The "Startle" Effect during type rating training.

[sheppey]

Google “Surprise Factor in aviation” and there is no shortage of replies. They include recommendations that a surprise or startle factor should be introduced into routine simulator training. While this sounds like yet another buzzword like CRM and TEM, the concept has its limitations.

For example:
During an instructor mutual practice session in a 737 Classic simulator, my colleague quietly arranged to block the captain’s static port before takeoff. I was unaware of this.

During the takeoff roll there are no untoward indications. After lift-off the PM in the copilot’s seat called “Positive Rate of Climb” from the indication of his barometric altimeter. This would normally trigger a call from the captain of “Gear Up” providing his instruments confirmed the aircraft was clear of the ground.

In this case due to the captain’s blocked static port, my altimeter and the IVSI remained inoperative although the attitude, and thrust setting indicated the aircraft should have been climbing away. A few seconds later I was startled when the windshear aural warning sounded and I noticed the airspeed reducing steadily. I pushed the thrust levers against the stops and increased pitch attitude a few degrees.

Soon after with the ASI needle dropping quite rapidly as we gained height in initial climb, the stick shaker actuated. Initial reaction was to lower the nose but with no airspeed, altimeter and IVSI on the captain’s side and with takeoff thrust and normal initial climb attitude on the ADI it was clear we had an erroneous airspeed and altimeter situation.

My colleague “froze” the simulator, grinned and asked what I thought was causing all these spurious readings? I had never seen this combination events before.Naturally there was a startle or surprise factor when it all happened seconds after VR but in those days the expressions “Startle or Surprise factor” had yet to enter aviation lexicon. We took this sort of thing in our stride as part and parcel of flying aeroplanes. Big deal, as they say.

Of course I was embarrassed at being caught hesitating for a few seconds as I pondered what on earth was happening. I decided to pull this trick on my own 737 type rating students and we all had sheepish laughs at the various reactions.

I mentioned this to two long retired friends from our days in military aviation. I was taken aback when both said it was a rotten trick to play on unsuspecting students and that it would have been better instructional technique to first brief them of the intention to block the captain’s static vent, and then demonstrate to them by flying the aircraft and ‘pattering.”
After all, watching a pattered demonstration as part of the training sequence during a type rating allows students to absorb what they see rather than being caught totally unawares and embarrassing themselves like I did when my colleague pulled the stunt on me.

It seems to me that the new fad for deliberately setting up a startle or surprise event is counter- productive and contrary to good instructional technique. Call it practicing bleeding if you like. What is the point of practicing being frightened or startled? It already happens numerous times in everyday life including flying.

A well flown demonstration of the effect of a blocked static vent takes only a few minutes and everyone goes away having learned a lesson without embarrassing themselves in front of the instructor or other crew members. It is rare to see a simulator instructor take the time to first demonstrate a sequence whether engine failure on the runway followed by a rejected take off or a continued take off.

Saying that there is no requirement for demonstrations during type rating training in the simulator misses the whole point. A picture is worth a thousand words. Of course the instructor needs to be a competent practitioner. Which may explain why few instructors dare risk their reputation?

[sonicbum]

It all depends on the tone and environment You set for the session. If You clarify beforehand that the whole session is training and confidence building then startle scenarios are fine, as long as everyone gets out of the box with a smile and learning points.
Modern training is deviating from events training and moving towards competencies training. Any scenario you run can fit this purpose and it’s just a means to an end, ie. develop resilience. As pilots we need to be able to handle the unexpected rather than a set of well defined scenarios.

[turbidus]

Well, one has to wonder if one wasnt aware of MCAS issues, and it was sprung on them in the sim, what would happen.

[KayPam]

About your story, it seems obvious that you can't learn by surprise.
So if you never saw before a static port blocking, then you face both startle effect and lack of knowledge.
If you tell them just before takeoff "your static port is blocked, but you don't know that so now takeoff anyway", the startle effect may decrease but if they never practised or learned it there will still be lack of practise/knowledge.

Startle effect training, in my opinion, would be very effective to forget you're in the sim.
The main drawback of sim training, in my opinion, is that it feels very artifical due to the fact that there is a scenario.
If there is a known scenario, in which I know I will have to divert because it is written in the lesson plan that today is about diversions, my thought process as a student will be different than reality.
Because in reality there is no scenario at all, just reality.

One time I had a check ride with no known scenario. It felt much more real because I knew the guy behind had no particular expecatations, just wanted to see me try as best I could to land safely at a suitable airport.
If I'm flying today with an instructor that told me yesterday "turning back at your destination airfield is always an option", I will have a mental bias about turning back in case of a minor failure after takeoff. Which I would probably not have with another instructor or with a real flight.

