Boeing to Recommend Sim Training for MAX Pilots

[Zeffy]

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/business/boeing-737-max-simulator-training.html




Boeing Will Recommend 737 Max Flight Simulator Training for Pilots
The company had long maintained that the training wasn’t needed to fly the plane, which has been grounded following two deadly crashes.

By Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles
Jan. 7, 2020
Updated 1:28 p.m. ET


Boeing will recommend that pilots train in flight simulators before flying its 737 Max and plans to inform airlines of its decision soon, according to two people familiar with the matter, a move it had previously resisted.

The Max has been grounded since March following two crashes that killed 346 people, and Boeing has been working for months on changes to the software that contributed to both accidents. The training requirement further complicates the company’s efforts to return the plan to service.

Boeing recently informed the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Stephen Dickson, of its recommendation. The final decision to require the simulator training would be made by the F.A.A., which is likely to follow the company’s advice. The regulator still has to complete testing of the plane.

The Max was designed, in part, to avoid having pilots train in simulators. The plane is the latest update to the 737, which has been flying since the 1960s. By making the plane similar to the 737 NG, the previous version of the plane, Boeing was able to persuade regulators that pilots did not need to train on simulators.

But Boeing did make fundamental changes to the plane, including the addition of software known as MCAS, which played a role in both crashes. Initially, pilots were not made aware that the software existed and were not trained on how to react if it was erroneously activated.

Avoiding simulator training was beneficial for Boeing. In negotiations with Southwest Airlines while the plane was being developed, Boeing agreed that if the Max required simulator training, it would give Southwest a discount of $1 million per plane. Southwest has ordered 280 Max jets.

The decision to recommend simulator testing comes as Boeing is facing continued delays in its effort to return the Max to the air. The company said it would temporarily shut down the Max factory this month, and new problems with the plane unrelated to the software that contributed to both crashes have recently been identified, raising the prospect of further delays. In December, it fired its chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg.

The F.A.A. said that it would consider Boeing’s recommendation, adding in a statement that it was, “following a thorough process, not a set timeline, to ensure that any design modifications to the 737 Max are integrated with appropriate training and procedures.”

Boeing’s decision stems from its analysis of flight simulator tests of the Max it conducted with airline pilots from United, Aeromexico, American Airlines and Southwest last month, according to a person familiar with the matter.

In the tests, which were part of the work involved in evaluating the software update, many of the pilots did not use the correct procedures to handle emergencies, instead relying on their flying skills. Those results raised questions about whether simply informing pilots of which procedures to use would be sufficient to prepare them to fly the plane.

There are currently 34 certified Max flight simulators worldwide, according to a person familiar with the matter. Getting pilots trained in the machines, which are designed to replicate emergency scenarios, will add another hurdle for airlines, who have struggled with mounting losses throughout the Max crisis.

Airlines may also be able to use the more than 200 737 NG simulators to conduct the training, though it isn’t clear yet whether that is possible.

This is a developing story. Check back for updates.

[AviatorDave]

I‘m curious about Southwest‘s response to this.

[jdawg]

I'm curious if they will recommend NG or mandate MAX sims.

[jdawg]

I‘m curious about Southwest‘s response to this.
That should put about 300 MM in SW coffers

[ams6110]

That might be looking like a cheap way out right about now.

[AviatorDave]

That should put about 300 MM in SW coffers

Yeah, short term. Wondering about their relationship in the future.

[Spooky 2]

Originally Boeing and SWA had a contract that called for 1 million $ penalty per aircraft if in fact sim training was required. Probably looks cheap right now. As far as using an NG sim? That makes no sense at all. Someone has not been paying attention to this discussion???

[AviatorDave]

Maybe they‘ll offer an MCAS plugin module to enable training on the NG sims ... errr ... I‘ll show myself out ...

[Zeffy]

Above linked NYT article updated:
There are currently 34 certified Max flight simulators worldwide, according to a person familiar with the matter. Getting pilots trained in the machines, which are designed to replicate emergency scenarios, will add another hurdle for airlines, who have struggled with mounting losses throughout the Max crisis.

Airlines may also be able to use the more than 200 737 NG simulators to conduct the training, though it isn’t clear yet whether that is possible.

[OldnGrounded]

Yeah, short term. Wondering about [the Boeing-SWA] relationship in the future.

Compared to the cost of the grounding and delivery delays to both parties, $300 million just doesn't seem like a lot of money. And both parties are heavily committed to each other.

For perspective: SWA has something like $20 billion in annual revenue and Boeing comes in at something like $100 billion.

