clear you don't.

You DON'T need Stars and SIDS to procedurally separate.

In class G they should’ve been given traffic but they werent.

For about the tenth time, the aircraft WERE GIVEN TRAFFIC IN CLASS G AIRSPACE. No, it wasn't done in a timely manner, this is a function of the limitation of this class of airspace.

What I want to know is exactly what was said, and where were the two aircraft relative to each other when the calls were made. It would be very easy to construct by comparing the radar data vs ATC tapes.

You will get that information, all of it. It's not a conspiracy and won't be hidden or redacted. You will have to wait 3 years, that's the way it goes. By that time the lessons of this will be conveniently forgotten.

Lead Balloon

2nd Jun 2020, 09:25

... You will get that information, all of it. ...

No we won’t. We’ll get the ATSB’s interpretation of the information.

We went through this with the ‘investigation’ of the ditching of NGA. The supposed ‘transcripts’ of transmissions contained what were either patent errors in the transcription or patent errors in the transmitted information, neither of which - in any event - were investigated and explained.

One wonders why the raw material is not published. (Actually, one no longer wonders...)

Bodie1

3rd Jun 2020, 00:25

Lead, so the information came out eventually? My recall is not that good.

Lead Balloon

3rd Jun 2020, 00:29

Lead, so the information came out eventually? My recall is not that good.No it did not. At no point was any ‘raw’ recording ever published.

Old Akro

3rd Jun 2020, 02:53

Bodie, I said they didn’t get traffic on the ground.

They got traffic on departure. 2 minutes before they collided.

This is pretty misleading. The ATSB report only says " At 1119, the air traffic controller passed traffic information to AEM about JQF departing from Mangalore. At 1122, JQF made a departure call from Mangalore, advising ATC of a planned climb to 7,000 ft. "
JQF had clearly made a taxy call on the area frequency - how else would the controller have known about the JQF being traffic for AEM???. The taxy call was made a 1111 or 13 minutes before the collision. It is highly likely that there was some mention to JQF about AEM in response to the taxy call, even if it was just mentioning that there was traffic with details to follow.

Both aircraft had filed IFR plans. Both were flying in accordance with their plans and or instructions by ATC. The filed plan of JQF and its climb to 7,000ft clearly put it in conflict with AEM's cruising level of 4,000 ft. Both aircraft has ADS-B transponders. AsA had returns from both aircraft's ADS-B transponders. The system had all the information it needed at predict that there was a conflict 13 minutes before the accident. Once the aircraft were airborne the ADS-B returns proved it, but the ATSB report gives no intimation that the ADS-B returns triggered any warning to the pilots.

The class G self separation of IFR aircraft debate is frankly bureaucratic masturbation. The aircraft were in IMC. See and be seen doesn't work outside the confines of air conditioned meeting rooms.

The problem with the preliminary report is that it does not give any radio transcripts. The report has cherry picked the information that it wanted to present. We don't know what was in the preceding calls. But its clear that there were preceding calls.

The ATSB has 2 credibility problems. The first is (as has been noted by others) the ATSB has a history of changing radio transcripts and secondly that it has a history of passing draft reports to AsA & CASA for comment before publishing the report AND making amendments requested by AsA & CASA.

Those of us who fly IFR have paid to install the mandatory ADS-B equipment to "improve safety" and we pay air navigation charges on a user-pays basis to have a controller oversee the flight. We do this to avoid exactly the situation of this accident.

Dick Smith

3rd Jun 2020, 07:51

If the “self separation “ was safe you would find other countries would copy us and save the so called extra cost of class E.

They don’t because it is a fail dangerous system.

And consider the cost of ADSB that is not used by ATC to separate aircraft in most low level airspace. What a waste of money.

Dick Smith

3rd Jun 2020, 09:17

Is it a fact that there is no beep back unit at Mangalore?

If so I would be prepared to fund one of these basic safety necessities.

Mr Approach

3rd Jun 2020, 09:54

andrewr

3rd Jun 2020, 12:01

From another report, where there were at least 3, possibly 5 aircraft trying to coordinate and fly the same approach in IMC:

In Class G airspace, pilots are responsible for separation from other airspace users and from terrain.

IFR aircraft in Class G airspace are provided with a traffic information service by an Airservices Australia (Airservices) air traffic controller (controller) about conflicting IFR and observed visual flight rules aircraft. The traffic information is based on pilot reports and, where coverage exists, air traffic service (ATS) surveillance data. The obligation to provide the traffic information ceases when the pilot reports changing to the CTAF.
...
The controller would not have been aware that the pilot was in instrument meteorological conditions, nor would the controller be aware of any position reports the pilot was making on the CTAF.
...
The provision of traffic information and alerts by controllers, however, are supplemental to the pilot’s responsibility to ensure separation from other airspace uses and terrain in Class G airspace.

MarcK

3rd Jun 2020, 22:38

Those of us who fly IFR have paid to install the mandatory ADS-B equipment to "improve safety" and we pay air navigation charges on a user-pays basis to have a controller oversee the flight. We do this to avoid exactly the situation of this accident.
In the era of mandatory ADS-B, how many of you have installed ADS-B "IN" for traffic awareness?

Old Akro

4th Jun 2020, 02:24

Australia does not support "ADS-B - in"

Bodie1

4th Jun 2020, 02:53

The timeframe of the traffic being delivered to the appropriate aircraft is moot. What's to say anything different would have happened had the aircraft had the traffic 10 minutes earlier? It's basically up to the pilots to arrange separation in this scenario. Why? Why should they be doing this? Class E would have had those aircraft positively separated. No prang.

This accident was caused by inappropriate airspace classification for the density of traffic.