So, imo, the best training would be to trick the student/trainee into thinking it was a normal flight, brief them that if any problem arise they must be treated as real, then trigger problems.
Then, they could learn how to deal with startle effect.

[derjodel]

It seems to me that the new fad for deliberately setting up a startle or surprise event is counter- productive and contrary to good instructional technique.

That is an interesting conclusion, given that you have clearly learned alot that day, including your reaction to an unknown situation*.

By the time you sit an a 737 simulator, you should have been exposed to theory behind this simple to understand failure multiple times. Either you were not, or you did not remember it.


*I wonder how you, or any other pilot on this forum, would react to a mcas activation simulation before lion air crash... because, a rational pilot should have prevented that, right ;)

[vilas]

Some of methods like static blocked to set UAS are not recommended by Airbus because of the startle it amounts to negative training. That creates lack of confidence and fear.

[KayPam]

Some of methods like static blocked to set UAS are not recommended by Airbus because of the startle it amounts to negative training. That creates lack of confidence and fear.
Yes, but you still trust and expect a qualified crew to deal with that sort of major/hazardous incident in real conditions, right ?

[derjodel]

Some of methods like static blocked to set UAS are not recommended by Airbus because of the startle it amounts to negative training. That creates lack of confidence and fear.

If that is true, then it must be true that pilots have false confidence in their abilities (and airplane makers know that!).

The statements:

A: pilots have a a valid confidence in their abilities based on rigorous training they go through to be certified
B: surprise scenarios in simulator results in startle, which results in negative training

contradict each other and can not both be true. so which is false?

If startle factor is expected for certified pilots, then the whole industry is in deep trouble, as apparently the planes are meant to be flown by confident, un-startled pilots, who apply just the right procedures i just the right time (see discussion in then Atlas thread).

[sonicbum]

If that is true, then it must be true that pilots have false confidence in their abilities (and airplane makers know that!).

The statements:

A: pilots have a a valid confidence in their abilities based on rigorous training they go through to be certified
B: surprise scenarios in simulator results in startle, which results in negative training

contradict each other and can not both be true. so which is false?

If startle factor is expected for certified pilots, then the whole industry is in deep trouble, as apparently the planes are meant to be flown by confident, un-startled pilots, who apply just the right procedures i just the right time (see discussion in then Atlas thread).

He is talking about This. (https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/the-adverse-effects-of-unrealistic-simulator-scenarios/) Surprise and startle factor is one of the several EASA CRM training elements but it must be done through the appropriate ways.

[meleagertoo]

I'm somewhat startled to learn that an instructor would operate like that. It seems to me there was a lot wrong with that scenario in terms of handling and management.
Why did you not crossckeck instruments with the PNF?

Why did you not hand control over to him when it was obvious you had a pressure system failure on your side?
You should have anticipated erroneous airspeed indications after a pressure system failure even if you hadn't decided what exactly had failed so a stall warning too should not have been unexpected, for that to come as a surprise really startles me, and why wasn't PNF handling by that time?
In any case why just cram on' a few extra degrees' of pitch with a windshear warning? Is that really the correct technique?
How did all this stack up against your SOPs I wonder, or was this before the days of SOPs?

Sure, for rookie pilots or low hours guys new on type this sort of thing needs briefing, demonstarting and then practicing. An established line pilot should be able to cope with this as a minor irritation during recurrent trainig unbriefed and unanticipated, but for an isntructor to find it hard makes me feel very uncomfortable indeed.

The startle factor is doubtless something that will be looked at much more closely in future, as failure to recognise a runaway trim or reduce power from TOGA thrust because of a stall warner and odd instrument indications shouldn't ever happen. Especially when the only topic of conversation in your crew room over the last few months must have been about nothing else...

[acbus1]

A blocked static is a perfectly feasible fault. Are we to ban all feasible fault simulations because they will, or might, 'startle' a crew member?

On all the transport aircraft I've ever flown, there were three sets of every essential instrument (as defined by the contents of the standby set). If any essential instrument in any set confuses you, check it against the same instrument in each of the other two sets. The odd one out should be assumed misleading and the two in agreement assumed correct. The exact situation can then be identified and approporiate action (or no action) taken.

Was that explanation startling? Who cares if it was: that's real life; live with it.

(BTW, there's an essential lesson for Boeing 737 Max designers in the above, although you have to wonder how utterly dreadful they surely must be to need it)

[PAXboy]

I am pax of 54 years duration, a nephew is RHS 738.
Whilst I understand that new crew are briefed before an exercise, it was my presumption that experienced in for recurrent session would not.