[old,not bold]

Observing from a respectful distance, it seems to this old cynic that if you have some software/hardware that has twice demonstrated a capability to force a dive into the ground, the solution to the problem lies in removing/changing/improving the software/hardware, not in retraining pilots to deal with its behaviour in a simulator which may well not fully replicate the aberrant behaviour pilots may experience in practice.

Of course, if the need for the software is a design error which causes a pitch up which has to be corrected, the best solution is a redesign. But it would be a pity to scrap all those lovely new airliners, even though that would teach a lesson to manufacturers that speed into the marketplace does not trump getting the design right.

I can think of many situations in global airline operations where a response learned and practiced in a simulator may not solve the problem when it actually strikes. So for my money the industry, ICAO, Boeing, FAA et al, should focus on getting the software/hardware right, regardless of cost, not on training people to deal with it when it goes wrong, as a cheaper option.

And now I'll retreat back to the respectful distance.

[OldnGrounded]

So for my money the industry, ICAO, Boeing, FAA et al, should focus on getting the software/hardware right, regardless of cost, not on training people to deal with it when it goes wrong, as a cheaper option.

We're way past the point where it's an either/or selection. The MAX is not going to fly again until a long list of people agree that MCAS has been fixed (hardware, software, whatever) and pilots have received training as agreed appropriate by the various stakeholders.

[Spooky 2]

Maybe they‘ll offer an MCAS plugin module to enable training on the NG sims ... errr ... I‘ll show myself out ...

Dave, no insults intended but you obviously do not understand how sims are built or certified. Don't let the door hit you on the way out. ...Just kidding:)

[Winemaker]

Dave, no insults intended but you obviously do not understand how sims are built or certified. Don't let the door hit you on the way out. ...Just kidding:)
I'm SLF, but I thought the whole drive behind the 737NG/737MAX thing was that pilots could transfer to the MAX without sim training as the aircraft cockpits and flight characteristics (theoretically) were the same. Wouldn't the sims be very similar except for programming and some switches/hardware? Why couldn't the 737NG simulators be modified? Please don't jump on me.....

[safetypee]

Winemaker, the objective was for the Max with MCAS to be sufficiently similar to the NG that differences training did not require the use of a simulator.

An issue with the modified Max is that MCAS.2 should shut down with malfunction, leaving the pilots with an aircraft which is different from the NG. Also, the Max may require specific procedures for recognising MCAS shut down, multiple systems alerts for an AoA failure, and revised instrument displays.

In addition it is possible that training for a trim system runaway, not associated with MCAS, will be required if the Max aerodynamics result in higher manual trim forces than the NG, or require quicker pilot recognition and action.

The NG simulator is not the same as the Max without MCAS, plus new alerting or switching logic. There would be significant changes and approvals required for an NG sim to be dual use.

[tdracer]

The flight deck differences between the NG and the MAX are minor enough that a new s/w load should be adequate to allow an NG simulator to be used as a MAX simulator.
Such multiple use simulators are already common - they simply select whatever aircraft version is wanted when booting up the simulator.

[xyzzy]

I'm just an interested passenger who flies quite a lot (including some rather pleasant flights on Turkish's 737 MAXen, as it happens).

There's thousands of pilots in 737 fleets whose employers would like them to also fly the MAX, and only 34 simulators.

If those 34 simulators were deemed suitable to the task, then you probably need more of them. Cloning physical simulators not simple, but it's "just" a matter of throwing a lot of money at a production line, and Boeing will be very happy to help throw that money.

And after you've got the simulator hardware you'll need certified instructors and certified simulator maintenance people, but I suspect that's also not beyond the reach of "spend a lot of money".

But isn't the fidelity of the simulators already the topic of some debate? Isn't there, for example, concern that the simulator does not replicate the forces required to operate the trim controls? Which might have been glossed over in the past, but is now rather more serious. That's not a software fix, I would guess, but requires motors and actuators and stuff, modelling the forces of an aircraft that has yet to be flown in its final configuration.

And isn't that fidelity the crux of the emails from the Boeing technical pilot that have exercised Congress and regulators?

If that's the case the problem isn't that there are only 34 simulators. The problem is that there are zero simulators, and getting the first one certified by all the relevant parties is not going to be a trivial task. Who wants to be the regulator that signs off a simulator and a simulator programme of instruction as being "good enough"? Will European regulators accept simulators that the FAA accept, on the FAA's say so? Aren't regulators going to want sight of a lot of test flights of the definitive version of MCAS/etc in the MAX in order to calibrate and verify the simulator? What are the forces required to trim the aircraft in the scenarios we're interested in? How long to agree it all?

(Could someone clarify whether "we recommend you have a 737 MAX simulator session before flying the 737 MAX in revenue service" is equivalent to "the 737 MAX is a distinct type-rating"? I suspect the answer is "no", but how much additional training does there need to be, and how compulsory does it need to be, before it constitutes a separate type-rating?)

