Mooney accident pilot refused a clearance at 6,500'

[Dick Smith]

Here is the preliminary report for the Coffs Harbour Mooney accident. https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/aair/ao-2019-052/ (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/aair/ao-2019-052/)

The report verifies Bindook’s old statement where he called Class C airspace “road block airspace”. To prevent it being “road block airspace” with unnecessary accidents occurring, the Minister John Anderson issued a directive with the following words on 1 August 2004 – yes, 15 years ago. Note this refers to Class C over D.

“AA must … provide an operating ATC control tower at the airport and an approach radar control service at the earliest time one can be supplied and installed.”
This would mean that ATCs could operate Class C airspace and successfully keep VFR and IFR aircraft apart, but not with ridiculous procedural standards. For some reason, Airservices decided not to comply with this Minister’s directive, and CASA once again remained mute, saying nothing.

What is not discussed in the report is what the cloud tops were. Is there a chance that the aircraft was above cloud at 6,500’ and in good visual flight conditions?

Also, do I read it correctly? Is it clear that the aircraft was not reported missing until it did not arrive at Taree? That is, the local ATC controllers at Coffs, or in the Centre, did not notice that it had disappeared? I would imagine the aircraft was at least fitted with a Mode C transponder, and that surely would mean it would be visible from the local secondary surveillance radar unit.

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick, please point us to the ICAO document that requires C to be radar-controlled.

[le Pingouin]

The unidentified aircraft faded from radar coverage, something that happens very frequently - there is nothing to trigger the ATC to pay it any attention. Would you notice a person missing from a random crowd of identical people?

[The name is Porter]

Dick, please point us to the ICAO document that requires C to be radar-controlled.

Back in Anderson's day, radar would have cost a fortune to install and maintain, having said that, Coffs is in the 'J' curve. Surely a benefit would have been gained from having coverage to allow a radar service into these towers?

Walking into some or all of the Class D Metro and Regional towers is like taking a step back in time. I reckon someone sleeping rough would turn their nose up at these places? Lack of investment, little piggys tarted up with lipstick, mutton dressed up as lamb. So long as everything looks good from the outside.

There really is no excuse for lack of ADSB coverage to the ground at these places and the appropriate tower equipment to utilise.

[Squawk7700]

The unidentified aircraft faded from radar coverage, something that happens very frequently - there is nothing to trigger the ATC to pay it any attention. Would you notice a person missing from a random crowd of identical people?

So no LSALT warnings for unidentified traffic?

[The name is Porter]

Squawk, why??

The nanny state is alive and well in this country but do you really want that level of eyes looking over your shoulder?

What if the aircraft was descending for low level ops? Into a private hillside strip?

[Dick Smith]

Le Pingouin, you say that aircraft frequently fade from radar. How often does an aircraft fade from radar that requested a clearance at 6,500 feet – probably above the weather and certainly above the mountain range – and is then forced down into bad weather, without anyone being interested?

Capn Bloggs, no there is no ICAO requirement for C to be radar controlled. No doubt it is understood that if it is not radar controlled, pilots of VFR aircraft will be told to “keep out” – what happened this time. As I said, it is a giant “road block” in the sky that has now resulted in people losing their lives.

[Dick Smith]

Let’s keep this simple.

Why was the pilot denied a clearance at 6500’ ?

[Vag277]

Oh dear! Here we go again! It is the fault of ATC, lack of radar, lack of services not included in Class G, road block airspace etc etc. The Smith mantra is becoming boring, never mind offensive. Why not wait for the full report rather than jump to conclusions that blame everyone other than perhaps poor pilot decision making - the cause of most VFR accidents, especially VFR into IMC. Look at the weather forecast included in the preliminary report. Why go direct when coastal would have been better. At least no high terrain over the beach.

[Capn Bloggs]

Why was the pilot denied a clearance at 6500’ ?
Let me guess. There was a conflicting aircraft?

no there is no ICAO requirement for C to be radar controlled.
So Minister Anderson's directive was based on what? That VFR aircraft are more inconvenienced by Procedural C than Radar C? Is that it? Who gave him that idea, to convince him to either trash C airspace or force a multi-million-dollar upgrade at places that didn't need it? How many times have VFR flights been denied a clearance into procedural C airspace? Are you going to push for dual carriageway roads everywhere to stop head-on car crashes?

[BlackPanther]

.....you say that aircraft frequently fade from radar. How often does an aircraft fade from radar that requested a clearance at 6,500 feet – probably above the weather and certainly above the mountain range – and is then forced down into bad weather, without anyone being interested?
Dick, I do not mean to sound rude by this reply. Whilst you certainly have a LOT of experience and knowledge, your understanding of how ATC works is unfortunately completely wrong.

When an aircraft squawks 1200, ie. "squawks VFR", it is displayed as a VFR track on the controllers screen. These are certainly looked at, and safety alerts issued where required, for example in conflict with other traffic or approaching restricted airspace. But the aircraft is telling you via it's squawk code that it is VFR. They are saying they are visual and navigating themselves. It is not the controllers job to follow every VFR aircraft, and it would not be possible for this to happen - the workload would probably double Airservices staff requirements.

This is why things like flight following are listed in the regulations as dependant on controller workload. The same concept applies if you look at the other end of the industry. Take for example a major disruption at Sydney airport, causing huge holding. ATC may initiate a ground stop around the country, not because of delay to aircraft, but because ATC are so overwhelmed with the level of traffic that workload dictates it.

I fear your understanding of controller performance and workload is stuck in the last century. You are looking for someone to blame. Think instead of the human factors.

Perhaps you should reach out to Airservices and spend some time in one of the appropriate centres. The only problem is, I am not sure how a controller would feel about that. Many of them find your comments online personally offensive, insulting, and upsetting.

I should finish the post by saying that EVERYONE, including you, me, pilots, ATC, regualtors, etc - we all want this kind of incident to not happen. But the way you are going about it is misinformed.

[Styx75]

I saw a large radome being dismantled at Coffs about 6 months ago. Was mounted on top of a big enough building to be a control centre too.

Did Coffs use to have a radar facility based there?

[The name is Porter]

Bloggs, I'm not persuing an agenda here, other than archaic airspace and equipment for anything operating below A100.

How many times have VFR flights been denied a clearance into procedural C airspace?

A significant number of times, more the problem is actually getting a VFR clearance through radar controlled C airspace (not CTR). So much so that training organisations are forced to plan and fly in very limited Class C (in our case Essendon) because they know the likelihood of getting the Radar C clearance is remote. If it wasn't for the top notch service we get from Essendon Tower we'd be farked!

Are you going to push for dual carriageway roads everywhere to stop head-on car crashes?

Uhmm, why should we expect any less?? I suppose we should be happy with 1 mbs broadband internet?

[Dick Smith]

Vagg. All very well however how about coming up with a suggestion on why the pilot was refused clearance at 6500’.

[ACMS]

What, you think the ATCO’s just refuse a clearance for fun? Just for a giggle?
They would have had a good reason to deny a clearance that day for a myriad of reasons and rules they work under and you know that.

This does NOT obsolve the PIC from using good judgement , airmanship and just plain good old common sense to keep his Aircraft, himself and his passengers legal and SAFE at all times. If he subsequently flew into a hill because he didn’t have a plan B that’s on him I’m afraid to say.

[Squawk7700]

Let me guess. There was a conflicting aircraft?

That’s BS and you know it. It’s not like they are operating special VFR out of Moorabbin where they only allow one aircraft at a time... the airspace is huge in comparison!

I requested a clearance over YMML recently (with a plan in the system). I said I would take any track, any altitude to FL125, vectoring or with a delay.... what did I get? “Clearance not available squawk 1200 have a nice day.” So instead I battled severe turbulence over a built up area between 1,500-2,500 agl under a step.

[Mr Approach]

Airservices has recently transferred responsibility for airspace over Class D towered aerodromes from Tower procedural approach to en-route area controllers from 8500 feet to 6500 and will shortly be reducing that to 4500. The story will be that surveillance will be able to be used however anyone familiar with the large areas of airspace displayed on en-route controllers screens will be able to work out that they will likely have to deny clearances to VFR aircraft in order to separate IFR aircraft. Amazingly the Class D towers already have surveillance displays (radar, multilateration, ADS-B) but are not allowed to use them for other than "situational awareness" because Airservices refuses to upgrade the communication links to separation standards. Third-world ATS in a country that claims world's best practice.

By the way, as far as I am aware only the FAA has a rule that states Class C airspace can only be established were there is surveillance coverage.

[Vag277]

Smith. Why speculate? A pointless exercise that you seem to use as a basis for your airspace mythology.

[Dick Smith]

Class C over D has been known since the Bindook days as “ road block airspace”.

I wonder why?

Its upside down reversed airspace and now could have been one of the holes in the Swiss cheese that resulted in two fatalities.

I do not blame ATC for refusing the clearance at 6500’

Its clear that C requires a terminal radar system to operate correctly.

That’s the reason for the Ministers directive.

[Dick Smith]

ACMS. The Moony pilot planned at 6500’

Why would he expect to be totally denied a clearance at that or a similar level?

Its not as if it was JFK.

[Capn Bloggs]

That’s BS and you know it.
That's a bit harsh. Actually, I don't know. Do you? Given Coffs has a tower, I imagine that it's a reasonably busy airport. Perhaps there was arriving or departing traffic from the north or the south?

Its clear that C requires a terminal radar system to operate correctly.
No Dick, it's clear that C has to have radar so it'll produce the results you want. As for upside down, this just highlights the absurdity of 7 alphabets of airspace. A>D, B>D, C>D, E>D, what's the point?

[Vag277]

As said before, speculation without facts is pointless. Was it a plan, was a flight plan submitted to give ATC prior notice, what was the IFR traffic at the time, what separation standards were in use? Why plan over high country with the weather forecast when coastal might have been better? No one here knows so stop blaming the absence of your views on airspace and ATC procedures until the facts are known.

[Aussie Bob]

Unbelievable, we have an outdated and over regulated bunch of airspace in this country where it is virtually impossible to get a VFR clearance at any sensible level. Dick is here pointing that out and you blokes are mostly so apethetic that you shoot the messenger and support the system.

That said, it is still my opinion that when you pilot an aircraft, more than most pursuits, you are responsible for yourself.

[Vag277]

Clearly the clearance for a formation of 6 light VFR aircraft coastal through the YBSU zone yesterday did not happen. Wait - I was in the formation!

[JamieMaree]

Unbelievable, we have an outdated and over regulated bunch of airspace in this country where it is virtually impossible to get a VFR clearance at any sensible level. Dick is here pointing that out and you blokes are mostly so apethetic that you shoot the messenger and support the system.

That said, it is still my opinion that when you pilot an aircraft, more than most pursuits, you are responsible for yourself.


Bob,
That is my my problem with Dicks approach to all of this.
At the end of the day it is the pilots responsibility. He has to keep the aircraft safe. Whatever ****e is thrown at him/ her. He has to deal with. Clearances and al, that crap are about what you’d like todo not what you have to deal with. I’ve always had the view that Dick’s approach to the rules is that he should be allowed to fly his aircraft anywhere at anytime anyway he wants. The rules should be adjusted to allow this.

[junior.VH-LFA]

You can advocate for airspace change without having to leverage on the death of fellow aviators in order to justify your argument, particularly when it's a long bow at best to correlate the relevance of that issue. There's two separate thread right now doing exactly that.

[Dick Smith]

Come on. I and others have campaigned relentlessly against C over D for 15 years.

AsA have operated by stating “ clearance not available “
Are you suggesting that by refusing the pilot clearance at 6500’ and forcing him into bad weather at a lower level there is no accountability?

[junior.VH-LFA]

Come on. I and others have campaigned relentlessly against C over D for 15 years.

AsA have operated by stating “ clearance not available “
Are you suggesting that by refusing the pilot clearance at 6500’ and forcing him into bad weather at a lower level there is no accountability?




No; I'm suggesting that if the weather prevents doing that you declare a pan and make the controllers work for you. That's how it works when you're in danger.

There is always scope to talk about airspace change. This is a perfect forum for that. Make a thread about it and stop hijacking accident threads to push your agenda.

[lucille]

The PIC was responsible for keeping himself and all his passengers alive no matter what curve balls ATC threw at him.

An option of last resort would have been for him to climb to 6500 and proceed as planned. Let ATC sort the mess out. Better to be alive and answering to panel of armchair experts the next day than not. This is an option that should not be abused but should always be in the back of any PICs mind. We are not there to make ATC’s life “easier”, rather it’s their rather highly paid job to sort our mess out.

[le Pingouin]

Le Pingouin, you say that aircraft frequently fade from radar. How often does an aircraft fade from radar that requested a clearance at 6,500 feet – probably above the weather and certainly above the mountain range – and is then forced down into bad weather, without anyone being interested?
Correct. Why would we be? They're VFR so responsible for terrain and weather avoidance. If there's a problem speak up. We aren't mind readers and aren't looking out the aircraft windscreen. I see numerous VFR paints flying around when the weather seems totally foul, yet the ground isn't littered with crashed aircraft.

[jmmoric]

Correct. Why would we be? They're VFR so responsible for terrain and weather avoidance. If there's a problem speak up. We aren't mind readers and aren't looking out the aircraft windscreen. I see numerous VFR paints flying around when the weather seems totally foul, yet the ground isn't littered with crashed aircraft.

Maybe not, but there are definately more aircraft spread around outside airports after bad weather.... the amount of traffic taken into comparison... :confused:

Some pilots just does not know when to turn around...

[jmmoric]

Come on. I and others have campaigned relentlessly against C over D for 15 years.

AsA have operated by stating “ clearance not available “
Are you suggesting that by refusing the pilot clearance at 6500’ and forcing him into bad weather at a lower level there is no accountability?

You're forgetting that ATC is not there to make anything harder for the pilots, we're here to make the skies safer first, then more efficient.... saying no to a pilot, does not mean it cannot be changed, if the pilot would be so kind as to inform about the necessity for the request.

But I have no clue how it works "down under", but high traffic load, especially in C airspace can be a good reason to say "no", and especially if there's no radar service provided. Ask again and stress the importance, you may have to wait a bit, then you'd get your clearance. That C airspace is made to make the life of airliners safer, you know those boxes that runs at 250+ knots and sweeps though clouds doing a lot of other things besides looking out windows, and carries 200+ people onboard.... Though I have no clue about the mentioned airspace, and airport for that matter.

[Sunfish]

But wasn’t ADSB supposed to make separation practicable without radar? I’m more confused.

[Jabberwocky82]

Vagg. All very well however how about coming up with a suggestion on why the pilot was refused clearance at 6500’.

An educated guess would be that the airspace was being used at the time. The bush fires we were working on that day in the Doreigo area provided horrible visibility and the weather did not help at all. it was hard enough to nav low level in a helicopter...
We had the LAT coming in a lot and it probably didn’t help with all the other AC that would have been in C class airspace; Airmed, bird dogs, LAT, Linescan AC.
its a tragic result but something that I really don’t think is anything of a ATC cause.
the pilot in command can always turn back.

[Squawk7700]

An educated guess would be that the airspace was being used at the time.

You can fit many aircraft in a piece of airspace at the same time. You can funnel them through, they can change speeds to better allow transit, delay, provide vectoring, hold or otherwise, different altitudes, VFR and IFR... like I said, it’s not like it’s special VFR where only one can be there at any one time. If it’s too much workload for one controller, then there is a problem with the system, split it up and find another controller. It’s not rocket science!

Yes it is up to the pilot to turn back, but forcing them to take alternate routes down lower, possibly in turbulence, closer to cloud, over tiger country,
or perhaps precipitation is not ideal and carries a greater degree of risk. Why take the backroads when there’s an 8 lane freeway available.... but you can’t, because there’s another car on it.

Don’t just accept the status quo because it’s always been that way. Stir things up to make a change for better for all of us!

[Jabberwocky82]

I would not be surprised at all if it was Special VFR conditions...

My other point was you do not need to continue in to **** conditions. It’s not that hard. Perhaps we need more education in that and these sorts of things might start to become less frequent.

[Aussie Bob]

Having once pushed on through a restricted area due to weather and in direct defiance of a “clearance unavailable, remain outside Romeo .... “ directive, I can report that the repercussions I anticipated came to a big fat nothing. Nada, zip, no call, no action, nil communication afterwards. I would do it again in a heartbeat.

[BlackPanther]

If it’s too much workload for one controller, then there is a problem with the system, split it up and find another controller. It’s not rocket science!

Absolutely true. Unfortunately, the system does not allow to 'split it up' like you suggest. A combination of both TAAATS limitations and staffing numbers don't allow stuff like this to be split. The controller would have been responsible for a large piece of airspace, which included Coffs steps. You can't just pull out the C steps into a different controllers jurisdiction.

We are going in the wrong direction whilst the industry demands more 'efficiency', and the government demands more dividends from Airservices.

[Dick Smith]

Now some important facts are coming out.

Thanks Prune!

[megan]

As many have said as PIC it's your task to ensure the safety of your aircraft and pax. If ATC direct you to some unsafe condition, eg VFR into IMC, there is the phrase "unable". If you've really ballsed up, a PAN will get the desired help. A PIC can break every regulation and rule in the book to ensure his safe arrival on terra firma. Too many think a controller has an overarching command of an aircraft, s/he is a helper not a controller :) , remember the statement "are you down there because I'm up here, or am I up here because you're down there?". It's a joint effort to keep us from bumping into each other.

[deja vu]

No; I'm suggesting that if the weather prevents doing that you declare a pan and make the controllers work for you. That's how it works when you're in danger.

There is always scope to talk about airspace change. This is a perfect forum for that. Make a thread about it and stop hijacking accident threads to push your agenda.
Yeah, it sounds simple, "declare a pan and make the controllers work for you" I always thought they were there to work for you anyway, pan or no pan. Apparently not.
Sadly there are many relatively low time pilots prepared to risk encounters with terrain or weather rather than incur the wrath of CASA or ATC, this has been the case for far too long and needs to stop.

[havick]

ACMS. The Moony pilot planned at 6500’

Why would he expect to be totally denied a clearance at that or a similar level?