I thought you briefed for a normal sector and then took whatever the instructor chooses. If my driving instructor briefed me that a motorcycle would overtake towards me on the wrong side of the road, I would not be startled. Learning to manage the surprise factor must be part of the training?

[ChrisVJ]

Whether it was realistic or not the film "Sullenberg" gave a very good responsre to the question. When briefed all the pilots were able to return the sim to the airport. When not briefed all failed and if they did not choose the river passengers would have died.

I would hope that whatever the failure an unbriefed pilot should be able to achieve stable flight so the problem could be diagnosed or a diversion. Obviously failure may be a learning experience but in real life it is a failure.

[alf5071h]

“… recommendations that a surprise or startle factor should be introduced into routine simulator training. While this sounds like yet another buzzword like CRM and TEM, the concept has its limitations.”
“… the new fad for deliberately setting up a startle or surprise event is counter- productive and contrary to good instructional technique.“
There is a trend in the industry to take up salient findings or recommendations from recent accidents without due consideration. This could reflect the current level of safety, and the difficulty of improvement - ‘just do something’; which can suffer bias from seeking success and inability to quantify improvement. Also, training appears to be expedient and less costly than addressing the environmental contributions to surprise - system failures, ambiguous situations, conflicts with SOPs.

“… forget you're in the sim.”
It is probably impossible to deeply startle / surprise humans in simulation. Theme parks and ‘thrill rides’ generate necessary effects of situation surprise, but never create a fear of dying as could happen during flight. ‘Fear potential startle’ (Martin).

‘Fundamental Surprise’; - “A fundamental surprise reveals a profound discrepancy between one's perception of the world and the reality.” (James Reason). Something which cannot be conceived as reality.
"fundamental surprise often is denied ... redefine the incident as if only a situational surprise ... leading to denial of any need to change or to attribution of the “cause” to local factors with well-bounded responses". (David Woods)

Scenario training could inadvertently strengthen bias towards situational surprise - redefine the situation as one which I have been trained for, and from that I have understanding, except you don’t. Similarly in an SOP culture, rushing (by rote) to fit an SOP to a situation where there is no SOP.
Also there is no guarantee that the training and actions will be recalled when surprised, because the emotional state diminishes cognitive capacity, difficulty in recall and acting.

The industry must focus the circumstances of surprise; aircraft system failures, environmental aspects.
‘How might pilots react to MCAS activation’; - after modifying the aircraft so that a system failure minimises the need for pilot intervention, minimise the risk of surprise.
AF 447 - all pitots modified; new independent speed display BUSS; less opportunity for failure and surprise.

For the human, education, knowledge, confidence, self efficacy - that for most situations in aviation someone has been there first - flight test , or simulated it - evaluation, or thought about it - regulation; except in those very rare instances when they didn’t - so then fix the process.

https://www.rizoomes.nl/fundamental-surprise-als-je-wereldbeeld-de-oorzaak-is-van-een-crisis/
Translation required from Dutch, but well worth the effort.

[KayPam]

Whether it was realistic or not the film "Sullenberg" gave a very good responsre to the question. When briefed all the pilots were able to return the sim to the airport. When not briefed all failed and if they did not choose the river passengers would have died.

I would hope that whatever the failure an unbriefed pilot should be able to achieve stable flight so the problem could be diagnosed or a diversion. Obviously failure may be a learning experience but in real life it is a failure.
We don't expect any line pilot in a real situation to make a decision as perfect as the one a committee of aerospace engineers and test pilots could make after careful review of the recordings, of the situation, and a thorough thought process including meetings and simulator tries.

We expect them to try their best to continue trying to manage the situation and make decisions that are just good enough. By going as far as possible to save everyones lives.
A relatively quick decision to go in the Hudson was the decision made that day, and apart from a few idiots, everybody praised it.

During my initial training we had lots and lots of crappy situations in the MEP sim and even in the aircraft, and we always managed to land back safely.
In the aircraft we flew in simulated IMC with simulated partial panel (basically a curtain and/or imc goggles on the window and post it notes on the instruments), with no horizon, no variometer, no gyro, sometimes even no altimeter and no airspeed for a short time..), just trim and power presets and it worked. Sometimes down to cat II ILS minima or NDB minima (the instructor was visual.. for obvious safety reasons). In the sim we could have several emergencies at a time as well : engine failure, diversion due to weather, alternator failure on the good engine..
Except the exceptionnal one time where the sim crashed due to a bug during an engine failure : the instructor relaunched the exercise to avoid this negative training, by showing the trainee that he had reacted correctly.
All that under single pilot IMC operations.

This type of training could lead to overconfidence rather than fear, since it always ended in a safe landing despite conditions that literally never happen.