[Australopithecus]

Surely for current NG crews the mandated training will be a single session? Even two sessions would allow the 35 Max simulators to do 2900 pilots per week, which would see all Max’s crewed within six weeks exclusive of initial type rating training. How many airlines are using the Max as their first 737 apart from Air Canada?

[Intruder]

Maybe they‘ll offer an MCAS plugin module to enable training on the NG sims...
May not even be needed. It is entirely possible they will "simply" change the procedures for runaway trim to accommodate the possible failure modes of MCAS. Examples would be extending the flaps and/or immediately hitting the stab trim disconnect switches...

[jdawg]

Originally Boeing and SWA had a contract that called for 1 million $ penalty per aircraft if in fact sim training was required. Probably looks cheap right now. As far as using an NG sim? That makes no sense at all. Someone has not been paying attention to this discussion???
You're giving a huge vote of confidence to the FAA and Boeing if suggesting they won't try the NG sim route. They will try to pass this off as a "procedural" or "muscle memory" box to check in a sim. The NG sim can accomplish that.
As for me? I have no faith in the FAA or Boeing right now so I'm going to I assume they recommend the NG sim. Obviously I've been paying closer attention to this subject matter than you.
For the record, MCAS needs to be removed from the MAX and crews segregated for training and operational purposes.

[jdawg]

I'm just an interested passenger who flies quite a lot (including some rather pleasant flights on Turkish's 737 MAXen, as it happens).

There's thousands of pilots in 737 fleets whose employers would like them to also fly the MAX, and only 34 simulators.

If those 34 simulators were deemed suitable to the task, then you probably need more of them. Cloning physical simulators not simple, but it's "just" a matter of throwing a lot of money at a production line, and Boeing will be very happy to help throw that money.

And after you've got the simulator hardware you'll need certified instructors and certified simulator maintenance people, but I suspect that's also not beyond the reach of "spend a lot of money".

But isn't the fidelity of the simulators already the topic of some debate? Isn't there, for example, concern that the simulator does not replicate the forces required to operate the trim controls? Which might have been glossed over in the past, but is now rather more serious. That's not a software fix, I would guess, but requires motors and actuators and stuff, modelling the forces of an aircraft that has yet to be flown in its final configuration.

And isn't that fidelity the crux of the emails from the Boeing technical pilot that have exercised Congress and regulators?

If that's the case the problem isn't that there are only 34 simulators. The problem is that there are zero simulators, and getting the first one certified by all the relevant parties is not going to be a trivial task. Who wants to be the regulator that signs off a simulator and a simulator programme of instruction as being "good enough"? Will European regulators accept simulators that the FAA accept, on the FAA's say so? Aren't regulators going to want sight of a lot of test flights of the definitive version of MCAS/etc in the MAX in order to calibrate and verify the simulator? What are the forces required to trim the aircraft in the scenarios we're interested in? How long to agree it all?

(Could someone clarify whether "we recommend you have a 737 MAX simulator session before flying the 737 MAX in revenue service" is equivalent to "the 737 MAX is a distinct type-rating"? I suspect the answer is "no", but how much additional training does there need to be, and how compulsory does it need to be, before it constitutes a separate type-rating?)
You are correct in assuming the answer is no. The single sim session constitutes "Differences" training on a same type certificate. What is needed for the return of the Max to be done the safest possible way is for the authorities to mandate segregated crews and the removal of MCAS. It adds a layer of complexity for the sake of saving money. Bad move.

[Grebe]

The flight deck differences between the NG and the MAX are minor enough that a new s/w load should be adequate to allow an NG simulator to be used as a MAX simulator.
Such multiple use simulators are already common - they simply select whatever aircraft version is wanted when booting up the simulator.


And properly modify the trim wheel per aero forces as a function of AOA, stab deflection, altitude, and speed- which then brings up the game played with NG simulators . . .

[krismiler]

No manufacture is going to produce large numbers of the simulators required without certainty that the MAX will fly again or a guarantee of payment if it doesn't. Given the lead time required to make the sim, deliver, install and certify it along with training the instructors needed, work needs to start immediately.

A greater number of simulators will be required to avoid a bottle neck if the MAX flies again than will be required if operations return to normal. Even if the simulators are running 24/7 they will only be able to support a phased return to flying, but that shouldn't be a problem as long as they can match the pace of aircraft deliveries and engineering work.

The logistics involved in returning the MAX to service, if it ever happens would require someone with the level of skill required to plan the invasion of a foreign country.