Dick, I'm told that ASA haven't got a problem with being told to implement Class E, everywhere. That it's CASA getting in the way of it all.

Vag277

4th Jun 2020, 03:06

Old Akro

No support is needed. You just need a receiver/display in the aircraft

Squawk7700

4th Jun 2020, 07:55

Australia does not support "ADS-B - in"

I've been doing this for the last 2+ years for $300.

andrewr

4th Jun 2020, 08:13

Easy to do on an iPad but not necessarily a good idea IFR.

Last week I was flying with my iPad and for a while it was showing my heading as 90 degrees different to what it actually was. I was VFR, so it was no problem, but I wonder whether it would cause situational awareness difficulties if it happened while IFR? Yes, pilots should be able to ignore the nice pictures and use the certified instruments, but it is very tempting to believe what the iPad is showing.

Vref+5

4th Jun 2020, 08:52

And if we all had ADS-B in, what is the IFR-IFR separation standard that pilots would apply In Class G ?

andrewr

4th Jun 2020, 08:58

And if we all had ADS-B in, what is the IFR-IFR separation standard that pilots would apply In Class G ?

If it looks too close, you just zoom in and make it bigger.

Lead Balloon

4th Jun 2020, 10:20

I can only, with exasperation, say again that it all boils down to what the Minister considers to be a safe air traffic control system.
If the system is to be run as a cost recovery exercise, then it will never be As Safe As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). It will only be as safe as what money can be recovered from the users to fill Government coffers.
A national disgrace, but what other conclusion can be reached?

Dicks later post about his letter to the Airservice Board and article in the Australian, prove me correct.
The Board of Airservices, the Board of CASA and their CEOs simply do not care! Why becuase their boss does not care.

We can argue all we like in the columns of PPrune, it will not make one jot of difference.
Frankly I do not know what it takes to get a Government to take notice, for goodness sake let's close this interminable trail of argumentative emails.
There is a common misconception that the Minister is the boss of the heads of independent statutory agencies like CASA and Airservices. One needs merely to read the legislation that establishes them to work out it’s not true.

The heads of these agencies are not supposed to care what the Minister thinks. That’s precisely the Parliament’s aim in setting up independent agencies. If the Minister has a strong opinion about some specific issue, the Minister can try to get the Parliament to change the legislation or get a binding general policy order made. There’s a bunch of flim flam about high-sounding plans and policies and other stuff, none of which overrides the specific regulatory powers and their exercise. (The airspace regulation legislation is a work of art that makes the Minister look important but, when you scratch the surface - by reading it - you realise it’s a facade.)

(In any event, successive Ministers ‘responsible’ for aviation regulation over the last couple of decades seem to me to have been little more than meat puppets. For a while there it looked like Barnaby Joyce had the temerity to think and decide stuff for himself, but the machine sorted him out. Senator Susan McDonald will be cured of her case of independent thought, too.)

The Parliament is the boss of the independent agencies. The Parliament makes and changes the laws that establish and fund the independent agencies and confer functions and powers on them.

The constituency of the Parliament is in my view the problem. The major party abdication of responsibility to the ‘professionals’ in the agencies is the problem. As I’ve said many times, while ever a majority of voters vote either for Labor or the Coalition, they both win. I’ll bet the majority of people who whinge about the state of aviation in Australia vote for either Labor or the Coalition. (As HL Mencken said: “Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.”)

The solution is not another inquiry or commission. (And I note the pathetically small number of submissions made to the Senate inquiry into GA. There are more submission to the Senate inquiry into “the opportunities for strengthening Australia’s relations with the Republic of France”, FFS. It’s as if almost everyone in GA has no time on their hands at the moment to express a view, even if it is to provide glowing support for the efforts of CASA, ATSB and Airservices. Must be all that increased aviation activity out there.)

A smoking hole that used to be an RPT jet full of fare paying passengers flying in stone age G airspace will merely result in MORE power and MORE funding for the cabal of bureaucrats that have been in a symbiosis with major party governments for decades. That cabal is now effectively a mutual protection racket.

The solution lies in ending the duopoly. And the chances of that are somewhere between Buckley’s and none while ever people dedicate their finite energy to trying to change a meat puppet’s mind.

Squawk7700

4th Jun 2020, 11:00

And if we all had ADS-B in, what is the IFR-IFR separation standard that pilots would apply In Class G ?

At least you know they are there versus being totally blind. If you get no calls back and you see someone on there, you’ve got a fighting chance. It’s not something you have to watch like a hawk.

It doesn’t have to be on an iPad, there are other adsb-in options depending on your avionics stack. Are you likely to see those in your basic flying school IFR trainer though? Probably not.

Sunfish

4th Jun 2020, 12:37

An acquaintance lost their partner in an air accident. Their experience of CASA and the ATSB afterwards was less than stellar. The agencies fastened on a politically advantageous (or least damaging) interpretation of events and fitted their analysis to the desired outcome. You cannot trust a word they say.

A bit of advice: do not carry your logbook while flying, or carry it and send images and take images of your maintenance release before every flight and send them somewhere. Same with fuel dockets. That prevents ATSB from speculating about your flying and the state of the aircraft.

Sunfish

4th Jun 2020, 12:40

Squawk, can you suggest easily available and cheap adsb-in solutions for skyview?

Squawk7700

4th Jun 2020, 13:54

Squawk, can you suggest easily available and cheap adsb-in solutions for skyview?

Dynon sell their own one. As to whether it’s cheap, will it depends what your life is worth to you.

My ADSB-In has saved my bacon on one occasion and I consider it to be priceless. It was a high speed twin passing across my front from right to left and in my blind-spot. I had zero idea it was there otherwise. I watched it coming from 10 miles out on the screen and we would have come within less than 100 metres without the forewarning.