Regarding the simultaneous complete pitot blocking :
Any instructor at this flight school would tell that a pilot trained at their flight school should be able to identify the unreliable airspeed situation by noticing the abnormal speed acceleration when related with the rate of climb and power available.
[A job that could also be done with a few lines of code : comparing the power input to the aircraft (power of engines minus drag power) with the power input sensed in terms of mass*acceleration*speed+weight*climbspeed, and triggering an "unreliable airspeed" if a difference higher than X was sensed during more than Y seconds, Airbus being able to very finely tune X and Y thanks to big data analysis] [They could also trigger a "suspicious airspeed" alarm based on the fact that total pressure remains constant during more than Z seconds..]
It looks like a case where Airbus is not confident about a case where their aircraft is very vulnerable.

[alf5071h]

KP, see above, # 15.
The scenarios which you discuss involve situational surprise. If a situation can be conceived and replicated in simulation then it is very difficult to be assured of creating fundamental surprise - and anyway it is only a simulation - the crew are primed.

Re pitot blocking; a classic example of inappropriate focus on a singe accident, the probability of which exceeded the assumptions of certification.
The regulators were fundamentally surprised, their ‘black swan’ event turned out to be a ‘muddy duck’; although a situation which could be conceived, it was discarded by the certification process in accepting triple redundant systems as having sufficient integrity.
Forget the code - modify the pitots, which was done; and furthermore, learning of the relative importance of speed, another system was added. Belt and braces; and triple redundancy is still good enough.

[Propjet88]

It all depends on the tone and environment You set for the session. If You clarify beforehand that the whole session is training and confidence building then startle scenarios are fine, as long as everyone gets out of the box with a smile and learning points.
Modern training is deviating from events training and moving towards competencies training. Any scenario you run can fit this purpose and it’s just a means to an end, ie. develop resilience. As pilots we need to be able to handle the unexpected rather than a set of well defined scenarios.
Absolutely!

One of the major outcomes of the currents moves towards EBT (exposure) style training is to help to “know thyself”. When faced with an unknown situation, we all react differently - and the range of these differences can be extreme. If there is any doubt about this, read the thread on the Altlas B767 crash where the NTSB docket reveals the reaction of the First Officer when the TOGA buttons were inadvertently activated as the Captain selected flap. The Captain’s apparent (lack of) reaction to the First Officer’s actions is also instructive.

Appropriate exposure to unexpected and previously unseen events in a TRAINING (as opposed to check) environment allows us to experience our own reactions / feelings / emotions when we face a, possibly time critical, unknown / unseen situation. (Anyone who has done hypoxia training will recognise the value of exposure to one’s own unique symptoms).

Resilience is about bouncing back after a disruption. As we have seen the problem, particularly with modern automated aircraft, a critical disruption (the one that is most likely to get you) is likely to be one that you haven't experienced before. Why - because our natural tendency towards uncertainty avoidance, causes stress to increase massively when we are not sure of what to do. Our natural tendency to quickly “pattern match”, which is the way we normally deal with events, may well be just the wrong thing to do. EBT style training Does not only not only reinforce how to deal with specific “events” but, by appropriate exposure, helps us to recognise our own cognitive biases (and those of our fellow crew members) and to develop strategies to manage them.
(”Please run the checklist for when there is no checklist”).

FlySafe
PJ88

[john_tullamarine]

An interesting thread. It appears to this reader that there be two main schools of thought -

(a) those folk who see negative training in pushing the pilot's individual boundaries, especially if the aircraft's systems have to be somewhat prostituted to achieve an end, and

(b) those folk who see some value in stretching things a little for the (sometimes) difficult to quantify potential value to the pilot's overall skill set. There is the ever-present rider that such things must be consistent with a simulator's reasonable capabilities ie, if the simulator's performance is hopelessly unrealistic the exercise ought not to be countenanced at all.

Clearly, if an event is an impossibility (or very nearly so), there is an argument which suggests it is of little, if any, value. It would be expected that folks in the first group might opine in this direction.

Those in the latter group might see some (un)related value if the set up is used as a means to an end to establish a scenario.

To this reader, the essential consideration (given the realities of real world airline flying, training, and checking) is that the reasonably probable needs to be isolated from the highly improbable with a guarantee of "nil hazard" in the latter case so that the pilot might be prepared to expose himself (herself) to the potential for embarrassment, etc. There is the added difficulty in the case of a check pilot holding regulatory delegations in respect of delegation integrity - I've never been too sure how this one ought to be addressed - possibly by removing the delegated check pilot from the overtly extended training environment. The specialist training pilot should not have the same consideration with which to battle at a personal level.