[old,not bold]

We're way past the point where it's an either/or selection. The MAX is not going to fly again until a long list of people agree that MCAS has been fixed (hardware, software, whatever) and pilots have received training as agreed appropriate by the various stakeholders.
My point is that if the software/hardware has been properly fixed, repeat properly, there would be no need for special training on how to manage it if and when it goes wrong. The special training should not need to be part of the solution. If there is no longer a problem, what is it for?

If special training is really needed, there is still a problem which needs fixing. Why do commercial pilots not receive special training on what to do when an aileron falls off? Because everyone has total confidence that it won't happen, that's why. Now apply that thought to the MCAS system.

Here's Boeing;

Boeing has developed an MCAS software update to provide additional layers of protection if the AOA sensors provide erroneous data. The software was put through hundreds of hours of analysis, laboratory testing, verification in a simulator and two test flights, including an in-flight certification test with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives on board as observers.

The additional layers of protection include:

Flight control system will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors. If the sensors disagree by 5.5 degrees or more with the flaps retracted, MCAS will not activate. An indicator on the flight deck display will alert the pilots.
If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only provide one input for each elevated AOA event. There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs.
MCAS can never command more stabilizer input than can be counteracted by the flight crew pulling back on the column. The pilots will continue to always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane.

These updates reduce the crew’s workload in non-normal flight situations and prevent erroneous data from causing MCAS activation.

''There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs''. I refer you to Donald Rumsfeld;

But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know.

Here's a random question. If there is a sensor disagreement =>5.5 degrees MCAS will not operate. OK, but if the crew can, without MCAS, manage safely the pitch-up condition in which MCAS would operate if the AOA sensors agree, what exactly is MCAS there for?

[jdawg]

My point is that if the software/hardware has been properly fixed, repeat properly, there would be no need for special training on how to manage it if and when it goes wrong. The special training should not need to be part of the solution. If there is no longer a problem, what is it for?

If special training is really needed, there is still a problem which needs fixing. Why do commercial pilots not receive special training on what to do when an aileron falls off? Because everyone has total confidence that it won't happen, that's why. Now apply that thought to the MCAS system.
Training addresses human factors too. Muscle memory, memory items etc. The added complexity of MCAS needs additional training whether it's the best version of MCAS possibly designed or not.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Seems to me the lack of MAX Simulators is not a problem that is going to go away soon so airlines will now have to have a segregated pool of 737MAX pilots. Those pilots will get the extra training and only fly the MAX with maybe a bit of fill in 737NG work while most of the current NG pilots at the big airlines won't see the MAX for a long time if ever. The airline bean counters are not going to happy about that

On another note I was in YVR the other day and a WestJet 737Max was parked on the South ramp. I noticed that the tail logo was 737-8, seems to me it used to say 737 Max.....

[OldnGrounded]

My point is that if the software/hardware has been properly fixed, repeat properly, there would be no need for special training on how to manage it if and when it goes wrong. The special training should not need to be part of the solution. If there is no longer a problem, what is it for?

I guess the most meaningful answer is that it just doesn't matter how necessary the training might be, if the question were being considered under other circumstances. In the context of the events since October, 2018, no one is going to take the risk of letting the MAX return to service without an approved fix and training. You might think of it as a belt-and-suspenders (braces) approach or you might think of it as a gigantic, multi-entity CYA operation -- but it ain't gonna happen any other way.

Here's a random question. If there is a sensor disagreement =>5.5 degrees MCAS will not operate. OK, but if the crew can, without MCAS, manage safely the pitch-up condition in which MCAS would operate if the AOA sensors agree, what exactly is MCAS there for?

The official answer, I'm sure, is the same as before: MCAS is just there to make the stick force gradient compliant with the regs. Lots of folks would like to see the results of bare airframe testing to help them decide whether they believe that.

[krismiler]

You might think of it as a belt-and-suspenders (braces) approach or you might think of it as a gigantic, multi-entity CYA operation -- but it ain't gonna happen any other way.

Exactly, any solution will be way in excess of what should have been done in the first place and far in excess of what actually needs to be done. Think cast iron, fireproof, waterproof, bullet proof and most importantly LAWYER proof. Nothing will be signed off until all the experts give it the okay and they will make sure they have covered themselves.

[Fogliner]

If simulator training is required to deal with MCAS potential failures and Mcas was put in place to deal with potential pitch ups re:engine placement, why not remove Mcas now and just train for the potential pitch up possibilities?

fog

[jdawg]

I guess the most meaningful answer is that it just doesn't matter how necessary the training might be, if the question were being considered under other circumstances. In the context of the events since October, 2018, no one is going to take the risk of letting the MAX return to service without an approved fix and training. You might think of it as a belt-and-suspenders (braces) approach or you might think of it as a gigantic, multi-entity CYA operation -- but it ain't gonna happen any other way.