Its not as if it was JFK.

even LGA and JFK lets VFR traffic through, hear it all the time.

[L'aviateur]

It's often difficult to figure out what is possible and what isn't as a pilot. The Sydney controllers seem to be able to handle VFR traffic on the Harbour Scenic when the airspace appears to be completely saturated, absolute kudos to them. Then Williamtown can't give you a transit when it seems like nothing is moving in their airspace...
I thought we had it rough in the UK with being denied the occasional transit, but here in Australia I have experienced numerous delays and denials at tin pot airfields.

[Lead Balloon]

At post #186 in the "Bell ditching off Newcastle" thread Maggie Island said:Don't you worry, the [Willytown] Romeo's are activated with or without justification! (Mine or otherwise)Says it all, really.

[On Track]

L'aviateur, I agree with you about Williamtown. The most anal controllers I've ever dealt with.

[visibility3miles]

I was under the impression that air traffic controllers could suppress signals from planes squawking 1200 to avoid clutter on their screen.

As a private pilot, I have had my transmission swamped by another plane transmitting on the same frequency at the same time. I'm told commercial planes have stronger transmitters.

Yes, I have been refused clearance through controlled airspace. I have no problem with this.

If it is an emergency, say so, or act accordingly regardless of permission.

If you look to the left, I was taught, "See and avoid."

the pilot reported that he was operating in clear conditions,

Not the sort of comment that would indicate an emergency...

[Mike Flynn]

ACMS. The Moony pilot planned at 6500’

Why would he expect to be totally denied a clearance at that or a similar level?

Its not as if it was JFK.


Reading this thread makes me feel Australian aviation has a responsibility for this accident.

Were the controllers working this aircraft pilots?

I doubt it. Had they ever experienced this scenario?

Could they appreciate what the outcome could be?

Did they help the pilot?

[Mike Flynn]

Now some important facts are coming out.

Thanks Prune!



You were the boss some time ago so why blame others now Dick?

Bob Hawke gave you the job as Chairman of CASA.

What did you do to reign in regulation in your days back in the ‘90’s?

It appears the old days of a great welcoming Australian flying community has long gone.

The likes of GOANNA and other outback tours are long gone.

I still have my fixed and rotary wing Aussie licences from decades ago but you regulators are the big issue when it comes to
winter in Australia.

The days of self fly hire for European and American pilots are long gone.

[swh]

even LGA and JFK lets VFR traffic through, hear it all the time.


Be hundreds every day, the banner towing advertising, and all the helicopters going to downtown Manhattan, East 34th, West 30th, traffic into TEB, N07, MMU, CDW, LDJ

Yeah, it sounds simple, "declare a pan and make the controllers work for you" I always thought they were there to work for you anyway, pan or no pan. Apparently not.

Controllers are not mind readers, I have been denied weather deviations and even being accepted to my diversion airport for ATC procedural issues, simply declared PAN and I got what I needed. If ATC says unavailable, declare a PAN then it becomes available, if the danger level increases declare MAYDAY.

Pilots should use the use the system correctly, if enough people declare a PAN the ATSB will require a change.

Were the controllers working this aircraft pilots?

I doubt it. Had they ever experienced this scenario?


No requirement for controllers to be pilots unlike some other countries that require controllers to be at least PPL holders.

[Sunfish]

Deja Vu: Sadly there are many relatively low time pilots prepared to risk encounters with terrain or weather rather than incur the wrath of CASA or ATC, this has been the case for far too long and needs to stop.

If the penalty for incurring the wrath of CASA or ATC was the equivalent of a speeding fine, no one would give it a second thought.

However the penalty is potentially the acquisition of a criminal record, becoming a felon, no reputation, no house, no family, no super, no flying, no firearms, no employment, no air travel and no overseas travel.

Like most rational adults, I regard CASA and ATC as more capricious and vindictive than weather and terrain and in the unlikely event I was caught out I suggest it’s not a simple choice to bust controlled airspace at all, despite what you may think.

So, sadly, it isn’t going to stop until the law and unjust culture changes.

[machtuk]

It ALL boils down to who ultimately is in charge of flight? PICommand!

[NaFenn]

While I cant speak of this incident as I dont know any more than the ATSB report - I have had several situation in GA where a clearance was required and ATC weren't keen... until i told them what was happening. A phrase as simple as "due weather, request clearance direct ..." was enough to get a clearance organised - not necissarilly immediately (due IFR traffic or similar) however actually talking to the controller and telling them what you need can make all the difference. Now that I work in an IFR RPT capacity, i do not know a single pilot that I work with that wouldn't mind burning an extra 5-10 minutes of fuel to allow a VFR aircraft through/infront in marginal weather if we're in the way. We can fly through it... they can't.

In some situations, even the old "we have this issue, we are doing this" was enough to make things happen, the paperwork can be dealt with later - and if you have a good enough reason to do your own thing to stay safe... then you're good.

[junior.VH-LFA]

Sunfish if you can find me a genuine example of someone who was REQUIRED to breach airspace due to weather or an emergency, who articulated that was the case and was subsequently punished in the way you've described, I'll never question you again.

Good luck.

[Track Shortener]

ATC as more capricious and vindictive than weather and terrain and in the unlikely event I was caught out I suggest it’s not a simple choice to bust controlled airspace at all, despite what you may think.
So, sadly, it isn’t going to stop until the law and unjust culture changes.

I suspect a good way to begin the culture change Sunfish refers to here - on an operating level - is a better mutual understanding of each others' roles. That means pilots visiting ATC facilities and ATCs going flying, in big or little cockpits. Sadly there hasn't been much opportunity to send ATCs on famil flights of late (yay, staffing) but there is a program running to facilitate pilot information nights at the two centres. NaFenn's strategy:
A phrase as simple as "due weather, request clearance direct ..." was enough to get a clearance organised - not necissarilly immediately (due IFR traffic or similar) however actually talking to the controller and telling them what you need can make all the difference. [snip]
In some situations, even the old "we have this issue, we are doing this" was enough to make things happen, the paperwork can be dealt with later - and if you have a good enough reason to do your own thing to stay safe... then you're good.
...is one of the big take-home messages at these nights. They run in Melbourne at least on an ad-hoc basis - contact details here: Pilot Information Nights | Airservices (http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/flight-briefing/pilot-and-airside-safety/ga-pilot-information-nights/)
It sounds to me like this is the sort of thing pilots like Sunfish might find valuable. A bit of mutual understanding goes a long way!

[Dick Smith]

The airspace configuration is clearly wrong.

C above D with no terminal radar is likely to be a “ giant roadblock in the sky” to quote others.

It now looks as if it has contributed to a fatal accident.

[Jabberwocky82]

Please stop it. You have done well for yourself and are held in high regard, and applaud your push for safety when it’s appropriate. But you’re ruining it with your routine conduct in these particular threads.

[Piston_Broke]

I suspect a good way to begin the culture change Sunfish refers to here

Don't take Sunfish's view as representative of the real situation.

Last he stated he's had no interaction with CASA at all, and probably only very limited time even communicating with ATC, let alone had any strife with them.

And yes, he for one would benefit from a visit,

[Dick Smith]

Jabber. Why don’t you explain the reason for the upside down airspace?

It could have a link to this accident.

If it had remained class E the pilot would not have been forced to a lower altitude.

[Jabberwocky82]

I simply don’t think it is all that complicated. If you know these areas are there, you plan according and communicate with the control zones and you generally have no issues at all.
Use some respect when you talk to the person at the other end of the radio, it’s amazing what liberties that can afford you.
Have some knowledge of the process and show them you have tried and you will get a lot more out of the communication.
Plan and accept that sometimes it will not happen straight away and you have to be flexible to get what you want.
Don’t fly in to **** situations.

Having been flying on the fires just west the day this aircraft went in, it was not an ideal flying environment. It was hard work, in a helicopter, flying low level. And I’m a somewhat experienced “professional” (I use that term lightly).

And the very similar incident involving the helicopter in to Williamtown. A colleague of mine was the last person to see them alive. They landed and refilled themselves at Coffs Harbour where I had been parking my machine each night. They filled their aircraft up from fuel stored in a drum and a plastic agricultural tank they had onboard the aircraft. Initial reports from the ATSB show the pilot was not even night rated. Yet took off with no possibility at all of finishing the next leg during daylight hours.

Unfortunately these two situations were both tragic. But they were both realistically avoidable and to blame the airspace for what at best seems like poor airmanship is a massively long bow to draw and simply not fair to the people in the ATC zones doing their jobs as best they can. I think education towards the industry to realise stopping and not trying to continue at all costs might be more beneficial than changing some airspace’s that are, at present, completely manageable.

[Dick Smith]

Jabber. So why is the airspace upside down?

No other country that I know of has reversed airspace like this. Its clearly not the ATCs fault.

If the pilot had not been forced to a lower level he well may of continued the flight safely above the cloud.

Don’t you understand this?

[Jabberwocky82]

What is so hard about flying through Class C or D airspace? It may not have been an instant passage but it would no doubt have eventuated in to one. Or why could they not come in and land and have a breather and get their ducks lined up again?

I’d hazard a guess (seems to be a lot of them being thrown around in here already), that they were not confident in dealing with the airspace. Whether that was training, exposure or currency related who knows but perhaps there lies the answer.

Is the airspace perfect? Probably not. But it is not an impossible space to pass through. They did not have to continue.

[iron_jayeh]

So how far past CTA did the accident occur?

[deja vu]

Don't take Sunfish's view as representative of the real situation.

Last he stated he's had no interaction with CASA at all, and probably only very limited time even communicating with ATC, let alone had any strife with them.

And yes, he for one would benefit from a visit,
How helpful is this? Could do a course in basic courtesy yourself.

[sunnySA]

Its clear that C requires a terminal radar system to operate correctly.
That’s the reason for the Ministers directive.
I understood that the Minister was fearful that unless he "gave in" then he may not be re-elected in the 2004 election.

[ausatc123]

Jabber. So why is the airspace upside down?

No other country that I know of has reversed airspace like this. Its clearly not the ATCs fault.

If the pilot had not been forced to a lower level he well may of continued the flight safely above the cloud.

Don’t you understand this?

Dick... if the airspace was class E, then yes the VFR would be able to do whatever he wanted. But you'd also have VFR and IFR traffic mixing it in the middle of approachs that most of the time wouldn't be talking. Seperation not required, but if I told a jet he was in direct conflict with someone and cleared them for the approach he'd want to hold until clear. You now have a roadblock the other way around, if you have good radar coverage you might be able to tell them they are about to hit someone, or you might just hope TCAS picked them up or the VFR is keeping a good eye out.

I work airspace where I deny clearances to VFR all the time. Its just not possible to get aircraft in and out of my airport with VFR in certain spots. I tell them an expected delay, or they can go around. If I know the weather is marginal, I'd be confirming that is a safe course of action.. but I have absolutely no idea what conditions they are flying through unless they tell me... and I have weather cameras a few miles away and a tower giving me weather updates.

I'm not going to delay mutliple IFR planes for a VFR to have a jolly or cut a few minutes off their journey... UNLESS they REQUIRE to go through my airspace. As it has been pointed out in this thread, and many other threads... if that pilot says "I'm coming in anyway" or "I require it due weather"... then I make it work. I stop departures, I hold arrivals, and I put delays on the IFR guys to make sure everyone is safe.

"However, at 0724, the pilot advised the tower controller that he was operating in clear conditions at 4,100 ft AMSL" at this point my level of concern for a VFR is ZERO. If you tell me you are fine, I have no choice to believe you.

If at any point the pilot said they were concerned about staying visual or required a clearance they would have got it... don't you understand this? This sounds like it is about pilot education... they need to stop being scared about talking to us, or saying no... there are no repercussions to doing this... and its not worth your life to save the embarassment of talking to ATC.

[iron_jayeh]

So does anyone know how far past the cta boundary the accident occurred?

[havick]

Dick... if the airspace was class E, then yes the VFR would be able to do whatever he wanted. But you'd also have VFR and IFR traffic mixing it in the middle of approachs that most of the time wouldn't be talking. Seperation not required, but if I told a jet he was in direct conflict with someone and cleared them for the approach he'd want to hold until clear. You now have a roadblock the other way around, if you have good radar coverage you might be able to tell them they are about to hit someone, or you might just hope TCAS picked them up or the VFR is keeping a good eye out.

I work airspace where I deny clearances to VFR all the time. Its just not possible to get aircraft in and out of my airport with VFR in certain spots. I tell them an expected delay, or they can go around. If I know the weather is marginal, I'd be confirming that is a safe course of action.. but I have absolutely no idea what conditions they are flying through unless they tell me... and I have weather cameras a few miles away and a tower giving me weather updates.

I'm not going to delay mutliple IFR planes for a VFR to have a jolly or cut a few minutes off their journey... UNLESS they REQUIRE to go through my airspace. As it has been pointed out in this thread, and many other threads... if that pilot says "I'm coming in anyway" or "I require it due weather"... then I make it work. I stop departures, I hold arrivals, and I put delays on the IFR guys to make sure everyone is safe.

"However, at 0724, the pilot advised the tower controller that he was operating in clear conditions at 4,100 ft AMSL" at this point my level of concern for a VFR is ZERO. If you tell me you are fine, I have no choice to believe you.

If at any point the pilot said they were concerned about staying visual or required a clearance they would have got it... don't you understand this? This sounds like it is about pilot education... they need to stop being scared about talking to us, or saying no... there are no repercussions to doing this... and its not worth your life to save the embarassment of talking to ATC.

Class E vfr/IFR mix works pretty well in the USA in the busiest airspace and also quiet regional areas.

Just because you’re trained/conditioned to find VFR aircraft a hindrance by your own admission unless they require a clearance operationally, doesn’t make it normal practice worldwide.

I’m not suggesting clearance/no clearance or the pilots hesitation had any bearing on this accident, simply highlighting your attitude to service delivery is not what is the norm worldwide.

[Super Cecil]

If at any point the pilot said they were concerned about staying visual or required a clearance they would have got it... don't you understand this? This sounds like it is about pilot education... they need to stop being scared about talking to us, or saying no... there are no repercussions to doing this... and its not worth your life to save the embarassment of talking to ATC.
Previous experience with ATC has made many VFR pilots wary. I'm sure I've mentioned before about an experience into Tamworth, there were 4 aircraft inbound including a Singapore Lear and a Dash 8. I was inbound VFR and was held and had to change levels, after a barrage of instructions the controller said time to knock off and sort yourselves out. Previous to that it was dangerous to have 4 aircraft inbound, after the controller shut down the aircraft inbound sorted it out and you'll be surprised to know there were no accidents.
The experience I've found with Alice Springs, Tamworth, Coffs and Maroochydore, they make it hard for VFR traffic, even with no inbound IFR traffic. Most VFR pilots I talk to have the same experience, they try to avoid ATC even at their own peril it seems.

[BigPapi]

Whenever a CTA clearance was simply for convenience (i.e. most direct route, trying to get a bit higher into C steps) I've found that more often than not ATC don't really want to deal with it.

The only time I have absolutely required a CTA clearance to reach the destination safely due weather (short of turning around and going back home) I found ATC to be incredibly willing and able to help, once I communicated the situation.

"Cleared direct to the field not above 4500, track as required"
​​​​​​

[The name is Porter]

Dick... if the airspace was class E, then yes the VFR would be able to do whatever he wanted.

Yes, which probably would have been to track in VMC overhead the field then on to destination. That the aircraft descended in attempt to remain in VMC points to the probability that they would have remained in VMC if they'd had the option to do 'whatever he wanted'

But you'd also have VFR and IFR traffic mixing it in the middle of approachs that most of the time wouldn't be talking.

Let's say the VFR aircraft was operating in VMC, overhead the field, doing whatever he wanted in Class E airspace. The IFR aircraft needing an approach to get down through the cloud would be in VMC at the same levels as the VFR. They would continue the approach in VMC, look out the window until they spotted the aircraft, then continue into IMC on the approach if it was safe to do so.

They wouldn't need to talk, the IFR aircraft has you, the ATC, to tell them when they are clear of the aircraft. More often than not they have TCAS to help them and that's if they didn't spot the aircraft visually prior.

Seperation not required, but if I told a jet he was in direct conflict with someone and cleared them for the approach he'd want to hold until clear

Yes, and this occurs at times as well. You'd be surprised at how often an RPT aircraft will delay to allow a lighty to clear the airspace, and do it without a whinge, most of the time the crew of the RPT know what it's like to have 'been there' as a lighty.

Don't forget, this airspace works in the most saturated airspace in the world. Aluminium (and composite!) does not rain down from the skies as a consequence.

BUT and it's a big BUT, the airspace I talk of has surveillance, and plenty of it, and low level. Australia is a pathetic, backward, under resourced aviation backwater. That's unless of course you want to buy your wardrobe or a coffee or a gourmet pie from a city airport terminal. Then you'll find the best of the best. It's only when you get the opportunity to fly in another countries airspace system you say to yourself WTF??

[flighthappens]

Dick... if the airspace was class E, then yes the VFR would be able to do whatever he wanted. But you'd also have VFR and IFR traffic mixing it in the middle of approachs that most of the time wouldn't be talking. Seperation not required, but if I told a jet he was in direct conflict with someone and cleared them for the approach he'd want to hold until clear. You now have a roadblock the other way around, if you have good radar coverage you might be able to tell them they are about to hit someone, or you might just hope TCAS picked them up or the VFR is keeping a good eye out.

I work airspace where I deny clearances to VFR all the time. Its just not possible to get aircraft in and out of my airport with VFR in certain spots. I tell them an expected delay, or they can go around. If I know the weather is marginal, I'd be confirming that is a safe course of action.. but I have absolutely no idea what conditions they are flying through unless they tell me... and I have weather cameras a few miles away and a tower giving me weather updates.

I'm not going to delay mutliple IFR planes for a VFR to have a jolly or cut a few minutes off their journey... UNLESS they REQUIRE to go through my airspace. As it has been pointed out in this thread, and many other threads... if that pilot says "I'm coming in anyway" or "I require it due weather"... then I make it work. I stop departures, I hold arrivals, and I put delays on the IFR guys to make sure everyone is safe.