I put myself squarely in the (b) group, with the caveat that a declaration of "nil hazard" is made (along with a rider that, if we collectively screw it up really badly for whatever reason, then we will go back and practice whatever it was until we can achieve an acceptable performance level). I note that I have had some very experienced check pilots in this situation - provided the initial session briefing was sensible, in all cases, the exercise was completed in good humour with a reasonable achievement of the intended manipulative skillset end.

An example I use from time to time relates to a 732 simulator contract with which I was involved many years ago. The particular operator made extensive use of overspeed takeoff schedules (line and sim) but had at least one sector which was flown, routinely, at a very low weight and for low speed schedules. It was clear that there were surprises to be had as the crews had no exposure to this "tiger country" end of the aircraft's handling spectrum. Mainly for the initial command/intake folk (which was the main thrust of our contract) I provided appropriate work up to the point where a min weight, min speed, aft CG, failure could be handled adequately hand flown, raw data, IMC, and with tracking out on the opposite end localiser. There were a couple of other exercises introduced with similar reasoning.

Was this stuff of much direct, routine value to the flying side of things ? Of course not.

Was there value to the development/improvement of stick and rudder I/F work (for that was the underlying intention) ? You bet there was ! (I note that I used a range of skillset exercises as part of an overall work up of basic I/F handling skills which were a bit lacking in some of the upgrade personnel. By the time they had finished my gentle ministrations, the problems were, in the main, adequately addressed).

Of relevance to the thread topic, I used this exercise (only with, and by, agreement with crews), for exposure during after LPC work during available sim play time. Those who wanted a go without any lead up practice saw what constituted "startle" in stark and harsh relief. For the old hands, a couple of practice work up runs was the general route to an acceptable level of stick and rudder proficiency for that box's presentation.

[compressor stall]

Airbus covered this briefly covered in the last Safety Conference. It was in the context of "Black Swan" events - ie. Statistically one off events - Hudson, QF 32, the A300 in Bagdad, Sichuan Windscreen etc.

Airbus's position was much a focus on resilience (being a mix of competence and confidence) being the tool to manage Startle. There should be no training beyond SOPs but pilots should be aware of where they stop so that the can act outside the box. Training programs introducing surprise elements must ensure that they can be returned to safe flight. Negative training to be avoided and used the blocked pitot situation as the example.

TR training now is not a scripted lesson plan but exercises conducted that will achieve training objectives.

As for replaying Hudson type events - Airbus don't have a problem with it per se, but do NOT recommend it for training courses.Iif you have 15 mins at the end of a sim session, go ahead and play, but bear in mind that there may be negative training.

[Judd]

Read the CVR transcript on this fatal accident to a B737 if you want see examples of total confusion in the cockpit between the captain, first officer and jump seat flight engineer. Here are Surprise and Startle factors all rolled into one and impossible to reproduce in a simulator.

That said, a case could be made for a powerful instructional video using professional actors to illustrate how even highly experienced airmen have been known to react adversely when things go wrong and all previous training didn't save the day. The Sully episode is in stark contrast.
https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/628282-b737-go-around-tragedy-pilot-error-all-over-again.html

[john_tullamarine]

There should be no training beyond SOPs but pilots should be aware of where they stop so that the can act outside the box

I don't suppose that the presenter indicated upon what basis crews might

(a) recognise the occasion, and, subsequently,

(b) "act outside the box"

in the absence of any relevant role-play exercises which might provide some basis for so doing competently ?

I see little point in endeavouring to train for black swan events, per se, but to use appropriate scenarios to provide generically useful training (for confidence and resilience) appear to be useful, I would have thought ?

Whatever happened to the skilled artisan pilot philosophies of yesteryear ?

I'm afraid that many of the older pilot brethren will have a jaundiced view of the cited philosophy ...

[misd-agin]

*I wonder how you, or any other pilot on this forum, would react to a mcas activation simulation before lion air crash... because, a rational pilot should have prevented that, right ;)

The jumpseater on the flight before the first crash watching the crew actually might have prevented that. He brought up behavior that Boeing thought pilots would respond to - uncommanded/runaway stabilizer trim. He suggested it, the crew agreed and applied the appropriate actions, and they continued to their destination.

[misd-agin]

As for replaying Hudson type events - Airbus don't have a problem with it per se, but do NOT recommend it for training courses.Iif you have 15 mins at the end of a sim session, go ahead and play, but bear in mind that there may be negative training.

The NTSB recommendation was that crews get trained in dual engine failure at low altitude. During a recent Airbus type rating course we did about 8-10 dual engine failures after takeoff and on arrival. Two CA's and an instructor. We did it on our own and it's not part of the syllabus as the FAA, and airlines, have not implemented the NTSB's recommendation.