The official answer, I'm sure, is the same as before: MCAS is just there to make the stick force gradient compliant with the regs. Lots of folks would like to see the results of bare airframe testing to help them decide whether they believe that.
In the low speed environment MCAS exists solely for training avoidance. As in costs to airlines.

[OldnGrounded]

If simulator training is required to deal with MCAS potential failures and Mcas was put in place to deal with potential pitch ups re:engine placement, why not remove Mcas now and just train for the potential pitch up possibilities?

fog

FAR §25.173

[OldnGrounded]

In the low speed environment MCAS exists solely for training avoidance. As in costs to airlines.

In case you're serious . . . no.

FAR §25.173

[jdawg]

In case you're serious . . . no.

FAR §25.173
Lol. Ok.
So they jet can't fly without it but it was originally designed to? You can't be serious. This is all about same type approval. You don't migrate into hybrid FBW for any other reason.
The jet does not need MCAS except in the high kinetic realm.
if you are correct the MAX is done. And I'll celebrate with you.

[Water pilot]

That is just words on paper, which can be changed. Only very slight weasel wording required, perhaps "unless the aircraft is equipped with <something that can be easily added to the MAX>". Electrical codes are full of this sort of exception, in my opinion. I can tell you for sure that NIST standards are. ;)

What is ironic about this whole debacle is that the rule that MCAS was designed for is intended to prevent stalls which are commonly trained for, and the implementation introduced the possibility of a runaway trim sort of behavior which seems to be an esoteric sort of failure that is so rare that it wasn't deemed worth doing much training on. It seems like sim training on how to avoid the part of the envelope where the force gradient gets wonky, followed by how to recover from the stall if the worst case happens. The second part should be a cakewalk to a professional jet pilot, right? You don't even get an interview if you can't do that, I assume.

[OldnGrounded]

Lol. Ok.
So they jet can't fly without it but it was originally designed to? You can't be serious. This is all about same type approval. You don't migrate into hybrid FBW for any other reason.
The jet does not need MCAS except in the high kinetic realm.
if you are correct the MAX is done. And I'll celebrate with you.

I'm totally serious. The official reason for the existence of MCAS is to keep the the stick force gradient linear (and remaining positive) in the corners of the envelope where the increased lift of the LEAP engine nacelles may cause . . . uh . . . problematic pitch-up tendencies. That's what they keep telling us.

Now, there are some who wonder whether MCAS is really an anti-stall system . . .

[OldnGrounded]

That is just words on paper, which can be changed. Only very slight weasel wording required, perhaps "unless the aircraft is equipped with <something that can be easily added to the MAX>". Electrical codes are full of this sort of exception, in my opinion. I can tell you for sure that NIST standards are. ;)

What is ironic about this whole debacle is that the rule that MCAS was designed for is intended to prevent stalls which are commonly trained for, and the implementation introduced the possibility of a runaway trim sort of behavior which seems to be an esoteric sort of failure that is so rare that it wasn't deemed worth doing much training on. It seems like sim training on how to avoid the part of the envelope where the force gradient gets wonky, followed by how to recover from the stall if the worst case happens. The second part should be a cakewalk to a professional jet pilot, right? You don't even get an interview if you can't do that, I assume.

I think you're pretty close to the big question: Is it really only about stick force? If that were the case, why wouldn't it have been easier to massage some weasel words in the regs?

[tdracer]

I think you're pretty close to the big question: Is it really only about stick force? If that were the case, why wouldn't it have been easier to massage some weasel words in the regs?

It doesn't work that way. Even if it did, it takes many years to change a regulation (it took the FAA over 20 years to finalize rules that covered HIRF for flight critical FBW and FADEC - before that everything was done via Special Condition). Furthermore, that's a harmonized regulation between the FAA and EASA (FAR/CS). So add a decade to get the FAA and EASA to agree on new wording (and that's assuming of course that EASA would go along with the change).
At best, it would have required an exemption to the regulation, which is all but unheard of for flight controls regulation.

[ZFT]

Dave, no insults intended but you obviously do not understand how sims are built or certified. Don't let the door hit you on the way out. ...Just kidding:)

Spooky 2 Maybe you don't understand either as sims are not certified. They are uniquely qualified as an individual device. (Don't let the door hit you on the way out either ...Also just kidding:))

[Water pilot]

If it was part of the right solution, it would not take 20 years to come up with a regulatory fix. It is in nobody's interest (except perhaps China's) to have this fleet remain grounded for a long time, assuming that it is basically a safe aircraft. It would help if the political situation were more normal, but aside from that everybody knows what is going on and what doc fixes are required for this "one time situation". That is much easier to process than regulations/specifications that are supposed to guide several decades of future development.