"However, at 0724, the pilot advised the tower controller that he was operating in clear conditions at 4,100 ft AMSL" at this point my level of concern for a VFR is ZERO. If you tell me you are fine, I have no choice to believe you.

If at any point the pilot said they were concerned about staying visual or required a clearance they would have got it... don't you understand this? This sounds like it is about pilot education... they need to stop being scared about talking to us, or saying no... there are no repercussions to doing this... and its not worth your life to save the embarassment of talking to ATC.

what, you mean like plain English comms?

Get out out of here...

[Squawk7700]

A good few points have been raised above.

Thinking more about this... CASA like to ram information down our throats to help us learn, however I don’t seem to get much from AirServices. Am I missing something, like an email update I’m not subscribed to or are they just the big bad boogie-man that our instructors warn us about?

[The name is Porter]

No, they are not the boogie men, they are 'educated' by their employer that they have the best airspace system in the world when they don't. Their employer will NOT spend money where it is required. They will spend it on their big customers, not on the little guy. Their big customers tell ASA where the money is to be spent.

[Atlas Shrugged]

Dick... if the airspace was class E, then yes the VFR would be able to do whatever he wanted. But you'd also have VFR and IFR traffic mixing it in the middle of approachs that most of the time wouldn't be talking. Seperation not required, but if I told a jet he was in direct conflict with someone and cleared them for the approach he'd want to hold until clear. You now have a roadblock the other way around, if you have good radar coverage you might be able to tell them they are about to hit someone, or you might just hope TCAS picked them up or the VFR is keeping a good eye out.

I work airspace where I deny clearances to VFR all the time. Its just not possible to get aircraft in and out of my airport with VFR in certain spots. I tell them an expected delay, or they can go around. If I know the weather is marginal, I'd be confirming that is a safe course of action.. but I have absolutely no idea what conditions they are flying through unless they tell me... and I have weather cameras a few miles away and a tower giving me weather updates.

I'm not going to delay mutliple IFR planes for a VFR to have a jolly or cut a few minutes off their journey... UNLESS they REQUIRE to go through my airspace. As it has been pointed out in this thread, and many other threads... if that pilot says "I'm coming in anyway" or "I require it due weather"... then I make it work. I stop departures, I hold arrivals, and I put delays on the IFR guys to make sure everyone is safe.

"However, at 0724, the pilot advised the tower controller that he was operating in clear conditions at 4,100 ft AMSL" at this point my level of concern for a VFR is ZERO. If you tell me you are fine, I have no choice to believe you.

If at any point the pilot said they were concerned about staying visual or required a clearance they would have got it... don't you understand this? This sounds like it is about pilot education... they need to stop being scared about talking to us, or saying no... there are no repercussions to doing this... and its not worth your life to save the embarassment of talking to ATC.

ausatc123, without doubt, the most straight forward and logical reply to the otherwise usual gibberish... some people will just never get it. :ok:

100% correct.

[havick]

ausatc123, without doubt, the most straight forward and logical reply to the otherwise usual gibberish... some people will just never get it. :ok:

100% correct.

Until you see how more user friendly other airspace systems are.

[Atlas Shrugged]

I think I've seen most......., but that's not the point.

[Cloudee]

I work airspace where I deny clearances to VFR all the time.

And that there sums up Airservices Australia “service” just perfectly. And some of you are applauding this. I shouldn’t have to explain my circumstances to suddenly find that a clearance is now available.

Lots of people being denied entry to airspace just because they are VFR. Airservices have no way of knowing whether theses are recreational pilots on a jolly, a doctor flying to a clinic, a farmer or a businessman trying to get to a meeting etc etc. if the “service” can’t handle the demand, expand the service. Oh wait, we’re in Australia, silly me.

[ausatc123]

And that there sums up Airservices Australia “service” just perfectly. And some of you are applauding this. I shouldn’t have to explain my circumstances to suddenly find that a clearance is now available

If a vfr aircraft comes through my airspace below 3000ft, they will drop off radar at certain points and I cannot seperate IFR aircraft inbound or outbound. No approaches for at least minutes 10-15 minutes... If I don't have Arrivals I give the clearance away. If I do I won't. Or should I let every big smasher through and hold 3 jets? How much delay would you feel happy with? A few hundred people for 15 minutes or the vfr takes the long way around four an extra 10 minutes of flight time?

[kaz3g]

Previous experience with ATC has made many VFR pilots wary. I'm sure I've mentioned before about an experience into Tamworth, there were 4 aircraft inbound including a Singapore Lear and a Dash 8. I was inbound VFR and was held and had to change levels, after a barrage of instructions the controller said time to knock off and sort yourselves out. Previous to that it was dangerous to have 4 aircraft inbound, after the controller shut down the aircraft inbound sorted it out and you'll be surprised to know there were no accidents.
The experience I've found with Alice Springs, Tamworth, Coffs and Maroochydore, they make it hard for VFR traffic, even with no inbound IFR traffic. Most VFR pilots I talk to have the same experience, they try to avoid ATC even at their own peril it seems.

My experience with towers as a rather geriatric Auster driver has always been fine. I flew to Essendon a couple of weeks ago and phoned up before takeoff to see if I could get a direct via Kalkallo. Lovely chap suggested I plan via Doncaster because MELBOURNE was using east-west.

i called at Doncaster, no flight plan, and got a clearance straight away. Nice lady shepherded me to end of 08 because a C172 was close behind and the Auster is very slow with flaps deployed. I had explained I’m the same age as the aeroplane so she arranged for a safety vehicle to lead me back to the parking area :-)

Departing again in late afternoon and guy in the tower said some nice things about TW machines. I asked for a clearance north via KAO and he asked me how high I wanted. I said 1500 would be plenty and that’s what he cleared me to. He called again when I got to the boundary and he wished me a pleasant run home. Absolutely top class treatment all the way.

I’ve been into the Alice on a number of occasions, once with a dicky engine, and again they treated me royally. Ditto Moorabbin where they got me away Special VFR on one occasion when fog was hanging around. They’re human, helpful, and I find they respond positively to good manners.

[Capn Bloggs]

And that there sums up Airservices Australia “service” just perfectly.
Cloudee, don't be ridiculous. Read the rest of what ausatc said.

if the “service” can’t handle the demand, expand the service.
Fine. You can pay. Who gave you the "unfettered right to the freeway" without paying a cent for it? You want a full-blown 24/7 radar approach service for Coffs so you can go Direct and not down the coast as sugegsted? You pay. 20 years ago, a console on TAAATS cost $1m per year, IIRC.

​​​​​​​Let's say the VFR aircraft was operating in VMC, overhead the field, doing whatever he wanted in Class E airspace. The IFR aircraft needing an approach to get down through the cloud would be in VMC at the same levels as the VFR. They would continue the approach in VMC, look out the window until they spotted the aircraft, then continue into IMC on the approach if it was safe to do so.
Absolute nonsense.

[cogwheel]

For those that have flown in the ATC system of other countries, the comments above only serve to confirm the comments of a friend that had done many ferry (non RPT) flights from both Europe and the USA. It is not the system here, but the culture of those that work the system. It maybe safe, but it does not flow very well, hence some of the comments above re VFR ops.


"Everywhere else they treat you as a professional until you prove your an idiot, but crossing the FIR boundary into Oz you are treated like an idiot until you prove your a professinal"

Maybe ASA should reflect on their culture?

[Cloudee]

Cloudee, don't be ridiculous. Read the rest of what ausatc said.

I did read the rest of it, but the first thing he/she said indicated there were many people trying to access the airspace and being denied. I have no idea where that is and I’m not blaming the controller but if LAX can have safe usable VFR corridors why can’t we design our airspace to provide the same? No, our solution is to just say no, cut Airservices staff and pay the boss a bonus for doing that. I think we should be aiming for better than that.

[The name is Porter]

Absolute nonsense.

Yeah - nah.

[TwoFiftyBelowTen]

This is what I’ve heard from the Townsville refueller....

No flight plan lodged

Clearance requested very close to the CTA step

Controller unable to issue the clearance without first completing coordination with CFS tower, “standby” is an unacceptable response , required response is “remain clear of controlled airspace” in this circumstance apparently

Controller was himself/ herself a GA pilot, would have been willing to help as they could

No further request for help/ advice received, no expression of doubt/alarm/distress

Um , that’s about it, my aircraft was refuelled by then....

[roundsounds]

There’s no way our ATS system could be at fault - it’s the second best in the world.

[TwoFiftyBelowTen]

You’re in love with Jacinda too, huh roundy?

[Squawk7700]

This is what I’ve heard from the Townsville refueller....


It is interesting how airport refuellers often know more than the authorities do... they are a bit like a golf caddy.

[andrewr]

My experience with towers as a rather geriatric Auster driver has always been fine. I flew to Essendon a couple of weeks ago and phoned up before takeoff to see if I could get a direct via Kalkallo. Lovely chap suggested I plan via Doncaster because MELBOURNE was using east-west.

That's not good service. You basically got "Clearance not available" from Melbourne Centre before you even took off. It's marginally better than telling you to plan via Westgate Bridge but not much.

Good service would be a clearance e.g. Broadford or Kilmore to Essendon, with vectors to keep you out of the way of the Tullamarine traffic. ATC can do that but they choose not to.

[Sunfish]

It’s quite clear that GA are “second class citizens”. It’s a culture thing and self reinforcing. VFR pilots in general perhaps avoid controlled airspace except during the obligatory excursion at the flight review. We are thus rusty, clumsy and hesitant which makes more work for ATC. Who then perhaps get a little curt and annoyed and the cycle continues.

YMEN must be sick of our tentative efforts during reviews and sick of requests for city orbits. No one would think of calling YMML because the answer is always going to be “no” and the thought of the paperwork and threat of prosecution if one caused an RA to an A380 freezes the blood.

To put that another way, considering the demonstrated proclivities of the regulator, dealing with officialdom of any sort is akin to stopping your car next to a police vehicle to ask for directions.

Having said that, I was always very comfortable with the wonderful and patient ATC at YMMB, who have always been a joy to talk to.

However that’s my perception.

[AmarokGTI]

While we at it why not blame the authorities for not mandating Synthetic Vision in all aircraft so they can see the rock solid stuff coming. Or even “basic” TAWS. Because VFR into IMC and/or CFIT keeps happening.
Dick always bangs on about how we are not as good as the USA. Australia could have *bettered* the US requirement to have TAWS in anything turbine with more than 12 seats (1992) or more than 6 seats (1998) by requiring it in ALL aircraft here. Accident likely avoided.

Who was the boss of CAA in 1992 and CASA in 1998?

[Dick Smith]

I have to plead guilty.

As CAA/CASA Chairman I was concentrating on reducing unnecessary costs - not increasing costs!

[havick]

Credit where credit due, the Adelaide controllers have always been extremely accommodating to VFR aircraft.

[TwoFiftyBelowTen]

It is interesting how airport refuellers often know more than the authorities do... they are a bit like a golf caddy.
If I really wanted any more detail, I’m sure my hairdresser could help. Hi Candice!

[malroy]

I have to plead guilty.

As CAA/CASA Chairman I was concentrating on reducing unnecessary costs - not increasing costs!

... and there is the real issue. If you want clearance for VFR in C, or you want C changed to E, it is going to cost. AsA would need more controllers, more consoles, and more ADSB sites.
1 new controller is a minimum $300K before they get anywhere near seperating traffic.

Dick, if you can convince the minister to remove the requirement for AsA to return a dividend to the government that would be a great first step!

The requirement to run as a business restricts services to to nonpaying clients.

(The townsville refueller seems on the money)
​
​​​
​​​​
​​

[andrewr]

... and there is the real issue. If you want clearance for VFR in C, or you want C changed to E, it is going to cost.
​​

What makes you think it isn't costing VFR already?

If I want to go to Essendon to cover CTA on a flight review, it probably costs an extra $80 to go in and out via Westgate than a more direct clearance through CTA.
I heard what was obviously a training flight (with an annoyed instructor) denied a clearance into CTA. If that flight needs to be repeated to tick off CTA, it could easily cost the aspiring CPL an extra $500.
If it takes an extra 10 minutes to track around Melbourne OCTA instead of direct, at $300/hr that's $50. Look at all the aircraft that track OCTA from one side of Melbourne to the other and back e.g. student navs. That cost might be an extra $100 per flight.

VFR pilots are paying a truckload of money to make life easier for ATC.

What do IFR aircraft pay in enroute charges? If you charged VFR aircraft e.g. 100km of enroute charges at double the IFR rate every time they received a clearance, and clearances were available as freely as they are for IFR it would probably be a fantastic deal.

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

VFR pilots don't want to pay airport charges. What makes you think they'll pay en-route fees? When you have a user pays system, the user paying for it gets priority.

[10JQKA]

VFR pilots don't want to pay airport charges. What makes you think they'll pay en-route fees? When you have a user pays system, the user paying for it gets priority.

Don’t think VFRs are subject to enroute charges.But the ones who are probably won’t like E above D in regional airspace as it would congest the terminal area too much. Also unless there is some sort of ADSB mandate for VFR the safety risk may be too high with unknown tracking on random VFR in and out of surveillance coverage in busy terminal type airspace mixing it with high performance commercial traffic.

[Lead Balloon]

Don’t think VFRs are subject to enroute charges.But the ones who are probably won’t like E above D in regional airspace as it would congest the terminal area too much. Also unless there is some sort of ADSB mandate for VFR the safety risk may be too high with unknown tracking on random VFR in and out of surveillance coverage in busy terminal type airspace mixing it with high performance commercial traffic.
Bollocks.

And to satisfy minimum post length parameters: Complete bollocks.

[iron_jayeh]

So no one seems to want to answer my question. Probably because it would render dicks argument the rubbish that it is if what I suspect is true.

How far past the cta boundary did the accident occur?

[Sunfish]

How many IFR rpt flights per day into/out of Coffs? Ten? So much for high performance jets mixing it with VFR traffic. Some of you make the East coast sound like LAX.

[OCTA Aus]

Iron Jayeh, the report doesn't really make it totally clear how long they were clear of controlled airspace for. However, the report states that the aircraft was tracking Murwillimbah direct Taree. Drawing that on a chart would have the aircraft just clipping the C step near Grafton. So realistically at an estimate the pilot was at least 10 minutes past the CTA boundary with a choice of levels ranging from surface to FL175. So its clear that Dick is totally correct, it must have been ATC that forced the pilot down low.....

Also assuming the report is correct, the pilot planned over this high terrain, which goes against Dicks assertion that ATC forced them over the high terrain. You should probably leave Dick alone though, he is doing great work, and rumour has it he is even getting close to successfully pinning the crash of MDX on the centre controller. Just look at the quality of his arguments on other threads, like the huey. The pilot is not night rated in a day VFR aircraft flying 30 mins after last light on one of the most turbulent days of the year. Totally understandable that the pilot was up flying after last light, I can't imagine there being anywhere you could land a helicopter between CFS and Williamtown. The controller clears the aircraft to operate as required, but somehow its still the fault of WLM airspace..... May as well tell the ATSB to pack up shop, the DS fan squad has solved it.

Whatever the airspace, nothing absolves the pilot in command of their responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight. All the arguments about low time pilots lacking assertiveness are irrelevant, if you lack the temperament required to meet your obligations as the PIC then you have no business flying an aircraft. Ultimately the pilot had to have had a multitude of options right up until the end, even if the option left was ask for help. Sadly for some reason the pilot didn't ask for help.

Not sure how accurate the Townsville refuellers account would be, there is a chance that some of the lead from the avgas may be affecting his/her memory.

[Vag277]

Sunfish

Go back and look at post 34. You appear to form your judgments from negative posts on pprune rather than actual experience or knowledge. I have been flying in most states as a VFR PPL for 46 years and have not had the experiences you complain about.

[Old Akro]

which goes against Dicks assertion that ATC forced them over the high terrain.

i don't think Dick is asserting that they were forced over high terrain. The crash site is pretty much on track.

It is known from the ATSB outline that ATC refused a request to enter the control steps at the aircraft's cruising level of 6500 ft, which forced it to be low level over rugged terrain.

The ATSB has not presented any weather information. Dick's hypothesis which he is seeking to test (and which has alarmingly not been considered by the ATSB) is that the Mooney was VFR on top of cloud and could have sailed above the mountain terrain happily and safely if the pilot revived a clearance to enter a control step and cut through a corner of the control steps. This is a critical piece of information that must be examined.

And Vag277, I agree with Sunfish and have experienced being screwed around by ATC because (even IFR GA) is low priority for them. I have had controllers admit to me that they descend aircraft under control steps purely for procedural ease on their part. I also believe there has been another fatal accident that was caused by controllers descending an aircraft under the steps for nothing other than procedural ease.

[iron_jayeh]

What crash is that old acro?

And Dick is not trying to ascertain anything. He's pushing his own agenda by using the atsb preliminary report. There is no investigative analysis included in the so he had no idea what or isn't being investigated.

He is a politician and a business man. You need to look at his comments from that angle and you may see through the way he writes.

All of this discussion at this point is useless until we know actually what happened.

[OCTA Aus]

i don't think Dick is asserting that they were forced over high terrain. The crash site is pretty much on track.

It is known from the ATSB outline that ATC refused a request to enter the control steps at the aircraft's cruising level of 6500 ft, which forced it to be low level over rugged terrain.

The ATSB has not presented any weather information. Dick's hypothesis which he is seeking to test (and which has alarmingly not been considered by the ATSB) is that the Mooney was VFR on top of cloud and could have sailed above the mountain terrain happily and safely if the pilot revived a clearance to enter a control step and cut through a corner of the control steps. This is a critical piece of information that must be examined.

And Vag277, I agree with Sunfish and have experienced being screwed around by ATC because (even IFR GA) is low priority for them. I have had controllers admit to me that they descend aircraft under control steps purely for procedural ease on their part. I also believe there has been another fatal accident that was caused by controllers descending an aircraft under the steps for nothing other than procedural ease.