NTSB recommendation - Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators to include a dual-engine failure scenario occurring at a low altitude in initial and recurrent ground and simulator training designed to improve pilots’ critical-thinking, task-shedding, decision-making, and workload-management skills. (A-10-69)

[beamer]

A few thoughts. I have been in more simulators than care to remember as Captain, Co-pilot and Instructor - thankfully I will never enter one again !

There are many ways to use a simulator to best effect. Systems training aid, procedural training, emergency procedures, loft exercises etc etc. Any simulator session should be used for both training and refreshing pilots allied to test and check items as required.

It is easy to overload even the most experienced and skilled pilot should the console operator choose to do so - in my experience such an approach does not achieve a great deal.

The lack of 'real aircraft handling' in recent years has meant an ever increasing tendency to fly aircraft by numbers. There are legions of training captains out there who have never shut down an engine in flight in anything bigger than a Seneca - that is a fact of life based upon airline economics but in my view not a good thing.

The 'startle factor' which began this thread is a problem that many pilots will have faced in both the aeroplane and simulator. The much quoted Hudson birdstrike was ample proof that even the most skilled pilots will need a finite period of time to analyse any problem and in particular an unusual problem which they may not have encountered in training which I guess leads us onto the 737-800 Max accidents.

In the UK, many companies have adopted the 'first look' principle in recurrent simulator training - in simple terms, guaranteed engine failure at or just above V1 in marginal weather, perhaps at max weight on the first take-off. If the handling pilot does not excel in that first problem, the whole tenor of that session may go downhill. To my mind the aim of the simulator is to train, refresh and finally examine with an assessment of the pilot made at the end of the series of sessions in the sim. Mistakes may be made, perhaps items repeated but there is no need to do anything other than gradually raise the 'pressure' on the pilots according to their level of performance.

When I hear of pilots practicing in the real aeroplane in preparation for the simulator, I do feel that we are beginning to get things a little out of synch !

[WhatShortage]

I've got to say that the answer from your old military friends caught me off guard, not because it was wrong but because they actually want to show and teach what should be done ( perfect instruction from my point of view) rather than showing off and shouting at students ( what I am used to)

[Centaurus]

Disconnecting the Auto Pilot under effort in a reflex action is particularly significant as it generally results in a large control input. Indeed, many high altitude upsets would never have become upsets had pilots contained the startle factor. This is a critical area of human factor development that cannot be overstated.

That is true. Readers may recall the CL604 Challenger that lost control after being affected by wake turbulence from an A380 at high altitude over the Middle East . The investigation revealed excessive and inappropriate flight control inputs by the pilot of the Challenger exacerbated the initial roll caused by the wake turbulence. It recommended that rather than instantly countering an initial roll caused by wake turbulence, it is better for pilots to delay corrective action for a few seconds until wake turbulence stops and then recover.

This avoids the rapid change of airflow that can occur depending on what angle the wake turbulence was encountered and in turn minimises the tendency to not only over control but to inadvertently apply control in the opposite direction causing significant airframe damage. The Challenger suffered severe damage during the recovery process with severe injuries to some passengers.

See: https://avherald.com/h?article=4a5e80f3

[Uplinker]

It seems to me that the new fad for deliberately setting up a startle or surprise event is counter- productive and contrary to good instructional technique. Call it practicing bleeding if you like. What is the point of practicing being frightened or startled? It already happens numerous times in everyday life including flying.

None of us want to be embarrased in the SIM, but we all should be capable of reacting correctly.

The difference between giving someone an unbriefed Static blockage, and demonstrating the same fault with ‘pattering’, is that in the first case, the pilot is shocked into realising that they perhaps did not spot the error or take the correct action; so they get sweaty with the thought of what could have happened in the real aircraft. This will hopefully spur them on to revise instrument failures, revise their instrument scan, and perhaps even bring instrument failures into their take-off brief.

With the second ‘non surprise’ method it is too easy to subconsciously think ‘yeah, I would have spotted that, and done the right thing’.

Being confused or startled in the SIM might help us make sure that if that fault ever occurs for real, we will recognise it and take the correct action. I am not proposing SIMs that consist of a series of nightmare subtle but dangerous failures - resulting in pilots who don’t have the confidence to even walk, let alone fly a plane - but I think it would be very useful to experience some instrument failures on a regular basis to keep our knowledge fresh. Being shown a Static blockage in the SIM some years’ ago and never since then, does not keep it fresh in the mind.

Perhaps a non jeopardy section in each SIM should consist of a couple of instrument failures each, non briefed and random, just to keep our skills fresh and ensure that if it all goes wrong, we automatically revert to pitch + power = performance.