[fdr]

At least there is acknowledgement of a need for training. that has only taken a little while to permeate through granite like opposition.

An A330 sim changes to an A340, the differences between the NG and MAX for a sim are less, but the displays would be a pain. Making a combi might make sense over time, but in the short term, it is a complication on making Max sims for the masses. QTG data would be interesting to look at, as it would need to show on/off for MCAS presumably. That would answer a lot of interesting questions.

[Spooky 2]

The flight deck differences between the NG and the MAX are minor enough that a new s/w load should be adequate to allow an NG simulator to be used as a MAX simulator.
Such multiple use simulators are already common - they simply select whatever aircraft version is wanted when booting up the simulator.

Do you know that for a fact regarding the MAX vs..NG? If that were the case one has to wonder why Boeing had a stand alone MAX sim built by TRU for their MIA training center? Ditto for ET and SWA. I agree that multi use sims do exist, and again in the case of Boeing, there is a 747-8 and 747-400 sim in MIA, but it take a significant amount of time to convert. Not simply a matter of throwing a switch. More like a day or more as I recall.

[Spooky 2]

You're giving a huge vote of confidence to the FAA and Boeing if suggesting they won't try the NG sim route. They will try to pass this off as a "procedural" or "muscle memory" box to check in a sim. The NG sim can accomplish that.
As for me? I have no faith in the FAA or Boeing right now so I'm going to I assume they recommend the NG sim. Obviously I've been paying closer attention to this subject matter than you.
For the record, MCAS needs to be removed from the MAX and crews segregated for training and operational purposes.

I believe I read awhile back that SWA 1st MAX sim was to ne delivered last summer and be ready for training by November. Of course this was before all the MCAS issues started to be defined. I believe SWA is using a CAE device, and if anyone can bring this to closure, CAE would be my first choice.

[Spooky 2]

Spooky 2 Maybe you don't understand either as sims are not certified. They are uniquely qualified as an individual device. (Don't let the door hit you on the way out either ...Also just kidding:))


Got you ZFT. I understand perfectly well that the airplane has to be certified before the sim in this case. FWIW though there are cases where the sim is certified for training prior to the airplane having even flown. The 787 is but one example. Maybe you are not thinking along the lines of the FAA, but perhaps some other regulatory body? Or, mybe we just use different words to describe the same regulatory process?

[tdracer]

If it was part of the right solution, it would not take 20 years to come up with a regulatory fix. It is in nobody's interest (except perhaps China's) to have this fleet remain grounded for a long time, assuming that it is basically a safe aircraft. It would help if the political situation were more normal, but aside from that everybody knows what is going on and what doc fixes are required for this "one time situation". That is much easier to process than regulations/specifications that are supposed to guide several decades of future development.
Water - what you're suggesting would be the exemption route (or possibly an Equivalent Level of Safety - ELOS) for the stick force gradient. The catch is that pretty much all the regulators (not just the FAA and EASA) need to agree that an exemption is the right thing to do. I was involved in a few partial exemptions, and they were such that everyone agreed it was probably the right thing to do (sometimes stick compliance with a regulation can actually make things worse). Although SOP is to initially certify with the FAA and EASA, countries not represented by those two still do their own assessment before approving it, and one of the things that pay special attention to are any Exemptions or ELOS in the cert basis - it's generally not a rubber stamp.
In the case of the MAX, there has been one lonely Canadian regulator who's suggested an exemption might be a better path than MCAS. I've yet to hear of any other regulators (even in Canada) agreeing with his assessment.

[Fly Aiprt]

I believe I read awhile back that SWA 1st MAX sim was to ne delivered last summer and be ready for training by November. Of course this was before all the MCAS issues started to be defined. I believe SWA is using a CAE device, and if anyone can bring this to closure, CAE would be my first choice.

Just a question.
Since nobody knows what the final accepted version of MCAS will be, nor whether some hardware mods will be mandated or not, how could a MAX simulator be designed and programmed at the moment ?

[Spooky 2]

Just a question.
Since nobody knows what the final accepted version of MCAS will be, nor whether some hardware mods will be mandated or not, how could a MAX simulator be designed and programmed at the moment ?


I think the answer to that is that when the MAX sims were ordered, the MCAS was not an issue and was not even addressed. Since then as we know, it has become a point of concern and will have be included in the final version of the sim loads. Harware is not likely in the emulation as software can be used to effectively create the simulation which is the way many sims are built to begin with. Smoke and mirrors make everything seem real1 Your assuming that the sim manufactures and FAA/Boeing and other regulatory authorities don't have a good idea what's required at this hour, but in all likelyhood they are probably pretty close to the final fix.