Once again, the aircraft was at least 10 minutes past the CTA boundary when it crashed, they could have been at any level they wanted up to the base of class A airspace. ATC did not force the aircraft low, the pilot chose that option. If you draw the requested route up on the chart, then it just clips the controlled airspace. A small turn further west and the aircraft would remain clear of the controlled airspace and able to stay at 6500 if it was as clear as you were suggesting. From what I can gather in the report the pilot had lots of options and chose the most dangerous option. And it would seem when it all went pear shaped they didn’t ask for assistance. Of course that doesn’t fit dick and his fan clubs rhetoric that controllers are evil and out there to get you so I understand why those facts are being largely ignored, to the point where the person who raised the question of how long was the aircraft past the CTA boundary had to ask 3 times before they got some kind of answer. Airspace isn’t what’s killing pilots, it’s age old problems such as get there itis, overconfidence and the same things that have been getting pilots since the time of the Wright brothers.

[Piston_Broke]

which forced it to be low level over rugged terrain.

No-one forced the PIC to do anything ...

because (even IFR GA) is low priority for them.

Private flights are lowest priority behind other classes.

It's in AIP somewhere.

[junior.VH-LFA]

OCTA, you hit the nail on the head.

“If you lack the temperament required to meet your obligations as the PIC then you have no business flying an aircraft.”

Good airspace design helps. There is likely grounds to change airspace. It doesn’t absolve blame from the PIC for not flying their aircraft safely, even if that necessitates declaring a pan at the extreme end. There’s a range of options before having to do that.

[Squawk7700]

Once again, the aircraft was at least 10 minutes past the CTA boundary when it crashed, they could have been at any level they wanted up to the base of class A airspace. ATC did not force the aircraft low, the pilot chose that option.

Hard to get back up on top to be VFR over the top when you are down under the crud. They would not have have had any level available to them if it was 8/8 as suggested by others. There’s nothing worse than being stuck underneath when you can be in brilliant sunshine on top but you can’t get there.

[OCTA Aus]

Hard to get back up on top to be VFR over the top when you are down under the crud. They would not have have had any level available to them if it was 8/8 as suggested by others. There’s nothing worse than being stuck underneath when you can be in brilliant sunshine on top but you can’t get there.


Ok let’s assume you’re correct and it was totally clear on top, the pilot could have easily just turned and went around the CTA, it would only be a few extra track miles, not a big deal really. Or when they were at 4500ft they could have turned back and climbed in clearer conditions. Or are you trying to suggest there was a magic corridor of clear weather exactly one Mooney width in diameter conveniently lined up Murwillimbah direct Taree? Ultimately unless the controller in the day physically instructed the aircraft to be where they were (highly unlikely, ATC as a general rule don’t seem to issue control instructions OCTA) then it was the pilot of the aircraft that put the aircraft there, not ATC. Why are dick smiths sheep so unwilling to accept that the pilot is really responsible for the safety of their flight....

[Dick Smith]

So why is the airspace reversed?

Clearly C over D doesn’t fit the commonsense test.
Once again I am not blaming controllers -just the reversed airspace!

[junior.VH-LFA]

Why are dick smiths sheep so unwilling to accept that the pilot is really responsible for the safety of their flight....


Because it doesn’t fit their agenda. Simple as that.

[Lead Balloon]

Most of us “sheep” understand the responsibilities and obligations of a PIC.

Most of us “sheep” have more experience in the real world of command decision making than do Dick’s detractors.

When you grow up, junior, you’ll hopefully realise the extent of the damage done as a consequence of rules that are not a proportionate response to objective risk.

[OCTA Aus]

Most of us “sheep” understand the responsibilities and obligations of a PIC.

Most of us “sheep” have more experience in the real world of command decision making than do Dick’s detractors.

When you grow up, junior, you’ll hopefully realise the extent of the damage done as a consequence of rules that are not a proportionate response to objective risk.

My apologies. I forgot that being a fan of dicks politics automatically put another 10000 hours in your logbook and made you instantly far more experienced than everyone else who takes a far more measured and reasonable approach to the issues.

What many people are forgetting is there is no such thing as a perfect airspace system, all airspace will have limitations. Every time we fly there are potential threats, be they weather, mechanical, terrain, aeromedical, all the possibilities. They will always exist to some extent and that’s our job as pilots to manage them. For some reason dick seems hyper focussed on airspace, probably because it’s easy to create the outrage in the public he enjoys so much. Ultimately there are far bigger killers of pilots we really need to work on, and most of those killers are built into the pilot.....

[Capn Bloggs]

Clearly C over D doesn’t fit the commonsense test.
I agree. It should be C over C. Or D over D. As long as everybody's on the same freq and being controlled because as Dick says, the terminal area is the one with most risk, especially in the small arcs with the IFR routes. You know, Controlled Airspace. :ok:

[Squawk7700]

Ok let’s assume you’re correct and it was totally clear on top, the pilot could have easily just turned and went around the CTA, it would only be a few extra track miles, not a big deal really. Or when they were at 4500ft they could have turned back and climbed in clearer conditions. Or are you trying to suggest there was a magic corridor of clear weather exactly one Mooney width in diameter conveniently lined up Murwillimbah direct Taree? Ultimately unless the controller in the day physically instructed the aircraft to be where they were (highly unlikely, ATC as a general rule don’t seem to issue control instructions OCTA) then it was the pilot of the aircraft that put the aircraft there, not ATC. Why are dick smiths sheep so unwilling to accept that the pilot is really responsible for the safety of their flight....


You are so transparent. Why are you posting under a new username rather than continue with the old one? I’ll answer that.... because you’re hoping it will enhance your credibility to agree with your other posts!

[BronteExperimental]

I reckon I've privately flown into the Sydney basin from all directions about 300 times in the last 10y.
Probably a 50/50 mix of IFR and VFR.
100% without exception been advised/informed/told to be OCTA if I'm not doing the RNAV.
Its never been an operational issue for me as I'm on descent anyway and terrain isn't an issue....
But its pretty clear they CBF dealing with me in the terminal area regardless of traffic (which I can obv see on multiple platforms and is never remotely conflicting) and the fact I'm paying via airways charges.
Even when you do RNAV you just get told radar services terminated mid approach out of the 4500 step on the YSBK RNAV into G in cloud. Full radar coverage.
Why bother paying airways for no service at the time you actually need it and the systems are there. WOFTAM. No wonder everybody scud runs.

Clearly you could count the IFR traffic in the western sector of the CFS CTA early in the morning on about zero or 1 finger.

As frustrating as this all is (ts just arse covering and corporatisation of essential services) I don't think it had much to do with this unfortunate event.

[Mr Approach]

Hi Bronte - If you want to see what is wrong with Bankstown and the rest of the Sydney Airspace have a read of this https://www.casa.gov.au/file/158911/download?token=HgBrFWtF
It's available on the CASA web site and dates from 2015. CASA seems to have identified most if not all of the issues but then kicks the can down the road by referring to something called the Bankstown Joint Airspace and Procedures Analysis Team (JAPAT). As you will see the J stands for Joint so if you thought anything good ever came from a committee this will convince you other wise. Their reports if any do not seem to be available however the CASA recommendations are still matter of public record:
Recommendation 1:
CASA and Airservices should utilise strategies developed through the Bankstown JAPAT to reduce any potential risk factors that might be identified and apply these, where appropriate, to the wider Sydney Basin airspace, including:
o Class D airspace architecture;
o VAPs;
o Airspace integration; and
o VFR routes.
Recommendation 2:
Commonwealth aviation agencies should establish a Working Group under the auspices of the Aviation Policy Group to investigate options for the future airspace arrangements in the Sydney Basin. This will include consideration of:
o Current airspace architecture in the Sydney Basin;
o PBN airspace concepts;
o Integration of air traffic operations across the Sydney Basin;
o Optimising airspace volumes;
o Western Sydney Airport (Badgerys Creek) airspace requirements;
o ICAO SARPs and Global Air Navigation Plan; and
o International best practice such as the use of Class E airspace.
The Working Group should also build on the near term work that will be completed by the JAPAT during 2015.
Office of Airspace Regulation Page 11 of 131
Sydney Basin Aeronautical Study March 2015 Version: 1.0
Recommendation 3:
The Working Group established under Recommendation 2 should also consider Air Traffic Management (ATM)/Air Traffic Services (ATS) arrangements as part of the integration of air traffic operations across the Sydney Basin. This should include consideration of how changes to ATM policy could facilitate implementation of PBN trajectories, improve efficiency and reduce environmental impact.
Recommendation 4:
CASA should further investigate the risks associated with inappropriate flying activities reported to be occurring in close proximity to the Class D CTRs within the Sydney Basin.
Recommendation 5:
CASA and Airservices should apply strategies utilised by the JAPAT to enhance the safety and efficiency of TIFPs at other locations within the Sydney Basin including Camden and Westmead Hospital.
Recommendation 6:
Airservices should review relevant Sydney Airport TIFPs to identify areas to improve efficiency, including:
o Reduced interaction between arrival (STAR) and departure (SID) procedures to maximise potential for continuous climb and descent operations;
o Reduce radar vectoring (where appropriate); and
o Maximise use of PBN where possible.
Recommendation 7:
CASA and Airservices should review and revise, as appropriate, all sub-optimal descriptive, illustrative, regulatory, standards, guidance and advisories references to the Sydney Basin in publications (including the AIP) identified in this study to enhance safety in the Sydney Basin.
Recommendation 8:
CASA and Airservices should conduct further study of the communications issues across the wider Sydney Basin, including frequency congestion within broadcast areas and VFR routes.
Recommendation 9:
CASA and Airservices should consider the issues raised by stakeholders regarding limited access to portions of Sydney Class C airspace in the work undertaken by the Bankstown JAPAT and the Working Group established under Recommendation 2.
Recommendation 10:
Defence should consider a review of:
 Holsworthy and Richmond airspace to improve access for IFR and VFR aircraft, including airspace redesigns; and
 The use of restricted areas as substitutes for CTR/CTA airspace architecture and the dimensions of the Richmond

Has any of this ever happened? If not why not? What happens to CASA recommendations? Are they binding on anyone, even CASA?

[BlackPanther]

It really has to be reiterated that denying clearance is not necessarily as a result of conflicting traffic.

The ATC may have complex procedures that they need to go through to allow your airways clearance. There may be coordination, route requirements, local instructions, etc etc, that all need to be sorted before a clearance can be given. Not to mention systems issues with a rapidly aging ATC system.

Plus, they may not just be controlling your particular part of the world. They may be getting pumped in another section of their airspace. Plus, because of the staffing pressure that airservices is currently experiencing (due to funding pressure from industry and government), these areas of jurisdiction are getting ever larger.

I am led to believe that you can fly all the way from Archerfield to Bankstown talking to a single controller (excluding a few minutes with the Approach guys). That's a huge area to deal with, considering some of the aviation hotspots in that particular corridor.

Please don't see me as an ATC apologist. I just don't like people in this thread that are blaming ATC, when instead it's the system and culture created by industry that might be worth looking at.

[Sunfish]

I was sitting at Coffs this afternoon waiting for my ride. The high speed jet traffic was incredible, I can see why there is no VFR corridor - way too dangerous in such a heavily trafficked area, why, there must have been one movement every half hour. That includes jet water bombers.

[havick]

BlackPanther;

Everyone is in agreement that the system is broken and it isn’t the ATC’ers themselves doing it out of spite.[/left]

[Piston_Broke]

BlackPanther;
Everyone is in agreement that the system is broken

Who is "everyone"?

[Sunfish]

Everyone who is not RPT jet crew.

[The name is Porter]

It really has to be reiterated that denying clearance is not necessarily as a result of conflicting traffic.

Then that is not an air traffic control system is it? If you're denying a clearance because it's all too complex, then whomever designed the the system needs a good hard kick up the arse.

The ATC may have complex procedures that they need to go through to allow your airways clearance. There may be coordination, route requirements, local instructions, etc etc, that all need to be sorted before a clearance can be given.

So what? Do what you're paid to do.

Not to mention systems issues with a rapidly aging ATC system.

Horse****, it's not rapidly ageing.

Plus, they may not just be controlling your particular part of the world. They may be getting pumped in another section of their airspace. Plus, because of the staffing pressure that airservices is currently experiencing (due to funding pressure from industry and government), these areas of jurisdiction are getting ever larger.

Valid. Except for the funding pressure from the government, they make a profit.

I am led to believe that you can fly all the way from Archerfield to Bankstown talking to a single controller (excluding a few minutes with the Approach guys). That's a huge area to deal with, considering some of the aviation hotspots in that particular corridor.

Who's fault is that?

Please don't see me as an ATC apologist. I just don't like people in this thread that are blaming ATC, when instead it's the system and culture created by industry that might be worth looking at.

I don't see too many peeps blaming the controllers. Probably for the 10th time in this thread, it's not the controllers fault, it's the garbage airspace they work.

But I'll tell ya a couple of things, controllers are constantly told (by their employer) they are amongst the best in the world, really? They are told they have the best airspace system in the world, really? Despite this, ASA is petrified of liability, the arseguarding is world's best practice.

There is also a deep culture of 'f@ck VFR, we don't make money out of them, piss off OCTA'

[The name is Porter]

100% without exception been advised/informed/told to be OCTA if I'm not doing the RNAV.

I'd be interested to hear from any ATC around the world if they do this?

One day, ASA will be held to account for this unprofessional practice.

I'd suggest you tell them that you require the protection of controlled airspace.

[BlackPanther]

@Porter...

I think we are getting to the same point but from different paths. The entire system (I mean the Australian Industry, not TAAATS) is broken. ASA definitely believes they are the best, but I reckon that most of their ATC's don't think that. They certainly try the best, but they are stymied by bureaucracy.

Making a profit is the reason for the funding pressures. They sacked so many safety and project staff in the clean out that they can't perform basic functions now. They are creating a profit at the expense of safety. The aging of TAAATS and the reduced staffing are all as a result of trying to run Airservices commercially.

One day, ASA will be held to account for this unprofessional practice.

Can't agree more, but in a general sense, not RNAV specific. The way that company is run will one day come back to bite them.

[The name is Porter]

Black Panther, I used to be counselled for 'helping VFR out too much'. The airspace and infrastructure is an absolute joke. ASA looks shiny and new on the outside, like a showbag really, big, fat and full of ****.

[Sunfish]

Can someone tell me the point of fitting ADSB - out to a VFR aircraft if, as has been suggested, ASA has no interest in affording any services whatsoever to VFR aircraft? If I wanted to be churlish, I’d be asking why the #### should we be making their job any easier?

[BlackPanther]

Can someone tell me the point of fitting ADSB - out to a VFR aircraft if, as has been suggested, ASA has no interest in affording any services whatsoever to VFR aircraft?
I think you will find that a lot of that is tied up in politics, particularly around ASA and CASA saying that they are fostering the general aviation industry because they can have them on surveillance and provide better service.

[BronteExperimental]

I'd suggest you tell them that you require the protection of controlled airspace.

Haha. We all know I’d just be put in the hold at Bindook over tiger country for some indeterminate amount of time.

[The name is Porter]

Haha. We all know I’d just be put in the hold at Bindook over tiger country for some indeterminate amount of time.

Absolutely you would, guaranteed.

When conducting these checks, you may discover that you would be landing at your original planned destination without sufficient fuel, that is, your fixed fuel reserve remaining.

If this occurs, make an alternate plan to land safely with sufficient fuel at a different location than you had originally planned. Your new safe landing location will depend on your aircraft capabilities and the conditions.

However, if a safe landing location is not an option and you are landing with less than your fixed fuel reserve, then you must declare Mayday Fuel.

Preserving fixed fuel reserve is the foundation for in-flight fuel decision making which leads to safer operations.

That doesn't mean that in all instances preserving your fixed fuel reserve is the highest priority. There may be occasions where it is more important to exercise your judgement to determine the safest outcome, which may include landing with less than fixed fuel reserve.Why declare Mayday Fuel?The Mayday Fuel declaration aims to increase safety. It alerts other airspace users to a potential fuel problem facing an aircraft in their vicinity and ensures priority is given to that aircraft to reduce the chances of an accident.

The declaration is an internationally recognised standard aligning Australia with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization that are designed to assist in the management of aviation safety risks.

Mayday Fuel is not aimed at setting conditions to prosecute pilots or operators and a declaration does not automatically mean that emergency services will be mobilised

[KRviator]

Can someone tell me the point of fitting ADSB - out to a VFR aircraft if, as has been suggested, ASA has no interest in affording any services whatsoever to VFR aircraft? If I wanted to be churlish, I’d be asking why the #### should we be making their job any easier?As has been proven in this accident Sunfish they will know exactly where you crashed when they refuse you clearance through CTA...:}

In saying that, I have ADS-B in my RV and am quite happy to do so. I've had directed traffic information from Center (not just "aircraft 5 miles north Singleton...") several times, and the KRviatrix can track me when I'm airborne, above and beyond what Google Maps and OzRunways offer.

[Old Akro]

Can someone tell me the point of fitting ADSB - out to a VFR aircraft if, as has been suggested, ASA has no interest in affording any services whatsoever to VFR aircraft?

Ditto IFR really. Especially with the woeful cover outside the J curve and below 5,000 ft.

ADSB was to benefit the airlines, reduce AsA's capital costs of radar installations and allow AsA executives to big note themselves at ICAO meetings by being an early adopter.

[Squawk7700]

Ditto IFR really. Especially with the woeful cover outside the J curve and below 5,000 ft.

ADSB was to benefit the airlines, reduce AsA's capital costs of radar installations and allow AsA executives to big note themselves at ICAO meetings by being an early adopter.

ADSB out is great, because those of us with ADSB receivers such as the Ping, Stratux or otherwise piped into OZRunways or AvPlan can see you. Budget reliable traffic information on your iPad. Combine that with the Avplan and OZRunways 4g data feed also displaying, we may have half a chance of survival by catching conflicting traffic if ASA can’t protect us from running into each other.

[Una Due Tfc]

Can someone tell me the point of fitting ADSB - out to a VFR aircraft if, as has been suggested, ASA has no interest in affording any services whatsoever to VFR aircraft? If I wanted to be churlish, I’d be asking why the #### should we be making their job any easier?