[alf5071h]

Research highlights that startle and surprise are similar, but surprise is more significant due to duration and depth of effect. Also, that surprise can build slowly or be reinvigorated if events do not progress as expected after crew action. (Landman).
The description of cognitive effects is a good guide, but the conclusions of the research into methods of intervention are less convincing; similar to the range of views in this thread.

Opposed to debating alternatives to alleviate the issue, reconsider what the issue actually is, why is surprise now being considered - a new fad.
Surprise is a human reaction to a situation - stress, part of our natural defences and education.
Why is surprise now of greater concern in aviation; human nature hasn't changed.
Aviation is evolving, safer, fewer challenging situations from technical failure; similar due to the environment. Thus the view that decreased exposure to surprise and experience of managing the effect is contributive.

Conversely, historical accident rates were higher than now, but we did not record the number of accidents involving surprise. The contribution of surprise then could have been very much higher than now, so in effect aircraft and environmental change has helped - even thought humans will always be surprised. The issue is that we are ‘surprised’ by the apparent change or not knowing why.
Another view is that with high levels of safety, accident investigators have fewer occasions to probe human contributions, but when opportunity arises they do so in more depth. Very few accident reports cite surprise as ‘the cause’, only as a possible contribution, which investigations consider with different levels of debate along with other possibilities.

The issue is typically complex, many views of what should be considered or implemented. Also those who profess solutions may only contribute to the mess; regulators, training organisations, etc.

Re-reading the research on training intervention with a view to identify the issue opposed to intervention, suggests that much of what is already being trained could be detrimental.
Regulators could review what is being trained now, and how this might relate to research findings - negative training; also to consider that by requiring more training they risk diluting hard pressed resources from more urgent safety need.

Landman https://pure.tudelft.nl/portal/files/55707836/dissertation_startle.pdf

[jimmyg]

"I see little point in endeavouring to train for black swan events, per se, but to use appropriate scenarios to provide generically useful training (for confidence and resilience) appear to be useful, I would have though"

Exactly; A good example of using scenarios are what Airbus and other are attempting with upset recovery training. Which will help recognize and contain startle factor with more advanced simulator outputs which will enhance a given scenario with more realistic sim training.


Safety First-issue 7

"Containing the startle factor applies to every situation a pilot may encounter, regardless of high altitude or sea level operating environment. It is a natural reaction; perhaps even reflex action, to want to do something when one is startled. Reactively, disconnecting an Auto Pilot and making un-calibrated open loop rudder and/or control yoke or sidestick inputs will never be the correct reaction and will almost always lead to an amplified abnormal situation. It is in this area that pilots must develop skills to discipline themselves from putting their hands and/or feet into motion, without first understanding what is going on and what the potential consequences of their actions will be. Disconnecting the Auto Pilot under effort in a reflex action is particularly significant as it generally results in a large control input. Indeed, many high altitude upsets would never have become upsets had pilots contained the startle factor. This is a critical area of human factor development that cannot be overstated."

[deja vu]

A good startle event I had on a sim session was during a take off just after V1 was called and prior to Vr the airspeed dropped to around 20 knots below V1, (wind shear) 2 choices remain, stop with no guarantees or select TOGA and rotate at the end regardless.

[Centaurus]

Perhaps a non jeopardy section in each SIM

Don't fool yourself on the non jeopardy bit. If you cock-up a so called non-jeopardy sequence in the simulator, you will be marked down mentally by the simulator instructor even though he knows you will not be formally assessed on paper. And memories can be long with some instructors.

[Uplinker]

Yeah, but that is a crazy situation isn’t it?

If a competent guitarist tried to play something from memory they haven’t played for three years; their first attempt is likely to be a bit dodgy, with the odd wrong note or wrong chord while they remember the proper sequence*. Once they have recalled the piece, they will be able to play it extremely well.

Pilots have the problem of not being able to take the aircraft home to practise stuff, (!! that would be cool :)). The only opportunity we have to go over things and refresh our memories, is in the SIM. If the entire SIM is a jeopardy situation, officially or unofficially; no pilot will want to explore or do anything beyond what is strictly necessary to pass that particular SIM.


*(I have heard Paul McCartney go wrong at a concert, stop and start again, but nobody would claim he is a bad musician).

[BluSdUp]

I find some of the " New" politically correct words are masking the real problem.
In the old days we were surprised, then we got scared, and then we panicked into action!
This feeling and urge to do something, ANYTHING, had to be controlled , or we made things worse.
"Take a deep breath , sit on You hands" was at times good advice!
Airbus has apparently come to the same conclusion.