[ZFT]

Got you ZFT. I understand perfectly well that the airplane has to be certified before the sim in this case. FWIW though there are cases where the sim is certified for training prior to the airplane having even flown. The 787 is but one example. Maybe you are not thinking along the lines of the FAA, but perhaps some other regulatory body? Or, mybe we just use different words to describe the same regulatory process?

Actually I meant that product ranges i.e aircraft are certified. FSTDs (simulators) are individually tested (by FAA, EASA etc) and are qualified and issued their own unique qualification certificate.

[Toruk Macto]

Set the pilots up for the blame !

When next one spears in at 500 knots because of its poor design . Boeing been run for the shareholders only not operators or traveling public , all fingers can safely be pointed at the pilot because “ he had the legal training “ .

just fix the bloody thing !!!!

[Spooky 2]

Actually I meant that product ranges i.e aircraft are certified. FSTDs (simulators) are individually tested (by FAA, EASA etc) and are qualified and issued their own unique qualification certificate.


Okay I see wha you are saying. Thanks!

[Fly Aiprt]

Your assuming that the sim manufactures and FAA/Boeing and other regulatory authorities don't have a good idea what's required at this hour, but in all likelyhood they are probably pretty close to the final fix.

Understand.
On the other hand, maybe the "bare aircraft" test flight has not yet be performed to EASA's satisfaction, and one might not be sure that the Boeing/FAA fix will suffice ?

[turbidus]

Would this be simply a type rating update and utilize an FTD, not an FS? After all, the first round was an iPad.

On using the NG FS, it was shown it could not replicate the MAX issues...simple programming, but didnt they try that already?

[Spooky 2]

Would this be simply a type rating update and utilize an FTD, not an FS? After all, the first round was an iPad.

On using the NG FS, it was shown it could not replicate the MAX issues...simple programming, but didnt they try that already?

Don't know the answer to that. Boeing did the initial cadre of sim instructors by only using a fairly advanced FTD. The instructors we all previously 777 qualified.
This was done as a proof of concept for minimal 777 to 787 conversion training. I don't think and airlines are actually using that footprint for there flight crews.

[Twitter]

CNN now reporting “new and worrying“ documents released by Boeing relating to Max sim development two years back. A covering note contains an apology to FAA and the public.

[dontgive2FACs]

Some very good points in here. Good food for thought.

Despite the aeroplanes sitting idle and orders, it’s going to be interesting to see what success this aeroplane has after its shaky start.

If the max indeed gets back in the air (and is accepted by airlines and the public), surely it will be known perpetually for this sad start.

[retired guy]

Some very good points in here. Good food for thought.

Despite the aeroplanes sitting idle and orders, it’s going to be interesting to see what success this aeroplane has after its shaky start.

If the max indeed gets back in the air (and is accepted by airlines and the public), surely it will be known perpetually for this sad start.
Hi there
The public have incredibly short memories about such things and are easily misled by renaming for example.
DC10 +MD!!
Spantax + Spanair
Swissair = Swiss
German wirings becomes Euro Wings
Then there is just the fact that they have short memories. None of my friends have any idea what plane they flew on this year on holidays and care less. OK, there will be an initial "Is this a MAX" reaction for a few months but then it will disappear..
The damage to Boeing is still massive but the 737 may yet become the first plane to reach 100 years in service mostly in its origin guise as a 707 from 1958! Same fuselage and main design features including STAB trim system. Can still be flown "by wire" meaning 10mm stainless steel cables connected from controls to the surfaces that control the plane.
Manual Reversion.
Happy new year to all
R.Guy

[retired guy]

SIMULATORS
Having worked with sims for years and seen how quickly the engineers can change the characteristics I see no problem using a NG sim to replicate near enough the issues arising from the MAX MCAS debacle. Which were mainly total lack of knowledge of basic flying skills.
Lots of sims can be programmed. on the fly to replicate variants of the same plane even down to the flight deck displays and handling.
The main thing it to teach the current and future generation of pilots how to fly in basic modes - stick and rudder skills and basic airmanship such as LOSS OF ALL AIRSPEED = simple reversion to pitch and power = something like 4 deg pitch and 70% N1 after takeoff. This did not happen in Lionair or ET.
My worry is that this new debate about 'training" is a band aid to paper over the lack of basic skills and will only focus on the issues directly related to the LN and ET crashes so that the next major multiple failure will see the pilots equally unable to cope. And it is getting worse.
The voice recording of Lionair is remarkable in that at no stage did the Captain or First Officer really address the issue that would kill them - the gradual and insidious ND movement of the STAB. No drills were carried out for LOSS of AIRSPEED (memory followed by QRH) and the STAB issue never got a look in other than the fact that the plane was becoming harder and harder to hold level. The reference on the CVR to "noises of pages being turned" in a manual is the final thing for me. Looking in a book for solutions to a basic flying skill just after takeoff
Safe flying folks
R.Guy