I might make up a YouTube video to show how well it works. There’s plenty of units available that do the job. If someone knows a good way to way record from the iPad screen, please PM me.

Bodie1

4th Jun 2020, 21:39

Camtasia maybe?

(hurdy-hurdy-hurdy, filler)

Old Akro

7th Jun 2020, 02:12

MarcK

7th Jun 2020, 03:10

Someone will correct me if I'm wrong, but I understand that pretty much all the ADS-B in traffic solutions are UNCERTIFIED. That is, they are not legal for use in IFR - or situations such as this accident.

As i understand it, unlike the USA, Australia elected the ADS-B out only system. The proper certified ADS-B in and out system would require AsA to invest in a network of transmitters.

I'm not suggesting for a moment that the traffic display via the 4G network offered by AvPlan & Ozrunways is not a good thing. As is the Stratux reciever, the Stratus receiver, The Dual XGPS190, Sage clarity, Dynon DRX, etc. These systems work relatively well in VFR type situations at low level and in 4G areas, but at higher altitudes, remote areas, congested areas and outside 4G areas they cannot be relied upon at all.

But none of these systems are a) fully reliable or b) part of the Government designed airways system. In the wake of this accident we, as IFR pilots need to do 2 things:
1. Learn what we can from the accident and figure out how to stay safe in an imperfect airways system and an imperfect AsA system and
2. Keep the pressure on AsA to fix its problem areas.

I don't like the notion that if we all just connect a a Stratux receiver to our iPads or an uncertified Dynon display that the problem goes away. we deserve a more robust system that has AsA sanction.
I'll be happy to correct your misconceptions. ADS-B IN does not require any ground support. Certainly not 4G. What it does, is listen to the ADS-B broadcasts of aircraft it can see, sort of like TCAS, only this is receive only, no additional transmitters are required since all aircraft are transmitting their position/speed asynchrously, all the time. So what you need is a receiver that can hear the other aircraft and display their position and direction relative to your position and direction -- easily done since the GPS coordinates are part of the packet. There are no altitude constraints, or geography constraints. The only requirement is that you can hear the other's ADS-B transmission.

I don't know of any "IN" systems that are "certified". Certified for what? You aren't using the information for navigation, only for situational awareness. If you can't get your ATC to call out the conflicts, this seems to me to be a good backup plan. If your VFR potential conflicts don't have ADS-B, this won't help. But my understanding is that all of your IFR traffic has ADS-B. Of course, you are welcome to ignore the information.

MarcK

7th Jun 2020, 03:16

As i understand it, unlike the USA, Australia elected the ADS-B out only system. The proper certified ADS-B in and out system would require AsA to invest in a network of transmitters.
The USA system differs from the Australian system in that there are two different ADS-B frequencies, one for GA (below 18000 feet) and one for everyone else. The Transmitters in the US system rebroadcast between the two frequencies, so that everyone sees all the traffic. This is not necessary where everyone is on the same (1090) frequency. The US system also uses the GA frequency to broadcast weather, metars, and other information, but this facility is not part of the Australian ADS-B requirement. So, no ground transmitters required.

Lead Balloon

7th Jun 2020, 03:16

<snip> I don't know of any "IN" systems that are "certified". Certified for what? You aren't using the information for navigation, only for situational awareness. If you can't get your ATC to call out the conflicts, this seems to me to be a good backup plan.<snip>.Errrrm. Just errrmmm.

OZBUSDRIVER

7th Jun 2020, 03:36

Old Akro, do some research (https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/wp-content/uploads/FAQ_ADS-B_DEC16.pdf)* on 1090es and UAT so you can understand the difference. 1090es is a transponder, UAT is not! UAT requires ground transmitters, supplies radar returns as well as ground received 1090es as well as weather information. It operates on 978mhz and only works within range of a ground station. TCAS does not see UAT hence the need to also carry a transponder. A 1090es in or ADS-B Rx receives the extended squitter message regardless of ground station coverage..twice a second..(UAT data is twice a minute.)

* The AirServices article refers to TIS-B in the US 1090ES equipment actually receiving TIS-B (new one on me).

For my thoughts (https://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/381710-ads-b-stuff-i-have-found.html)? I still believe the issue lies in separate CTAF and mandated verbal diarrhea. Also,CTAF does not have a facility to record transmissions.

Dick Smith

7th Jun 2020, 04:26

If it is E airspace to 700 agl as per the FAA the pilot remains on the ATC frequency when in cloud.

A VFR aircraft wanting to enter the airspace if cloud was at the minima would have to get a special VFR clearance from ATC.

It’s a fail safe system that does not require a pilot to be on two frequencies at one time.

Works superbly in the USA.

mgahan

7th Jun 2020, 04:55

There is a description of the TIS/B and ADS/B IN systems in the Benefits of Surveillance paper prepared in response to the CASA RFQ 09/327.

MJG

AnotherFSO

23rd Jun 2022, 06:36

Posted yesterday on the ATSB site (sorry, I can't post links yet):Visibility study highlights how ADS-B IN can assist pilots to better identify potential traffic conflictsA cockpit display or electronic flight bag app showing traffic information from ADS-B IN data would have alerted the pilots of two training aircraft involved in a fatal mid-air collision near Mangalore, Victoria to the position of the other aircraft much earlier compared to visual acquisition, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau study concludes.

In March, the ATSB released its final report from its investigation into the accident which found that, following receipt of verbal traffic information provided to both aircraft by air traffic control, the pilots of both aircraft did not successfully manoeuvre or establish direct radio communications to maintain separation, probably due to not recognising the risk of collision.