With regards to sim training:
Do not teach anything wrong, ie Unrealistic , unsolvable stuff just to " startle" pilots.
Otherwise , anything goes in the sim ,as I would rather ask for a sim reset with a red face then try to dig myself out of a hole in the ground in real life.
This coddling, pre -planned, feelgood, predictable sim stuff, has reached its useful limit, in my humble opinion!
Eating some humble pie in the sim has certainly worked for me, and I did some of it live in Hollywood the first 4000hrs before I ever touched a sim.
Since getting Yourself properly confused and scared in a Cessna 185 up towards Hudson Bay is not the recommended way anymore I propose we push our personal limits for say 15 minutes a year in a safe and cozy sim box.

Remember:
" What happens in the sim, stays in the sim" as I always assured my victims!
The self-insight and knowledge You bring with You to the real world, when applicable.

On that note, I am gone fishing! The Cod is in!
I wish You all the best for the New Year.
Safe Landing to all.

Kind regards
Cpt B

[safetypee]

BSU, good points, sound advice

See the presentation below.
It uses the word ‘startle’ throughout, but the discussions cover other words and definitions which describe aspects of surprise elsewhere in this thread.

Slide 5 - startle magnitude, ‘false alarm’, could represent the level achievable in simulation. You can be surprised, but not deeply and not for very long.
Compare this with slides 6 and 7, which better relate to the real world.

Slide 9 - self efficacy indicates some ways forward.
Most of which can be developed without a simulator, and previously identified as qualities within airmanship.

http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Presentations/Managing%20Startle%20Individual%20Crew%20and%20Organizationa l%20Strategies.pdf

[Private jet]

That is true. Readers may recall the CL604 Challenger that lost control after being affected by wake turbulence from an A380 at high altitude over the Middle East . The investigation revealed excessive and inappropriate flight control inputs by the pilot of the Challenger exacerbated the initial roll caused by the wake turbulence. It recommended that rather than instantly countering an initial roll caused by wake turbulence, it is better for pilots to delay corrective action for a few seconds until wake turbulence stops and then recover.

This avoids the rapid change of airflow that can occur depending on what angle the wake turbulence was encountered and in turn minimises the tendency to not only over control but to inadvertently apply control in the opposite direction causing significant airframe damage. The Challenger suffered severe damage during the recovery process with severe injuries to some passengers.

See: https://avherald.com/h?article=4a5e80f3

For unusual attitude recovery, wake turbulence etc I was taught from basic training and also on the Chally course, to do it in stages (a bit like "blipping" the stab trim), so input - back to neutral - see what happens- input again - back to neutral - see what happens & repeat until back to normal. I don't know how it can be done any other way, especially on instruments.
With regards to "startle" training itself, I think it works well for some people less well for others. People are different and learn differently so there is no one "right" system. But whatever techniques are used, I don't subscribe to the old idea that people must "suffer" in order to learn something. Confidence is the key to performance in my mind as long as it is checked, and not over confidence of course.

[Centaurus]

For unusual attitude recovery, wake turbulence etc I was taught from basic training and also on the Chally course, to do it in stages (a bit like "blipping" the stab trim), so input - back to neutral - see what happens- input again - back to neutral - see what happens & repeat until back to normal. I don't know how it can be done any other way, especially on instruments.

That seems to me an extraordinary teaching and someone's personal opinion. If the aircraft has rolled nearly inverted (wake turbulence for example), alternating control inputs in order to get wings level again can only delay the aim of the exercise which is to get wings level as quickly as possible, remembering it could be in IMC. Jerking the aircraft not only increases the chances of structural damage but is an extraordinary way of flying on instruments.
To see-saw the aircraft just to "see what happens" means to me the pilot doesn't quite know what to do next and is buying thinking time.

[Private jet]

That seems to me an extraordinary teaching and someone's personal opinion. If the aircraft has rolled nearly inverted (wake turbulence for example), alternating control inputs in order to get wings level again can only delay the aim of the exercise which is to get wings level as quickly as possible, remembering it could be in IMC. Jerking the aircraft not only increases the chances of structural damage but is an extraordinary way of flying on instruments.
To see-saw the aircraft just to "see what happens" means to me the pilot doesn't quite know what to do next and is buying thinking time.

It's NOT "see-sawing" or "jerking" the aircraft about, its making a number of same sense control inputs to return the aircraft to normal flight, correctly ,accurately & in an expeditious time frame, not a rushed reaction . In fact you're more likely to cause structural damage with large, long inputs, and more likely to overcompensate for what is actually required. I don't care what you think, It got me through my IR flight test, (recovery from unusual attitudes with partial panel) on both sides of the Atlantic so hardly "someone's personal opinion" is it?