I'm an ATCO in another part of the world so cannot comment on Oz specific issues, but it's being said that Aireon Alert were able to provide data to OZ SAR via space based ADSB that narrowed the crash site to within 1 square NM. In an accident where there are survivors, this could be the difference between life and death, so there is a benefit there.

[Squawk7700]

I'm an ATCO in another part of the world so cannot comment on Oz specific issues, but it's being said that Aireon Alert were able to provide data to OZ SAR via space based ADSB that narrowed the crash site to within 1 square NM. In an accident where there are survivors, this could be the difference between life and death, so there is a benefit there.

It would be better if that system could help prevent the crash in the first place!

[Dick Smith]

The ATSB final report has been released on the Mooney crash with two fatalities west of Coffs Harbour on 20 September 2019. Here is a link: https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5779252/ao-2019-052-final.pdf

I believe the ATSB is deficient in this report because they don’t mention that the only way to operate Class C airspace satisfactorily in the terminal environment is to use an approach radar facility. The Minister’s directive of 2004 made this quite clear.

It is all very well to blame the air traffic controller and pilot, but to ignore a Minister’s directive with no explanation, and then not even cover it in the ATSB report, shows that something is going on here.

[iron_jayeh]

The ATSB final report has been released on the Mooney crash with two fatalities west of Coffs Harbour on 20 September 2019. Here is a link: https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5779252/ao-2019-052-final.pdf

I believe the ATSB is deficient in this report because they don’t mention that the only way to operate Class C airspace satisfactorily in the terminal environment is to use an approach radar facility. The Minister’s directive of 2004 made this quite clear.

It is all very well to blame the air traffic controller and pilot, but to ignore a Minister’s directive with no explanation, and then not even cover it in the ATSB report, shows that something is going on here.

The atsb is not there to comment on ministerial directions. They report on the facts of the case, their opinion on the cause and recommendations. Why should they get involved in political manoeuvring.

And I just knew you'd be here today beating your drum.

[Capt Fathom]

And I just knew you'd be here today beating your drum.

He's not the only one apparently! :rolleyes:

[Squawk7700]

The atsb is not there to comment on ministerial directions. They report on the facts of the case, their opinion on the cause and recommendations.

There you have it... and who pays their wages?

[Old Akro]

Before we play the normal "pile on Dick" game. I think the point he is making is that there is a pre-existing directive from the Minister about use of approach radar in the airspace of the accident. If there is a Ministerial directive as Dick asserts and if AsA has not complied with this directive then subsequently there has been an accident that could have been avoided if AsA complied with the Minister's directive, then Dick is absolutely correct in suggesting that the ATSB has been deficient in its investigation.

[iron_jayeh]

So Dick, where is evidence of this directive and what does it say

[Dick Smith]

CLEARANCE NOT AVAILABLE is a reply you get from ATC only in Australia..

In five flights around the world I have only heard this terminology in this country.

The ATSB have effectively blamed the pilot and the ATC for this accident.

What is dishonestly not covered is the fact that the ATC was also responsible for aircraft in un controlled airspace at the same time. This clearly was a contributing factor.

A famous poster on this site, namely Bindook called the class C airspace above D “ roadblock airspace” He was correct. And now two lives have been lost.

The ATSB needs to re do this report and stop protecting the minister and AsA.

[Dick Smith]

Iron. See post number 1 on this thread.

[andrewr]

The full report makes interesting reading.

The planned flight path tracked west of Coffs Harbour through the corner of the 5500 step to the north, and the 3500 and 4500 steps to the south.
The pilot was at 6500 and contacted ATC and requested clearance to track through the corner of the 5500 step (less than 3 minutes transit time).
The controller (a trainee under supervision) advised clearance in class C was not available due to workload, and suggested transit through the class D airspace. There were no other aircraft in the Coffs Harbour airspace and no expected IFR arrivals or departures, however "controller performance assessment reports and daily training records included debriefing and coaching comments emphasising to trainees and controllers to be cautious with issuing clearances below A080 through the [Coffs Harbour] airspace" and the supervisor judged denying the clearance was conservative but appropriate.
The pilot contacted the Class D controller, who asked whether he wanted to remain at 6500. The pilot said yes, so the Class D controller said to contact the class C controller for clearance.
The pilot switches back to the Class C controller, and meanwhile the class D controller has also advised the Class C controller to expect the call.
The Class C controller sends the pilot back to the Class D controller again. At this point I imagine the pilot stress levels are rising.
The Class D controller says that clearance would only be available "not above 1000 feet", but doesn’t provide any tracking instructions.
It appears that the pilot read back "not above 1000 feet" as if it were a clearance, entered the Class C and began descending. Terrain was about 3000-4000 feet.
Shortly afterward, the pilot reported that they were OCTA at 4100 in clear conditions, and that they would be requesting clearance through the southern steps when they reached them.
The Class D controller asked them to report entering controlled airspace.
After a short climb they continued to descend until they crashed.

Communications between the pilot and ATC seem to be important in the context of the report. Did the pilot believe he had received a clearance down to 1000 feet, implying that there was no high ground on track? Did he believe ATC was managing terrain clearance?

A transcript of the actual radio calls would be very helpful. Times are not given for most of the events and they are discussed out of sequence. For example, the report implies that the pilot entered class C immediately after the clearance was denied and presents it as an airspace infringement, but the altitudes in the other requests suggests that it happened after the pilot read back "not above 1000 feet" i.e. he may have thought he had received a clearance requiring a descent.

Important issues are e.g.

ATC denied clearance due to workload for no obvious reason - there were no other aircraft in the airspace.
Pilots need to maintain awareness of terrain clearance and not assume that ATC are protecting them even if they have received a clearance or instructions.
ATC need to be alert for pilots reading back things that are not meant to be clearances or instructions and clarify if necessary.

The big question is whether the presentation in the report (no transcript, events out of order) is deliberate obfuscation to make it difficult to understand the role of ATC in the accident.

[Sunfish]

So basically according to the Coroner, Airservices murdered the pilot and passenger. Judging by what happened to Glen Buckley, CASA murders the industry and judging by the quality of its reports, ATSB murders the truth.

How can anyone consider anything these institutions do as promoting safe aviation? All of these alleged behaviours encourage industry participants into unsafe behaviours.

[Lead Balloon]

My view is that Airservices, ATSB and CASA are now effectively running a mutual protection racket. What’s not said in ATSB reports or not followed up by ATSB speaks volumes.

As another recent example, the ATSB report on the Renmark tragedy says:The operator’s training and checking manual procedure for simulating an engine failure in a turboprop aircraft was inappropriate and increased the risk of asymmetric control loss.
...
Despite the operator’s procedure being approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), reducing the power to flight idle on a turboprop aircraft is not representative of the drag associated with a real engine failure as it does not take account of the beneficial effect of auto-feather/negative torque sensing systems. Consequently, had flight idle been selected it would have created significantly more drag on the ‘failed’ engine, making it more difficult to control the aircraft and achieve the expected OEI performance. While the operator’s procedure only required use of this power setting during the initial ‘phase one’ checks (which would be expected to be completed in less than 30 seconds), it has been a contributing factor to previous asymmetric loss of control accidents (for example AO-2010-019 in the section titled Related occurrences).

The ATSB sought information from CASA regarding the circumstances under which the incorrect procedure was approved for use by the operator. Despite this request, no information was provided by CASA. Consequently, the ATSB was unable to determine whether the approval of incorrect information was an isolated human error or symptomatic of a systemic deficiency with the approval process.Well that’s OK then. Nothing more can usefully be done to find the truth. Move on, nothing to see here. Only three dead.

(Perhaps the deceased, including the CASA FOI, were among the critics of CASA identified in Mr Carmody’s ‘research’ as being the kinds of people likely to have accidents. Maybe those involved in the Mangalore tragedy, too...)

ATSB has powers to compel the disclosure of information, and the failure to disclose when compelled to do so is a criminal offence. The only people excused are coroners in their capacity as coroners. Those powers are there precisely to enable ATSB to obtain information when it is not volunteered, and that includes when not volunteered by CASA.

Although the procedure was - according to ATSB - “not necessarily contributory to the accident”, the procedure was - according to ATSB - “inappropriate and, if followed, increased the risk of asymmetric control loss.”

Wouldn’tcha think it might be important to find out whether CASA had insisted on the risk-increasing, folklore-based procedure to be in the operator’s C&T Manual, or whether CASA had overlooked the existence of the risk-increasing, folklore-based procedure in that Manual? If either of those were true, would it not follow that CASA may be part of the problem? And wouldn’tcha think it might be important to make a recommendation - or whatever the weasel word is these days - for CASA to find out whether the risk-increasing, folklore-based procedure is in other T&C Manuals and get the procedure removed?

The “safety issues and management” part of the report focussed on procedures for the safety of CASA personnel! “The [CASA temporary safety instruction’s] intent was to generally provide higher risk protection around operations involving CASA flying operations inspectors (FOIs).” Make CASA FOIs ‘safer’ and the job’s done!

[andrewr]

So basically according to the Coroner, Airservices murdered the pilot and passenger.

Murder is probably a bit strong. I would say negligence and dereliction of duty though. Air traffic is their job.

Training notes discouraging issuing clearances below 8000 and a controller whose first instinct in their first week of on the job training is to deny a clearance despite zero traffic in the airspace suggest something rotten at Airservices.

[Lookleft]

It never ceases to amaze me how people will just read what supports their bias in these accident reports. I am very much of the view that a PIC needs to take that responsibility seriously and plan for contingencies that are within their control, fuel, weather navigation etc. Have another read and note what this PIC did not do that had a significant influence on the sequence of events. Did not have a recent BFR

Based on the available information, the ATSB concluded that the pilot had not met the CASR Part 61 flight review requirements and, as such, did not hold the required licence to undertake the
flight.

Did not have any charts or EFB available to at least have some understanding of terrain and most likely did not obtain a weather forecast

The ATSB also found that the pilot was not carrying suitable navigation equipment and had most likely not obtained the required weather forecasts. These factors reduced the pilot's ability to
manage the flight path changes and identify the high terrain. This led to the aircraft being descended toward the high terrain in visibility conditions below that required for visual flight, resulting in controlled flight into terrain.

ATC contributed in part by not providing a clearance but as it states in the report.the PIC could have taken a route that did not put him in the high ground.

While it was the pilot’s decision to descend from 6,500 ft and continue along the direct track instead of other available safe options, this decision was likely influenced by the information provided by the controller

I always challenge the assertion that ATC tell pilots what to do. any pilot who thinks that will come unstuck. I have heard it said that ATC will kill you if you let them. In this accident the PIC was along for the ride just as much as his unfortunate passenger was. The Australian system is far from perfect but it is what it is and to operate in it you have to be up to speed on how it works. Transits through coastal CTZ should not be a rarity but denial of a clearance is always a possibility and should be planned for. The lesson out of this report to pilots is stay current. plan your trip and accept your responsibility as PIC. With the information provided in the report this bloke did none of that and the unfortunate confluence of circumstance lead to his death and that of his passenger. If he had got a clearance through Coffs then maybe the accident would not have happened but with such an attitude to his responsibilities it was possibly only a matter of time before it did.

[KRviator]

Where's the Coroner's report, Sunfish? I've had good look through their website and stuffed if I can find it online.

[Checklist Charlie]

I do wonder if Lead Balloon's obvservation My view is that Airservices, ATSB and CASA are now effectively running a mutual protection racket. What’s not said in ATSB reports or not followed up by ATSB speaks volumes. could perhaps be further explained by the career path involving all 3 organisations of the current ATSB Commissioner.

May be, maybe not!

CC

[Dick Smith]

The text in my letter to Greg Hood of 18 September 2020 is self-explanatory - see below:

Dear Greg

Further to my letter of 16 March 2020 regarding the fatal Mooney crash on 20 September 2019, I trust that your report will make it absolutely clear that the reason for the attached direction for Airservices to put in an approach radar facility at places like Coffs Harbour was to move away from the “road block” airspace.

As shown in the attached letter, a previous consultant to the CAA, Mr Tony Broderick (the ex-FAA Flight Standards Deputy Associate Administrator and head of the Regulation and Certification Complex) had made it absolutely clear that Class C could not be operated safely without an approach radar facility.

I explained that the way we did it in Australia was simply to deny a clearance to the VFR aircraft, with the associated safety implications.

This appears to be what happened in the case of the Mooney accident.

Please make sure these important points are covered, as well as the fact that Airservices has not complied with the direction.

Best regards

Dick Smith

I would like to make it very clear, because I was involved at the time, that the only reason for the Minister’s directive was to prevent accidents such as the Mooney crash west of Coffs Harbour.

It is simply unconscionable that the ATSB does not mention this.

[Capn Bloggs]

a previous consultant to the CAA, Mr Tony Broderick (the ex-FAA Flight Standards Deputy Associate Administrator and head of the Regulation and Certification Complex) had made it absolutely clear that Class C could not be operated safely without an approach radar facility.
And for decades before, we safely operated non-radar Class C (actually "CTA") over vast enroute nd terminal areas. Just because some yank who hasn't been outside his own backyard thinks something doesn't make it true.

As always, it's about money. A radar approach service at towered airports costs. Stop making AsA "make" money for it's owners and we might get a better service.

[Dick Smith]

Bloggs. Are you suggesting that in this case Airservices are putting profits and management bonuses in front of safety?
Surely not.

[Dick Smith]

Lookleft, you state in your post:

Transit through coastal CTZ should not be a rarity but denial of a clearance is always a possibility and should be planned for.

Lookleft, why should they be planned for? Surely you agree that if Airservices had changed the airspace back to Class E, as they had planned to do, and as mentioned in the ATSB report, the pilot and his passenger would most likely be alive today.

If you are suggesting that pilots flying over Class D airspace should do all their planning on the possibility that they may not get a clearance, that is something that would only be required uniquely in Australia. Surely we should follow world’s best practice.

[Lookleft]

Dick what are your thoughts on a pilot who did not do the legally required BFR? Could you please comment on what you think should be done about pilots who do not do any flight planning or even obtain a weather forecast before they operate? Do you agree that pilots should always plan contingencies for any flight they conduct or that a single plan of action will do? When you flew around the world in a helicopter did you blindly follow what ATC told you to do or did you have a contingency plan/ In this instance ATC definitely influenced the sequence of events but this pilot should not have been flying with their haphazard attitude to flying. Especially in a relatively high performance single such as the Mooney.

[Mark__]

I do think Dick has a strong point here, and Airservices do provide a substandard ATC service compared to the US. Some controllers seem to get flustered anytime there is more than a couple of non RPT aircraft in their sector. Only have to look at how restrictive they have been with ILS training in the Melbourne basin over the years. They forget when denying clearances in the modern age we can now see all the same traffic (or more likely lack of) ADS-B returns on our iPads as they see when assessing the traffic load and deciding whether to fit a GA aircraft into the flow or not.

Without doubt the back and forth between the class D & C controllers and the ultimate refusal of the clearance was a contributing factor to the accident (especially with no IFR arrivals or departures at Coffs Harbour at the time). However the pilot only needed to get a forecast including a sat pic and plan his flight coastal seeking a not above clearance/transit through Coffs’ class D to have ensured a totally different outcome. Perhaps filing a flight plan may have also helped with more efficient handling by ATC as well. Very “relaxed” attitude to airmanship by the PIC to put it mildly.

[Dick Smith]

Here is an article from Sydney’s Daily Telegraph headed “Lack of training, GPS behind fatal plane crash.” Notice how the article makes no mention of ATC involvement and the denial of a clearance. It also omits that Airservices had not complied with the safety directive to provide an approach radar facility where Class C above Class D was in use.

Notice that it puts all the blame on the pilot and mentions that the pilot had started to descend near high terrain, without suggesting in any way that a clearance had been refused at the obviously safer level for terrain clearance of 6,500 feet

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1613x1210/daily_telegraph_20_1_21_lack_of_training_gps_behind_fatal_pl ane_crash_92d12e075fb319f11119330125f5af0d07642ccd.jpg

[Dick Smith]

Lookleft, I agree with the drift of your approach and it is clear that the ATSB has made important observations.

However that doesn’t explain why they have decided to leave out the fact that Airservices had been given a directive by the Minister – which if complied with, would have resulted in the airpace being Class E, or an approach radar facility being provided.

In each case, there is less likelihood that the plane would have crashed with the loss of the lives of two people.

[Lookleft]

I agree that an approach radar at all Class C airports is the safer way to go and I don't disagree that there is less likelihood of this accident occurring if one had been available. If a radar is not available however don't plan or make decisions based on the desire that one should be available. The lack of a radar and a clearance exacerbated the poor airmanship, it didn't cause it.

[Squawk7700]

Some controllers seem to get flustered anytime there is more than a couple of non RPT aircraft in their sector. They forget when denying clearances in the modern age we can now see all the same traffic (or more likely lack of) ADS-B returns on our iPads as they see when assessing the traffic load and deciding whether to fit a GA aircraft into the flow or not.



Melbourne is a shocker. They don’t care for giving you a clearance unless your aircraft has a blue tail on it. I’ve got ADSB in, with OZRunways and Avplan traffic too (arguably I can actually see and identity more traffic than they can) and I’ve recently been denied multiple clearances that would have been a non-event a few years back) when there has been visibly next to zero traffic in the whole Melbourne airspace sector.

When denied a clearance I usually reply and suggest that I can take any altitude of their choice including vectoring. The response usually includes a level of spite that subconsciously suggests how dare I ask again when I’ve already been told no.

I often don’t care if I have to go 30 miles or more out of the way if it means I can avoid some terrible turbulence and near scud-running at the legal minimum altitude over built-up areas.

Perhaps it would be good practice for these pilots flying as students of the blue tail to be denied a clearance on occasion so they can actually learn how to read a map and navigate around Melbourne and learn properly, rather than being guided and babied through airspace by ATC.

Edit: it has occurred to me that those IFR students are paying for the service and as a VFR I am not. I’ve often wondered if that is a factor in all this.

[gerry111]

"a fiery plane crash" eh, Georgia Clark?
I'm pretty sure there wasn't a fire.
(But this was from the Daily Telegraph.)

[andrewr]

what are your thoughts on a pilot who did not do the legally required BFR? Could you please comment on what you think should be done about pilots who do not do any flight planning or even obtain a weather forecast before they operate?