The accident was the first mid-air collision between two civil registered aircraft operating under the instrument flight rules (IFR) in Australia. As the collision occurred outside of controlled airspace, air traffic control (ATC) was required to provide traffic information on other IFR aircraft, but was not responsible for ensuring separation. This meant that the pilots were self-separating using radio communications and, where possible, the ’see and avoid’ principle.

‘See and avoid’ has known limitations, and central to the investigation was determining the likelihood that the pilots of each aircraft could detect the other visually in sufficient time to take avoiding action.

“To support the investigation, the ATSB initiated an aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study to determine when each aircraft may have been visible to the pilots of the other aircraft,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell.

“In addition, the study was undertaken to determine what effect an ADS-B IN system would have had on the pilots’ ability to detect traffic as they converged.”

Aircraft fitted with ADS-B OUT transmit positional and speed information derived from GPS to receivers including those used for air traffic control. Aircraft fitted with ADS-B IN equipment can receive this information on nearby aircraft, aiding pilot situational awareness.

Mr Mitchell said the investigation found that the pilots had insufficient time to visually acquire the opposing aircraft as cloud likely obscured the aircraft up until the collision, and added the study found that even in clearer conditions the aircraft were unlikely to have had sufficient time to visually acquire one another in time to avoid a collision.

“Analysis indicated that even in clearer conditions than experienced on the day of the accident, closing speeds and shielding by the aircraft structures would have limited the pilots’ opportunities to acquire the other aircraft, with two of the four pilots involved likely having the opposing aircraft shielded from their view at key moments prior to the collision,” he said.

As part of the study the ATSB developed scale three-dimensional models of the internal and external structures of representative aircraft using laser scanning technology, and determined the pilots’ approximate eye position within each model.

Investigators then developed animations using ADS-B position and aircraft performance data showing the cockpit view for both pilots in each aircraft overlaid with simulated cockpit traffic displays and alerts. This was supplemented by recorded air traffic control data.

These animations help illustrate the limitations of visual acquisition. Moreover, they demonstrate the significant additional alerting time that would be provided by an ADS-B IN display with an aural alert.

“The study has clearly shown that had the aircraft been equipped with ADS-B IN, the pilots would have been assisted in locating the other aircraft and alerted to its position much earlier than by visual acquisition,” Mr Mitchell said.

“The ATSB continues to strongly encourage the fitment and use of ADS-B transmitting, receiving and display devices in all general and recreational aviation aircraft, as these devices can significantly assist pilots with the identification and avoidance of conflicting traffic, and are available at relatively low-cost.”

While both aircraft involved in the mid-air collision were equipped with ADS-B OUT, neither aircraft were equipped with ADS-B IN systems, and nor were they required to be.

“Both a cockpit display of traffic information with an ADS-B traffic alerting system or an electronic conspicuity device connected to an electronic flight bag application could have provided this advance warning of a potential collision to the pilots of both aircraft,” Mr Mitchell said.

“While effective radio communication remains the primary means of self-separation in non-controlled airspace, the targeted and accurate information provided by ADS-B IN can provide pilots with significant assistance.”

Read the aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study: AS-2022-001 – Aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study supporting investigation into mid air collision of VH-AEM and VH-JQF near Mangalore Airport Vic. on 19 February 2020

Read the final report: AO-2020-012 – Mid-air collision involving Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, VH-JQF, and Beech D95A Travel Air, VH-AEM, 8 km south of Mangalore Airport, Victoria, on 19 February 2020

More information about ADS-B and the benefits of using the technology: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast - Airservices

tossbag

23rd Jun 2022, 09:48

A cockpit display or electronic flight bag app showing traffic information from ADS-B IN data would have alerted the pilots of two training aircraft involved in a fatal mid-air collision near Mangalore, Victoria to the position of the other aircraft much earlier compared to visual acquisition, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau study concludes.

Yeah, I'm not so sure about that. We all see those 'paints' on our EFB's and it's not often I see the aircraft in the position the EFB says it's in. The aircraft had traffic on each other, they knew about each other yet still hit. It doesn't appear that any effort was made by either aircraft to arrange their own separation. You know what would have prevented this accident? Controlled airspace.

Squawk7700

23rd Jun 2022, 12:31

Yeah, I'm not so sure about that. We all see those 'paints' on our EFB's and it's not often I see the aircraft in the position the EFB says it's in. The aircraft had traffic on each other, they knew about each other yet still hit. It doesn't appear that any effort was made by either aircraft to arrange their own separation. You know what would have prevented this accident? Controlled airspace.

I’m not sure which EFB you use, however mine has always been spot on. I do find it difficult to physically see an aircraft that appears on my EFB.

tossbag

23rd Jun 2022, 22:21

I'm on avplan. Don't get me wrong, brilliant tools, but the traffic............maybe I'm a blind ****.

djpil

24th Jun 2022, 02:43

I'm on avplan. ....Me too. I flew over Mangalore last week with my SkyEcho fitted. One or two others around, one overhead Mangalore at about the same altitude who knew that I was there (on his EFB too I guess and also from my earlier radio call) and called me requesting my intentions and he advised his clearly (good because IFR buzzwords are meaningless to me). AvPlan soon showed us going in different directions although I never saw him at all.

Along the lane NE of Melbourne I only saw some traffic because I looked where AvPlan indicated. Centre advised of one that I was already aware of from AvPlan. Passenger in the back saw them before I did - as I was more interested in looking for others who may be around but not showing on AvPlan.

Squawk7700

24th Jun 2022, 03:05

Sunfish

24th Jun 2022, 21:53

The Dynon ADSB IN solution works pretty well as far as I can tell.