[retired guy]

Seems to me the lack of MAX Simulators is not a problem that is going to go away soon so airlines will now have to have a segregated pool of 737MAX pilots. Those pilots will get the extra training and only fly the MAX with maybe a bit of fill in 737NG work while most of the current NG pilots at the big airlines won't see the MAX for a long time if ever. The airline bean counters are not going to happy about that

On another note I was in YVR the other day and a WestJet 737Max was parked on the South ramp. I noticed that the tail logo was 737-8, seems to me it used to say 737 Max.....
Hi Pistons
In the 90 s we flew 757/767 concurrently on short haul and extended ETOPS long haul flights, often on the same day. Two more different planes is hard to imagine. One nearly twice the size of the other and quite different handling and even control panels. Landing totally different with a flare height 20 foot apart.
Didn't seem to be a problem then. So to fly an NG and a MAX would seem simple enough by comparison.
Cheers
R Guy

[HarryMann]

Water - what you're suggesting would be the exemption route (or possibly an Equivalent Level of Safety - ELOS) for the stick force gradient. The catch is that pretty much all the regulators (not just the FAA and EASA) need to agree that an exemption is the right thing to do. I was involved in a few partial exemptions, and they were such that everyone agreed it was probably the right thing to do (sometimes stick compliance with a regulation can actually make things worse). Although SOP is to initially certify with the FAA and EASA, countries not represented by those two still do their own assessment before approving it, and one of the things that pay special attention to are any Exemptions or ELOS in the cert basis - it's generally not a rubber stamp.
In the case of the MAX, there has been one lonely Canadian regulator who's suggested an exemption might be a better path than MCAS. I've yet to hear of any other regulators (even in Canada) agreeing with his assessment.

That approach has seemed at least an option since I first discovered the MCAS and its nefarious raison d'etre and histoire.
Surely it should be seriously examined ?

[WHBM]

I'm sure I remember this coming up in the early days of the grounding, and it being described there were nothing like 34 Max simulators - which went along with it being portrayed as the same as an NG, plus a Powerpoint presentation. Air Canada had one, as the 737 was new to them, and Ethiopian had one as well, but there weren't many others.

I also recall the established 737 crew who had done the Powerpoint and were suddenly presented in a rearrangement with their first Max flight, and said afterwards it was notably different to what they had been given to believe.

I presume the sims will need new software to replicate accurately whatever MCAS or its replacement does, this being a key part of the training. As we know it hasn't even been certified yet what those changes are, once agreed the sim manufacturers are going to have to then develop, test and deploy the new sim software, and train instructors, before training can even start.

[Longtimer]

I'm sure I remember this coming up in the early days of the grounding, and it being described there were nothing like 34 Max simulators - which went along with it being portrayed as the same as an NG, plus a Powerpoint presentation. Air Canada had one, as the 737 was new to them, and Ethiopian had one as well, but there weren't many others.

I also recall the established 737 crew who had done the Powerpoint and were suddenly presented in a rearrangement with their first Max flight, and said afterwards it was notably different to what they had been given to believe.

I presume the sims will need new software to replicate accurately whatever MCAS or its replacement does, this being a key part of the training. As we know it hasn't even been certified yet what those changes are, once agreed the sim manufacturers are going to have to then develop, test and deploy the new sim software, and train instructors, before training can even start.
Evidently AC has 2, CAE has also said they can speed up production of more if there is a demand. I wonder how many of the carriers have .Only 34 certified Max flight simulators currently exist globally, the New York Times and the Seattle Times reported Tuesday.CAE builds extra Boeing 737 Max simulators, expecting pent ... (https://business.financialpost.com/transportation/cae-builds-extra-boeing-737-max-simulators-expecting-pent-up-demand)
https://business.financialpost.com › transportation › cae-builds-extra-boeing-... (https://business.financialpost.com/transportation/cae-builds-extra-boeing-737-max-simulators-expecting-pent-up-demand)
Nov 13, 2019 - CAE Inc. has built extra simulators for the Boeing 737 Max series as it anticipates high demand for training products once the grounded aircraft ...
https://montrealgazette.com/business/local-business/aerospace/cae-open-to-building-737-max-simulators-faster-to-help-airlines

[Longtimer]

Boeing Fought Lion Air On Proposed MAX Simulator Training RequirementSean Broderick (https://aviationweek.com/author/sean-broderick) January 10, 2020

https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/boeing-fought-lion-air-proposed-max-simulator-training-requirement