Those aspects were quite well covered in the report. However, accidents rarely have one cause and it's worth looking into other contributing factors.

The pilot wanted to stay at 6500, and the simple way to remain OCTA was to divert about 5 miles right of track. After the initial clearance was denied, the pilot did turn right, presumably that was their intention.

Then the Class D controller provides a clearance into class D (2 way communication constitutes a clearance) with the instruction "at or below 1000 feet" but no tracking instructions. The pilot reads back "At or below 1000 feet", turns back on track and begins descending. There was no reason the pilot would descend other than to comply with the "at or below" instruction.

If there was a communication misunderstanding between the pilot and ATC that resulted in the aircraft descending into the ground in bad weather, is that aspect worth investigating? Or do we just put it down to the fact that he didn't do a BFR?

[le Pingouin]

Edit: it has occurred to me that those IFR students are paying for the service and as a VFR I am not. I’ve often wondered if that is a factor in all this.

Nothing to do with paying, everything to do with being VFR.

[Sunfish]

You all know where this ends up, don't you?

[Lookleft]

Read the report andrew! The pilot was not given a clearance to descend to 1000', he was advised that if he wanted to transit the CTZ VFR he would have to descend to 1000'

In response to the pilot’s request, the Class D controller advised that ‘…the only way you could transit this airspace VFR would be around… not above one thousand [feet]’. The pilot responded
that the flight would descend to ‘not above 1,000 ft’ and commenced a descent from 6,500 ft. The controller had also requested that the pilot report at the 7 NM airspace boundary to receive a
clearance, but had not provided any tracking information

I'm not sure where you get this from:2 way communication constitutes a clearance. A clearance to descend would have been prefixed by "You are cleared to...." He was OCTA he didn't need a clearance but if he wanted to transit the Coffs control zone he would only get one at not above 1000'.

The lack of a BFR was an indication of the pilots attitude to his responsibilities as was the lack of planning and obtaining a weather forecast. When will the GA population of Australia stop thinking that if only ATC were better then VFR into IFR accidents wouldn't happen?

[Sunfish]

Lookleft: The lack of a BFR was an indication of the pilots attitude to his responsibilities as was the lack of planning and obtaining a weather forecast. When will the GA population of Australia stop thinking that if only ATC were better then VFR into IFR accidents wouldn't happen?


When will the BFR be more than an expensive box ticking exercise (unfair to some)? When will the regulations actually encourage safe behaviours? When will enforcement encourage safe behaviour? When will accident analysis and reporting encourage safe behaviour? However that is actually irrelevant.

To put that another way, suppose the pilot was an ab initio student high on drugs and alcohol in a stolen aircraft. Does that absolve Airservices? Of course not! They have no way of knowing the state of the pilot unless she tells them!

The idea that a BFR and a map may have saved them from Airservices is a fantasy.

[Lookleft]

Thanks Sunfish you have made my point for me. To paraphrase Clinton "Its your attitude stoopid."

[Mark__]

Melbourne is a shocker. They don’t care for giving you a clearance unless your aircraft has a blue tail on it. I’ve got ADSB in, with OZRunways and Avplan traffic too (arguably I can actually see and identity more traffic than they can) and I’ve recently been denied multiple clearances that would have been a non-event a few years back) when there has been visibly next to zero traffic in the whole Melbourne airspace sector.

When denied a clearance I usually reply and suggest that I can take any altitude of their choice including vectoring. The response usually includes a level of spite that subconsciously suggests how dare I ask again when I’ve already been told no.

I often don’t care if I have to go 30 miles or more out of the way if it means I can avoid some terrible turbulence and near scud-running at the legal minimum altitude over built-up areas.

Perhaps it would be good practice for these pilots flying as students of the blue tail to be denied a clearance on occasion so they can actually learn how to read a map and navigate around Melbourne and learn properly, rather than being guided and babied through airspace by ATC.

Edit: it has occurred to me that those IFR students are paying for the service and as a VFR I am not. I’ve often wondered if that is a factor in all this.

Nailed it Squawk! Ahh yes the spite or tone in the reply, maybe even a sigh if you’re lucky hahaha. Love that you don’t let them off that easy with an offer of complete flexibility.... must remember that reply next time!

[Thirsty]

From the final report:
"At altitudes less than 1,000 ft along a track between the aircraft’s position and Coffs Harbour Airport and more significantly, along a continuation of the direct track to Taree, terrain clearance was not possible. However, the pilot did not voice any concerns with the advice provided and the flight descended on the direct track to Taree." (my emphasis)
Quite interesting.

Is the inclusion of the following a deference to this thread?
"Future Coffs Harbour airspace reclassification
Prior to the accident, Airservices commenced the Airspace Modernisation Program (http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/projects/airspace-modernisation/). This program will reclassify the Class C airspace above Coffs Harbour to Class E. At the time of writing, the timeframe for the completion of this program was not available.
Undertaking a VFR transit of the Class E airspace will not require a clearance."

[Outtahere]

Lookleft- 'I'm not sure where you get this from'

AIP 2.2.12.2 'For entry into Class D airspace establishment of two way communications between an aircraft & ATC constitutes a clearance for the pilot to enter the Class D airspace'

[Lookleft]

Thanks OH for the reference. It certainly doesn't constitute a clearance to anything else such as climb or descend. For that you need a very specific clearance.

[Capn Bloggs]

AIP 2.2.12.2 'For entry into Class D airspace establishment of two way communications between an aircraft & ATC constitutes a clearance for the pilot to enter the Class D airspace'
Imported directly from Yanksville, Of course it doesn't need to make sense, as long as they do it it must be OK.

[jonkster]

2.2.12.2 needs to be read in conjunction with the table in 2.2.12.3.

If you state your intentions and ATC *acknowledge* your call and give nothing else, you must comply with your stated intentions (ie although they haven't said 'you are cleared', you have been cleared to enter D and your 'clearance' is effectively 'do what you said you would do'). Also you *can* descend to join the circuit if no altitude instructions subsequently given.

If ATC give you specific instructions (which seems to be the more common case), you are cleared to enter D and your clearance is to do what you were instructed (although you *can* descend if no altitude instructions given by ATC).

Also VFR aircraft operating in D are responsible for maintaining themselves in VMC.

[andrewr]

The pilot was not given a clearance to descend to 1000', he was advised that if he wanted to transit the CTZ VFR he would have to descend to 1000'

What the controller expected and what the pilot understood seem to have been different. I am suggesting that this should have been explored more in the report.

A full transcript of the communications would be useful. The communications that are included are short excerpts out of context so it is hard to be sure what was meant. Listing the events in sequence with timestamps would be useful.

The airspace steps that the pilot wanted to transit were Class D below Class C. He was told to request clearance from the Class D controller.

It appears he had 2 way communication and wasn't told to stay OCTA, so technically had clearance to enter Class D (but the controller may not have expected that).

He didn't receive tracking instructions from ATC, so he was REQUIRED to track according to his request. The controller said clearance was available at or below 1000 feet. The pilot read back "at or below 1000 feet" i.e. he appeared to interpret that as an instruction, and began to descend. He didn't want to descend, which supports the idea that he viewed it as an instruction.

Misunderstandings between pilots and ATC are one of the more useful areas to investigate, because there are often things that can be changed.

[McLimit]

As another has stated, the ATC/Pilot comms quoted are out of context and not in their entirety, it is difficult to get a handle on the exact sequence of events. The ATC work does appear to be sloppy though and Airservices response is an attempt to pull the wool over your eyes. Class D Towers in Australia are not operated as to how ICAO intended and if they were modelled on the way the US runs them? Well, yet more wool pulling.

Having said that, any attempt at apportioning blame to ATC for this accident is spurious and deflection at its best. It may be how the legal system works in Australia? Or how accident investigation works?

Intentional flight into IMC by an unqualified pilot, blatant and intentional rule breaches by the PIC, the ones that can (and did) kill people. Clearly no understanding of LSALT, the list goes on.

[Lookleft]

It appears he had 2 way communication and wasn't told to stay OCTA, so technically had clearance to enter Class D (but the controller may not have expected that).

He would have had to have been in contact with the Class D controller i.e. Coffs Tower for that statement to be correct. Had he descended to 1000' coastal and contacted the Tower for a clearance to transit the Class D control zone it is highly likely that would have been given. don't forget that the controller he was in contact with was a trainee.

What the controller expected and what the pilot understood seem to have been different.

I think that is absolutely what happened but we will never know what the pilot understood. I'm not sure that having the full transcript would clarify it either as it can't inform the reader as to nuance and tone of the communication.

Misunderstandings between pilots and ATC are one of the more useful areas to investigate, because there are often things that can be changed.

As a PIC you are responsible for clearing up any misunderstanding that you may have with an ATC instruction especially if you think it is going to lead to a dangerous situation. It is beyond comprehension as to why the pilot thought that ATC were telling him to descend to 1000' over high terrain. All he had to do was ask for clarification of the instruction. The report stated

A review of recorded air traffic control surveillance data showed that after the pilot reported that the flight was operating in clear conditions, the aircraft was climbed to about 4,500 ft in Class G uncontrolled airspace and continued on a direct track until 0732. At that time, the aircraft commenced a descent, which continued until the last recorded position about 1 minute later.

Possibly he did have doubts which is why he climbed back up to 4,500'. That was the time to speak up but he then started a descent. I stated in a previous post that ATC will kill you but only if you let them. Despite what some of them think they are not in the cockpit and do not have the authority to make you do anything that you consider will affect the safety of your aircraft and passengers. The main reason these reports are published is to hopefully educate other pilots on how to avoid a similar situation. I would be interested in peoples response as to how this accident might change the way they operate. I would hope that the big lesson learnt is to always be in control of your situation when operating as a PIC.

[Lead Balloon]

That’s why the actual recordings of comms, and not selective, mistake-ridden transcripts or summaries of them, should be made available as part of these reports. I agree with the points being made by andrewr.

[junior.VH-LFA]

Controllers in Class D airspace do not have responsibility for terrain clearance. Regardless of what clearance you receive in class D, it’s your responsibility as the driver to keep yourself alive.

A pilot without a valid license, BFR, seemingly unprepared and out of their depth allowed themselves to descend into terrain.

Would a clearance have prevented this? Yes, of course. Should not getting a clearance have been a reason to descend into terrain as a VFR aircraft? No. There was a multitude of other options available to the pilot rather than just accepting a descent to below 1000ft, one must ask if they were even in VMC conditions at all when they commenced that.

If better procedures come as a result of this, then that’s good, and it’s good that the report has spent considerable time detailing the failings in ASA’s processes. It’s not the silver bullet though for what seems to be a continuing list of accidents where VFR pilots allow themselves to hit the ground in IMC. By the letter of the law, the pilot had no business being in an aeroplane that day at all.

[Lead Balloon]

Circumstances in which a “controller” is not in control. What possible confusion could arise from that?

And I know, from personal experience, how dangerously incompetent I become the day after my BFR falls due.

[junior.VH-LFA]

Circumstances in which a “controller” is not in control. What possible confusion could arise from that?

And I know, from personal experience, how dangerously incompetent I become the day after my BFR falls due.

Probably minimal confusion if you had read about Class D airspace or done some preparation before expecting to fly into it. If you haven’t been identified, how is a controller supposed to provide you with terrain clearance? Seems like a pretty common sense thing really, wouldn’t you say?

Is the day after the same as 5 years? Just clarifying.

[Lead Balloon]

I know it’s always the fault of the pilot. There will never be any other contributing factor in any aviation accident or incident.

[junior.VH-LFA]

It’s actually incredible watching you wheel this out where two posts above I have said verbatim:

“If better procedures come as a result of this, then that’s good, and it’s good that the report has spent considerable time detailing the failings in ASA’s processes.”

😂

But thanks anyway for your informative answers to my above questioning. It’s clear you have no agenda to push.

[Squawk7700]

And I know, from personal experience, how dangerously incompetent I become the day after my BFR falls due.

I seriously doubt I’ve taken away any skill that I didn’t posses before, by doing my last 3 BFR’s or more.

Many pilots take their learning from their original instructors and complement that over the years with idle gossip from the airport about changes to procedures, plus possibly the odd email from CASA about rule changes and possibly if they are lucky, may take something away from their AFR.

The one hour flight time for the AFR and the little quiz that some offer is arguably a waste of time and purely a box-ticking exercise.

Maybe I’ve been doing mine with the wrong operators...

I am confident that for IFR pilots that the story is quite different, however old-mate with his 1,000 hours and his Garmin Aera has probably been flying this way and hasn’t changed since his licence test, like many other pilots out there.

[Lead Balloon]

Yep. Spot on. If AFRs achieved anything substantial, there’d be consistency in radio broadcasts.

Junior: My ‘agenda’ is safety.

[Arm out the window]

Maybe all the Chuck Yeagers out there can maintain all the skill they need without needing AFRs, but I'm not ashamed to say that having to get a bit of critical scrutiny from an instructor for a check flight (and then only every two years!) is beneficial for me, and a good reality check to remind me that I can **** up in new and interesting ways even after decades in the seat.

[McLimit]

The one hour flight time for the AFR and the little quiz that some offer is arguably a waste of time and purely a box-ticking exercise.

Maybe CASA should be having a chat to any instructor that is merely ticking boxes.

Maybe I’ve been doing mine with the wrong operators...

I reckon you probably are.

The Flight Review can also (and should) be a training exercise. An opportunity for the candidate to ask 'WTF goes on in these Class D volumes?' or 'can you run through some radio calls with me' or 'I do a regular flight from Glen Innes to Taree but the track I take is a pain in the arse, your thoughts?' But more often than not you get a phone call saying 'how much will a Flight Review cost me??'

It doesn't matter what class of airspace you are in, as a pilot, it's your responsibility to not hit anything, regardless of any thing a controller says to you or tells you what to do.

[jmmoric]

How do they handle VFR traffic in class D airspace in Australia?

I mean, in some places they're very much unrestricted, providing a clearance and then traffic information if conflicting traffic should happen making the pilots themselves responsible for the separation (updating if necessary to avoid collision).

[Capn Bloggs]

ATC in Class D tend to be a bit more bossy, which is fine by me. The last thing I need is to be negotiating with a VFR about the landing sequence in a control zone. :cool:

[McLimit]

How do they handle VFR traffic in class D airspace in Australia

There are eerie similarities to the old GAAP control zones. I liked GAAP, didn't see the need for change to Class D. However, if you're going to call it Class D shouldn't it be run that way? Another problem with them here is that they all seemed to have developed their own special procedures. Flying in one Class D procedure wise can be significantly different to another. How are you supposed to be consistent as a pilot in the way you operate?

The last thing I need is to be negotiating with a VFR about the landing sequence in a control zone.

You as a pilot will not be negotiating a landing sequence with another pilot in ANY Australian control zone.

[Lookleft]

Circumstances in which a “controller” is not in control. What possible confusion could arise from that?

That is the problem. The pilot thought that ATC was in control. ATC are never in control of your aircraft and the way it is operated. If thats the prevailing attitude in GA then good luck you are going to need it. If your attitude towards a BFR is that it is just a box ticking exercise then it is your attitude that is the problem not the rules. I am in the simulator 4 times a year and never do I take the attitude that it is a box ticking exercise and that I have nothing to learn. If you think you have nothing to learn then "its your attitude stoopid" If you think getting a weather forecast is a waste of time then"its your attitude stoopid". If you think that technology has made proper flight planning redundant then "its your attitude stoopid". If you think that safety is all about the system then...you know the rest. Safety starts with your attitude towards flying. Your attitude to obtaining information, your attitude towards using a mandated check flight as a learning opportunity, your attitude towards applying the fundamentals of operating an aircraft i.e planning, weather, fuel. This report states that ATC could have handled the original clearance request differently and Airservices are addressing that through additional training of its controllers. It also very clearly states the PIC was not required to or issued a clearance to descend into the ground. Once he decided that he was required to descend because ATC told him and did not clarify that instruction then the outcome was inevitable. I hope that GA pilots will take some important lessons from this tragedy but from some of what I have seen posted I don't think they will.

[Capn Bloggs]

You as a pilot will not be negotiating a landing sequence with another pilot in ANY Australian control zone.
Precisely my point. But IFR is theoretically given Traffic on VFR (and vv). So what is it? Do I then have to negotiate with the VFR re tracking, or is ATC just giving me traffic so I can take evasive action if I see fit?

A control zone should be a control zone with all aircraft under air traffic control; none of this "traffic" nonsense. This is, of course, generally the way Australian ATC operate our Class D. Make it Class C and be done with it.

Controlled or Uncontrolled. Sound familiar, Griffo?

[Lead Balloon]

ATC are never in control of your aircraft and the way it is operated.Are they never in control of where your aircraft may lawfully be operated?

If yes, best to change the name.

[Lookleft]

Declare a MAYDAY and you go where you need to go. As a PIC you are always in control of where your aircraft may be lawfully operated. I don't imagine for one minute LB that you ever fly an aircraft where you do what ATC instruct you to do if it conflicts with the operation of your aircraft. I also dont imagine that you have ever rocked up to Controlled Airspace not having an alternate plan if a clearance is not available.

[Ixixly]

Here's my question to the masses here that doesn't seem to have been actually answered so far, WHY was this Pilot denied a clearance through Class D Airspace in this circumstance? And No, I don't think "Workload" in this case is a valid reason and seems to be some kind of coverall being used.

In Aviation we have many safety nets, everyone knows the swiss cheese model, in this case, the Pilot basically bore themselves a hole halfway through the swiss cheese by not being prepared or legal for this flight, there's NOTHING REASONABLE that can be done about this now without a time machine to go back and force them to take the proper steps, there is also very little I think that can be done in the future to stop someone else making similar decisions. What we can do is look at the layer that does currently still exist and focus on making that better in the future. All the talk about a valid AFR and planning IMHO are moot at this point, they've been put out there and should serve as a warning for all Pilots to not take these things likely but the ones reading it are likely the diligent ones that don't need to be told anyway.