I say “as far as I can tell” because the unit (which is made for Dynon by Uavionics) has a filtering algorithm built in to its software that normally doesn’t paint aircraft unless they are a potential threat. While this might be useful for display clarity in a congested traffic situation, it deprives you of the ability to manually confirm all other aircraft are painted. This is disconcerting sometimes.

There is a work - around for this with the current software that gives you all targets but it’s provided by accident not design.

Furthermore, I wonder if there should be a compulsory standard radio call for announcing that you have acquired an aircraft on ADSB? This is the equivalent of “traffic sighted”. When arranging or confirming separation, I call ‘Got you on ADSB’ and have had ‘got you on TCAS” or ADSB back. IMHO you need to do this especially with RPT as part of confirming that both of you agree on how you are going to separate.

AnotherFSO

13th Dec 2022, 23:01

From the CASA website, December 7:Mangalore aeronautical study: final report publishedhttps://www.casa.gov.au/mangalore-aeronautical-study-final-report-published

43Inches

14th Dec 2022, 01:30

I do find it somewhat amusing that ADSB was to be the be-all-end-all solution. There was a mad rush to implement it and mandate it and the push for manufacturers to hit the market with low cost ADSB-out devices, with everyone thinking that ATC would magically guide us all to a safe flight.

Now after the first mid-air tragedy, all of a sudden everyone realises that OUT is useless without IN and that ADSB-in devices are next big thing.

The issue is the lack of devices available to fit into the fleet. It’s great to have one of the two EFB’s, however you still need an ADSB-in device and that’s not simple. So we go and fit a $10,000 certified out solution and have to buy a $900 Skyecho and IPad to receive traffic to save our own butt as ATC can’t do it for us.

There are some units that will hook into the EFB’s without having to buy more kit, but they aren’t cheap. Dynon have a good ASDB-in solution, however that requires a lot of costly components and isn’t going to work for your average flying school.

While I do agree mostly, ADSB out was really just a cheaper way to get far more effective RADAR coverage, it only has the same effect as primary RADAR with transponders. What is being proven more and more is the problems with our current philosophy behind air traffic management. No point having all this coverage if one guy is monitoring 100 aircraft at once, and when he tries to highlight conflicts is in with a mash of 20 others making various calls because sectors are too large. No one is willing to look at that elephant as they have spent so much cash trying to downsize and save cash and now wont admit it's below safe levels.

The key to remember is that even with all the bells and whistles the other aircraft may not be fitted with or have a defect preventing its use or the system just switched off. That then makes them invisible to all other units. So even the best ACAS now still has large holes that really mean its a fallback system after your eyes and ears have done their job out the windscreen and on the radio. A recent midair in the US between seaplanes highlighted this when one aircraft had its ACAS switched off and they collided.

A good ACAS will tell you when something is too close highlighting the conflict. So it's not just about visual clutter, however the visuals do give you a heads up as to whats around before you get there.

There are so many other things that highlight how archaic our air traffic systems are, and how overwhelmed they have become. Simple weather or single runway usage sends RPT traffic into meltdown with hours of delays, the system can only cope with one emergency at once, there's normal ops, and then there is chaos it seems. One aircraft blocks 20 miles around it, and I can't sight report clear traffic in VMC above 10,000, even when its clearly passed by and heading away. Not allowed to track direct because an aircraft is holding about 30 miles from the new track, which is only 5 miles from the old track, and so on. And don't even get started with noise abatement etc people complaining when they live in a city anyway and probably next to a highway or trainline.

Squawk7700

14th Dec 2022, 03:28

The key part of the lengthy report.

1.2 Recommendations
The following recommendations, observations, or opportunities to enhance services are made because of CASA’s analysis of the airspace within the aeronautical study:
Recommendation 1
CASA Aviation Safety Advisors should conduct a safety seminar at Mangalore and surrounding aerodromes with an agenda that focusses on awareness and safety for operations within the vicinity of a non-controlled aerodrome and the importance of precise and concise radio calls.
Recommendation 2
Enroute Supplement Australia entries at Mangalore, Ballarat, Latrobe Valley and Busselton be amended to remove or clarify the requirements for the addition of 1,000 FT to prescribed altitudes during practice instrument approach procedures.
Observations/Opportunity to enhance regional services.
(1) Local operators should consider the need for additional visual flight rules (VFR) approach points and/or VFR routes to enhance situational awareness using the Melbourne Visual Navigation Chart (VNC). The OAR, where appropriate, should assist operators in preparing an airspace change proposal (ACP).
(2) The Mangalore Aerodrome operator should amend the En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) entry for Mangalore to include the flying training area used by local operators. The area should be designed to avoid the circuit area at Mangalore.
(3) The OAR should identify and arrange for the addition of gliding symbols on the Melbourne VNC (and other appropriate aeronautical information publications).
(4) The OAR will update the contact information for Danger Area D333.

43Inches

14th Dec 2022, 04:01

So in short nothing that actually addresses the causes of the Midair, just a bunch of map marks on visual charts and so on.

PiperCameron

14th Dec 2022, 04:42

So in short nothing that actually addresses the causes of the Midair, just a bunch of map marks on visual charts and so on.

Yep. I also note that CASA are essentially working on Recommendation 1 already. Can you guess what the topic of the AvSafety Seminar at Lilydale last Wednesday was?!? "Non-controlled Aerodromes: Manage Your Risks" ..with a particular focus on the importance of precise and concise radio calls!