Can we focus on the question of why this clearance for what seems to be a few minutes of transition was denied and thusly this last safety net that could have prevented this and other accidents in the future failed? If we can ignore the other parts we can't really fix and focus on this question then we can get to the heart of trying to find solutions for the future.

[Sunfish]

I agree with you Lookleft, safety is an attitude. I do all the things you mention religiously and try to apply common sense. It’s a pity that CASA, AsA and ATSB don’t appear to do the same.

‘’To put that another way, who trained that pilot? What was his attitude? Why was that his attitude? What series of errors caused the accident? It’s never one thing like “missing a BFR’ there is always more to it. However the ATSB is unlikely to delve deep enough because I suspect the answer would be unpalatable.

[le Pingouin]

The controller was an early phase trainee so it's hard to label it a systemic issue. "Workload" is a somewhat personal perception - he may have been preoccupied with thinking of other issues he perceived to be more important, got flustered & chose the easy solution of denying a clearance. Was there any indication to the controller that this course of action would be in any way dangerous? I very much doubt it. Trainees in any field often choose less than optimal solutions, provide a less than ideal service & just plain screw up, it's all part of the learning process. The instructor probably saw it as a minor inconvenience for the pilot that wasn't unsafe so didn't intervene - to be discussed later.

Why didn't the pilot simply deviate around the airspace? He'd deviate around weather so why is this any different? Or would that have presented a problem for this pilot as well?

P.S. it was "C" the pilot was denied the clearance for.

[jonkster]

Here's my question to the masses here that doesn't seem to have been actually answered so far, WHY was this Pilot denied a clearance through Class D Airspace in this circumstance? And No, I don't think "Workload" in this case is a valid reason and seems to be some kind of coverall being used.


As I read it he wasn't denied a clearance through D. The D controller offered a VFR clearance but at 1000' (I assume due cloud - the controller cannot offer a clearance if it would put a VFR aircraft in cloud so offered a clearance that would keep him VMC). I interpreted it as the D controller trying to appropriately accomodate the request by the pilot.

It was the C controller who didn't give the clearance (why he was talking to the D controller). I agree it probably would have ended differently had a clearance in C been given and the denial is a factor and should be addressed.

However the pilot still (IMO) bears a larger responsibility, being denied a clearance should not have been a big deal - a prudent diversion should also have resulted in a safe outcome - or even some polite negotiation ("eg is there an alternative clearance available at a different altitude or track or can I hold until clearance will become available? I need to avoid weather"). The pilot seemed to have had a strong case of push-on-itis which is sadly one very repeated cause of VFR->IMC->accident since aviation began.

As far as no flight review goes - seems more a symptom than a cause. I doubt a recent FR would have changed much for this accident but by avoiding it that raises (to me) a red flag about the pilot's attitude which I do think is a significant factor in the accident.

We all (I assume) agree accidents have multiple causes and establishing them and looking at ways of mitigating them helps improve safety - little can be done to change the pilot's actions in this case however certainly worth asking about any reluctance to give clearances and if this is a problem and if it can be handled better.

[Sunfish]

Am I right in thinking that a pilot cleared through airspace at a thousand feet would assume that such a flight path at that level was safe? If it wasn’t, what is the point of having ATC if you are not RPT heavy iron?

This dovetails with the class E paper, ADSB, and airspace reform? What responsibility for the mangalore midair? What’s the point if AsA does not take any responsibility the ATSB always blames the pilot and CASA helpfully catalogues all the regulations the pilot broke?

What happens when the non rpt pilot population perhaps one day decides that the regulations are a joke, enforcement is a joke, AsA is a joke and the ATSB is a joke? If we do not have a consistent set of regulations that are grounded in good airmanship, enforced fairly, an ATC system and airspace design that is both efficient, safe and equitable and an ATSB that reports without fear or favor we are asking for trouble.

[andrewr]

being denied a clearance should not have been a big deal - a prudent diversion should also have resulted in a safe outcome

He had a good second option. He could divert 5 miles right of track and avoid the CTA while remaining at cruising altitude. He had turned right, it appears that is what he was doing.

However, he had requested clearance 4 times bouncing between 2 different controllers. Perhaps when the Class D controller came back with "at or below 1000 feet" he didn't feel like he could say "You know what, I don't need clearance after all." Perhaps he felt obligated to accept what he understood to be a clearance and descend.

[Arm out the window]

Not saying airspace and controllers didn't contribute to the tragic outcome, but put yourselves in the pilot's position - any VFR pilot knows he has to maintain, if not AIP stated vis and distance from cloud conditions to the metre or foot, at least a decent bit of clear airspace out front to continue into and, let's hope, room to turn around if it clags in too much. The investigators found that the aircraft was descending clean in a straight line with cruise power set, not weaving around as you would if you were trying to scud run under low stratus through some hills. I cannot visualise a situation where as a VFR pilot I'd descend into, if not cloud, then at least conditions of such reduced visibility that I couldn't see far enough in front of me to know whether or not there was anything to hit, can you? - and he must have known there was cumulo granite there, surely.

[Capn Bloggs]

The controllers are copping some flak here because there was no traffic. What about the scenario where there was a conflicting aircraft on descent into Coffs? As others have said, you've got to be ready for the worst.

What happens when the non rpt pilot population perhaps one day decides that the regulations are a joke, enforcement is a joke, AsA is a joke and the ATSB is a joke?
Precisely what VFR in Class E is all about. Just go and do your own thing, don't concern yourself with anybody else. They will (probably) keep out of your way. :cool:

[Ixixly]

The controller was an early phase trainee so it's hard to label it a systemic issue. "Workload" is a somewhat personal perception - he may have been preoccupied with thinking of other issues he perceived to be more important, got flustered & chose the easy solution of denying a clearance. Was there any indication to the controller that this course of action would be in any way dangerous? I very much doubt it. Trainees in any field often choose less than optimal solutions, provide a less than ideal service & just plain screw up, it's all part of the learning process. The instructor probably saw it as a minor inconvenience for the pilot that wasn't unsafe so didn't intervene - to be discussed later.

Why didn't the pilot simply deviate around the airspace? He'd deviate around weather so why is this any different? Or would that have presented a problem for this pilot as well?

P.S. it was "C" the pilot was denied the clearance for.

What was it during his training that made him decide that it would be better to take the easy way out and deny the clearance though? Nothing takes away from the Pilots responsibility in this but I don't believe there is anything that can be changed to Pilots training syllabus or requirements, in general, to address this issue unless we're going to start denying Licences based on perceived "Poor Attitude" either during their training or AFR, even then clearly this person wasn't able to legally fly and chose to, as such no real changes there I think would have affected that part of the flight at all.

This is the problem in these discussions, we're so focused on the minutiae instead of actually discussing the relevant parts that could be fixed for the future. In this case, the Pilot is dead, we can't pick his brains to figure out exactly why he chose to make the decisions that he did and I don't believe any changes to regulations would prevent this from happening. What we do have are the Controllers who were on that day and whose brains we can pick to see why they made their decision and what can be done in the future to enable them to make different decisions and instead all we're getting is "Workload", I don't think this is good enough. This isn't about just one incident either, I'm sure we've all been in situations where clearance was denied with 0 traffic around and no particular reason that we can see, but the thing is there HAS to be a reason why, was there something else happening in the background? Was that controller overloaded with other sectors? Did they just decide not to because they didn't have to and decided that was good enough? I think the fact that a lot of Pilots don't really trust the ATC system in this regard means that the trust is very reduced and more needs to be done to at some level to restore that. Flight Instructors, ASA Instructors, Controllers, Pilots, Ground Handlers, CASA and everyone else involved in Aviation are part of the safety net from start to finish, when there is an incident there isn't always much that can be done and focusing on the things that can't be fixed doesn't help anyone at all.

[jonkster]

Am I right in thinking that a pilot cleared through airspace at a thousand feet would assume that such a flight path at that level was safe? If it wasn’t, what is the point of having ATC if you are not RPT heavy iron?


I assume it would have been safe if he was there, he never got into that airspace, he was in G airspace, he descended into what I am assuming must have been IMC and unaware of what was outside, into the ground well before he got to the airspace.

You are responsible for maintaining VMC in G, in this case, while in G he flew into cloud.

The pilot may have been mentally overloaded or unsure of procedures which is tragic and if there may be systems/procedures we can put into place to reduce the chance of such problems leading to catastrophe, (should a pilot be overloaded and out of their depth), they should be investigated but we are supposed to be trained and operate to a standard where flying VFR, we do not deliberately enter IMC.

Would you fly into cloud to make the requirements for an upcoming clearance? Surely you wouldn't. This pilot did. The failure to get his requested clearance was a factor but similar things happen daily without it leading to catastrophe because pilots take appropriate courses of action to work around it. This pilot didn't. Why? We cannot know for certain, and while I think ATC actions were factors the pilot's choice to proceed into IMC was a major factor.

Saying he must have felt he had to do it to comply with ATC even if it meant descending into cloud seems like a problem more at the pilot's end of the spectrum rather than ATCs, to me. That may include his training or perhaps his age/cognitive state.

[le Pingouin]

Ixixly, how about training pilots to always have a plan B?

Controllers are trained to say "no" as part of ensuring workload remains manageable, it's part of the job because if the workload exceeds your ability to handle you're no longer in control. You don't just say "yes" without considering the consequences - a random unannounced flight presents a challenge because you need to work out where they are & how you'll separate. You don't just make it up as you go along but continually plan.

There will always be situations where a controller will say "no", there is no way of avoiding that. As I mentioned, airspace is just another obstacle to be avoided if a clearance is denied, no different to weather or terrain, so treat it as such.

[Squawk7700]

This is what I had been thinking after reading the report again:

- The pilot was tracking from Murwillumbah to Taree and for the most part, the track was exactly that.
- The fact that he asked for a clearance to enter Class C was merely as he was going to pass through a small chunk of airspace and it would have been convenient.
- He gets bounced around and annoyed with ATC so comes up with another plan.
- He reports as ‘currently 4100 in clear and we’re OCTA' as you would expect with an update as he exited their airspace to do his own thing.
- He climbs back to 4,500ft for 5-6 minutes to remain hemispherically correct.
- Based on the track, he clearly has no intention of entering Class-D at 1,000ft or below as he'd have to turn 45 degrees left, a long way off track and may be over solid cloud at this time. Why would you, as he can't get down?
- He recalls that the cloud base is 2000-3000ft after witnessing it out of Murwillumbah.
("At the time of the incident the region was covered in widespread broken low cloud. With bases generally between 2000 - 3000ft above mean sea level")
- He checks the GPS and looks ahead knowing that past Mount Moombil area, that the terrain is very low and will likely be well clear of cloud.
- A controlled descent begins through cloud. ("The descent rate averaged about 850 ft per minute with a groundspeed between 165 kt and 175 kt") - this does not sound like an out-of-control descent as testified by the previous owner of the aircraft.
- Impact at 2,900ft.
- Had the descent begun only a couple of miles later, he would have missed the mountain completely and been in clear skies at 2000-3000ft.


BUT..... then I looked on the map and realised that he still had 90 nautical miles remaining!
Once I realised that, his actions made no sense, except for if he believed that the cloud ahead was worse than what he was currently experiencing and he needed to be under it.

The rest of his actions aside from the descent all made perfect sense and when you look at the airspace versus his track, then you can hardly blame ATC for such a tiny part of a bigger picture.


https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/546x634/map2_ceb125f9082d6569f29b7143d294f0f125bed14d.png

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/311x407/map5_bc16e076a90528f1f78005cc5963cea1dfd76c00.png

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/743x1015/map7_f76767c571cfc9104eedc862d255dabc3f37045d.png

[andrewr]

Based on the track, he clearly has no intention of entering Class-D at 1,000ft or below as he'd have to turn 45 degrees left, a long way off track and may be over solid cloud at this time.

He has Class D in the step ahead of him. I suspect the GPS didn't give an easy indication of the exact altitudes of the steps, just that they were there.
I think the Class D in front of him, on track was what he thought he had been told to transit at or below 1000'.

[junior.VH-LFA]

A “clearance to descend” (if that’s how it was interpreted) does not imply that the pilot was allowed to descend below 1000ft in IMC in a VFR aircraft.

There seems to be two mindsets commenting in this thread:

a) those that think the clearance (or lack of) was a contributing factor
b) those that know that want to blame Airservices regardless of any other information that’s put infront of them.

[Squawk7700]

He has Class D in the step ahead of him. I suspect the GPS didn't give an easy indication of the exact altitudes of the steps, just that they were there.
I think the Class D in front of him, on track was what he thought he had been told to transit at or below 1000'.

He appears to be lined up with the 3,500ft step with Mt Gladstone at 2,504ft and 1,200ft+ terrain after that, so it seems incomprehensible that he would think he needed to be below 1,000ft and make it through. He only needed to be around 10nm right of track to avoid all of this hassle and stay up there for the next 80 miles and into clear skies. By the time he got there (to the class D) he would have been in 10k+ vis and would have realised it couldn’t be done.

Also, the Class C clearance was denied for the northern sectors, but what about the southern sectors... where is the transcript ASA and what was actually said, not a vetted summary?

If he was descending in cloud in an attempt to get to 1,000ft in order to comply with a direction from ATC some 90 miles from the destination, it simply doesn’t compute.

I feel like he’s gone on his own with his own descent to avoid CTA completely. It’s not uncommon, especially when you get multiple knock-backs.

[VH-MLE]

Post #190 by Lookleft sums it up well in my opinion.

Having read the report, it seems fairly clear the PIC demonstrated a poor attitude to his role as PIC. This attitude not only claimed his life, but that of his son too. The view that a lack of a clearance being available was a significant factor in this accident is ridiculous. I'm no fan of AirServices, however it's not their role to fly the aircraft - that's the PIC's job!

There's a well documented list of hazardous attitudes (on pilot decision making) & this pilot seems to have had at least one or more of them.

[TwoFiftyBelowTen]

I wonder if the tower meant to be proposing 1,000 ft coastal. I wonder if that crucial word was missed.. or missing?

[McLimit]

What about the scenario where there was a conflicting aircraft on descent into Coffs? As others have said, you've got to be ready for the worst.

Inbound IFR aircraft do not just 'pop up.' That's not how an ATC system works. They are known about well in advance through co-ordination from the previous controller. The Tower also gets a departure message from the AFTN network.

There is a culture of 'clearance not available' to VFR aircraft in Australian ATC. It's ingrained from day one of ATC training.

[Dick Smith]

I have written to the ATSB requesting they make available the full transcript.

In the interests of transparency and safety they should not keep it secret.

I wonder if the controller has other class G workload that has not been mentioned in the report?

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick, good for you. I too asked for the actual calls made during an incident that was published a few years ago. After a bit of tooing and froing, I was eventually ignored. Not good enough.

[On eyre]

Post #190 by Lookleft sums it up well in my opinion.

Having read the report, it seems fairly clear the PIC demonstrated a poor attitude to his role as PIC. This attitude not only claimed his life, but that of his son too. The view that a lack of a clearance being available was a significant factor in this accident is ridiculous. I'm no fan of AirServices, however it's not their role to fly the aircraft - that's the PIC's job!

There's a well documented list of hazardous attitudes (on pilot decision making) & this pilot seems to have had at least one or more of them.

What he said exactly.

[Ironpot]

If a vfr aircraft comes through my airspace below 3000ft, they will drop off radar at certain points and I cannot seperate IFR aircraft inbound or outbound. No approaches for at least minutes 10-15 minutes... If I don't have Arrivals I give the clearance away. If I do I won't. Or should I let every big smasher through and hold 3 jets? How much delay would you feel happy with? A few hundred people for 15 minutes or the vfr takes the long way around four an extra 10 minutes of flight time?

If he had filed a VFR flightplan, would that have helped ?
I envisage ATC would have had an indication of his intentions much earlier and had a heads-up.
What difference if any would flight following have made?

[Arm out the window]

AIP ENR says that VFR flights intending to operate in CTA must submit flight details, with the preferred order of doing that being via NAIPS, then in writing, then by phone, and last by radio. It also says you should submit details at least 30 minutes before you expect to enter controlled airspace, and that 'Flight details submitted with less than the 30 minutes notification may be subject to delay.' Some places won't even let you in as a matter of course if you haven't submitted a plan.

If you don't customarily put plans in then using NAIPS can be a confusing and slow process, but once you get used to it, it's a doddle and just takes a minute or two to put a VFR plan in. You can choose whether you want to do that or not, but it's very probably going to make your life easier.

[Lead Balloon]

One of the more eye-opening experiences I've had over the decades was going for a jolly with an ATCer, in and and out of a capital city CTR, in his lighty. He was a friend of a friend and I wanted to hire his aircraft for a trip.

Amazing how flexible the system was for a call sign whose owner was known by the folks behind the Airservices mics. Simply amazing...

After that, I did a lot more submission of departure and inbound details by radio, and continue to do so, when that's convenient to me. I take the - perhaps naively quaint - view that a government organisation with "service" in its name and sends bills should give me the same level of service as one of its employees in the same operational circumstances.

"Some places won't even let you in as a matter of course if you haven't submitted a plan." Which just goes to show, and has become evident to me over the decades, that differences of outcome in like circumstances are sometimes the result of the personalities, pet peeves and local normalised deviations of those in the system.

Someone usually pipes up and says the people concerned could have been coordinating with other sectors or dealing with other aircraft with plan in the system or dealing with a bee-sting or heart attack, and that apparent different treatment in like circumstances is because the circumstances were actually different. Great: Let's hear what the differences actually were. I do not want to know what the Controller/s involved could have been doing; I want to know what they were actually doing, and why the clearance was actually unavailable. Two sentences.

The Mooney pilot in this tragedy did some stuff that I have never done and, touch wood, would hopefully not choose to do in the future. But, has already been pointed out, there's no explanation of the "why" the requested clearance into C was refused. That simply invites negative speculation about the ATC system and ATSB's motivations.

The failure to make the raw recordings of comms in ATSB reports is, in my view, inexecusable and, again, merely invites speculation about ATSB's motivations.

ATSB - like some in this thread - have no concern about throwing pilots under the bus. One wonders how the ANSP and regulator have reached operational perfection, when they are chronically dysfunctional organisations from a human resources management perspective.