How convenient.

sunnySA

4th Aug 2023, 11:30

MANGALORE (YMNG)
C26/23 REVIEW C11/23
CTAF 121.1 MAY BE MONITORED
WHEN WARRANTED, MELBOURNE CENTRE WILL PROVIDE SAFETY ALERTS PER AIP
GEN 3.3 SECTION 3.5.
SAFETY ALERTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BETWEEN AIRCRAFT CONDUCTING
CIRCUTS.
CONTINUE TO MAKE ALL STANDARDS REPORTS TO ATS, PER AIP ENR 1.1
SECTION 6, ON THE AREA FREQUENCY 122.4
FROM 06 290209 TO 09 040800 EST
DAILY 2200/0800
"When warranted", interesting wording. What changed on 29/6 and happens after 4/9?

missy

28th Nov 2023, 10:44

I was reviewing the ATSB report AO-2020-012 Mid-air Collision involving Piper PA-44 180 Seminole, VH-JQF, and Beech D95A Travel Air, VH-AEM, 6 km south of Mangalore Airport, Victoria, on 19 February 2020
Final Report (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2020/aair/ao-2020-012)

The Safety Issue identified [AO-2020-012-SR-06]
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority addresses the ambiguity in the En Route Supplement Australia requirement relating to practice instrument approach altitudes at Mangalore Airport to reduce the variation in application and risk of traffic conflicts.
I checked AIP ERSA to confirm the change however there are a number of other ERSA entries that are most likely applicable at other airports. Why is Mangalore special?
Mangalore ERSA (https://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/pending/ersa/FAC_YMNG_30NOV2023.pdf)
FLIGHT PROCEDURES
3. Training flights conducting practice instrument approaches should add 1,000FT to all the ALT prescribed in the approach to reduce noise nuisance and interference with circuit
traffic. Such flights should BCST their intentions, including ALT limits of OPS when turning inbound. IMC flights should remain as high as practical when encountering VMC and join
the circuit in the standard manner.
4. It is recommended that all ACFT shall illuminate LDG and taxi lights WI a 10NM radius of the airport and when established in the circuit.
6. The MNM radio broadcasts are taxiing, entering, departing: Inbound, Joining, Base and Final with position, altitude and intentions.
Note: Pilots must respond to radio requests from other TFC for intentions, position or altitude
7. Base/Final broadcast is to include a nominated ACFT landing sequence number, determined by your position behind preceding airborne ACFT (e.g. Warrior ABC final 23 touch and go number 2).
If these procedures are valid then shouldn't they be applied nationally? National promulgation rather than special procedures at a specific location.

I acknowledge that this post is slightly off-topic but any occurrence should lead to a review of existing procedures, is there a better way?

Mr Mossberg

28th Nov 2023, 11:01

My major concern is this report only took 3 years. How on earth has there been time to collect all the evidence. This is a joke, Shirley.

43Inches

28th Nov 2023, 23:03

7. Base/Final broadcast is to include a nominated ACFT landing sequence number, determined by your position behind preceding airborne ACFT (e.g. Warrior ABC final 23 touch and go number 2).

Absolute waste of time, getting pilots to quasi ATC. Making a Turning Base call, fine, calling out your sequence number when it's constantly changing in a busy environment, creates additional radio traffic and confusion in the circuit if one gets it wrong, leading to more radio traffic. I watched this go to ****e several times at Moorabbin when a large flying school implemented it. Sequencing is for ATC to decide, if you are flying a circuit follow the aircraft in front of you, if you stray outside a normal circuit make sure you add 'wide' to your position. I watched a Cessna cut off a turboprop after calling number two to it, because there was two turboprops on final.... "I'll follow the turboprop on final no 2" sighted the first, then cut in front of the second, the second TP thought the first TP had landed so didn't think it was a conflict. Ended up in a very close call and planes going all over the sky. If the Cessna had just said turning base, the 2nd TP would have informed them they were still on final, and possibly avoided the situation. PS adding 1000ft to approaches also just puts you in the way of Turbo-prop/jet traffic joining the circuit. Better to just coordinate your procedures to stay out of each others way.

OZBUSDRIVER

29th Nov 2023, 10:03

Band-aid outcome. CTAF has a huge hole in the cheese when the wx is 100% IMC. Nobody has the balls to call it as it is. If everyone was on area four people would still be alive today.

missy

14th Mar 2024, 06:41

My major concern is this report only took 3 years. How on earth has there been time to collect all the evidence. This is a joke, Shirley.
Apparently the inquest will be Q1 2024.

Advance

15th Mar 2024, 04:50

Missy is correct - as always.
RE: COR 2020 000976 - Peter Phillips (lead case)
This grouped investigation is listed for Inquest which is to be held from 25-28 March 2024.
Inquests are held at the Coroner’s Court of Victoria, 65 Kavanagh Street, Southbank VIC 3006 .

ER_BN

15th Mar 2024, 22:36

Advance,

Thank you! If you posted a link (underlined), I could not access it. May be my ongoing and increasing dementia. :)

However the coroner’s office has been very helpful and I believe there is a weblink available for people not able to attend in person. One can watch it just like Senate Estimates, not that I’ll be using it and it does raise some issues…

I’ve been assured the inquest is open to the general public, not that I have a “seat” at the table, it will be a case of quiet observation whilst there and reflection after each day.

Just like Global Warming, I am not optimistic about this inquest but I still have hope, if only for the relatives of the four pilots and also for the air traffic controller. My analysis would indicate those desires are not mutually exclusive…

I expect that hope to be extinguished after the inquest. I expect it to be another VH-TNP / Benalla.

The ATSB report in my opinion is full of omissions and misinformation. I am not suggesting a conspiracy, merely (like a lot of things in Australia) severely flawed by a combination of seeming incompetence, mediocrity and self interest. I cannot see any other reason for the strange content and simplistic conclusions.

The only good news is that the inquest has been given the varsity i.e. Justice John Cain, the Chief Coroner of Victoria.

However, if the right witnesses aren’t called and the right questions aren’t asked coupled with accurate physical evidence; it doesn’t matter how good the intentions are “…the road to hell is paved….” etc.

As far as I’m concerned were FS still in place the accident would not have happened. That in itself is a sad indictment of the “advancement” of policy in regard to aviation safety specifically to airspace in Australia below 10,000 ft since the early 1990s. Technology and surveillance are not always “an advancement” especially in the transition from humans to automation.

I am not sure having a front row seat was a good idea and was in fact really just a “poisoned” chalice.

Sigh!

43Inches

15th Mar 2024, 22:56

Saying that 'X' control or other traffic monitoring would have prevented this accident is a big call. A good deal of collisions happen in controlled airspace in or near the circuit of towered airports. Having control or directed traffic advice in no way prevents collisions 100%, it just helps in certain scenarios. After all a JAL A350 landed on top of a Dash 8 recently at a world class controlled airport, and that was a simple runway incursion with lights, markings and everything else to prevent it happening as well as ATC.

Squawk7700

16th Mar 2024, 04:52

As I discovered today, you can’t crash into another aircraft in CTA if they won’t let you in there in the first place!

Seems it was impossible to transit north to south within 40 miles either side of Melbourne today. Instead I had to fly down low amongst the rotors and 32 degrees of turbulence due to 2 airliners in the entire airline basin at the time.

Advance

16th Mar 2024, 08:04

ER_BN, No, I did not paste a link, it was formatted that way as emailed to me by the Court.

As for the reports etc - well can you imagine the Minister for Everything allowing ATSB to say, CASA has no power to force AsA to provide a best in class ATC system because we allow AsA to decide what services they will or won't provide?
And we do that in the knowledge that AsA do not have the technical skills to decide what is needed.
It's like the bus driver deciding the road rules, in fact it is more like allowing the bus passengers to decide the road rules; a nonsense and all under one Minister - talk of conflict of interest!@!!!!!~!

Advance

21st Mar 2024, 23:59

The inquest is next week in MEL.

My views are mainly in posts 571 and 615.

A prominent member of this forum once challenged me to "Put my money where my mouth is." after I sounded off about my dissatisfaction with something.

Well, I have again done so. I have made a submission to the Coroner.

OVER...............................

Ex FSO GRIFFO

22nd Mar 2024, 06:42

Hey Mr 'A',

Would 'Duty Of Care' have got a mention in your submission?

PLENTY of 'that' debate going around in 'FS Circles' in the many changes of 12/12/'91 and again in 11/11/'93......

n'est-ce-pas..??

And, to you Mr ER BN, I Thank you for your comment.

However, I feel that certain 'statisticians' amongst us might claim that in the 30 years or so, to have had 'only 'one' 'major incident' - where lived were lost re traffic info - then we 'have saved xx Trillion Dollars' / yy aircraft movements......so, THE SYSTEM WORKS....but at what cost REALLY??
Then the 'usual comments' re Road Trauma victims etc etc would follow,
no doubt...........ad infinitum................................................... ............................................................ ............................................................ ..............

43Inches

22nd Mar 2024, 10:16

Talking on the radio does not prevent all collisions, it's well proven. Paying somebody to monitor and provide traffic in every CTAF would be more expensive then mandating ACAS/TCAS be fitted to all IFR aircraft, which would actually be more effective. Going back to the Warrior vs ATR at Albury, which likely would have been a collision and the worst accident in Australian aviation history had the ATR not had TCAS. That was at a controlled airport, with a tower, both in radio contact and both aircraft in close visual range.

If you want a smart answer, and not something regressive and proven to be more expensive and less effective, then push for technology actually proven useful in preventing collisions.

missy

22nd Mar 2024, 13:12

as received.

Dear Parties,

Judge John Cain, State Coroner has invited you to attend the Inquest into the Mangalore Aircraft Accident which commences on Monday 25 March 2024 at 10:00am.

If you wish to observe the hearing please use the below link: inquest (https://csvic.webex.com/csvic/j.php?MTID=md15c7337da9f7e357729a3e3cb37eedc)

You can forward this link to any party that wishes to view the hearing.

The link will be accessible 30 minutes before the start of the hearing. This allows you to test video and audio settings on your device and address any technical issues.

Information regarding online hearings, including video tutorial on how to connect to Webex, can be found on the Court’s website here: on-line hearings (https://www.coronerscourt.vic.gov.au/online-hearings.)

Please do not hesitate to contact the Court if you have any queries at all.

Many thanks,
Registry Team
E: [email protected]

Advance

22nd Mar 2024, 21:59

Yeah Griffo, I reckon you've got the idea there.
But we're old fashioned folk - wonder what the woke world will think?

Duty of care? What's that?
Shut up and take my money.

Geoff Fairless

23rd Mar 2024, 12:53

It is regrettable that the same old arguments about FS versus ATC seem to be still with us.

We replaced procedural FS with an ATC based FS nearly 30 years ago, because it made industrial sense, PREI v Civil Air, it gave the provider of FS access to radar based information, and it theoretically provided more efficient processing of both IFR and VFR aircraft.

It was supposed to be the precursor to a US based airspace classification system where IFR aircraft would always be in controlled airspace and VFR aircraft were free to fly anywhere accept tightly defined Class D, C, B and A airspace. (In order of restrictedness) By tightly defined I mean Class D being an aerodrome control service, Class C requiring radar approach control; services, Class B services being confined to airports where all aircraft, VFR or IFR, need to be vectored to final approach, and of course Class A above FL (to be defined)

This never happened due to fightback from those who had never seen a "different" airspace model and were terrified of self-imposed duty of care threats in Class E, and at a higher level the costs associated with Class E IFR-IFR separation requirements.