[andrewr]

I want to know what they were actually doing, and why the clearance was actually unavailable.

That is one thing that is actually in the report:

At the time of the Class C clearance request, there was no other traffic below 10,000 ft in the Coffs Harbour airspace, nor were there any impending arrivals or departures during the time the aircraft would have transited the airspace. Within the remaining airspace being managed by the trainee and OJTI, there were five other aircraft being provided an air traffic service. Additionally, in the minute prior to receiving the request from VH-DJU, the trainee had completed handling a flight following request from a VFR aircraft.

[Lead Balloon]

Your reading skills are evidently better than mine, andrew. That's just the what they were doing, not why doing that prevented the grant of the clearance.

[andrewr]

There is more

the trainee assessed that workload and priorities would not permit a clearance at the requested level
...
The OJTI assessed that the workload at the time of the clearance request was low, but the trainee being new to the role may have perceived the workload as higher. The OJTI also stated that while the trainee’s decision was conservative, it was appropriate
...
performance assessment reports and daily training records included debriefing and coaching comments emphasising to trainees and controllers to be cautious with issuing clearances below A080 through the [Coffs Harbour] airspace

One thing that I find interesting is that a trainee in their first week would be so quick to deny a clearance to a VFR aircraft. And it obviously did not come as a suggestion from the supervisor. They are being trained to deny VFR clearances.

[le Pingouin]

We're trained to say "no" to many things if it will or may increase workload to a potentially risky level, doesn't matter if you're VFR or IFR. Direct tracking, tracking inbound across outbound routes, block clearance, airwork in the middle of arrival routes, etc & so forth. Not because we're lazy but because we have to be on top of the traffic & can't risk things getting too busy.

[Lookleft]

LB- No one has thrown the pilot under the bus, he quite deliberately walked out in front of it with his eyes only for the other side of the road. Even the simple act of crossing the road requires certain prerequisites to ensure a safe crossing. Ignore them or disregard them at your own peril.

[Lead Balloon]

I was speaking in more general terms about ATSB reports, LL. You know that.

But even in this case, I can understand why the communications with ATC may have confused the pilot into believing it was OK to fly at 1,000' or below on the track he ended up on. Whilst the pilot should have known the bus was coming, so should have ATC. Only in the Orwellian world of Australian aviation 'safety' can it make sense that there wasn't an added sentence in the ATC comms: "By the way, if you fly at 1,000' AMSL or below over there you're probably going to hit a mountain and die."

Centre seems to me to be able spend time telling IFR aircraft about blips and SSR returns miles separated but converging in G (which is why it isn't real G in Australia), and a lot of time telling blips and SSR returns in G that they are getting close ("two aircraft in vicinity of X. safety alert"). And it's great that that happens. But somehow it's OK for ATC to wash it hands on 'below 1,000' 'guidance' - or whatever that comms was meant to mean - because terrain clearance always remains the VFR pilot's responsibility?

"We're trained to say "no" to many things if it will or may increase workload to a potentially risky level ...". And there it is. We know who judges the potential. And, of course, there is no judgment of whether saying "no" merely moves the "potentially risky level" to an "actually higher risk level", because that's "someone else's" responsibility. And, on the basis of my experience, the outcome would have been different if the callsign had been an ATC mate's aircraft.

This is why in some places and times some grumpy arsehole will presumptively say 'no' to any 'pop up' request for clearance, no matter how busy or idle he is, because .... well, because he can and those pesky pilots should be taught that the AIP means what it says (the relevant provisions having, of course, been written by Airservices), but in other places it's obvious the person is trying his or her best to fit you in. That 'attitude' is felt and means something in some cockpits.

[Lead Balloon]

[T]he trainee assessed that workload and priorities would not permit a clearance at the requested level.

That's OK then.

Trainee: I'm just a trainee, this is getting complicated for me and I've been trained to say "no" in these circumstances.

Supervisor: Well done!

[Cloudee]

We're trained to say "no" to many things if it will or may increase workload to a potentially risky level, doesn't matter if you're VFR or IFR. Direct tracking, tracking inbound across outbound routes, block clearance, airwork in the middle of arrival routes, etc & so forth. Not because we're lazy but because we have to be on top of the traffic & can't risk things getting too busy.

Of course every time someone gets a “no” it costs someone money, or in this case the ATSB has stated the “no” was a factor in the death of two people. I wonder if management at ASA collect data on the number of “nos” generated by their employees or just collect bonuses for cutting numbers of employees.

[VH-MLE]

The one I really feel for in this mess is the wife & mother of the pilot & his trusting passenger i.e. her son (+ any other close family members & friends).

I'm reminded of the statement from one of the pioneers of the early days of aviation: “Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect”. Obviously, nothing seems to have changed in respect of this accident...

[Lookleft]

I was speaking in more general terms about ATSB reports, LL. You know that.

Sorry LB I missed the nuance in your post as it did refer to this thread

ATSB - like some in this thread - have no concern about throwing pilots under the bus.

I take your point about whether a clearance would have been available had the trainee or the OTJI had known the pilot behind the call sign. Its an unfortunate aspect of human nature that mates are treated differently to others. Its not just ATC however. How many policeman have been let off a speeding fine with a nod and a wink. Someone I know is more likely to get the jump seat than a random from the Group.

The ability to just say no is also available to the pilot. Words like "negative" "unable" and "require" are all in the vocab and can be used by pilots of all levels. It took me three times on one occasion before the Departures Controller understood I was not going to take the tracking instruction that would take me and my 180 passengers and crew through a cell. When I was a freshly minted NVFR PPL coming into Canberra in a 210 with pouring rain and wisps of cloud in the hills ATC wanted me to take a vector towards Black Mountain Tower. "Unable" was the reply. They then wanted me to do an orbit. "Unable" was the reply. They then gave me a CTL on 12.

That flight taught me a lot about who is in control. Checking my log book I had a grand total of 170 hours. The current system is neither safe or perfect as any time I fly into Ballina reminds me. As it stands though Ballina suits GA as there is no Tower, Coffs suits RPT as there is a Tower. Which is safer? It depends on your perspective. In both circumstances the pilot has to operate in the environment that they are not comfortable with and mitigate as far as possible any risks to their operation.

[le Pingouin]

Lead Balloon, we're not sitting in your aircraft so have absolutely now way of knowing what the view is like through your windscreen. You're flying an aircraft so the assumption is you're competent to do so & will advise if you're unable to comply with an instruction or need assistance. The pilot was in VMC when he initially requested clearance & would have remained so if he'd continued deviating right as he initially started doing. It would have added very little to his workload, no more than a deviation around a region of cloud would have.

The basis of your experience of a single flight with an ATC? Maybe, just maybe he applied a great deal of local knowledge to achieve the flight? Something a local operator would have as much knowledge of.

[Lead Balloon]

I confidently predict that we'd agree on the substance of most stuff, LL. It's the implementation that is the hard bit in the real world.

The key point you make is spot on:The ability to just say no is also available to the pilot. Words like "negative" "unable" and "require" are all in the vocab and can be used by pilots of all levels.Pounds to peanuts that no private pilot licence trainee ever gets to practise that often these days, even as a mock exercise in the cockpit.

[le Pingouin]

[T]he trainee assessed that workload and priorities would not permit a clearance at the requested level.

That's OK then.

Trainee: I'm just a trainee, this is getting complicated for me and I've been trained to say "no" in these circumstances.

Supervisor: Well done!

Yes it is okay. Or are you arguing a trainee pilot initiating a go around because they aren't comfortable should be criticised as well?

[andrewr]

Pilots like to read a report and find something they would not have done so they can rationalize "That wouldn't happen to me." But it's not a controversial idea that accidents have a chain of causes that together led to the accident i.e the swiss cheese model.

The pilot's actions were analyzed in detail in the report. The Class C controller denying clearance was another link.

But I think there was confusion between the Class D controller and the pilot that was significant, and that wasn't examined well in the report.

If the Class D controller had been alert to the pilot reading back something that wasn't intended to be a clearance it might have avoided the accident. That should be as big a red flag as an incorrect read back.
If the Class D controller had been more specific about the clearance that was available, e.g. Woolgoolga - Bundagen Head at or below 1000 instead of just "at or below 1000 feet" the pilot might not have descended on track.

They weren't the only causes. But they seem significant enough to rate some examination.

[junior.VH-LFA]

Why would any clearance or instruction in any airspace warrant a VFR aircraft descending into IMC?

[andrewr]

Yes it is okay. Or are you arguing a trainee pilot initiating a go around because they aren't comfortable should be criticised as well?

There were zero other aircraft in the airspace and the transit would have been less then 3 minutes. At what point does it become unreasonable to claim it is getting complicated?

[Lead Balloon]

It's always clear as to which posters are in the ATC system and who ain't.

Le P:

A student pilot deciding to go around, as a consequence of his or her own training and decision making in the specific circumstances of that decision, are making a decision for which the student and his or her instructor are responsible.

An ATCer saying 'no' to a request for clearance is, apparently, responsible for nothing.

Junior:

We get your point. The pilot was obviously a complete idiot who just didn't know what he was doing.

Andrewr's question says it all.

[le Pingouin]

I don't disagree that on the surface it looks unreasonable but we have no idea what else was occurring. In the end it's up to the controller to make their own judgement & there will always be situations where "clearance not available" is an appropriate response. i.e. pilots have to plan for it. "Though shalt always issue a clearance" simply isn't possible.

As I keep saying it's no different to encountering weather or any other obstacle en route - you simply avoid it. Seriously, how is this any different?

[le Pingouin]

Lead Balloon, the controller had no control over the actions the pilot took. How can they be held responsible for his lack of airmanship? Or are you arguing that if I say "climb to 9,000ft" & the pilot stalls his aircraft & crashes then I as a controller am responsible?

[andrewr]

we have no idea what else was occurring

The report does go into some detail about what else was occurring.

Or are you arguing that if I say "climb to 9,000ft" & the pilot stalls his aircraft & crashes then I as a controller am responsible?

Are you saying it would not be a considered a problem if a controller issued an instruction to a VFR aircraft to descend below the level of terrain? Is that a common practice?

I am not saying the controller did that - I am saying there appears to be confusion and the pilot might have thought he was instructed to descend to 1000'.

[le Pingouin]

The controller who said "clearance not available" was the "C" controller - it's a totally separate issue to what the "D" controller did.

[Lead Balloon]

Lead Balloon, the controller had no control over the actions the pilot took. How can they be held responsible for his lack of airmanship? Or are you arguing that if I say "climb to 9,000ft" & the pilot stalls his aircraft & crashes then I as a controller am responsible?Gosh.

Just for transparency's sake, please declare that you have no involvement in this incident, either from a training or decision-making perspective, Le P.

You seem to me to be confusing - or perhaps (and sadly deliberately) obfuscating - a decision or instruction to do something, on the one hand, and the decision as to the way in which that thing is done on the other. And you may be confusing - or perhaps (and sadly deliberately) obfuscating - that which can be achieved safely (climbing to 9,000') and that which can never be achieved safely (tracking below 1,000' where the rocks are above that).

[andrewr]

The controller who said "clearance not available" was the "C" controller - it's a totally separate issue to what the "D" controller did.

That is true. "Clearance not available" was a minor issue, but it seems to have touched a nerve as it frustrates a lot of people.

I think the confusion with the Class D controller was the worse problem. The efforts in the report to deflect attention away from the controllers and the lack of a transcript make me wonder whether there was a much more serious problem with the controllers than we are aware of.

[Lead Balloon]

Confusion.

And for minimum post length reasons: Confusion.

[le Pingouin]

No involvement at all with the incident. I know nothing more than is in the report.

There are two separate aspects to the incident from the ATC perspective - the denial of clearance & 6,500ft, & what happened subsequently. The "C" controller who denied the clearance gave no level instruction & mentioned no other level to the pilot so any change in level is on the pilot or the other controller. Do you understand the differentiation? How does "clearance not available" indicate descend to 1,000ft? It could have been perfectly safely achieved by turning right 30 degrees for a few minutes.

Again I ask how is this any different to avoiding cloud?

[Squawk7700]

Put it into perspective and tell me if it's likely...

Old mate is cruising along at 6,500ft and can't get a clearance, so rather than deviate a few miles right of track, he contacts the D tower and misjudges what was offered, so descends on his current track, miles inland towards the mountains, down to 1,000ft where the mountains are 3,500ft high, whilst he still has well over 90 nautical miles to go to his destination.

At 90 miles to run, descending to 1,000ft to get under a tiny little airspace step that could be avoided seems very difficult to believe, doesn't it?

If I'm 90 miles out, descending to 1,000 ft would be the last possible option I would take, especially given that you'd likely want to climb back up again.

Passengers who had flown with the pilot reported that the pilot routinely used a Garmin Aera 500 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)6 unit carried in their lap. Aera 500 The Aera 500 unit carried by the pilot was not approved as a sole means of navigation. However, the unit did present useful information relating to the progress of the flight. This included topographical and airspace information. The unit had a terrain function that required a valid 3D GNSS position solution and a valid terrain and obstacle database to operate properly. Terrain information was advisory only and could include: • display of altitudes of terrain and obstructions relative to the aircraft’s altitude • pop-up terrain alert messages issued when flight conditions meet parameters set within the terrain system software algorithms • forward looking terrain avoidance alerts The ATSB recovered data from this unit indicating that it was in use at the time of the accident. However, it could not be established which mode was selected at the time of the accident or whether the terrain function was operable and the status of any user and system inhibitions.

I used to run a similar unit. Unless you specifically turned off the terrain warning, it pops up at 500 or 1,000ft depending on what you set it to.

That makes another unknown. He was definitely using this or another GPS (the GTN 650) and both have coloured map and potentially terrain alerts that have been completely missed.

Truly bizarre.

Garmin Aera 500
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/365x224/1459255482_garmin_20aera_20500_5cb3bce8c350918758ea10ec9818e d88431b735f.jpg



Garmin GTN650
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/600x400/650xi_c5e0551d96dd2365c2b14c2710da966187b8d1ed.jpg

[junior.VH-LFA]

This thread is the equivalent of a car speeding through a red light and crashing in the middle of the intersection and then focusing on why the light was red.

For the sake of balance, there are serious questions that need to be answered about ASA's level of service to VFR aircraft, particularly in light of the recent proposal to lower Class E to 1500ft. I do not deny that at all, I've fallen victim to it like everyone else seems to have, but oh boy oh boy this accident is NOT the starting argument you're looking for to justify a series of changes at ASA.

You absolutely can and should look at ATC as a factor here, but it is beyond ridiculous to blame them for what the PIC elected to do here.

[Ixixly]

Ixixly, how about training pilots to always have a plan B?

Controllers are trained to say "no" as part of ensuring workload remains manageable, it's part of the job because if the workload exceeds your ability to handle you're no longer in control. You don't just say "yes" without considering the consequences - a random unannounced flight presents a challenge because you need to work out where they are & how you'll separate. You don't just make it up as you go along but continually plan.

There will always be situations where a controller will say "no", there is no way of avoiding that. As I mentioned, airspace is just another obstacle to be avoided if a clearance is denied, no different to weather or terrain, so treat it as such.

Let me put it this way le pingouin, point to a specific way in which a Pilots training can be changed to ensure Pilots are always trained to have a Plan B? IMHO, you can't, there's simply no easy way to put that into regulation or a tick box to make sure they'll always do that so why even bother looking at this aspect? It's been identified that bad decisions were made here and they didn't do enough prep from the beginning. We also don't know if he had a Plan B or not, we can't ask because he's dead, we don't know his mindset or why he made the decisions he made, we can only make educated guesses based on very little information which makes it even hard to find deficiencies that can be rectified and even then those deficiencies would mean locating the people involved in his training and ensuring they don't train anyone else that way if they even still train anyone which all things considered is probably unlikely.

On the other hand, we DO have the ATC involved on the day, we CAN pick their brains to figure out why they decided not to give this clearance and then we CAN figure out if there is a way to make it easier for ATC in the future, to do something that seems like it should have been relatively easy to do. The persons that have trained this ATC are almost certainly still in the organisation and teaching others so we can much more easily rectify any deficiencies that may exist in the way they're teaching others and disseminate that information across to everyone for the future.

[le Pingouin]

But you're never going to be able to totally eliminate "clearance not available", so there will always be a need for pilots to action. Saying "no" must be a tool that's available to controllers. Trainees get flustered & bugger things up & do things a rated controller wouldn't do. That's just the nature of training. His denying a clearance was a minor contribution.

How hard is it to train pilots that if they're intending to request a clearance that they need a contingency plan in case they're knocked back? You have plan Bs for every phase of flight - abort the take-off, avoid that large patch of cloud, go around to avoid that cow. How hard is it to ask the trainee pilot to explain & implement what they'll do if denied a clearance?

[Checkboard]

Being bounced back and forth between the two controllers four times would have been confusing and annoying, though.

[Sunfish]

So CASA and by association AsA get to micromanage aviation to the point of requiring a calibrated torque wrench on a tire cap, breath test, ramp check, medically inspect and comb youtube and logbooks for infractions, yet claim no responsibility for the actions of a pilot?

This is crazy! Pilots are products of the Aviation environment in which they operate. Crappy environment = crappy decisions.

There is much evidence, in the form of government review after review, that the Australian Aviation environment is toxic to good decision making.

FFS, if Glen Buckley is to be believed, look what CASA did to an organisation, APTA, and its owner, Glen, who were in the process of improving flight training to comply with all CASA dictats.

[andrewr]

How hard is it to train pilots that if they're intending to request a clearance that they need a contingency plan in case they're knocked back?

It's wrong to say he didn't have a plan B.

Plan B was simple - deviate right to go around the CTA at cruising level. He was following that plan.

The question is why did he turn back on track and descend, after he had indicated that he wanted to stay at 6500?

[Squawk7700]

It's wrong to say he didn't have a plan B.

Plan B was simple - deviate right to go around the CTA at cruising level. He was following that plan.

The question is why did he turn back on track and descend, after he had indicated that he wanted to stay at 6500?

Exactly what I have been wondering and why the transcripts would be handy!

That fateful decision was about plan F in the ranking, not plan B.