So we have the mess we have now. Airservices requires (CASA to require) all VFR aircraft in Class E to have transponders, Class E not to extend below a level where Airservices can make a dollar (see Airservices Act Para 13g). Extensive Class C areas, where CASA is now changing regulations (CASR Part 172) to allow helicopters to operate using Class D provisions, but without changing the airspace classification. IFR aircraft unable to depart VFR because their FPL stated IFR, (the old IFR category with VFR procedures flight plan.) No Class B areas because Class C is so widespread.

It is a mess, and places like Mangalore suffer because of the mess. CASA OAR is a top-down regulator. It looks down on airspace, looks at statistics and because, in safety-terms, these are lagging indicators, it has to wait for things to go bad before it acts.

A better model would be to allow airports with ambitions to excel, and attract business, to provide their own air traffic services, and not have to wait for good old grandfather CASA to amass enough information to make a decision and the try to convince it's government partner Air Services, to do something about it.

Recently I reviewed a draft OAR report on the Pilbara area. This area provides 94% of WA's income and 46% of Australia's income. There are 11 certified aerodromes and 19 ALAs within 100 NM, with six new aerodromes planned by mining companies. Airservices, according to the report, is unable to provide services at lower levels, resulting in very high frequency congestion, cannot provide surveillance even at FL125, and leaves IFR aircraft to self-separate in an area with over-lapping instrument approaches and even reciprocal runway operations! Air Services provides the same service in the Pilbara as everywhere else in the country, two VHF outlets, two ADS-B receivers and HF as a back-up!

My view is that Air Services is not providing the services it is required to provide by CASR Part 172, and the Minister, her Department, the Air Services Board and every aircraft operator in Australia knows it.

43Inches

23rd Mar 2024, 20:53

Airservices has no chance at providing reliable ATC services outside of the main cities. Just like the rest of aviation in Australia they are clinging to a cost model that is unsustainable, that is pay and conditions that will never match the attrition rate. There is a pathological obsession in the Australian aviation sector to never pay staff more than CPI, less if they can, and lifestyle conditions and pension/health clauses are non existent. Combine this with an age where the romanticism of aviation jobs has faded away, no more lines of ex airforce pilots, short lines of dreaming youngsters. It's now seen for what it is, long, stressful hours away from family and friends, having to commute to airports and rebase to where work is, everything dependent on a medical and checks which could make you jobless in an instance of bad luck.

They have pushed the cost factor so low that even those that make the planes have all gone bust, and we're left with 1960s designs strapped with a few efficiency gains and modern avionics. Funny that trains have become faster while jets have slowed since the 70s in an effort to cost less. Airspace could easily be safer by the introduction of more technology, mandated ACAS/TCAS, ADSB with PFD cockpit displays of all traffic and it's GPS route path if interrogated/selected, with predictive analysis of conflict for a whole route, not just the immediate future. The technology has existed for years, yet we rely on airspace models and control flows from the 1940s. And more importantly a radio separation system where only one aircraft can transmit at once, so one conversation at a time, one separation situation resolved at a time.

Pay more, move forward, stay the same, stagnate and fail.

Just remember that the governments here are willing to blow billions of dollars on sporting events, but can't be bothered to spend a measly 1 billion on a critical runway upgrade at say Melbourne airport. So it's not a lack of cash or an affordability issue, it's a mindset.

Advance

23rd Mar 2024, 23:06

Geoff Fairless has given us a good history lesson but I must take issue with one point.

The workload to provide traffic information is GREATER than that to separate aircraft. Accordingly it can cost more. THAT is why we no longer have FS.

Airservices, in the process of designing new workstations for the then proposed two major centres, tried to design a COW - a Common Operator Workstation,
That came about because a study of the information requirements for both FS and ATC showed an identical need for certain types of information presented in a manner for best assimilation and at the most useful time.
So same problem, same solution for both disciplines.
A workload study was abundantly clear in showing the workload for FS was greater for FS than for ATC.
An ATC discovers a separation problem coming up, decides how to resolve it, issues instructions as required, obtains readbacks and the job is done for now.
BUT the FSO tells each pilot "traffic is" , which may provoke a multi way discussion as to various ways to resolve the situation, so perhaps one pilot says he will change level - the FSO considers the new intentions in comparison to all his/her other traffic and may find further confliction in what is proposed, more traffic information and perpahs there is a resolution and perhaps there is not.
Keep in mind that an aircraft on an instrument approach or on an instrument departure below sector LSALT has liittle choice about what is or is not possible; the lateral confines of the manoeuver are mandatory for obstacle clearance reasons.
But the point remains valid, the FSO has the greater workload in attempting to resolve a conflict.

This came to "light" in an ATS Facilities investigation of how to do things better in the future but it caused Airservices Management to realise that maybe they would have to pay all the FSO's more money.
Yes, there was also a separate argument along the lines of one Union not wanting members of the other to have access to radar information, but as always the money argument was top dog.

A decision was made to abolish Flight Service and use ATC to provide traffic information........... not you will notice to realise the safer and more workload efficient answer was to utilise more Class E airspace to the USA model.

The thread is about the MNG mid air.
Airservices is legally obliged to provide ATS and is, by legislation, given authority to decide the extent to which it provides those services. Arguably CASA can (and has) set standards etc but by law, Airservices decides the extent to which it does or not provide services.
CASA therefore can not achieve its legislated requirement to provide effective compliance with its standards.
Leaving Airservices wholly and solely responsible for what happened an Mangalore.

It could have, it should have and it did not.

No criticism of the workface controller, only of the management decisions as to what service was not to be provided.